infrastructure management: public and private roles

36
Infrastructure Management: Public and private roles Céline Kauffmann, Senior Economist Regulatory Policy Division Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate OECD PERQ-OECD WORKSHOP ENHANCING REGULATORY QUALITY: INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND SOLUTIONS FOR VIETNAM Hanoi, October 2011

Upload: others

Post on 03-Feb-2022

1 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Infrastructure Management: Public and private roles

Céline Kauffmann,

Senior Economist

Regulatory Policy Division

Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate

OECD

PERQ-OECD WORKSHOP ENHANCING REGULATORY QUALITY: INTERNATIONAL

EXPERIENCE AND SOLUTIONS FOR VIETNAM Hanoi, October 2011

1 Infrastructure needs

4 OECD Policy Support

2 Private investment in Infrastructure: key facts

3 Making it work: lessons from international experience

Vietnam investment needs

• Ministry of Planning & Investment: investment capital needed to develop essential infrastructure systems is around $15 to 16bn/year. Available capital satisfies only 50-60% of this demande.

• High level of public infrastructure investment (some 10% of GDP)…

• …but important inefficiencies: poor master planning and project design & selection (financially non-viable projects), poor management and supervision capacity, burdensome regulation (procedures & time), questionable investors protection.

• Particular concerns: transport (roads and ports), and electricity .

Infrastructure score (ranking in brackets / 142)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6

Malaysia

Thailand

China

Indonesia

India

Vietnam

Philippines 105

90

89

76

44

42

26

Source: 2011 WEF Global Competitiveness Report

Quality of infrastructure (ranking / 142)

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140

Quality of overall infrastructure

Quality of roads

Quality of railroads

Quality of ports

Quality of air transport

Quality of electricity supply

Source: 2011 WEF Global Competitiveness Report

Private investment in infrastructure (1990-2010)

0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000

China

Philippines

Malaysia

Indonesia

Thailand

Lao

Vietnam

Cambodia

Source: World Bank PPI database

Private investment projects in Vietnam (1994-2010)

49%

3% 12%

3%

3%

21%

9%

Number of Projects

Electricity

Natural Gas

Telecom

Airports

Roads

Seaports

Treatment plant

Source: World Bank PPI database

25%

19% 33%

0%

2%

16%

5%

Total Investment

Types of private investment projects (1994-2010)

Source: World Bank PPI database

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

Energy Telecom Transport Water and sewerage

Management and lease contract

BOT for new facilities

Divestiture

Concession

1 Infrastructure needs

4 OECD Policy Support

2 Private Investment in infrastructure: key facts

3 Making it work: lessons from international experience

Key facts – Although public ownership and management remain the

norm, most countries have had some experience with involving the private sector in financing and managing infrastructure, with in some instances mixed results.

– Massive infrastructure investment needs coupled with budget constraints make PS involvement an attractive option for governments.

– Increasing competition across countries and sectors to attract private investors.

– Increasing diversity of private actors: emergence of regional players, new businesses, mixed companies.

– Diversity of risk-sharing arrangements from full private to full public ownership, depending on levels & nature of risks.

Infrastructure investment through PPPs in OECD

(2010)

Range N Country

0% - 5% 10 Austria, Germany, Canada, Denmark, France, Lithuania, Netherlands, Hungary, Norway, Spain

>5% - 10% 7 United Kingdom, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Greece, Italy, South Africa, Ireland

>10% - 15% 2 Korea, New South Wales

>15% - 20% 0

>20% 2 Mexico, Chile

Total 21

Diversity: the case of WWS (% of pop)

% PSP Water % PSP Sewerage

Austria 7 0

Belgium 3 10

France 74 Veolia: 39% - Suez: 19%

55 Veolia: 26% - Suez: 18%

Germany 21 (RWE: 16%) 18

Hungary 29 27

Italy 40 (ACEA: 16%) 29

Lithuania 0 0

Netherlands 0 10

Norway 6 0

Poland 3 3

Sweden 1 1

Switzerland 0 0

UK 88 (> 17 private utilities)

90

Sources: Pinsent Masons Water Yearbook 2009-2010, Veolia, Suez, ACEA, RWE

Recent market entrants, ex from water

Categories Examples

Emergence of local players • Manila Water

Diversification into water of co with core business elsewhere. Boosted by dynamism of BOT in treatment plants, concerns over resource scarcity.

• Desalinisation projects (GE, Siemens). Trading companies offering treatment systems, developing integrated services (Hyflux). • Increased involvement by construction firms and big users such as beverage and mining companies (Nestlé, Coke, Penoles)

Expansion by established water operators

• Local private operators taking over other projects internally or externally • Public companies acting in a commercial fashion and venturing into market (Vitens + Rand Water in Ghana, ONEP in Cameroon).

Joint venture: Combining public & private capacities

Saltillo (Mexico) - SIMAS is a mixed company constituted by the municipality & Agbar.

Graduation of small-scale APWO (Uganda)

Source: OECD (2009), Private Sector Participation in Water Infrastructure,

OECD Checklist for Public Action.

Contractual arrangements (Gov/Private)

Service contract

Management contract

Affermage / Lease

Concession BOT Joint

venture Divestiture

Asset ownership

G G G G P/G G/P P

Capital investment

G G G P P G/P P

Commercial risk

G G Shared P P G/P P

Operations / Maintenanc

G/P P P P P G/P P

Contract duration

1-2 yrs 3-5 yrs 8-15 yrs 25-30 yrs 20-30 yrs Infinite Infinite

Source of retribution of operator

Municip

Municip: fee is fixed or based on

performance

Operator collects user fees. Lease:

municip. pays fee.

Afferm: rev. shared

Users Municip. Users Users

Occurrence 1991-2009

(WB PPI Database)

Not part of scope

Together: 111 of 715 projects

278 of 715 projects

294 of 715

projects

Not a separate category

32 of 715 projects

Complexity of infrastructure sectors

Capital intensive, high fixed costs, long-

term investments, technology-specific,

inelastic demand, low returns and important

asymmetry of information.

Monopolistic

Essential for life

Basic need, important externalities on

health, gender equality and environment.

Essential input for business.

Risky Commercial risk, contractual risk, forex risk,

sub-sovereign risk, risk of capture by

vested interest.

Many stakeholders and

segmentation

Public sector, communities, users,

employees, private sector, donors, NGOs.

Responsibilities split between ministries &

across national, regional & local authorities.

Argument for PPPs

• Private sector has greater incentive and ability to manage infrastructure & deliver services cost effectively.

• Private sector brings the attention to cost recovery, which may encourage faster construction and better continued maintenance over the contract life of the assets

Weaker arguments:

• Fiscal constraint coupled with

• Perceived infrastructure deficits inhibiting growth

1 Infrastructure needs

4 OECD policy support

2 Private Investment in infrastructure: key facts

3 Making it work: lessons from international experience

G

“Good” environment for PPPs

“Good” contracts

Incentive Risk-

sharing Value for

money

Institutional

framework

Macroeconomic

stability Legal & regulatory

framework Competition

Making private participation work

1. Ground the selection of PPPs in “value for money”

2. Building institutional capacity at all levels of government to ensure value for money – role of PPP units.

3. Competent, well-resourced regulatory authorities

4. Financial sustainability over the life cycle of projects

5. Affordability for government: integrity and transparency of budget process

Overarching good principles

1- Assessing value-for-money • a complete cost-benefit analysis of all alternative

provisions methods available to both the government and the private sector (most complex)

• calculation of a public sector comparator before the bidding process to assess whether or not public-private partnerships in general offer better value-for-money (e.g. South Africa)

• calculation of a public sector comparator after the bidding process to assess whether or not a particular public-private partnership bid offers better value-for-money

• the use of competitive bidding process alone without a comparison between public and private provision methods (e.g. France).

21

Risk Distribution is key for VFM

Source: E. Farquharson, PartnershipsUK

Govern

men

t Pri

vate

Secto

r

Design & construction

Service provision

Maintenance & renewal

Quality of service

Volume

Force majeure

Obsolescence

Regulation/policy

Design & construction

Service provision

Maintenance & renewal

Quality of service

Volume

Public Procurement PPP

Force majeure

Obsolescence

Regulation/policy

Types of PPP arrangements vary depending on degree of involvement (and risk sharing) of private sector

Mapping forms of PS involvement

Publicly owned, financed & operated

Publicly owned & financed; operated by the PS

Publicly owned & regulated; financed & operated by PS

Owned, financed & operated by PS; regulated by the public

Fully subsidized Project cash flows Generates profit

Massive capex Investment requirement Min capex Fre

e r

igh

ts

P

ub

lic p

erc

ep

tio

n S

erv

ice p

aid

for

S

ocia

l eq

uity

perc

ep

tion

Source: Adapted from William Streeter (2011). The quest for sustainable infrastructure finance

2 – Catalysing expertise: PPP Unit

Organisation set up with full or partial government aid to ensure necessary capacity within government to create, support and evaluate multiple PPP agreements.

Table 0.1. Is there a dedicated public-private partnership unit at the

national level?

Number of countries

Countries

Yes 17 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, United Kingdom

No 12 Austria, Finland, Iceland, Luxembourg, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Slovak Republic, United States

Note: No data for Turkey.

Arguments for setting up a unit

• Pooling expertise and experience within government,

• Appropriate budgetary consideration of projects

• Standardisation of procurement procedures

• Separation of policy formulation and project implementation

• Demonstrating political commitment and trust.

The location of PPP units

Three models of dedicated PPP units:

1. Locate it within the regular departmental structure of the Ministry of Finance (UK, Victoria [Australia] and South Africa).

2. Locate it as an independent government agency that collaborates with a secretariat in the finance ministry (or equivalent).

3. Locate it in an individual line ministry that is predisposed in its functions to use PPP, such as an infrastructure ministry.

Functions

• Policy guidance on content of legislation; eligible

sectors & PPP methods; project procurement & implementation processes; procedures for conflict resolution.

• In some cases (UK, Victoria, South Africa), green lighting projects. In Germany & Korea, the Ministry

of Finance fulfils this role, because the unit is independent.

• Technical support to government organisations

during the various stages of project identification, evaluation, procurement, contract management.

• Capacity building including training to public sector

officials interested or engaged in PPPs.

Budget and staffing, 2009

Country Number of staff Approximate annual budget Funding source

Partnerships Germany 21 n/a User charges

PIMAC, Korea 77 KRW 17 065 million (EUR 9.56 million)

Government budget & user charges

PPP Policy Team, United Kingdom

13 No discrete budget Government budget

Partnerships Victoria 12 No discrete budget Government budget

National Treasury PPP Unit, South Africa

20 ZAR 35 million

(EUR 3.1 million) Government budget

Case: Korea

• PPPs = initiatives involving public & private sectors to provide infrastructure and public services

• Sept 2009 = 569 projects (203 BTO & 366 BTL)

• Establishment of the Private Infrastructure Investment Centre of Korea (PICKO) in 1999, renamed PIMAC (Private Infrastructure Investment Management Center) in Korea Development Institute, in response to:

– lack of expertise within government to develop and evaluate PPP;

– lack of transparency, complicated procedures, unattractive risk-sharing arrangements & insufficient incentives

3 - Regulatory authorities

Progressive trend towards contracting-out & liberalisation has combined with establishment of independent regulatory agencies

The diffusion of regulatory agencies in 36 countries & 7 sectors (Gilardi et al, 2006)

Water regulatory framework in Asia Bangladesh No

Cambodia

No. sectoral responsibility for piped water supply in urban areas is with the Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy while the Ministry of Rural Development handles rural areas and point sources.

China No

India No, but creating a regulatory agency has been discussed.

Indonesia

Yes. The Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body commenced operation in 2001 but with limited powers. The Jakarta concessions foresee regulation by contract.

Malaysia Yes. National Water Services Commission (SPAN) .

Nepal

No effective regulatory system. The government has statutory power to safeguard consumer interests but enforcement has been ineffective because the government is also the service provider.

Philippines

Yes, MWSS-RO oversees the Manila concessions, but overlaps of regulatory functions across authorities limit and fragment enforcement. There is also a regulatory agency for other water supply providers but no budget, manpower to enforce the law.

Singapore Regulatory framework but effectively self regulation by PUB

Thailand No

Regulation of Water services: Manila

• Achievements of Manila Water (East) from 1996 to 2009: availability (16h to 24h), coverage (58% to 99%), water losses (63% to 15%), staff/connection (9.8 to 1.4)

• 1997: MWSS enters in 2 concession agreements. A Regulatory Office is established to monitor implementation (MWSS-RO).

• Asian crisis put important pressure on the concessions.

It compromised the ability of Maynilad (West) to repay foreign debt. This ultimately led to contract cancellation in 2002.

Economic regulation by MWSS-RO

• Tariff adjustment mechanisms:

– rate rebasing every 5 years,

– annual inflation adjustment,

– quarterly adjustments to currency evolutions,

– extraordinary price adjustments as needed

• Performance indicators

– 14 Key Performance Indicators (water services, sewage and sanitation, customer service),

– 9 Business Efficiency Measures (income, operating expenses, capital expenditures, non-revenue water).

Improving governance of regulators

What does it mean competent, well resources regulatory authorities?

• Role clarity

• Independence

• Accountability & transparency

• Predictability

• Consultation

• Non discrimination

• Proportionality

=> How does it translate in terms of legislative framework, governing structure, funding, staff…

1 Infrastructure needs

4 OECD Policy Support

2 Private Investment in infrastructure in Vietnam

3 Making it work: lessons from international experience

OECD policy tools and processes

=> Development of tools & platforms for exchange on good practices in the area of institutional, policy & regulatory environment for PPPs

• A network on PPPs of Senior Budget Officials, a network of regulators under development

• Principles for PSP in Infrastructure and Guidelines for PPPs

• Support of reform implementation in countries through reviews (of general framework for PPPs or sector-specific).

• Capacity Building Programme for PPPs with the IMF, the African Development Bank…