initial license -1 other · 2012. 11. 18. · above -1 90". the scenario may be ... 9s30 b ovdl...

SIMULATOR

EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE L-

SCENARIO TITLE: NRC EXAM SCENARIO

SCENARIO NUMBER: I

EFFECTIVE DATE:

EXPECTED DURATION:

REVISION NUMBER:

PROGRAM:

1 Hour

L.O. REQUAL

r\ INITIAL LICENSE -1 OTHER

REVISION SUMMARY:

*--

NRC SCENARIO I .DOC

1. OBJECTIVE( S) :

Enabling Objectives A. The crew must demonstrate the ability to operate effectively as a team while

completing a series of CREW CRITICAL TASKS, which measure the crew's ability to safely operate the plant during normal, abnormal, and emergency plant conditions. (Crew critical tasks within this examination scenario guide are identified with an 'I *.")

'v

II. MAJOR EVENTS:

A. Alternate RACS pumps B. Reactor Building isolation C. D. E. F. HPCl auto start failure

Loss of station power transformer T-4 and 1 OAI 10 Recirculation pump high vibrations and subsequent trip LOCA with Loss of Feedwater

111. SCENARIO SUMMARY:

The scenario begins at 70% Rx power with a Reactor startup in progress. RClC is unavailable due a system maintenance outage. After alternating RACS pumps, a spurious isolation of RBVS occurs (HD-9414 B closure) requiring FRVS to be placed in service to maintainhestore Rx building AP. Shortly after reactor building AP is restored, station power transformer T-4 and 7.2KV bus 10Al 10 trip and lockout resulting in a loss of the " A RR pump and other 7.2KV loads. After conditions have stabilized, high vibrations on the "B" RR pump occur requiring the crew to secure the pump and initiate a manual Rx scram. If the crew delays in securing the 'B' Recirc pump the high vibration condition will cause the pump to trip. When the scram is initiated, a small LOCA occurs coincident with a trip of the "B" and "C" primary condensate pumps. HPCl fails to auto initiate at 1.68 psig and must be manually initiated to provide sufficient makeup capacity to maintain RPV water level above -1 90".

The scenario may be terminated when the crew has stabilized RPV water level, and containment parameters are improving.

c-

IV. INITIAL CONDITIONS:

INITIAL IC: Initialize the simulator to 74% power IC; MOL, 100% rod line Insert Groups 10A and 1OC to 00. Place Recirculation pumps in Master Manual

L' Raise power to approximately 70%(736 Mwe), and ensure PCP runback unarmed.

NRC SCENARIO 1 .DOC Page 2 of 17 Rev.: 06

PREP FOR TRAINING: (Le., computer set points, procedures, bevel covers) I

Initial I Description

- I . Mark up HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0003 is complete through step 5.4.20, and step 5.4.22. - 2. WCD for RClC system outage. Close RClC CST suction and secure RClC Jockey pump. - 3. COMPLETE Attachment 2 "Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist" of

v

NC.TQ-DG .ZZ-O002(Z).

EVENT TRIGGERS: I

lnitial I Description 1. EVENT ACTION: et-array(2) >= 1 && rrlwr

REMOTEIF I ELD FU NCTl ON SUM MARY: I I I I I I

lnitial I Description 1 Delay I Ramp I RemoteIEvent 1 Initial I Final Rack

1. ET015 RClC INBRD STEAM IS0 F007 Preinsert Close

Rack - 2. ET016 RClC INBRD STEAM BYP IS0 F076 Preinsert Close

Rack - 3. ET017 RClC OUTBRD STEAM IS0 F008 Preinsert Close - 4. RC12 HV-F059 Steam Exhaust lsol Vlv Preinsert TAGGED - 5. HVOI Reactor Building Exhaust Fan ‘A Hand Switch 2INone STOP - 6. HV02 Reactor Building Exhaust Fan ‘B’ Hand Switch 2INone STOP - 7. HV03 Reactor Building Exhaust Fan ‘C’ Hand Switch 2/None STOP - 8. HV04 Reactor Building Supply Fan ‘A Hand Switch 2lNone STOP - 9. HV05 Reactor Building Supply Fan ‘B’ Hand Switch 2/None STOP - I O . HV06 Reactor Building Supply Fan ‘C’ Hand Switch 2lNone STOP

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I/O OVERRIDE SUMMARY: I I I I I I

Initial I Description I Delay I Ramp I RemotelEvent I Initial I Final - 1. - 2. - 3.

- 5. - 6.

7.

- 8. - 9. - I O .

4. .v. -

-

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

- - - - - - - - - -

b.

1A175 E OVDl HD-9414B open-outbd exh-RB

1A175 F OVDl HD-9414B close-outbd exh-RB

9S12 A OVLO HV-F012 overload power/fail

9S13 B OVLO HV-F012 open indicator 9S36 A OVLO AP-HV-FOIO overload power/fail

9837 B OVLO AP-HV-FOIO closed indication

9DS32 B OP219 PUMP stopped indication

9827 A OP220 PUMP overload power/fail

9DS31 B OP220 PUMP stopped indication

9S50 A OVDl BP228 OVLD/PWR FAIL

9S30 B OVDl OP219 STOP 9829 A OVLO OP219 OVLDIPWR FAIL

9S13 C OVLO HV-F012 OPEN

9843 B OVLO HV-F031 CLOSED

9842 B OVLO HV-F031 OPF

9DS39 B BP228 STOPPED

9DS33 B HV-F059 CLOSED

9S31 A HV-F059 overload power/fail



60 l/None

60 I/None

P re i nse rt

Preinsert

Preinsert

Preinsert

Preinsert

Preinsert

Preinsert

Preinsert

Preinsert

Preinsert

P reinsert

Preinsert

Preinsert

Preinsert

Preinsert

Preinsert

Preinsert

Preinsert

OFF

ON

ON

OFF

ON

OFF

OFF

ON

OFF

ON

OFF

ON

OFF

OFF

ON

OFF

OFF

ON

OFF

OFF


Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlanVStudent Response

0 CRS directs alternating RACS pumps to A and B pumps in service in accordance with HC. OP-SO. ED-000 1 .

Comments

-%-

NOTE: Report as EO, 0 PO transfers RACS pumps in RACS Pump C normal on start. by:

accordance with CRS directions

- Ensures that RACS PMP 1AP209 BKR 52-41011 CLOSED is on. (10C650E)

AUXILIARIES COOLING PUMP A START PB (10C651A), and observes that START comes on.

- Observes AI-6460 REACTOR AUXILIARIES COOLING PUMP A MOT AMPS settles at c I 80 amps and is approximately the same as the other I/S RACS pumps' motor amps.

- Presses the REACTOR

Crew recognizes RBVS problem

OHA E6-C5 and EI-F5

CRlDS digital alarms: D3960 RBVS EXH RMT PNL C382 D3961 RBVS SPLY RMT PNL C382 B7164 RX BLDG DlFF PRESS and informs CRS.

NRC SCENARIO 1 .DOC

0 Crew recognizes loss of RBVS via Rx bldg AP decreasing on SPDS and informs CRS.

Page 5 of 17 Rev.: 06

Event / Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response

Report as EO after an appropriate time delay that low flow alarms are present for all RBVS fans. Report that all RBVS fans have tripped. ACKNOWLEDGE E6-C5, using Remote Function. If dispatched, report as RBEO report that damper HD-9414B is shut and there are no indications of any problems.

Comments

.-, If requested as RBEO, secure RBVS by inserting RT-2

NOTE: Tech Spec 3.6.5.1 may not be referenced if Rx bldg AP is maintainedhestored negative.

NRC SCENARIO 1 .DOC

0 CRS directs actions in accordance with AB.CONT-003:

- Verify dampers HD-9414NB and HD-937OA/B are open.

0 PO determines that HD9414B is closed and informs the CRS.

0 RO/PO dispatches EO to investigate problem with RBVS.

RO/PO dispatches RBEO to check damper HD-94148 and FRVS ready for start.

0 CRS directs FRVS placed in service IAW AB-CONT-003.

0 RO/PO places FRVS in service in accordance with CRS direction to maintain Rx bldg AP.

- Start 1 FRVS Vent Fan

- Remove the Reactor Building Ventilation System from service

- Closes the following dampers

+ HD9370A + HD9414A + HD9370B

Fans - Start 4 FRVS Recirculation

0 OS/CRS evaluates Tech Specs Sections 3.6.5.1 & 3.6.5.2 for applicability; determines 3.6.5.1 and 3.6.5.2 are applicable.

0 CRS directs actions to investigate cause of damper H D-94 1 4B closure.


Event i Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response

If I&C is dispatched, 0 RO/PO dispatches maintenance Repod as lac that there is personnel to determine cause of a logic trip output to damper HD-9414B closure IAW damper HD-9414B and it CRS direction. will take a few hours to investigate. Inform the CRS a troubleshooting plan will be developed and submitted before work is commenced.

b

Comments

Crew recognizes electrical ma Ifu nctions :

- OHA E3-A1, E3-A2, E3-B1, E3-Cl I

- Informs CRS of loss of 1OA and transfer of all other applicable loads to 1 BX501 1BX502, and lBX503.

and

I10

I

0 RO/PO recognizes/reports loss of the following to the CRS:

- TB chiller AKI 1 1

- Air compressor 10K107

- APCP

- ASCP - A RR pump and MG set

0 CRS implements: - AB.RPV-002, conditions A or B,

and C

- AB.RPV-003 condition A

to investigate switchgear,

IAW CRS direction.

As yard operator report 0 RO/PO dispatches yard operator lockout on station power transformer T-4. switchyard/ transformer problems If dispatched, report as TBEO 1 OAl10 differential current lockout is tripped.

L,


Event / Instructor Activity Expected PlantIStudent Response

0 CRS directs actions IAW AB. RPV-003:

- Insert Control Rods to clear APRM Upscale Alarms.

- Ensure that the Recirc MG Drive Motor Breaker has TRIPPED for the tripped Pump

approximately 5 minutes, and then re-open.

+ DL.ZZ-0026 Att. 3n (as

- Close HV-F031A for

- Implement the following:

required)

+ DL.ZZ-0026Att. 3~ - Direct the Reactor Engineer to

develop a Rod Sequence to achieve an 80% Rod Line

- Implement 10-6 requirements

Comments

for Single Loop operations.

RO inserts control rods per CRS directions.

RO/PO shuts discharge valve for "A' RR pump IAW CRS direction. CRS implements:

- AB.COMP-001

- AB.RPV-002, AB.RPV-003, AB.RPV-004

a Crew determines loss of normal Instrument Air compressors:

- OHA A2-AII and A2-A2

- Lowering IA pressure CRIDS

\-

NRC SCENARIO I .DOC

CRS directs PO to start the Standby or Emergency Instrument Air Compressor in accordance with H C . 0 P-AB .ZZ- 0001.

PO starts the Standby or EAlC in accordance with CRS instructions.



NOTE: Operation will stabilize inside the EXIT region.

L

Comments

NOTE: If control rods are inserted so that operation is below the 70% rod line, the crew may reduce the speed of the operating Recirculation Pump in an attempt to lower vibration levels.

L

NRC SCENARIO 1 .DOC

e Crew evaluates Rx power and flow, determines operation is currently in the exit region, and monitors for power to flow oscillations.

0 Crew monitors for power oscillations.

0 CRS directs actions to exit the EXIT region by:

- Inserting Control Rods, or

- Raising Recirculation flow

0 RO inserts Control Rods per Reverse order of the pull sheet or the Stuff Sheet, and CRS directions in order to clear APRM Upscale alarms and/or to exit the EXIT region.

0 Crew ensures proper operation of the Service and Instrument Air system to maintain air pressures.

0 Crew ensures that Feedwater system maintains RPV level

0 Crew makes preparation to enter Single loop operations IAW

12.5”-54”

HC. OP-IO .ZZ-0006.


Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response

0 Crew recognizes rising vibrations on “B” RR pump:

Comments

- CRIDS Display 85, and/or - OHA C 1 -E4 and informs CRS.

Note: Lower Recirculation CRS directs actions IAW HC.OP-

entry into the SCRAM - If Danger Level is reached, region. remove the RR pump from

service

flow may cause intentional AR . ZZ-00 08

0 CRS directs actions to scram and trip RR B

NOTE: The crew may 0 * CREW manually scrams the scram before tripping the Rx within 60 seconds following RR pump. That will satisfy trip of both RR pumps. this Critical Task. (WA 202001 A2.04 3.713.8)

(WA 212000 A4.01 4.6/4.6)

0 RO places the Rx mode switch in shutdown and takes actions IAW AB.ZZ-0001:

0 RO performs the following IAW AB.ZZ-0001:

- Announces, “Crew - Standby for Scram Report”.

- Locks the Mode Switch in Shutdown.

L

NRC SCENARIO I .DOC Page 10 of 17 Rev.: 06


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NRC SCENARIO 1 .DOC

Comments

- Announces the following:

+ Rod Motion status + APRM Downscale status + Reactor Shutdown status

- WHEN the above actions are complete, then announces “Scram Report Complete”.

- Inserts the SRMIIRM’s - Selects IRM chart recorders.

- When Main Generator output reaches zero Mwe, then trips the Main Turbine.

- Locks Out the Main Generator

- Ensures the Reactor Scram has been announced (over PA)

- Reports “All Scram Actions Complete”

RO determines the Rx is shutdown by verifying all control rods are fully inserted and informs CRS

0 CRS enters and directs HC.OP- EO.ZZ-0101 , RPV Control, to restore and maintain Rx parameters.

0 CREW recognizes increasing DRWL pressure:

OHA A7-E4

SPDS indication and informs CRS.

0 RO/PO determines RPV level, pressure and containment parameters and informs the CRS.


Event 1 Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response

Crew recognizes DRWL pressure

- OHAA7-D4, C5-B5, and LOCA initiation signals and informs CRS.

L at 1.68# :

Comments

c

CRS enters and directs HC.OP- EO.ZZ-0102, Containment Control, to control containment oarameters. I

- ~-

PO verifies the RHR and CS pumps auto-start.

RO/PO verifies EDGs auto-start.

CRS directs actions to restore:

- Instrument gas

- RACS

- CRD

RO/PO restores systems to service IAW CRS direction.

CRS directs action to initiate supp chamber sprays.

PO places the "A" RHR loop in supp chamber spray IAW CRS direction.

* Crew inhibits ADS if RPV water level reaches -129".

(WA 218000 A4.04 4.114.1) (WA 295031 EAI.06 4.414.4)

6. HPCl auto start failure PO recognizes failure of HPCl to inject at 1.68 psig:

Closed indication: HV-F001 HV-FOO6 HV-8278 and informs CRS.

0 PO manually initiates HPCl to inject when directed by the CRS.


Event / Instructor Activity Expected PlanffStudent Response

0 * Before RPV water level reaches -1 go”, crew manually initiates HPCl by opening HV- FOOI, HV-FOOG, and HV-8278 to maintain RPV water level above -1 90” and prevent an Emergency Depressurization.

(WA 295031 EA1.02 4.514.5) 0 When supp chamber pressure

exceeds 9.5# and adequate core cooling is assured, CRS directs action to secure DRWL cooling and initiate one loop of DRWL spray after ensuring compliance with the Drywell Spray Initiation Limit (DSIL) and supp pool level below 125”.

0 PO places the “A1 RHR loop in DRWL spray IAW CRS direction.

PO prevents injection from low pressure ECCS not required to assure adequate core cooling IAW CRS direction.

Comments

L


. . . ,

VI. SCENARIO REFERENCES:

A. Conduct of Simulator Training. B. NUREG 1021, Examiner Standards

C. JTA Listing

D. Probabilistic Risk Assessment

E. Technical Specifications

F. Emergency Plan (ECG)

G. Alarm Response Procedures (Various)

H. Inservice and Surveillance Test procedures

I. HC.OP-AB.COMP-0001 Instrument and/or Service Air

J. HC.OP-AB.CONT-0003 Reactor Building K. HC.OP-AB.RPV-0002 Reactor Power Oscillations

L. HC.OP-AB.RPV-0003 Recirculation System

M. HC.OP-AB.RPV-0004 Reactor Level Control N. HC. OP-AB .ZZ-000 1 Transient Plant Conditions

0. HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0101 RPV Control

P. HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0102 Primary Containment Control

Q. HC. OP-SO.AE-0001 Feedwater System Operation

R. SH.OP-AS.ZZ-000 1 Operations Standards v

L,


VII. ESG CRITICAL TASK RATIONAL

ESG-001 / 00 -

I.

(KIA 202001 A2.04 3.7/3.8) (KIA 212000 A4.01 4.6/4.6)

* CREW manually scrams the Rx within 60 seconds following trip of both RR pumps.

The abnormal procedure requires a manual scram to be initiated if in Condition 1 and no RR pumps are in operation. The resulting high power and low flow conditions provide an unstable operating envelope for the Rx. The sixty-second time limit provides a reference for the “immediate” nature of the required action.

2. 0 * Before RPV water level reaches -190, Crew manually initiates HPCl by opening HV-

FOOI, HV-FOO6, and HV-8278 to maintain RPV water level above -190” and prevent an Emergency Depressurization.

(KIA 295031 EA1.02 4.514.5)

The HPCl system has failed to automatically initiate upon either low RPV water level or high drywell pressure. Manual initiation of the HPCl system will prevent RPV water level from reaching -1 90” and will therefore prevent a required emergency depressurization and subsequent transient on the RPV.

3. 0 * Crew inhibits ADS if RPV water level reaches -129”. (KIA 218000 A4.04 4.114.1) (KIA 295031 EA1.06 4.414.4)

.--..--

Given the current operating conditions in this scenario, an automatic RPV depressurization is not warranted based upon the directions provided in the EOPs. Therefore, in hibiting ADS actuation prevents an emergency depressurization and subsequent transient on the RPV.

L


ESG-001 / 00

HOPE CREEK ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM LJ EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE

Y/N EVENT - YtN EVENT TRANS1 ENTS: SPECIAL INITIATORS:

Turbine Trip Loss of ssw X Loss of Feedwater Loss of SACS

MSlV Closure Loss of RACS Loss of Condenser Vacuum Inadvertent Open SRV

Loss of Instrument Air

Loss Of Offsite Power Station Black Out

ATWS X LOCA

COMPON ENTlTRAl N/SY STEM U N AVAILABI LlTY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY

Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN HPCl

One SRV EDG A One SSW Pump / Loop EDG B Circulating Water System - 4 pumps TACS

Class I E 12OVAC Bus - A Train i, X RClC Class 1 E 12OVAC Bus - D Train

OPERATOR ACTIONS IMPORTANT IN PREVENTING CORE DAMAGE

Y/N OPERATOR ACTION Manual RPV Emergency Depressurization when required Manual RPV Depressurization during ATWS Initiation of RHR for Decay Heat Removal Initiation of Containment Venting Restore Offsite power within 45 minutes SACS/SSW restoration after total loss of both systems Avoiding Loss of Feedwater during transient Recovery of the Main Condenser

Complete this evaluation form for each ESG.

NRC SCENARIO I .DOC Page 16 of 17 Rev.: 06

- 1

HoDe Creek SIMULATOR Turnover Sheet

Protected Equip Emergent Issues WIN Team Workarounds

FOR TRAINING USE ONLY

HPCI, HPCI 250 VDC, EDG A, switchgear and logic panels Abnormal noise from C RACS Pump motor. Troubleshooting planned when pump is 00s.

Oncoming Shift: Days [XI Nights [ ] Op Con: 1 Rx Pwr: 70% Gen Output: 736 MWe Work Window: B Risk Color: Green

NotiWDate I Description

Major activities accomplished on the last shift:

Maintenance continuing on RClC

Major activities scheduled for this shift Place RACS Pump A in service and remove RACS Pump C from service Withdraw Groups 1OC and 1OA control rods to 100% rod line then continue raising power to 100% using RR flow @ s 15%lhr.

HC.OP-10.22-0003 is complete through step 5.4.22, except withdrawing control rods per RE guidance to 100% rod line

-

Immediate Mitigation Additional Action I Assignee I Date

1 Operations Superintendent issues:

SIM-001 I Yes I 3.7.4 I RClC Turbine Maintenance + I O days None

DEFICIENCY Number I ASSIGNED I DUE

Compensatory Actions in Effect (Required by CRODKRFA for Operability) Number I DEFICIENCY I COMPENSATORY ACTIONS I DUE

I

I I I L

Reactivity Controls: MOL, Step 1 on Sheet 77, beginning of 1OC rods

Standby Safety Systems: RClC CIT for Maintenance. ETR 8 hours

Balance of Plant: C RACS Pump abnormal noise

RestrictedlEmeraency Use Onlv Equipment:

0

0

0

Electrical: 0

Chemistry: 0

Coolincl Water: 0

Computer: . Radiation Monitorinq Systems:

Cold Weather Issues:

Administrative:

0

0


,.

SIMULATOR

EXAMINA TION SC E NA RI 0 G U I DE W


SCENARIO NUMBER: 2

EFFECTIVE DATE:

EXPECTED DURATION: 1 Hour

REVISION NUMBER: 00

PROGRAM: n L.O. REQUAL INITIAL LICENSE

REVISION SUMMARY:

L

NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC

I . OBJECTIVE(S):


completing a series of CREW CRITICAL TASKS, which measure the crew's ability to safely operate the plant during normal, abnormal, and emergency plant conditions. (Crew critical tasks within this examination scenario guide are identified with an " *.")

e

II. MAJOR EVENTS:

A. B. Stuck Control Rod C. lnerting the Containment D. Loss of 1A-D-482 inverter E. F. G.

Raise Reactor Power with Control Rods

Steam leak in the steam tunnel Small break LOCA /RHR Room Flood(Fai1ure to isolate) Emergency Depressurization/SRV Failure to open


The scenario starts with the plant at approximately 17%. The crew will withdraw Control Rods to 15% load. During the Rod withdrawal, a Rod will stick. The crew's efforts to unstick the Rod will be successful. The crew will then commence inerting the drywell.

The 1A-D-482 inverter will develop a fault resulting in TACS isolation requiring restoration, and loss of various indications. Once TACS has been restored, the plant will develop a steam leak in the steam tunnel requiring the unit to be shutdown and the crew to close the Main Steam Isolation Valves.

A LOCA will develop due to the pressure transient from closing the MSIVs. When an RHR Pump D is started, a Suppression Pool leak develops on the suction piping to the pump. Attempts to isolate the leak and to makeup will be unsuccessful, requiring an Emergency Depressurization of the RPV. An SRV will fail to open when required and the crew will be required to open an additional SRV.

The scenario will be terminated when the Reactor is depressurized and level is above -190 inches.

u


INITIAL IC:

Initialize the simulator to IC-07; 23% power, MOC. Pull step 487 Insert control rods through step 481. Deinert containment to >4% 02. Secure lineup, but leave H202 analyzer in service. Ensure lineup to inert containment is up to 5.1.9 of HC.OP-SO.GS-0001.

NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC Page 2 of 22 Rev.: 00

PREP FOR TRAINING: (i.e., computer set points, procedures, bevel covers) I

/ M a / I Description .d - 1. Markup HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0003 to Step 5.4.1 3. - 2. Markup HC.OP-SO.GS-0001 to Step 5.1.8.

- 3. Markup HC.OP-AP.ZZ-0104 Forms 1 and 2 to support inerting containment.

- 4. Complete Attachment 2 “Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist.”

EVENT TRIGGERS: I

M i a / I Description 1. EVENT ACTION: ZLRHPMR(4) -

COMMAND: IMF RHO7D PURPOSE:

COMMAND: PURPOSE:

3. EVENT ACTION: LCPNEPOI >= 300 COMMAND: DMF CD031835 PURPOSE:

COMMAND: PURPOSE: HV-F004D Switch to CLOSE

Inserts flooding malfunction when RHR D pump is running 2. EVENT ACTION: ZLMS20A -

CLOSED light for A MSlV

-

Deletes malfunction when drive pressure is 300 psig 4. EVENT ACTION: ZDRHFOC(20) -

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MALFUNCTION SUMMARY: I I I I I I

Initial I Description I Delay I Ramp I Remote/Event I Initial I Final - 1. - 2. - 3. - 4. - 5.

- 7. - 6.

- 8.

CD031835 Control Rod 18-35 stuck

AD02EC ADS/Relief valve F013E sticks closed

ED09A2 Loss of 120Vac Class 1 E instr bus 1AD482

MS04A Steam line A leak in tunnel

RH07D RHR leak via pump D suction PC06 Suppression Pool Break

RR31A2 Recirc Loop A large break

RR31 B2 Recirc loop B large break

Preinsert

Preinsert

1 /None

600 2/None 100

None/l

Nonell 10

300 None/2 3

300 None/2 3

REMOTE/FIELD FUNCTION SUMMARY: I I I I I I

Mia1 I Description I Delay I Ramp I Remote/Event I Initial I Final - 1, RH21 D HV-F004 RHR pump D suction valve None14 TAGGED - 2.

.---


' l/O OVERRIDE SUMMARY: I I I I I I

lnifial I Description I Delay I Ramp I Remote/Event I Initial I Final


Event 1 Instructor Activity

CRS directs the RO to raise Reactor power with Control Rods in accordance with RE guidance.

with Control Rods:

Expected PlanVStudent Response Comments

\.

NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC

RO withdraws Control Rods in accordance with HC. OP-SO. SF- 0001 and CRS directions.

- Selected rod PB comes ON (bright white)

FOUR ROD DISPLAY indicates the control rod position (lOC65OC).

- The associated Full Core Display (white) numbered rod identification light comes ON (1 OC650C).

- At the ROD SELECT MODULE, simultaneously press and hold both the WITHDRAW PB AND the CONTINUOUS WITHDRAW PB and observe the following:

+ The INSERT (white) light

+ The WITHDRAW (white) light

- CONTROL ROD POSITION

comes ON momentarily.

comes ON and the CONTINUOUS WITHDRAW (white) light comes ON.

+ CONTROL ROD POSITION FOUR ROD DISPLAY indicates control rod movement.

- Prior to reaching the desired control rod position, simultaneously release both the WITHDRAW PB and the CONTINUOUS WITHDRAW PB and OBSERVE the following:


Event / Instructor Activity

+ The WITHDRAW (white) light goes OUT.

Expected PlantfStudent Response Comments

+ The SETTLE (white) light comes ON for = 6 seconds, then goes out.

+ CONTROL ROD POSITION FOUR ROD DISPLAY indicates the control rod has settled to the desired position.

+ At position 48 the applicable Full Core Display FULL OUT (red) light comes on

Perform a control rod coupling integrity check IAW HC.OP- ST. BF-0001

NOTE: LPRM downscale 0 Perform the following while giving alarms can be expected. As the selected Control Rod a RE, inform crew alarms are continuous wit hd raw sig nal : expected for this rod pattern. - Observe the following as

.- -

indication of the Control Rod being coupled:

+ ROD OVERTRAVEL alarm does NOT annunciate.

+ Red Full Out light illuminates on the Full Core Display.

+ RPlS indicates the Control Rod is full out (48).

+ Proper response of the Nuclear Instrumentation while withdrawing the Control Rod.

0 Indicates the completion of the movement on the Pull Listing.

L


Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments

RO determines that Control Rod 38-31 is stuck by observing no change in Rod motion on the 4 Rod Display or the RWM and informs the CRS.

-

2. Stuck Control Rod:

Preinserted.

CRS directs actions in accordance with HC. OP-AB. IC- 0001, Condition I.

0

0 RO performs actions in accordance with CRS directions:

- Verifies no Rod Blocks are present.

- Attempts to operate the drive in both directions to determine the exact condition of the Control

NOTE: Crew may request RE guidance. Respond that a withdraw signal then an insert signal may be attempted. Rod.

- Verifies drive water flow fluctuates normally.

- Verifies proper operation of the SETTLE, INSERT, AND WITHDRAW lights.

- Performs the following:

+ Raises the drive water pressure in approximately 50 psid increments, not to exceed 500 psid

+ Attempts to notch in notch out the Control Rod at the new pressure increment.

0 RO observes Rod Movement as indicated on the 4 Rod Display or RWM, and notifies the CRS.

0 RO returns the drive water pressure to the normal operating range (260-270 psid on A3015).

L’


V. SCENARIO GUIDE SEQUENCE AND EXPECTED RESPONSE

Event / Instructor Activity Expected PlanVStudent Response Comments

0 CRS directs the PO to inert the containment in accordance with HC.OP-SO.GS-0001 starting at 5.1.8.

0 PO commences inerting the containment in accordance with CRS directions by:

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NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC

Opening the following valves:

+ HV-4978 + HV-5035 + P-KH-V9973, Liquid NZ To

Vaporizer (local)

+ GU-HD-9372A + HV-4958 + HV-4952 + HV-4950 Establishes communications between the Main Control Room AND an operator stationed at TI-3955

Log start time on Gaseous Effluent Release Permit

Presses the FV-4971 ON push- button.

Presses the FIC-4971 I NZ FLOW, AUTO push-button.

Intermittently presses FIC-4971

attain the desired nitrogen flow rate as indicated on FR-4971-1,

Intermittently OPEN one of the

Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breakers, using the TEST OPEN push-button approximately every 15 minutes.

N2 RAISE SETPOINT PB to

N2 FLOW (UP to 150,000 scfh).

PSV-4946A (B, C, D, E, F, G, H)



Crew identifies and communicates the loss of TACS to the CRS.

RO/PO informs CRS that RPV power, level and pressure are stable.

Comments

----

NOTE: HC. 0 P-AB .ZZ-000 1 0 CRS orders TACS placed on the may be referenced also for the transfer of TACS. AB. COOL-0002.

B SACS loop IAW HC.OP-

PO performs HC.OP AB-COOL- 0002 as directed by the CRS

0 PO ensures the standby SACS pump starts.

Ensures BOTH pairs of TACS supply and return valves on the Standby loop open to supply

Ensures TACS supply AND return valves on the loop that WAS supplying TACS are

0 Determines that the HV-2522E

TACS. (HV-2522/2496)

CLOSED. (HV-2522/2496)

and HV-2522F are closed THEN re-opens them as follows:

- Verifies no large break has occurred in TACS by observing SACS expansion tank levels.

- Determines that no large break in TACS has occurred, then simultaneously presses and holds the HV-2522E and/or HV- 2522F OPEN PB’s until the valves indicate open.

-.-



WHEN dispatched to the IA - D-482 as an operator, THEN REPORT the inverter output breaker CBIO is open, the AC Reg Output breaker CB302 is open and the Static Switch cabinet is de-energized.

WHEN dispatched to the 1A- D-482 as maintenance, THEN REPORT there appears to be a fault in the Static Switch cabinet and you will need to inverter tagged.

NOTE: If dispatched to investigate H2 Seal Oil System, respond that alarm due to low pressure. Using Remote Function acknowledge a la rm.

Note: If dispatched to the lsophase System, alarm was due to high temperature. Using Remote Function acknowledge alarm.

Comments

WHEN dispatched to SACS or SSW, THEN REPORT the equipment is ready for starting or post start checks are SAT.

L-.

NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC

0 Crew identifies the loss of the 1AD482 inverter

- OHA D3-E3 12OVAC UPS TROUBLE

- CRIDS

0 CRS implements HC.OP-AB.ZZ- 0136, Attachment 5

0 Crew recognizes loss of RWCU via OHA and trip of both RWCU pumps due to a loss of HV-F001 i nd icatio n .

RO/PO refers CRS to HC.OP- AB.RPV-0007 in accordance with H C . 0 P-AR .ZZ-0008.

CRS directs actions to be taken in accordance with HC.OP- AB.RPV-0007, Condition B.

CRS recognize Tech Specs action

- 3.8.3.1 .a.l .e and action A applies.

- 3.6.3 Action a (Containment Isolations)


Event I Instructor Activity

WHEN dispatched to perform BOP-0005 actions, REPORT: Action A.3: Steam Tunnel supply and return back draft dampers - both sets are open. Action A.4: Place Both Steam Tunnel cooling fans in service by placing REMOTE FUNCTION HVI 1 and HV12 in run.

WHEN dispatched as ABEO,

and 9395B are closed. THEN REPORT GU-HD9395A


Crew recognizes temp rising:

A2541 StmTun temp in alarm.

Steam Tunnel

ne1 Clr Inlet

0 CRS implements HC.OP- AB.BOP-0005, Condition A:

- Isolate the source of the leak if known.

- Monitor the following to determine the source of leak:

+ Main Steam Flow indication + Feedwater Flow indication + RWCU System

- Ensure proper positioning of Steam Tunnel Supply AND Return Backdraft dampers

0 CRS assigns a crewmember to monitor Steam Tunnel temperature.

0 CRS implements HC.OP- AB.CONT-0004, Condition A, AND Condition C.

-..-



NOTE: 0

This alarm may not be received.

High alarm is 2.5 mR/hr. 0


The CRS may take 0 conservation action and scram before 145 degrees.

a

‘V

0

i

L

NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC

Crew responds to RM-11 “High Alarm” for 9RX620 for the Tech Support Center ARM.

CRS briefs the crew on plant conditions and contingencies for a rising Main Steam Tunnel temperature.

Crew monitors HC.OP- AB. BO P-00 05 Retain men t Override.

CRS directs a manual Scram when Steam Tunnel temperature > 145 degrees IAW the Retainment Override.

RO takes actions to manually scram the reactor IAW HC.OP-

PO takes action to control, restore and maintain RPV level with Feedwater.

CRS implements EOP-101 based on entry condition of 12.5” and directs actions to stabilize the plant.

RO performs the following IAW

AB.ZZ-0001,

HC. OP-AB.ZZ-000 1 :

Announces, “Crew - Standby for Scram Report”.

Locks the Mode Switch in Shutdown.

Announces the following:

+ Rod Motion status + APRM Downscale status + Reactor Shutdown status


Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlanffStudent Response

- Inserts the SRMIIRM’s

- Selects IRM chart recorders.

Comments

NOTE:

The MSlVs m y aut

e

e

e

matically close on an isolation signal.

e

e

L

NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC


- Locks Out the Main Generator

- Ensures the Reactor Scram has been announced (over PA)


CRS transfers level and pressure control to RClC and SRVs in anticipation of MSlV closure.

RO/PO coordinate transfer of Reactor Pressure and RPV level control . Crew places ‘B’ RHR in Suppression Pool cooling to support RCIC/SRV operation.

CRS directs closing MSlVs and drains to isolate steam leak.

PO closes the MSlVs and drains

The CRS directs the PO to restore and maintain RPV level / pressure with HPCl and/or RClC and SRVs.

CRS implements HC.OP- AB.BOP-0002, Condition A:

- Verify the Main Turbine valves are CLOSED

- Ensure the Motor Suction Pump and Turning Gear Oil Pump are running

- When Main Turbine Speed e900 rpm, ensure all Main Turbine Lift Pumps running.



c

Expected PlantIStudent Response Comments

L-

NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC

0 Crew recognizes LOCA condition:

RM-11 DLD monitors.

Rising Drywell Pressure.

OHA A4-F5, A7-E4, C6-C2.

0 CRS directs actions for the high Drywell pressure IAW HC.OP-

- Maximize Drywell Cooling by

AB.CONT-0001.

ensuring:

+ All Drywell Fan Cooling Coils are Open

+ All Drywell Fans are running in Fast Speed

+ Turbine Bldg. Chill Water system is operating properly

+ Check Reactor Recirc. Pump

+ Check SRV Tailpipe

0 PO maximizes Drywell cooling

- Perform the following:

Seals

Temperatures

and checks proper operation of TB Chillers.

0 Crew recognizes HI-HI Drywell pressure of 1.68 psig

0 CRS reenters EOP-101, enters HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0102, and directs actions to mitigate the leak.

sprays are required based upon DRWL temperatures / pressure.

0 CRS determines that drywell



Event I Instructor Activity Expected PIantlStudent Response Comments

0 CREW may recognize Suppression Pool leak via decreasing Suppression Pool level indications on SPDS and annunciator A6-A5 and informs the CRS.

CREW determines leak to be in RHR pump D room via SPDS and/or CRlDS alarms D2971 and D2939.

investigate cause of RHR pump room flooded alarm.

As RBEO, two minutes RO/PO notifies RBEO to after being dispatched report leak at D pump suction with approximately two inches of water on floor.

NOTE: Role-play as the building EO to support implementation of EOP 300 level procedures.

Do NOT implement EO- 315, use Remote Functions CS02 or CS04. Although, REPORT completion of lineup to the MCR.

NOTE:

NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC

CRS enters and directs actions

Reactor Building and Rad Release to isolate the leak.

0 CRS directs actions to isolate RHR Pump D suction by closing

PO attempts to close HV-F004D, observes that the OVLD/PWR FAIL illuminates, and informs the CRS.

0 When Suppression Pool Level drops below 74.5 inches, CRS reenters HC. OP-EO .ZZ-0 I 02 , Primary Containment Control, and directs actions to restore suppression pool level using RCIC, Core Spray, or Service Water.

of HC.OP-EO.ZZ-O103/4,

HV-F004 D .

0 CREW closely monitors Torus level decrease and determines



level decrease and determines that a major failure of the Torus has occurred.

Once Crew determines a major failure of the Torus has occurred and level

Comments

cannot be maintained, they may stop makeup efforts.

0 * CREW determines that Suppression Pool water level cannot be maintained above 38.5 inches and initiates an emergency depressurization in accordance with H C . 0 P-EO .ZZ- 0202.

(WA 295030EA2.01 4.1/4.2)

e

Note: This task is 0 completed satisfactorily if Em erg e ncy Depressurization occurs before 38.5” of SPL is reached

L

NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC

C RS implements H C . 0 P- E 0. ZZ- 0202, Emergency RPV Depressurization, when torus level cannot be maintained above the 38.5”.

PO opens 5 ADS valves IAW CRS direction.

PO recognizes failure of SRV F013E to open via closed indication on 10C650C and informs CRS.

CRS directs PO to open other SRV(s) until 5 SRVs are open.

PO opens additional SRV per CRS instructions

* CREW recognizes via acoustic and temperature indications that F013E, ADS SRV, has failed to open and opens an additional SRV before Suppression Pool level has been below 38.5 inches for 1 minute.

(KIA 223001A2.11 3.6/3.8) (WA 218000A2.04 4.114.2)


Event t Instructor Activity

PO maintains/restores RPV level >-I90 inches in accordance with CRS instructions.

0 PO initiates Suppression Pool cooling IAW CRS direction.

Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments

L

NRC SCENARIO 2.DOC

0



A.

L B.

C.

D. E.

F.

G.

H.

I . J.

K.

L.

M. N.

0. P.

Q. R.

S.

T.

U. V.

w. X.

Y.

'-

Conduct of Simulator Training.

NUREG 1021, Examiner Standards

JTA Listing

Probabilistic Risk Assessment

Technical Specifications

Emergency Plan (ECG)

Alarm Response Procedures (Various)

lnservice and Surveillance Test procedures

HC.OP-AB.BOP-0002 Main Turbine

HC.OP-AB.BOP-0005 Main Steam Tunnel Temperature

H C . 0 P-AB . CO NT-000 1

HC. OP-AB. CO NT-0004 HC.OP-AB.COOL-0002 Safety Auxiliaries Cooling System

HC.OP-AB. IC-0001 Control Rod

HC.OP-AB.RPV-0007 Reactor Coolant Conductivity

H C. 0 P-AB .ZZ-0 00 1

HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0 136

H C . 0 P-EO .ZZ-0 I 0 1 HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0102 Primary Containment Control

HC.OP-EO.ZZ-O103/4

H C . 0 P-E 0.ZZ-02 02 HC.OP-SO.AE-000 I Feedwater System Operation

HC, OP-SO. SF-000 1

HC. OP-ST. BF-000 1 SH.OP-AS.ZZ-0001 Operations Standards

D rywel I P ressu re

Radioactive Gaseous Release

Transient Plant Conditions

Loss of 120 VAC Inverter

RPV Control

Reactor Building and Rad Release

Emergency RPV Depressurization

Reactor Manual Control

Control Rod Drive Exercise - Weekly

~L


- VII. ESG CRITICAL TASK RATIONAL

L ESG-002 / 00

1. * CREW determines that Suppression Pool water level cannot be maintained above 38.5 inches and initiates an emergency depressurization in accordance with HC.OP- EO.22-0202.

(WA 295030EA2.01 4.1/4.2)

EOPs direct action to emergency depressurize the Reactor if Suppression Pool level cannot be maintained above 38.5 inches. This level represents the Suppression pool level that results in uncovering the downcomer pipes and a loss of the pressure suppression function of the Primary Containment.

2. * CREW recognizes via acoustic and temperature indications that F013E, ADS SRV, has failed to open and opens an additional SRV before Suppression Pool level has been below 38.5 inches for 1 minute.

(WA 223001A2.1 I 3.613.8) (WA 218000A2.04 4.1/4.2)

The Minimum Number of SRVs required for Emergency Depressurization (MNSRED) is 5. The MNSRED is utilized to assure the RPV will depressurize and remain depressurized when Emergency Depressurization is required. L

L


- ' , ESG-002 / 00

HOPE CREEK ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE L

Y/N EVENT Y/N EVENT TRANSIENTS: SPECIAL INITIATORS:

Turbine Trip Loss of ssw Loss of Feedwater

Loss of Condenser Vacuum Inadvertent Open SRV

Loss of SACS X MSlV Closure Loss of RACS

Loss of Instrument Air


ATWS LOCA

Y/N

COMPONENTlTRAlNlSYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY

COMPONENTl SYSTEM, OR TRAIN Y/N COMPONENTl SYSTEM, OR TRAIN HPCl Class 1 E 12OVAC Bus - A Train RClC Class 1 E 12OVAC Bus - D Train One SRV EDG A One SSW Pump / Loop EDG B Circulating Water System - 4 pumps TACS


Y/N OPERATOR ACTION X Manual RPV Emergency Depressurization when required

Manual RPV Depressurization during ATWS Initiation of RHR for Decay Heat Removal hitiation of Containment Venting Restore Offsite power within 45 minutes SACS/SSW restoration after total loss of both systems Avoiding Loss of Feedwater during transient Recovery of the Main Condenser


L-


2 , d Hope Creek SIMULATOR Turnover Sheet

Oncoming Shift: Days [XI Nights [ ] Rx Pwr: 17% Gen Output: 126 MWe Work Window: D Risk Color: Green SMD: none

Protected Equip Emergent Issues WIN Team

Activities completed last shift: Major activities scheduled for the next 12 hours Continue with Startup by withdrawing Control Rods @

3

FORM 2 (This Form page 1 of I)

CONTAINMENT PREPURGE CLEANUP, INERTING, OR PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE PERMIT

SECTION A

3ate: Today

3aseous Effluent Permit #: 020030001

NOTE: This permit is valid only until 2400 of this date

SECTION B HOURS VALVESLINES OPEN PREVIOUS YEAR (Note 1)

Calculate Total Hours Open During Previous Year (Note 1)

DATE NUMBER OF HOURS

(1) Max. allowed for 365 days (admin limit)

(2) Total previous year (Note 1)

452 hrs

(-1 0

Hours available this date (line 1 minus line 2 OR 24, whichever is less)

Hours authorized this date (max 24 hours)

NCO performing calculation

7ohn Smith

OS/CRS verification and authorization

3 ndrew Jones

(=) 24

Datemime

Today/OlOO

Daterrime

Today/Ol30

SECTION C VALVE/LINE OPEN TIME (Note 2)

START TIME STOP TIME TOTAL HOURS Time at which valve/line was closed or Condition 4 or 5 was entered with valve/line

rime at which valve/line was open or 2ondition 1,2, or 3 was entered with rralve/line open opened

Total number of hours valve/line opened this cycle

Total number of hours valves/line open this permit:

NCO performing calculations Date/Ti m e

OS/CRS Closing permit Date/Time

NOTE 1 : The previous year includes the period from 2400 on today’s date back to 0001 on the same date one year earlier.

NOTE 2: Completed Form 2 should be filed in the AP-104 binder in the control room. b


L SCENARIO TITLE: NRC EXAM SCENARIO

SCENARIO NUMBER: 3

EFFECTIVE DATE:


REV1 SI ON NUMBER : 00

PROGRAM: T I L.O. REQUAL F I INITIAL LICENSE

REV IS I ON SUM MARY:

u

NRC SCENARIO 3.DOC

I. OBJECTIVE(S):

Enabling Objectives A. The crew must demonstrate the ability to operate effectively as a team while completing a

series of CREW CRITICAL TASKS, which measure the crew’s ability to safely operate the plant during normal, abnormal, and emergency plant conditions. (Crew critical tasks within this examination scenario guide are identified with an ‘I *.”)

Lc

II. MAJOR EVENTS:

A. B. C. RWCU Pump Trip D. E. F. G. RClC turbine overspeed

Lower Reactor Power with Recirculation Flow Secondary Condensate Pump Trip/Failure of Recirculation Pump to Runback

Loss of Station Power Transformer, and then a loss of offsite power Failure of “B” EDG, and failure of “A EDG breaker to auto close HPCl steam leak with failure to automatically isolate


The scenario begins with the plant at 95% power and reducing power for a forced outage. The “B” PClG compressor and BS 5-1 are out of service for maintenance. As the shutdown is commenced, Secondary Condensate Pump C trips. This failure will cause an Intermediate Runback on one Recirculation pump, requiring a manual runback of the other.

Following a report of severe weather warnings in the Salem county area, a RWCU Pump Trip will occur. The operator will be required to adjust RWCU system flow to prevent pump damage.

A total loss of offsite power occurs following a lightning strike. The B EDG fails to start and will be unavailable for the duration of the scenario. The A EDG Output Breaker fails to automatically close, and will require manual closure (at 1 OC651) to energize 1 OA401. RClC trips on overspeed upon system initiation and water accumulation in the HPCl steam line will result in a steam line leak in the HPCl room. The HPCl System will fail to automatically isolate. The crew will have to manually isolate HPCl to terminate leakage into the secondary containment. RClC may be restored to service following local reset of the overspeed trip device.

The scenario may be terminated when RPV water level is being maintained above -190”.

b,


Initialize the simulator to 1OOoh power IC; MOL, 100% rod line C o m p I e t e Attach me n t 1 ‘IS i m u I at o r Re ad y - fo r-T ra i n i n g / Exa m i nation C heck I is t . ’I

L‘


OTHER CONDITIONS: (i.e., computer set points, procedures, bevel covers) I

Initial I Description Place “B” PClG compressor in manual and place red bezel cover over compressor; close HV-5162 and HV-5160B, place red bezel covers over controls. Place Instrument Gas Loop B in “Man Byp” on Panel lOC650D. Acknowledge Annunciator A I -A5 using Remote AN01 to Normal. (If required) Set CRIDS point D4498 to 1 Place RR in Master Manual and lower power to 95% Markup and ensure conditions satisfy HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0004, through step 5. I .2. Utilizing Monitor set MSTSRVL(12) = 255. This raises F013M tailpipe temperature to 255F. Acknowledge OHA.

EVENT TRIGGERS: I

Initial I Description EVENT ACTION: COMMAND: PURPOSE:

1. -

MALFU NCTlON SUMMARY: I I I I I I

Initial I Description I Delay I Ramp I RemotelEvent I Initial I Final

- 4. - 5.

- 7.

- 9.

- 6.

- 8.

IO.

11.

12.

- - -

RCOI RClC turbine overspeed

HPlO HPCl valves HV-F002 & F003 fail to auto isolate

DG02B Diesel generator B failure

DG08A Diesel generator A failure to auto close

AN-A1A2 A1A2 Instrument Gas System 6 trouble

AN-Dl 63 Containment Isolation Valve OPF

FWO4C Secondary condensate pump CP137 trip

CUOIA RWCU pump A trip

ED01 16 Station Service Transformer 1 BX501 failure

HP09 HPCI steam line break inside the HPCl RM 41 1 I

EGI 2 Loss of all offsite power

RR30A Recirc system A failure fo intermediate runback

Preinsert

Preinsert

Preinsert

Preinsert

Preinsert

Preinsert

I/None

2/None

420 3/None

740 300 3/None 5 40

720 3/None

Preinsert

REMOTE/F I ELD FU NCTl 0 N SUMMARY: I I I I I I

Initial I Description I Delay I Ramp I RemotelEvent I Initial I Final 1.

2. - -


I/O OVERRIDE SUMMARY: I I I I

lnitial Description Delay I Ramp I Remote/Event I Initial I Final 10A3 B LO BK-202 MAN-INSTRUMENT GAS

1 OA3 F LO BK-202 STOP-INSTRUMENT GAS

10S4 A DI HV-5162 OPEN-INSTRUMENT GAS

10S4 B LO HV-5162 CLOSED-INSTRUMENT GAS

lOS7 A LO OVLD/PWR FAIL-INSTRUMENT GAS HV- 51608

10DS2 B LO HV-5160B CLOSED-INSTRUMENT GAS HV-5160B

10S8 C DI OPEN HV-5160B

7DS4 A LO CH D INBD-CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES-MOV OVLDIPWR FAIL

10S3A A OVLO OVLO/PWR FAIL-INSTRUMENT GAS

Preinsert

Preinsert

Preinsert

Preinsert

Preinsert

Preinsert

Preinsert

Preinsert

Preinsert

OFF

OFF

OFF

OFF

ON

OFF

OFF

ON

ON

L-



Event f Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent L Response

Comments

0 CRS directs reduction of Reactor with Recirculation Flow power in accordance with RE

guidance and HC.OP-IO.ZZ- 0004.

0 RO reduces Reactor power using Recirculation pumps in accordance with CRS directions.

i

NRC SCENARIO 3.DOC

a I PO recognizes Secondary condensate pump C trip via:

- Alarm CONDENSATE TRAIN

- Intermediate runback on both

C TROUBLE (A6-F3)

REACTOR RECIRC pumps

and informs CRS.

.CRS implements HC.OP- AB.RPV-0004 and directs actions to maintain RPV water level between level 4 and level 7.

PO ensures FWLC maintains water level between level 4 and level 7

.CRS directs the following in accordance with HC.OP-

- Ensure Feedwater and

AB. RPV-0004:

Recirc. Pump Runbacks have occurred.

- Ensure Reactor Power is within Feedwater delivery capability.

- Close HV-1651 C for tripped pump*

- Bypass the Reactor Feedwater Runback when conditions permit



Event I Instructor Activity Expected Plant/Student L Response

Comments

.L

NRC SCENARIO 3.DOC

0 RO observes that Recirculation Pump A failed to runback, informs the CRS and coordinates running back A pump with the PO.

bypasses the FW runback in accordance with CRS directions.

CRS directs the following in accordance with HC.OP-

.PO closes HV-1651C and

AB.RPV-0001: - If APRM Upscale alarms are

received, then insert control rods to clear APRM Upscale alarms.

- Verify that Reactor Power is NOT in an Instability Region on the Power to Flow Map.

- Ensure Main Generator MWe and MVAR are maintained within limits. (MA)

- Ensure Recirculation pump MG oil temperatures are maintained in the Normal band. (BB)

appropriate for the power reduction.

Maneuvering T/S S u rve i I la nce requirements in SHOP-I 08.

- Implement 10-6 as

- Review the Power

0 ROlPO reset runbacks in accordance with CRS directions.

RO may observe APRM Upscale alarms, and insert control rods in accordance with the Stuff sheet, and CRS directions.


Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent L' Response

Acknowledge orders as EOs from MCR.

Comments

As TBEO, report SCP C pump motor is extremely hot, unusual odor in the area, and no fire.

Severe Weather:

CALL as System Operator; PJM has informed us of a severe thunderstorm warning is in effect for Salem county, which includes high winds and hail; If requested, report sustained winds up to 60 MPH are expected. -

0 Crew verifies operation outside the Exit Region of the Power- Flow Map.

0 PO ensures:

- Main Generator MWe and MVAR are maintained within limits

temperatures are maintained in the Normal band.(Dispatches EO)

0 CRS dispatches ABEO to check SCP for abnormal conditions.

- Recirculation pump MG oil

0 CRS directs maintenance to investigate problem with "C" SCP.

change has occurred and informs the CRS.

power change and informs Chemistry and Rad Pro of actions for:

0 Crew recognizes a >I 5% power

0 CRS reference SHOP-I 08 for

- T.S. 3.4.5.~.

- ODCM for 3.11.2.1.

weather warning. 0CRS informs crew of severe


'v

0

Event 1 Instructor Activity Expected PlantIStudent Comments Response

RO/PO determines that A RWCU pump is tripped by RWCU

alarm, loss of running indication, CRIDS alarms, and informs CRS.

SYSTEM TROUBLE (CI-C2)

0 RO refers to HC.OP-AR.ZZ-0008 and takes actions to reduce RWCU pump flow to

Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent d’ Response

As outside operator, report after 2 min. of dispatch; lightning and extreme winds.

Comments

---../

NRC SCENARIO 3.DOC

0 ‘Crew recognizes loss of power condition via decreased lighting, alarms for Rx scram (window C- 3) and station service transformer trouble (window E-3) and informs CRS.

RO performs the following IAW HC. OP-AB.ZZ-000 I : - Announces, “Crew - Standby

for Scram Report”.


- Announces the following: + Rod Motion status + APRM Downscale status + Reactor Shutdown status

- WHEN the above actions are complete, then announces “Scram Report Complete”.

Ensures the Reactor Scram has been announced (over PA) Reports “All Scram Actions Complete”


Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent v Response

L

Comments

0 CRS enters and directs HC.OP- EO.ZZ-0101, RPV Control and directs actions to:

- Verify scram actions

- Verify EDGs start

- Verify ECCS actuations

- Verify PCIS/NSSSS isolations

- H2 injection isolation

0 RO/PO recognizes "B" EDG failure to start via lack of running indication(s) and "A1 EDG breaker failure to close via breaker open indication and informs CRS.

0 CRS directs RO/PO to close "A" EDG breaker.

0 RO/PO closes "A" EDG breaker and verifies loading IAW CRS direction.

0 * Crew energizes 10A401 by closing "A" EDG output breaker . (WA 295003 MI .01 3.713.8)

0 CRS directs RO/PO to attempt start of "B" EDG.

0 RO/PO attempts start of "B" EDG IAW CRS direction and reports failure of "6" EDG to respond.

0 CRS implements HC.OP-AB.ZZ- 0135 and directs actions to mitigate the loss of offsite power condition.

electrician to investigate "6" EDG failure and to attempt local start.

As ABEO, report broken oil line on "B" EDG.

Crew dispatches ABEO/Shift

L


L

0CRS directs PO to maintain RPV water level between + I 2.5” and +54” using HPCl and/or RCIC.

Event 1 Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Comments Response

(Pre-inserted)

0 PO recognizes RClC turbine trip condition via alarm B1-AI, turbine trip energized indication, and informs CRS.

As RBEO, report mechanical Overspeed Of RCIC; standing by for reset attempt.

.Crew dispatches RBEO to investigate RClC turbine trip and reset turbine overspeed trip.

’.-

PO recognizes HPCl steam leak conditions via HPCl trip and alarms BI-A4 & BI-A5 and informs CRS.

0 PO recognizes HPCl failure to isolate via isolation initiation signals and failure of HV-F002 and HV-F003 to close and informs CRS.

0 CRS directs closure of HV-F002 and HV-F003 to isolate HPCI.

0 PO closes HV-F002 and HV- F003 IAW CRS direction.

O * When the HPCl System TEMP Isolation Logic initiation signal is

and/or HV-F003 to terminate source of leakage into secondary

Room (41 1 I) temperature reaches 250°F.

(HA 206000 A2.10 4.0/4.1)

NOTE: Isolation of HPCl before

considered satisfactory completion of the critical step. containment before HCPl Pump

receipt of isolation signal is received, Crew shuts HV-FOO~

--



Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent -- Response

Comments

CLEAR malfunction RCOI. When HV-F045 and/or HV-4282 a re/is closed, RESET overspeed HC.OP-SO.BD-OOO~. trip with Remote RC02, and as RBEO report reset of RClC turbine overspeed.

0 CRS directs actions to reset RClC trip throttle valve and to restore RClC to operation IAW

0 CRS directs PO to restore and maintain RPV water level to between +12.5” and +54”.

0 PO injects with RClC to restore and maintain RPV water level between +I 2.5” and +54”.

NOTE: Crew may decide to operate two CRD pumps for RPV water level control assistance. Support two CRD pump operating as EO using appropriate Remote Functions

NOTE: These actions occur in the event of RPV water level reaching-I 29”.

(CD).

NOTE Crew may be able to maintain RPV level >-190”.

NRC SCENARIO 3.DOC

~ -- 0 CRS directs RO to restore “A”

CRD pump to service, and/or place SLC in service.

0 RO restores “A” CRD pump to service.

0 RO/PO places available SLC pump in service.

0CRS directs RO to line up and inject with two CRD pumps IAW HC, OP-SO. BF-000 1.

0 RO coordinates with the EO to start A CRD Pump and line up for two CRD pump operation IAW CRS directions.

oCRS directs inhibiting ADS when RPV level reaches -1 29”.

0 PO inhibits ADS IAW HC.OP-

0 If RPV water level cannot be

SO.SN-0001.

maintained above -1 go”, CRS orders an Emergency Depressurization by opening 5 ADS valves IAW EOP-I 01 AND 202.


-

0 PO opens 5 ADS valves per CRS directions.

Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlanVStudent Comments Response

0 C R S directs injection with available low pressure ECCS pumps to restore RPV level to greater than -1 90”.

0 PO lines up and commences injection with available ECCS, and restores level IAW CRS instructions.

.-

NRC SCENARIO 3.DOC

0 * CREW maintains, or restores, adequate core cooling by maintaining Reactor water level above -190 inches, or emergency depressurizing by opening at least 5 ADS valves and restoring RPV level to above -1 90 inches IAW HC.OP-EO.ZZ- 01 01.

(WA 295031 EA1.08 3.813.9) (WA 295031 EA1.03 4.4/4.4) (WA 295031 EA1.06 4.4/4.4)


' ,

VII. SCENARIO REFERENCES:

A. Conduct of Simulator Training.

B. NUREG 1021, Examiner Standards

C. JTA Listing

D. Probabilistic Risk Assessment

E. Technical Specifications

F. Alarm Response Procedures (Various)

G. HC.OP-AB.MISC-0001 Acts of Nature H. HC. OP-AB. RPV-000 I Reactor Power

I . HC.OP-AB.RPV-0004 Reactor Level Control

--

L.

J. HC.OP-AB. RPV-0007

K. HC.OP-AB.ZZ-000 1 L. HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0135

M. HC.OP-AB.ZZ-0136

N. HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0101

0. HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0102

P. H C. 0 P-EO .ZZ-0202

Q. HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0004

R. HC.OP-SO.AE-0001

Reactor Coolant Conductivity


Station Blackout//Loss of Offsite Power//Diesel Generator Malfunction

Loss of 120 VAC Inverter

RPV Control

Primary Containment Control

Emergency Depressurization

Shutdown From Rated Power to Cold Shutdown

Feedwater System Operation

S. HC.OP-SO. BD-000 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Operation

T. HC.OP-SO.BF-0001 CRD Hydraulic System Operation

U . SH . OP-AS .ZZ-000 1 Operations Standards

'L


. ,. ,

VIII. ESG CRITICAL TASK RATIONAL

-- ESG-003 IO0

I. * Crew energizes 10A401 by closing "A" EDG output breaker.

(WA 295003 AAI .01 3.713.8)

With the "B" EDG unavailable, restoring power to the "AI vital bus, lOA401, provides power for the "A' FRVS vent fan which is required to maintain secondary containment differential pressures. Given the HPCl leakage into the secondary containment, it is critical that the potential release path be monitored and filtered to minimize release and reduce exposure to the public. Additionally, the vital bus will provide the source of power to the "A" RHR pump for long term cooling capability.

2. 0 * When the HPCl system isolation logic initiation signal is received, Crew shuts HV-

F002 and/or HV-F003 to terminate source of leakage into secondary containment before HCPI Pump Room(411 I ) temperature reaches 250°F.

(WA 206000 A2.10 4.014.1)

The HPCl system has received valid isolation signals based upon high steamline flow and a failure to isolate has occurred. Manual isolation of this release path is necessary to terminate the source of leakage into the secondary containment and prevent a possible unmonitored release via the torus room relief panels. 250°F. is the Max. Safe Temperature for Room 41 11 in HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0103.

L

3. * CREW maintains, or restores, adequate core cooling by maintaining Reactor water level above -190 inches, or emergency depressurizing by opening at least 5 ADS valves and restoring RPV level to above -1 90 inches IAW HC.OP-EO.22-0101.

(WA 295031 EA1.08 3.813.9) (WA 295031 EA1.03 4.4/4.4) (KIA 295031 EAI.06 4.4/4.4)

Maintaining adequate Core cooling under these conditions is accomplished by maintaining level above -1 go", or by emergency depressurizing and restoring level to above -1 90". [-I 90" corresponds to the Minimum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level (MSCRWL).]

c


ESG-003 IO0

HOPE CREEK ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM . EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE

Y/N EVENT TRANSIENTS:

Turbine Trip Loss of Feedwater MSlV Closure Loss of Condenser Vacuum Inadvertent Open SRV

X Loss Of Offsite Power Station Black Out

Y/N EVENT SPECIAL I N IT1 AT0 RS:

Loss of ssw Loss of SACS Loss of RACS Loss of Instrument Air

ATWS LOCA

COMPON ENTlTRAl N/SY STE M U NAVAl LAB1 LlTY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY

Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN X HPCl Class 1 E 12OVAC Bus - A Train - RClC Class 1 E 12OVAC Bus - D Train

One SRV EDG A One SSW Pump / Loop X EDGB Circulating Water System - 4 pumps TACS


Y/N OPERATOR ACTION X Manual RPV Emergency Depressurization when required

Manual RPV Depressurization during ATWS Initiation of RHR for Decay Heat Removal

~~

Initiation of Containment Venting Restore Offsite power within 45 minutes SACSISSW restoration after total loss of both systems Avoiding Loss of Feedwater during transient Recovery of the Main Condenser


NRC SCENARIO 3.DOC

1 1

Hope Creek SIMULATOR Turnover Sheet

Protected Equip. Emergent

Oncoming Shift: Days [A] Nights [ ]

~

“A” PCIG, “C” EDG and switchgear Elevated tailpipe temperature F013M SRV

Op Con: 1 Rx Pwr: 95% Gen Output: 1060 MWe Work Window: C Risk Color: Green Major activities scheduled for this shift:

Continue with shutdown IAW HC.OP-10.22-0004, currently at step 5.1.2. RE guidance is to continue power reduction to 75% with RR Flow at 45%/Hr. RE will evaluate at 75% power.

Major activities accomplished on the last shift: Commenced plant shutdown due to elevated temperatures on F013M “ B PCIG compressor was CTT for maintenance to replace the suction filter last shift.

v

Problems WIN Team Operator Workarounds

Operations Superintendent Issues:

Number I DEFICIENCY COMPENSATORY ACTIONS I Due Date

Number I DEFICIENCY ASSIGNED I Due Date I Follow-up Operability Assessments (CRFA) Assigned

Reactivity Controls: MOL 100% rod line

Standby Safety Systems:

Balance of Plant:

RestrictedlEmerqencv Use Only Equipment:

Electrical:

Chemistry:

Coolinq Water:

Computer:

Radiation Monitorina Systems:

Cold Weather Issues:

Administrative: 0

~u


SIMULATOR

EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE v


SCENARIO NUMBER: 4

EFFECTIVE DATE:

EXPECTED DURATION:

REVISION NUMBER:

PROGRAM:

1 Hour

-1 L.O. REQUAL 1 7 1 INITIAL LICENSE n OTHER

REVISION SUMMARY:

NRC SCENARIO 4.DOC

1. OBJECTIVE(S):

Enabling Objectives A.

U'

The crew must demonstrate the ability to operate effectively as a team while completing a series of CREW CRITICAL TASKS, which measure the crew's ability to safely operate the plant during normal, abnormal, and emergency plant conditions. (Crew critical tasks within this examination scenario guide are identified with an " *.")

11. MAJOR EVENTS:

A. B. C. D. Full-core ATWS E. Turbine Bypass Valve failure F.

Raise power with Control Rods APRM failure upscale with single rod scram Failure of Main Turbine to runback following loss of Stator Water Cooling

SLC Failure to Automatically Initiate / SLC Pump A trip

Ill. SCENARIO SUMMARY: The plant is operating at 40% power during power escalation. The B EDG is inoperable. During preparations for power ascension, APRM C fails upscale, resulting in a half-scram and a single rod scram (02-27) due to a blown fuse. When the APRM is bypassed and the half-scram reset, a loss of Stator Water Cooling occurs with a failure of the turbine to runback.

As the crew is attempting to manually reduce Main Generator load, the turbine trips, and a full-core ATWS occurs. In addition, BPVs fail to respond and control RPV pressure, requiring SRVs for pressure control. In responding to the ATWS condition, the SLC System fails to automatically initiate, This requires the operators to manually initiate SLC. Following SLC start, the A SLC pump will trip. With SRVs controlling RPV pressure, Suppression Pool temperature will begin to rise, eventually requiring intentional lowering of RPV level to control power. The Crew should implement HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0320 to insert control rods and complete the scram.

.--/


INITIAL IC:

Initialize the simulator to 36% power IC, rod sequence sheet 57.

---


PREP FOR TRAINING: (i.e., computer set points, procedures, bevel covers) I

lnitial 1 Description - 1. Ensure plant conditions support Reactor Startup IAW 10-003 through step 5.4.21, N/A

step 5.4.19.C. 2. Raise Reactor power with Recirc flow to 40% power. -

- 3, Complete Attachment 2 “Simulator Ready-for-Training/Examination Checklist.” 4. -

.. EVENT TRIGGERS:

I Initial I Description

1, EVENT ACTION: zdrp05nx(2) // Reset RPS Logic A2 - COMMAND: dmf cd060227 PURPOSE: This command will delete Malf CD-06 on Rod 02-27

2. EVENT ACTION: Icvposb(1)

REMOTE/FI ELD FUNCTION SUMMARY: I I I I I I

lnitial

Initial I Description I Delay I Ramp I Remote/Event I Initial I Final - 1. EG-01 B “B” Stator Water Cooling Pump Preinsert OFF

-2. FW21 HWCl Status

- Preinsert Running

3. AN10 A4-B3 HWCl System Trouble Preinsert Norm

4. RM03 Main steam rad monitor set points Preinsert High

- 5. FW05 Demineralizer E Preinsert IN - 6. FW06 Demineralizer F Preinsert IN

7. CW15 TACS clg vlv AE126 to Recirc m/g set A Preinsert 50

- 8. CW16 TACS clg vlv BE126 to Recirc m/g set B Preinsert 50

Description I Delay I Ramp I RemotelEvent I Initial I Final I/O OVERRIDE SUMMARY:

I I I I I I


Event 1 Instructor Activity Expected PlanUStudent Response Comments

v

NRC SCENARIO 4.DOC

I. Raise power with Control Rods:

-

CRS directs power rise using Recirc flow/rod withdrawals per HC.OP-IO.ZZ-003 and RE directions.

0 CRS informs Load Dispatcher of continued power ascension.

0 RO raises Reactor Power with Control Rods in accordance with CRS directions.

RO / PO recognizes /takes actions IAW C3-A3, C4 & D4, C6-A1, C7- D3 & D4, and informs CRS.

- Determines APRM C upscale

- Monitors Rx

- Verifies feed flow/ temperatures

- Checks non-upscale APRMs, verifies only one channel upscale

- Verifies half scramlrod block in

press u re/p owe rlleve I

0 RO / PO recognizes control rod 02-27 single rod scram, informs CRS.

CRS enters / directs actions IAW HC.OP-AB.IC-0001 and HC.OP- AB. IC-0004.

0 PO checks APRM “C” on back panels, verifies upscale and other APRMs normal.



NOTE:

Verify ET-I becomes Active when RPS Logic A2 is reset. This will clear the Scrammed Rod Malfunction and insert Ma If u nct ion RP-04.

NOTE: EO requested to investigate, report that the Scram Valves for 22-27 are open (if RPS is not reset)

Expected PlanVStudent Response Comments

CRS observes requirements of TIS 314.3.1 and TIS 314.3.6

CRS directs I&C to investigate single rod scram

0 CRS directs APRM “C” bypassed and half scram reset.

CRS enters I directs actions IAW C6-E3; directs NE0 to check HCU for scrammed rod, notifies RE, and directs fuse replacement and control rod recovery.

RO I PO takes action IAW C6- E3:

- Verifies only one control rod scrammed and fully inserted

- Verifies that thermal limits are within acceptable constraints using the Reactor Engineer to verify

guidance to reposition the rod - Have Reactor Engineer provide

0 CRS refers to T/S 314.1.3 and 314.2 and directs Reactor Engineer to verify they are within thermal limits.

L


Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlantIStudent Response

NOTE:

Report as NE0 that no Stator Water Cooling pumps are running. If asked, report that the “B” Stator Water Cooling pump will not manually start, and will check breaker status.

Comments

NOTE:

- IF the CRS directs Recirc flow to minimum and manual scram, THEN Insert RT-3 (trips Main Turbine).

i--

NRC SCENARIO 4.DOC

RO / PO recognizes /takes actions IAW El-C1 , informs CRS.

Immediately directs local operator to investigate

Recognizes Stator Water Cooling low pressure comp point in and is not clearing

uter

0 RO / PO recognizes turbine failure to runback and informs the CRS.

0 RO informs CRS of Full Reactor Recirculation Pump Runback

0 CRS enters / directs actions IAW HC.OP-AB.BOP-0002:

- Dispatches operator to local panel 1 OC120 to start both Stator Cooling Pumps and ensure tank level is normal

- Directs RO to monitor for power oscillations

- Directs PO to runback main turbine to < 7055 amps and reduce MVARs to zero

PO manually runs back main turbine to less than 7055 amps and reduces generator MVARs to zero.



Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments

L

NRC SCENARIO 4.DOC

0 CRS monitors Reactor Power and since power is >25% and Stator Water Cooling has not been restored within 2 minutes, Directs CREW to Scram the Reactor, trip the Turbine and implements HC.OP-EO.ZZ-101.

0 RO places and locks the Rx mode switch in shutdown.

0 RO performs the following IAW HC. OP-AB .ZZ-000 1

- Announces, “Crew - Standby for Scram Report”.


- Announces the following:

4 Rod Motion status

4 APRM Downscale status

+ Reactor Shutdown status

IF the reactor is not shutdown then perform the following:

A. Initiates manual scram from

6. Initiates ARI.

C. Announces the following:

o Scram Air Header status.

o Reactor Shutdown status

RPS.

- WHEN the above actions are complete , then announces “Scram Report Complete”.



Event I Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response Comments A

- Inserts the SRM/IRM’s

- Selects IRM chart recorders.


- Locks Out t h e Main Generator - Ensures the Reactor Scram has

been announced (over PA)


L--

NRC SCENARIO 4.DOC

PO/RO recognizes turbine trip during runback, failure of some BPVs to open and informs CRS.

0 CRS enters / directs actions IAW

0 Directs initiation of SLC

Directs RR pumps tripped 0 Directs inhibit ADS

0 Directs alternate control rod

HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0 1 0 1 A;

insertion methods

A RO/PO record tank level, initiates SLC, and verifies RWCU isolation.

PO inhibits ADS IAW HC.OP- AB.ZZ-0001.



* Crew prevents an uncontrolled depressurization during A W S conditions by placing ADS Actuation Timer Inhibit switches to INHIBIT position.

(WA 218000 A4.04 4.1/4.1) (WA 218000 A4.05 4.2/4.2)

Expected Plantl Student Response Comments

NOTE: Support crew’s requests for EOP implementation. Delay EOP- 320 until level is intentionally lowered. Use Remote Functions to implement EOPS.

NOTE:

For reference, SLC “A” Pump Breaker is 52-21 2063

‘L

PO initially opens SRVs until RPV pressure drops below 935 psig then stabilizes RPV pressure below 1037 psig or as directed by CRS

PO recognizes “A SLC Pump trip and informs CRS

Directs local operator to check “A SLC Pump and breaker

CRS enters and directs action IAW HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0102 when Suppression Pool Temperature reaches 95 OF

Directs placing Suppression Pool Cooling in service

PO places Suppression Pool Cooling in service

CRS directs bypassing Group I low level isolation signal per HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0301, -031 1 & - 0319.

L



NOTE: 0 * CRS enters / directs actions When CREW is

level, implement EOP-320, if it has been ordered, THEN Delete RP06 and RP07 when RPS is reset.

and CREW performs IAW

- LOWER RPV level by TERMINATING and PREVENTING injection (except for SLC, CRD and RCIC) UNTIL RPV level drops below -50 in

OR

intentionally lowering RPV HC.OP-EO.ZZ-O101A to:

- IF Supp Pool Temp > 11 0 O F , power is >4%, and Drywell Press > I .68 psig or SRV open or cycling, LOWER RPV level by TERMINATING and PREVENT injection (except for SLC, CRD and RCIC) until any of the following: 0 Rx Power < 4%, or

0 RPV Lvl reaches -129”, or

0 All SRVs remain closed and Drywell press remains < 1.68 psig

(WA 203000 A4.02 4.3/4.1) (WA 209001 A4.01 3.8/3.6) (WA 206000 A4.05 4.4/4.4)

CRS directs PO to maintain RPV level between -1 90” and level to which it was lowered with Preferred ATWS Injection Systems from Table 1 of HC.OP- EO.ZZ-IOIA

Comments

L.


Event 1 Instructor Activity Expected PlantlStudent Response

0 * Crew maintains or restores adequate core cooling by: restoring/maintaining RPV level - >-I 90 inches, or emergency depressurizing by opening at least 5 SRVs and restoring level to >-I90 inches when below the Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure in accordance with HC.OP-EO.ZZ-OI OIA.

(WA 295037 EA2.02 4.1/4.2) (WA 295031 EA1.06 4.4/4.4)

0 After EOP-320 implementation, RO inserts a manual scram, observes that all rods fully inserted, and informs CRS.

* Crew implements HC.OP- EO.ZZ-0320 manually inserts all control rods.

(WA 295037 EA1.05 3.9/4.6)

0 CRS exits HC.OP-EO.ZZ-O101A and reenters HC.OP-EO.ZZ- 0101 at RC-1;

Directs level restoration

0 PO / RO restores level to +12.5” to +54” as directed

NOTE: CRS directs:

IF RPV level cannot be maintained above -1 go”, an emergency depressurization is required .

0 Securing all injection except for SLC, CRD, and RClC

e Emergency depressurizes the RPV in accordance with HC.OP- EO.ZZ-0202,

0 Commencing injection to RPV when below the MARFP and raise level to >-I90 inches.

Comments


Event / Instructor Activity

NRC SCENARIO 4.DOC

Expected PlantEtudent Response Comments



A.

B.

C.

D.

1.

E.

F.

G.

H.

I.

J.

K.

L.

M.

N.

0.

P.

Q. R.

S.

--

Conduct of Simulator Training.

NUREG 1021, Examiner Standards

JTA Listing

Probabilistic Risk Assessment

Technical Specifications

Emergency Plan (ECG)

Alarm Response Procedures (Various) HC.OP-AB. BOP-0002 Main Turbine

HC.OP-AB.IC-0001 Control Rod

HC. OP-AB. IC-0004 Neutron Monitoring

H C . 0 P-AB . RPV-0002

H C. 0 P-AB .ZZ-000 1

HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0 1 0 1

HC.OP-EO.ZZ-01 OIA ATWS-RPV Control

HC. OP-EO.ZZ-0 1 02

HC. OP-EO .ZZ-0320

HC. OP-EO .ZZ-0322

HC.OP-IO.ZZ-0003

SH . OP-AS .ZZ-000 1

Reactor Power Oscillations


RPV Control

Primary Containment Control

Defeating ARI and RPS Interlocks

Core Spray Injection Valve Override

Startup from Cold Shutdown to Rated Power

Operations Standards

b


.

VII. ESG CRITICAL TASK RATIONAL

ESG-073 / 00 1. -.. * Crew implements HC.OP-EO.22-0320 manually inserts all control rods. (KIA 295037 EA1.05 3.914.6)

Implementation of HC.OP-EO.ZZ-0320 OR manually inserting all control rods provides the only methods for control rod insertion and substantial negative reactivity addition. It is critical for the crew to implement one of these methods to insert control rods and shut the reactor down. Failure to initiate these actions would result in requiring RPV level to be lowered to or below TAF to reduce power to < 4%. This represents a significant challenge to maintaining adequate core cooling.

2. * Crew prevents an uncontrolled depressurization during ATWS conditions by placing ADS Actuation Timer Inhibit switches to INHIBIT position. (KIA 218000 A4.04 4.114.1) (KIA 218000 A4.05 4.214.2)

Given the current ATWS conditions of this scenario, preventing ADS automatic operation and potential uncontrolled reactor level floodup prevents a significant transient and subsequent positive reactivity addition to the reactor. EOPs direct this action under the current conditions.

‘V

5 .

0 * CRS enters I directs actions and CREW performs IAW HC.OP-EO.=-0101A to: 0 LOWER RPV level by TERMINATING and PREVENTING injection (except for SLC, CRD and

RCIC) UNTIL RPV level drops below -50 in

OR

IF Supp Pool Temp > I10 OF, power is >4%, and Drywell Press > 1.68 psig or SRV open or cycling, LOWER RPV level by TERMINATING and PREVENT injection (except for SLC, CRD and RCIC) until any of the following: 0

0

Rx Power c 4%, or RPV Level reaches -129”, or

All SRVs remain closed and Drywell press remains c 1.68 psig (KIA 203000 A4.02 4.3I4.1) (KIA 209001 A4.01 3.813.6) (KIA 206000 A4.05 4.414.4)

Given the above scenario conditions, HC.OP-EO.ZZ-OIOIA directs actions to lower RPV water level to reduce reactor power. With the Suppression Pool temperature at or approaching 11 O°F and energy addition to the Suppression Pool in progress (the reactor not shutdown), actions must be taken to reduce Reactor power and prevent challenging the Primary Containment via the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit.

4. * Crew maintains or restores adequate core cooling by: restoringlmaintaining RPV level 1-190 inches, or emergency depressurizing by opening at least 5 SRVs and restoring level to >-I90 inches when below the Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure in accordance with HC.OP-EO.=-0101A. (KIA 295037 EA2.02 4.114.2) (KIA 295031 EA1.06 4.414.4)

Maintaining adequate core cooling under ATWS conditions is accomplished by maintaininghestoring RPV level 2-1 90 inches, or by depressurizing and restoring level to >-I 90 inches when below the Minimum Alternate RPV Flooding Pressure.

-v


ESG-004 / 00

HOPE CREEK ESG - PRA RELATIONSHIPS EVALUATION FORM EVENTS LEADING TO CORE DAMAGE

Y/N EVENT Y/N EVENT TRANSIENTS: SPECIAL INITIATORS:

X Turbine Trip Loss of ssw Loss of Feedwater Loss of SACS MSlV Closure Loss of RACS Loss of Condenser Vacuum Loss of Instrument Air Inadvertent Open SRV


Y/N

‘v

Y/N

X ATWS LOCA

COMPONENTITRAlN/SYSTEM UNAVAILABILITY THAT INCREASES CORE DAMAGE FREQUENCY

COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN Y/N COMPONENT, SYSTEM, OR TRAIN HPCl Class 1 E 12OVAC Bus - A Train

~

RClC Class 1 E 12OVAC Bus - D Train One SRV EDG A One SSW Pump / Loop EDG B Circulating Water System - 4 pumps TACS


OPERATOR ACTION Manual RPV Emergency Depressurization when required Manual RPV Depressurization during ATWS Initiation of RHR for Decay Heat Removal Initiation of Containment Venting Restore Offsite power within 45 minutes SACS / SSW restoration after total loss of both systems Avoiding Loss of Feedwater during transient Recovery of the Main Condenser



~ k * Hope Creek SIMULATOR Turnover Sheet

Op Con: 1 Rx Pwr: 40% Gen Output: 394 MWe Work Window: B Risk Color: Green

Emergent Issues WIN Team

Major activities accomplished on the last shift: Major activities scheduled for this shift: \.- Performed startup through step 5.4.20 of HC.OP- Continue with the startup IAW HCOP-IO.ZZ-0003 at

1o.zz-0003 step 5.4.21 Performed “B” EDG Surveillance. Because of slow starts, still available but inoperable HC.OP-ST.ZZ-0001 completed 1.5 hours ago troubleshooting

Withdraw rods to the 80% rod line @

- SIMULATOR

EXAMINATION SCENARIO GUIDE L


SCENARIO NUMBER: SPARE

EFFECTIVE DATE:


REVISION NUMBER:

PROGRAM: T I L.O. REQUAL INITIAL LICENSE

REVISION SUMMARY:

NRC SPARE SCENARIO.DOC

1. OBJECTIVE(S):


completing a series of CREW CRITICAL TASKS, which measure the crew's ability to safely operate the plant during normal, abnormal, and emergency plant conditions. (Crew critical tasks within this examination scenario guide are identified with an " *.'I)

--

II. MAJOR EVENTS:

A. B. Condenser Level Transmitter failure C. D. E. F. Large Break LOCA/Downcomer Failure

Transfer B RPS to the Alternate Power Supply

RWCU leak, failure to automatically isolate SRV stuck open, and then closes (Similar to Audit, but modified) Seismic Event, Loss of Chilled Water to the Drywell


The scenario begins at 100% power. Transfer of RPS B to its alternate power supply is required for MG set maintenance. Following the transfer, the controlling Condenser level transmitter fails. The crew must select an alternate transmitter to prevent a loss of

A leak will develop from the RWCU System. Manual isolation of the leak is required due to a failure of the automatic isol

initial license -1 other · 2012. 11. 18. · above -1 90". the scenario may be ... 9s30 b ovdl...

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