innovation+in+practice+wk+1+intro+pdf

Innovation in Practice

Innovation in Practice Pilot 2010

DISCOURSES IN INNOVATION 1:

DISCLOSING THE (K)NEW:

LEARNING, SKILL ACQUISITION AND THE PRODUCTIVIST LIMITS OF INNOVATION THEORY



INNOVATION IN PRACTICE

METHODS AND PROCESSES

IMAGINATION, BODY, MATERIALITY

innovation

If there‟s one thing that we want to do in this course it is to smash this

romanticist and Cartesian illusion that “innovation” happens in the head

– however literally or metaphorically – of some uniquely gifted or

talented individual who exists in isolation form that world of which they

are a part, and all of those “practices,” or even more appropriately,

that community of practitioners who - however acknowledgedly or

unacknoweldgedly – inform what they do, and all of those various

semiotic, linguistic, material, economic, social, cultural, political, and

cognitive systems that similarly inform them as well.

innovation

“Innovation” exists in our skillful adaptive relationships to those environments in which we exist….

innovation

… our relationships to each other in those environments….

innovation

… and those materials that constitute those environments….

… the objects or tools that we make with those materials that then further facilitate our

relationships to those environments…

innovation

… and even more specifically in those “communities of practice” that provide us with the

requisite skills to do all of these things!

Haridimos TsoukasComplex Knowledge. Studies in Organizational Epistemology

The world in which we exist can only be truly understood – let alone

“innovated” for – according to the “logic” of complex systems theory, second

order cybernetics, emergence, and an enactive, embodied, or dynamic

understanding of the nature of cognition or mind, or what he specifically calls

an “open” as opposed to a “closed” ontology, an “enactivist” as opposed to a

“representationalist” epistemology, and a “poetic” as opposed to an

“Intrumentalist”praxeology.

Open Ontology/Enactivist Epistemology/PoeticPraxeology

Open Ontology/Enactivist Epistemology/Poetic Praxeology

“An open-world ontology assumes that the world is always in a process of

becoming, of turning into something different. Flow, flux, and change are the

fundamental processes of the world. The future is open, unknowable in principle,

and it always holds the possibility of surprise.”

“An enactivist epistemology assumes that knowing is action. We bring the world

forward by making distinctions and giving form to an unarticulated background

of understanding. Knowledge is the outcome of an active knower who has a

certain biological structure, follows certain historically shaped cognitive practices,

and is rooted within a consensual domain and sociocultural practice.”

“A poetic praxeology sees the practitioner as an active being who, while

inevitably shaped by the sociocultural practices in which he/she is rooted,

necessarily shapes them in turn by undertaking action that is relatively opaque in

its consequences and unclear in its motives and desires, unreflective and situated

in its mode of operation, but inherently capable of self-observation and reflexivity,

thus susceptible to chronic change.”

Tsoukas, Haridimos. 2005. Complex Knowledge. Studies in Organizational Epistemology. New York. Oxford University Press. P 5

The world is not an absolute, stable, pre-determined, and “re-

presentable” thing that exists outside of or beyond our

perceptions and understandings of it, but is rather in a constant state of, “flux, flow, and change,” that is

simultaneously affected by our “enactive” participation in it,

and our “poetic” disclosure of it.

Francisco VarelaEthical Know-How: Action, Wisdom, and Cognition

Cognitive science is waking up to the full importance of the realization

that perception does not consist In the recovery of a pre-given world,

but rather in the perceptual guidance of action in a world that is

inseparable from our sensorimotor capacities, and that “higher"

cognitive structures also emerge from patterns of perceptually guided

action. Thus cognition consists not of representations but of embodied

action. Thus we can say that the world we know is not pre-given; it is,

rather, enacted through our history of structural coupling, and the

temporal hinges that articulate enaction are rooted in the number of

alternative rnicroworlds that are activated in every situation. These

alternatives are the source of both common sense and creativity in

cognition.

Varela, Francisco. 1999. Ethical Know-How: Action, Wisdom, and Cognition. Stanford University Press.

This “epistemic shift” toward a more “open,” “enactive,” and

“praxeological” understanding of the nature of our existence

has been influenced by a number of different sources

besides Varela‟s “neurophenomenological” amalgamation

of his and Humbeto Maturana‟s insights into the neurophysiological nature and structure of our systems of

perception and cognition and phenomenological

philosophy and these include…

Pheonomenology/Pragmatism/Cybernetics/Systems Theory

Heinz Von Foerster born November 13, 1911 –

October 2, 2002

Stephen Toulmin - 25 March 1922 - 4 December

2009

Stafford Beer – born September 25, 1926 - August

23, 2002

Humberto Maturana September 14, 1928 –

Alasdair Macintyre - 12 January 1929

Richard Rorty – born October 4, 1931 – June 8,

2007

George Lakoff - May 24, 1941

Francisco Varela - September 7, 1946 – May 28,

2001

Charles Taylor - born 28 January 1948

William James - January 11, 1842 – August 26,

1910

Henri Bergson born, 8 October 1859 – 4 January

1941

John Dewey – born October 20, 1859 – June 1,

1952

Alfred North Whitehead born 15 February 1861 –

30 December 1947

Ludwig Wittgenstein - born 26 April 1889 – 29

April 1951

Michael Polanyi - March 11, 1891 – February 22,

1976

Martin Heidegger - born September 26, 1889 –

May 26, 1976

Hans-Georg Gadamer - born February 11, 1900 –

March 13, 2002

Gregory Bateson – born 9 May 1904 – 4 July 1980

Phenomenology and Pragmatism

Martin Heidegger Hans-Georg Gadamer John Dewey

Cybernetics/Systems Theory/Enactive-Embodied Mind

Gregory Bateson Heinz Von Forester Francisco Varela

“Truth” – or perhaps even more appropriately – what we know, or can

come to know, is produced in practice.

That is through our active participation in a world –what Heidegger

called our “being-in-the-world” – that we “hermeneutically” or

interpretively disclose or produce – i.e. “enact” - as Gadamer

suggested, and consensually agree upon and act within as Dewey

claimed.

Facts that have been even more “empirically” validated in recent

years through the likes of Bateson‟s and Von Forester‟s research into the

organizational nature and structure of those systems in which we exist –

whether social, cultural, economic, or cognitive - and are inextricably

“structurally coupled” to as Maturana and Varela claim.

“Truth” is produced in Practice

Bruno Latour – Actor Network TheoryThe Social Construction of Scientific Facts

Hannah ArendtThe Human Condition

“The use of the experiment for the purpose of knowledge was already

the consequence of the conviction that one can only know what he

has made himself, for this conviction meant that one might learn about

those things man did not make by figuring out and imitating the process

through which they had come into being.”

Arendt, Hannah. 1958. The Human Condition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago. p295

Francisco Varela and Humberto MaturanaAutopoiesis and Cognition. The Realization of the Living.

Purpose or aims, however, as we saw in the first chapter, are not features

of the organization of any machine (allo- or autopoietic); these notions

belong to the domain of our discourse about our actions, that is, they

belong to the domain of descriptions, and when applied to a machine,

or any system independent from us, they reflect our considering the

machine or system in some encompassing context.

Maturana, Humberto and Varela, Francisco. 1980. Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living,

Dordrecht: D. Reidel

Reiner SchurmannHeidegger On Being and Acting. From Principles to Anarchy

”it is only because man first grasps himself as archi-tect, as initiator of

fabrication, that nature can in turn appear to him as moved by the

mechanisms of cause and effect.”

“it is only because the artisan experiences the origin of production as

indigenous to himself, he finds another such origin in nature, concordant

with although allogeneous to his own.”

“The experience that guides the comprehension of origin as it is operative

in the „philosophy of nature‟ is thus paradoxically the experiencing of

fabricating tools and works of art, the experience of handiwork.”

Shurmann, Reiner. Heidegger on Being and Acting from Principles to Anarchy. Indiana University Press. Bloomington

Jean-Luc NancyThe Creation of the World or Globalization

It “creation” means anything, it is the exact opposite of any form of

production in the sense of a fabrication that supposes a given, a

project, and a producer. The idea of creation, such as has been

elaborated by the most diverse and at the same time most convergent

thoughts… is above all the idea of the ex nihilo [out of nothing]. The

world is created from nothing: this does not mean fabricated with

nothing by a particularly ingenious producer. It means instead that it is

not fabricated, produced by no producer, and not even coming out of

nothing (like a miraculous apparition), but in quite a strict manner and

more challenging for thought: the nothing itself, if one can speak in this

way, or rather nothing grows as something…In creation, a growth grows

from nothing and this nothing takes care of itself, cultivates its growth.

Nancy, J-L, (2007)The Creation of the World or Globalization. Trans. Raffoul, F & Pettigrew, D. Albany, State

University of New York Press. P 51

As much as we might have intellectually realized the enormous ontological and

epistemological significance of these insights – insights that, whether in the

physical sciences or philosophy we have, in many instances, been aware of for

over a hundred years! – we have as yet to recognize the full implications of their

significance within the machinations of our everyday lives. That is in the ways in

which we actually come to know, learn, teach, and act within - or more

importantly for our current purposes, design or “innovate” within - this world of

which we are all a part, and actively, or even more appropriately, “enactively,”

contribute to the construction of.

There is an absolutely massive disconnect between what in a few weeks time

we will see Donald Schön and Chris Argyris call our “espoused theories” and our

“theories-in-use.” Or what we can even more simply describe as those

fundamental beliefs and practices that actually inform what we do and those

that we claim to inform what we do.

Gert BiestaCritique of the “representationalist” epistemology of modern education

John Gray and Fernando FloresEntrepreneurship and the Wired Life: Work in the Wake of Careers

Daniel Pink – “The MFA is the new MBA”

Complex- Collective – Collaborative – Emergent – Enactive

theorisations of the nature of cultural production, organization, meaning, or “innovation”

Leadbeater – Anderson – Taleb – Tapscott and Williams

Wenger – Lave – Dreyfus - Hildreth - Kimble

Peggy Kamuf – “Accounterability in Higher Education”

“First, I note the assumption that, according to this statement, my

university education ought to have been a preparation for the global,

competitive workforce. This is not said in so many words, but that

would be precisely what signals it as an unexamined assumption. I do

not share this assumption and my university experience has, I believe,

been the richer for it; moreover I believe this despite the fact that, in

another sense, I am now far poorer because my parents refused to

continue subsidizing my studies ever since I changed my major to the

Programme in Critical Thinking. No doubt like the author of these

assertions, they were willing to invest in my university degree only so

long as I promised an appreciable return of marketable skills.

Nevertheless, I believe that my program of study, and this will be my

second point, has definitely enhanced my „capability and capacity

to think and develop and continue to learn‟, aims that, I agree,

should motivate university teaching, learning, and research”

DISCOURSES IN INNOVATION 1: DISCLOSING THE (K)NEW:


• General Introduction and course overview.

• Innovation as Creative Destruction – Schumpeter and Beyond.

• Innovation as „History Making‟ - Ontological Design and the disclosure of the

(k)new.

• Innovation and „Expertise‟” - Hubert Dreyfus and the „tacit‟ nature of „skillful‟

innovation.

• Innovation in „Practice‟ – The „tacit‟ knowledge of innovatory practice. Flores,

Schon, and Nonaka.

• Innovative Change – Stephen Turner and the “object” of transformative „practice.

• Innovation and Systemic Change – Open Source Innovation, Distributed Mind,

and the Economy of Contribution.

• Summation, Critical Review and Essay Planning

“Innovation as Creative Destruction – Schumpeter and Beyond”.

In this first lecture we will consider of some of the key ways in which innovation

has come to be understood, both practically, conceptually, and critically

through out its development. We will place particular emphasis on the way in

which it has been articulated within the discourses of economics, business,

organisation, and management theory, from Joseph Schumpeter‟s original

analysis of it as “creative destruction” through to Henry Chesbrough‟s most

recent ideas on “open innovation”.

Joseph SchumpeterInnovation as Creative Destruction

Henry ChesbroughOpen Innovation

Innovation as „History Making‟ - Ontological Designand the disclosure of the (k)new

This lecture seeks to expand on our understanding of design‟s essentially

“inventive,” “innovative,” or what we will call its “ontologically disclosive” nature.

The principle inspiration for this re-reading of the nature of innovation is Hubert

Dreyfus, Fernando Flores, and Charles Spinosa‟s hermeneutically and

phenomenologically inspired reading of it in their text, Disclosing New Worlds.

Entrepreneurship, Democratic Action, and the Cultivation of Solidarity. We will

also discuss the basic underlying philosophical premises of this work.

Hubert Dreyfus, Fernando Flores, and Charles Spinosa

Disclosing New Worlds: Entrepreneurship, Democratic Action, and the Cultivation of Solidarity

Innovation and „Expertise‟” - Hubert Dreyfus and the „tacit‟ nature of

„skillful‟ innovation‟.

This next lecture seeks to expand our understanding of what “tacit” knowledge

is by focusing not only on Hubert Dreyfus‟ analysis of its importance to his more

philosophically orientated critique of the nature of “cognition” or “intelligence”,

but even more specifically his analysis of its role in “skill acquisition”, learning,

and the development of the sort of “expertise” that is essential to innovation.

Michael Polanyi‟s original definition and analysis of the concept will also be

considered.

Hubert Dreyfus and the „tacit‟ nature of „skillful‟ innovation

Martin Heidegger

Michael Polanyi – Personal Knowledge

Innovation in „Practice‟ – The „tacit‟ knowledge of

innovatory practice.Flores, Schon, and Nonaka

In this next lecture we will seek to further explicate how these ideas

have not only been directly applied to the discourse and practices of

innovation theory through the work of individuals like Fernando Flores,

but also to the discourses of Education, Learning, and Organisation

and Management Theory, through the work of Donald Schon, Chris

Argyris, and Ikujiro Nonaka.

Donald SchönThe Reflective Practitioner

Chris ArgyrisTheory in Practice

Ikujiro NonakaEnabling Knowledge Creation - “Tacit” Knowledge

“Innovative Change – Stephen Turner and the “object” of

transformative „practice‟”.

In this next lecture we will seek to further consider some of the more essential

critical or philosophical questions about the nature of how “tacit” knowledge

is actually transmitted, communicated, learnt, or acquired through those

“practices” that we share. Stephen Turner‟s critique of the supposedly

“collective” and “objective” nature of that knowledge that we “tacitly” share

through our mutual co-option and adoption of shared “practices” leads

directly into some of the key themes of the following analysis of the

“distributed” nature of intelligence, “skill”, “expertise”, and “practice” that

have been so important to the development of many of the most recent

theories of “open source” innovation

Stephen TurnerThe Social Theory of Practices

Innovation and Systemic Change – Open Source Innovation, Distributed

Mind, and the Economy of Contribution

Having considered Turner‟s analysis and critique of the supposedly

“collective” and “objective” nature of that “tacit” knowledge that we

acquire through our mutual co-option and adoption of shared “practices”,

this final lecture seeks to outline how some of the implications of this critique

of the way in which that “innovative” knowledge that we “tacitly” acquire

through those “practices” that we share has affected the development of

some of the most recent theorisations of “open source” innovation that were

briefly outlined in the introductory lecture. Some of the social, cultural,

political, economic, and ethical implications of this model of innovation will

also be considered – particularly as they relate to what Bernard Stiegler has

recently described as the “economy of contribution”.

Being-in-the-World – The Movie

innovation+in+practice+wk+1+intro+pdf

Technology

novation innovation

practice pilot

practice methods

communities of practice

openworld ontology

pregiven world

embodied action

guided action