inside the command post: the seat of command · 2020. 2. 25. · in march 2004, the firefighter...

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INSIDE THE COMMAND POST: THE SEAT OF COMMAND Mike Alder Division Chief (Retired) City of San Bernardino Fire Department Chief, Crafton Hills Regional Fire Academy

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  • INSIDE THE COMMAND POST:

    THE SEAT OF COMMAND

    Mike Alder

    Division Chief (Retired)

    City of San Bernardino Fire Department

    Chief, Crafton Hills Regional Fire Academy

  • INTRODUCTION/OBJECTIVES

    • A little about me. Not expert but a very diverse background in multiple areas

    • This class evolved from an attempt to fix some risk taking on the fireground.

    • The fire service culture is very powerful and it takes real leadership to change a safer fire service

  • OUR EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS…

    LET’S GO BACK A FEW YEARS

  • A LOOK BACK

    • SBFD – A strong “Let’s go get it” mentality

    • Several years of observations and an increase in “risk taking” on the fire ground

    • A realization that just because we did things and got away with them, was not an indication that we were doing them safely

  • THE FIRST PLACE WE LOOKED TO GET SOME ANSWERS

    What is the rest of the Fire Service doing and what do the Facts and Stats say?

  • Overall, the same number of firefighters that are dying today per fire incident is the same as it

    was 20 years ago.

    IS SAFETY just a buzz word?

  • NIOSH Top 5 Causes of firefighter deaths

    • Lack of incident command

    • Inadequate risk assessment

    • Lack of firefighter accountability

    • Inadequate communication

    • Lack of SOPs

  • NIOSH Investigation of Structure Fires

    • Compiled facts from 84 trauma-related incidents at structure fires. 1998 to 2008:– 118 firefighter fatalities

    – 126 serious injuries

    • 75% of the deaths and 86% of the injuriesoccurred in structures that the firefighters knew or suspected were unoccupied.

  • NIOSH Investigation of Structure Fires

    • Of the 84 incidents, 65 involved offensive firefighting tactics.

    Level of risk needs objective, smart size up.

    Manage the risk using your experience and knowledge of alternative tactics.

    Slow down?

  • NATIONAL FALLEN FIREFIGHTERS FOUNDATION

    In March 2004, the Firefighter Life Safety Summit was held in Tampa, Florida to address

    the need for change within the fire and emergency services. Through this meeting, 16 Life Safety Initiatives were produced to ensure

    that Everyone Goes Home.

    http://www.everyonegoeshome.com/initiatives.html

  • Everyone Goes Home

    First Four of Sixteen Life Safety Initiatives

    1. Leadership for Cultural Change:Define and advocate the need for a cultural change within the fire service relating to safety; incorporating leadership, management, supervision, accountability and personal responsibility.

    2. Accountability for Safety:Enhance the personal and organizational accountability for health and safety throughout the fire service.

    3. Manage the RiskFocus greater attention on the integration of risk management with incident management at all levels, including strategic, tactical, and planning responsibilities.

    4. Everyone Can and SHOULD Stop an Unsafe OperationAll firefighters must be empowered to stop unsafe practices.

  • THE INTERNAL STRUGGLE AS A FIRE GROUND COMMANDER

    • The previous facts and stats were not in line with the observations on the fire ground

    • A feeling that the “let’s go get it” culture was dominating common sense

  • TRAINING VS. CULTURE

    • K St. Incident – This incident opened the door to understanding the strength of a culture

    • Subsequent Dept. Training Plan Implemented

    • 6 months later – Temple Incident - This incident opened the door to understanding dysfunctional momentum and operant conditioning

  • Why would a smart guy like Ben get himself in a situation like this?

  • • The problem is Ben. He wasn’t thinking and should have known better.

    • The problem is the organization's culture. It made him believe that this kind of behavior was OK. Maybe even desired.

    • The problem was the situation. Things move too fast during emergencies. There was no way to see this coming.

    What’s the Problem??

  • Organization

    Person

    Situation

    Culture of Safety=

    Safe Behavior

  • Composure

    When you have it . . .

    • You can take in more information

    • You can process it logically and critically.

    • You can communicate it effectively.

    • Your calm catches on.

    When you don’t . . .

    • Your “vision” narrows.

    • You overlook critical information and don’t integrate new inputs well.

    • Your communication fragments, is hard to follow, and disorganized.

    • You scare people!

  • WHEN YOU DON’T HAVE COMPOSURE

    IT CAN BE PRETTY UGLY

  • WHEN YOU DO HAVE COMPOSUREIT CAN MAKE ALL THE

    DIFFERENCE

  • Conventional Wisdom

    Don’t let your emotions get in the way!

  • Decision Making Under Pressure

    Don’t get emotional vs

    • Understand the origin of emotion.

    • Capitalize on what emotions do for us in the emergency decision making process.

    • Recognize emotional states (in yourself and others) and work within them, don’t try ignore them.

  • Rational Thought

    Emotional Thought

  • Maintaining Composure

    • PRACTICE “Thinking about thinking”

    – Understand the source of anxiety in the context of the event.

    MYTH: “Good high-stress decision makers have less fear, know more about the emergency, and don’t get excited easy”.

    What we really need in emergencies: Resiliency, not perfection

  • Maintaining Composure

    • PRACTICE “Deliberate Calm”

    – A process of engaging in a deliberate and focused awareness of your surroundings learned through conscious effort and regular practice.

  • Maintaining Composure

    • PRACTICE Dealing With:

    – Unconventional challenges

    – Unpredictable outcomes and,

    – Developing flexible, innovative solutions

  • Solving Problems or Following Directions?

  • Acronyms, Mnemonics, and Rules• SLICERS

    – Size-up, Locate, Identify, Cool, Extinguish, Rescue, Salvage

    • REVAS – Rescue, Evacuation, Ventilation, Attack, Salvage.

    • RECEO-VS– Rescue, Exposures, Extinguish, Overhaul, Ventilation,

    Salvage

    • SCREEO– Size Up, Call for help, Rescue, Exposures, Extinguishment, Overhaul.

    • SLEEVS – Situation, Life safety, Exposures, Extinguish, Ventilate, Salvage.

    • COAL WAS WEALTH – Construction, Occupancy, Area, Life Hazards; Weather, Apparatus/Manpower, Special Conditions; Water Supply,

    Exposures, Age/Access, Location, Time, Height.

    • FIRE SCALDS– Fire Weather, Instructions, Right Things First, Escape Plan, Scouting, Communication, Alertness, Lookout, Discipline,

    Supervision

    • WALLACE WAS HOT – Water, Area, Life hazard, Location-extent,

    Apparatus-personnel, Construction-collapse, Exposures, Weather, Auxiliary appliances, Special matters, Height, Occupancy, and Time.

    • BEERS– Basement, Exposure, Electrical/gas, Rescue, Seat of fire

    • CHAOS– Chief Has Arrived On Scene

    • TEQUILA

  • Rational Thought

    Emotional Thought(Limbic system)

  • A LOOK AT THE YOUNGER BRAIN IN ACTION

  • I am totes slaying the dragon right now

  • Controlling Incident Momentum

    1. Start Early!

    2. Create the pause

    3. Don’t fall in love with your plan

    4. Practice Humility

    5. Be a decisive leader

  • Start Early5 Early Signs of Dysfunctional Momentum

    1. Decreased or ineffective communication between crewmembers and/or IC during periods where incident activity is increasing.

    2. Incident conditions are not improving or are getting worse in spite of tactical efforts, but adjustments are not being made in response.

    3. Crewmembers begin engaging in higher risk tactics that do not match the potential gain of using them.

    4. Team members begin to fragment from the established organizational structure. More independent action, less teamwork.

    5. Crews or individuals opt to engage in operations without adequate resources in place to safely support them, even when there is time to get these resources in place.

  • Create the Pause

    • A calculated, brief, intentional, mental retreat to reevaluate your direction.

  • Lt. General Hal Moore

  • Lt. General Hal Moore

    • “In battle, I periodically detached myself mentally for a few seconds from the noise, the screams of the wounded, the explosions, the yelling, the smoke and dust, the intensity of it all and ask myself: What am I doing that I should not be doing, and what am I not doing that I should be doing to influence the situation in my favor?”

  • Controlling Incident Momentum

    Don’t fall in love with your plan

  • Colonel John Boyd, USAF

    Forty Second Boyd, Genghis John, The Mad Major, The

    Ghetto Colonel

  • The OODA Loop

  • • The nature of any given system is continuously changing even as efforts are directed toward maintaining it in its original form.

    • The key to survival is the ability to adapt to change, not perfect adaptation to existing circumstances.

  • Controlling Incident Momentum

    A Little Humility Goes a Long Way!

  • Controlling Incident Momentum

    Be a Decisive Leader

    (Keep Grandma Out of the Command Post)

  • 3 Younger Brains

    &

    Risk Taking

  • Rational Thought

    Emotional Thought(Limbic system)

  • Survey of younger firefighters

    • “ . . . 80% of the junior firefighters surveyed said that they would not report a dangerous condition to command officers, even though it might effect firefighter safety. This was mainly because they felt that command already knew of the situation and did not want to hear from the junior firefighters”

    (Lubnau and Okray 2001)

  • After the Burn over

    Several subordinate members of the crew stated that they noticed clues that the fire situation was getting dangerous, but did not make an issue about it since

    more senior crew members did not seem to be alarmed.

  • After the Burn over

    The I.C. trainee seemed to be in denial that the fire would overrun them. After the fire, he was quoted as

    saying , “ the hair on the back of my neck never stood up” and that he “had never lost a fire.”

  • Operant Conditioning

    If you commit an unsafe act enough times, and nothing bad happens, you begin to think it’s actually not

    unsafe after all!

  • A Near Miss?Lessons from the aerial ladder

  • After Action ReportTwo key findings

    1. The injured firefighter had done the same thing before, didn’t get hurt, so he kept doing it!

    OPERANT CONDITIONING

  • “After the incident, several department members relayed stories of the same thing almost happening to them. These stories ranged from simply scuffing the toe of a boot, to actually having the boot get

    pulled into the rung”

    After Action ReportTwo key findings

  • HIT

  • Near-Misses vs Remote-Misses

    • Near-miss response

    – Survive, but deeply affected by the incident. Reinforces a more careful approach in the future, productive fear.

    • Remote-miss response

    – Psychological consequences are ”the exact opposite of the near-miss group. Their survival comes with an excitement associated with the attack and a feeling of invulnerability. A near miss leaves you traumatized, but a remote miss makes you believe you are invincible.’

  • Times we got it

    right

    95%

    Times we didn't

    get it right

    5%

    Where do we focus our attention?

    Where we like to focus

    Where injuries and fatalities take placeWhere real learning

    takes place

  • What defines us as members of the fire service?

  • What defines us as members of the fire service?

  • How We See/Define Ourselves Can

    Get us all Jacked-Up

  • Firefighters are not normal people!

    Occupational Safety Logic

    • The more we reduce risks the safer the environment is for those around us.

    Fire Service Logic

    • If I take risks, I can increase the safety of the environment for those who call for service.

  • Public Expectation

    Esperanza Burnover Report

    Contributing Factor #1

    “The public (social and political) and firefighting communities expect and tolerate firefighters accepting a notably higher risk for structure protection on wildland fires . . .” (pg. 43)

  • Things we do that work contrary to our own best interest

    • Overconfidence– Overestimate our capacity.

    – Underuse the capacity of others

    – Too many “remote-misses”

    • Overly motivated to accomplish strategic tasks.– Failure to recognize, or accept, deteriorating

    conditions.

    • Acquiescence to social pressure

  • What are we really looking for?

    Consistent, reliable

    SAFE BEHAVIORS

  • Clearly Defined Scope of Duty

    Identification and Understanding

    of

    Risks Involved

    Safety Systems Adequate

    and

    Appropriate to Address Identified Risks

    Safety Culture

    Safe Behaviors

  • Clearly Defined Scope of Duty

  • If you identify it, train on it, and prepare for it, you CAN do it.

  • Clearly Defined Scope of Duty

    Identification and Understanding

    of

    Risks Involved

    Safety Systems Adequate

    and

    Appropriate to Address Identified Risks

    Safety Culture

  • Symptoms of absence• Management actions not congruent

    with meaningful safety initiatives.

    • Role modeling of unsafe behavior.

    Components• Management offers visible evidence of

    safety commitment by modeling safe behaviors.

    • Safety is a deeply held organizational value

    • Safe behavior is rewarded.

    • Rewards systems for safe behavior congruent between formal and informal leaders/groups.

    Safety Culture

  • Firefighter Phillip Townsend Denison TX. Fire Department

    December 30, 2006

    “Everything was going well . . .

    . . .until the Chief showed up”

    President of Local 951

  • Identified Collapse Zone

  • The Fire Chief Arrives

  • Symptoms of absence• Management actions not congruent

    with meaningful safety initiatives.

    • Role modeling of unsafe behavior.

    • Near misses underemphasized or ignored.

    • Management commitment to safety is seen as inconsistent, leading to low credibility.

    Components• Management offers visible evidence of

    safety commitment by modeling safe behaviors.

    • Safety is a deeply held organizational value

    • Safe behavior is rewarded.

    • Rewards systems for safe behavior congruent between formal and informal leaders/groups.

    Safety Culture

  • Clearly Defined Scope of Duty

    Identification and Understanding

    of

    Risks Involved

    Safety Systems Adequate

    and

    Appropriate to Address Identified Risks

    Safety Culture

    Leadership

    Intervention

    Critical!

    Safe Behavior

  • Barriers to Effective

    Command & Control Failure to make proper

    decisions on the fire ground by Incident Commanders. Why?

    Not understanding the responsibility of managing the strategy, resources and the risk

    Not understanding the functions of command

    Not understanding fire behavior, building construction and the changing fire ground

  • The Eight Essentials to Effective Command

    1 Be competent

    2 Bring value to the incident

    3 Effectively communicate

    4 Formally declare the strategic mode

    5 Set good tactical objectives

    6 Organize the incident

    7 Monitor the triangle of communication

    8 Continually question & be pessimistic

  • #1 - Be Competent

    • Understand fire behavior and building construction

    – The fire ground has changed. Modern vs. Legacy (UL & NIST Studies)

    • Realize the importance of really knowing your craft

    • Realize what needs to be done if your weak. Reality check – We all are!

  • STRATEGIC & TACTICALCONSIDERATIONS FOR TODAY’S

    FIREGROUND

  • Cincinnati Ohio2003

  • Standard Measure: BTU

    The amount of energy needed to heat 1 pound of

    water 1 °F

    1 Lb. of Wood =8,000 BTUs

    16,000 BTU• 1 Lb of Plastic =

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fahrenheit

  • The change per unit time as a result of the conversion of

    the chemical energy of a fuel to heat in a combustion

    process.

    Heat release rate is typically reported in kilowatts (kW) or

    megawatts (MW).

    It is, in effect, the most pertinent measure

    of the size of a fire.

  • Heat Flux: Flow of energy per unit of area per

    unit of time (W/m2)

    The intensity of the thermal environment to

    which a sample is exposed when burned.

  • Heat release rate(GPM)

    Heat Flux(Velocity/Pressure)

    Object

  • In IDEAL circumstances, rated for:

    5 minutes in 500 degrees F (NFPA 1971)

    Does NOT take into consideration:

    Heat flux (measured – kW/m2)

    Rate of heat transfer due to the velocity of

    convective flows.

  • NIST Research:

    Just prior to flashover, the heat flux from the upper hot gas

    layer to the floor approaches 20 kW/m2.

    Post flashover heat flux ranges from 60 kW/m2 to 160

    kW/m2

    Survival time for firefighter in full structure gear exposed

    to 500o F combined with heat flux in excess of 20 kW/m2

    is:

    Less than 30 seconds

  • 126 126

    The contents of a

    single-family home.

    Now dominated by

    synthetic materials.

    Source: National Geographic

    Magazine

  • 127 127

    26% of Houses built in 2008

    were greater than 3000 ft2

  • SMOKE IS FUEL

    Dual pane glass failed in about 5 min. at about

    650o.

    A ventilation limited (fuel rich) condition

    developed prior to the failure of the windows.

    Oxygen depleted combustion products filled the

    rooms of the structure.

    Once the window failed, the fresh air provided the

    oxygen needed to sustain the transition through

    flashover, which caused a significant increase in

    temperature.

  • Externally applied water:

    Fog and solid stream patterns through the window for 60 sec

    at about 150 GPM:

    Heat Factor Fog Stream Solid Stream

    Temperature 20% decrease 40% decrease

    Heat Flux 30% decrease 40% decrease

    SS had little or no impact on gas velocity in

    corridors outside fire room

  • Offensive or Defensive

  • Transitional Attack:

    Quick attack of the fire from an exterior

    position with a straight stream to hold the

    fire in check , coordinated with a subsequent

    offensive attack.

  • Transitional Attack Guidelines• A structure fire is pre or post-flashover with visible

    flames venting from one or more openings.

    • The time or resources required to make an offensive attack will allow the fire to:

    – Reach flashover, or

    – Extend to uninvolved rooms, or

    – Extend to structural components.

    • In the absence of an “imminent rescue”, and resources are insufficient to comply with 2-in/2-out.

  • When NOT to use T.A.

    • When an offensive attack can be made safely and effectively, or

    • An offensive attack is needed to affect rescue (known rescue).

    • The location of the fire is unknown.

    • When the amount of fire or structural conditions are such that defensive attack is the only safe alternative.

  • UNDERSTANDING FLOW PATH/AIR TRACK

    Flow Path – “every new ventilation opening provides a flow path to the fire and vice versa. This could create a very dangerous condition when there is

    a ventilation limited fire.“

    This requires that firefighters be aware of flow path and air track. Flow path is the course of movement that hot gases follow between the fire area and exhaust openings. It affects the movement of air into the fire.

    Air track is considered closely related. Air track is the observation of the movement of both air and smoke as observed from the perspective of

    inside or outside of the structure. Air track terminology describes a group of fire behavior indicators. These indicators include direction and intensity of smoke, velocity and turbulence and movement between the upper and

    lower boundaries of thermal balance

  • #2 - Bring Value to the Incident

    • Understand the need for an increased level of situational awareness. Your job is to watch and listen and see what the troops are not seeing

    • Understand the fire service culture of risk taking. We often work harder/faster and not necessarily smarter when pressed.

    • Manage the fire ground momentum

  • Principles and Concepts which Help with Awareness & Decision Making

    • RPDM - Recognition Primed Decision Making

    • Humility

    • Balance

    • Diligence / Vigilance

    • Team Effort

    • Trust but Verify

  • Terminology

    Slowing down does not mean moving slowly

    It means managing the momentum of the incident.

  • # 3 - Effectively Communicate

    • Articulate your arrival report utilizing the 4 big critical fireground factors

    • Proper use of tactical channels. Don’t get overloaded

    • Increased use of CAN (Conditions, Actions and Needs) reports

    • Consistent vocabulary and terminology

  • CRITICAL FIREGROUND FACTORS

    No Sprinkler System

  • CRITICAL FIREGROUND FACTORS

    • Building – SFD, Small Box Commercial, Strip Mall, Center Hall Apt, etc

    • Occupancy – What type of occupancy and is it occupied?

    • Fire Conditions – Room & Contents, Well-involved structure fire, fully involved

    • Arrangement – Where is the fire, where is it going and what obstacles are in our way to extinguish it (forcible entry, exposures, attic fire, etc)

  • CRITICAL FIREGROUND FACTORS

    • Life Hazard

    • Resources Needed

    • Action that needs to be taken

    • Special Circumstances

  • SIZE-UPGood size-up and IAP is based on identifying the critical fire

    ground factors such as:

    – The building

    – The occupancy (BOFA)

    – The fire

    – The arrangement

    – Keep in mind that there are obviously other fire ground factors but always get the big 4

  • VERBAL REPORTAFTER B.O.F.A.

    Name the Incident

    Establish Command

    Command Post Location

    Establish A Side

    Actions Being Taken

    Needs – Additional Resources

    Declare Strategy backed up by 360

    Immediate Safety Concerns

    Accountability Started

  • Arrival Example1st Arriving Company:

    E-1 has arrived at 123 Main St, establishing Main Command. I have a single-story 4-plex, heavy fire & smoke conditions in the garage on the Alpha side, it appears to be an evacuated building from face to face reports from the RP. The fire has potential to move into an attic fire.

    It currently looks like we can be in the offensive mode but will confirm on the 360. The Command Post is located on Main St and this is the A side of the fire.

    Confirm the 360 Declare the mode and make sure it matches the SPR

  • Practice the arrival report using videos and pictures

  • Terminology

    What does vacant mean?

  • NIOSH and IAFC Recommended Terminology

    • Abandoned

    • Vacant

    • Unoccupied

    • Evacuated

    • Occupied (Risk a lot)

  • NIOSH and IAFC Recommended Terminology

    • Abandoned: Not being used for any purpose and not being maintained for future use. (Risk nothing)

    • Vacant: Not currently in use, but could be used in the future. Has inherent property value, even though it may not contain valuable contents or human occupants. (Risk little)

  • NIOSH and IAFC Recommended Terminology

    • Evacuated: Building was occupied when incident occurred but all the occupants have self evacuated or been assisted out.

    – How do we know?

    • If you know, then it’s now only a propertyissue. Risk a little.

  • NIOSH and IAFC Recommended Terminology

    • Unoccupied: Not occupied by any persons at the time of the incident. Could be a business that is closed, or residential structure where the residents are at work, vacation, etc. May have inherent property value and contents value.

    “But there’s no such thing as an unoccupied structure”

  • # 4 - FORMALLY DECLARING THE

    STRATEGIC MODE

  • It is very simple… do not declare a mode until you have attempted to

    get as many sides of the fire as possible!!!

  • 7 SIDES OF THE FIRE & THE 360

    • Your arrival will get you two & maybe 3 sides of the fire

    • Just does not make sense to commit resources until we get info on as many sides as possible

    • 4 sides, top and bottom & inside

  • A LOOK AT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE 360

  • Colerain Township Department ofFire and Emergency Medical Services

    Line of Duty DeathFact Finding Committee

    Preliminary ReportJuly 11, 2008

  • Captain Robin M. BroxtermanApril 16, 1970 – April 4, 2008

    Firefighter Brian W. SchiraOctober 15, 1978 – April 4, 2008

  • Building Construction

    Figure 1: Front (alpha side) photo of 5708 Squirrelsnest LN.

  • Rear elevations from the Bravo /Charlie corner showing the basement exterior door and window.

  • STRATEGIC MODES

    • Offensive We are going in!

    • Defensive All operations are outside of the hazard zone

    • Transitional Quick attack of the fire from a position with a straight stream to hold the fire in check, coordinated with a subsequent offensive attack.

  • # 5 - SET GOOD TACTICAL OBJECTIVES

    • In order to set good tactical objectives we all need to mentally slow down and think about what we really want to accomplish

    • Be concise but specific with the requests

    • Be realistic and take into consideration resources, training, experience.

    • Never forget that TIME is ticking away

  • Remember…

    All companies must have a

    tactical objective

  • Tactical Objectives

    RECEO vs. all the others

    Don’t get too hung up on a new fire service

    phrase

    All Companies must have an assignment

  • # 6 - Organize the Incident

    • Efficient use of the ICS. Don’t fear the ICS Police

    • Understanding the Strategic, Tactical and Task functions and using them correctly

    • Correct use of Span of Control

    • Don’t ever leave staging empty. Be proactive

  • 3000 square feet has been determined to be the

    dividing line between small and large structures.

    3000 square feet or less – Use Geographic

    Divisions

    More than 3000 square feet – Use Functional

    Groups.

    Known rescue in any size building – Use

    Functional Groups.

    Geographic vs. Functional

  • # 7 - Monitor the Triangle of Communication

    Ventilation has to be coordinated

  • TRAINGLE OF COMMUNICATION

    SAFE

    OPERATIONS

    IC

    FIRE ATTACK

    VENT GROUP

    ALL THREE ARE TALKING AND COORDINATING

    WITH EACH OTHER

  • All ventilation has to be coordinated through the IC…

    PPV has to be thoroughly understood when to use and when

    not to use

  • # 8 - Continually Question &

    Be Pessimistic

  • COMPARING THE FIREGROUND WITH A MILITARY BATTLE GROUND

    A LOT IS APPLICABLE TO OUR JOB