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Insider Threat Working Group

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Page 1: Insider Threat Working Group

Insider Threat Working Group

Page 2: Insider Threat Working Group
Page 3: Insider Threat Working Group

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. 1. Make sure you have the right personnel on-point to develop the program

2. Make sure your program comprehends the essential design elements

3. Integrate technical and non-technical indicators to identify, prevent, detect, and respond

4. Infuse lessons learned, communicate ROI & performance with formidable metrics

5. Execute the plan – catch bad guys!

1. People can temporarily change their behavior but not their personality traits.

2. Insider Threat personality traits are identifiable and measurable.

3. Early identification and help to those at risk is critical.

4. Review Security Metrics Evaluation Tool (SMET) described in ASIS Foundation Report Persuading Senior Management.

Page 4: Insider Threat Working Group

Model Collaboration Component

Model Education Component

Q & A Session

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Why Collaborate?

Internal Collaboration

Industry Collaboration

Government Collaboration

Scalable Collaboration Basic-Intermediate-Advance

Conclusion

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Required internally to operate the ITP

Required within industry sectors for threat management and developing best practices

Required with government to prosecute criminal acts and to safeguard nations critical infrastructure

We rely on each other to work effectively and cooperatively to

produce the best outcomes…

Teamwork and trust are critical to who we are and what we do.

Page 8: Insider Threat Working Group

ITP Operations Management & Planning design element defines cross-organization requirements for program management

The following is a non-exclusive list of cross-organizational units that participate in the ITP collaboration:

S e n i o r M a n a g e m e n t

L e g a l

I n f o r m a t i o n T e c h n o l o g y

H u m a n R e s o u r c e s

L i n e M a n a g e m e n t

S e c u r i t y / F S O

I n s i d e r T h r e a t O f f i c i a l

E m p l o y e e A s s i s t a n c e

We are Smarter than Me

Page 9: Insider Threat Working Group

Stakeholder Buy-in on Insider Threat Program

Mitigate Legal and HR risk

Senior Management Buy-In

Information from Line Managers

Integrated ITP protects employees and company from harm

Must coordinate

Slower then individual action by security

Must sell value

Political disputing

Availability of personnel

Pros Cons

Page 10: Insider Threat Working Group

Industry Peers (Cleared Defense Contractors) ◦ Classified Threat Reporting from supported offices

Customers and Suppliers

Professional Association and Working Groups ◦ ASIS, AIA, NCMS, National Industrial Security

Program Policy Advisory Committee (NISPPAC), National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center

Trade Groups

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Pepsi gets a letter offering Coca-Cola trade secrets and market info

Pepsi went to Coke; Both went to the FBI

Three charged including an assistant to senior Coke executive

Business rivals cooperate to prevent insider threat

How do you want to win?

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US Businesses [DOMESTIC]

◦ NCIX reporting

◦ FBI Field Office

US Businesses [INTERNATIONAL]

◦ U.S. Embassy (Commercial Services, Legal Attaché)

◦ AMCHAM

Law Enforcement (Local, State and Federal)

Regulators/Law Makers

Government Contracting Activities and Security Offices

Defense Security Service (Industrial Security Representatives and Counterintelligence Special Agents)

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The reporting requirements for industry will not change from Section 3 of the NISPOM:

o Reports to FBI o Adverse o Suspicious contacts o Change conditions to cleared employee status

As information is gathered from the Internal Insider Threat Working Group, the FSO will report the information IAW NISPOM, paragraphs 1-300 to 1-302

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Government Contracting Activities/Government Customers

Not a Federal Government Contractor o No requirement to report o Is that in your best interest? o Where can you report?

Will other industry regulators (SEC, etc.) establish Insider Threat reporting requirements?

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18 U.S.C. §1831 – Economic Espionage

“Economic espionage is:

(1) whoever knowingly performs targeting or acquisition of trade secrets to

(2) knowingly benefit any foreign government, foreign instrumentality or

foreign agent.”

18 U.S.C. § 1832 – Theft of Trade Secrets (Commonly called Industrial Espionage)

“Theft of trade secrets is:

(1) whoever knowingly performs targeting or acquisition of trade secrets or intends to convert a trade secret to,

(2) knowingly benefit anyone other than the owner.”

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Title 18 U.S.C.,

Section 1831

Title 18 U.S.C.,

Section 1832

Knowingly targets or

acquires

Trade Secrets Trade Secrets

For the benefit of

Foreign government,

instrumentality, or

agent

Anyone other than the

owner

Max. imprisonment

(Individual)

15 years 10 years

Max. fine (Individual) $5,000,000 $250,000

Max. fine

(Organization)

$10 Million or 3X value of

Trade Secret $5 Million

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Has potential or actual economic value

Not generally known to public

Reasonably protected

A trade secret can come in many forms, both tangible

and intangible, but it must cover these three areas:

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Liew was tasked by PRC Government to acquire trade secret for production of commercial chemical compound

Maegerle retired from named chemical products company

Liew contracted with a Chinese partner to provide the production technology to China. Maegerle provided technical plans and engineering know-how

First federal jury conviction under Economic Espionage Act of 1996

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Accused of directing China-based hackers to steal specific data files

related to U.S. military aircraft production from named defense company.

Canadian resident, owner of China-based aviation company

C-17 Transport, F-22 and F-35 Fighter aircraft targeted

Collaboration between companies, supported agencies, and FBI

Company trade secrets protected in open court

Arrested by Canadian authorities in collaboration with U.S. Government investigators; awaiting extradition

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Basic Intermediate Advanced

• Insider Threat Focal point as liaison

with Internal/External contacts

• Policy established and Risk

assessment cycle started

• Procedures for Internal/External

Collaboration

• Tracking Productive/Unproductive

Collaboration

• Corporate IT system requirements

support Insider threat prevention

• ITP is interactive with

Internal/External contacts and uses

info to mitigate internal

vulnerabilities

• Policy reviewed and updated; Risk

assessment cycle improves

• ITP guides Internal/External

Collaboration

• Corporate Info Tech system

requirements support prevention; all

trusted Info Tech (partners, vendors,

etc.) have demonstrable ITP

capabilities

• ITP is active on external

committees/councils promoting best

practices and partnerships

• ID gaps in research needed to

support prevention

• ITP evolves collaboration objectives

and develops metrics to demo ROI

• Corporate Info Tech system

supports Insider Threat prevention;

signature sharing supported (if

warranted)

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“Mitigating the risks to U. S. critical infrastructure from the insider threat will

require collaboration between government and industry to develop

comprehensive and scalable insider threat program standards that

incorporate long–term employee monitoring policies including background

checks and re-investigations, employee training and termination of access at

separation.”

-- Executive Summary : National Risk Estimate Risks to U.S. Critical Infrastructure

from Insider Threat, Department of Homeland Security (December 2013)

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Who must receive insider threat education, training, and awareness?

◦ Insider Threat Program Personnel

◦ Executive Leadership

◦ Workforce

What must be included in the program?

Where and when should it be taught?

How should this training be conducted?

What resources are available to support this training?

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Section 3-103. Insider Threat Training. The designated Senior contractor official will ensure that contractor program personnel assigned insider threat program responsibilities and all other cleared employees are trained.

a. Contractor Insider Threat Program Personnel must be trained in:

(1) Counterintelligence and security fundamentals to include applicable legal issues;

(2) Procedures for conducting insider threat response actions;

(3) Applicable laws and regulations regarding the gathering, integration, retention, safeguarding, and use of records and data, including the consequences of misuse of such information; and

(4) Applicable legal, civil liberties, and privacy policies.

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Proposed NISPOM Conforming Change #2 identifies specific Insider Threat training requirements for U.S. defense contractors. The following training syllabus may be required to be implemented during 2015:

Our ITP covers these requirements in all three model types:

Basic – Intermediate – Advanced

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b. All cleared employees must be provided insider threat awareness training, either in-person or computer-based, within 30 days of initial employment or prior to being granted access to classified information, and annually thereafter. Training will address current and potential threats in the work and personal environment and will include at a minimum:

(1) The importance of detecting potential insider threats by cleared employees and reporting suspected activity to the insider threat program designee;

(2) Methodologies of adversaries to recruit trusted insiders and collect classified information, in particular within information systems;

(3) Indicators of insider threat behavior, and procedures to report such behavior; and

(4) Counterintelligence and security reporting requirements, as applicable.

c. The contractor will establish a system to validate and maintain a record of all cleared employees who have

completed the insider threat briefings.

Section 3-107. Initial Security Briefings. Prior to being granted access to classified information, an employee shall receive an initial security briefing that includes the following:

a. A threat briefing security briefing, to include insider threat awareness in accordance with 3-103b, Insider

Threat Training.

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Currently there are no mandates, standards, and or benchmarks that exist for corporations for Insider Threat Programs for the Private Sector.

Your company may not be impacted by this pending U.S. government security requirement.

But other government agencies may consider implementing similar requirements for industries that fall under their regulatory oversight.

Just because there is no requirement doesn’t eliminate the need for Insider Threat education at your company.

If When something happens at your company, what will your CEO say?

Security professionals are expected to be proactive not just reactive.

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Page 26: Insider Threat Working Group

Insider Threat terminology

Different types of Insider Threats

Case examples of Insider Threats

Available data

Personal and organizational factors which prompt an Insider Threat

Behavioral Indicators

Current organizational policies and controls

Legislative and regulatory requirements on the Insider Threat

Laws and related penalties

Document the training program

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Basic Intermediate Advanced

Mention made during:

New Hire Orientation

Initial Security Briefing

Annual Security Refresher Training

Annual Information

Systems Training

Modules Developed for Presentation

During:

New Hire Orientation

Initial Security Briefing

Annual Security Refresher Training

Annual Information Systems Training

Quiz Questions

Specific, Separate Training

Developed for:

New Hires

New Clearance Holders

Individuals with Information Systems

Access

Insider Threat Annual Refresher

Scored Quiz Required to Fulfill

Training Requirement

Pamphlets given to new

employees/workforce

Pamphlets given to new

employees/workforce

Monthly E-Communication sent to all

employees

Pamphlets given to new

employees/workforce

Monthly e-Communication sent to

workforce

IT posters changed monthly

Annual event highlighting IT

Awareness

Quarterly events highlighting IT

Awareness

Annual evaluation

Monthly events highlighting IT

awareness

Continuous evaluation

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Executive Leadership: Why is an Insider Threat Program necessary?

How can it be implemented?

What will it cost?

What checks and balances are in place?

Insider Threat Program Personnel:

What should be tracked?

How is reporting managed?

What civil liberties need to be protected?

Workforce: What are we protecting?

What assets are most wanted by others?

How can suspicious activities be reported?

What checks and balances are in place?

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The Insider Threat is Real

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Identify your company’s “Crown Jewels”: Key assets, products and services.

Give real life examples of Insider Threat and show the consequences.

Provide economic rationale and ROI for implementing Insider Threat Program.

Explain ethical obligations, legal limitations and regulatory requirements.

Outline how your program will be established and operated.

Introduce key members of your Insider Threat Program Team.

Gain specific support commitments from each executive.

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Educate the ITP security team on Insider Threat terminology, behaviors, motives, anomalies and

ways to “connect the dots.”

Educate your team on how data collection points indicate Insider Threat:

◦ Human Resources

◦ Legal

◦ Physical Security

◦ IT Security

◦ Information Assurance

◦ Data Owners

◦ Ethics and Compliance

◦ Internal Audit

◦ EAP

Determine what is normal within your organization (both behavioral and on the computer).

Educate the team members on new and developing trends.

Teach team members how to interpret data and generate metrics.

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Explain what needs to be protected and why.

Point to policies and procedures already in place.

Explain what suspicious activities look like.

Explain how to report suspicious activities.

Develop a multi-pronged, repetitive approach to education.

Consider your audience when developing materials.

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Executive Leadership

ITP Personnel

Workforce

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Before formalizing this Insider Threat training program consider what current company policies and procedures and resources already in place.

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Procedures for reporting suspicious behavior or employees / trusted partners.

Access Control Systems / Badging Procedures

Annual Security Awareness training

New Hire Orientation

Pamphlets / Posters

ALL employees should be trained on Insider Threat.

Initial Security Briefing

Computer usage policy / wireless device policy / social media policy

Procedures for handling sensitive, proprietary and personally identifiable information (PII) as well as classified information.

Procedures for reporting suspicious activities and security incidents.

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Training Venue

Options

Evaluate

New Hire Orientation

Initial Security Brief (cleared employees)

Annual Refresher Training (cleared employees)

Pamphlets

Posters

Email reminders

News Articles

Lunch and Learns (brown bags)

Outside speakers from government

counterintelligence programs to brief your organization

(FBI, IC, DSS, etc.)

Based on quiz questions, interviews, reports submitted.

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Where is the ASIS Insider Threat Information Repository and who can access it?

Access the ASIS site: www.asisonline.org

Sign in

Under “Membership,” select Library (IRC)

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Type Model

Pamphlets Basic, Intermediate

Posters Basic, Intermediate

Videos Basic, Intermediate, Advanced

Virtual Learning Basic, Intermediate, Advanced

Government Policy & Guidance Basic, Intermediate, Advanced

Legal Statutes Basic, Intermediate, Advanced

Newsletters Basic, Intermediate, Advanced

Research Publications Intermediate, Advanced

Fee-Based Training Intermediate, Advanced

Fee-Based Publications Intermediate, Advanced

Presentations & Briefings Intermediate, Advanced

Fee-Based Technology Intermediate, Advanced

When will the repository be completed?

What is in the

ASIS Insider Threat

Information Repository?

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Re-evaluate and conduct self-assessments.

Enable independent assessments for internal audit, senior management, Board of Directors, regulators including government compliance.

Communicate regularly, share information, with industry and government partners.

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Page 38: Insider Threat Working Group

“Insider Threat experts agree that an insider is a person –

a human being – a heartbeat … Whether an organization has

just ten employees or hundreds of thousands, insider

threat is always a security risk.”

- INSA Cyber Council Report, September 2013

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Page 39: Insider Threat Working Group

Presentation can be downloaded from ASIS seminar web page.

Insider Threat Information Repository (ITIR) located in ASIS Library will be available for ASIS members to access by November 1, 2014.

ITWG White Paper to ASIS D&IC in January 2015.

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