institute - defense technical information center force- institute ' a:r university.aof technol...
TRANSCRIPT
Best Available Copy.
• " PRE-PLANNE", - .- ,';OCT IMPRO.VEMENT "•-BETTER W A Y 5oF Wt 'k-ON SYSTEM AC Gill .'.r IG•i?
NM
* 0
- LSR 4-m
? ~~DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE Y!0 5
s
' A:R UNIVERSITY.AAIR FORCE- INSTITUTE OF TECHNOL
Wright-BPaefetso!ý Foeste BAsa, OhioCop
Ph•~T ac y, ,ap •, J,
LSS 5..
P.RE-PLANNFD PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT
A BETTER WAY 0. WEAPON SYSTEM ACQUISITION?
Phil1ip T. Mackey, Captain, USAF
LSSR 64-83
* r4ELECLEp"
* .
w N
A,
hOt V"Iae TWO42-. and me* its
* durib~~i I 'ank~t.
-. . . . . . .. . . .,.
The contents of the document are technically accurate,'andno sensitive items, detrimental ideas, or deleterious infor-mation are contained therein. Furthermore, the views expressedin the document are those of the author(s) and do not necessarilyreflect the views of the School of Systems and Logistics, theAir University, the United StatesAir Force, or the Departmentof Defense.
-. o-
V 'AvallI *i:id/oirDist Cta I-
INP 1 *
U'jCLA$SI PIEDSE:.jQl1' CLSI:4I ) F 7.iS PAGE 'wliw.n Def. Emv-de1
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE RED1S-!.0'
1. pc~r %Qmaem i 5VT ACZESSIC. So.) iN :ACAr..~zr N...*9E
LSSR 64-83 Z. j- -I.3 L4. T4i)-E rand-Subt!rle) S. 7." 3w Re Ap & P f:ý: .E AE:;
PRE-PLANNED PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT: A BETTER WAY OFWEAPON SYSTEM ACQUISITION? Master's Thesis
7. Au ?One.)q, 9. ZZNTRC OR :;A04 *4Uw8!E~fvf
Philip T. Mackey, Captain, USAF
i PER,:ý0141% OGANI ATICN 1.AME AND AC:)ESS T0 *o O;VAM4 -- %Ev' 20' . F_ 'r .
School of Systems and Logistics ARAA0I6 -
Air Forze Institute of Technology, WPAFB OH
AFIT/LSH, WPAFB OH 45433 I .8
%d41::14 A GLN.Cy NAME A 40C-RE3S,,f 1 ~!.,.r 'po r v rrolh"ng Office) 5. ; :C4Ss at ~.. q
UNCLASSIFIED
-- r; ON,$-N ,A rMes 1 'at !himN Rpoo~r/
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
STATSN EYA '*I? !he ?ob .hrpef tne rod :M 3ack 20, it !It..fs ir Report)
V.w ,
19 !' 4 PS 'Canrino,. art @1qfV ,.do 1. ,ceqvw I 4d 1.,,fliv 1V tSloc ".bee,
Product ImprovementAau isit ion
,rocurement-3 b!SIUAC- in~fU 0ý10 o *d3 'f ,epeyg - and 'enrsfY 21d' o
Thesis Chairman: Ronald G. 31ackledge, Lt "ol I 'JSAF
. .., . ..... ...... _.. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ . . ' . - . . - - . o
'N CLASS IFi PD.•g~~o,:11-,;3 THAS~IA '•N•r I"S1 O•AGE •'W.?.o Dotsl Entered)
The object of this thesis was to evaluate the acquisition approach calledpre-planned product improvement or P31 and the benefits it offers. Firsta comrparison of PII and a similiar concept called Evolutionary Acquisitionor EA, was made to improve understarmding of P31 and how it relates to EA.It was concludedthat EA, as.. defined, is a Command and Control (C2) specific
IP31 application. Then, to see if the theorized benefits of P31 actuallycome about, the cost and schedule performance of a P31 program was comparedto' that of non-PSI programs. Acquisition lengths were also compared. Thiscomparison found that P31 may indeed lessen acquisition times and enhancecost and schedule performance. ... L ..- if ...
* .'J..... SIfIED" -,
- ~ :~.AI~fe~hJI II A S ISII I F I E 1'A"e1
LSSR 64-83
PRE-PLANNED PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT
A BETTER WAY OF WEAPON SYSTEM ACQUISITION ?
A Thesi s
Presente.i to toe Faculty of the School of Systems and Logistics
of the Air'Force Institute of Technology
Air University
In Partial Fulfillment'oF t'he Requirement for the
Degree of Master of Science in 'Logistics Management
By
Philip T. Mackey, MSCaptain, USAF.
February 1984
Approved for public release;distribution unI imited
This thesis, written by
Captain Philip T. Mackey
has been accepted by tne undersigned on behalf of the faculty p
of the School of Systems and Logistics in partialfullfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT
DATE: 16 February 1984
COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN
iii
* turn
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
LIST OF TABLES ......................................... vi
LIST uF FIGURES ............................ vii
CHAPTER
I. .INTRODUCTION .......................... , ..... 1
II. PROELEM STATEMENT......... .6
Background ........................ 6
Soviet Evperience .......................... 6
F-15 Experience ........................... 7
Use of High Technology., ................... 8
US Comparative Advantage ................... 9
Resource Requirements ...... ................ 10
Problem Development .............. ". ........ 12
'Factors in the Military Balance ............ 12
Weapons Technology vs. Military Technology. 13
Adverse ConseqUences ....................... 13
Requirements Process ................... 14
Role of Doct rine ...... o . . .. ........... . 15
The Evolutih nary Approach .................. 16
I'II. PRE-PLANNED PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT........ o ... 18
Acquisition Improvement Program ............. 18
Research Objective ....... .. 20
Research Questions ............... 20
lii
IV. RESEARCH ME'THODOLOGY ........................ . 21
Scope and Limitations ........................ 21
Study Framework ................... ....... 21
Data Collection Plan .................. 22
Question nen e .... .......... ............. 2
Questions Two & Three ...................... 22
Data Analysis Plan.......... ..... 23
Question One ...... ........ ..... ........... 23
Question Two & Three............. . 23
Data .................... .... 23
Data Format ........ ........... 24,
V. FINDINGS. ............. .......... 28
Questic.. One................ .28
Literature Review-.......................... 28
P31 Definition .............................. 34
QLestion Two & Three ........ 39
F-14 Aircraft ...... ................. 39
F-14 Development ...... I .. 40
F-14 Growth Provisions ..................... 41
Results ... ......* 42
V VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS............... 4:8
Conclusi-on One ..................... 48
Conclusion Two . ".. 48
Recommendation s.. ........................ .. 50
APPENDIXES
A. RAND STUDY METHODOLOGY .....................- l
B. F-14 COST DATA .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................... 67
A. REFERENCES CITED.................................. 68
B. RELATED SOURCES............................. 70
LIST Or TABLES
TABLE PAGE
F-14 vs. 1960s and 1970s ProgramsCost and Schedule Performance ................ 43
2 F-14 vs. Other Fighter ProgramsCost and Schedule Performance ................. 45
vi
LIST OF FCGURES
F IGUR P
S!IS/USSR Militar-' RDT&E Expenditures ........... 3
2 Relative US/USSR Standing in the 20Most Important Basic lechnology Areas .......
Relative US/USSR Technology Level inDeployed Military Systems ......................
vii.
. • .. • . ,
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
For the past decade, the United States has relied on
the qualitative superiority of its weapons to offset the
'quantitative advantage of its principle opponent, the
Sovipt. Uni'on.
This preference for high value, multipurposeweapons and the desi e to substitute technologyfor rnanpoi.er can be ra 11d an American'doctrine of quality'.[i3:550]
In recent years, the Soviets tiave eroded the U.S.'s
once sizable qualitative edge. The-r present generation of
"military aircraft, the MIG-2.3/27 Flogger, the SU-19
Fencer, and the TU-22M Backfire, ali possess far greater
performance than their predecessors (23). The Soviets are
presently diligently working on 'nother generation ofadvanced i'rcra~t The MIG-29F'u1rum, the SU-27 Flanker,
and tne 'TJ-122 Blackjack are said to .be equivalent to or
better-t'han the US.S s F -15, F-16, and B-i 'aircraft
(23:73,83,84;24). In his recent testimony to 'Cong~ress,
t the Under Secret.ary of Defense for Research and
V Engineering (IISDRE), Dr. Richard -D. DeLauer, staied that
"our cointat forces face superior, quantities of
increasingly .cipable Soviet equipment in almost every
nission area. (9:. - )."
i..
r+ This impressive growth in the Soviet combat potential
is due, in part, to tneir massive comimitment to military
research and development (R&D). As shown in Figure One,
the USSR has outspent tne US by a wide margin in research,.development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) in the last
decade (9:1-10). This sustained RDTHE effort'has enabled
the Soviets to `close the technology gap (9:1-9)." They
have gained ground tin six vital .basic te.chnology areas
(Figure Two). This trend is also evident in deployed
- weapons systems, where the Soviets have eroded US
superiority in seven areas (Figure Three).
Because of the inherent stability in Soviet weapon
sys'tem development and procurement (1:8-,22:3), it is
* obvious that they will continue to improve their weapon's
technology. The, threat to the US and its allies, whose
technological lead has been a vital "factor in the military
balance is clear (9:1-6).
*, 7
[RDT&Ej
'PROJECTED"
amaw
j , CALENDARt YEAR
Figure 1
US/USSR M¶ilitary RDT&E Expenditures(DeLauer,1983Fg.I6
BASICTICH04OLQGIES SUPERIOR IL'Ai SVERO
aAualofia,q Comfn A
3. er~*,n! ahksad lmdctlu.ax
5 Diuected L" swpx
* 11Ie'O-Op:.ca: S,'a'
G uidanrw5 X..rt0o
I mirtmoi Matrinals
9 Nuclear 11brkad
10 Opws a
II pa sow'.eft (okk) x
12 P wfadeai/m4aufiCmurml; x
1S3ma Propium AmwoX
14 SetatSmww X
17, Sualth (Settiwe Rolidtsm x
It S~trci,.rul Mwerali, ftbhtwrem.
I, Submuw Dre"f
2D fdKecwn --- mwsas x
Figur. 2
Relative US/USSR Standing in thtn 20Most Imoortant Basic Technology AreAS
(DeLauer j 1983: Vi g..JI1-4)
U.S U.S 'USSR USSRDEPLCYEO SYSTEM SUPERIOR EQUAL S*JPEXIO1R
Pew x -0.
SSIN p
SL5M
SAM%"bbuic MuIS"Ir Otfefin x
Cno., MISVak xTACTICAI
Land Forme
SAM$ fImctudnfl N8,411p X
Attu)er)Ia'ialf? combal VachicnAtta..Tank Guided Wsteb, xAcme&t H4e1cog~ers
Chmiaf afare
Theautt D1alliusc Unulet x
As. Formcfrigher-Anack Aircraft -o
*,w Lift x
U Na~aIFoctt
SSP" x
*Aa...Suitarswm Wwfw .,.
SncaDaw A*' x
5uwfbmar Cw'boams X-1
Crowa MrAde
M, Wart..,
Commaid £ CowrofEheiraiK CotwsummumEwccK x
garb Warwm x
* Figure 3
Relative US/USSR Tiechnology Levelin Deployed Military Systems
(neLauer,1983:Fig,. 11-4)
"CHAPTER II
-•. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Background
The critical question, how to maintain the military
- balance between the United, States and the Soviet Union,
"has generated much furor and controversy. Some feel that
our reliance on high technology, the American 'doctrine 60
quality', is, in itself, faulty. They believe -that
simpler, less costly weapons are what is needed.
* The current weapon5, they argue, are tooexrensive, have a poor operationally ready (OR)rate due to their complexity and would, afterall, be defeated by a greater number of cheaper,simpler weapons. [17:53]
T The reformers feel tnat simpler weapons will have
"inherently 'better OR rates, and, because of lower
"acquisition costs, more of.them can be bought; leading to
-' a amore useful and less vulnerable forc' (17:53.)
"- Unfortunately there .,are .several weaknesses in this
reasoning.
"Soviet Experience
One is the. automatic a'ssumption that simple weaponsI
h have inheren_tl.y better OR rates than high technology ones
"The Soviet experience In this area is enlightening. "'The
. general trend in Soviet weapons is for relatively simple, -, .-
* 6
I7
designs (2:14)." Simple designs are easier and cheaper to
mass produce. They are also easier to operate and
maintain, thus requiring less training of personnel
(22:14). However, the simple-Soviet equipment is not
necessarily relieble. ThE Soviet's main tank engine, for
example, requires an overhaul every.250 hours (versus 500
hours 'for any mainten'ance on the US X-60 tank engine).
The US Army's OpFors (Opposing Forces) units, which
operates and maintains captured Soviet equipment, feel
that it is, "simplo, even crude,, in design but very
unreli-able (8:141)." Soviet aircraft have had similar
problems. :The MIG-21's engine is overhauled .very 300.
hours (versus 800 hours for typical US fighter
engines)(8:177). Some MIG-27 components, such as the
aircraft's brakes, are replaced after only two or three
flights (8:169). Fortunately, due to its simple design,
the MIG-21 is relatively easy to repair. The low
reliability of ind'ividu'al Soviet weapons may be one reason
they produce and field so many of them (.8:188). The
Soviet's emphasis on mass, along: with their rigorous,
effective •reventative maintenance practices, may insure
that the unreiiabilityof the individual weapon. does not
detract from their overall force reliab'ility.
F-15 Experience
Another assumption i• that high technology weapons
7
have low OR rates. However these low OR rates may not be
inherent in the weapon itself (17:55). It may be caused
by improper or inadequate logistical support. The F-15
aircraft proyides a good illustration of this. Numerous
problems suffered by the F-15 could be traced to a lack of
needed spare parts, both for the aircraft and for- its
essential support equipment, such as the Avio i1cs
Intermediate. Shop (AIS) test- set This deficiency
resulted, in part, from a decision to cut back on th.
spare parts buy in order to preserve the number of F-1*>.
procured (14:30). When sufficent spares are availablv,
the F-15 has had an impressive sortie rate' (14:26). One
must evaluate the entire problem before concluding ri'.it
high technology is the cause of a. low OR rate (17:51%.
Use of High Technology
In fact, high technology, if properly used, can lead
to more reliable, less expensive systems (17:54).
Commercial products s-uch as. televisions, calculators, and
computers are good examples of this. Solid State
electronics have lead to m'ore durable, reliable systems
wiith easier diagrnosis and repair, when failures -do- arise
(1.7:54). Jnfortunately, i~n the military, advanced
technology h.s been commonly used to increase performance
at the expense of reliability (7:16).. "MiIitary
preferences for high performan-...['havej dominated the US
÷a
[acquisition] process (13:548)." This preferenc'e has
resulted in many weapons systems with outrageous cost
growth (the C-5A, the F-111, and the B-1A for example).
When fielded these systems often car. not achieve their
high performance potential because of maintainability and
relia'ility problems. Yet high -technology, if- properly
applied, can improve -reliability, lessen maintenance, and
lower costs. Some reformers, in their quest for simple
weapons, may have overlooked this fact'.
US Comparative Advantage.
The main weakness in the case for *simple weapons is
that, it is in high technology that the US still enjoys a
comparative advantage (17:55). Although the USSR has
closed the gap in recent years, they are still behird in
many technological areas. Their, ongoing efforts to steal
US technology is ample proof of this. However the USSR
has a tubstantial advantage over the US in manpower. They
insure full use of this advantage through their policy of
universa'l military conscription. As General George S.
Patton once s'aid:
[The Russians].. have a very large man'powerwhich they are willing to expend recklessly.' Ittherefore behooves us to devite, military for-mations which wil.l exploit 'our natural aptitudefor machines and at the same time save oursomewhat limited and very valuable manpower.[17 56]
.9
As former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown states:
The United States has no real choice but tnadopt high technology fo.r it- weapon systems,given the relative advantage it can provide overpotential adversaries... [7:163
To fail to make use of this -dvantage may be throwing away
a major equalizing factor (7:20).
Resource Requirements
More capable, higher technology weapons can not only
offset numerical -superiority, but also allow one to
* accomplish the same mission with fewer resources (17:56).
Greater numbers of simpler weapons would require more
resources. A much larger standing army would be needed
(17:56). The increased personnel costs a looie would
significantly reduce the savings from lower acquisition
costs (17:56). The higher logistical costs of maintaining
such a force are also not addressed by the* reformer$.
Simple weapons may not require the expensive s upport
equipment and highly trained technicians that high
* technology weapons sometimes do, but they still need fuel,
spare pa~rts, maintainers, and facilities. If more simple
weapons are bought, more support is required.
It is questionable if the American public will accept
such a sizable increase in our Armed Forces. The present
US force levels are, historically, the highest ever
10
nia Intaiined in peacetime. It is doubtful if an increased
volunteer force, with its associated increased expense, is
politically or even economically viable. Reinstitution of
the draft may be required--a very controversial option
with many difficulties (17:56).
The United States may not be able to abandon, in
total, its "doctrine of quality" (7). To do so would be
to abandon our strength and rely on our weaknesses. The
USSR, because of its political and economic system, will
always be able to maintain a large military force. The US
may not. A larger standing army, with its associated
costs, may not have the support of the American public or
its political leaders (7:16). The present level of
defense spendin.g is already being sharply criticized; thus
it is hard to envision the increased spending needed for a
simpler defense force' being accepted. If. correctly
handled, advanced technology can lead to a more effective
military capability (.7:16). It is in technology that the
US still maintains a edge over the Soviet Union.
The United Siates must not fall to -take ad-vantage of the advantages.it has--economic., pol'i-
..tical, ideological, or any other. And among allthese, the US technoligical advantage is one ofthe most important and valuable. [7:26]
IIU
Problem Development
Unfortunately, the maintenance of the US's vital qua-
litative edge has had numerous problems. As noted, one
problem may lie in a potential for mis-focusing on weapon
system characteristics, sush as speed, payload, and range,
to the detriment of other- equally important factors,, like
the weapon' s reliability, maintainability, availabilih:y,
and operability. The military often demands advanced
capability beyond present requirements simply because it
appears feasible (11:106). The tendency is to obtain the
best possible theoretical weapons system characteristics
and to use high technology predominately for that purpose
(7:23)).
factors in the Military Balance
Thi s approach overlooks' that quality is only one
factor in the military balance. The German Army', in both
World Wars, maintained a qualitative' advantage in basic
miitary hardware--tanks,, artillery, aircraft. (7:17). Yet
they were ultimately de'feated by foes "ith less
sophisticated, , but more 'numerous, weapons, Superior
weapons alone are not enough to insure m iitary success.
Subjective factors, such as morale, training, strategy,
tactics, and leadership, are often equally decisive
(7:18) There are many example's of military victory by
inferior forces -With proper doctrine, morale, and superior
* 12
generalsrip (7:17-18). tetter weapons can greatly affect
the military balance but .only in concert with oLher
equally important, but less measurable factors.
Weapons Technology vs. Military Technology
Another cause for this possible mis-focus on weapon
system characteristics may be a n'isperception of just what
military technology is (-13:545). Military technology is
often equated- with weapons system characteristics.
However, weapons system charactari-stics are more a measure
of weapons technology; military technology encompasses
more than just weapons.
Military technology is the set of skills.andtechniques that contribute to the production,
-operation, and maintenance of weapons and othermilitary equipment. Technological progress...issimply the ability'to accomplish objectives thatwe-e not possible to achieve [before] or toreach presently achievable objectives morecheaply or efficiently. [13:545]
Military technology is thus not a matter of just.weapon
system characteristics or capability, it is a matter of
total force capability.
-Adverse Consequences
There have-been several unfortunate outcomes of these
misperceptions, The first and. foremost. iY the increa'sed
cost of 'acquiringoperating, and maintainit- our ,eApon
systems. To obtain the best possibl-e weapon tystem
13
1~.
ciaracteristics, pursuit of 1eading edge te-chnology is
required. This increases risks and ultimitely leads to
higher prices and cost overruns (11:106). The pursuit of
maximum performance is also costly in terms of system
reliability and 'maintainabillity (7.:23). The weapon
system may indeee have outstanding theoretical per-
formance characteristics; but, when fielded, itsperfor-
mance is often much less. Operators may not have the
training or experienre to fully utilize t.he weapon -s
performance capabilities. Doctrine may preclude its use
altogether. For example, restrictive rules o.f engagenent Iprevented optimal use of air-to-air missiles in Viet'nam.
Maintenance is not ot, 1y expensive n material and
manpower, but may even be beyond the* capability of the
3ystem's user to perform. The C-5A is a good illus-
tration of this. Obtaining the best possible performance
characteristics is a difficult, strenuous task. Many
times deployment of a critically needed weapon is ,delayed
as the 'bugs" are worked out of it; leading edge tech-
nology,. Technology which gives the system performance
that may not be really nrec:essary. "Better is. the enemy
of good enough (11:106)."
Requirements Process
The root problem may lie in the US military requir--
ments process. AS noted by Colonel Richard G. Head,
14
there is a large asymmetry in the US .and USSR require'-
m ments process. The Soviets reject the thesis that.
weapons dictate strategy; they use military doctrin'e to
produce military requi.-ements, to 'pull' technology
(13:548). In contrast., "'doctrine is only one of many
determinates of US weapon design (13:548). T.he US
'doctrine of quality' and the m.i sperception of military
4 technology have often ld to the basing of US military
requirements on the adversaries' weapon characteristics-.
-the "threat". New weapons are required when the enemy
increases the performance characteristic.s of the weapon's
he possesses. However, weapons, by themselves, are only
part of the real threat. It is how these weapons are to
be used, iii what environments, by. what tro~ps,for what* objectives--these and other dynamic factors determine the.
true capability of a weapon and the threat it may pose.
To react to changes in an enemies' weapon characteristics
is simple, but it can be expensive if based on. imperfect
information. The dynamic factors are more subjective and
less'subject 'to simple quid-pro-quo increa'ses in weapon
system characterictics.
-ole of Doctrine
Doctrine can play a vital role in the complex task of
defini ng weapon system requirements. It can lessen the
uncertainty of. the dynamic factors involved. One reason
1 5.,. .
f or requi r ing 'the best pos s ibl1e weapon performance
c ch aract erist ic s i s .the d e s ire to cover all future
p os s ib ili ti es--a very di ff icul t i f not impossilble task.
Proper use of doctrine can establish bounds on the future
jpos~sibili t ies, by defining' future mission requIrements.
It can thu~s shift the focus of the process from weapon
system performance to total force capability. Doctrine
c an al-so hi ghl ight areas where advanced 'technology is
needed. This can enhance the 'effic~iency of t.pchnological
changes and can limit the nu~mber of unnecessary advances.
Doctrine can §ive needed discipline not only to the
requirements process, but also to weapons system acquisi.-
t ion . However, one problem lies in the interactive
nature of. doctrine and technology. Doctrine can indeed
'pullI technology, but technology can also 'push' 'doc-
t tr in e. Gi ven the rapid advance of technology in certain
areas, a means of dealing with this paradox is needed.
The Evol utionary Approacn
An evol u~tionary approach to wea'pon system acquisition9
may o f fer one -way o f dealIi ng with this problem.
Traditionally, weapon system characteristics were rigidly
defined earl y on -in t~he program, based on projected
'threats' far into the future. As noted, t h~is tends tn
d r i v requirements towards unproven I ead'sng edge
tec~hnol ogy , to guarintee the system's viatbilIity o ve r t hi s
416
SmU••
!7
uncertain period. In an evolutionary approach, initial
weapon system characteristics are based on present
doctrine, technology, and threats. This initial design
has inherent growth potential, so that as technology,
S . doctrine, or threats change, the system can evolve as
needed to meet the new requirements. This ac'quisition
"approach can apply equally to a 'pull' or 'pu~sh'
situation. In fact, Dresent evolutionary acquisition
approach definitions can be divided along such lines.
One,. termed evolutionary acquisition or EA [developed by
the Armed Forces Communications ana Electronics
"Association (AFCEA)], leans towird a- 'pull' approach in
defining system requirements (3). As defined by the
American Defense Preparedness Association (ADPA), the
other, called pre-planned product improvement (P31) tends
more towards a 'push' approach. This thesis, to simplify
matters, will refer tu any evolutionary' acquisition
approach as P31. Current Department of Defense' (DOD.)
directives address the concept of evolutionary acquisi-
tion as P31, and, as will be shown further in the thesis,
there may be some validity in treating EA (as defined) as
a subset of the DOD's general P31 concept.
1 7
N .ý -1 S-vS, '~. .- r~ -
CHAPTER III
PRE-PLANNED PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT
"Acquisition Improvement Program
In 1981, the Department of Defense initiated an
Acquisition Improvement Program (AIP)-- an effort to
improve the results of DOD weapons policies and to
institute an series of reforms (16:17). It is based on
former Deputy Secretary of D.efense Frank C. Carlucci' s
thirty-two acquisition initiatives, one of which is P31.
O The tasic concept behind P31 is to plan right from a
system's origin to incorp'orate improvements over the
course of the system's life (6:1). This is not a new
*concept in i'ts entirety (4:27).' The'US military has been
improving its existing weapons from many years. The B-52
-aircraft, for example, has evolved from a higin altitude,
penetration strategic bomber to a stand-off, cruise
missile launcher. The present version of the M-60 tank,
- the -60A5, is much improved over Its earlier brethren.
_ It h s IR sensors, laser guidance, and a ,shoot on the
move capability that the initially fielded version did
'n ot aOssess. P 31 d iffers from these past modification
* effo ts in that. It stresses preplannlng for improvements
whil the system is still In the initial design stages
(5: . P3I proponents characterize it as I coherent
"modi ication strategy w hich plans for multiple system
• " " 2".. " '1 8
9o
upgrades far into the future, in contrast to the
reactive, ad hoc modifications presently undertaken
(5:12).
'P31 support~ers feel that this acquisition approach
offers several substantial benefits. P31,, i f properly
implemented, should lessen technological risks, since
advanced, leading edge technology is no 'longer required
in the weapon systema. The syst~m can now grow with the
technology as it matures. This should lead to shorter
acquisi-tion times, and lower acquis'ition costs. Less
risk means better attainment of program cost, schedule,
and performance goals. P31 allows a system, through its
growth provisions, to keep pace with a changing mission
and threat environment. This should lower modification
costs as well. aslengthen the system's usable life.
(4,11,15,16,)9)
* Industry has used a P31 strategy (though not labeled
as such) quite successfully (19:18). P31 has the support
a and interest of many, not -only in DOD, but also in the
General Accounting Office (GAO),.and in Congress (5:11).
'-'-sDespite this~interest', the P31 concept remains vague and'
'ill -defined '(6:1). .- Its advar.tLaqes have received much
attention and press but still a.*e theoretical and
:.abstract (5:11).
S
II
Research Objective
The research objective of this thesis-is to evaluate
previous aircraft program examp'les that have utilized an
evolutionary (P31) approach to determine if the expected
benefits a, 'rued.
"Research QLestiors.
This thesis focusdd on the following research
questions:
What is P31? What is the relationship between P3Iand EA?
. Does use of P31 enhance a programs achievement ofcost and schedule goals?
Does P31 use lessen acquisition times?
2'0
CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Scope and Limitations
This thesis looked at past military aircraft programs
to find any ,qhich, in some way, anticipated or planned
for quality. improvements in its initial design.
There were few such programs (6-:23). One, the Navy's
F-14 fighter program; had sufficient, readily available
data for analysis. As noted by Captain Sickels in his
thesis, civilian use of P31 has been more commonplace
(19:18). But the data for these projects. is difficult
(if not impossible) to obtain and their widely varying
formats would make analysis impractical (19:18,45.). This
thesis will concentrate on the cost and schedule
achievement of the F-14 program and compare it to the
cost and schedule, performance of' 1960s and 1970s weapon
system programs. Performance goals were not eval-uated
since some programs' performance data were classified
(The F-14 was one of these programs). Thus this aspect
of P3-1 was.notanalyzed.
Study Framework
The study framework includes an initial effort. to
establish a broad, encompassing definition of P31. Then
21
the P31 example is compared with other non-P31 programs
to assess relative attainment of cost and schedule goals.
A comparison of respective cost drivers between the P31
program and selected, similar programs was drawn to
further highlight P31 benefits. Finally, the length of
acquisition time for these programs is analyzed to see if
P31 does shorten the process.
Data Collection Plan
Question One: What is P31? What is the relationshipbetween P31 and EA?
Data collection began wit) a focused searzh for P31
related literature, P31 program examples, and P31 related
studies. The review also included articles and reports
on EA. The initial intent of the literature search was
to enhance definition of P31 and to relate EA to P31.
Question Two: Does use of P31 enhance a program'sachievement of cost and schedule goals?
Question Three: Does P31 lessen acquisition times?
A review of past military aircraft pro'gram studies
was undertaken to find P31 examples and to gather
comparative data on non4P31 programs. This information
was examined to see if P31 use did improve achievement of
cost and schedule goals. Acquisition times were also
extracted to assess P31's impact on program length.
22
Data Analystis Plan
Question One: What is P31? What i-s the relationshipbetween P31 and EA?
A review of the various articles and reports on P31
and EA established a basic understanding of the concepts.
Utilizing the definitions of P31 and EA espoused by their
respective supporte-rs, the two.concepts were compared and
contrasted to highlight differences and similarities.
This effort enhanced understanding of the relationship
between EA and P31.
Question Two: Does use of P31 enhance a program'sachievement of cost and schedule goals?
Question Three: Does P31 lessen acquisition times?
Thi s thesis uses the Navy's Grumman F-14 Tomcat
fighter aircraft as an example of P31 use in a maj.or
weapon system program. The F-14's cost and .schedule
performance was compared. and contrasted with other
non-P31 -programs to answer research question two.
Acqusi tion times were also compared -to resolve research
questi.on three.
Data Sources
The data for the quantitative portion of this thesiI
23
was obtained from four primary sources. Two Rand
reports, "System Acquisition Strategies"(18) and
"Acquisition Policy Effectiveness: Department of Defense
Experience in the 1970s"(10), supplied the necessary data
ior prior weapon system acquisitions. These reports also
pro.vided the methodology used to make required data
adjustments to compensate for the effects of inflation
an'j any variations in the procurement quantity (Appendix
A). The data format of the Rand studies was also
utilized since it provided an ' excellent means of
comparing and contrasting the various program results.
The F-14 data-came from two mid-197'g studies: "The Study
of The Cost Growth of a Major Weapon System", an
unpubl'ished masters thesis by Lt. Col. D. E. Webb, and
"The F-14 andF-4", a compar'ative analysis undertaken for
the US Navy by the Columbia Research Corp. (Appendix B).
This data was adjusted using the above methods to conform
to the Rand format, thus allowing valid comparisons to be
made.
Data Format
The Rand studies used a result vesus goal' approach in
their data analysis (10:25). Raw data -was drawn from
system prog'ram offices, contractors, and various reports
for pre-1968 weapon system.s. (18:1) and' from the Selecte'd
Acquisition Reports (SAR) for post-1968 programs (10:5).
24
For analysis of program costs, the development estimate
(DE) was divided by the current estimate (CE) to produce
a goal-result ratio (10:25). A ratio of unity (1)
signifies achievement of the goal (the DE) while a ratio
of less than 'unity (<1) indicates a cost underrun or a
cost 'savings'. A ratio greater than unity (>1) means a
cost overrun. The CEs were adjusted accordingly' to allow
comparison in terms of c'onstant dollars and production
quantities. For program schedule, the ratio of the
number of months actually taken to the number of months
originally scheduled was used. Again, the preferred
ratio is unity or less than unity. To analyze program
length (the Rand ratio only measures accomplishment of
the stated.goal), this thesis measured .the time from the
initiation of full scale development (FSD) to the
delivery of t-he first production model. This measure
aVoids the difficult task of acqurately determining the
amount of time spent in the' conceptual and
demostration/validation phases (LO:59)•. The use, of the
date of the first production mcdel. delivery as a stop
date avoids~the problem of analyzing production schedule
deviations d.ue to quantity chan es or program stretch-
o ut . These schedule deviati ns are usually due to
budgetary turbulence, which may or- may not reflect
internal program factors. The difficulty of correctly
assessing the cause of -such chafges, wnether political,
' ' 25
S, . U
economic, or technical, is thus avoided.
26
CHAPTER 'V
FINDINGS
Question One: What -is P31? What is the relationshipbetween P31 and EA?
Literature Review
The Amerircri Defense Prepardness Association (ArPA)
was nne of the first defense related organizations to
research the strategy of planning for improvements in a
weapons initial design. It was the ADPA Who labeled the
strategy pre-planned product improvement or P31 (19:18).
In April 1'980, the ADPA and the Defense System Management
School sponsored a three day seminar and workshop to
discuss 'P31 and recommend ,,how to implement it in the DOD
(19:21). The' proceedings of this' seminar (the ADPA P3,1
Seminar and Workshop Proceedinms) was the first
comprehensive discussion of P31 (19:22). The January
1981 issue of the ADPA's ' National Defense magazine
published several articles based on the findings of -the
seminar and workshop. Dr. Hylan B. Lyon, th'e ADPA P31
committee chairman, gives a brief overview of, P31 in his
orticle, "Pre-Planned Product Improvement'" (15). He
highlights its benefits, the difficulties it faces, and
how it needs to be managed. In' "P31 Ccipetitlon,
"Standardization, and *System Engineering", •Joseph F.
Grosson discusses the competitive aspects of the 931
2* '*
Istrategy (12). ornan. R. Augustine, Vice President,
Operations, Martin Marietta Aerospace, also gives a
ge; . al overview of P31 in his article, "P31: An idea
Whoce Time Has Comee...Again" (4). He contrasts P3 .:Ith
other modification strategies, looks at Soviet examples
of evolutionary acquisition hi ghlights P31 benefits aind
problems, and proposes actions to implement P31.
Captain Stephen W. Sickels' AFIT thesis, 'Pre-P.lanned
Product Improvement (P31)", advanced the P31 :oncept by
providing a better understanding of the P31 process (19).
Captain Sickels studitd the nature of P31 by revi ting g
specific examples of P31 use in military and commercial
programs. The Joeing 727 aircraft provided the•
comriercial P31 example; the Boeing Air Launched Cruise AMissile (ALCM) gave. an example of P31 in a military
weapons program. Another military example was provided
by the Gene ral Dynamics F-16 Multinational' Staged
Improvement Program (MSIP). These case studies ,
highlighted the P31 process and thp role it can play in a
program. Methods. to effectively' sel-ect , and plan
improvements were also evaluated. This illustrated how
P31 can actually help reduce long range uncertainty.
Captain S ickels' overall recommendation was to implement
P31 not through formal regulations and policies hut b.?
r eaxing current regulations to support the P31 efforts
29
of industry. This assumes that P31 is already inherent
in industry's design practices. This may be true of the
companies studied, but may not be typical of all.
About a year after the ADPA's seminar, the Armed
Forces Communications and Electronic Association (AFCEA)
formed a study team to eval date command and control (C2)
Ssystem acquisitibn. Out of this effort came a similar'
"concept to P31, which the AFCEA termed Evolutionary
Acquisit;on or EA. Since the AFCEA study focused on C2
(versus the general focus of the ADPA seminar), it is not
* .too surprising that many aspects of.,EA are oriented to C2
requirements. The findings of the AFCEA study were
compiled in the Command and Control (C?) System
Acquisition Study Final Report (3). TiJs report provides
a detailed overvi-ew of EA; how -it was developed, the
benefits, it can offer, and the obstacles to its use. EA
was also disc'ussed in several articles In the August 1982
iss'ue of the AFCEA's Si gr al magazine.. Mr. John Smith,
Director, Major System Acquisition, Off'ice of the
Secretary Of Defense, in his speech, "New Initiatives in
Defeense Acquisition' compares EA and P31 (2,0). It is his
,c'ortention that P31 and EA are. "exactly the same thing
(20:56).' Mr Smith submits that EA Is merely P31 applied
"to C2 s'ystems. Like Captain SickeIs, Mr.. Smith feels.
* that 'P31 (and thus EA) can be implemented without major
3
030
changes in the existing acquisition process. Several E.A
advocates strongly disagree; they feel that the present
Sacqjisition policies inhibit and hinder use of EA (3:IV).
- They therefore recommend' major changes in policy and Ain
the'acquisition process itself (3:VI-VIT).
'In their article "A Cultural Change: Pre-Planned
Product Improvement"' Lieutenant Colonel Garcia E. Morrow
and Dr. Jules J. Bellasch'i contend that P31 implementa-
"t tio n requires a cultural change, not a procedural one
(16:20). Their article discusses how P31 differs fromS
past modification programs, what 'criteria need to be
considered when applying' P31, and the benefits P31
offers, especi~ally in progrdm flexibility and adapta-Ubility. The basic thrust of Lt. Col. Morrow and Dr.
Bellaschi's work is that the. conviction and persistance
of the program manag'er is vital to. an effectiv.e P31
effort. Given the present *short tenure of many pr~ogram
managers (10:15), this may be a serious hinderance to P31
I mplementation and success. Like most P31 advocates Lt.
Col. Morrow and Dr. Bellaschi integrate P 31 into the
present acquisittion, system. -Inoeed, they stress how P31
must fit into the Five Year Defense Plan' (FYDP) and the
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)
process.
3 1-6./
"P31-Help in Reducing Weapon System Costs" by
Lieutenant Commander Marlene M. Elkins gives another
general overview of the P31 approach. Cmdr. Eikins
provides some insight into why weapons costs are esca-
lating rapidly and identifies how P31 can help alleviate
this trend. Lt. Cmdr. Elkins emphasizes the importance
"of early pianning in an ef.fective P31 effort. Like Lt.
,a Col. Morrow and Dr. Bellaschi, Lt., Cmdr. Elkins feels
that the "major obstacle to the acceptance of [P31J...is
the cultural mindset of the user and engineering com-
munity... (11:116).".
The Rand Note, "Pre-Planned Pruduct Improvement and
"Other Modification Strategies: Lessons Learned From Past. Aircraft Modi'fication Programs", is a less -positive
a. asssessment of P31. Authors Federick Biery and Mark
Lorell reviewed past aircraft modification efforts; fo-
cusing on. those aircraft with some discernable preplan-
ning for future improvements. Unfortunately, only t~hree
such. aircraft programs existed, the 'Northrup F-5, the
Grumman F-14, and the Northrup N-102; one of which (the
N-102) 'never even advanced' beyond the conceptual stage.
Thus 3iery aic. Lorell evaluated long lived, often modi-
fled aircraft on the premise, that some common factor
could have accoun.ted for these aircraft's adaptability
anl extended Ii fespans. -In their work they also break
32
e
P31 into three distinct categories. The first, general
or non-specific P31, attempts to facilitate any and all
types cf future improvements. The second, subsystem
specific P31, concentrates on subsystems known or antici-
pated to be availabe in the near future. The third t-'pe
of P31 defined takes advantage of -the benefits of stan-
dardization in design, interfaces, and architecture to
apply a building block dpproach to improvement's. Also
"known as 'modularization', its use in avionics has
received much study, thus Biery and Lorell do not speci-
* fically address it in their study. This unfortunately
may have ignored its possible benefits -in aircraft
applications (19:75). Based on their research, the two
*authors conclude ý'that preplanning far into the future is
probably unworkable (6:VII)." But that short range pre-
*-planning. based on' specific subsystems (the second type
of P31), could be worthy'of future consideration (6:Vll).
"* This conclusion can be faulted in two ways. One is t e
noted scarcity of P31 exampl~es in their study group.
While it Is true that past examples of P31 use in mil -
tary orograms'is rare, commercialapplications are mo e
numerou's (19:18) and could have been included in the r
study sample. Second, -their major premise is that desi -
Sners can not antic~ipate future weapon system requiremen s
"a and thee improvements thus needed. Rut,.as ably describ d
by Captain S ickels in his thesis, uncertainty can e3
S~33
i
managed and P31 can be a vital aid dealing with it
(19:87). Biery and Lorell do highlight some very val-
uable lessons learned from post modification programs;
applicable to P31 an-d non-P31 programs alike. NIteres-
j tingly, one of the lessons cited by the authors,, to
minimize technical risk by pursuing incremental advances,
-* is an inherent benefit of the P31 approach.
P3,1 Definition
Despite the sizable number of articles and studies on
j the subject, there is still uncertainty 'and debate over-
:just what P31 'is. One major disagre~ement is between the
proponents of EA and P31 supporters. EA advocates feel
S.that their evolutionary approach differs from P31. P31
supporters insist that their concept incorporates EA; it
is simply a more detaiied, C2 specific P31 application.
The AD'PA defined P31 as follows:
P31 is a systematic and orderly acquisition,strategy beginning at the syster.'s concept phase
9. to facilitate evolutionary, cost effective up-grading of a system throughout the life cycle toeiihance readiness, availability, and capability.
The modular baseline configuration design shallpermit growth to meet the changing threat and/orto take advantage of significant technologicaland/or operational oppurtunities through futuremodification or product improvements at appro-priate time intervals.
The baseline technological ri'sk will be mini-
34
mized and provide early availability by utiliz-"i nrg well known and establis~hed technology to themaximum extent feasible, limiting advanced tech-nology to the subsystem(s) offering substantialoperational or cost benefits. [19:114J
The. AFCEA Defines Evolutionary Acquisition as follows:
Evolutionary Acquisition is a system acqui-sition strategy in which only a basic or 'core'capability is acquired initiall.y and fielded
Squickly, based on a short need statement -thatincludes a representative description of theoverall capability needed and the architecturalframework within which evolution will occur.Subsequent increments or 'blocks' are definedsequentially, based on continuing feedback pro-vided from lessons learned in operational u~sage,concurrent evaluation of adequecy of hardware/software configuration, and judgements ofimprovements or increased capabilities that canresult from application of niw technology, whenfeasible. [3:VII]
Both definitions stress shortening the time needed toifield new systems; P31 through use of proven technology,
'EA through building only a basic 'core' system (Impli-
citly this 'core' must also be based on existing tech-
nology.) In EA, however, the system does not explicitly
meet present requirements. Both definitions emphasis
sequential upgrades, based on' changing requ-irements (the
"threat" in P31, '"evolving needs" in EA) and 'on techno-
Slogical adv~ances. EA limits incorporati-on of advanced
technolog~y to that which is feasible. P31 evaluates
"application of advanced technollgy by its benefits and
thus may ignore it's costs. EA does, not specifically call
for growth provisions in the initial 'core' design. It
35
may be that such provisions are not cost effective in C2
equipment. However, design techniques such as modulari-
zation and form, fit, and functi.on (F3) specification may
provide the needed growth capability. EA bases i'ts
growth capability on. its requirement for a definite
architectural framework. Programs such. as the Modular
Automatic Test Equipment (MATE) program have suCcesfully
utilized this approach. But as it name indicates, MATE
also relies on its hardware's-modularity to insure growth
capability. EA's reliance on system architecture may
re'flect the software intensive nature of C2 equipment.
This architecture mus't be prec'ise, -to insure effective
upgrades, astwell as flexible, to allow for unanticipated
changes like new technology; a difficult goal to achieve.
The major difference between P31 and EA is that EA is
process oriented, P31 is more design or hardware
oriented. EA has a final desired ;'al-a system that
fulfills a specified need. It utilizes user feedback and
technological evolution to determine how to reach that
goal. In P31 the initial system meets-all requirements
(hopefully) when it is deployed. Its designed-in growth-
provisions allow. it to react to new technology, threats,
and changing missions. The .EA process emphasizes user
involvement since C2 systems are traditionally user
intensive and the man/machine interface i.s' often a
36
critical factor in them. The EA process if art iterative
one, with increments based on user assimilation of system
advances and his subsequent refinement of system capa-
bilities needed to achieve the stated goal. In EA, the
'end' (the goal.) is defined, the 'means' to this end are
evolved in the dynamic operational and technological
environment. In P31' the 'end' is undefined, the dynamic
technical, operational, and threat environment determines
overall system requirements. P31 defines the 'means' to
achieve these requirements by. incorporating specific
growth provisions in its initial design. One could say
that the EA process 'pulls' technology to meet its final
goal, and that P31 allows technology to 'push' its
systems requirements.
This asymmetry may not be due to a fundamental
conceptual difference but could be a simple reflection of
the different focus of each approach. EA js focused on
C2 -system acquisition, P31 seems to f'ocus on weapon
systems or ha'rdware. C2 systems are, as noted, very
software intensive. Softwal-e is inherently flexible and
has great growth potential, so much so'that a system
architecture is often needed to control and direct
improvements. Thus the EA concentration on d4fining such
an architectural framework. In contrast, hardware does
not have inherent growth pot~ntial-it must be designed
37
into the system. Thus the P31 emphasis on incorporating
upgrade provisions in the initial 3ystem design. Both
approaches stress preplanning for future upgrades; EA
through its system architecture, P31 through its hard-
ware's initial design.
The problem could be simply that both the ADPA's P31
definition and the AFCEA's EA definition are t6o detailed
and specific.. Therefore, this thesis will use a more
general definition of the evolutionary process, published
in a July 6, 1981 memorandum of then Deputy Secretary of
Defense Frank C. Carlucci.
P31 is an acquisition concept which programsresources to accomplish the orderly and costeffective phased growth of or evolution of asystem's capability, utility, and operationalreadiness. [19:129]
This definition is basically the same. as the ADPA one,
just less detailed. How one "programs resources" is left
to the specific, program, thus EA can be classed as an
adaptation of this defin'ition to the unique needs of C2
system acquisition. However a problem may arise. in
determining what' definition of P31 (the',general, DOD one
or the speci'ic ADPA o'ne) is being discusised. The
general definition is useful in describing common traits
of an evolutionary-acquisition approach, yet the two
specific definitions (t.he ADPA's P3,1 definition and the
"38
AFCEA's EA one) are more precise and much more useful in
parti'cular situations. Probably the best solution for
this problem is to use a more generic term such as
Technology Improvement Program (TIP) for the general
definition and recognize that P31 (as defined by the
ADPA) and EA are subsets of TIP
Question Two: Does use of P31 enhance a programrsachievement of cost and schedule goals?
Question Three: Does P31 lessen acquisition times?
The F-14 Aircraft
The Grumman F-14 Tomcat is the Navy's premier air
superiority fighter, performing primarily in the Fleet
Air Defense role. It is a twin engine, supersonic
carrier based aircraft with variable sweep wings, armed
with a mix of long, medi'um, and short range missiles (the
AIM-54 Phoenix, the AIM-7 Sparrow, and the AIM-9
Sidewinder) plus a 20mm cannon (the M61Ai Vulcan)(25:33.).
Its two man crew ope.rates an array of sophisticated
avionics, including an' automatic sweep control system
-which gives the aircraft superior maneuverability, as well
as increasing its range and loiter time. (21:8). The
F-14's AWG-9 weapons control system (WCS) can track up to
twenty four targets and .simultaneously guide six Phoenix
missiles to six separate targets (25:34). This
39
capability is presently unmatched by any other fighter
aircraft.
F-14 Development
The F-14 evolved from the Navy's VFX program, which
was initiated when it became apparent that the F-111B
aircraft would not meet ill of the Navy's air superiority
fighter requirements (25:34). The related Navy Fighter
Study (NFS), conducted in 1968, conc'iided that the
desired fighter performance could be achieved with an
advanced airframe in combination with the developed AWG-9
WCS and the TF-30 engine from the F-111B program (25:36).
The NFS stressed growth potential as a vital fa-tor in
the aircraft's design to provide flexibili.ty 'in accepting
system changes 'with minimal penalties in cost.and weight
(25:36). Five contractors responded to the VFX's (now
designated the F-14) Request.'For Proposal (RFP). ''The
Grumman proposal was ultimately selected, chiefly because
of its technical superiority., lesser development risk,
and greater growth potential (25:38). It was not the
lowest cost bid. Grumman not only had experience with
swing w9ing techoiology (its XF-1OF was the US's first
.swing wing .aircraft.) but also had, benefi'ted from its
previous work with the specified engine and avionics as a
subcontractor on the F-111B program (21:4,8,14). This
knowledge was a important factor in Grumman's selection
40
as the F- 1.4prime contractor (21:29).
F-14 Growth Provisions
The. F-14 was designed from the start to incorporate
an advanced engine, the F-401, the Navy's version of the
Air Force's F-100 engine (now installed in the F-15 and
F-16) which was then in development. The aircraft was
also designed to accomodate various avionics and
armaments improvements, specifically in infra-red (IR)
detection and targeting (21:6-7). These variants were
subsequently designated the F-14B and the F-14C.
It is apparent that the F-14 program has most of the
elements of a P31 approach. It made maximum use of
existing technology: the aircraft's armament, engine, and
major avionics were either already fielded or developed.
It u~tilized a , subsystem approach in planning for
subsequent upgrades. Provisions were made in the initial
design for the fitting of an advanced engine, the F-401,
and for anticipated avionics improvements.. This thesis
thus recognizes the F-14 as a -good example of P31..use in
a weapons system acquisition. This program will be
compared and contrasted with other, non-P,31 programs to
see if the theorized benefi~ts of P3! were, in fact,
realized.
41
Results teF4wsa h
The data for the F-14 program was Adjusted as per the
Rand data format and t'he results are shown in the Table
One..
4 P.
TABLE 1
F-14 vs. 1960s and, 1970s Pr~ogram~s
Cos" and Schedule Performance
COST
F-'14 Ratio
1960s Program' Mean.Ratio 1.44 (1)
1970s Program Mean Ratio 1.34 (1)
SCHEDULE
F-4Ratio' 1.10
.1960s Prcgram Mean Ratio 1.15 (1)
17sProgram Mean Ratio 1.13 (1)'
()Program m ean ratios are f ,rom the Itand reports.
43
As can be seen, the F-14 program did better than the
mcan in its achievement of both'cost and schedule goals.
However, the above means are for all weapons systems in
the respective study gr'oups. This includes not only
fighter aircraft but also transports, bombers, and
helicopters, as well as tanks, missiles, artillery, and
electronic systems. A better comparison may be to
compare the F-14 with similar fighter aircraft. This
thesis selected the F-4, F-15,,F-106, and F-111 aircraft.
as analagcous aircraft to the F-14. Fach is a high
performance fighter with advanced (for their times)
avionics. The F-4 is the F-14's immediate predecessor as
the primary Fleet Air Defense (FAD) aircraft. The F-1,06
was the most advanced interceptor of its day. The F-111,
in its F-111B version, was once planned to be the next
FAD fighter. The F-15. is the F-14's contemoorary, with a
similar air superiority role. The results of this
selected comparison are shown in the Taole Two. (The
averages shown' are simple arithmetic averages of this
fighter group's cost, and schedule perfo'rmance. They can
not be directly compared to the Rand results, as these
are mean' values)
14 .
4
TABLE 2
F-14 vs. Other Fighter ProgramsCost and Scheduile Performance
COST RATIOS
F - 14 1.27
F-4 1.25 (2)
-F-15 1.25
F-106 2.06
F-11 2.07
Average 1.58
SCIIEDULE (months) (1)U
F F-14 42
F-4 77
E F-15 53
F -106 47
F-Ill 77
- Average 60.4
""i) Schedule, ratios could not be obtained from thepresent lat3 sources thus tlie use of the months fromD OSARC II to the first production ver-1on.
(2) 7'-e :-4 cost ratio is from a estimati( in the£olIumrbia Researcn Corp. study.
j.
The F-14 once again does better than the average in
Sboth cost and schedule. However, the F-14 cost ratio is
worse than its immediate predecessor, the F-4, and its
contemporary, the F-15. Further study was therefore made
-of the causes of the F-14 cost growth versus those for
the F-15. SARs break down cost variances into nine
categories and this analysis focused on them. The F-14,
1 due to its evolutionary approach,, should have shown less
cost growth in internal cost variance categories, like
engineering and scheduling. And this was borne out by
the results of the evaluation. The F-14 showed a .1%
negative variance in engineer~ing cost versus a 17%
positive variance for.'the F-15. Schedule deviation for
the F-14 was 21.7% against 46% for the F-15. The largest
variances for the F-14 were in the quantity and economic
categories (25:51). These were due to the decision'to cut
the F-14 buy to .332 aircraft (down from 469 aircraft),
and to Grumman's miscalculation of the inflation rate in
their original bid. Recause of the economic dcwnturn in
the early 1970s., Grumman lost a large portion of lts
commercial business, forcjng the F-14 program to carry
mnore of Grumman's overnead costs. Some feel that
Grumman's initial program costing was very unrealistic
and amounted -o a 'buy-in' (21). With realistic DEs the
F-14 could. have performed even better in achieving its
cost goals.6
The F-14's schedule performance is one-area where it
shows a significant improvement over related programs.
"The F-14's schedule length of just 42 months is 18 months
less than the average for the sample group. This means
that the F-14 was in the field one and a half years
• earlier than comparable aircraft. The only other air-
craft to have a similarly short acquisition time was the
F-106. However, this aircraft was, in reality, a major
product. improvement of a existing aircraft, the F-102,
which may explain its short acquisition time.
-.
'•
o-
0
. S*
,.-, 47
0°
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSION ONE: E A i s' a e.'.:',nd a n d ontro Cspecific subset 5f the generai P31 a~proah.
As seen in the review of literatur'e, EA, as presently
def~ined seems to be simply P31 applied to the unique re-
3quirements of command and control (C2) system acqui si-
t ion . The -probl em appears to be one of overly detailed
definitions of the process. The P31 definition espoused
by the ADPA is v ery hardware oriented, thus the apparent
conflict with the AFCEA's C2 or~iented EA defilnition.
When one moves up a l evel of abstraction to ,a more
*general definition of P31, such as the one used. in the
Carlucci Memorandum (19:129), the conflict is re-solved.
EA can *be viewed as P31 adapted to the specific require-
ments of C2 acquisition. To avoi d confusion it may be
necessary to abel the general definit~ion TIP '_or som'e
other generic term, since the ADPA's P31 definition is
useful in specifi'c applic~ation~s. 'Thus one could say that
both' EA an~d P31 (as. defined by the AFCEA and ADPA) are,
speci fic subsets of the general evolutionary acquisition
ap~proach (TIP).
CONCLUSION TWO: P31 can enhance achievement of cost. andschedule goals as well as lessen acq~uisition times.
The comparison of the F-14 program, which util ized a
3.
"P P31 like acquisition, approach, to other weapon system
acquisitions seems to show that P31 use can benefit cost
"and schedule performance. The F-14 program not only did
better than most i960s a'nd 1970s programs in both
categories, but also outperformed analogous fighter
aircraft programs in cost goal attainment. The F-14 cost
variations that did occur were generally in non-technical
a areas, futher reinforcing 'the perception that the .P31
approach can lower technical risk. 'The relatively short
length of the F.-14 acquisition also supports the
*contention that P31 can help lessen acquisition times.
Howevef,, some caveats must be made. First, the F-14 is
only one program and its success with a P31 approach does
not necessarily prove that P31 will improve all
acquisitions. Many other factors could have lead to the
F-14 program's excellent cost and schedule performance.
For example, the Navy's critical need for a F-4
replacement due to the failure of the F-111i program may.
have been a major element in the the F-14's short
acquis~ition leng'th. More studies are necessary to state
with -certainty that P31 will indeed produce as
hypothesized. Mevertheless, thŽ resu'lts of this initial
anal.ysis are significant in that they show, in one case
at least, that P31 can benefit weapon system acqui-
sitions. The advantages of P31 are no longer abstract
and theoretical but can be seen in hard figures.
49
Recomnmendations
The F-14 program does not, unfortunately, provide any
support for P31 as a force modernization strategy. The
growth provisions in th.e F-14 have not, to date, be
utilized. This, in fact, points out a serious disad-
vantage in the P31 approach; its vulnerability to funding
cuts in the program's outyears (6:33). Further study of
other P31 programs should be undertaken to assess this
aspect of the concept. The F-16 Multinational Staged
Improvement Program (MSIP) may be one, viable candidate
for' such an effort.' The' MSIP is a subsystem specific P31
program to insure that the F-16 aircraft can economically
and effectively incorporate future avionics and armament
systems (19:75). An evaluation of the F-16 Derivative
Fighter Entry (.DFE) could also fill this need. This
program takes aavantage of the growth potential provided,
by the modular destgn-of the F-16's major compdnents. A
new wing, advanced engine, ,and improved avionics were
easily fitted to the basic F-16 airframe. The -F'-16 DFE
has *a higher bomb-load, longer acti-on radius, better
manueverability, and increased take off and landing per-
formance 'than 'earlier F-16 versions (19:72). 'A diffi.
culty in these studies could be a lack of comparative
data. Aircraft modifications, unlike aircraft, acquisi-
S50o
tions, are managed in a multitude of ways (19:13).
Detailed data, such as the SARs, may not be available.
Further study of the effect of P31 in initial weapon
system acquisition should also be undertaken. This will
broaden the P31 program sample size and allow more
rigorous assessment of the concept's benefits. A con-
current study of EA applications could also highlight
whether EA is truly a subset of P31, as this thesis
contends, or if it is actually .a separate and distinct
acquisition approach. These studies may bring out addi-
tional benefits of the P31 approach and -evaluate how to
effectively apply it to specific programs. Hopefully,
with all the present programs incorporating some aspect
of P31, a result of, former De-puty Secretary of Defense
Frank C. Carlucci's directives and the AIP, enough P31
examples and related data will be available to make such
studies possible. One research approach would be to du-
plicate the Rand "Acquisition Policy Effectiveness"
report (whic.h was an assessment of the effects o'f the
early 197'Os reforms, insti,t-uted by then Deputy Secretary
of Defense David Packard) and provide.a quantitative
evaluation of the effects of all the Carlucci initia-
tives, including P31, on weapon system acquisitions.
51
APPENDIX A
RAND STUDY METHODOLOGY
52
A p p~e ndLx A
BASIC METHODOLOGY FORASSESSING PROGR,01 COST GROWiTH
INTRODUMTON
Prvpgiarncag data um-d tK~vuLhout this ttud-, %ere drs-*n rmmnSe1.erWtAcqtzi-sitX N ! -j¶. The O'.5ce of the Set-mzry of Dc~en~e (Coc~ptro~rr)
(O.4SDC;, a!-j uia 0at sokie to dcve,;, mecaxzm or a-cquil~tion ewe. grzw.*.Hcavr .:7e 6rt~e srstvaiý": rne*.h:-s:b OhZ ~eTtv l~cred
we used, end this e.n 3eitd te somnewhat &fferentrec.lth (rmii what appear to besiciu.ar rness-.Ieg or ccr. Grwth. To avoid c-"arprr~atiozz o!oiur !&dy rmi'Uu.in this aprxcr.a we expl.Lj our cog analysis cwUechzd and Madte lýow they V~frerfr-.z- tho& used by QASD(Cl.
Proiram cots is the cror of the wh-u!e .&cqt.itioc program. iccludine the dtvel-opment and laetins of the qaem. the prod uction otsjstem, units (with their sparesand peculiar support). and any directly rtlated zrfliuuy constmction Program mgrowth is the chauge in program wat over tirat The smore general urms "catwsrioce" and "co a cape r wnmethý.m .W in~ p~u o cIct growth. becausethieyu aecoaasrzen with both increasint sar- decveaaag cwat. HRom we UaDeza&,dcot Crowth to include boa,~ neSptiv we d positive char~gvs "Cwt mwnace" is theterta usually employed in the Seocted Acqulacac. RrMILa
We am WtereesW in cos growth over the uB lifteime of the acquistion programn Idealy. tisi invo' ves a cmpairison between in intWa cast etimate orcapmjectioc' and the aaWctual incufred in brinm" the proram to completion. Inowartudy of 1970s ptvgrins the initial or boalie pr*V=a cows am. theDevelopmient Estimste (DUs pm-pared at the thiA d DSARC 17; t' is, at timprogram ccýWtooe between the valiýtion phose aMd &fu4lk~ development. AIprog;=i's DE is nre!y changed, =Ad for. most programuft provides a fized pointfrn= which to meausue xiheequent growth.'L b whets used in the coat growth
takuatim ame act, bc-mover, fMl tamn acuals, becuge no progrim in owu 1970asmmple hW reached oxn;-ac. &-o 4-1 two have been an=adle. 1hus, the ~a:,growth, cclcladow pe'--*nW bere (sand in to.of the .&fvne- apnuidtiooliteu-am) are really, -ai ,rAc between tzo actw aon eujy timate ad aaestimnate madc Low ths programas evolution. For these hatir adtmate we Melk
am" u- ~~i~ p~~4a Iwga e d'
'For ftv* crVM-?b~rr. and Cmd-de =m e94 h muet SAP& A& ad t iex .t da
MA LW~a rethf4if Me p.C denad *= Ue Oam CFuM~M (CEOmiud a. the BARSai M~AW f IL~ ni is la' 1L Aaaji C
Oft t"~ cuemnd W = aiM Un &: b d th Je Cm -jw Few twon ChoWu,
53
an the Current Eot-irwtf (CEAI týha' art Upds~ed q'.;--rly in the SARA Ilve CFAused ir oui rest rrcý. cae-uai~to-x Lr tho Cie i: the M.Irc 1978 SAR&
totbeen the CL are5 Lv UL. F- Lh CE c'io 4 the mrnov rw=c zd iw'.ally Ltlle I& r~r)eW~r,.a&tc The period over which 9rclrMm 00- grvth v ,owiiredý is the Us*.
IM7 SAR Whet the ea. grmwth or se~v-sl diffev- Fncrark is ov-ijauid oraegmpted, it is Common to *xprm Cst M~inh wat =* 60Wl term%, but ina tearwor.a percentage int.-ftse, or the rfmtio MEDE, which we refer to here as the "costgrowth rstio.'
ADA.SMN1G FOR C A?.G1.- IN PhODL'Cr~IO%4vANI]TrT:IT( %LTMN.AM7E LaTHiOD8
As &* --dy erz,skuid in the text, we eizp-i bo: ME and DE in to'wc ofcc-.L t i is-; e.:L~.-&, uo eZra~te etL. evo the pvc'ra d"*woAls We alm exmw progra cc= in tervm. a' Lse oiiginel (DE) rFvductiooquiatity cotepated at ?d-lestme one. Refert~ic t- wcx beaetin prf~l-umk'quantityis osedd to roepte the effoet ofsny ehap it pr~dtactoa quantity ("qmse.tity ehizic 0-. Vqwmit.ty vsanLOme) that rey oci. Sach ehsossM ane commm,and .tlomeliowe ae-au MGM thaa occe in the comuoa G!s FvPzna lifetime. Prngvamca Pý haigy mwiirve to the numbreer of item.s pm~z4 and witmho utmch abaselise it would be misleadin to compare the CE/D-ur " Cwth ratics ofsevoraJdifferent progams Vf some pr-o-m= held preda~du qzantities eoav.Ant andOthkis dii no-.
When Owe CE production quaikt7ity di¶.remt fim &h DFpmradcU quandtythere it mor than one way to adjun program " to esmirats te ad~ Offe. of
this d Ing, quantity. Oae method Is lb uw the D'Ep'sdu.-Nona peift = thebaein.a.,s whse bar e & Ln& ants. E w hilisrepoute Inthe L42 ihITUm ofthe currently ap~eowod qwaaatty. Is *Vjuomd* w-malisd cc the bissaf the Dr quantity :Thuaslf the pautoalon qnantty~buwn redoKd slam DBARCU (a sommon ocuun). an adi-tie to theCE is ,-#re tbring-the p.egamm
mibek up to what it void be irttb ozigijaiy prspamimo quanuty wers tw be*proeu.-ed. if the pod~ctic qatit has beet- inwmt a rsductos of tOw C2 is
Wnra&rd 7his i&=cK~opJiaed dn*Lv3 by de!&~ng the aw. chanp atiuted &-s theVropnms"SAR to 4razziy vz.L'Lý
AM'. IW? Mel.ho it tO use tbL* UWidlY VprOC~ = fUa'dItY 0 thNEMn.Whw= L~xis i dL~e---t &=o the quaxn~ for wthA the DE mae imcuakted, tbm theDE mux berckltsd fw the mw quantity. For eno*Pe. If Che zw, quL-;tit isis. Oha- the DE quanti.7,~a r*+tadon n the DE Is wawy *qua ID tbe quazb-.yce~ vurisnot rep~vod in the &AR. bn this appvas& the dutondrintor of the aw.pW~th MU. ChAACOG wi41th h CUmnt IS Planned PIOSiO. 7%ki bs ft etOd-4,; by the 'Of~ of thes Amiam Ssavw7 oa f Ddel j~na o&
If quan~til~wducd cot chang wars the au* at dsn&% &at zmoud. it
obviog*1y would wjke so dirsrehco which Vf 1mM two rolbods a foilu" atWheither we delete Lthe var~u-s fromb the CE ow as?. it 15 the DL. 12II =4 Cwth,atec '~ to e.?- hcv!.ine ;uientty. *,.L1 be tem ML'e car-hrati ratio
Sbc a-s r~.. iti or! m'~? u~y~e ef-be r--=) typesof coc va-Am mw=Lemd in &cq..&mjo prvoimri Lad ,wope in the SA.&
""T& d~- ;';O e 01 C~_ Cs4-:W &-_ 1!ý L" a the Lz &rLAp; v.&di Ti. belw. AWhe oth typc a o:-&Asw a'w izi-se. the4bebaaeii~quanti-ty has a deid beartr ez the sie of the cc~rp%& cw.Crowtii nxio. Moreove.wlien, progro cotvaianc Includes both a &=V ne 4a qa2tky and a chmn-4v inthe pre W unit Vhe cre in which the q-=tity vAA= is a ~kuIted (that is.vb.heth before or aftei7 the evor.W -uni~t cI=.ant is uk into amount) mnA alqect
t0e21ar of towa varanci attbubw~ to the chg.nA k q;"isnty and bets to theAt .te ofL% a ~tty &4u AT=. T1w regcIi is that tbe-oc~jwth ratio Doms~liedto esdu~ae the sfferts Voqtiunty +e:-* cnan diff:&;-e.nding an the way thesa~t itde of qu~nt.ty niris= is eetiatad &W cc L way Its affect, cc cagrvvth is e1~mine'.M. T1-ese u~~emC tioca V.11 be 6d..±iAtmtd be'- to indictewly VSetoe vwth eiga-w adIruIett. by OAS1)Cl a so-a~ piroamms dLCffehum tOse ahawm it th~s twdy. Oar a-proazh vwa s olfwurt, by the ba=-Sgro-.i ruJe of the etu4-4to mea.ure ch=Li- &=~ Ote DSAY.C H ber.:t~m-arL
Ahbugi% t" SALs defilnate many cctepese comt, vsarie, from a onjtational point of vaew these faU into foar basc typ4 oddar.~az (1) quantity. (2)tecurrvjg cojr-ut. (3) co-quaantty curveuilo. a:4 (0'I nomrr~ine Vrepee
are iMutratod in Ni. A.I. where WW cot: is me~r.znd veni=Bly and quantitjr isshowr on lh. horizontal azss. Becauveth lb. =iL~mrik~ asas gay, a VA,, vir.aI
baaUra telb grieater dhe proa:ciaccl change) and a wWnmzao~uz~tysatrmea-s enveataona)y reprovated by straight Iliac Is a Joghlg &-it'l we 6=mlogarithale scAls for both am In FISL A.1 tbroto A.4.
7be DE mad CE cagquantity m.-vas reveal Their tbil agb at seb jnadimiquati-ty. Mie quanti dodr.at~d Q"Wi- In arefm pon rvemmoag a byw
.tbtinblepat u40 ~ormimdatthe ftad6DSRCUI. Thet~oW DIbmlizm . C, Ia urd at the point ofintrue --k af4La besDne DZ
* Coaquantity onve.Tbe C]CE osta ml sow m man sw apb.Cb, indicates the uffadae'en puwth vaf tthseqdflied amo~mi nd type vovviaw. ?. ane me uWlat the DE quantity-exhept. ciwn.for oOW I-* vw ~ m~used by a 44anM Inquantity.
*Ae braareumak4' tow ig ~awqmty um iwo. mUe.aow w mp visuy~e Wm*g ~ ~ ~ ~ b em Ors am~ V~ ut=~b~ S tn.q E i t. 06mI
t of b~ia2 %341 1 min. 2 i 4UU I W g 4 VQ a.W~ L2. eta. I= = gm 4.:- ~Ja'e au~ v~a tis)
F mw~i.L-3m te Qs-fp n 4 -1vvA 4Vudf d vo&a vm
q~C U Q460t
low 2.~e. 14
10 j-_1 77;.- CsA
10- .; - - , , .
7j T
it) awn:Ty rwewdr OC wo v£bIa RoawrbrtS cw-z-m~at re wwm
I5- Ow lowr
cc
ILI !L1
10is - Nav wfT I I3U
(DO um. Of log-* mak)a~
ov
57-
Is
Iw
me o Dt CC r.6a
a(a.4Vi
At
I.M
4Me
7* A.-=do 1tt c a vd .r
(Dez ow f lt lo VU
=atit.% -indvee chat-e2 (FkC. A.1 (a)) have &!m&!, bet: dmsnumid; they aim-pl% mn kc th p rovr u lon ; t he eiven w.t-qu~anbty cu.rve to the W% CZE quantity.
harv.rn t~he a.'.e &!u~p* tht DE curve but wint) aL r427 iras Ta~vrrinor e
A.l(0)1jx:7tm Tar.&,Not th.:t ?tu..Lta frocw. a C).Lzgv ia Lhr 05:4)C of Uhe w*Aquwztit) c~--* iu Licuta from 30 percent to U~ kreatt Mai ce.Ct a nuw%polmmir~ic project~on Ithe eipectad rate of CW rvdvt~x u produitioa gtimncsedaol rer.Lps iz4 the in4ctw-, wcrcmaw in tcW~ -- A 909t c'iA--fL io IN otherdirection wor4W of co.rie, dbc-rcsae tot~cw~
Notec~rin L* waiazr.~ r sa s4 in erielo~xentt coets. is zwprtk3ented by a coiV~zt dollaer iw-?tincot (f it. A 1(d. In the exazpt. Owe irxruetit 10 aoc ur~u Mfe appa.rer dt-cr~aw in #be DoWoa.rm4 ppX at h~igter hIdeof* LoWa i mc= t re r~-l f t~ e graph's ',r~ mir ~a, wtach re.11cts 1$. reduicodp'o,40?icon a'ueh o~uhc rized coet Wa~Lve to the &iz.acxe bww'Loc. the abso.'ate
of~r~us athe =- rtrMment ftu3ins cC~st r,For kn,-L.~it% %t chose. in Fig. A.I. to Alius~ztet) iir f% ty~as oei.riarw,. ow
at a tVcic. ua rdd5oL to % basebn DE curve that is n; st~ec a.- a Kzt~pM haeon the 3og.I,.C Frid b'% eff&.-t. we limited the hrsetine to necrritSg C.ws which wne?
* asri'ned to exhibi 0* awe reductin3 tham-tastim~~ olaz 10j*,rcctn cw.~tvtaty'k~rn~nr curve.
In Fig. A.-2. Lbe pimwe is more =,npl~ets. Here we show the tunderiying muw.bare of. a ee-* DE bawhelne oustqiant~ty cuwv. eM a CE am"e. rth Lohw DE
* - ~~qiajaouty crave Mnuees both nracumug "d noczwirning cmA.. and the totaCE a~quaodty eimv combiras the D~E basslim. cur%# with additions of &alowbmWyes of cad varince' 4 The, cost and qwmztity uum1*n hdicatsd i*n Ig. "J arehypothetic&1. In pmr. iti ko isW twxwmon for an ibereve In mse type ofwaLicab.to be oA, at kut Partly. by 0A dersme In Another. ftg. AJ Wnicate how wtbeimpocent of tW program ca PM&d to quaaty CLIUM~
Figim A.3 uwpa~o the toWa DE a&M CS wema*~i cws ba PIC. -L.As sotLi orbai, the hd&i~ oftbwe. DE .od-qaaanty came at tdo lsmli quarabty,Q. sstxblisbe the to t i L wulin oC.TeCttaai C.rsl f the
stiMAaeaa in WUAR~7 to q PluM a ClOCatoUDUn Of the three OypW OtvaianM shownIn Ag. A 2 that cause the shift to the high.pr CE mqanlttity cure..
El~ren A.3 ilusLLat our methad and the method mmd by OASD(C) ta ebmjn-maeteefc of xu~bquantity cb~Anp fi~oz the cos. r.,wth aiwvrezt. As soWe
a,~~ Mac IL 7I.C froe re, ".nrM to Fij A_...e MMs.:ft cos grrawthcc Owhe sbsa of the s-.gioe quaztVty Q, Traens: var..ao dtie to tbCe hlýp bi
* qua rtty is co--paW io tarruxa f the known eumvW mr.. co, oc the CE airmg 1washvot the toal o=growth is indicatad in fta. "~ by the "~.ied vortmi ha.
aC - CQ dywo a. quuianty Q, Fpollowing thi appmedi, the Program owtis moverta to cwa~nt (DE,% queaaty tar= by &lftz& the qur-tity ca mriam.
*Aa P VSPýteMLi eDWM6O fqal e i W"O9
60
from the tOW2 cos' povn'- This ka ves the remairciag s4-ur~ed- cew vanhi&*m-in~dwted by the doned verti"a hne IC. - C.1 at qjatotita Qr-in ie-vw of the DE:
qu~nlty, ad Vs is the 1otrx-id we ubr n caku~icti cog pvwLh-The &L,!- Crit Lltxr~sta L4~ msLh,,d Lwa-l b? OA&SDýC'j = &.Itrcg tie D
to offbei the Cefect c" q-.=L.ty charge L-tis 'IU latar method eC gToWVS ia s-~ t~-, -TM- ~-1=W 7~ythe 4r.az-tit- d.~w is
mod,!b) a,4rg to the DE e-oic p do..r amozte.W :. aquantty-induced cvaria= 7VV- the qu.tty coo varaim 6conastadin serms ofi teortinl DEemi-fuentity ewve Thu&, utfem ki to Fg. A.3. Owe abat of tho'totacost pow-th
mn'butzed by OASD;C, to qu~aztjiy cotvaricz u the amo'unt (Cý, - CQ. lth dishcdvortical Lot drzvr at. the rrv. qr"Lity. Q, Cod gowth u94g tf-e OASD;C, ap-"psch is, tbe-, ona1 the ba-ý of the adj-tsuW DE co at hN De~w toitaiqAmbtjty, La.. OA ar~t CC. - C) &h wr. in e figm aa the dotted vortical Ikebe~weto lie two co~~tt currs at quaztity Q,.
The tWO &Med LM-~ 12 FIg 3,r*C ti&CZ gMp~h td4raatd toq.UnttychanCe I>) thie two txh,- are cekLHiy difleret in kengt. Thu.. the DE and CECO anu b t PsreLfl &zD!. " the &mak is 1%Athzijc. it foIWA that lty ccampVEth Mckv C=Put 8.0 Lhe-.~ two dqp~t.iauvýe are otý the M10'
The tzar!t pm-.:~tc in Fig AA4 demo-wm.5 how the choie of baselinequ:Ll.ty can in.heoc. the TaJuf of tL*. OASD'.CJ .carowth ntis When it is
*~w L o "cft the q~t~~e cW. rar m. The DI an CE t~jJ ow.vxrvs -v the mLe- & before ezcmpt abet. aettarn-.z CE gua theia an 46i
I.Q -
raimg MM* r~ eans. mmIM. anu uuwwo a 9dWb tw Sabn WWUSdmim wOL I
C. - dr *~aM Irdo. NO *~ U., h -L S061V1
'At q i - e. 4 W. 16 ra ovmo mbe an We ma~m* ~ I
ce . r.v* U.q,.A 4f~mdd &La4 wA&Mý mc ., um LVM ba Q two de'awI ruakn do am ad
F. + ... @I
a'- Ow-AM mb ,I
To, us "
0 Tb t~~~~~Wo e CJr m.ud?,ab~id S.a i .
on bir-eaur over the DE bawuLme quantit7 t$a,, ar!Ia d.oram to Q,. Th Drbwm taud osa et at a quantity of 411 is 76 ecit umu h-dudj4~ Vio quiantt*y.induc,~i eost m-unc, the Q., &6wa con at a qu&wiuty or s00 is 9ze cost "toU.
W- a erlutic ecjt In pro.JueLior tesviv er~ly I d-teb:;-e".1 L-1.irt. he eCoe 2t i -6 cot ur. i ta.
Lf we app'y the OASD(C) nwthod ic? odj~ua for the e~etl 04', cklAnte is~ L. t~' frmz aw-. D~ q-,.Az:y (Q,% ko~qa~ ~ it~ Fit A 4 would
reaui. is qu.aritiw-induetd varice Or=53- 74 - 277 tmear..rd oc aie hesAi attit origitai DE bwin~e ce-quantity curve). Tha nmZrA added to L%. DE ia V77+476 - 3S3 itM the eodtgrowth ratio ia 956/353 a 171. On the other MhAd, withthe wme nom:?U-rTing car variasc* and the oame P~ares in curve slope andrecumTn~g ev.pemimnit variance st itja the saarz DE ad CE~ cm<jumxtit1 '*cs).Is &mmsm t.-= the DE q.uantity to the quwnity Q. m 7tU. AA4 would insuit inqu~tity cL varmnet or 30 - 76 m -46 abd az adyrWA! wc~ostvaJ mti.2 ofW2/76 - 46) - &.^"30- 1.73. nhua. when there iuv rusoma chane s lproduc-
tion quantity, the OVSD(C) rnetW of sfepwtic& quanti-y tost vurman =2 lad toIlarg ddlerenws is the rssu~tang aAdus:ed =4-grovth ntia Or. to put it aziotc.-way, tioe QASIC tmethod o~djusýizj for quantityc}.-imazj za flostLig ba.taeaand *.ia caz load to imioc&iment com-growth neuls.
Tbe ine-mirtezcep sarr avol&ed (at leu, it r~ioc.p!e) in~ the mehdW advls.dIs this stdy In our approac1,4 the DE qaaztity. Q. bs a fixed Lkseliw. the ~cmvahn-am attributed to any chame-4, in productim qriar.L~y is subtriate frcc. thetotal ct gswth%. and the isu~h of thia vbmzbtni is the varianc eUtrbutud toarmrjaztity4nducd meat Phaiges bn both the q, and Q. exxaz~pW in FAC AA4 thenmith is the sme H60 - 76 as 4. Tea d2sit .M.4-A C*A P*%h b, thusIrnAepeadent of Lhe sip and ampsmite of the quantity danceu. When the ca.growth ratn is n u.uated for thew two ozampko, ths romaiab an WAi - (056 -160);/75 - 160/74. and 152 - (52 - 160))/76 - IW7C. It boat)ca &b e eamtpoawth ratio b2MI. in practic. diflferom cthia smepitud ar an. Eta.stforprograme that have loses chanted cdmiv*, rnd gmwtb nwaa'jz by aither
OC~T GROWNM Ta3M TRErrXI
To eadmata the oveamp mumum aJ te ofcost pov'h for our 1S7os mg am&Jyzumampl of.33 prpw wo plattd their March 19F.4 pvatLl. tio g ap~wt theainh oy.msz pasl DSARC 11 for ach of the -pu~m The iruha appear in
11t lof thearta.1hclir ?xati RiPPWot for %be expecte flaratud ae at S~aped axw,
with u'Jn-zr Is4(see RXL Iand 10ofthe tatwiththean~jof pn w n the productoc pha). we opted for a hnzairx erts howing'&amsant amszp anuaul Vvwth rule as the b" way to descrile tbe dsew. 7be
hmarps~o oftb* antai p aib Fig. 11 bWimted thai thi at of prouma
62
had an Aveisjc vIniza1 ca grcwt rate ofs-$ p"rnni h sahouU be DWin tha wedus~rn'tatd the Y-iinLzrrtP or the re-ra~oc line to show wv.- growth (a jmsL%.redo or, wni) at DSAP.c n. Alao "u pn4xedure ammisme, w4 Inicnn ee oforcams that suared uintwuEY hjrll govwtJ raw am a?&.r mmFc et.
Lzpce~c~~ ~ ~ uJ. e~rl Lg~ guv..~ Ikeie!y W beh4Lnwu:-Wt. Alk-wirm the rtem oi: &a1zo ofDd ft&oVwr Y-1 terarpc ig,.'
iaWut ia pJUlir4 up the ar~in 0 tlhp beid ho. above saity.O tme~e baaclines 0*tht=.*of DTX5-ARC- Vl ." dbL ~ x tu r4 te &:;,; or he 6ve4 Lor p~C-. s
thathd h~t~ initial vvJ~nea- rtas he lower the F.i$e .ir & r~anDua frowth nub would tp~wu io be).
jOAMDCCI obued 2axwTwhat lower acjreptic CM gmdvh weria W~ Pr~o-psaa ew~vvt a, "d time, about 3.6 perult a yea. A part or( the difrcrrvvbewoqD th. two rcauk. eiafo h feii ivhedauw t jr &4CLoBquxity4ndumd cw ehaufm~, "s erp.4io wears But Owet rTmu recx= Ibrthe ddrev=t growth ntec is Ohe ditfrcm= fa Wh pvp= samp~w OAS~eC)bdludae Owe M prognsmi rrpci1 to Coams~ma LM~a minus tb- TFV. p'ur 5sd~tioa proVam that. are covere iz SA~s not npcrle to the Coe,~rw- The
.Ml pr~ocrat vith aircu);u data. When we tia$t co;We' OASD(O wm.pk1-61 e~n:')oyed QU: C- uiVt--&Ai uwe'zA h.4 snnani roK pwth rate rw 43peroi The nrcmaning diffe ew.* betiweo our U. pts t growth. Pete iadOASD(CAS 3.6 perltL nte was aim~c eoople-teTy aaMtDW for b7 the dIffswtfcwitho& ut~d for reprwcmng cWa~& . growth. Our pa tip rawe Is viaplya liwea. aicrae annuai growik rale, wherea OASD(CI ame a owcpo-ad gcw~b
Oft'.IMM MMW BOLJ-&...
Cwwia. CLVU LS A Ou Aw~~sp~w 0~ PU& Aq~w%.1 Tam =c"6M XMWU. Sep
So. V meft. &U. W In dm-pvh a&M "Mi =h4U1 .mhuehOwn*a old uambtw ad tb" UU.r36 to~ mud U& W.OL~V
bmw. m t&.~ s v 63
APPENDIX B
F-14 COST DATA
64
F-14 COST DATA
(1) (2) (3)PrO ;-2r Acquisition rlcve.cprent Current-Cost (S millions) Estimate (DE) Changes Estimate (CE)
Base Year (1969) Cost (FY69-76) (FY 69-77)
Development
RDT&E (F-14A) 678.0 166.4 1044.4RDT&E (F-14B) 221.5 121.1 342.6Total RDT&E 899.5 487.5 1387.0
Procurement 2
Total Flyaway 3323.4 2904.5
Support 47).1 692.3
Initial Spares 697.4 381.5
Total Procurement 4491.9 -513.6 3978.3
Construction 3 0 6.1 6.1
EsralationEconomic Change 774.6 202.8 977.4Program Related -3.4 .- 3.4
TOTAL PROGRAMI COST 6166.0 179.4 6345.4
Quantties 4Deveouient 6 6 12~
Procurement 463 -141 322Total 469 -135 334
Unit Cost F-14AProgram 12.63 5.26 17.89
1 DE covers FY 69-73, CE for F-14A covers FT' 69-7S.2CE change principally a fun:tionP of quantity changes.
3• covers FY's 71, .3, and 74.
4 Result of Congressional transfer of funds from PAWN toRDT•E.
Source: F-14 Sclccted Acquisition Report,: Confidential,31 Aarch 1974.
65
F-14 COST VARIANCE
Tot 4:(S in Iillions) Escalation Prý;:amDEV PROC CONST Provisions '•stDevelopmentEstimate 889.S 4491.9 0 774,6 6616.01 Quantity 269.3 -109S.4 -179.6 -100S.72. Engineering -2.8 .6. -2.23. Schedule 101.9 27S.6 99.6 477.14. Economic
202.8 202.8
S. Unpredictable
6. PerformanceIncentive S.S .5 6.0
7. ContractCost Overrun67.6
$5. 73.18. Support Z42.6 6.1 .80.3 329.09. Estimating 43.2 66.4 -10.3 99.3CurrentEstiIate 1387.0 3978.3 6.1 974.0 6345.4
(Webb,1974:Fig.6)
.66
\
(. _ ___ ____ ___ ____ ___ ____ ___ ___ ____ ___ ____ ___ ____ ___ __.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
67
A. REFERENCES CITED
1. Alexander, Arthur J. "Patterns of Organizational Influencein Soviet Military Procurement." Unpublished researchnote, N-1327-AF, Rand, Santa Monica CA, April 1982.
2. Alexander, Arthur J."Soviet Science and WeaponsAcquisition." Unpublished research report, R-2942-NAS,Rand, Santa Morica CA, August 1982.
3. Armed'Forces Communications and Electronics Association."Command and Control (C2) System Acquisition StudyFinal Report." Unpublished research reportunnumbered,AFCEA, Falls Church VA, September 1982.
4. Augustine, Norman R. "P31, An Idea Whose Time Has Come...Again," National Defense, January 1981, pp.27-31,62.
5. Biery, Federick P. "Are Other Acquisition StrategiesSuperior To The P31 Approach?" Defense ManagementJournal, First Quarter 1983, pp. 1 1 - 1 5 .
6. Biery, Federick P. and Mark Lorell. "Pre-Planned Product.Improvement and Other Modification Strategies: LessonsLearned From Past Mo'dification Programs." Unpublished.research note, N-1794-AF, Rand, Santa Mcnica-C.A,December 1981.
7. Brown, Harold. "Technology, Military Equipment, andNational Secur-ity," Parameters, VolXIII, No.1,
Spp.15-27.
8. Cockburn, Andrew.'The Threat. New York: Random House,1983.
9. DeLauer, Richard D., Under Secretary of Defense., Researchand Engineering. The FY 1984 Department of DefenseProgrant-o-r Research,. Developmeat, and Aquisition,
'Statement to the 98th Congress. Washington DC:Government Printing dffice, March 1983.
10. Dews, Edmund, Giles K. Smith, Allen Barbour, ElwynHa'rris,and Micheal Hesse."Acquisition PolicyEffectiveness: Department of Defense Experience in the1970s.4 Unpublished research report, R-2516oDR&E,.Rand, Santa Monica CA, October 1979.
11. Elkin, Lieutenant Commander Marlene. M., USN. "P31-Help inReducing Weapon System Costs," Concepts, Spring 1982,pp.105-110.
- 68
. . , *' - '- , _. ,'
12. 'Grosson, Joseph F. "P31,Competition, Standardization, andSystem Engineering," National' Defense, January 1981,pp.25-26.
13. Head, Colonel Richard G., USAF. "Tecnnology and theMil-itary Balance," Foreign Affairs,'April 1978,pp.554-563.
14. -Johnson, Major Herbert W., USAF. "Air Force Fighters:Simple or Complex?" Air University Review, May-June1983, pp.24-35.
S15. Lyon, Dr. Hylan B.,"PrePlanned Product Improvement,"Nat.ional Defense, January 1981, pp.20-25.
16. Marrow, Lieutenant Colonel Garcia E., USAF, and Dr. JulesJ. Bellaschi. "A.Cultural Change: PrePlanned ProductImprovement," Concepts, Summer 1982, pp.16-25.
17. McKitrick, Jeffrey S. " ,Military Look at MilitaryReform," Comparative Strategy, Vol-IV, No.1, pp.51-64.
18. Perry, Robert, Giles K. Smith, Alvin J. Harman, and SusanHenricksen. "System Acquisition Strategies."Unpublished rese-arch report, R-733-PR/ARPA, Rand,Santa Monica CA, June 1971.
19; Sickels, Captain Stephen W., USAF. "Pre-Planned ProductImprovement (P31)." Unpublished mastersthesis, LSSR59-81, AFIT School of Systems and Logistics, WrightPatterson AFB Ohio; September 1981. ADA 110971
20.. Smith, John, Director, Major System Acquisition, Officeof the Secretary of Defense. "New Initiatives inDefense Acquisition," Signal,, August 1982, pp.55-57.
21. Sponsler, George C., Norman M. Rubin, 0. Gignoux, andEugene Dare. "The F-.4 and the F-14." Unpublishedresearch report, 'N0014.-72-C-0339, Columbia ResearchCorp., Gaithe'rsburg MD, May 19,73.
22. Taml i.n, Captain Eric H., USAF., "Comparisons and Resultsof Soviet and American Military Approaches To Researchanp Development." Unpublished technical repcrt, unnum-bered, AFIT School of Systems and LogiStics, WrightPatterson AFB OH, September 1980.
23. Taylor, John W.R. "Ga.llery of Soviet Areospace Weapons,"Air Force Magazine, March 1983, pp.79-94.
69
.-- . - . , - - -
. , . ,.- .,**A ;. . . * *-x.;x-. . .-
24. Ulsamer, Edgar. "Will Economic Weakness Increase SovietMilitan'.y?" Air Force Magazine, March 1983, pp.41-47.
25. Webb, Lieutenant Colonel Donald E., USMC. "The Study ofthe Cost Growth of a Major Weapon System." Unpublishedmasters thesis, unnumbered, Naval Postgraduate School,Montery CA, December 1974. ADB 001397
B. Related Sources
Barbers, Major General Donald M., USA. "P31, Pre-Planned.Product Improvement," Signal, July 1982, pp.11-16..
Berman, M.B. and C.L. Batten. "Increasing Future Fighter,Weapon System Performance 'by Integrating Basing,Support, and Air VehicleRequirements." Unpublishedresearch note, N-1985-1-AF, Rand, Santa Monica. CA,April 1983.
3oyes, Vice Admiral Jon L., USN(Ret). InternationalPresident, AFCEA. "Evolutionary Acquisitiin," Signal,March 1983, p. 9 .
Brabson, Colonel G. Dana, USAF. "DOD Acquisition ImprovementProgram," Concepts, Autumn 1981, pp.59-74.
Br~abson, Colonel G. Dana, USAF. "Can We Afford the DODAcqujisition Improvement Action?" Concepts, Winter1982, pp.45-54.
Forney, Major William A., USMC. "A Case Study on theProcurement of the F-14." Unpublished research study,unnumbered, Air Command an.d Staff College, AirUniversity, Maxwell AFB AL, May 1977. ADB 0183431
,Goldstein, Lieutenant Colonel Micheal J., USAF. "Reducing theBow Wave in Defense System Budgeting," Concepts,Winter 1981, pp.75-78.
* Gregory, Will-iam H. "Mods and Pods," Aviation Week and SpaceTechnology, November '7, 1981', p.11.,
Gregory, William H. "Streamlining the Acquisition Process,"Aviation Week and Space Technology, May 4, 1981, p.9.
Lamar, Brigider General Kirby, USA(Ret). "C-E DevelopmentStrategies: New Emphasis on the Theory of Evolution,"Signal, July .1'981, pp.18-23.
Spangenberg, George A. "Cheap Fighters.- The ImpossibleDream,," Armed Forces Journal, April 197,4, pp.33-34.
70
.. .. .. . . .. . . . . .......... ... ' ...
Supko, Charles J. "Today's Weapons-Tommorrow's Requirements:Upgrading Existing Systems vs. New System Development-A Cise in Point." Unpublithed study. report,unnumbered, Defense Systems Management College, Ft.Belvoir VA, May 1976.
Thayer, Paul, Deputy Secretary of Defense. "Guidance on theAcquisition Improvement Program (ALP),. DODMemorandum, Washington DC: Government PrintingOffice, Jun'e 1983.,
"Time Spurs New Design Approach," Aviation Week and SpaceTechnology, December 8, 1981, pp.57-T9.
71
I516
[ 6"-85
DTIC