Institutional Change and Learning forSustainable DevelopmentR.D. Connor and S.R. Dovers

Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies

Working Paper 2002/1

ISBN: 086740 529 5ISSN: 0313 – 7414

This Working paper is an interim outcome of Land and Water Australia ProjectANU-24 (Implications for Australian natural resource management of interna-tional experiences in institutional change and reform arising from sustainabledevelopment), being undertaken through the Centre for Resource and Environ-mental Studies, The Australian National University, Canberra 0200, Australia.Comments are welcome – contact [rconnor@cres.anu.edu.au].

The Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies was established in 1973 as a policy-oriented,interdisciplinary centre for research and post-graduate training: [http://cres.anu.edu.au].

Land and Water Australia is a research and development agency established by the Australiangovernment to advance the knowledge base for sustainable natural resource management:[http://www.lwa.gov.au].

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Institutional Change and Learning forSustainable DevelopmentR.D. Connor and S.R. Dovers

This paper is an interim outcome of Land and Water Australia Project ANU-24 – Implica-tions for Australian natural resource management of international experiences in institutionalchange and reform arising from sustainable development – being undertaken through the Centrefor Resource and Environmental Studies, The Australian National University.

In summary, the aim of the project is to explore operational institutional lessons of relevance toAustralia, gleaned from institutional change in other countries driven by the post-WCED (1987)and UNCED (1992) policy agenda of sustainable development. The primary output of the projectis a brief (~20 page) report with a target audience of the NRM policy community, stakeholders andNGOs, supplemented by explanatory material, background papers, case studies, data bases, etc. asrequired. Clearly a review of institutional change around the world over the period 1987-2001represents a mammoth task, and thus this study must scan widely and then scope more narrowly.This paper seeks to inform that process, and to do so is organised as follows:

• In Part 1, a conceptual discussion of the nature of ‘institutions’, emphasising the need to under-stand the broader and interdependent institutional system (policy, organisations, rules, politicaltraditions);

• In Part 1, a discussion of different types of policy and institutional learning, and of who learnsabout policies and institutions;

• In Part 2, thoughts on operationalising the idea of ‘institutional learning’ in the context of thisstudy, Australia, and sustainable development;

• In Part 2, a discussion of proposed primary criteria for selecting case studies and themes forcloser investigation;

• In Part 2, a set of proposed cases and themes for further investigation, along with a set of optionsthat are relevant but not favoured.

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Part 1: Conceptions of Institutions and PolicyLearning

1. Introduction

This project, under the LWA Social andInstitutional Research Program, is taskedwith drawing lessons for Australian naturalresource management (NRM) from experi-ences of other countries in “institutionalreform.” Underlying this investigation isthe proposition that Australia should bemaking a purposeful effort to move toNRM policies and practice consistent withthe notion of sustainable development andwith commitments made under interna-tional agreements at, and subsequent to,the 1992 UNCED conference.

In approaching this broadly defined task,part one of this paper seeks to provide thebasis for a discussion of the key concepts of“institutions” and “policy learning.” Thisis intended to assist the project team tobuild a set of criteria for the selection ofcase studies from which to draw lessonsrelevant to Australian NRM. First weexplore the issue of defining the focus ofour attention – institutions. It is importantanalytically that a shared and well-understood meaning for the term “institu-tion” is established at the outset, and thatconsistent usage is maintained as much aspossible throughout the project. We arguethat clear and consistent terminology willpromote a deeper understanding of thedynamics of institutional systems, which inturn will produce a more useful selectionand analysis of case studies.

Secondly, as this project is “an exercise inpolicy and institutional learning,” someexploration of what might comprise learn-ing in this context seems worthwhile. A

brief summary of ideas from the policylearning literature is given to bring focus tothe search for case study material. Fromthis framework, a focus is developed in thefollowing sections on what it is we mightattempt to learn about with respect toinstitutions for sustainability, and examplesof potential case studies are raised toprompt discussion.

In addition to serving a systematic selec-tion of case studies, this section stands in itsown right as a contribution to the discus-sion and development of conceptions ofinstitutions and policy learning forsustainability, and one that we trust will beof interest to the NRM policy community.

The institutionalisation of the sustain-ability idea, and its eventual integration asa fundamental and mainstream principle ofgovernance, is a long-term project onlyrecently begun. Arguably, sustainabilityhas an inexorable logic, on a plane withother deep social logics such as democracy,justice, and human rights. Inevitably itseems, these central animating ideas ofmodern societies are all intertwined andinseparable. Sustainability has yet to attainthe status of its natural partners at nationalor global levels. This will require bothbroad normative change and purposiveinstitutional change. Now is certainly animportant historical point for humanitywith respect to institutional development,and one that demands that we attendclosely to the task of better understandingthe substance and the ways of our institu-tions.

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2. Institutions: Form, Function and Relations

This section of the paper sets out aframework for the consideration of institu-tions in the context of the project objectives.It develops a general conception of institu-tional systems based on the analyticaldefinition and explanation of institutionsdeveloped in the New Institutional litera-ture, and particularly the ideas of DouglassNorth (North 1990). The account givenseeks to reconcile this analytical definitionof institutions with meanings underlyingcommon usage, reducing apparent conflict

through the view that the need for analysisforces refinement and precision in definingthe objects of study. This theoretical workin turn facilitates clearer understanding ofthe commonalities of meaning behindseemingly disparate common usages. Italso allows us to develop a systems view ofinstitutional form and function that willfacilitate a deeper appreciation of how andwhy particular institutional arrangementsmay be more or less effective at addressingthe problems of sustainability policy.

DEFINING INSTITUTIONS

The term institution has been used inmany ways to refer to a range of differentthings. It is used in everyday language torefer to entities as seemingly disparate asbanks and insurance companies, a nation’sconstitution, or an older member of thecommunity reliably seated at the bar of thelocal pub. This broad scope in commonusage of the term has been reflected in thelanguage of institutionally related theoris-ing dating back a century. Most definitionsof institutions are descriptive and encom-pass a diversity of social entities. Follow-ing a period of neglect, institutional theoryhas recently undergone a revival through-out the social sciences (Goodin 1996; Marchand Olsen 1984). References to institutionsand the use of institutional language oftenremains vague and, despite a greateremphasis on analysis, somewhat con-flictual. Some of this is a deliberate attemptto accommodate a range of disciplinarytheoretical perspectives with disparatetraditions, or merely traditions of similarimprecision, with an associated view that arestrictive definition would not be helpfulto scholarship. In recent Australian litera-ture Henningham (1995), for example,relies on a dictionary definition originatingin the sixteenth century, describing aninstitution as: “an established law, custom,

usage, practice, organisation, or otherelement in the political or social life of apeople.” Dovers (2001) builds on this toproduce a more detailed meaning, but onethat retains the ambiguity of the original,and summarises this as: “An institution isan underlying, durable pattern of rules andbehaviour.”

Theoretical work in other areas has led toattempts to provide a more precise defini-tion to assist analysis. However, as fore-shadowed above, such definitions havecontributed to confusion over how to utilisethe term in a discourse that refers to severalof the differing entities that in variouscontexts are called institutions. A particu-lar difficulty arises in the distinction ofinstitutions and organisations. Where theterm institution is used to refer to anorganisation, those that use it so would notagree that all organisations could be de-scribed as institutions. So a key questionmust concern what it is that distinguishesone type of organisation from another inthis way. Dovers (2001), for example,argues that persistence is a feature ofinstitutions, and therefore an organisationthat persists over time could qualify as aninstitution. However, here we explore adifferent approach.

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One of the most widely used theoreticaldefinitions of institutions is that ofDouglass North (1990):-

Institutions are the rules of the game in asociety or, more formally, are the humanlydevised constraints that shape human in-teraction.

“They are made up of formal constraints(e.g., rules, laws, constitutions), informalconstraints (e.g., norms of behaviour,conventions, self-imposed codes of con-duct), and their enforcement characteristics.Together they define the incentive structureof societies and specifically economies”(North 1994). This definition can be inter-preted as referring to an institution as beinga single rule (such as that proscribing theforward pass in rugby, or that prescribingwhich side of the road to drive on), but it isalso possible and of considerable utility toallow a hierarchy of aggregation of indi-vidual rules. Thus the set of official formalrules of a sport can be considered aninstitution.

North also proposes the primary purposeof institutions.

Institutions reduce uncertainty by pro-viding structure to everyday life. They area guide to human interaction…”

Thus the way others will respond in agiven interaction is made more predictableby institutions, whether by formal rules ofthe road or sport, or through informalsocial and cultural norms of behaviour.This allows us to move through manyinteractions with others every day withouthaving to renegotiate ground rules everytime.

The scope of this view of institutions isimportant to appreciate. It includes allsocially devised rules of governance suchas articles of constitutions, statute andcommon law, regulations and by-laws,policies, legal rulings, contracts, codes ofconduct and honour, and the myriad socialand cultural traditions and norms thatconstrain the way individuals and groupsact in social contexts. This vast array ofconstraints and guides to appropriate

behaviour forms an institutional matrixwithin which all social actors interact.

North specifically enjoins us to separateinstitutions from organisations conceptu-ally – warning against confusing the rulesof the game with the players. “The purposeof the rules,” he explains, “is to define theway the game is played. But the objectiveof the team within that set of rules is to winthe game – by a combination of skills,strategy, and coordination; by fair meansand sometimes by foul means” (North1990). Thus teams (the organisations) andtheir strategies are responses to the rule set,and are different in kind to the rules them-selves (the institutions).

North’s conception and definition ofinstitutions derives from his underlyingpurpose in theorising: to explain an eco-nomic history in which firms (economicorganisations) are primary actors. Thismakes the separation of institutions fromorganisations crucial to his analysis, andthe distinction we hold to be well made andvalid. However, it does present a challengeto consistency in the institutional languageof a broad and cross-disciplinary publicdiscussion.

One approach to this problem is to viewNorth’s definition as an analytical refine-ment of common usage of the term “insti-tution,” rather than a departure. In North’smodel, institutions are environmentalvariables set by society that conditionbehaviour generally, and therefore theemergence, form and actions of organisa-tions. They do this in combination withother variables, particularly the purposeand objectives of actors and organisations,cost structures and potential benefits, risksinvolved in breaking rules and so on,although these other factors themselves areall conditioned by, or are direct products ofthe broader institutional environment.General agreement may be had on theproposition that at least a minimum set ofsuch rules is essential for orderly andpredictable social life.

Now, some organisations are also essen-tial for orderly social life as we know it,

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because they provide the essential serviceinfrastructure required for the degree ofsocial coordination and assurance neces-sary to support the level of governance andeconomic activity that is the norm in aparticular society. These services providethe regularities upon which we build oursocial lives. To this extent they, and theorganisations that deliver them, form partof the institutional system. If we attempt toidentify such essential services and theirassociated organisational structures, wefind that many of these tend to be referredto as institutions. Schools, universities,hospitals, banks, the key arms of govern-ment, are all referred to in this way, argua-bly because they serve to facilitate thefundamental workings of our society, justas the basic rules do. These are expectableregularities, or norms, in a given socialcontext. They provide us with a “normal-ised” social environment and are entirelyintegral to our way of life.

From this perspective, it may also beappreciated that particular organisationalentities might, for convenience, be substi-tuted in common parlance and perceptionfor the system of infrastructure of whichthey are merely a delivery point. Thuslocals are shaken by the closure of a bankbranch or postal agency, not only becausethis may require changes in the way theygo about their daily business and thepossible extra costs involved, but becausethey regard the branch, and sometimeseven the building, as an institution in itsown right. Whether the closure of a par-ticular bank branch represents real erosionof essential institutional infrastructure is inpart an empirical question, and is certainlya matter of social discourse. However, thisis not itself relevant to the task of separat-ing out the underlying meaning of the useof the term institution in the current con-text.

In the context of the advanced westerneconomies, it is the underlying servicedelivered by the infrastructure of institu-tional systems that is critical, and we havebecome increasingly acculturated tochanges in their organisational configura-

tion. Regulatory reform, including privati-sation of government owned assets andgovernment controlled services, hasbrought altered modes of delivery thatcontinue changing with technological andeconomic change. These regulatory changesare the real institutional changes in theNorthian sense of the rules of the game,rather than the organisational changesconsequent to them.

However, we cannot so easily discardcommon usage for an analytical conven-ience. Remember that old fella at the bar?Both he and the bank building on MainStreet are regularities in the socio-physicalenvironment that are directly analogous tothose produced by rules. It is this socio-physical reality that people experiencemost directly on a daily basis, and thatrepresents in the sensorial world the kindof order and predictability that institutionsas rules bring to behaviour.

It is now becoming clear how the seem-ingly conflicting notions of institutions asrules, organisations, or other longstandingsocio-physical phenomena, are related associal regularities. The analytical cleavageemerges when we ask what is cause andwhat is effect. In complex dynamic systemslike human societies, there are few trulyindependent variables. Each social entity,whether individual, group, organisation,process, or institution, is interlinked withmany others and bound into the whole, andthese linkages are not arranged in a strictlinear hierarchy. Hence the relationshipsbetween a rule and the entities (e.g. organi-sations) acted upon by it are often two-way,with feedback from the results of the rulebeing applied used to modify it so as toimprove future outcomes.

The New Institutional literature makes aconvincing analytical case for “institutions-as-rules” providing the fundamentalinfrastructure of coordinated social action,and thereby setting the stage for the emer-gence of other regularities such as organi-sations. Some authors have suggested thatthe regularities themselves should betreated as the institutional analytical unit,

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but this seems less helpful than using thecause of the regularity. However, theanswer to the question of what is an insti-tution depends to some extent on why thequestion is being asked. In any case it isstill a work in progress, in that interest inthe issue has undergone a recent resur-gence and it will take time for the analyticalutility of particular definitions to be dem-onstrated and accept-ed. The range ofdisciplinary traditions in the use of institu-tional language is likely to remain quitebroad,1 and hence analytical definitionssuch as North’s will not be appropriate inall discussions.

However, for those engaged in discus-sions of public policy for sustainability, itseems that North’s framework provides asignificant clarification in language as acrucial building block to an improvedanalytic theory. Although founded on amicro-behavioural model of the bound-edly-rational actor, the framework viewsindividual action as fundamentally con-strained by social choice as expressed in theinstitutional system. This allows morescope for addressing sustainability con-cerns through purposive institutional

1 For an example of the diversity just within sociol-ogy see Scott 1987, and Goodin 1996 provides anaccessible summary of institutional interests across aselection of social science disciplines.

development and reform, and for learningabout how to approach this, than do otherviews of institutions more concerned withexploring multiple theoretical perspectives.However, the bounded rationality caveat isimportant in its implications for institu-tional change. Herbert Simon (1986)comments:

If… we accept the proposition that theknowledge and computational power of thedecisionmaker are severely limited, then wemust distinguish between the real worldand the actor’s perception of it and rea-soning about it. That is to say we mustconstruct a theory (and test it empirically)of the process of decision. Our theorymust include not only the reasoning proc-esses but also the processes that generatedthe actor’s subjective representation of thedecision problem, his or her frame.

The implication is that perceptions arebuilt on cultural norms as well as experi-ence. Because humans have limited cogni-tive capacity and incomplete information,our judgements of the world are based onperceptions guided by beliefs – our mentalmodels. Cultural beliefs about resourcesand environment are difficult to change,and to an important extent determine boththe demand for institutional change tosupport sustainability and the effectivenessof new rules for a given level of enforce-ment.

STRUCTURAL LOGIC IN INSTITUTIONS

In the context of the current project, es-tablishing the distinction between institu-tions and organisations, and the considera-tion of cause and effect relations betweenthese classes of entity, promotes a systemsview of institutions, and of the contributionthat they make to the functioning of soci-ety. Institutions are fundamental buildingblocks of social systems, providing thegeneralised regulatory framework forsocially acceptable behaviour. Withoutinstitutions-as-rules, social and economiccoordination would not be possible and

social life would be reduced to face to facenegotiations of terms for every interaction.Even language is an institution, or institu-tional system, in this view.

The complexity of the general institu-tional environment can be appreciatedfrom the consideration of many everydayactivities that require coordination ofindividuals. From the running of theformal mechanisms of governance such asparliamentary or court processes to drivinga private car through the city, successfulnegotiation of daily tasks is mediated by a

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plethora of socially defined rules, normsand expectations. The very purpose ofthese rules – reducing uncertainty ininteraction – means that they remainunchanged for long enough to often be-come suppressed from conscious consid-eration. We do not think constantly aboutwhich side of the road we should be driv-ing on, or whether to stop for a red light.However, should the traffic lights go out orstart operating in a random fashion, chaossoon results.

In the wider institutional environmentthere is often a considerable degree ofredundancy in the system, particularly athigher levels of group decision makingwhere results, and therefore mistakes, havefar reaching impacts. The separation ofpowers and the notion of checks andbalances in government is an institutionalexpression of the principle of redundancysupporting several subsystems that mustagree to, or at least agree not to veto, policyproposals for them to succeed. Havingsuch multiple parallel institutional chan-nels has the effect of broadening the rangeof views included in policy debates andtends to increase both their sophisticationand acceptance. This redundancy built intogovernance mechanisms again emphasisesthe systems nature of the institutionalmatrix. A hierarchy is evident, but demo-cratic government is not a rigid single-headed beast. It is, rather, a system ofactors and resources whose, sometimesalmost unfathomably, complex relationsand interactions are defined and con-strained by a large set of institutions-as-rules.

The concept of policy systems is familiarenough, and we can directly observe manyof the processes and actors involved in theformation of policy. In a broader institu-tional system model, these can be viewedas sub-systems, often acting as feedbackloops, as well as producing new or alteredinstitutions as policy edicts or legislativechange. Existing institutional settingsprescribe, encourage, or allow certainorganisations and processes to emerge anddevelop that consider issues of importance

for government policy. Through resultinginteractions the facilitating framework mayitself be modified and developed, changingconditions for further policy work. Inaddition, policy processes result in outputsthat address substantive issues, setting therules and parameters for action in the realworld, thus adding new substance andoften complexity to the institutional sys-tem.

Organisational form in state-run NRMhas traditionally adopted standard de-partmental bureaucratic modes as a meansof dealing with distinct and separablesectors of government responsibility. Thisform is based on a hierarchical model ofadministration and decision making, anassumption of discrete issue areas, and isreproduced by convention (another institu-tional form). Such models have beenargued to be particularly inadequate forenvironmental policy problems due toimportant characteristics such as complex-ity, uncertainty, and cross-sectoral impacts(Dovers 1997; Dryzek 1997, discussedfurther below), and proposed alternativemodels embody different fundamentalprinciples.

The notion of organisational form andculture having an embedded rationality isworth developing briefly. Popular argu-ments over what comprises rational actionhave become dominated in recent decadesby a single view or form of rationalitybased on economic theory. Here, efficiencyis the key principle upon which rationalityis judged, and its purpose is the maximisa-tion of a plurality of goals (social welfare)through the mechanism of individualutility maximisation. However, many stillrecognise that other rationalities exist basedon different principles of order, and theirown sets of values and goals. Easily distin-guishable ones include legal rationality,political rationality, technical rationalityand social rationalities.

Each form of rationality is supported bywhat has been termed a discourse: “ashared way of apprehending the world.Embedded in language, it enables those

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who subscribe to it to interpret bits ofinformation and put them together intocoherent stories or accounts. Each dis-course rests on assumptions, judgements,and contentions that provide the basicterms for analysis, debates, agreements,and disagreements…” (Dryzek 1997). JohnDryzek (1996) sees the discourse as “insti-tutional software,” interacting with thehardware of rules, rights, operating proce-dures, customs and principles. The systemwon’t work without the software, and thishas arguably been demonstrated in at-tempts to introduce a free market economyto the former Soviet bloc countries. Formalchanges were wheeled in, but the informalsystems of understanding that support thekind of response expected by the reformerswere not widespread and chaos has beenthe predominant result. The discourseconcept is perhaps a more socially devel-oped version of the Simon-North view ofcultural norms and subjective mentalmodels of reality.

Standard bureaucratic administration ofenvironmental and NRM policy, as seen inmany state agencies, has been built on apre-existing administrative rationality thatprivileges scientific and managerial exper-tise, and is strictly hierarchical (the Webe-rian model). The underlying purpose is tobe able to deal with large and complexproblems facing society by reduction –breaking them down into sub-problems,solving each separately, with the processcontrolled, and the value of outputsjudged, from the top. This rationality isbuilt into the structures and processes ofadministration, but it is also (to someextent) built into the mindset, thoughtprocesses and language (the discourse) ofthe occupants of the hierarchy. Thus bothstructure and culture are integral to themaintenance of administrative rationality.This approach has worked to deal withmany policy issues arising in complexdeveloped economies over the past cen-tury. However, it seems particularlyinappropriate to sustainability issues due toseveral important characterising features,

including the key issues of complexity anduncertainty (Dryzek 1997).

Over the last four decades, a range ofmodifications to the basic model have beenmade through the modification of organ-isational structure – such as the flatteningof management hierarchies – and theadoption of new practices – such asstakeholder consultation. Such changes canhave transformative effects on attitudes,organisational culture and policy discourse.However, they can contribute confusionand conflict, particularly where the changesare adopted as a means of neutralisingpolitical pressure, rather than in an attemptto change system dynamics. This is be-cause institutional structure has an embed-ded logic, and a “mix and match” systemmay, unthinkingly, embody conflictingrationalities.

One example of this type of conflict hasbeen created where an NRM agency, inresponding to stakeholder demand andpolicy fashion, has adopted a formalisedconsultative structure to advise policydecision-making. The implicit structurallogic in this arrangement is at least three-fold. It acknowledges that those with astake in the outcome:

• Have a right to a voice in decision-making because they bear the conse-quences of decisions made under consid-erable uncertainty;

• Hold local environmental, social andeconomic knowledge not available toagency staff in other ways;

• Will be more likely to accept manage-ment decisions and comply with subse-quent rules because they have been partof the process (ownership).However in this case, in compliance with

the Weberian expertise-based hierarchicalmodel of bureaucratic problem solving, themembers of the consultative groups areselected from stakeholders (by the hierar-chy) on the basis of “expertise,” and spe-cifically not as representative ofstakeholders. This potentially allowsrelevant expertise to be defined in a man-ner convenient to the agency in determin-

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ing which stakeholders will be part of theprocess. Control is maintained. Thesystemic conflict resulting from this clashof rationalities may well not be recognisedfor what it is, at least until there is recogni-tion that such a thing is possible. However,solving actual problems may be madeconsiderably more difficult, and stake-holders may become frustrated and fac-tionalised. This points to an importantissue in policy learning that will be ex-plored in a later section – that learningmust involve improved understanding, notjust mimicry.

A systems view of institutions makes itclear that the specification of new types oforganisation, on its own, is an ad hoc ap-proach and likely to prove inadequate tothe task of institutionalising sustainability.It is the rationality, the principles and goalsthat organisational form must embody andimplement, that is required to be elaboratedwithin the institutional system first, alongwith a credible commitment from govern-ment to support it. This implies sincereand believable high-level avowals ofprinciple, and the establishment of prag-matic policies and ongoing initiatives, withadequate resources to back them up. Ofcourse we cannot start with a blank canvas,and changing the cultures of existing

organisations to employ a new logic is adifficult task, precisely because the formalrules are only part of the institutionalsystem. The critical role of informal insti-tutions such as cultural norms and socialand policy discourses must not be disre-garded. Normative change is required atall levels along with formal institutionalchange. In the case of sustainability, thissuggests directed effort to re-educatepolicy-making and implementation agencystaff and stakeholders.

It also suggests that the level at whichsustainability is embedded in the generalinstitutional system of governance needs tobe raised, perhaps to constitutional level, toprovide some insulation from the rapidfluctuations of partisan political economy.For many, it seems a self evident truth thatgovernance of human societies shouldsubscribe to the principles of sustainabilityat the same level as justice, human rightsand democratic self-determination. Likethese other foundation social values,sustainability is an ideal and not somethinglikely to be fully achieved any time soon. Itis a matter for ongoing social considerationat the most serious level, and requiresmechanisms to accumulate experience andknowledge of decision-making so thatlearning may proceed into the far future.

RULES FOR INSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE

The key question that this project seeksto answer is, in what ways and to whatdegree have other nations succeeded inestablishing credible and working institu-tional instantiations for sustainable NRM,and how can we learn from them. Inseeking answers, it is proposed that thearguments put here be adopted for theconsistent use of institutional language. Inparticular, “institution” should not be usedas a synonym for “organisation.”2 Such

2 The use of the term “institute” in reference to ornaming a research, teaching, professional or other

usage is of little analytical utility and can beperceived as a merely rhetorical device,aimed at imbuing the said organisationwith socially critical relevance. Someorganisations, as argued above, provideservices that are critical to social function-ing. Where these are prescribed directlythrough a policy or set of rules, and par-ticularly where they are part of the machin-ery of government for policy development

organisation will not be discussed here, other than tosuggest that this is generally intended to convey theimpression of a distinguished, not to say criticalcomponent of the intellectual establishment.

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and delivery, they can accurately be re-ferred to as part of the “institutional ar-rangements” with respect to that policy.“Institutional arrangements” encompassesthe notion of a system of decisions, rulesand agreements that involves structurallinks between existing organisations, andpossibly the creation of new organisations,for the implementation of policy. The termrefers to the way that the individual rulesare arranged, and the opportunities andobligations created by those rules amongstakeholders and their organisations inrelation to the policy issue. Institutionalarrangements form the infrastructure of theinstitutional system (or subsystem) and thevenue for the systems dynamics. Similarly,“institutional setting” can be used to referto the specific institutional environment orbackdrop for an issue, policy or action.“Institution” should be reserved for rules ofvarious types and their aggregative units.

Examples of high level formal institu-tions of governance include constitutionsand legislation, and their provisions.Sometimes the distinction between institu-tion and organisation can be difficult todraw. For example, Parliament may beviewed as an organisation, but is, under theview adopted here, an aggregate institutionor institutional system. It comprises a set ofrules about how representative governmentis to be carried out, organisational unitsand processes prescribed by these rules toenable the institution to function, and arange of actors with status and rights ofparticipation also bestowed by the rules.The elected representatives are not thoughtof as belonging to, or being employed by,the organisation of parliament, but asactors in an institutional system, independ-ent and yet bound by a vast array of formalrules, constraints imposed by party affilia-tion, and norms of social expectation heldby the electorate. The Common Lawprovides a clear example of an importantaggregate institution, being made up of a

great many individual institutions – princi-ples, decision rules, protocols, precedents,and sub-aggregates such as doctrines.However, the Common Law is only onecomponent of the broader legal system – aninstitutional system of institutions-as-rules,actors, organisations and processes.

Social and cultural norms and their ag-gregates tend to be regarded as informalinstitutions, whether or not direct sanctionsare applied for breaches of rules. Informalinstitutions can play a critical role in NRMin interaction with formal rules, as in manycases the close monitoring of behaviour forbreaches of formal rules is not possible.The congruence of formal and informalinstitutions is therefore an important issuein policy change for sustainability. Wiselyhandled, with judicious choice of policyinstruments and well-designed processes,policies driven by urgent ecological im-peratives but implying social changeshould be able to lead compatible norma-tive change, albeit over time-scales thatmay be politically inconvenient. As North(1994) has commented:

While the rules may be changed overnight,the informal norms usually change onlygradually. Since it is the norms that pro-vide legitimacy to a set of rules, revolu-tionary change is never as revolutionary asits supporters desire, and performance willbe different than anticipated. And econo-mies that adopt the formal rules of anothereconomy will have very different perform-ance characteristics than the first economybecause of different informal norms andenforcement.

This last statement is directly relevant tothe notion of the possibility of learningfrom other jurisdictions and their institu-tional settings, and the problem of how tochoose appropriate case studies of institu-tional innovation for sustainability. Theseissues are addressed in the followingsections.

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3. Policy Relevant Learning

This section of the paper briefly exploreswhat the learning part of “an exercise inpolicy and institutional learning” might beabout. Four categories of policy relevantlearning are drawn from the literature:instrumental, government, social, andpolitical learning. All of these are relevantareas from which to draw lessons from theexperience of other jurisdictions withsustainability and NRM policies. In addi-tion, the institutionalisation of learning –the embedding of purposive learningmechanisms in the NRM institutionalsystem – is something that we undoubtedlyneed to learn more about. Hence, in itssearch and evaluation of case studies, theproject might look to learn from:

• Examples of instruments used;• Organisational structures and processes

established;

• New or different social constructions ofproblem sets; and

• Strategies used for raising the agendastatus of NRM issues; and, in addition,

the mechanisms built into institutionalarrangements that have promotedlearning and innovation in these areas.May (1992) proposes that policy related

learning must involve increased under-standing, not just mimicry – the directtransfer of a policy from one situation toanother. It follows that, rather than justnoting that “success” has been attained bya certain policy in a given context, evalua-tion in case studies undertaken by thisproject must attempt to understand whythe institutional arrangement had theobserved effect in its particular social,economic, environmental and institutionalcontext. Further, it is important for thisproject as intermediary in a policy learningprocess to identify whom the appropriatelearner might be for each type of lesson.The characterisation of the four types ofpolicy related learning described hereinclude such linkages, and the case studieswill explore this issue further in context.

INSTRUMENTAL LEARNING

Within government departments andagencies charged with NRM, policy in-struments are selected and programsdeveloped to address defined problemswith stated intended outcomes. Instru-mental learning concerns improving thedesign of such institutional arrangementsto achieve existing policy goals. Evaluationof the “success” of particular instrumentswith respect to stated goals might berelatively straightforward if results areconspicuously positive, but generatingunderstanding about why and how par-ticular results were attained in a givencontext is more difficult. May (1992)champions the view that demonstratinginstrumental learning requires evidence ofincreased intelligence and sophistication of

thought. We must ponder how to assess inthese terms whether this project results inreal learning. The so called “goal trap” ofpolicy evaluation must also be kept inmind: there may be positive (or negative)outcomes that were wholly unintended,from which we can learn as much about thenature of policies and context as fromevaluation in relation to intended out-comes. Some policies may fail to achievetheir primary aims, but have unintendedside effects that are just as beneficial, or atleast educational.

Most NRM stakeholders can benefitthrough better understanding of how theuse of particular instruments affects social,economic and ecological outcomes throughinteractions with contextual variables.

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Instrument choice may be left to imple-mentation units within government de-partments based on their previous experi-ence with the issues. Alternatively, wherelegislation or regulations are required toauthorise revenue collection, police powersor enforcement provisions, executivegovernment and possibly cabinet leveldecision-making may be involved. In somecases, particular instruments have beenspecified in legislation as governmentpolicy (e.g. ITQs in the CommonwealthFisheries Management Act 1991). It is in-creasingly the case that the norms of thecontemporary NRM policy environmentrequire wide consultation and some form

of consensus before new policy instrumentsare implemented. This process will bedriven or at least mediated and stronglyaffected by the section of the governmentdepartment responsible for policy devel-opment in the area. Therefore these policyanalysts and managers must be key learn-ers in instrumental lesson drawing fromoutside jurisdictions. Depending on theissue, analysts from stakeholder peakbodies may also be important, as a coalitionfor policy change involving the majorindustry representative bodies and theresponsible government departments,sharing a common policy discourse, can beimmensely powerful.

GOVERNMENT LEARNING

Government learning involves someconceptual overlap with instrumentallearning. However, government learninghas as its focus the organisational structureand processes of agencies and deliverysystems, as distinguished from the policyinstruments used. Where existing depart-ments are restructured for greater effec-tiveness or efficiency, independently ofpolicy change, and continue to utilise thesame set of policy instruments, the distinc-tion is clear. However, reorganisation canbe a result of the adoption of new policyinstruments that require special adminis-trative arrangements. Bennett and Howlett(1992) use the same passage from Ether-edge (1981) as a criterion for judging thistype of learning – “increased intelligenceand sophistication of thought” – used byMay (1992) for instrumental learning. Theconcept of improved structural intelligencein both instrumental and organisationaldesign may be of some utility, to the extentthat it can relate organisational logic andeffectiveness to the rationality and dis-course supporting the policy approachbeing implemented. Structural intelligence

can be said to increase as congruence oforganisational logic and policy rationalityis improved.

It is clear that the key learners for thiscategory must be senior departmentalbureaucrats and in some cases GovernmentMinisters. Reorganisation (like decimationin the Roman army) is used as a periodicalstrategic management tool within manyorganisations for reinvigorating functionalunits. This presents regular opportunitiesfor government learning, and some organi-sations, no doubt, become structurallymore intelligent as a result. However, suchlearning is attuned to particular manage-ment objectives, and these do not necessar-ily include the needs and principles ofsustainability. Structural models that takethese needs seriously could play a powerfulrole in policy related learning at the boththe instrumental and social levels, acting aseffective seeds for wider institutionalchange. This area may be one of the mostfertile for this project if existing studies ofthe impacts of departmental restructuringfor sustainability can be found.

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SOCIAL LEARNING

The above two categories of learning areboth about more intelligently effectingpredefined policy goals. Social learning, bycontrast, involves the recasting of the policyproblematique – the policy problem itself,the scope of the policy, or policy goals(May 1992). Social policy learning there-fore involves the wider policy network thatparticipates in modelling and sustainingthe prevailing social construction of theproblem. The basic building blocks used inthese constructions are (according to May):

• Beliefs about cause and effect;• Preferences concerning desired policy

outcomes;

• Perceptions of policy targets; and• Beliefs about the policy ideas that under-

gird policies.Changes resulting from a new social con-

sensus about one or a combination of thesefundamental aspects of a problem andtherefore the policies in place to address itcomprise social policy learning accordingto May. It is clear how this conception ofproblem framing or social construction isrelated to the Dryzek’s notion of policydiscourses. Each discourse has its ownconstruction of the problem based onbeliefs and preferences for particularoutcomes. “Social consensus” in the abovestatement relates to “dominant discourse”in Dryzek’s view – the construction of theproblem that actually gets supported inpolicy.

Generalised normative change regardingthe environment has an important part toplay in social policy learning as it affectspreferences for outcomes and beliefs aboutpolicy ideas in particular. Normativechange involves shifts in individual beliefsand the social consensus over fundamentalvalues. Without normative change at somelevel social policy learning would be rare.Normative change can occur in differentways: through diffusion of ideas and valuesfrom other cultures; conflict between

opposing groups; or persistent deviationfrom existing norms by sub-cultures.Certainly, with respect to environmentalissues, normative change has been rapidover the past four decades. Science hasplayed a large role in informing thesechanges, particularly through creation andmodification of models of cause and effectrelationships, and the collection of data onthe state of the environment. Improvedinformation has shifted values over pre-ferred outcomes for the environment, butthe consequent thirst for more informationhas exposed pervasive uncertainty withregard to many issues. Perhaps one of themost significant currently incipient norma-tive changes involves the dethroning ofscience and technology as exclusive pro-viders of solutions to environmental prob-lems. This is bringing more attention toinstitutional aspects of problem solving,and hence to the institutional constructionof problem definitions, with a resultingextension of peer communities and broad-ening of the range of inputs to policy.

As we have seen in the foregoing discus-sions, how, and to what extent, beliefsystems or worldviews are embedded incognitive institutional systems, such aspolicy subsystems, and how durable oradaptable they are is a subject of contempo-rary theoretical and empirical study. Thereexists a range of conceptual approaches tothe issue with a common language yet toemerge (e.g. see Apthorpe and Gasper1996), as we have seen is also the case withthe issue of the nature of institutionsthemselves. However, “problem framing”is commonly recognised as being of fun-damental importance, along with the factthat the framing varies with the worldviewof the problem framers. This in turn affectsconclusions about what information isrequired for policy making and manage-ment, and therefore what research isundertaken or funded by agencies. Walsh(2001) provides an example of this in her

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case study of the Inter-American TropicalTuna Commission, where the dominantcentral policy idea (Walsh calls this the“embedded epistemology”) has beenreplaced successively over several decades.First came conservation (of tuna), thenpreservation (of dolphins), and then eco-system management. Each successivecentral policy goal controlled the researchagenda for the period of its dominance, andtherefore what knowledge was generatedby the agency. These goals were formu-lated by an influential “epistemic commu-nity,” in this case mainly comprisingmarine biological scientists. In other NRMpolicy subsystems the originators of newproblem frames may be biological-ecological or physical scientists, economistsor other social scientists, or they mayoriginate in integrating processes drawingon a range of disciplinary and lay inputs. Itis new framings of the latter type that aremost likely to lead to sustainable policypathways.

Through the current project, we mightlearn about different social constructions ofa particular common NRM problem, or theprocesses through which social learninghas occurred or been promoted in otherjurisdictions. Instrumental and govern-ment learning are able to occur at theagency level without elected politiciansbecoming involved in decision-making.However, social policy learning requirespolitical decision-makers to either leadcommunity normative change or to re-spond to it. The greatest opportunity forsocial policy learning is probably at thepoint where elected governments change,as different ideological values and beliefsare brought into play, and new administra-tions introduce and search for policies thatdemonstrate leadership and differentiate

them from the prior incumbents. Circum-stances where resource issues flare intoovert and politicised social conflicts, orwhere resources and their exploitationsystems are in crisis, can also promote arethinking of attitudes, ideas, and policiesthat have remained stable for extendedperiods. Conflict can bring informationand alternative logics to the attention ofpolicy makers and the public that can resultin redefined objectives, changed targetgroups, and redistributed rights. Thedeeply embedded nature of many of thevalues that underpin particular framings ofpolicy problems means that there is likelyto be a generational aspect to social policylearning. Early adopters of new problemconstructions in the sustainability field maywell be younger policy analysts withspecific education and training in NRM andenvironmental problems. However, thekey actors in policy decision-making aresenior bureaucrats, politicians, and eco-nomic stakeholders, often with long-terminvestments in current problem definitions,and this is part of what makes for stableinstitutions. North (1994) states: “Politicalinstitutions will be stable only if under-girded by organisations with a stake intheir perpetuation.” The same may be saidfor policies. Rapid change may be depend-ent on conflict or political opportunism orboth, otherwise we may need to rely onlong term social normative change.3

3 This analysis suggests that structural change inpolicy agencies (government learning) may promotesocial policy learning. For example, shallow hierar-chies that support innovative policy cultures,promote policy entrepreneurs, encourage challengeof dominant policy discourses, and ongoing theoreti-cal education of staff.

POLITICAL LEARNING

Political learning involves political actorsconstructing more effective strategies forgetting their concerns onto the policyagenda, countering opposition to their

proposals, and eventually getting theirpreferred policies adopted by decision-makers. This type of policy orientedlearning occurs within advocacy coalitions,

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composed of people from various organi-sations who share a set of normative andcausal beliefs (a discourse) and who oftenact in concert (Sabatier 1988). These coali-tions, in turn, occur within ‘policy subsys-tems,’ i.e. the interaction of actors fromdifferent agencies and organisations,politicians, etc., interested in a policy area.

How relevant political learning is to thecurrent project is a question that requiresfurther consideration. This aspect of policyoriented learning is undoubtedly importantto effecting policy change, even wheresubstantial normative change has alreadytaken place. In the area of environmental

and NRM policy for sustainability, power-ful advocacy coalitions for defence of statusquo policies may be well entrenched onsome issues. The question arises as towhether it is appropriate for this project toresearch issues of political strategy andtactics that may assist policy change.Investigation of policy change that isseeking to explain causation in significantdetail, arguably, must attend this issue, asdifferences in strategies brought about bypolitical learning may explain why policychange occurs in one situation and not inother similar circumstances.

4. Concluding Comments

Both the above conceptual discussionsoffer some insight into the nature of thepolicy and institutional systems and struc-tures that will be the focus of this study asit attempts to draw lessons from experi-ences around the world. There are distinc-tive synergies between the systems view ofinstitutions and the policy learning frame-work, but there are some disjunctions aswell. The learning framework, in its at-tempt to separate categories of learning,under-emphasises the interactions betweenthe levels, conveying a view of a ratherlinear one-way cause and effect process ofpolicy formulation and subsequent imple-mentation. The systems model developedhere, reinforced by standard approaches topolicy analysis structured by models ofpolicy cycles and subsystems (e.g. Howlettand Ramesh 1995; Bridgman and Davis2000), reminds us that life is not that sim-ple. For example, whether a particularpolicy is sold and/or perceived as a changeof instrument or a reframing of the problemcan depend the political tactics used in thedevelopment of the “policy event.”

The introduction of market instrumentsis a case in point. These are billed in policydebate as more efficient, with the implica-tion left unspoken that they are more

efficient at achieving what we are all tryingto achieve anyway. This can be viewed asinstrumental learning. However, in manycases the introduction of the efficiencyobjective actually displaces an existingpolicy objective of distributional equity. Byreplacing the instrument the policy prob-lem has been redefined. This can passrelatively quietly, or it can blow up into aconfused public debate and protest. Theintroduction of such “instruments” usuallyinvolve legislative change and the creationof some form of implicit or explicit legalproperty right – a fundamental institutionalbuilding block – and may involve thecreation or reorganisation of governmentagencies for implementation and admini-stration.

Thus there appears little hope of clear-cutand simple categories of policy and institu-tional initiatives even at the conceptuallevel. In the second part of this paper weadd into this broth the operational ingredi-ents of the specifics of what it is we wish tolearn about. This will bring us toward aricher appreciation of the nature of thechoices we need to make in selecting casestudies, but it seems this issue is set tobecome more complex not less.

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PART 2: Operationalising Learning

1. Introduction

The preceding discussion provides aworkable definition of institutions and anapproach to policy and institutional learn-ing. The remainder of this paper proposesavenues for applying this understanding in

the present project, in terms of what Aus-tralia might wish to learn about, fromwhere, and through what case studies andoverseas models.

2. Learn About What?

There are several ways in which onecould proceed to learn from other coun-tries. One is to seek countries that aresimilar and assess their recent experience.Similarity might be defined socially andinstitutionally (western, English-speaking,liberal democracies, etc) or environmentally(dry, variable, high biodiversity, extensiveprimary production, etc). The problemwith this approach is that a set of ‘similar’countries only captures a small and per-haps inadequate sample of potentiallyrelevant experience. Another warningagainst it is that it would echo Australia’sunthinking history of seeking policy andpolitical lessons only from other White,English speaking countries.4 However, theinstitutional framework prompts us tothink about this in terms of tensions andtrade-offs. Innovations developed insimilar institutional contexts would havegreater probability of being supportedappropriately, on transfer, by existing legaland organisational configurations. How-ever, mechanisms developed under weak

4 The most recent example of this has been theapplications of neo-liberal political and neo-classicaleconomic theory most vigorously in the English-speaking world (Castles 1989; Bell 1997; Orchard1998).

institutional systems may be more innova-tive and resilient, particularly for issuesrequiring local action, precisely becausethere is little external support for enforce-ment of rules.

Another approach would be to identifythe substantive issues most high on Aus-tralia’s domestic agenda and then scan theworld for examples of institutional re-sponses to those (for example, waterallocation, dryland salinity, off-reservebiodiversity conservation, and so on). Thiswould run the risk of only focusing onissues of the moment, of not being open tocross-issue relevance of particular institu-tional strategies, and of reducing the fieldof study back to a collection of discreteissues rather than a (possibly) integratedsuite of issues. On the other hand it mayproduce some immediately applicablelessons for current problems.

However, this project seeks to learn fromoverseas examples of institutional reformand change in the policy field of sustainabledevelopment (SD), not necessarily withregard to particular issues that make upthat agenda. To do so, it would need to beestablished what sustainable developmentmeans, or at least a reasonably widelyaccepted Australian version of what wethink it means.

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THE MEANING OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Although a highly contestable term,sustainable development is expressed inAustralia as principles of ecologicallysustainable development, or ESD principles(see Box 1). These were developed as partof Australia’s response to the emergingglobal policy agenda of SD in the early1990s, reflect international discussions andinstruments, are sufficiently broad to covermost aspects of SD, and have been ex-pressed in many hundreds of Australianpolicies and over 120 Australian laws(Dovers 1999; Stein 2000). Thus, ESDprinciples should encapsulate much ofwhat Australia might wish to learn aboutinstitutionalising SD: that is, if ESD iswhere we think we want to go, then ESDcan logically also describe what we need tolearn about to get there. Pursuing theinstitutionalisation of ‘official’ policy goalsand principles in this way has the addedadvantage of providing additional strengthto any lessons drawn, as opposed to lessonsdrawn from statements of the problem thatdo not reflect widespread consensus atgovernment level.

As stated in policy and law, though, ESDprinciples are summary, vague and notparticularly instructive in institutionalterms (although they are more so in policyterms). This is not surprising, as they werecompromise and summary statements,conveniently stated during a short-termpolitical process. However, they do reflectmuch of the nature of sustainability as asuite of research and policy problems, forexample in the following iteration of theattributes of sustainability problems (fromDovers 1997):

• deepened and variable temporal scales;• broadened and variable spatial scales;• possible ecological limits to human

activities;• often, irreversible and/or cumulative

impacts;

• complexity within problems, and con-nectivity between problems;

• pervasive risk and uncertainty;• poor information base for many proc-

esses;• important assets not traded and thus not

valued economically;• new ethical dimensions (rights of other

species, future generations);• systemic problem causes, rooted in

patterns of production and consumption,settlement and governance;

• insufficiently developed and/or con-tested theories, methods, techniques;

• poorly defined policy and propertyrights and responsibilities; .

• public/private costs and benefits difficultto separate;

• demands and justification for broadcommunity participation in policy dis-cussion and formulation;

• sheer novelty as a recently defined policyfield.These problem attributes, especially

when encountered in combination, givesome meaning and tractability to thewidespread perception and common claimthat sustainability problems are particu-larly difficult. They also reconfirm some ofthe targets of learning that flow from ESDprinciples (Box 1).

These attributes, and the discussion oflearning above, can inform a restatement ofESD goals and principles into a moreoperational statement of ‘what we want tolearn about’. Box 1 adds to the NationalStrategy for ESD (Australia 1992) iterationof goals and principles summary commentsthat define learning targets that wouldappear to logically flow from those princi-ples, and from the generic attributes of ESDproblems, in terms of learning as thatconcept is constructed earlier in his paper.Also in Box 1 are summary descriptors ofeach goal and principle for efficient useelsewhere in this paper.

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Box 1: ESD Principles as Targets for Policy and Institutional Learning

ESD Goals, Objectives andPrinciples5

SummaryDescriptor

Core Meaning as Target for Learning

Goal: Development thatimproves the total quality oflife, both now and in thefuture, in a way that maintainsthe ecological processes onwhich life depends.

Goal. Too general – see under objectives andprinciples below.

Objectives:

1: To enhance individual andcommunity well-being andwelfare by following a path ofeconomic development thatsafeguards the welfare offuture generations.

Sustainableeconomicdevelopment.

Policy processes and institutional ar-rangements that ensure longer considera-tions in economic policy and planning,and the implications of economic policyfor individual and community well-being(well-being defined in broad terms,including social, cultural, environmentaland economic aspects).

2: To provide for equity withinand between generations.

Inter- and intra-generationalequity.

Policy processes and institutional ar-rangements explicitly targeting the issueof the multiple dimensions of equity overthe long term.

3: To protect biological diver-sity and maintain essentialecological processes and lifesupport systems.

Biodiversity andecologicalprocesses.

Policy processes and institutional ar-rangements that elevate the importance ofbiodiversity and ecological processes asmatters of policy concern and as socialand policy goals, across policy sectors.

Principles:

1: Decision making processesshould effectively integrateboth long and short termeconomic, environmental,social and equity dimensions.

Integration. Processes and arrangements that seek tointegrate, encourage or demand policyintegration, or research and developmethods for such integration.

2: Where there are threats ofserious or irreversible damage,lack of full scientific certaintyshould not be used as a reasonfor postponing measures toprevent environmentaldegradation.

PrecautionaryPrinciple.

Processes and arrangements that explic-itly inform decisions in the face of uncer-tainty, ensure consideration of risk anduncertainty, seek to enhance the informa-tion base for decision making in the longterm, or research and develop approachesfor so doing.

3: The global dimension ofenvironmental impacts ofactions and policies should be

InternationalCommons policy.

Processes and arrangements that accountfor, seek to account for, or seek to estab-lish the nature of international threats to

5 From Australia, The Commonwealth. 1992. National strategy for ecologically sustainable development. Canberra:Australian Government Publishing Service.

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recognised and considered. sustainability or opportunities for im-proving prospects for sustainabilitythrough international coordination ofpolicy and action.

4: The need to develop astrong, growing and diversi-fied economy which canenhance the capacity forenvironmental protectionshould be recognised.6

Sustainableeconomic growth.

Processes and arrangements that explic-itly seek to link economic growth withenvironment or to establish whether suchlinks can or do exist.

5: The need to maintain andenhance international com-petitiveness in an environ-mentally sound mannershould be recognised.

Internationalcompetitiveness.

Processes and arrangements aimed atexplicating, reviewing and/or ensuringthe environmental (and social) benefits, oravoiding the disbenefits, of internationallaw, trade, policy and interactions.

6: Cost effective and flexiblepolicy instruments should beadopted, such as improvedvaluation, pricing and incen-tive mechanisms.

Policy instrumentchoice.

Applications of flexible policy instru-ments, and/or processes and arrange-ments to research, monitor, select and testnew approaches to policy instrumentchoice and application (including but notonly market mechanisms as implied in theprinciple).

7: Decisions and actionsshould provide for broadcommunity involvement onissues which affect them.

Communityinvolvement.

Processes and arrangements that allow orencourage community participation inpolicy debate, policy formulation andmanagement.

6 This is a central and contested proposal in the sustainability literature; ie. that environmental protectiondepends on economic growth (for a review, see van den Bergh and de Mooij 1999). Here, the object of learningthat arises is defined not around belief or disbelief in this proposal, but rather in terms of policy and institu-tional settings aimed at either establishing such a link in practice, or further testing the proposition.

In Box 1, all targets for learning arestated in term of policy processes andinstitutional arrangements, and framed in abroad manner including policy and institu-tional responses that fulfil, aim to fulfil, orresearch and develop approaches forfulfilling that objective or principle or partthereof. Such responses may includesustained (as opposed to superficial) policyprograms, organisational restructuringsuch as portfolio re-arrangements, creationof new agencies, information-based initia-tives, or deeper institutional change such asstatutory or constitutional reform. Anintegrated and concerted institutional andpolicy response to all ESD objectives andprinciples is arguably not evident in anycountry, but would equal a rather fulsome

and impressive response to the intellectualand policy agenda constructed between1987 and 1992. In these terms, this transla-tion of ESD principles into (albeit broadlyframed) targets for policy and institutionallearning constructs what may be regardedas an already sufficiently large canvas forthis study. With respect to kinds of learningdiscussed earlier, most possibilities areembedded in the targets in Box 1, althoughperhaps with a less explicit emphasis onpolitical learning.

The principles of ESD adopted by Aus-tralia (Box 1) strongly reflect the economicgrowth element of the Bruntland construc-tion of sustainable development. Onecritical reading of Bruntland is that the

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WCED emphasis on growth as the answerto global maldistribution was the onlyapproach that could succeed in gainingbroad consideration of and consensus onthe other central issues of sustainability.Australia’s ESD principles enthusiasticallyrestate this approach, emphasising stronggrowth and international competitivenessas sustainability goals, and incentive andsignalling (economic) instruments asmeans. With time this may come to be seenmore widely as an overemphasis producedby transient political conditions and policyfashion – given that three of the sevenprinciples are given over to economics.

However, there are things missing fromthe NSESD version of sustainability thatemerge when actual policy and institu-tional responses in Australia and elsewhereare considered. The following sectionreviews such directions of reform. Further,

consideration of the most complete andconsensus-derived global statement ofintent regarding sustainability, the 1992 RioDeclaration, adds other, significant agendasfor policy and institutional reform. Forexample, principles 5-6 of the Declarationemphasise poverty reduction and prioritisethe needs of least developed countries,while principle 11 states the need foreffective national legislation and standards.Principles 20-22 elevate the views andinvolvement in sustainability of women,youth and indigenous and local people.Consideration of such principles in a studylike this is important given their status asinternationally agreed goals, and given thatthey have been expressed explicitly andthus may have informed the policy andinstitutional reform agendas of othernations.

THUS FAR IN AUSTRALIA …

If ESD principles represent the policychallenge agreed to by Australian govern-ments and major interest groups, it isrelevant here to consider the style of re-sponse to that challenge thus far. Thissection characterises the style of policyresponse, not in terms of the efficacy oradequacy of the response but rather thepolicy and institutional directions that thecountry has chosen.7 The following at-tempts to roughly categorise the policy andinstitutional baskets into which Australiahas placed the bulk of its ESD eggs:8

• Community-based programs such aslandcare, waterwatch, etc, with an empha-sis on on-ground coordination and works

7 Reviews of the both the kinds of reforms and theiradequacy can be found in Productivity Commission1999; Yencken and Wilkinson 2000; Dovers 1999,2001b; and in the forthcoming 2001 Commonwealthstate of environment report.

8 Overviews and assessments of most of thesecategories are available in specific studies containedin Dovers and Wild River 2001.

and to a lesser extent monitoring, relying tovarying degrees on a mixture of volunteer-ism and government financial and othersupport;

• Integrated catchment management,through informal cooperative initiativesand more formally structured creation ofnew administrative and statutory arrange-ments;

• Often less formally structured or sup-ported regional planning initiatives, oftenexplicitly seeking to integrate economic,social and environmental concerns throughlong term planning involving communityparticipation or leadership;9

(The last three above are often the deliv-ery mechanisms for government-financedpolicy programs, such as the NationalHeritage Trust and the National Salinityand Water Quality Action Plan.)

9 For examples see Dore and Woodhill 1999.

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• Information-based processes (for exam-ple state of environment reporting, naturalresource accounting, land and water audits,etc.);10

• The application of economic instrumentsand market mechanisms of various kinds(incentive and signalling approaches),including tradable emission permits,salinity credits, rights markets in fish andwater, levies, and so on (noting that theadvocacy of such instruments has exceededtheir practical application thus far);

• Self-regulatory approaches (codes ofpractice, corporate reporting, etc) in variousindustry sectors, usually developed coop-eratively between government and theprivate sector;

• Development or maintenance of inter-governmental arrangements of variouskinds, such as the MDB Initiative, man-agement of the Great Barrier Reef, coop-erative arrangements for management ofthe Australian Alps, ministerial councils,etc;

• (Limited) moves toward co-managementarrangements with indigenous people,including major conservation reserves andthe more recent Indigenous ProtectedAreas program;

• (Variable) domestic engagement in theformulation and implementation of inter-national instruments dealing with majorresource and environmental issues;

• Sectoral and issue-based policy devel-opment, with associated programs (oceans,forestry, biodiversity, greenhouse, land-care, coasts, etc). Of all sectoral policyinitiatives, the RFA process has been by farthe largest and most comprehensive. Mostmajor sectoral11 policies have been devel-

10 See Venning and Higgins 2001.

11 Note that some of these policy initiatives, andOceans Policy in particular, cut across traditionalsectors (fishing, coastal management, shipping,marine conservation) and are attempts at integrationover the broader sustainability policy concerns, usingecological rather than economic parameters asprimary criteria for defining the policy sector.

oped cooperatively by the Commonwealthand the sates/territories (and less oftenwith local government);

• Some significant specific institutionalreforms, such as the creation of the (nowdefunct) Resource Assessment Commissionand the proposed Victorian Commissionerfor ESD;

• Experiments in the arrangement ofresource and environment portfolio at stateand Commonwealth level, where variousconstellations of resources, lands, agricul-ture, environment and conservation havebeen constructed (and often deconstructed).While not an apparent or explicit ESD-related policy, this is of interest given thequestion of where in the public policylandscape environment and resource issuesshould be located. At state/territory level,some of the experiments seem purposefulin ESD policy terms, whereas at the Com-monwealth level the portfolio changesappear to have be driven by other impera-tives;

• Research and development programs(and sometimes actual agencies) in theresource and environmental fields.

A feature of the early ESD era in Austra-lia, consensus policy development organ-ised along so-called corporatist lines (usingmajor representative groups to formulatepolicy), has been less evident in the secondhalf of the 1990s. Also less prominent hasbeen the Council of Australian Govern-ments, which was key to major policydevelopments such as ESD.

These Australian responses cannot belocated entirely in the post-Brundtland orpost-Rio era, as they build upon and reflectprevious responses constructed before“sustainable development” was adopted asan overarching agenda, or fully articulatedas such (for a potted history, see Frawley1994). For example, much of what Land-care “does” draws heavily on the accumu-lated knowledge and practice of manydecades of the agronomic tradition of soilconservation. Integrated catchment man-agement and regional resource manage-

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ment have similarly deep histories. TheMurray-Darling Basin Initiative in itsmodern form was a product of the 1980s,and dates to the formation of the RiverMurray Commission eight decades ago.The importance of historical context ofinstitutional and policy change is revisitedbelow.

Each country develops and favours aparticular mix of policy and institutionalresponses, and Australia is no exception.Some of the response categories above arecommon to many countries, whereas othersare particularly Australian. Likewise, othercountries may have embarked on quitedifferent pathways than Australia. Forexample, strategic, statutory planning hasnot been a feature of the Australian experi-ence recently; nor have the sort of detailed,

intergovernmental regulatory approachesof the past decade in Europe. This raisesthe question, in a study such as this,whether the focus should be on institu-tional reform in countries that have donesimilar things, or on countries that haveheaded in policy and institutional direc-tions unlike Australia’s. There are obviousbenefits either way – to learn how to dowhat we are doing better, or about thingswe have not thought of doing – but tochoose one or other would perhaps beefficient in terms of scoping this study.Alternatively, this demarcation allowsexplicit recognition of the quite differentbasis for learning (accepting that the famil-iar/unfamiliar demarcation is likely inmost cases to be a continuum).

DEFINING THE OBJECTS OF LEARNING

Given the large number of factors andtheir combinations that could characterisepolicy and institutional responses tosustainability, some categorisation isrequired to simplify the task of choosingcase studies. Here we use the typology ofpolicy learning outlined earlier to grouppotential objects of learning. As might beexpected, the least general examples are themore numerous – individual instrumenttypes. The more generally applicablelessons are fewer in type and likely to bescarce as documented examples – e.g. theexplicit reframing of policy problemsthrough normative acceptance ofsustainability principles. However, wemust also remain cognisant of the systemsview of institutions presented above, whichemphasises the embedded and interde-pendent nature of different elements of thepolicy and institutional landscape. Thismeans individual case studies may yieldlessons on several levels of the typology.

1. Implementation InstrumentsPolicy instruments are the policy tools

applied to deliver defined policy goals.Bearing in mind the previous discussion ofpotential multiple impacts of certain types

of instruments, including on policy goals,instruments may be classified as:

• Coercive: such as statutory and regula-tory proscription, prescription, standardssetting etc;

• Organisational: such as communitycoordination and participatory ap-proaches;

• Informational: including research,education, SOE reporting, environmentalmonitoring etc;

• Signalling and incentive: market andpricing based approaches, taxes, levies,user charges, subsidies etc;Primary learners here would be govern-

ment agencies implementing policy towhich the case is relevant, and theirstakeholders;

Policy programs utilise more than oneinstrument toward a more comprehensiveset of goals, in some coordinated fashion,usually targeted at a substantive issue (eg.salinity) or a resource sector (eg. fisheries).The design of programs allows for greateropportunity for building in the flexibilityrequired for most sustainability problems,

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given their complex nature and the uncer-tainty of the effects of change. Primarylearners would be strategic policy analystsin relevant agencies, although specialists insustainability problems in this class aresomewhat thin on the ground. The sophis-tication of such design tasks begs a realquestion here with regard to the sufficiencyof human capital and organisational con-figuration in government to addresssustainability problems;

Policy processes involve mechanisms andstructures dedicated to policy formulation,implementation design, and policy evalua-tion and maintenance. Processes may beongoing, lengthy or of short duration. Inareas where policy goals are evolving, anduncertainty prevails with respect to thecurrent or future state of a resource andimpacts of its use – as is often the case withsustainability issues – complex ongoingprocess “rounds” are required to assessnew information and update policy set-tings.

2. Organising GovernmentOrganising and restructuring within gov-

ernment, where the structures and processeswithin a tier of government are re-arrangedin some way to better meet a policy chal-lenge, including such things as manage-ment restructuring within agencies, inter-departmental committees and portfolioredesign, or involving the creation of newor substantially altered organisa-tions/agencies within the public sector, toundertake new or revised administrative,policy or information-related functions;

Intergovernmental structures and processes,where sustainability problems are ad-dressed through coordination betweendifferent levels of government within acountry (eg. in a federal system), throughcoordinated policy development, jointstandards, joint agencies, ministerialcouncils, etc.;

Participatory processes, whether aimed aton-ground management, monitoring,policy formulation or policy monitoringand evaluation.

3. Problem ReframingThrough normative change, where public

opinion, possibly assisted by governmentsponsored processes, has demonstrablyshifted to redefine an existing sectoral issueas a sustainability problem and has flowedon into government policy;

Through legal change, mostly statutory butpossibly also involving the common law.The law in this sense is viewed broadly,including both regulatory policy in thetraditional sense, but more so the crucialand often overlooked roles of statute law inexpressing social goals (eg. ESD principles),creating process, creating organisationalstructures, defining public access to deci-sion making processes, etc.;

Through Parliamentary or executive gov-ernment processes (e.g. like Senate Commit-tees) that allow sustainability issues to betreated in accordance with their attributesand sustainability principles (eg. temporalscale, integration, etc).

4. Political AdvocacyWhile relevant and important to the

raising of the sustainability policy agendain political fora, in the context of thisproject we think such advocacy a difficulttarget on its own. It is likely that exampleswill be picked up incidentally to studies inthe other target categories. For example,under organising government, the creationof commissioners for the environment orESD, or the specification of advocacy rolesfor agencies may prove worthwhile sub-jects.

Clearly, these categories are not entirelyseparate, and in any actual case of policy orinstitutional reform of any significance,more than one would be evident. Note that,across all these types, an important variableis the demonstrable or likely longevity ofthe institutional or policy change. Thisapplies both in terms of longevity andpersistence as positive attributes insustainability policy, but also the issue ofirreversibility and therefore possibleinflexibility of deeper policy and institu-tional change. Another important variableis where a particular reform sits on the

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continuum between application or use ofexisting policy or institutional settings or

capacities, and creation of substantiallynew settings.

3. Filtering Cases and Lessons

Given that the potential pool of casestudies for a study such as this is immense,the cases for more detailed (but still sum-mary) analysis will need to be selectedcarefully. Among the factors that caninform selection of cases in terms of theirrelevance to Australia are:

• Ecological/biophysical similarities anddifferences;

• Substantive issues that are relevant toAustralia, or are likely to be so;

• Socio-economic conditions in the caselocation, compared to those in Australia;

• Formal and informal institutional con-text;

• Political imperatives and policy styles(see further below); and

• Resourcing requirements and availability(human, financial, informational).All such factors need to be assessed and

interpreted with cognisance of particularhistorical contexts of institutional evolu-tion. A general principle linked closely tothe concept of an institutional ‘system’ ispath dependence. Institutional possibilitiesare historically defined – sudden creation ispossible but rare, and even sudden changewill be dependent on precedent conditions(information, cultural context, legal prece-dent, politcial norms built up over time).Transfer of institutional models or ideastherefore should be informed by the imme-diately apparent suitability of the recipientsetting, but also by appreciation of howthat setting has evolved over time.

Further to these considerations, there isthe matter of deciding whether or not tohave a ‘sample’ of case studies or thematicareas that cover all of, most of or a selectedsmall number of the variables discussed inthis paper. These include: familiar orunfamiliar (from an Australian perspective)policy and institutional responses to sus-

tainable development, judged according towhat Australia has done so far or a moreextended typology of responses; simi-lar/dissimilar countries; ESD principles;and types of learning. Clearly, not all canbe covered, so the basis of selection needscareful thought.

Recognising the interdependent andnested nature of the institutional system,there may be cases of institutional reformthat are both apparently successful andnovel to Australia, but which on anybalanced analysis may be judged veryunlikely to be adopted in this country.Institutional (and simpler organisational)lessons, and the reforms they might lead to,need to be analysed in the context of thepolitical and institutional setting into whichthey are to be transplanted. In the list ofprospective cases provided below, there aresome which may be, for this reason, judgedunlikely to inform actual change in Austra-lia. For example, sustainable developmenthas been given constitutional recognition insome countries, which would generally beregarded as a significant institutionalchange and in keeping with consistent butunsuccessful calls for an environmentalhead of power in the Australian constitu-tion. Leaving aside the eventual impact ofsuch a reform (flowing from the form ofexpression and the existence of implemen-tation mechanisms for constitutional law),the history of constitutional reform inAustralia would indicate that such consti-tutional expression would be most unlikelyhere. Should we seek lessons from suchperhaps unlikely cases, or would closingsuch options off be unwise?

The brief for this study stressed the needto look at cases of “successful” institutionalreform. Presumably this is intended to,firstly, maximise positive and operationallessons and, second, avoid the tendencies in

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the environmental and sustainabilityliterature to either be entirely critical andnegative, or to champion and advocatesingle examples of institutional (or moreusually organisational) change. While thisis a useful general tone to adopt, defining“successful” raises some problems that canbe briefly noted here.

The success, effectiveness or worth of aninstitutional or policy reform will be judgeddifferently by different groups and indi-viduals. For example, major components ofNRM policy in Australia in the past decade– such as Landcare or the Regional ForestAgreements process – have been judgedvery positively and very negatively bydifferent observers and analysts. Onecriterion might be that widespread (butrarely universal) acceptance or supportamongst the broader policy communitywould indicate successful institutionalreform, at least in early years. That high-lights another problem: in many cases theimpact of policy and/or institutionalchange in terms of positive improvement inthe state of the environment, human inter-actions with it, or in the human conditionmay take some time to become apparent.Many possible cases of institutional reformthis study might focus on are only a fewyears old, and thus “success” has yet to

become assessable. In other cases this willbe less of a problem, such as where thepolicy or institutional reform has as an aimsomething that may emerge quickly, suchas creating an information stream byincluding stakeholders in a process. Suchstrategies can be assessed with respect totheir procedural rationality and effective-ness in achieving these short-term goals,independently of the long-term substantiveoutcomes. Perhaps a useful distinction injudging success is to separate process fromoutcome. Finally, a case of institutionalreform is likely to have sub-componentsthat are more or less successful than others.Indeed, because a multi-faceted institu-tional reform may be brought undone byone poor component, an institutionalexperiment generally regarded as a failuremay provide valuable lessons in process orstructure. These considerations are bestworked through at a case by case scale, butthis does raise the issue of how strictly (andindeed just how) to interpret this part of thebrief.

Note that none of these factors rule outparticular kinds of cases or countries, butrather may inform or qualify choice, andwill be important in both informing analy-sis of selected cases and in qualifying andcontextualising any conclusions drawn.

SYNTHESISING: SCOPING CRITERIA

As forewarned, this discussion of opera-tionalising learning in the Australiancontext has revealed the complexity thatunderlies the attractive notion of ‘institu-tional learning’. To reduce the large rangeof possible avenues of investigation to amanageable level consistent with the toneof the explanation of institutions and policylearning given earlier, the following pro-poses primary criteria for selecting casestudies and thematic areas for furtherexploration in this study. These are or-dered according to the various implicit andexplicit criteria in the sequence they aredealt with in this paper:

1. What ‘parts’ of the institutional system?It is proposed that, in terms of a hierar-

chical understanding of institutionalsystems, focus would best be placed oncases involving higher-order institutionalchange, where there is evidence of crediblecommitment by governments to sustainabledevelopment principles. This wouldinvolve change at statutory level and/or instructures and processes that have trans-formative impacts on the way policy andmanagement is carried out. This emphasisis chosen in preference to seeking outexamples of change happening primarily atthe program implementation level. Havingsaid that, the most fundamental and radical

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forms of institutional change (revolutionaryrefashioning) would not be a sensible focusgiven the practical intent of the study.

2. What type of learning?It is proposed that the focus be on more

significant forms of government learningand on social learning, in keeping with (1)above. Instrumental and political learningmay become an incidental topic in somecases through this focus, but would not besought as a primary target for analysis.

3. What ESD principles to explore? And,what attributes of sustainability problems?

The five ESD principles (from Box 1)with the greatest generic and institutionalrelevance in terms of (1) and (2) above are:sustainable economic development; inte-gration; the precautionary principle; policyinstrument choice; and community in-volvement.12 These can be reshaped tocapture deeper properties of sustainabilityissues and ESD principles, and the spirit ofthe institutional approach so as to providea set of targets that may connect with non-Australian responses to the SD agenda:

• Integration of social, environmental andeconomic policy and goals;

• Handling of pervasive uncertainty;• The deep embedding of SD principles in

the institutional system, evidencingcredible commitment to the long term;

• The links between credible commitmentto SD, property rights instruments, andproblem reframing;

12 While important, it is proposed that the ESDprinciples of international policy and competitive-ness not be a focus, as this would require a massiveand impossible widening of the project to considerissues of development aid, trade policy, and treatynegotiation and implementation.

• Community participation in the above(as opposed to program delivery throughcommunity based groups not involvingdeeper or more lasting institutionalchange).

4. What objects of learning?It is proposed that the study focuses on

the following parts of the typology pre-sented earlier:

• Substantial policy processes targetingelements of (2) and (3) above;

• Organising government (restructuring,intergovernmental, participatory), wherethe reorganisation involves significantand ongoing refocusing of policy activ-ity, information flows, participation, etc;and

• Problem reframing (normative and legalchange, parliamentary or executive gov-ernment processes).Thus, implementation instruments and

policy programs would not be a focus, withthe exception of instrument classes with theintent or potential to affect (2) and (3)above; that is, significant legislative change,transformative rights instruments, andsome educational instruments (dealingwith reframing the problem rather thanspecific issues).

This narrows the criteria set to a man-ageable level, but certainly still allows morethan ample scope. An additional andimportant criterion in selecting particularcase studies of institutional change, is theavailability of sufficient existing data andanalysis, given the impossibility of thisstudy to engage in substantial primary datagathering. The ‘filters’ for considering casesfrom other countries, discussed above,would be applied at a finer level to casestudy selection, and utilised to qualifyinstitutional lessons that might emergefrom analysis.

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4. Possible Cases for Exploration

Utilising the above criteria, this sectionproposes a range of potential case studiesand thematic areas that could be examinedin this study. The options in the selectionbelow are all viable as targets for investiga-tion and analysis, and it is noted how theyaddress the criteria – in most cases morethan one criterion. The following optionsare considered viable and relevant, butother options are not ruled out. The fol-lowing options are divided into twogroupings, firstly those most favoured, andsecondly those that would be appropriatebut at present not highly favoured. Thebasis for this division, referring to thescoping criteria above, are provided foreach.

The currently favoured options forfurther analysis are:• New Zealand’s Resource ManagementAct, as a major statutory reform in responseto sustainability, organised in part on aregional basis, with significant participa-tion by varied policy and epistemic com-munities and well-described in the litera-ture. As a focus for case study this legisla-tion and its implementation could providelessons at various levels from devolution ofenvironmental management throughnested policy hierarchies, catchment basedregionalisation of NRM responsibility(structural logic), to consultative develop-ment of policy and legislation. The RMApresents the most well-documented at-tempt to move from traditional planningschemes toward planning for sustainability.Existing literature containing comparativeanalysis may allow some extension of thiscase study toward recognition of similar orcontrasting reforms in other countries.

• The institutional context and social,environmental and economic implicationsof creating and maintaining rights marketsin natural resources. This would be donevia an examination of Individual Transfer-

able Quota in fisheries in different coun-tries. Water rights may be a more obviouschoice for Australian relevance, but ITQhave been in place longer and have beensubject to recent and wide-ranging reviews.Water markets will thus be treated as anadjunct topic to the more tractable fisheriesdomain. This option addresses a transfor-mative instrument, property rights issues,integration of social, economic and envi-ronmental dimensions, and the statedAustralian preference for market-basedmechanisms;

• Actual and proposed strategic environ-mental assessment (SEA) processes andproposals for integrated assessment (IA) indifferent jurisdictions as responses aimed atextending the tradition of environmentalimpact assessment beyond discrete projectsand onto non-environmental policies, plansand programs (including consideration ofrelated approaches such as integratedassessment or technology assessment).Depending on particulars and implemen-tation, etc., this addresses integration,whole-of-government mechanisms, andpolicy rights and responsibilities.

• National councils for sustainable devel-opment and equivalent bodies, now estab-lished in dozens of countries, as nationallevel, inclusive policy advisory and educa-tional responses addressing (potentially)integration, long term policy making,reorganising government and participation.In particular, this theme allows investiga-tion into possible models for whole-of-government/cross-sectoral mechanisms forfurthering ESD.

• Institutional and especially regulatoryand policy integration in the Europeancommunity in environmental policy andstandards across national boundaries, asthe most significant example of trans-boundary, detailed mixed regulatory-selfregulatory approaches in the world atpresent.

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• Statutory expression of sustainabledevelopment principles in different juris-dictions (largely those comparable inpolitical and legal traditions to Australia),in terms of the extent to which expressioncan or has influenced the institutional andpolicy system and decisions made within it.This would of necessity include considera-tion of implementation of treaties andagreements, specifically the Rio-related setof instruments. This addresses problemreframing, integration, whole-of-government impact, and legal change.

Cases and themes at present less fa-voured are (noting that some observationson such options may be possible if materialis considered while investigation the optionsabove):• Constitutional expression ofsustainability principles. As discussedearlier, this appears an unlikely prospect inAustralia, and it is noted that recent majorconstitutional reform for other reasonsappears to be the key reason for suchexpressions in those few countries thathave given sustainability such status.

• Implementation of national sustainabledevelopment strategies in other countries,where comparable with Australia’s NESDand where, at least in intent, the strategiesare whole-of-government. While attractive,this would demand detailed and repeatedanalysis of specific national policy makingcontexts, beyond the scope of this project.• Parliamentary or executive governmentprocesses whereby bi- or multi-partisanagreements on policy directions are devel-oped, removing some aspects ofsustainability problems from rapid andperhaps unthinking change followingelections or changes in political fashion(nevertheless accepting the rights of gov-ernments to make and change policy andpriorities). Again, while attractive thiswould demand detailed understanding ofthe political context in a range of countries.

• Implementation of international instru-ments, focusing on inclusiveness of proc-esses (community, and within federal

systems), translation of principles to do-mestic law and policy, and monitoring ofimplementation. While the impact ofespecially the Rio set of instruments is asignificant issue, this would require consid-erable effort, and the lessons generatedmay be of limited transferability acrosslegal systems. The favoured option ofexamining statutory expression ofsustainability principles would offer someinsight into this.

• Participatory policy and managementprocesses (not specific programs) thatenable lasting and/or significant transfer ofpower to stakeholder groups, to provide acontrast to Australia’s investment in thisresponse type (including indigenous landmanagement and co-management of areasor resources). This addresses participationand reorganising government. This wouldrequire substantial research and scoping toselect particular cases, given the greatnumber and fine scale of most cases. Also,it is probably the case that participatoryarrangements, both in Australia and else-where, have received more attention thanother options, given their prominence inpractice and in research in recent years, andefforts would best be directed elsewhere.

• State of environment reporting in asample of jurisdictions, emphasising theinstitutional setting for SoE and the institu-tionalisation of linkages between thereporting process, long term environmentaland policy monitoring, and policy formu-lation. SoE is but one science-policy-communication mechanism in the ESDfield, and examined alone may be of littleinterest in the absence of consideration ofother mechanisms (resource accounting,corporate reporting, etc). However, afuller, comparative examination of science-policy-community information transferswould be a large task. To be effective, itwould also require assessment of theimpact of SoE systems, as opposed to theproduction of reports, and while an issuedeserving of close attention this would bebeyond the scope of this project.

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Despite its prominence in Australia, riverbasin governance and integrated catchmentmanagement are not proposed as cases,given the mass of previous work that hasbeen undertaken and that currently beingundertaken through the Murray-DarlingBasin Commission.

The favoured six options are consideredto offer a balance between sufficiently well-defined avenues of inquiry, and the need toconsider a range of kinds and degrees of

institutional change, and in particular theconstraints and opportunities to be foundwithin the institutional systems in whichthese reforms have taken place. In thisway, it is the intention of this project to notsimply or even primarily document thesecases, but to utilise them as vehicles forincreasing the sophistication and opera-tional usefulness of Australian discussionsof institutional change for ESD.

5. Conclusion

This working paper has benefited from input from the project steering committee,13 andsets the direction for the second phase of the project. As well as being an outcome of theproject – especially the conceptual background in Part 1 – the paper will be used to com-municate the nature and scope of the project to potential collaborating researchers andgroups. The next phase of research from 12/2001 to 8/2002 will involve more detailedinvestigation into the cases and themes of institutional change proposed above and theinstitutional systems within which they are embedded, and analysis and lesson-drawingfor the Australian context.

13 Dr Catherine Mobbs and Mr Ken Moore of Land and Water Australia, Professor John Handmer of the Riskand Community Safety Research Initiative, Ms Rosemary Purdie of the Murray Darling Basin Commission,and Dr Lorraine Elliott of the Australian National University.

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