HR7-14- T t

APPROVED FOR RELEASEHISTORICAL COLLECTIONDIVISION HR70-14 DATE:

,LLIG 07-18-2012

DIRECTORATE OFINTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Report

Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Facing NATO

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Copy No.

SR. IR 69-17Se tember 16

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Contents

Page

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Organization of Warsaw Pact GroundForce Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

General . . . . . . . .... . . . . . . . . 3Tank and Motorized Rifle Divisions . . . 3Airborne Divisions . . . . . . . . . . . 7Armies and Corps. .... ........ 8Fronts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Soviet Reinforcement Forces in the USSR . . . . 13

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Order of Battle . . . ... . . . . . . . . 13Equipment Levels of Soviet Divisions . . . 14Warsaw Pact Manning Levels . . . . . . . . 17Mobilization in Soviet Planning . . 23Soviet Mobilization Procedures .. . . . . 26

Forces in Eastern Europe Facing NATO . . . . . .31

Forces Opposite NATO Central Region . . . . 31Soviet Front in East Germany . . . . . . . 31Czechoslovak Front.... . . . . . . . 35Carpathian Front . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38Polish Front ..... ........ 40Soviet Forces in Poland . . . . ..-. . .. 42Belorussian Front . . . . . . . . . . 43Baltic Military District . . . . . . .. 44Strategic Reserve . . . . . . . . . . . 44

The Warsaw Pact Mission . . . . . . . . . . 47

Soviet Views of War in Europe . . . . . . . 47Warsaw Pact Contingency Planning . . . 50Possible Variations of the ContingencyPlan . . . . . ..... ............. 54

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Contents(continued)

Page

Soviet Capabilities for Nonnuclear War . . . . 56

Development of Soviet Doctrine andOrganization for Theater Warfare . . . . . 56

Recent Changes in Doctrine . . . . . . . . 58Recent Changes in Forces . . . . . . . . . 59Current Soviet Nonnuclear Capabilities . . 61The Soviet View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Future Prospects for the Soviet GroundForces .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Illustrations

Eastern Europe and the Western USSR (map) . . . 12

Equipment--Holdi-ngs of Soviet-D-ivi-sions inthe Carpathian Military District (chart) . . . 16

Categories of Warsaw Pact Divisions (chart) . . 22

Tables

1. Estimated Manning and Equipment ofCombat Ready Soviet Divisions . . . . . . 4

2. Warsaw Pact General Purpose ForcesAvailable for Early Commitment inCentral Europe . . . -. . . . . . . . . . 32

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYDirectorate of Intelligence

September 1969

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Warsaw Pact Ground Forces Facing NATO

Introduction

a comprehensive re-assessment of the capabilities and status of theSoviet ground forces. This intelligence report de-scribes the present.state of information and analy-sis of these forces and gives the findings and con-clusions-to date of the continuing reassessment. -

The report presents the results of analysis ofthe organization, current dispositions, and peace-time combat readiness--as measured by manning andequipment status--of the Warsaw Pact forces whichare probably available for war in Europe. It sum-marizes what is known about Soviet contingencyplanning for war with NATO in the Central Regionof Europe. It examines Soviet views on the likeli-hood of sustained nonnuclear war with NATO andassesses Soviet capabilities to conduct such a war.It also describes the general considerations whichwill probably guide Soviet policy toward generalpurpose forces in the future.

Note: This report was produced solely by CIA. Itwas prepared by the Office of Strategic.Researchand coordinated with the Office of Current Inteli-gence.

The major findings and conclusions of thisreport on the reassessment of the Warsaw Pactground forces and their capabilities begin on

page 73.

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Organization of Warsaw Pact Ground Force Units

General

No official tables of organization and equipmentfor Soviet ground force units are available. Esti-mates of their structure manninc, and eauipmentare basedraphy,

These data permit confident estimates of theauthorized wartime strengths of tank and motorizedrifle divisions, of the totals of major items ofequipment actually in Soviet combat ready tank andmotorized rifle divisions in East Germany, and ofthe size of airborne divisions.

The organization and composition of command andsupport echelons--armies, corps, and-frnts--hmae_been_deri_v_ed from these sources

and Soviet military commentary.

Tank and Motorized Rifle Divisions

Intensivea.nalys ishas provided the-basis for a

high-confidence estimate of the equipment holdingsof two of the combat ready Soviet divisions in EastGermany, one motorized rifle and one tank. Analysisof elements of other Soviet divisions in East Germany,

ppors zne juugmnt tnatthe two divisions examined are typical of Sovietdivisions in East Germany and that the assessment oftheir equipment levels is accurate. The table onthe next page shows the estimated personnel strengthsand numbers of tanks, armored personnel carriers(APCs), artillery pieces, and other equipment whichthis analysis inidcates would be found in Sovietcombat ready tank and motorized rifle divisions.

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Table 1

Estimated Manning and Equipment ofCombat Ready Soviet Divisions

Motorized HeavyRifle Div Tank Div Tank Div a/

Personnel 10,000 8,000 6,000

Major Equipment Items b/ 2,400 2,300 1,600

Tanks 186 314 225.

Armored personnelcarriers c/ 200 80 20

Artillery d/ 72 60 36

Other items e/ 1,940 1,845 1,320

a. About six tank divisions--including one of those inEast Germany--appear to be "heavy tank divisions,"differing from standard tank divisions mainly in thatthey have only about 225 tanks, 134 of which areheavy tanks, and no infantry units.

b. Because of rounding, components do not add to thetotals shown.

c. Many divisions inside the USSR do not have armoredpersonnel carriers in these numbers. Some divisionshave none at all.

d. Includes 122mm and 152mm howitzers. Mortars, recoil-less guns, multiple rocket launchers, and antitankguns are excluded. Divisions inside the USSR (exceptthose opposite China) have one-third less artillery.

e. Major equipment items include all self-propelled ve-hicles, except motorcycles, and all large towed itemssuch as artillery and two-axle trailers.

Soviet line divisions are small by US standardsbut have about the same numbers of tanks as similarUS divisions. The Soviet tank division, at about8,000 men, has only half as many personnel as theUS armored division. The Soviet motorized rifledivision, at about 10,000 men, is slightly morethan half as large as its nearest US counterpart,the mechanized division. Both types of Soviet di-visions have considerably fewer infantry and a lowerproportion of combat and service support and, al-though fully mobile, have only about half as manymotor vehicles as do US divisions.

Soviet line divisions vary substantially in themodels, types, and vintages of combat equipmentwhich they actually possess. For example, one di-vision on the Chinese border had World War II vintageT-34s as late as 1968. Some divisions inside theUSSR have no armored personnel carriers at all.Others have only a few, and use cargo trucks to carrymost of the infantry. Every Soviet division in EastGermany is believed to have pontons, but a number ofdivisions in the western USSR have none.

Soviet divisions in East Germany receive somepriority on the issue of new models of equipment.This priority does not always hold, however. As re-cently as 1968 at least one Soviet division in EastGermany had only T-54 model tanks when a number ofdivisions inside the USSR had already received moremodern T-62 tanks. Some motorized rifle regimentsin East Germany have been completely equipped withthe amphibious BTR-60 armored personnel carriers, butothers have only the older BTR-152.

Organizational changes such as the establishmentof antitank guided missile units have taken place inthe Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) severalyears before they were implemented in units inside

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the USSR. These delays presumably reflect the pace

of production of the new equipment required to effectsuch organizational changes.

a- coat diviion, beganto e reorganized and equipped accor ing to GSFGstandards only after it was selected to remain inCzechoslovakia following the intervention. It thenacquired its artillery battery and received BTR-60sas replacements for its BTR-152s. It had borrowedBTR-60s from another division for the Warsaw Pactexercises in June 1968.

These differences among divisions in availabilityand modernity of equipment indicate that, in Sovieteyes, the requirement for large numbers of divisionsoutweighs the requirement for rapid modernizationand uniform high quality. For example, the T-62medium tank--after eight years of production--makesup only about 20 percent of the Soviet tank inventory.Similarly, the modern BTR-60 now fills only aboutone-fourth of the total APC requirement--the rest is-fi-l-ed by older models or simply not filled at all.

Soviet divisions have only limited quantities ofessential supplies on hand. For example, extensiveanalysis of the Soviet divisions' mobile stocks ofPOL and ammunition indicates they are sufficient foronly about three days of intensive combat. Afterthis period, the divisions would lose their combateffectiveness unless full-scale logistic support wereprovided.

East European line divisions are generally pat-terned on the Soviet model, although there are sub-stantial variations in some countries. Documentsand evidence indicate that Czechoslovakand East German ivisions are similar to Soviet di-visions in structure. Combat ready Soviet and EastGerman motorized rifle divisions both have about10,000 men and 186 tanks. Soviet tank divisionshave 8,000 men and 314 tanks and East German tankdivisions about 8.800 men and 320 tanks.

have also placd heCzechoslovak motorized rifle division at 10,000 men.

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Jconfirmt -nese anx-strengrins-are generally correct and

that they are the planned wartime strengths--in bothpersonnel and tanks--for Soviet, East German, andCzechoslovak divisions.* Polish divisions are ap-parently slightly smaller. Polish mechanizeddivisions--equivalent to the Soviet motorized rifledivision--probably have about 9,000 men and 175 tanksand the Polish armored divisions about 7,500 men and275 tanks.

Airborne Divisions

Seven Soviet irbr_ u na a niAmtified. Analysistheir barracks an equipmen parks indcates thathey have, on the average, about 1,000 major itemsof equipment and that their personnel strength isabout 6,000. All seven are in the USSR and are prob-ably considered combat ready by the Soviets.

theairborne ivisions are not assigned to-tield armiesbut are centrally controlled by the Ministry ofDefense in Moscow. In wartime they would probablybe allocated to fronts for specific operations.These divisions probably would require service sup-port from the front--especially motor transport--inorder to stage for an airborne operation.

Poland is the only East European country believedto have an airborne division. Information fromformer members of that division indicates that it ishalf the size of a Soviet airborne division.

SAnalysisindicate that there

are some slight variations. A number of Soviet tankdivisions have only 300 tanks and some motorizedrifle divisions 180, the small differences dependingon whether the tank regiment and battalion commandershave tanks or armored personnel carriers as theircommand vehicles.

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Armies and Corps

The field army is the basic Soviet and EastEuropean combat and support organization above thedivision. Soviet field armies have from three tofive line divisions--and combat and service supportunits--and approximate a US corps in size and opera-tional function. Depending on the numbers and typesof divisions and support units assigned, a combatready field army such as those in East Germany wouldprobably range from as low as 35,000 to as high as55,000 men, including 9,000 to 12,000 men in armyheadquarters and support units.

Armies are of two types: the tank army, inwhich all or a majority of the divisions are tankdivisions, and the combined arms army, in which allor a majority of the divisions are motorized rifle.The numbers and types of support units found in So-viet field armies vary. The typical army supportstructure would include a brigade of six or nineSCUD tactical missile launchers, an artillery bri-gade of three to six battalions, an SA-2 regimentof 18-launchers (Soviet armies in East Germany eachhave two SA-2 regiments), a signal regiment, engineerponton bridge and assault crossing units, and serviceunits to provide essential transportation, mainte-nance, medical, and supply support.

Analysis ofSoviet classified writings

consistently indicate that divisions are intendedto fight in armies rather than as independent units.This same evidence indicates that the Soviets intendto commit their armies to combat essentially as theyare organized in peacetime. Although there is ap-parently nothing which would prevent changes in thisbasic organization, the transition from peace to warwould be smoother and more efficient if changes inorganization were minimized during the initial period.

The field army has some administrative as well ascommand responsibilities, but its service supportunits perform these functions at a minimal level,relying on the front rear services organization formajor logistical support of the tactical units. For

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example, classified Soviet writings indicate thatarmy mobile depots are expected to carry only oneor two days supplies for the army's units.

Soviet field armies in East Germany appear tohave even less capability for logistical support.Two to four motor transport battalions would be re-quired to carry even the small reserve which Sovietdoctrine prescribes for an army, but only one hasbeen identified in each army there. These shortagesin transport suggest a need for some augmentationwhen combat is joined.

East European field armies also contain fromthree to five divisions and combat and service sup-port at levels similar to Soviet armies. The EastEuropeans do not have tank armies, however, andtheir armies are usually made up of roughly equalproportions of tank and motorized rifle or mechanizeddivisions. East European field army headquarters donot exist as separate entities in peacetime but areformed during mobilization by previously designatedpersonnel from the territorial military districtcommands. This procedure for -organizing field armycommands is practiced in exercises.

Soviet armies inside the western USSR generallyhave about the same numbers and types of combat sup-port units as those in the GSFG. Analysis of photog-raphy indicates that most combat support units insidethe USSR are kept at reduced personnel and vehiclestrength in peacetime. Some of the service supportunits for armies there--especially motor transport,medical, and engineer construction units--apparentlydo not exist in peacetime and would be mobilized fromthe civilian economy in an emergency.

A number of divisions in the USSR are organized intoseparate corps. Most of these are in the southern andfar eastern USSR, although part of the Soviet forces inCzechoslovakia is subordinate to a corps headquartersthere. Corps are evidently similar to armies infunction but appear to have less support and usuallycontrol only two or three divisions. Soviet writingsindicate that in military operations a corps would be

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used in a secondary role, such as on the flank ofa front.

Fronts

The front is the Soviets' highest wartime fieldheadquarters for the joint operational control ofgeneral purpose forces. No fronts exist as suchin peacetime.

A front would consist of about three fieldarmies and a tactical air army plus combat andservice support. The rear services of the frontare responsible for most of the administrative sup-port of the combat units including supply, evacu-ation, medical service, construction, and mainte-nance. Little of these kinds of support is providedat division and army level--for example, the mobilestocks of POL and ammunition in both divisions andfield armies would be sufficient for only four tofive days of intensive combat--making the efficientoperation of the front's rear services from thebeginning of military operations a critical require-ment.

Several fronts are known to be planned forCentral Europe in the event of war. In terms ofcombat units and combat support, the Group of SovietForces in Germany is virtually *a front in being.The status of the GSFG rear services organizationis uncertain, however, since some of the units,particularly motor transport, which would be requiredto sustain the 20 divisions in combat apparently donot exist. Front level headquarters and supportpersonnel in GSFG (excluding the tactical air army)may amount to some 50,000 to 60,000 men.

The Polish and Czechoslovak military establish-ments are each responsible for forming a front inwartime, as is.the Soviet Carpathian Military Dis-trict (MD) and probably the Belorussian MD. In eachof these potential front areas there are currentlythree or more field armies, a tactical air army, andadditional combat support units. Except for theBelorussian MD, each is known to have rehearsed itswartime role in exercises. For each potential front,

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except the GSFG, much of the higher command andcontrol structure and a majority of the servicesupport units would have to be created by mobili-zation.

Other potential Soviet and East European frontsprobably exist in Bulgaria and the southern and fareastern USSR and possibly in the northwestern USSR.Ground armies and tactical air armies are stationedin each of these regions.

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Soviet Reinforcement Forces in the USSR

General

The reassessment of the size and disposition ofthe Soviet ground forces in the USSR which are avail-able for reinforcement of Warsaw Pact forces facingNATO has utilized information from all intelligencesources but has emphasized the.systematic collectionand analysis of satellite photography.

has providedthe initial indica-t-rono t-i-existence and location of most of the di-visions and armies, and most .of the evidencef r--ii-

idordnination of divisions to armies. Otheave provided important information on plans

and procedures for the mobilization and movement offorces and on the manning levels of units.

Much of the analysis to date has focused on thelocation of units, their identification by type, andthe assessment of their equipment strengths. The in--formation available and the-methodologies employedhave resulted in the location and identification ofarmy and corps headquarters and combat units (divi-sions, regiments, and combat support units) in theUSSR. They have also permitted confident assess-ment of the equipment strengths of most of theseunits. Assessment of personnel strengths and manninglevels is more difficult because of the lack of in-formation and the nature of the problem, but sometentative conclusions are possible and analysis iscontinuing.

Order of Battle

Analysis of photographyhas resulted in the identification of nine

ield armies in the Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian,and Kiev military districts--the MDs which containthe units probably earmarked as early reinforcementsfor the Warsaw Pact forces now in Central Europe.These nine armies contain 32 divisions--19 tank and13 motorized rifle. Another eight divisions, including

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two airborne, are located in these districts butare not subordinate to armies. Thirty-four of these40 divisions are judged to comprise the early rein-forcement capability.

In addition, some 46 divisions in other regionsof the USSR have been assessed, including 28 locatedin the border regions opposite China.

The five Soviet divisions from the western USSRwhich are currently in Czechoslovakia were assessedon the basis of their status prior to the interven-tion in Czechoslovakia. With the 26 Soviet divi-sions in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary, the totalnumber of Soviet divisions stands at 155.

Equipment Levels of Soviet Divisions

A combat ready Soviet division in East Germanyhas about 1,000 major items of equipment with noacceptable civilian equivalents which could be mobi-lized from the economy. Pared down to essentials, aSoviet division would probably still have about 800such items. Such a division--if augmented with ci-vilian vehicles--would probably be capable of performingmost combat roles of a Soviet division. Any Sovietdivision in peacetime probably requires at least 300trucks to be able to conduct limited training activ-ity and routine housekeeping, however, and would alsorequire that number of trucks to be able to movefrom its garrison to its alert area (normally about25 km away) in an emergency. Analysis of photog-raphy indicates that even those divisions with thelowest equipment levels have several hundred trucks.

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These considerations indicate that about 1,100major items of equipment is the minimum level con-sistent with a viable division--one capable ofbeing quickly mobilized and deployed. Such a divi-sion would need augmentation by 1,200 or 1,300civilian vehicles to reach combat strength.

Seventy-nine divisions were assessed againstthe equipment levels of the combat-ready Sovietdivisions in East Germany, and the seven airbornedivisions were assessed separately. As an example,the results of the assessment of the divisions ofthe Carpathian Military District are shown in thechart on page 16. Of the 54 line divisions now inthe western and southern USSR which were assessed,38 have shortages in major items of equipment rangingbetween 800 and 1,300.

Ten other divisions are more fully equipped.Six of these are short only about 600 items. Inthe four others the equipment levels cannot be de-termined with confidence because of the difficultyof identifying all the subordinate units and excludingnearby nonsubordinate units with _.sufficientprecision.All four are similar--in the number of troops apparentlypresent and in the nature and level of activity ap-parent at the installation--to the six divisions.In addition to these ten, the five divisions whichremained in Czechoslovakia after the bulk of the in-tervention force withdrew were assessed on the basisof photography prior to their mobilization in May1968. They were probably also short about 600 items.The shortages in these 15 divisions were mainly ingeneral purpose wheeled vehicles and armored person-nel carriers. These divisions probably have alltheir tanks and artillery, although their artillerydoes not appear to have been increased to the newlevels recently attained by Soviet artillery unitsin East Germany.

Six units, which appear to be combat formationswith at least some of the characteristics of divi-sions, have shortages of 1,500 or more vehiclesand probably do not possess all of the combat equip-ment of a division. The intended function of theseunits is unclear but since they -probably cannot bemobilized and committed as combat effective divisions

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without months of delay they are probably not partof the short-term Soviet capability against NATO.

Measured against the Soviet divisions in EastGermany, 48 of the 54 divisions assessed in the west-ern and southern USSR would be capable of early de-ployment. The four airborne divisions there are prob-ably ready for deployment as well.

Warsaw Pact Manning Levels

reliable evidenceindicates that equipment and personnel strengths ofEast European combat units are related, and suggeststhat Soviet units follow the same pattern.

This evidence confirms that in peacetime Polishunits are in three readiness categories--"combatready", "reduced strength", and "cadre strength."Reliable evidence indicates that Polish "combatready" units are at 80 to 100 percent personnelstrength and virtually fully equipped; "reducedstrength"- units_-require. substantial mobilization ofreservists and civilian vehicles and a "short time"to become combat ready; and "cadre" units requiremuch greater numbers of reservists and vehicles andtheir assembly time is measured in days.

the Czechoslovak Army had'combat ready divi-sions which were at combat personnel strength andfully equipped and also low strength divisions whichwere manned at 15 to 30 percent and short half theirtrucks. The low strength divisions were to be filledout quickly with civilian trucks and reservists in anemergency.

best Czechosovak divisionswere kept at 80 percent personne

strength.

Te_rxe is only a small amount ofI on- the_o_eaceatime_strenatbs_f ovia__nis_

05 o-i-zie-ifle Regiment (MRR) ofthe 31-st Tank Division, which deployed from the

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Carpathian Military District during the Czech crisisand is now in Czechoslovakia--as at about 50 ercentpersonnel strength before the Czeph crisis.

acquired about 30civilian trucks and large numbers of reservists whenit was mobilized in May 1968.

the 31st Tank Divisionwas a "tirst ine." division and as combat ready as anyin the Carpathian MD. This is supported bythe assessment of equipment levels of Soviet units,which revealed that the 31st Tank Division had oneof the highest equipment and activity levels. (Seec h a r t , p a n _ 3 e _ 6 _ -_ 1 'T ' e _ a s m s - m _ n s _ f_ + h _ _ _ 2 _ c t__ _ '

s ort only about 650 vehicles and that the MRRwas short about 30. Moreover, this division was theone selected from the 8th Tank Army, along with ahigh-strength division from each of the other twoCarpathian MD armies, to make. the initial militarydemonstrations against Czechoslovakia in May andJune 1968. The 31st Division-was selected, along -with four divisions from the Baltic, Belorussian,and Odessa military districts, to form the CentralGroup of Forces in Czechoslovakia.

3rdTTan kDivision, located at Ovruch in theCarna-hianMn__wa _ans__ ha-] personnel strength.

ndicated that thisa-rvrsron was-snorz-a-ou-t- --v- hicles, and that the321st MRR was probably underequipped.

tank units were keptat higher personnel strength in peacetime than motor-ized rifle units. In particular,tank crews were complete because o t e training re-quired to maintain proficiency.

This consideration would not necessarily applyto other personnel in a tank unit. Tank regiments,even in these two relatively well-equipped divisions,were short substantial numbers of vehicles, suggest-ing that at least some personnel shortages exist intank units. The low strength of motorized rifle

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regiments and the shortages of equipment for sup-port units in tank divisions suggests that sup-porting elements are at low manning levels, probably50 percent or less.

Based on these considerations, the pre-mobilizationpersonnel strength level of the 31st Tank Divisioncould have been as low as 55 percent. Even if thetank regiments were at full strength, the divisionprobably would have had only about 75 percent of itspersonnel. |

If they are typical ofthe best motorized rifle units, motorized rifle di-visions having the highest equipment levels are alsomanned in peacetime at 50 percent..

Idivisions which presently haveeguipment shortages of between 800 and 1,300. One

division had about 2,000 men. -Theother

in the- Carpath-i-an MD ,Ehe dvision was "demobilized" in 198

andhly officers and a few enlisted men wereretained. The equipment was put into storage atthe garrison.

Both Divisions were mobilizedduring the zechoslovak crisis. Prior to the mobili-zation the dad been assessed as havingabout 1,500 items of maior equipment (a shortage ofabout 900) and the as having about 1,200, halfits estimated comp emen . After mobilization eachhad about 2,400 items, including large numbers ofcivilian trucks.

Thus the available evidence suggests that a widerange of manning levels--from as low as 20 percentup to perhaps 70 percent--may exist in the peacetimeSoviet divisions inside the USSR which are probablycapable, because of their relatively high equipmentlevels, of early deployment. The evidence is insuf-ficient to determine whether the 20. to 70 percentrange is a continuous spectrum or whether the divi-sions fall into groups according to strength levels.

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The ten divisions which had equipment shortagesof about 600 would appear to form a group, with man-ning levels perhaps ranging between 50 and 75 percent.The 38 divisions with equipment shortages between800 and 1,300 appear to be a more heterogeneous lot.These generally have the lowest apparent activitylevels. A few, however, appear to have activitylevels similar to the divisions with equipment short-ages of only 600, suggesting that they may have morethan 50 percent of their personnel.

The paucity of direct evidence indicates that abroad range of uncertainty is appropriate in.esti-mating manning levels of Soviet divisions. At thisstage of the reassessment, 50 to 75 percent appearsreasonable as the probable personnel strength rangefor those divisions with equipment shortages of 600items or less and 20 to 50 percent as the probablerange for divisions with equipment shortages between800 and 1,300. A few divisions in each group mayhave higher strength levels.

Those divisions with shortages of 1,400 or moreprobably have only about 10 percent of their personnel,consisting of officers and small enlisted caretaker

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complements. For convenience, they have been desig-nated "cadre divisions." The role the Soviets seefor these divisions is unknown, but some have beenused as a base for expansion of the forces on theSino-Soviet border.

Soviet usage of the term "cadre" is ambiguousand inconsistent. The only mention of cadre divi-sions in field armies was a statement by Lt. Gen.S. Andryushchenko in an article entitled "The De-ployment and Forward Movement of a Combined ArmsArmy in a Border Military District in the InitialPeriod of a War." He stated that

...we studied the combined arms army made upof.four or five divisions (two or three ofthem up to strength and'the rest in cadreform or at reduced strength)....

This statement implies three distinct categories ofdivision, but in fact may only indicate that theauthor was uncertain of the exact status of thedivisions not up to strength or that he consideredthe -terms "reduced strength" and "cadre -fofm" synono-mous.

the 17th Guards Motorized Rifle Division inthe n3a_thian_MDwas called a cadre division. Anal-ysis shows that it is short about 1,700vehi res ana sarracks capacity for only abo_ut1,800 men, most of it inactive.

two motorized rifle regimen s of t e128th Guards Motorized Rifle Division of the Car-pathian MD were called cadre units. This divisionhas been assessed as short only about 600 vehicles,however, and therefore as probably being at 50 to 75percent manning. It was one of the divisions selectedto threaten Czechoslovakia in May-June 1968, and alsoparticipated in the intervention.

_ _ the 38th Army--to whichboth the 17th and 128th Divisions were subordinate--was called a cadre army. This is the only instancein which the term cadre has been applied to an army.One of its four subordinate divisions has been assessedas a cadre division but the other three probably are

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CATEGORIES OF WARSAW PACT DIVISIONS

For the purpose of categorization those WarsawPact divisions which would be available for eitherimmediate or early deployment can be described inthe following terms. The definitions apply alsoto East European divisions.

Combat Strength (Category IA) divisions haveall or most of their equipment and 80 to 100 per-cent of their authorized personnel. Soviet divi-sions in East Germany are believed to be kept at ornear full strength, and are available for immediateuse.

Reduced Strength (Category IB) divisions haveabout 75 percent of their equipment and 50 to 75percent of their authorized personnel. They couldbe filled up with reservists, augmented with up to600 civilian vehicles, and ready for movement with-in about 24 hours.

Low Strength (Category II) divisions have about45 to 65 percent of their equipment and 50 percentor less of their authorized personnel. A few maybe manned as low as 20 percent. They could befilled up with reservists, augmented by up to 1,300civilian vehicles, and could probably be ready formovement to a theater of operations within a week.

Cadre Divisions are those units which have nomore than one-third of their vehi-cles and whichappear to be short substantial amounts of combatequipment as well as trucks. Cadre divisions prob-ably have only officers and small enlisted care-taker complements--probably no more than 1,000personnel in all. These units could.not be madeinto combat strength divisions comparable to linedivisions through short-term mobilization. Theintended purpose of these units in wartime is un-known but they are probably not intended as earlyreinforcements and are probably not a part of Sovietshort-term capabilities against NATO.

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manned and equipped at levels sufficient to enablerapid mobilization and early deployment. The 38thArmy Headquarters itself was deployed to Czechoslo-vakia during the intervention and later providedthe basis for the formation of the headquarters ofthe Central Group of Forces there. This furtherillustrates.the uncertain meaning of the term cadrewhen used by the Soviets to describe units.

a cadre motorized rifleregiment which was located at Simferopol in the earlySixties. This unit's officers were mainly assignedto jobs outside the regiment and had only two activecompanies of enlisted men, which were used to main-tain and guard the installation and equipment.

Mobilization in Soviet Planning

The Soviet system of military preparedness reliesheavily on the rapid augmentation of low strength unitswith large numbers of men and vehicles mobilized fromthe civil economy, and the capacity of units to mobi-lize has to be taken into account in assessing theiravailability for reinforcement. The degree of re-liance on reservists and civilian vehicles in reachingfull strength affects the fighting capabilities of theunit, and it is necessary, if difficult, to considerboth availability and combat effectiveness when as-sessing the readiness of Soviet units.

This does not suggest that the Soviets do notvalue quality. They apparently have concluded, however,that quantity and speed of concentration are so crit-ical as to outweigh most other considerations.

Classified Soviet writings on mobilization anddeployment have been reassessed in the light of newevidence on Soviet and East European forces. Inaddition to the assessments of divisional equipmentand manning levels using photography, this evidenceincludes revised Warsaw Pact war plans (see the sectionon the Warsaw Pact Mission, pages 47 to 55), analysisof the mobilization and deployment during the Czechoslovakcrisis, and authoritative statements on plans andprocedures for mobilization and deployment of bothSoviet and East European forces.

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The 1961 issues of the classified Soviet periodicalMiZitary Thought are the most recent Soviet documentarysources on combat readiness. The primary source, Maj.Gen. Ya. Shchepennikov, the author of "Support of theStrategic Concentration and Deployment of the ArmedForces in Respect to Transport," stated:

In speaking of strategic echelons, we meanthat the first of these consist of the forcesand weapons necessary for achieving the stra-tegic aims of the initial period of the war;it is divided into several (not less thanthree) operational echelons. The first in-cludes the troops and materiel that are in afull state of readiness for immediate opera-tions, the second is the forces and weaponsdesignated for increasing the efforts of the

initial operations with readiness for pro-

ceeding to areas of concentration after sev-eral days, the third is the forces and weap-ons to be used only several weeks after thebeginning of full mobilization for the de-velopment of the subsequent operations ofthe --initial period of a war.

The forces Shchepennikov had in mind for the secondand third operational echelons are not further de-fined. His description conforms most closely tothe assessment of equipment holdings of Soviet unitsif his second echelon is taken to mean those divi-sions which have equipment shortages of 600 vehiclesand which may be at from 50 to 75 percent personnelstrength, and his third echelon to include all theremainder except the cadre divisions. Consideringthat cadre divisions probably cannot be made combateffective without extensive buildup and training, itis less likely that most of the western USSR fieldarmies--all except a few cadre divisions--are thesecond echelon and only the cadre divisions and somerear services units are the third echelon.

In the book Military Strategy, General Sokolovskiyidentified three categories of units in terms ofstrength, but did not state how the lowest categorywas to be employed. Sokolovskiy appeared to includeSoviet forces in Eastern Europe in his category

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"designated to conduct initial operations and stationedin the border districts":

...Some of the ground force units and for-mations designated to conduct initial opera-tions and stationed in the border districts...are maintained in peacetime at strength ade-quate to permit the execution of the maintasks of the initial period of the war. An-other portion of these forces has a shortmobilization period, enabling them to partici-pate in the initial operations; and, finally,a certain portion is kept at reduced strength

in peacetime.

Most other authors discuss only two categoriesof readiness in the context of early front opera-tions. The clearest statement is by Maj. Gen. A.Klyukanov in "The Most Urgent Problems of Train-ing Command Personnel and of Increasing the CombatReadiness of Border Military District Staffs":

The demand for full mobilization ofvarious large units within the shortesttime is especially important for the for-mations of border military districts, be-cause the speed of intensifying the effortsof first echelon troops, consisting of alimited number of divisions of increasedcombat readiness, will depend on the periodrequired for fully mobilizing large unitsand units of reduced strength, from which,as a rule, the second echelons and reservesof armies will be created.

and

Thus, in the peacetime composition oftroops of a military district there areline divisions (of increased combat readi-ness) and divisions of reduced strength.The field command of an army, army units,and front units are also kept at reducedstrength.

Most of the Soviet writings taken alone areambiguous in some particulars. They are consistent,however, in their statements that two categories of

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units in the border districts would be involved in theso-called "initial period" of a war with NATO. Al-though some writers, including General Gorbatov, wrotein terms of months, most Soviet authors in their class-ified writings consistently describe the initial per-iod--which was to end with the arrival of Soviet forcesat the English Channel--as lasting 10 to 20 days. Theinference is that this projected time period was apoint of doctrine and a fundamental element in Sovietplanning.

These writings also indicate that Soviet militaryauthorities in the early Sixties took it for grantedthat low strength divisions in the western USSR couldbe quickly mobilized and deployed against NATO. Morerecent evidence on East European and Sov_iet__forcessuBet thttesiltik so.

provide good evidence that both the Polish and Czech-oslovak armies include divisions whose personnel andequipment strengths, while low, are higher than thoseof Soviet cadre divisions. The sources indicate thatthese- low strength divisions are -intended to be mob-ilized and committed to combat within a week or less.

Soviet Mobilization Procedures

The capability to accomplish such a rapid deploy-ment depends in large part on the effectiveness ofthe mobilization system. Good information on theSoviet mobilization system and its capabilities hasbeen acquired during the past year or so.

Several former Soviet citizens have described theprocedure for mobilizing civilian vehicles. Essenti-ally, it involves the designation of selected civilianmotor transport organizations in cities throughoutthe USSR as organized reserve motor transport units(Avtokolonna). These units, which reportedly have350 to 500 trucks each, are under military super-vision and are periodically subjected to test exer-cises. Their personnel are qualified reservists andspecial efforts are made to maintain their vehiclesin good condition. Preliminary analysis indicatesthat Avtokolonna have been established in large

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numbers throughout the USSR--about 78 have been iden-tified thus far, representing some 27,000 to 39,000vehicles.

The Czechoslovak crisis provided the only recentlarge-scale test of Soviet mobilization and deploymentprocedures. About 20 divisions were mobilized, in-cluding some 11 of those with low peacetime manningand equipment levels. At least five armies were ap-parently mobilized--three of them and about ten ofthe mobilized divisions were used against Czechoslo-vakia. In all, at least 125,000 Soviet reservists and20,000 trucks were called up.

Three divisions from the Carpathian MD were mobil-ized in early May and used in the pre-interventionpressure campaign against Czechoslovakia.

the mobilizationand deployment-of the MRR the 31st Tank Divi-sion, one of the units invo ved. firstalerted at Zhmerinka on the afternoon of 7 May, mobil-ized its reservists and civilian trucks during thatnight, and moved out by road and rail to Uzhgorod thefollowing night.

After mobilization, the regiment still had vacanciesfor some 60 noncommissioned officers. These were sup-plied from a division at Berdichev after the unit hadarrived at Uzhgorod.

The reservists, which then made up about half theregiment's strength, ranged up to 42 years of age andhad had no military training since their dischargefrom conscript service--as much as 21 years previously.The regiment had only about two-thirds of its comple-ment of armored personnel carriers and one-third ofthese were obsolete BTR-152s, which are underpoweredand are not amphibious. The regiment had not yetbeen equipped with antitank guided missiles and ithad not yet had its artillery increased to the levelof the Soviet forces in Germany.

The 31st Tank Division would probably have beensignificantly less combat effective than a GSFG divi-sion had it been obliged to fight in Czechoslovakia.It had successfully accomplished the mission assigned

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it, however--it had mobilized and deployed in a re-markably short time and was evidently prepared tocommit its 300 tanks to combat.

The main mobilization period in preparation forthe intervention probably began on 17 Jul

The actual call-up of re-servists and civilian equipment began on 23 July, withthe announcement of a "rear-services exercise" whichterminated on 10 August. By this time, the initialdeployment of forces from the western USSR in prepara-tion for the invasion had been completed.

In the Czechoslovak case, when theSoviets could set the pace themselves, a partial mo-bilization and reinforcement was accomplished in18 days of overt activity, or 24 days if the probablepreparatory phase is included.

There is good evidence that the invasion forcesreceived logistical support through ad hoc arrange-ments with the Soviet Groups of Forces in Germanyand Poland and possibly Hungary, and the July mobili-zation of the rear services organization was probablyintended to provide the support necessary if hostili-ties had developed.

the Warsaw Pact'scontingency plans ca or the Soviet Carpathian Frontto begin arriving in Czechoslovakia on the fourth dayof hostilities

Maj. Gen. P. Stepshin, in a 1961 article entitled,"On Regrouping a Combined Arms Army From the Depthof the Country in the Initial Period of a War," ap-parently believed that armies from the western USSR

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could complete their mobilization and reinforcementin about 10 to 12 days:

...mobilization will begin only on the eveor at the beginning of the war. In thiscase, an army which is moving forward whileregrouping at a distance exceeding 1,000to 1,500 km will be able to participateonly in the second and subsequent operationsof a front....

An army which is...no more than 1,000to 1,500 km from the line of the front,and which succeeds in completing its mobili-zation before the beginning of militaryoperations, or which is in a state of con-stant readiness, will be able to join thecomplement of the front approximately asthe fulfillment of the subsequent task ofthe first front operation is beginning,i.e., on the fifth to seventh day of thewar.

-- On balance,-the evidence-indicates that theSoviets believe they could complete the essentialelements of reinforcement in Central Europe withinabout ten days if the need were sufficiently urgent.Their performance during the Czechoslovak crisis sug-gests that they would plan to accomplish a buildupat a more deliberate rate if circumstances permitted.

The most time-consuming and critical aspect ofmobilization is the organization and filling out ofthe front and army rear services. There is abundantevidence that both the Soviets and the East Europeansrely mainly on mobilization to provide the bulk ofthe service support organization at front and armylevel, and these units are the least ready in peace-time. Important elements of the rear services existonly on paper or as portions of the civilian economy.Although low strength divisions can probably be mo-bilized and deployed in a matter of days, they cannotbe sustained in combat more than a few days withoutextensive logistical support by- the front rear ser-vices.

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The Warsaw Pact is probably capable of mobilizingthe men and vehicles required to organize the fivefronts intended for Central Europe in a matter ofdays if the process is not interrupted by hostilemilitary action. The complete integration of themobilized units as functioning, combat effectiveunits in a theater of operations, particularly atthe front level, is likely ,to require more time. Inan emergency the mobilization of the line divisionsand combat support of the Carpathian and Belorussianfronts and their movement into Central Europe couldprobably be accomplished in 10 to 14 days, althoughsome important elements of the army and front rearservices would still be incomplete. In a situationwhere they could control the timing of events, theSoviets would probably plan to take at least threeweeks to complete the reinforcement.

In planning a deliberate aggression, the Sovietswould probably organize the theater of operationsdifferently. They would probably replace the Czecho-slovak and Polish fronts with mainly Soviet striking

forces and would probably requireconsiderably more._than three weeks to complete the mobilization anddeployment of the combat units and support servicesthis would require.

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Forces in Eastern Europe Facing NATO

Forces Opposite NATO Central Region

The Warsaw Pact forces available for early useagainst the NATO Central Region include thoseSoviet and East European armies, divisions, andfront level support units in East Germany, Czechoslo-vakia, and Poland and in the Baltic, Belorussian.and Carpathian military districts__of_th.e_ISRlt

In addition to these forces, in the Kiev Mili-tary District the Soviets maintain what is probablya strategic reserve available for use against eitherthe Central or Southern NATO regions.

The Soviets also have forces in Hungary whoseintended wartime role is unknown. Their location

- is such that they are available for use-either incentral or southern Europe, and they may be part ofthe strategic reserve.

After mobilization and reinforcement, the WarsawPact could deploy an estimated 1.3 million men againstthe NATO Central Region. The main striking elementof this force would consist of about 20,000 tankssupported by tactical missiles and rockets, about1,800 ground attack and reconnaissance aircraft.,and some 5,800 artillery pieces. Details of thisforce are presented in the table on page 32.

Soviet Front in East Germany

The Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) isby far the largest of all the potential Warsaw Pactfronts and is the only one which is believed to haveall of its divisions and combat support units suffi-ciently manned and equipped to go into combat with-out mobilization of additional men and vehicles.Even the GSFG might require augmentation of itsmotor transport to sustain an offensive.

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Table 2

Warsaw Pact General Purpose Forces Available for Early Commitment in Central Europe

Estimated Wartime StrengthArmies Divisions Aircraft

Currently Available Combined Tactical Category Ground Attack and Air

H -Forces Arms Tank Air lA IB II Men Tanks Reconnaissance a/ Defense b/

O ' GSFG and East GermanArmy 5 2 1 26 405,000 6,500 440 660

Czechoslovak Front 3 1 7 5 180,000 3,000 250 320U Carpathian Front c/ 2-3 1 1 5 4 6 230,000 3,400 240 150

Polish Front 3 1 11 d_/ 4 215,000 2;800 260 680Northern Group ofForces in Poland 1 2 35,000 600 180 110

Belorussian Front 1 2 1 1 e/ 2 8 165,000 2,800 180 110Baltic MilitaryDistrict 1 1 1 e/ 2 2 60,000 1,000 210 80 H

u Total 15-16 5 7 53 8 25 1,290,000 20,100 1,760 2,110

Strategic Reserve

Kiev MilitaryDistrict 1 1 1 10 110,000 2,500 80

Southern Group ofForces in Hungary 1 1 4 55,000 1,000 130 110

Total Available 17-18 6 9 57 8 35 1,455,000 23,600 1,890 2,300

a. Includes fighter-bombers, light bombers, and aircraft with a reconnaissance. mnnston.b. Fighters having a primary mission of air defense which are in Soviet tactical air armies Would probably

operate primarily in support of Soviet ground forces. Air defense units of the East European members of theWarsaw Pact are responsible primarily for air defense of national territorv, but would probably also flymissions in support of battlefield operations.

c. Includes the Central Group of Forces in Czechoslovakia. which approximates a field army.d. Includes an airborne division and an amphibious assault division.e. Airborne division. Employment centrally controlled by Mascow.

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The GSFG has five field armies--two tank andthree combined arms--with a total of 20 CategoryIA divisions (categorization of divisions is ex-plained on page 22). The 1st Guards Tank Army andthe 3rd Shock Army, each with four tank divisionsand one motorized rifle division, are in centralEast Germany and form the principal striking forceof the front. The 2nd Guards Army, with two motor-ized rifle and one tank division, and the 8th GuardsArmy, with three motorized rifle divisions and onetank division, are on their flanks. The 20th GuardsArmy, with three motorized rifle divisions, is con-centrated around Berlin. The front's air supportwould be provided by the 14th Tactical Air Army(formerly designated the 24th), by far the largestSoviet tactical air force and the only one containingan assault air transport regiment.

In an emergency, the Soviet front would probablyabsorb the two East German armies and their sixCategory IA divisions. The East German forces havefrequently exercised with GSFG in such'roles.. Al-though the East German divisions are at combatstrength, some mobilization of vehicles andiperson-nel would probably be required to complete the head-quarters and support elements of the armies.

With its East German allies, the front organizedfrom GSFG would probably have about 405,000 men(including 90,000 East Germans) and 6,500 tanks.It would be supported by some 440 ground attack andreconnaissance aircraft, 175 nuclear-capable missileand rocket launchers, 1,900 artillery pieces (mostlylight or medium caliber and none self-propelled),and 400 multiple-tube rocket launchers.

GSFG training exercises are apparently designedto approximate as nearly as possible the wartimeroles of the participants and thus serve as re-hearsals. Practice alerts are held frequently,and divisions are reportedly required to be capableof assembling outside their garrison areas in combatready condition in two hours. To meet this standard,the Soviets follow such practices as maintaining fullcombat loads of ammunition and POL on vehicles, andstrictly controlling the whereabouts of troops duringoff-duty hours.

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On the whole, GSFG has good potential for eitherdefense in depth or large-scale assaults with massedarmor. Its infantry strength is low in proportionto its armor by US standards, however, and a numberof its divisions do not yet have armored personnelcarriers (APCs) in sufficient numbers or of appro-priate design to match the speed and flexibility ofthe tank forces.

Although Soviet tactical doctrine emphasizes in-fantry engaging in combat in moving APCs, detailedanalysis of photography indicates that GSFG has lessthan half the modern APCs its motorized rifle battal-ions require. About half the APCs are of the olderBTR-152 type, which is not amphibious and has pooroff-road mobility. These shortages tend to disruptsmall unit integrity and result in crowding of theriflemen in the vehicles, hindering weapons use.

GSFG divisions are capable of only about threedays of intensive combat with their organic mobilesupplies, and depend on the early institution offull-scale logistical support from higher echelons-- army or front--to maintain offensive momentum.This support must be provided mainly by the frontsince the armies have only a small mobile reserve.

The GSFG front level organization probably ex-ists in peacetime. Its logistic capabilities are notclearly defined, however, since some of the unitswhich would be essential to perform these serviceshave not been identified. For example, only onePOL pipeline brigade and one motor transport regi-ment have been identified. The pipeline brigademight be capable of supplying most of the POLrequirements of GSFG's ground armies, but it wouldnot be able to supply the additional 4,000 to 6,000tons of fuel a day which the tactical air armyattached to GSFG would require if its aircraftbegan operating from fields outside East Germany.The GSFG motor transport regiment, with about 300to 350 trucks and trailers, has a lift capacityof only about 1,200 to 1,400 tons. This appearsinadequate to transport the 8,000 to 10,000 tonsof non-POL supplies which the 20 GSFG divisionswould consume in each day of a sustained offensive.

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A large truck park containing some. 900_trucks andtrailers_has been identified near Dresden

These vehicles are probably military,but their subordination and intended role are unknown.If they are available to GSFG, they would signifi-cantly augment its logistical capacity. There is noother evidence of Soviet planning to augment GSFG'slimited motor transport.

If the Soviet motor transport units which havebeen identified in East Germany are the only onesthere, the GSFG would be incapable of sustainedcombat without substantial augmentation. Such anaugmentation could be accomplished in three or fourdays by mobilized civilian motor transport from theUSSR or the Soviets might plan to requisition EastGerman vehicles.

Czechoslovak Front

Prior to the Soviet intervention in August 1968,the Czechoslovaks were responsible for organizing afront to cover the Warsaw Pact southern flank in theCentral--Region. ._

the front was charged with the mission ofsecuring crossings over the Rhine in its zone ofoperations. The Soviets probably actually expectedit to do no more than wear down NATO forces and defendCzechoslovakia long enough for Soviet reinforcementsto get there.

The Czechoslovak forces include three field armiesand a tactical air army. There are two field armiesin western Czechoslovakia, one with four divisionsand the other with three. Prior to the interventionthese divisions and their support units were probablyCategory IA (manned at 80 percent strength or betterand fully equipped for combat). A personnel reductionof some 20 percent took place in the CzechoslovakArmy after the intervention and probably affectedthese divisions to some extent. There is no evi-dence whether this reduction has subsequently beenmade up. In an emergency, however, these units areapparently expected to deploy into combat withoutreinforcement. If time permitted they could befilled up with reservists.

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The third army, located in eastern Czechoslovakia,was in cadre status before the intervention.

the cadres of the four divisions,each - 5 to percent of wartime strength, wereconsolidated under two commanders in peacetime foreconomy. The combat equipment for all four divi-sions and the army support units was stored in east-ern Czechoslovakia, but only about half the wartimerequirement of wheeled vehicles was on hand. In anemergency, the Czechoslovaks planned to fill up thearmy and divisional units with reservists. Theadditional wheeled vehicles needed, and their drivers,were to be requisitioned from the civilian economy.

A tank division which had been located in westernCzechoslovakia and had been at combat strength wasmoved to the eastern area in order to make room forSoviet forces. Its current readiness status isunknown, but its removal to a rear area previouslyoccupied only by low strength units suggests thatit may no longer be maintained on a ready status.

theCzechs plannedto complete their mobilization in three days. Inthat time they expected to deploy their two westernarmies into combat and assemble the army from easternCzechoslovakia. The Czechs are probably capable ofdeploying their two western armies within three daysor less, but their plan to complete the mobilizationand deployment of the third army and of the frontsupport organization during the same time period isless realistic since it depends on the successfulcompletion of complex procedures. These include thetransfer of numerous officers and NCOs from peacetimeactivities and their integration into the front andarmy organization and the mobilization of some 40,000reservists and as many as 10,000 vehicles. Such amobilization has never been fully tested, and wouldprobably require a week or more.

When fully mobilized, the Czechoslovak frontwould consist of about 180,000 men and 3,000 tanks.It would be supported by 250 ground attack and re-connaissance aircraft and, according to Czech plans,about 40 missile and rocket launchers, 750 artillerypieces, and 150 multiple-tube rocket launchers.

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Czechoslovakia will probably continue to maintainits armed forces at about their current size and theseforces will probably be available to the Warsaw Pact.Because of the intervention and subsequent events,the Soviets probably will judge the reliability ofthe Czech forces as low for some time. The Soviets,however, evidently still see a Warsaw Pact role forCzechoslovakia since the two Czech armies on thewestern frontier with NATO have remained in place.

The Soviet Central Group of Forces (CGF) inCzechoslovakia appears to be intended primarily tomanifest a Soviet military presence and maintainSoviet lines of communication into Czechoslovakiafrom East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and the USSR.The five divisions in the CGF probably have a secon-dary mission of reinforcing or replacing Czechoslo-vak units in their Warsaw Pact role until the Sovietsare satisfied with the reliability and combat effec-tiveness of the Czechoslovak front The CGF con-sists of three of the seven first-line motorizedrifle and tank divisions previously stationed inthe Baltic and Belorussian military districts, andone division each from the Carpathian. and Odessa-military districts. There is no evidence that theSoviets are increasing their own forces in the west-ern USSR to offset the decrease in Czechoslovakreliability and effectiveness or to compensate forthe reduction in forces in some areas when the CGFwas created.

There are no indications so far that the Sovietsare forming replacement divisions in the vacatedgarrisons of these divisions in the USSR. Barringsuch replacement, Soviet reinforcement capabilityon the axis of the Belorussian front--including theBaltic divisions--will remain reduced from 16 to 13divisions. The Soviet capability to reinforce inCzechoslovakia has been increased from 12 divisions

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to 16--one of the five divisions now in Czechoslo-vakia was formerly located in the Carpathian mili-tary district and already allotted to this front.

Carpathian Front

Before the intervention in Czechoslovakia theSoviets had planned to form a front from theCarpathian Military District to take over fromCzechoslovak forces after the initial hostilitiesin the Central Region. This front was to be formedfrom existing units in the Carpathian MD, filledout by mobilization. The forces there consist ofthree field armies, a tactical air army, and somecombat and service support units.

The three field armies include the 8th TankArmy, which now has three tank divisions, and twocombined arms armies, the 13th and 38th, each withfour motorized rifle divisions. Two of the threetank divisions in the 8th Tank Army and the army'scombat support units probably are capable of beingmobilized and deployed within 24 hours, but itsservice support units are probably at low strengtx_and may require more extensive mobilization of per-sonnel and vehicles to reach combat strength. Thethird tank division is probably also at low equip-ment and personnel levels, and would probably needa few days to mobilize.

The 13th and 38th armies each have one divisionwhich is probably capable of being mobilized anddeployed within 24 hours. Five of the six remainingmotorized rifle divisions and the combat and servicesupport units of the armies are probably at lowpersonnel and equipment strength but could probablybe mobilized and available for deployment in a fewdays. One cadre strength motorized rifle divisionin the 38th Army probably is short substantialamounts of combat equipment as well as trucksand personnel and would not be capable of earlydeployment.

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In addition to its divisions, each of the Carpa-thian armies has a Scud tactical missile brigade,an artillery brigade, an SA-2 surface-to-air missileregiment, and an engineer ponton and assault crossingregiment. One of the combined arms armies probablyalso has a separate heavy tank and assault gunregiment.

Front support units include two artillery divi-sions of about 160 guns each (both of which areprobably at reduced personnel strength and lack mostof their general purpose trucks), a Scud brigade, anSA-4 Ganef mobile surface-to-air missile unit, anda tank transporter unit which could carry aboutthree-fourths of the tanks in one tank division.The command and control organization of the Carpa-thian Front and most of its front level supportunits are probably manned and equipped at no morethan half strength.

Analysis of the units and activities of theCarpathian MD indicates that it has a higher levelof combat readiness than any other military dis-trict in the USSR. The three armies could probablycomplete the mobilization and deployment into Czecho-slovakia ,of their combat elements in about one week:The service support elements of the armies and thefront support units probably would require an addi-tional week to move up.

During the Czech crisis, the 38th Army controlledthree divisions from the Carpathian MD and one fromthe Odessa MD which threatened and later intervenedin Czechoslovakia. These included the two CategoryIB divisions of the 13th and 38th armies and oneCategory IB division from the 8th Tank Army. Twoof the divisions which the 38th Army controlled--the 31st Tank Division from the 8th Tank Army and the48th Motorized Rifle Division from the Odessa MD--stayed in Czechoslovakia as part of the ground forceelement of the Central Group of Forces.

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TUPE E FT.

In addition to the three Category IB divisionsin the Carpathian MD which were mobilized in earlyMay 1968, a portion-of the forces there were mobi-lized under cover of the July-August rear servicesexercise. About three Category II divisions of the13th Army er_eLmabbili_zed-atthat-time_but were notdeployed. ]in-dicates that these divisions had reverted to Cate-gory II status by late January 1969.

In the event of mobilization and reinforcement,the Soviet Central Group of Forces in Czechoslo-vakia would probably constitute the advance elementof the Carpathian front. The CGF, with its twotank and three motorized rifle divisions, approxi-mates a field army, particularly if it were rein-forced with combat support elements. The totalpersonnel strength of the CGF, including its twoair regiments, is estimated to be from 55,000 to60,000 men.

When fully mobilized and deployed, the Carpathianfront--incorporating the CGF forces--would have about230,000 men and 3,400 tanks. It would be supportedby about 240 ground attack and reconnaissance air-craft, 70 nuclear-capable missile and rocket launchers,1,300 light and medium field artillery pieces, and190 multiple-tube rocket launchers.

Polish Front

Poland is responsible for organizing and deployinga front consisting of three Polish field armies and atactical air army. Two of the field armies, one organ-ized from the Pomeranian Military District and one fromthe Silesian MD, could be ready for combat within a fewhours after being alerted. The nine divisions in thesetwo armies--five tank and four mechanized (equivalentto motorized rifle divisions)--are probably manned atbetween 80 and 100 percent personnel strength and haveall their vehicles and equipment. The support unitsof these two armies are also probably at sufficientstrength for immediate deployment.

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The rest of the Polish front would be formedby an army from the Warsaw MD. Its four mechanizeddivisions and its support units are believed to beat low strength in peacetime and are short much oftheir general purpose transport equipment. The prep-aration of this army for combat, including themobilization and integration of reservists andcivilian vehicles and the.organization of army-levelcommand and control and logistic organizations,would probably require seven to ten days.

In addition to the line divisions in armies,Poland has a small airborne division and a smallamphibious assault landing division. Both areprobably available for immediate deployment, al-though the airborne division would have to rely onSoviet aircraft for transport.

The front headquarters would be formed by cadresfrom the Ministry of National Defense, supplementedby reservists. The front support units, particularlythose concerned with supply, maintenance, and trans-portation, would largely be created during mobiliza-

--tion. Part of these units would be formed usingcadres drawn from peacetime organizations and func-tions, but many would be provisional units formedalmost entirely from civilian institutions such ashospitals and transport organizations.

As is the case with Czechoslovakia, the rapidcreation and deployment of the front's command,control, and support organization is the mostcritical and complex task involved in preparingthe Polish armed forces for war. Although thedivisions of two of the three armies could begindeployment and even enter combat largely on thebasis of predetermined contingency plans, theirsubsequent direction and support would depend onthe capability of the front to begin carrying outall its functions within a few days after mobili-zation began.

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TOPSE PET

When fully mobilized, the Polish front wouldprobably have about 215,000 men and 2,800 tanks.It would be supported by some 260 ground attackand reconnaissance aircraft, the bulk of which areaging MIG-15s and MIG-17s, by about 65 missile androcket launchers, as many as 1,000 towed artillerypieces of light and medium calibers, and about 170multiple-tube rocket launchers.

The main strength of the Polish front, as withthe Soviet front in Germany, lies in its large num-ber of tanks. The proportion of infantry is low.

The major weaknesses of the Polish front stemfrom its dependence on a complex and awkward mobili-zation procedure and from the necessity to deployits forces westward into Germany before they couldbe committed- in an offensive.-- -Not--only do the opera=- -tions of the Polish forces depend on the mobilizationand movement actions, but these actions are vulner-able to interruption if they are still under waywhen hostilities begin.

Soviet Forces in Poland

The Soviet Northern Group of Forces (NGF) inPoland consists of only two tank divisions, bothof which are probably Category IA, but has combatsupport units approximating those of a typicalSoviet field army and 180 ground attack and re-connaissance aircraft.

There is no evidence to indicate the intendedwartime role of NGF, but its units could be usedto reinforce either the GSFG or the Polish frontor they could form a part of a theater reserve.One tank division and about 75 aircraft of the37th Tactical Air Army were temporarily deployedduring the Czechoslovak intervention.

TaP-SCRET

Belorussian Front

The forces of the Belorussian Military Districtare similar in size and organization to those ofthe Carpathian MD but are at a somewhat lower stageof combat readiness and have less support. Theyare probably intended to form a front for use inthe Central Region.

There are- three field armies,- one combined armsand two-tank, and a tactical air army in the dis-trict. The. 28th Combined Arms -Army contributed itstwo Category. IB divisions to the Central Group ofForces in Czechoslovakia and now has only two Cate-gory II divisions, one tank and one motorizedrifle. The 5th Guards Tank Army and the 7th TankArmy have a total of seven tank divisions. One ofthese, the 3rd Guards Tank Division in the 7th TankArmy,is probably Category IB. The other six areCategory II.

The three divisions of the 5th Guards Tank Armywere mobilized during the Czechoslovak crisis butwere not deployed. They have since reverted totheir normal status.-

The Belorussian MD has an additional CategoryIB motorized rifle division not assigned to anyarmy which would be available for early deployment.An airborne division also located in the militarydistrict is subordinate to the Airborne ForcesHeadquarters in Moscow, which would control- itsemployment.

Analysis .ndicatesthat there are fewer combat support units in theBelorussian MD than in any of the other potentialSoviet fronts for Central Europe. Neither of thetank armies appears to have an artillery brigadeand the artillery unit for the combined arms armyapparently is only of battalion size rather thanbeing a brigade. Only two Scud tactical missile-brigades have been identified, but there is evi-dence that a third may exist. Each army doeshave an SA-2 surface-to-air missile regiment andan engineer ponton unit. The engineer unitsappear to be at low personnel and equipmentstrength.

, -_43TDPR&ECRET

TOPY °GREFT

Identified front level support consists of anartillery division at reduced or cadre strength anda tank transporter unit which would be capable oflifting the tanks of one complete tank division.

The Belorussian MD could probably produce afront which could complete mobilization and the de-ployment of its combat elements into western Polandor East Germany within about two weeks. It wouldprobably require about three weeks to assemble thecomplete front, including the rear services organi-zation, in the forward area. The front would con-sist of about 165,000 men with 2,800 tanks, supportedby 180 ground attack and reconnaissance aircraft,about- 45 nuclear-capable missile or rocket launchers,600 artillery pieces, and 120 multiple-tube rocketlaunchers.

Baltic Military District

The Baltic MD contains a combined arms army--the llth Guards--available for the Central Regionand an airborne division. There are also.210 groundattack and reconnaissance aircraft.

Between 17 July and 10 August 1968 the 11thGuards Army, which had three Category TB and twoCategory II divisions, was mobilized and began amovement into north-central Poland. By the endof August it was in the area of the East German -Czechoslovak border, where it apparently remaineduntil late October. It then returned to its nor-mal station and demobilized, leaving behind inCzechoslovakia the motorized rifle division ori-ginally located at Chernyakhovsk. The airbornedivision also participated in the intervention,and was subsequently returned to its home station.

Strategic Reserve

Simultaneously with the mobilization and de-ployment of the fronts, the Soviets would probablybegin developing a strategic reserve under thedirect control of the high command. This reservewould be intended to reinforce and replenish the

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forces in the Central Region or elsewhere. Ini-tially, it would probably include those forces inthe western USSR which are organized into fieldarmies in peacetime but are not committed to thefronts.

This suggests that the primaryarea of interest o- tnerorces of the Kiev MD up tothe mid-Sixties was opposite the NATO Central Region,but that they also had contingency plans involvingthe NATO Southern Region andoe~rhansdafenseoftheBlack Sea maritime area.

there has been no evidence to suggestany. significant change in the district's forces ormissions. During the Czechoslovak crisis a mobilizedtank division which probably came from the Kiev MDwas moved forward temporarily to Bolgrad in theOdessa MD to replace the 48th division, which hadbeen sent to Czechoslovakia. The 48th has remainedin Czechoslovakia, but the tank division which re-placed it has apparently returned to its home sta-tion. This temporary deployment suggests a con-'tinued Kiev MD interest in the area opposite theNATO Southern Region.

The two armies in the Kiev MD, each of whichcurrently has four Category II divisions, wouldprobably constitute the core of the strategicreserve. Two additional Category II divisions

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which are not assigned to either army would probablyalso be included. Both armies have combat supportunits including Scud brigades, artillery brigades,engineer regiments, and probably surface-to-airmissile units.

Both armies and the additional divisions couldprobably be available for deployment from. their pres-ent locations within about two weeks after mobili-zation began.

The Soviet Southern Group of Forces (SGF) inHungary approximates a field army with its fourCategory IA divisions and army level support units.There are also 130 ground attack and reconnaissanceaircraft. As with the Northern Group of Forces inPoland, there is no evidence to indicate the intendedwartime role of the SGF. It is so situated that itcould be used against either the Central or Southernregion of NATO and it may therefore be part of thestrategic reserve. Three divisions and some of theaircraft in the SGF were used in the Czechoslovakintervention.

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The Warsaw Pact Mission

Soviet Views of War in Europe

Classified Soviet military writing in the earlySixties--when the forces now deployed were beingplanned--had as its central theme the convictionthat a war with NATO in Europe would either beginwith or quickly escalate to the use of nuclear weap-ons. Most of the military writers opposed Khrushchev'searlier doctrine that the advent of nuclear weaponsobviated the need to maintain massive ground forces.Instead, these strategists stated that nuclear war-fare would require large ground forces, not only toabsorb the high casualties expected but also to ex-ploit Soviet nuclear strikes by eliminating any sub-stantial NATO forces surviving and to consolidatethe conquest of Europe.

Planning to meet this requirement for substantialground forces was complicated by the great distancebetween Germany, probably the area of initial con-flict, and the western USSR, where the bulk of theunits intended for the European theater of operationswere located. The size and disposition of currentWarsaw Pact ground forces represent a compromisebetween the concepts the Soviet military plannersdeveloped of the requirement for large combat readyforces near the NATO frontiers and the economic con-straints and political considerations which madesuch large forces impractical.

Economic constraints, stated simply, are themonetary costs incurred in supporting large andcomplex forces outside the USSR. The politicalconsiderations include the political or "publicrelations" cost of maintaining sizable Soviet forceson "fraternal" soil where they, by their very pres-ence, may ignite periodic outbursts of.public antag-onism and are vulnerable to charges of Soviet "occu-pation." This has been demonstrated over the yearsin Hungary and East Germany and recently in Czecho-slovakia.

. The Soviets have sought a solution to theirdilemma through the development of a capability for

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rapid mobilization and reinforcement. Their conceptis to maintain a large enough force in the forwardarea of the central region--East Germany, Poland,and Czechoslovakia--to defend against an unexpectedattack, providing the time necessary for a partiallymanned and equipped force in the western USSR to bequickly mobilized and brought forward to decide theissue in the Soviets' favor.

In keeping with this concept, the Soviets haveprovided their forward forces with most of the com-bat equipment they need and have assigned most ofthe manpower allotted to the ground forces to combatunits, relying on mobilization to supply the supportpersonnel and transport necessary for prolonged combat.

The successful completion of the mobilizationand reinforcement phases would probably depend ontheir being carried out without serious interruptionby nuclear attack. Doubts that the reinforcementscould reach the conflict area after nuclear hostil-ities had begun were widely discussed in the debateover force structures conducted in the classifiedmilitary journals in the early Sixties, and helpedincline Soviet military thought toward the ideathat at least a "short period of tension" wouldprecede the outbreak of hostilities. Soviet writingsexpressed a hope that this period of tension--whicheven achieved a certain aura of dogma by being of-fically designated as the "special period"--wouldallow time for the mobilization and movement west-ward of at least some of the reinforcements. Mostof the writers assumed that a "period of tension"would last long enough to permit the Warsaw Pactto accomplish some of the buildup uninterrupted.

A number of writers, notably Colonel GeneralPav-lovskiy, cautioned that the period of tensionmight be very short--"counted perhaps only inhours." The leading radical of the debates andspokesman.of the Khrushchev view, Colonel GeneralGastilovich, argued that the strategic nuclearexchange would certainly prevent any significantmobilization and reinforcement but that even so theSoviet forces normally stationed in Central Europe,

TOP-ECRET

with a few East European reinforcements, would beenough to finish the war.

The "short period of tension" is still a vitalingredient in Soviet thinking. Continued referenceto this concept in military writings implies thatthe Soviets--and their allies--seriously doubtwhether they could successfully complete mobiliza-tion and reinforcement if hostilities involving theuse of nuclear weapons should begin without warning.

Khrushchev's axiom that any hostilities betweenthe US and the USSR would inevitably escalate togeneral nuclear war is no longer the sole basis ofSoviet doctrine.. Current Soviet doctrine recognizesthe possibility o nonnuclear canmbat i nvol v;incr theUS and the_USSR.

theSoviets have movedaway rom the rigidity ofthe Khrushchev doctrine,but there is no reason to believe that they expectthey would achieve a decisive military success, suchas the destruction of NATO ground forces and theseizure of West Germany, without nuclear weaponshaving been introduced by NATO.

The command structure, deployment, and readinessstatus of Soviet and East European theater forcesand Soviet and East European military thought asexpressed in writings and statements are indicativeof an essentially defensive military posture oppositeNATO's Central Region. At the same time, Sovietdoctrine emphasizes the need--once hostilities havebegun--to seize the strategic initiative at theearliest possible moment, and Soviet combat unitsare designed for offensive operations.

In order to assemble enough forces to initiate anattack on NATO with a reasonable hope of success, theSoviets and their allies would have to resort to mas-sive mobilization of men and vehicles and large-scaleredeployment of Soviet and Polish forces over longdistances.consistently treat the possibiliity o such a mobiliza-tion and reinforcement as a reaction either to anincrease in international tensions caused by some US

TOFPEr IT ;

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action, or to an outright military attack by NATO,rather than as preparations for an attack. Classi-fied Soviet writings indicate that the Warsaw Pactcountries would not count on being able to masstheir forces in secrecy. They would expect to setoff mobilization on the NATO side, and possibly apre-emptive attack.

Warsaw Pact Contingency Planning

Significant new bodies of evidence are nowavailable which give a clear outline of the mainfeatures of Soviet planning for the contingency ofan attack by NATO, and the manner in which the So-viets intend to employ the main Warsaw Pact forcesin response. Soviet contingency planning clearlydemonstrates that, in Soviet eyes, the overridingmission of the Warsaw Pact general purpose forcesis to maintain Soviet security by defending CentralEurope.

In general terms, the plan which was nrobablyadopted in the early Sixties

envisions that a NATO attack would becontained by Soviet, East German, Polish, andCzechoslovak troops already in place in EasternEurope. These forces would then initiate a counter-attack which would develop into a broad, rapid ad-vance through West Germany and on to the EnglishChannel with a force of five fronts in two echelons.*

* "Echelon" has a special meaning in the Soviet viewof military operations. Soviet doctrine envisageslarge groupings of troops deployed behind the frontline or first echelon units and not engaged in com-bat. This second echelon would be committed onlyafter the first echelon forces had been substantiallyengaged by the enemy. To some extent the secondechelon can be viewed as a reserve, but it is pri-marily a maneuvering force, often with predeterminedobjectives. The Soviet concept of echelons is ap-plicable at all levels, including army, front, andeven theater.

- 50 -TOP YECRET

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it',

' ! ----

The primary offensive missions are evidentlythe responsibility of a "first echelon" comprisedof the Warsaw Pact forces presently deployed inEast Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Asecond echelon comprised of two fronts from thewestern USSR is apparently intended to move up assoon as possible and--along with Soviet forces fromEast Germany--consolidate the Soviet hold on WesternEurope and secure it from Western forces not on thecontinent. (The table on page 32 summarizes themen and weapons in this force.)

Under this plan, a Polish front is to make athrust along the seaward flank; a force composed ofboth the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG)and East German forces is assigned the front rolein the central sector; and forces from Czechoslovakiawould__cons-titute a front__on__the southern_f_lank_.)

a Sovietfront from the Carpat ian region of the Ukraine willconstitute the second echelon in the Czech sector.The five-division Central Group of Forces now prob-ably forms the vanguard of the-Carpathian front in- _

side Czechoslovakia. The.Soviet Belorussian Mili-tary District appears to be designed to perform asa second echelon front behind the GSFG or Polishfront.

The Soviet and East German front--comprising asmany as five combined arms and two tank armies, amassive air army, and other combat and service sup-port units--has the responsibility of destroyingthe main body of.NATO forces in the center.

The front from Czechoslovakia, which may nowinclude the Soviet Central Group of Forces, has themission of advancing as far as the west bank of theRhine in the area rou hly between Mannheim and theSwiss border. the Czechoslovakfront designed or tne mission was composed ofthree combined arms armies, one tactical air army,and assorted combat and service support units.

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The Polish front, of the same general composi-tion but larger in size, probably has an offensivezone of responsibility about one hundred miles wideextending as far west as the English Channel atOstende.

The two fronts from the western USSR are appar-ently intended for commitment after the NATO forceshave been significantly weakened bv_ combat with thefirst echelon fronts. Evidence

suggests that with these fresh forcesrests the responsibility for the final offensive tothe channel coast. The most critical aspect ofthis plan to the Soviets is the need to secure theEuropean theater in an extremely short period oftime--perhaps less than three weeks after the initi-ation of hostilities.

The Warsaw Pact contingency plan for the NATO

Central Region clearly posits a rapid achievementof numerical superiority in maneuver units, tanks,and artillery. With the exception of tanks, suchsuperiority is not maintained in peacetime-. The -

success of the plan would depend in large part onrapid mobilization for most of the rear servicessupport force and even for much of the combat force.

Highly reliable evidence outlines the majorfeatures of the plan for mobilizing Warsaw Pactforces against NATO in the Central Region. The

speed of mobilization of a front apparently is re-lated to the expected timetable for its commitmentto battle. As much as one-third of the Czech andPolish fronts is to be mobilized within three days.Two-thirds of the Carpathian front and all of theBelorussian front are expected to be mobilizing atabout the same time. Apparently only the Sovietforces in Germany are maintained at combat strength.

The Warsaw Pact countries, including the USSR,

evidently intend to begin deploying the ready por-tions of their fronts from the interiors of theircountries before the whole force is completely mo-bilized. The leading elements of the two Sovietfronts from the western USSR are expected to arrivein central Poland and Czechoslovakia within three to

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TOfsL PF

six days after mobilization begins. The Sovietsanticipate that the main elements of these twofronts would participate in combat operations with-in two weeks after mobilization is ordered.

The current plan differs from the previous onein two important respects. First, it shifts partof the burden of maintaining large combat readyforces from the USSR to Poland and Czechoslovakia.Secondly, and perhaps of greater importance, theestablishment of a combat ready Warsaw Pact forcein the forward area partially resolves the dilemmawhich has faced the Soviets since the rearming ofthe West Germans and the formation of NATO: how toprovide a defense of Central Europe with the Sovietforces there until reinforcements could be broughtup some 600 miles from the western USSR. Reinforce-ment is still considered necessary to provide a forcelarge enough to ensure seizing the initiative fromNATO and mounting a counteroffensive.

Possible Variations of the Contingency Plan

If the Soviets were to deliberately initiate afull-scale attack on NATO, they would probably makefundamental changes in their contingency plan. Inthat scheme, the East Europeans provide 60 percentof the first echelon forces. If the.Soviets wereto undertake a deliberate aggression, they wouldprobably not be willing to rely on Poland and EastGermany to furnish a large proportion of the strikingforce. They would certainly not depend on the Czecho-slovak Army, which was seriously demoralized by theSoviet intervention of August 1968 and by the subse-quent purges and manpower reductions. Rather, theSoviets would probably seek to build up a relatively

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TUYF-SDCREJT

large Soviet first echelon force to aim for themain objectives and would probably relegate theCzechoslovak and Polish forces to less importantroles.

The Soviets would probably attempt to completethe mobilization and forward deployment of theBelorussian and Carpathian fronts before initiatingan attack. The main attacks westward could then bemade by mainly Soviet fronts, possibly with Czecho-slovak and East German armies integrated into them.(The lower map on page 51 shows one possible planfor a Soviet attack on NATO.)

The Soviets would have to take into accountthat the massive mobilization and large troop move-ments which such a scheme would necessitate priorto hostilities would greatly increase the likelihoodof early detection by NATO of their reinforcement.They would probably assume that this would. increasethe risk of a pre-emptive NATO attack in which--ifnuclear weapons were employed--forward deploymentwould be severely hampered.

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Soviet Capabilities for Nonnuclear War

The wealth of evidence available, mainly classi-fied military journals and the 1959 and 1962 issuesof the Soviet Field Service Regulations, provides aclear picture of Soviet military thinking and doc-trine up to the mid-Sixties on the probable natureof a war involving the Warsaw Pact and NATO in Europe.The Soviet theater forces which evolved from thisdoctrine were structured to maximize their capabili-ties for general nuclear war, and they appeared tohave serious shortcomings for fighting a conventionalwar, especially a sustained one.

More recent evidence indicates that the Sovietshave modified their views on the likelihood of non-nuclear war in Europe or at least are seriously con-sidering some alternatives to the theory that esca-lation to the general use of nuclear weapons will beautomatic. Indications of changes in thinking, andevidence that some changes are under way in theforces themselves to increase their nonnuclear fire

- ----- support, have -led to a reassessment--of those--aspects--of Soviet capabilities for nonnuclear war on whichdata are available.

Development of Soviet Doctrine and Organizationfor Theater Warfare

From the late Fifties until the mid-Sixties theSoviets visualized a war in Europe as nuclear at theoutset. In accord with this concept, they undertookto shape their theater forces to advance swiftlyacross Western Europe in the aftermath of a nuclearholocaust.

In Soviet thinking, the concept of a quick warobviated the need for extensive service support,andthe nuclear nature of the war and the fluidity ofthe battle required less conventional fire supportfrom artillery and tactical aircraft. Instead ofmassed artillery and infantry, nuclear strikes wereto create gaps in NATO's defenses and destroy NATO'sreserves. Large tank forces would then pass throughthese gaps and advance rapidly through Western Europe,bypassing or encircling any remaining NATO forces.

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Support requirements--after the initial breakthrough--would be limited essentially to those which wouldkeep the tanks rolling--POL supply, engineer support,and limited ammunition supply. The artillery, beingtowed and lacking armor, was poorly suited for thisphase of the campaign but it was mainly intended tohelp reduce initial enemy resistance and supplementthe nuclear fires during the breakthrough phase.Once the tank units had overcome NATO's forward de-fenses, they would presumably rely on their ownnumerous direct fire weapons and on air and missilesupport.

To fit their new concepts, the Soviets acceler-ated' the mechanization and streamlining processunder way since World War II, discarding both theinfantry divisions, which had made up the bulk oftheir theater forces, and much of the massive artil-lery and tactical air support. In their stead, theydesigned a highly mobile force comprised essentiallyof tanks and supported by rockets and missiles withnuclear warheads and tactical aircraft with goodmobility and dispersal characteristics but low pay--load capacities. By the -early Sixties the reorgani-zation was virtually complete and the Soviets andtheir Warsaw Pact allies could assemble over 20,000tanks opposite NATO's Central Region.

Some compromises had been necessary, however.The force had relatively little infantry--althoughall the infantry that was retained was to be mounted.in armored personnel carriers (APCs)--and remarkablylittle combat and logistical support. Current So-viet divisions have roughly the same number of tanksas do US divisions but half as many men, andnondivisional support was- similarly pared down. TheSoviet concept required the motorized infantry tokeep pace with the tanks, but most of the APCsavailable were deficient in mobility and armor pro-tection, and even these were in short supply. TheSoviets evidently had concluded that tanks were theessential ingredient and that a relatively low in-fantry strength was acceptable. Except for unitsalready deployed on the frontiers with NATO, thenewly reorganized ground forces were obliged to relyon mobilization from the civilian economy for most

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of their trucks and much of the manpower needed tomake them ready for combat. Artillery forces werehampered by lack of mobility, firepower, and armorfor protection in a tactical situation.

Recent Changes in Doctrine

By the mid-Sixties this rigid concept of a short,nuclear war was being questioned by a growing numberof Soviet military writers. To a degree, theirrestiveness may have simply reflected the frustrationof practical military planners faced with the intrac-table problems of preparing-to conduct rational mili-tary operations in a nuclear inferno.

But it also reflected discontent with the lackof alternatives inherent in the prevailing doctrine.In a March 1968 Red Star article, no less an author-ity than Col. Gen.. M. Povaliy, planning chief ofthe Soviet General Staff, gave an unprecedentedendorsement to the rationale underlying the USstrategy of flexible response. Under the concept.of flexibleresponse., wrote Povaliy, .a -state-need -not run the risk of nuclear war in every situationinvolving its allies and can pursue its own militaryand political objectives with the least threat toits own security.

Analysis of the military press indicates thatthis "flexible response" concept has evolved intoan acknowledged part of Soviet military doctrineduring the past two years. The view that a futurewar may be conducted either with or without the useof nuclear weapons is no longer contested in themilitary press. On the contrary, strategic forceadvocates who in the past have warned that any con-flict with the West would inevitably and quicklyescalate into a general nuclear war are now arguingthat the new conventional war options exist becauseof the strategic nuclear relationship between theUSSR and the US.

Moving beyond Povaliy's acceptance of flexibleresponse were two more recent articles, both pub-lished in the May 1969 issue of the classified So-viet doctrinal journal Military Thought. These

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articles were by General of the Army S. Ivanov,chief of the General Staff Academy (and Povaliy'spredecessor on the General Staff), and Maj. Gen.Zemskov, chief editor of Military Thought. Accordingto these experts, a "new" world war would only"probably"--not inevitably--be nuclear. They saidthat recognizing the "terrible consequences" ofnuclear war, an aggressor would not lightly intro-duce nuclear weapons without having used "all"other means to achieve his goals. They also recog-nized the possibility of circumstances in whichboth sides would use nuclear weapons but only forlimited objectives--in short, limited nuclear actionsin an otherwise conventional war.

The clearest indication that Soviet thinkinghas gone beyond the talking stage and that some.modification in practice of the strict nuclearwar doctrine has already taken place comes fromWarsaw Pact exercises. In recent years a numberof these have had scenarios which assumed that thewar began with a NATO conventional attack. WarsawPact conventional forces would defeat this attack,

--whereupon-NATO would resort to the use -of tacticalnuclear weapons. Then the Warsaw Pact forces, rein-forced from the USSR and using nuclear weapons, wouldlaunch a counteroffensive that would overrun Europe.Earlier exercises simply depicted an initial nuclearexchange after which surviving Soviet forces achievedvictory.

Recent Changes in Forces

More tangible evidence of Soviet acceptance ofthe possibility of nonnuclear war are changes inthe structure of Soviet forces during the past year.Analysis\

shows thatfield artillery in ine divisions in the Group ofSoviet Forces in Germany (GSFG) has been increasedby 50 percent in motorized rifle divisions and 65percent in tank divisions. These increases haveadded 480 guns to GSFG artillery strength, which nowtotals about 1,600 guns. All but about 450 of theseare light artillery, and all are towed.

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In addition, multiple rocket launchers in eachSoviet division in East Germany have been increasedfrom 12 to 18, with many of them the new 40-tube122mm model. These weapons can deliver large volumesof area fire rapidly, but they are too inaccuratefor use as close support weapons and are vulnerableto enemy action once they disclose their location byfiring.

The artillery reorganization thus far appearsto be largely confined to Soviet divisions inEastern Europe and some of the new divisions on theChinese border. A few artillery units in the westernUSSR may have been up-gunned, but the evidence isstill inconclusive. As new production makes addi-tional artillery available, the Soviets will probablyreorganize all their division artillery along thenew lines.

Previous assessments of Soviet conventional warcapabilities have also identified as weaknesses therelative lightness in infantry, ,the short rangesand small payloads of the tactical aircraft, and

- the small -p-ovision of logistic and maintenancesupport at the division and army level. Most ofthese~result from stressing theater forces organizedfor quick, nuclear war. A change in Soviet doctrineto accept the possibility of sustained conventionalcombat would probably lead eventually to substantialchanges in these areas paralleling the increasesnow under way in artillery and rocket launchers.

Aside from the artillery increases, however,there is no evidence that the Soviets are nowmodifying their ground forces to improve their capa-bilities for sustained nonnuclear war. The tacticalair forces have not increased their conventional warcapability against NATO. The Soviets have virtuallyceased producing Fitter fighter-bombers and Brewerlight bombers for their tactical air forces. Newaircraft under development which have improved capa-bilities for conventional ground support, particularlythe Flogger, will not become available in significantnumbers for several years. The artillery increasesthemselves, although substantial when compared withthe previous holdings, still leave deficiencies in

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Soviet abilities to provide the armored forces withclose and continuous nonnuclear fire support.

Current Soviet Nonnuclear.Capabilities

The cent'ral and inescapable fact of the capa-bility of the Soviet theater forces to wage non-nuclear war is their superiority in numbers of tanks.Even in a nuclear war, Soviet doctrine wouldprescribe--and the current order of battle wouldreadily permit--the concentration of up to 1,500tanks in a breakthrough zone approximately 40 kilo-meters wide. In a nonnuclear situation, the Sovietsmight concentrate that number of tanks on even lessfrontage.

The emphasis on armor has resulted in a remark-ably low ratio of infantry to tanks in the Sovietground forces. Of some 60 Soviet line divisionsprobably available for early use against the NATOCentral Region, about 35 are tank divisions and25 are.motorized rifle divisions. These divisionscontain a total of 130 tank regiments and 110 motor-ized rifle regiments, and each motorized rifle regi-ment has an organic tank battalion of 30 mediumtanks.

In pure numbers, the Soviets and their Polish,East German, and Czechoslovak allies couldassemble 20,000 medium and heavy tanks oppositeNATO's Central Region and back these up with perhaps3,000 more in strategic reserves. This would givethem a superiority in battle tanks over NATO on theorder of 3.5 to 1. By Soviet standards the tankcrews are well trained; although they are probablysomewhat below the standards of US crews because oftheir relative lack of practice with main gun ammu-nition on realistic target ranges.

The Soviet infantry appears to have become thestepchild of the ground forces. Despite the lipservice paid in Soviet literature to "combined arms"doctrine, the Soviets seem to have given priority totanks and tactical nuclear weapons over everythingelse in the ground forces. Infantry has lost out to

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tanks in terms of organization and modernization,and must make do with a higher proportion of ob-solescent equipment and, apparently, a lower levelof peacetime manning.

After reinforcement, the Warsaw Pact forceswould have about 145,000 riflemen--some 10 percentof the total force--giving them an edge of about1.5 to 1 over NATO in numbers, although not inquality. This ratio would be adequate for defensebut would not provide a clear advantage if theforces were used offensively against NATO's superiorsupporting firepower.

The characteristics of their field artillerysuggest that the Soviets still view it as mainlyeffective in relatively static roles such as pre-paratory fires for an initial attack or in defense.In a nonnuclear situation, artillery would play amajor role either in facilitating a breakthrough orblunting an attack--these may have been primaryconsiderations in the Soviet decision to increaseit. In---other- offensive situations such- as pursuit--.or exploitation, the Soviets would probably relymainly on the direct fire of tanks, supplementedby close tactical air support, since the lack ofarmored, self-propelled guns would seriously limitthe ability of the artillery to maintain close sup-port of armored forces in fluid tactical situations.

Soviet field artillery units use relativelyprimitive gunnery techniques and are probably un-able to maneuver and mass fire with the speed,accuracy and flexibility of NATO artillery units.Anal si-s

indi-cates that the bulk of their training involves thedelivery of preplanned fires during coordinatedattacks and that little attention is given topracticing more dynamic roles involving close sup-port of units on the move.

Soviet artillery is substantially lighter incaliber than most of NATO's artillery, although itsrange capabilities are roughly the same. In abso-lute numbers the Warsaw Pact would have about 5,800

guns after reinforcement--roughly twice as manyas NATO. They would also have nearly 1,000 mul-tiple rocket launchers. These latter could delivera large volume of relatively inaccurate area fireand would be especially valuable in a defenseagainst unprotected attacking troops. They wouldbe significantly less effective against the typesof protected targets presented by an organizeddefense.

The evidence available indicates that plannedSoviet supply rates for artillery are only a littlemore than one-third of NATO rates. Consideringthis evidence, the heavier caliber of NATO artil-lery, and NATO's superior gunnery, it appears thatNATO artillery is likely to deliver a greater over-all volume of accurate artillery fire than WarsawPact artillery.

Soviet doctrine calls for extensive use ofsecond echelon and reserve tanks in the indirectfire role in support of breakthrough operations.The guns, ammunition, and fire control of tanks

- are not designed for indirect fire,- however, andconsiderable US experience indicates that attemptsto use tanks as artillery generally yield indif-ferent results. Given a relatively static situationsuch as preparation for attack and with adequatetime for preparing the tanks sand stockpiling highexplosive ammunition, however, the large number ofSoviet tanks likely to be in reserve or secondechelon might augment field artillery fires to asignificant extent.

Flexible employment of the forces would behampered by Soviet reliance on the regiment asthe basic maneuver unit. Soviet doctrine and So-viet practice in exercises indicate that eachregiment--whether motorized rifle or tank--wouldbe assigned a separate combat mission or objec-tive. The Soviets do not practice breaking upregiments in order to form combat teams tailoredfor specific missions and, as a result, Soviettank regiments would customarily go into battlewithout infantry support--a practice which was

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probably considered acceptable or even desirablefor nuclear war, but which is not as applicable tononnuclear war.

The Soviets would usually prefer to use motor-ized rifle divisions and regiments for those missionsinvolving attacks against heavily defended areas orthrough terrain not suitable for tanks. They wouldbe limited in this option, however, by their currentorganizational patterns. In East Germany, for ex-ample, the two Soviet tank armies which are intendedfor primary offensive roles along the main axis havea total of 26 tank regiments and only 13 motorizedrifle regiments. The principal reinforcement forGSFG--the forces of the Belorussian Military District--would add 26 more tank regiments and 13 motorizedrifle regiments, maintaining the high proportion oftank units.

Soviet combat effectiveness would probably alsobe hampered by the fact that tactical doctrine isrigid. The field service regulations are repletewith such expressions as "rapid maneuver" and"independent and enterprising action," but thesesame regulations prescribe the details of opera-tional planning for each of the various types ofmilitary engagements with an excruciating minutenessfar beyond the general principles usually set forthin US manuals. The Soviets have made a fetish ofthe meeting engagement--a surprise encounter betweentwo forces in movement, neither of which is fullydeployed and prepared for combat, which almost in-variably leads to a confused melee with the advantageusually going to the commander with the greatestinitiative--and lay out a sort of set-piece formulafor its conduct.

Such shortcomings have been commented on bitterlyby senior UAR officers, who concluded that Sovietorganization and tactical doctrine were unsuitablefor the conditions the Egyptians faced in the 1967war.

The service support organization at division andarmy level has probably remained essentially unchangedsince the early Sixties when it was reduced substan-tially in an effort to improve mobility. This action

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was reflected in the classified debates with theadvocates of the reduction--led by then Ministerof Defense Malinovskiy--who claimed that the cutshad enhanced the ground forces'capability to main-tain high rates of advance in nuclear war and whoproposed even further reductions. Others such asColonel.General Malykhin, deputy chief of the RearServices, complained that the cuts had alreadydangerously reduced mobile supplies and argued forkeeping the stock levels at least at the then cur-rent levels.

There is no evidence to indicate what servicesupport organization the Soviets would consideradequate for'sustained nonnuclear combat or whetherany increases in logistical capability are planned.Current Soviet logistic capabilities, particularlyfor ammunition supply, are consistent with earliernuclear war doctrine. If rates of ammunition con-sumption in nonnuclear war were to exceed greatlysupply rates planned for a nuclear war, as seemslikely, the Soviets would have difficulty in sus-taining an offensive longer than two or three days.If authorities such as Malykhin considered Sovietlogistical capabilities dangerously deficient fornuclear war, they probably view the prospects ofsupporting a sustained nonnuclear war with thesame organization with some dismay.

Over the years, the Soviet Army has been con-sidered well trained. New evidence, and the re-vised assessment of the peacetime manning levels -

of most of the army, suggest that a re-examinationof that view is necessary.

the training |in a first line Carpathian Military District

division was dull, unimaginative, and generallyslack. Training was seriously curtailed by frequentinterruptions for troop labor details.

If, as now appears to be the case, most Sovietunits have been at half strength or less for atleast the past ten years, the pool of trained re-servists with recent military service is substantially

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smaller than has been supposed. This judgment issupported by the experience of the 31st Tank Divi-sion during the mobilization in May 1968 as art ofthe forces used to threaten Czechoslovakia.

the enlisted reservists who had been earmarkedranged in age up to 42 years. None o them hadreceived refresher training since discharge frommilitary service as long. as 21 years previously,and, in the opinion of the regimental officers, theymade poor soldiers. The reserve officers for theregiment had been called up annually for two weeksof classroom lectures but had no other refreshertraining. The division had never had , mobilizationexercise in the ,six years

The evidence available indicates that, untilthe Czechoslovak crisis, mobilization exercises bydivisions were rare and most enlisted reservistsapparently have had little or no training sincedischarge. US experience suggests that such soldierswould require intensive refresher training to be-qualified -for any except the most unskilled-assign-ments. Soviet divisions, with their low men-to-equipment ratio, require a high proportion ofskilled personnel.

the typical training, regime is long andrigorous but that it contains no more solid militarytraining time than US training. Time is lost tohousekeeping and guard details and to the performanceof troop labor, both on military and civilian con-struction jobs and in support of agriculture.

In summary, the Soviets apparently chose tobuild what can best be described as an army of tanks.They evidently concluded that tank forces--in largenumbers and with nuclear fire support--could suc-cessfully perform virtually all the normal groundforces offensive or defensive tactical roles. TheSoviets appear to believe that such tank-heavy forcescan also meet their requirements for nonnuclear war.

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The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies couldquickly assemble about 20,000 tanks against theNATO Central Region. The Soviets' large superiorityin numbers of tanks would enable them to absorblarge losses in successive assaults in a number ofrather narrow attack zones, wearing down the opposingdefenses while still retaining relative superiorityin numbers. Neutralization of the Soviet tank ad-vantage would leave the Soviets with a relativelymodest capability and no clear overall advantage.Their infantry force, although about 50 percentlarger than NATO's, would be less well trained andequipped and would have inferior conventional firesupport.

Finally, their logistical capability may be solimited, especially at the division and army level,that the Soviets could not maintain the offensivemomentum that their huge tank force was designedto produce. With the loss of this momentum theirforces would become increasingly vulnerable toNATO's superior firepower in tactical aviation' andartillery.

The Soviet View

The Soviets may have a higher opinion of theirconventional war capability than Western intelli-gence. Not surprisingly, Soviet open statementson the ground forces have consistently implied asuperiority over NATO in every respect. AlthoughSoviet classified writings of the early Sixtieswere replete with criticisms of various aspectsof ground force doctrine, organization, and equip-ment, there was no suggestion that any of the authorsdoubted the ability of the Soviet Army to conductoperations without nuclear support. All of thosewriters, however, proceeded from the premise thatwar with NATO would involve some mutual use of nu-clear weapons. Even more recent writings whichargue for flexibility in doctrine do not assessSoviet capability to conduct sustained nonnuclearoperations, and Soviet planners may assume that ina nonnuclear war they would have time to remedywhatever deficiencies exist in the general purposeforces.

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Although there is limited evidence that Sovietthinking has progressed to the point of acceptingthe possibility of a NATO - Warsaw Pact conflict

fought to a decision solely with conventional weap-ons,

e Soviets apparenty do note ieve that NATOwould accept total defeat without resort to allavailable weapons.

Nevertheless, the evidence now indicates thatSoviet thinking has moved some wa from the rigidi-ties of the Khrushchev doctrinel

viet mi itary planners apparently now accept thepossibility that nonnuclear combat between US andSoviet forces might occur and persist for sometime. With this acceptance, they may be consideringthe further possibility that such a conflict couldend without nuclear weapons having been used at all.

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Future Prospects for the Soviet Ground Forces

The Soviets' developing confrontation with Chinahas caused a major shift in their policy toward gen-eral purpose forces. All the implications of thisshift as it affects the future deployment and sizeof the forces are not yet clear, but some of the gen-eral considerations and constraints that will probablyenter into the Soviets' calculations and decisionsand.influence the direction they take are alreadyevident, including the two main factors which appearto affect Soviet planning for the ground forces: theSoviet estimate of the NATO threat and the USSR'sAsian policy, including the prospects for war orpeace with China.

The Soviets probably do not see the overall NATOthreat as increasing. Rather, they probably antici-pate its decrease over the long term. They recognizethat the invasion of Czechoslovakia has delayed thisprocess, but that they were successful in carryingout the intervention and subsequently leaving fiveadditional Soviet divisions in the forward area with-

- out touching off any NATO reaction-probably encouraged-their long-term expectations.

There are abundant signs that as the Soviets' pre-occupation with the China problem has grown, they havebecome increasingly desirous of stability and securityin Europe. The Czechoslovak invasion was probably seenas necessary to preserve this stability. The conductof the Soviets since Czechoslovakia is consistent witha moderate estimate of the NATO threat and a desirefor stability. They almost certainly rate the Czech-oslovak armed forces low in reliability and combat ef-fectiveness, yet they have left them in sole occupa-tion of the western frontier facing NATO. The Sovietshave not taken any steps to increase the size or readi-ness of their reinforcement units in the western USSRto make up for the present deficiencies in Czechoslovakcapabilities.

The contribution made by the East European armedforces and their intended contingency roles are majorconsiderations for the Soviets in establishing therequirements for Soviet forces in the west. A key

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aspect of the Warsaw Pact war plan is its heavydependence on the reliability of East European nations,and on their willingness to march to the Soviet drum.The unresolved Czechoslovak crisis must have raisedserious questions about the fundamental validity ofthe scheme. This does not necessarily mean that theSoviets will discard the plan. To do so would entailsuch profound.changes in the military structure ofthe Warsaw Pact, and such a devastating admission ofthe failure of Soviet policy, that it is probably notfeasible.

More likely, the Soviets will do what they can torestore the status quo ante. They will probably seekto make the Czechoslovak Army a compliant and reliableauxiliary of the Soviet defense establishment again bypurging its leadership and by securing a reliable Czech-oslovak government. They will continue to argue formore integration and closer Soviet control of WarsawPact forces--and will probably get little but lipservice for their pains. They will probably keepsome forces in Czechoslovakia at least until the re-habilitation of the Czechoslovak Army is well underway, but the present force is likely to be reduced inthe next few years.

Analysis of all the available evidence suggeststhat the buildup now under way on the Chinese border,which began in 1965, was probably limited to a forcegoal of about 30 divisions. With this force, whichcould be completed by 1970 at the present rate ofbuildup, the Soviets will have the capability to de-liver a sharp, decisive rebuff to any military initi-ative which the Chinese are likely to be able to under-take within the next several years or to launch a lim-ited offensive at Soviet initiative.

The basis for the buildup was the transfer ofcadre divisions to the border from other regions ofthe USSR. These cadre divisions were then built up

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with additional personnel and equipment, with muchof the additional equipment coming from new produc-tion. If the Soviets should decide to continue theirborder buildup the same approach would probably stillbe available to them for some time. There are addi-tional cadre divisions available, and some 10 to 15of these could be moved and built up to combat strengthby 1973 without any change in the current rate of buildup.

This kind of continued buildup would simply enhancethe capability the Soviets already have without givingthem any significant new capability. They would stillneed massive reinforcement to conduct a full-scale warwith China. Continuing the buildup would interferewith any plans the Soviets have for modernizing andimproving the conventional war capabilities of theirforces opposite NATO. These considerations make ex-tension of the buildup beyond 1970 seem unlikely.

The volatile nature of the current phase of theSino-Soviet confrontation is such, however, that theSoviets may envisage contingencies which would re-quire the rapid deployment of much larger forces intothe Far East. Such requirement could not be metwithout using forces which are currently orientedagainst NATO. This consideration might incline theSoviets toward maintaining the current force levelsin the western USSR with a portion earmarked forAsian contingencies. A plan of this type would befacilitated by a prior buildup of equipment, supplies,and facilities.

The events of the past few years must have sig-nificantly increased the costs of maintaining Sovietground forces. More than 30 divisions, most of whichwere formerly at low strength or in cadre status, arenow being maintained at or developed toward combatstrength along the Sino-Soviet border and in Czecho-slovakia. The cost of equipping and maintainingall the ground forces has risen as new and more com-plex equipment has been introduced. This process isnot complete, and the Soviets must reckon with thedeferred costs of the modernization which has beendelayed by the unscheduled increases in the size ofthe forces.

There appear to be no compelling reasons for theSoviets to increase the size of their ground forces

further or to redeploy existing forces in the nextthree to five years. Their border buildup is prob-ably near completion, although their situation vis-a-vis China will impel them to retain large forces andpossibly to earmark some forces in the western USSRfor Asian contingencies. They apparently do not in-tend to increase their forces opposite NATO as a re-sult of the crisis in reliability brought on by Czech-oslovakia. On the other hand, they probably see fairprospects for a further gradual reduction of tensionsin Europe--perhaps with a possibility of some smallreduction in their forward area forces.

Therefore, while no clear indications of a trendare discernible, and the uncertainty of the Sino-Soviet question 'may bring unexpected changes, it ap-pears likely that the ground forces will stabilizeover the next year or so and may even decline slightlyby 1974. Barring major hostilities in Asia, furthermajor redeployments do not appear likely.

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Conclusions

Warsaw Pact ground forces facing NATO in the Cen-tral Region of Europe consist of a forward force ofabout 50 combat ready Soviet and East European divi-sions. These are intended to be reinforced in anemergency by about 50 divisions, mainly from mili-tary districts in the western USSR.

After mobilization and reinforcement, the War-saw Pact could deploy about 1.3 million men againstthe NATO Central Region. The principal striking ele-ment of this force would consist of some 20,000tanks, supported by tactical missiles and rockets,about 1,800 ground attack and reconnaissance air-craft, and some 5,800 artillery pieces.

The infantry strength of this force would be rel-atively light and would include a large proportionof poorly trained reservists. More than half of theinfantry in this force lacks modern amphibious armoredpersonnel carriers (APCs), and some divisions wouldhave to substitute trucks for APCs.

In a nonnuclear war, the Soviets would attachconsiderable importance to the use of artillery tofacilitate a breakthrough of NATO's defenses. So-viet artillery, even though recently increased, wouldbe limited in effectiveness by inflexible tacticsand outmoded gunnery and by the fact that the gunsare of light caliber and are not self-propelled.The limited amount of logistic support at divisionand army level, and possibly at front level, wouldseriously hinder the ability to conduct prolongednonnuclear combat.

Soviet line divisions are small by US standards,but have about the same number of tanks as similarUS divisions. A combat ready Soviet tank divisionhas about 8,000 men and 2,300 major equipment items,including about 300 tanks. A motorized rifle divi-sion has about 10,000 men and 2,400 major equipmentitems, including about 190 tanks. Most East Europeandivisions are similar to Soviet divisions in sizeand equipment.

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Currently, only the Soviet line divisions inCzechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Polandand part of those on the Chinese border are kept ator near combat strength. Thirty-four other tank andmotorized rifle divisions available for early com-mitment are located in the western USSR--in the Baltic,Belorussian, Carpathian, and Kiev military districts--opposite the NATO Central Region. Of these, abouteight are at reduced strength (i.e., probably mannedat between 50 and 75 percent of combat strength) andeach is short about 600 general purpose vehicles.These divisions can be filled with reservists andmobilized civilian trucks and made ready for move-ment in 24 hours. About 26 are at low strength (i.e.,probably manned at no more than 50 percent) and eachis short between 800 and 1,300 trucks. These divi-sions could probably be made ready for movement inthree to five days.

In addition, there are three cadre divisions inthe western USSR that are probably manned at about10 percent and are short substantial amounts of com-bat equipment as well as most of their trucks. Theseare probably intended --to provide a base--for-long-termmobilization.

The Warsaw Pact is probably capable of mobilizing--calling up, assembling, and forming or integratinginto units--the men and vehicles required to organizefive fronts in Central Europe in about a week if theprocess is not interrupted by hostile military action.Their integration as combat effective units in thetheater of operations, particularly at the front level,probably would require more time.. In an emergencythe mobilization and movement into Central Europe ofthe line divisions and the combat support elementsof the Carpathian and Belorussian fronts could prob-ably be accomplished in two weeks, although some im-portant elements of the army and front rear serviceswould still be incomplete.

In the past two years, the Soviets have beenmoving away from their former doctrine which held

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that any war involving major nuclear powers wouldquickly and inevitably escalate to general nuclearwar. They now appear to accept the possibility thatconflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pac cnuld_beough_solelywith conventional vzeanons_.-

As the Soviets move towardacceptance o the need for the capability to fighta. sustained conventional action, they probably willincrease the amount of combat and service support intheir forces. The recent increase of artillery by50 percent in the Soviet forces in East Germany isprobably the reflection of a developing trend.

The Soviets see their military posture as es-sentially defensive. They and their East Europeanallies maintain sufficient ready forces in the for-ward area opposite NATO's Central Region to guardagainst a surprise attack, and rely on rapid mobili-zation and early movement forward from the westernUSSR to provide sufficient force to launch a counter-offensive against NATO.

This combination of heavy reliance on alliedforces and rapid mobilization capability enables theSoviets to keep their resources in men and equipmentin active units low relative to the total forcewhich can be mobilized. Should they decide to initiatean attack on NATO, however, they would probably needto mobilize and move forward the bulk of their rein-forcement forces from the western USSR. This wouldpermit organization of the initial attack so that Sovietfronts would be immediately available in all sectorsand would reduce dependence on East European troops,whose reliability in an aggression against the West isuncertain.

The Soviets probably do not see the overall NATOthreat as increasing. Rather, they probably antici-pate its decrease over the long term. They recog-nize that the invasion of Czechoslovakia has delayedthis process, but that they were successful in carry-ing out the intervention and subsequently leavingfive additional Soviet divisions in the forward area

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without causing any NATO reaction probably encouragedtheir long-term expectations.

The uncertainty of the Sino-Soviet situation maybring unexpected changes in force levels but, barringmajor hostilities in Asia, further major redeploy-ments do not appear likely and no clear indicationsof a trend are discernible. It appears likely thatthe Soviet ground forces will stablilize over thenext year or so and may begin to decline slightlyby 1974.

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