Report

Intergroup relations and the attribution of emotions: controlover memory for secondary emotions associated with the ingroup

and outgroup

Ruth Gaunt,* Jacques-Philippe Leyens, and St�eephanie Demoulin

Department of Psychology, Catholic University of Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

Received 1 March 2000; received in revised form 7 December 2001

Abstract

This study tested the hypothesis that people perceive their ingroup as experiencing more uniquely human secondary emotions

than the outgroup. Jacoby’s process-dissociation procedure was used to measure participants’ controlled recognition memory for

materials that associated the ingroup or outgroup with secondary or primary emotions. Conscious memory was better for asso-

ciations between the outgroup and secondary emotions than for associations between the ingroup and secondary emotions. No such

difference was found for primary emotions. These results suggest that people attribute more humanity to the ingroup than to the

outgroup. � 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

The tendency for people to prefer their ingroup to anoutgroup is one of the most fundamental and robustphenomena in intergroup relations. Considerable re-search has found that group members exhibit ingroupfavoritsm in a variety of contexts and through differentevaluative and affective responses (e.g., Dovidio, Ga-ertner, & Validzic, 1998; Islam & Hewstone, 1993; seeBrewer & Brown, 1998 for review). We are interested ina unique form of ingroup favoritism, namely the ten-dency to perceive the ingroup as more human than theoutgroup. This form of bias has always been discussedwithin the context of racism and outgroup derogation(Bar-Tal, 1989) or as a predictor of intergroup aggres-sion and moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990; Struch &Schwartz, 1989). We believe, however, that perceptionof the ingroup as more human than the outgroup is acommon feature of intergroup relations that is not re-stricted to extreme cases of intergroup hostility.Leyens et al. (2000) have argued that ‘‘humanity’’ can

be conceptualized as a set of characteristics that differ-entiate humans from non-human species. A preliminarystudy (Demoulin et al., in press) indicated that these

characteristics include intelligence, morality, language,and certain complex emotions. We believe that each ofthese characteristics is necessary, but none of them issufficient, to be perceived as a human being. That is, themembers of a social group must seem intelligent, moral,and capable of experiencing complex emotions in orderto be perceived as human. Such a group will be per-ceived as more human than a group that is highly in-telligent, but lacks emotions, or a group that experiencescomplex emotions, but lacks intelligence. People prob-ably attribute more humanity to their ingroup than theydo to the outgroup (see Leyens et al., 2000). The out-group thus seems to possess fewer of the characteristicsthat are uniquely human.The role of ‘‘humanity’’ in intergroup discrimination

has already received some attention. For example, pre-vious research has demonstrated group discriminationon the basis of intelligence (see Crocker, Major, & Steele,1998 for a review) and language (see Giles & Coupland,1991). The present study focuses on emotions.

Uniquely human emotions

Cross-cultural studies in the US, Belgium, and Spain(Demoulin et al., in press) have shown that some

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 38 (2002) 508–514

www.academicpress.com

Journal ofExperimentalSocial Psychology

*Corresponding author. Present address: Department of Sociology

and Anthropology, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 52900, Israel.

E-mail address: gauntr@mail.biu.ac.il (R. Gaunt).

0022-1031/02/$ - see front matter � 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.

PII: S0022 -1031 (02 )00014-8

emotions are perceived as common to humans and otherspecies, whereas other emotions are perceived as uniqueto human beings. For example, people assume thatemotions such as fear, anger, or surprise are sometimesexperienced by animals, but they do not believe thatanimals experience hope, admiration, or regret. We referto the more complex, human emotions as ‘‘secondaryemotions,’’ and to the more primitive emotions of ani-mals as ‘‘primary emotions.’’ This terminology is bor-rowed from the emotions research domain, whereresearchers distinguish a small set of basic, primaryemotions, from many, more complex emotions (Buck,1999; Ekman, 1992; but see Turner & Ortony, 1992).However, our research focuses on people’s conceptionsof emotions, not on the psychological and biologicalmechanisms that actually produce emotions.An earlier series of studies (Leyens et al., 2001) tested

the hypothesis that people would attribute more sec-ondary (uniquely human) emotions to the ingroup thanto an outgroup. In two studies, participants were pro-vided with lists of primary and secondary emotions andthen asked which of these emotions best representedtheir ingroup and the outgroup. As expected, partici-pants selected more secondary emotions to describetheir ingroup than the outgroup, but no difference wasfound in the number of primary emotions they selectedfor each group. In another study, participants wereshown numbers that supposedly represented levels ofprimary and secondary emotions among ingroup oroutgroup members and then asked to estimate the av-erage level in each group. Again, higher levels of sec-ondary emotions were chosen for the ingroup than forthe outgroup, but the levels of primary emotions did notdiffer between the groups.Although these findings provided preliminary evi-

dence for the tendency to attribute more secondaryemotions to the ingroup, their reliance on relativelyexplicit measures limits the scope of their implications.A considerable amount of research suggests that inter-group biases and discrimination are often based onunconscious perceptions of groups (Banaji, Hardin, &Rothman, 1993; Devine, 1989; Dovidio & Gaertner,1986; Fazio & Dunton, 1997). However, in the studiesby Leyens et al. (2001), the differential allocation ofsecondary emotions to groups could reflect either par-ticipants’ unconscious perceptions of the groups or in-tentional discrimination (participants could haveconsciously allocated more human emotions to theirown group in order to present it in a more favorablelight). Therefore, these findings do not prove that thedifferential attribution of human emotions to groups isindeed deeply rooted in perceptions of groups.To explore this issue, we adopted an implicit measure

of recognition memory for associations between groupsand emotions. Using the process-dissociation procedure(Jacoby, 1991), which will be described in detail shortly,

we looked for unconscious memory processes thatmight reflect people’s beliefs about the ingroup andoutgroup.

Perceived emotions and memory processes

The rationale for testing our hypothesis using amemory task comes from Srull and Wyer’s model ofperson memory (Srull & Wyer, 1989). According to thatmodel, memory is better for inconsistent than consistentinformation about a person. People often try to form acoherent impression of a person, so they must engage inextra processing of any inconsistent information. As aresult, inconsistent information becomes linked to morenodes than consistent information does, and is thusbetter recognized and recalled (see Smith, 1998 for areview, but see also Stangor & McMillan, 1992). Thesame logic probably applies to the perception of groups.People engage in extra processing of information that isinconsistent with their impression of a group.Given our hypothesis that people believe the ingroup

experiences more secondary emotions than does theoutgroup, verbal material that associates the ingroupwith secondary emotions should be consistent with ex-isting beliefs. However, material that associates theoutgroup with secondary emotions should be inconsis-tent with those beliefs. Thus, people should rememberthe latter material better.Because primary emotions are not unique to human

beings, we did not expect people to believe that the in-group and outgroup differ in how often they experiencesuch emotions. Thus, we did not expect to find a dif-ference in memory for materials that associated the in-group and outgroup with primary emotions.

Overview of the present study

A process-dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 1991) wasused to test our hypotheses concerning memory for as-sociations between groups and emotions. This proce-dure consisted of three stages. In the first stage, Belgianparticipants solved anagrams that involved associationsbetween the ingroup (Belgians) or the outgroup (Arabs)and either primary or secondary emotions. In the sec-ond stage, participants listened to a list of similar items.Finally, in the third stage, a recognition memory testwas given. The test included items that were presentedas anagrams in the first stage, items that were heard inthe second stage, and new items that the partici-pants had never encountered. Half of the participantsperformed an inclusion memory test, while the otherhalf performed an exclusion memory test. Instructionsto participants for these two kinds of test were asfollows:

R. Gaunt et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 38 (2002) 508–514 509

Inclusion test

• Respond ‘‘old’’ to items that appeared as anagrams(in the first stage).

• Respond ‘‘old’’ to items that you heard (in the secondstage).

• Respond ‘‘new’’ to items that you have not seen orheard before.

Exclusion test

• Respond ‘‘new’’ to items that appeared as anagrams(in the first stage).

• Respond ‘‘old’’ to items that you heard (in the secondstage).

• Respond ‘‘new’’ to items that you have not seen orheard before.

The critical difference is that participants who per-formed the inclusion test were instructed to respond‘‘old’’ to items that were presented as anagrams in thefirst stage, whereas participants who performed the ex-clusion test were instructed to respond ‘‘new’’ to thoseitems. In the inclusion memory test, better recognitionof such items would be evident in a higher probability ofcalling them ‘‘old.’’ But in the exclusion memory test,participants first had to recognize those items as be-longing to the first stage, and then avoid calling them‘‘old.’’ Thus, better recognition of these items would beevident in a lower probability of calling them ‘‘old.’’Although both of these tests provide a measure of

recognition memory, Jacoby (1991) has argued that onlythe combination of both tests can indicate the degree towhich participants exert intentional memory processing,as opposed to the automatic and unconscious influenceof familiarity. When measuring intentional memory, it isnot enough to examine performance when people aretrying either to use or not to use information from aparticular source. Instead, it is necessary to examineperformance on both tasks. This argument is illustratedby an example that compares people’s control over theirmemory to parents’ control over their children: ‘‘If achild is as likely to engage in an act when told to as whentold not to, the parent has no control. Control cannot bemeasured by only telling a child to or not to engage insome act; rather, control is assessed by the difference inperformance between the two conditions.’’ (Jennings &Jacoby, 1993, p. 285).In Jacoby’s process-dissociation procedure (Jacoby,

1991, 1996; Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993) partici-pants in one condition are required to include certainitems in the ‘‘old’’ category, whereas participants inanother condition are required not to include thoseitems. If participants are as likely to call an item ‘‘old’’when instructed to as when instructed not to, then thatimplies that they have exerted no control over theirrecognition memory. Conversely, the larger the differ-ence in performance between the two conditions, the

more intentional and controlled is the participants’memory.We thus expected that the difference between the

likelihood of calling an outgroup secondary emotionitem ‘‘old’’ in the inclusion condition and in the exclu-sion condition would be larger than the same differencefor ingroup secondary emotion items. We did not expectto find a similar effect for primary emotions.

Method

Participants

Thirty-eight undergraduate psychology students fromthe University of Louvain-la-Neuve participated in theexperiment for course credit. All of the participants wereBelgians, except for one Arab participant, whose datawere discarded from analyses.

Materials

The materials were selected on the basis of a pre-liminary study (Demoulin et al., in press), in which 157emotion words were rated by a total of 500 participants.This study provided data about each emotion’s per-ceived valence and the degree to which it was perceivedas unique to human beings. On the basis of these data, alist of 64 emotion words was selected for use in thepresent experiment. The list consisted of 16 positivesecondary emotions (e.g., hope, admiration, sympathy,and passion), 16 negative secondary emotions (e.g.,humiliation, embarrassment, guilt, and repentance), 16positive primary emotions (e.g., surprise, pleasure, af-fection, and attraction), and 16 negative primary emo-tions (e.g., fear, panic, anger, and fright). Half of thewords in each of these four categories were paired withthe word ‘‘Belgians’’ and the other half were paired withthe word ‘‘Arabs.’’

Stage 1. A set of 32 group-emotion pairs was selectedfrom the complete list. This set consisted of eight pairsfrom each of the four categories. Primary and secondaryemotions were of equal valence. Two versions of this setwere constructed, so that emotion words that werepaired with ‘‘Arabs’’ in one version were paired with‘‘Belgians’’ in the other version. The emotion word ineach pair was then randomly rearranged as an anagramto be solved. Depending on the length of the word, 1–5letters in the anagram were underlined. Those under-lined letters were at their correct position within theword, so that only the remaining letters needed to berearranged to find the solution. This procedure wasadopted in order to equalize the level of difficulty ofanagrams with different lengths and to ensure that eachanagram had only one solution. The remaining lettersin words presented as anagrams were randomly re-

510 R. Gaunt et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 38 (2002) 508–514

arranged. From the 32-pair list presented to participantsin the first stage, the first and last four pairs were buffersfor primacy and recency effects. Those buffers wereconstant across versions and were not included in theanalyses. The rest of the list was presented in a ran-domized order.

Stage 2. A different set of 24 group-emotion pairs wasselected from the complete 64-item list for use in thesecond stage of the experiment. This set consisted of sixpairs from each of the four categories. The list of pairswas then read by a male announcer and recorded on atape with an interval of three seconds between adjacentpairs.

Stage 3. The test list consisted of 60 pairs: 24 pairsthat were presented as anagrams in the first stage; 24pairs that participants heard in the second stage; 8 pairsthat were never presented before; and 4 of the 8 fillersthat were used in the first stage. The four fillers alwaysappeared first; the rest of the list was presented in arandomized order.

Procedure

The experiment was presented to participants as ‘‘astudy of cognitive skills and strategies.’’ They were toldthat they would perform some different tasks, fromwhich the experimenters hoped to learn about people’sstrategies in handling cognitive problems.In the first stage of the experiment, participants were

required to solve anagrams. Pairs of words were pre-sented one at a time on a small sheet of paper. Each pairconsisted of a group label presented in its normal formand an emotion word presented as an anagram. Half ofthe participants were randomly assigned to each of thetwo versions, so that the combinations of emotion wordswith group labels were balanced. Participants were askedto solve each anagram as quickly as possible. The ex-perimenter used a watch to measure the time that wastaken to solve each anagram. The participants were notinformed that their memory would be tested later. Theywere told that some letters in the emotion words wereunderlined to help them solve the anagrams, and thatunderlined letters were in the correct positions within theword. We emphasized that only the letters that were notunderlined needed to be rearranged to solve the ana-grams. Participants’ comprehension of the task wasverified using an example. Once they solved an anagram,participants were required to say the pair of words aloudso the experimenter could record the time. If the pair ofwords was correct, then the experimenter recorded thetime and asked the participant to write down the wordsin the space provided for that on the paper. Otherwise,the participant was informed of the error and allowed tocontinue attempting to solve the anagram.In the second stage of the experiment, pairs of words

were presented by means of a tape recorder. Participants

were instructed to repeat each pair aloud and to mem-orize them for a later memory test.In the final stage of the experiment, a recognition

memory test was given under inclusion or exclusion in-structions. Participants in the inclusion condition weretold to call a pair of words ‘‘old’’ if that pair was pre-viously presented as an anagram in the first stage or washeard on the tape recorder in the second stage. Other-wise, if they had never encountered that pair of wordsbefore, they were told to call it ‘‘new.’’ Participants inthe exclusion condition were told to call a pair of words‘‘old’’ only if they heard it on the tape recorder in thesecond stage. If the pair was presented earlier as ananagram, or if they had never encountered it before,participants were told to call it ‘‘new.’’ In both condi-tions, participants were informed that the test wouldinclude pairs of words that were presented earlier asanagrams, pairs that were heard earlier on the tape, andnew pairs of words. When participants completed thetest, they were probed for suspicion, debriefed, anddismissed.

Results

Participants’ ‘‘old’’ responses to the items presentedas anagrams in the first stage were analyzed in a mixed-factor ANOVA. Condition (Inclusion vs. Exclusion)and Version (List 1 vs. List 2) were the between-partic-ipant factors and Emotion (Primary vs. Secondary),Group (Ingroup vs. Outgroup), and Valence (Positivevs. Negative) were the within-participant factors. In thisANOVA, Condition had a significant main effect,F ð1; 33Þ ¼ 115:89; p < :001. Participants in the Inclu-sion condition correctly called items ‘‘old’’ (M ¼ :647)more often than participants in the Exclusion conditionfalsely called them ‘‘old’’ (M ¼ :217). This verifies thatparticipants correctly understood the instructions andattempted to follow them.1

More important, and as predicted, the only othersignificant effect involved the interaction betweenGroup, Emotion, and Condition, F ð1; 33Þ ¼ 14:86; p <:001. Table 1 shows the mean probabilities of callingitems ‘‘old.’’ These probabilities were computed as thepercentages of items within each cell that participantscalled ‘‘old.’’ For secondary emotions, the differencebetween participants’ performance in the Inclusion andin the Exclusion conditions was larger for the Outgroup(M ¼ :719 vs. M ¼ :175) than for the Ingroup (M ¼ :526

1 If people had unlimited memory ability, or if the task was much

easier, the means for ‘‘old’’ responses in the inclusion and the exclusion

conditions would have been 1.00 and 0.00, respectively. However, this

would make the paradigm unsuitable for our purpose, because we

could not examine variations in memory as a function of the Emotion

and Group manipulations.

R. Gaunt et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 38 (2002) 508–514 511

vs. M ¼ :268), F ð1; 33Þ ¼ 16:10; p < :001. Because thedifference in performance between the Inclusion andExclusion conditions provides a measure for intention-ally controlled memory, this interaction indicates thatparticipants exerted more control over the memory ofoutgroup secondary emotion items than over ingroupsecondary emotion items. For primary emotions, incontrast, the difference between participants’ perfor-mance in the Inclusion and in the Exclusion conditionswas similar for the Outgroup (M ¼ :640 vs. M ¼ :231)and the Ingroup (M ¼ :701 vs. M ¼ :194), F ð1; 33Þ ¼1:20; ns. This confirms our hypothesis that the differen-tial association of groups with emotions is limited tosecondary emotions and does not reflect a general ten-dency to perceive the ingroup as experiencing moreemotions of all kinds.

Discussion

The results showed that associations between the in-group and secondary emotions are more consistent withpeople’s general beliefs about groups, and thus are lessconsciously remembered, than are associations betweenthe outgroup and secondary emotions. In contrast,conscious memory for associations between the ingroupand primary emotions does not differ from memory forassociations between the outgroup and primary emo-tions.These findings strongly suggest that people perceive

members of their ingroup as experiencing more uniquelyhuman emotions than members of the outgroup. Theuse of an implicit recognition memory measure indicatesthat these differential perceptions operate on an un-conscious level of processing and do not stem fromconscious, intentional preferences for the ingroup. Theabsence of differences in the perception of primary,animal-like emotions rules out the alternative explana-tion that people simply attribute more emotions of allkinds to their own groups. That is, people specificallyattribute more human emotions to the ingroup, but at-tribute other emotions to the ingroup and outgroupabout equally. Thus, these findings seem to show a

tendency to perceive the ingroup as more human thanthe outgroup.A few important questions arise concerning the na-

ture of this tendency and its relation to other intergroupbiases. First, does perceiving the ingroup as more hu-man than the outgroup reflect ingroup favoritism bias ora tendency to derogate the outgroup? Brewer (1999)suggested differentiating ingroup favoritism from out-group derogation and argued that discrimination gen-erally stems from relative favoritism toward the ingroup.Indeed, research has shown that increased ingroup fa-voritism is not necessarily accompanied by increasedoutgroup derogation (Brewer, 1979; Mummendey et al.,1992; Turner, 1978), and derogation of the outgroup isrelated to variables other than those related to ingroupfavoritism (Struch & Schwartz, 1989). In our line ofresearch, differential attributions of uniquely humanemotions could either stem from attributing such emo-tions more often to the ingroup or less often to theoutgroup. For example, recent results of ours using theImplicit Association Task (Greenwald, McGhee, &Schwartz, 1998) showed that people associate morestrongly secondary emotions with their ingroup andprimary emotions with the outgroup than vice versa(Paladino et al., 2002). These results do not distinguishstronger association of the ingroup with secondaryemotions from weaker association of the outgroup withsuch emotions. Our current experiment, however, yiel-ded findings that support the former explanation. As-sociations of the ingroup with secondary emotions werestronger than associations of the ingroup with primaryemotions, whereas no such difference was found betweenprimary and secondary emotions for the outgroup. Us-ing primary emotions as a baseline, there was thus in-creased attribution of secondary emotions to theingroup, rather than decreased attribution of secondaryemotions to the outgroup. Ingroup favoritism was thusmore likely to be the source of discrimination in ourexperiment. However, differential attribution of hu-manity could serve as a means of outgroup derogationunder certain circumstances. For example, perceivedintergroup conflict (Duckitt & Mphuthing, 1998), com-petitive search for positive distinctiveness (Mummendey

Table 1

Probability of calling an item ‘‘old’’

Task Stage 1 Stage 2 (old) Stage 3 (new)

Secondary emotions Primary emotions

Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup

Inclusion .719 .526 .640 .701 .585 .236

(.137) (.195) (.237) (.181) (.169) (.131)

Exclusion .175 .268 .231 .194 .666 .291

(.166) (.230) (.222) (.183) (.126) (.201)

Note. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses below the means.

512 R. Gaunt et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 38 (2002) 508–514

& Wenzel, 1999), or perceived threat to the self-image(Fein & Spencer, 1997) could all lead people to look forways to derogate outgroup members. It would be in-teresting to explore whether each of these conditionsalso results in decreased attribution of secondary emo-tions to the outgroup.In what way is differential attribution of humanity

different from other intergroup biases? Ingroup favor-itism has been found in many studies (see Brewer &Brown, 1998), some showing that the mere perception ofdifferent groups triggers intergroup discrimination (Bil-lig & Tajfel, 1973; Brewer, 1979; Gaertner & Insko,2000). In contrast, we speculate that people must firstperceive the outgroup as fundamentally different fromthe ingroup for differential attribution of humanity tooccur. For example, the outgroup should be perceived asholding different values (Struch & Schwartz, 1989), orpossessing a different essence (see Haslam, Rothschild,& Ernst, 2000; Miller & Prentice, 1999; Rothbart &Taylor, 1992; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997). Al-though ingroup favoritism occurs for similar groups,and may even increase with similarity (e.g., Brown &Abrams, 1986; Diehl, 1988; Roccas & Schwartz, 1993),differential attributions of humanity may only occurunder conditions of perceived initial difference. Furtherresearch should explore this issue more carefully. Spe-cifically, manipulation of perceived intergroup differenceis needed to show that differential attribution of sec-ondary emotions occurs only when the outgroup isperceived as fundamentally different than the ingroup,whereas other intergroup biases occur also under con-ditions of similarity.Finally, what are the consequences of perceiving the

ingroup as more human than the outgroup? Member-ship in the human category is generally conceived as theappropriate boundary for morality and considerationsof fairness (Opotow, 1990). People who are perceived asmembers of this category are treated more or lessequally, while others are morally excluded. Thus, at-tributing less humanity to the outgroup has importantimplications for behavior toward outgroup membersand for considerations of fairness and moral treatment.If outgroup members do not experience the same com-plex emotions that we do, then we may come to believethat harming them does not result in the same negativeconsequences as harming ingroup members.

Acknowledgments

This research was supported by Grant ARC 96/01.198 of the Communaut�ee franc�aise de Belgique. Wethank Magdalena Mozdzierz for her assistance in col-lecting data. We are grateful to Olivier Corneille for hisinvaluable comments and thoughtful advice on variousstages of this project.

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