internal security challenges

7/27/2019 Internal Security Challenges

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INDIA’S INTERNAL SECURITY CHALLENGES: NEW FRONTIERS

“ Arrows may not kill a soldier but skillful intrigue can kill even those in the womb.”Kautilya in Arthshastra

The whole of South Asia- India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Pakistan-

is going through internal unrest and upheavals due to insurgency movements, ethnic

conflicts and religious fundamentalism. Such unrests have a history of crossing national

boundaries and leading to inter-state tensions. With regard to India, the unrest is

brewing in Indo Nepal border and Indo Bangladesh border. The situation has become

grave owing to the development in the chicken neck area i.e the area in and around

Siliguri (West Bengal), Assam and the border areas of J harkhand ,Chhattisgarh ,Andhra

Pradesh and West Bengal.

Geo-politically, India has become a cauldron of merging insurgent movements which has

developed internal networks which can create horrendous logistical repercussions .On

the other hand, India has special ties with each of her neighbours–of ethnicity, language,

culture, common historical experience, or of shared access to and dependence upon

vital natural resources – of a character and to a degree of intensity that is not shared by

any two others. Although India does not have serious territorial security problem with

neighbours other than Pakistan, there are issues like the Indian secessionist groups

using their territory as sanctuaries, trans-border immigration, gunrunning and narcotics,

which affect the country’s security. The neighborly unrests, therefore, have special

significance and implications for India.

At tr ibutes of Internal Secur ity

Secure territory

Prevalence of peace and order

Freedom for people

Rule of law – law must protect everyone irrespective of status and equality

Growth through equity - -egalitarian growth - prosperity for all

Visible egalitarianism

Unity in plurality

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Internal Securi ty Challenges

Terrorism / Militancy

Left wing extremism

Communal divide – it can divide us and even lead to fragmentations of nation

Caste and ethnic tensions

Organised crimes

Forged Indian currency notes

Coastal security

Cyber crime

Mushroom growth of Madrasas and religious fundamentalism [growth of deobandis /

Qaumi Madrasas along Indo-Bangladesh border] they are not recognised by

government.

Illegal immigration, 12.5 lakh Bangladeshis have not gone back,entered India and

staying illegally. Reduction in illegal migration, though it is going on through West

Bengal.

Narcotics trade – smuggling and trafficking – unproductive lifestyle of people.

Hawala transfers(illegal money transfers)

Reasons for Internal Security Problems

Unfriendly neighbour

Weak state structure – poor governance

Abject poverty in large numbers – because of deforestation, sustenance has

decreased

Political insecurity – secessionism, revolutionary movements

Polarisation of society

Hardening class barriers – haves and have nots

Drug trafficking and arms smuggling

Rise in intolerance and fundamentalism [despite rise of literacy, intolerance is

increasing]

Tentacles of Terrorism (External Influences)

Al Qaeda

J amat-e-Islami, Ahle Hadith, J amal-Ul –Ulema-Islami etc.

Hijbul Mujahideen, J aish-e-Mohamad, Al Badar., Al-Umar, all groups (1200 approx).

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United liberation Front of Asom(ULFA) and terrorist networks in Bangladesh

Some specific issues that are faced in the country are:

Problems of national assimilation and integration particularly of Border States in theNorth East.

Porous borders with Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka which

enable illegal trans-border movements and smuggling of weapons and drugs. These

days AK rifles, machine guns, rocket propelled grenades, land mines, RDX, even

shoulder fired surface to air missiles are easily available in our neighborhood.

Weak governance including law and order machinery and large-scale corruption.

Nexus between crime, insurgency and politics.

The internal security has become a cause for serious concern for those in the national

security apparatus. The Indian map below shows the extent and spread of terrorist and

leftist insurgents.

Source :South Asia Terrorism Portal,New Delhi

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India - Insurgent and Extremist Groups

In India few of the extremist groups including that of the naxalites/Maoists have slowly

started to assert themselves in threatening the internal security apparatus of India which

are given in the map above and the details are as follows:

Assam

United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)

National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)

United People’s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS)

Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO)

Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF)

Dima Halim Daogah (DHD)

Karbi National Volunteers (KNV)

Rabha National Security Force (RNSF)

Koch-Rajbongshi Liberation Organisation (KRLO)

Hmar People’s Convention – Democracy (HPCD)

Manipur

United National Liberation Front (UNLF)

People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)

National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM)

Hmar People’s Convention- Democracy (HPCD)

Meghalaya

Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC)

Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC)

People’s Liberation Front of Meghalaya (PLFM)

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Nagaland

National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isaac Muivah)(NSCN-IM)

National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang)(NSCN-K)

Tripura

National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)

All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)

Tripura Liberation Organisation Front (TLOF)

United Bengali liberation Front (UBLF)

Mizoram

Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF)

Hmar People’s Convention –Democracy (HPC-D)

Arunanchal Pradesh

Arunanchal Dragon Force (ADF)

Left Wing Extremist Groups

People’s Guerrilla Army

People’s War Group(PWG)

Maoist Communist Centre(merged with PWG to form CPI-Maoist)

Communist Party of India -Maoist (CPI-Maoist)

Communist Party of India (Marxist –Leninist) J anshakti

Other Extremist Groups

Akhil Bharat Nepali Ekta Samaj (ABNES)

Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)

Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) Ranvir Sena

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The major threat to India's internal security apart from terrorism is from Naxalism.The

movement which started from Naxalbari in 1967 has assumed very sinister proportions.

One hundred fifty nine districts spread in 13 States are under the evil influence of this

violent creed. Forty, big and small groups, including the two major ones--People's War

Group and Maoist Communist Centre,(which have merged together in 2004 to form

Communist Party of India –Maoist) are active in the different parts of the country. In fact

the danger to the internal security of the country has grown manifold in view of the fact

that Maoist groups active in Nepal and Bangladesh are working in tandem with other

Maoist formulation and global groups such of LiberationTigers of Tamil Ealam(LTTE)

and Lashkar-e-Toiba(terrorist group operating in Kashmir ). During the last one year,

these Naxalites have gone out of control and berserk. During the last one month 24

security men have lost their lives in different states of India . It only underlines the ugly

reality that the menace of Naxalites is increasingly assuming dangerous proposition.

In a way if one analyses the spread of extreme leftist forces then there are startling facts

about the area of spread and the immense logistical support that the extremists have

developed .In this case a selective state wise analysis would be stressing on the new

emerging areas.

Orissa

On May 27, 2005 the Maoists in Orissa went on rampage and killed three villagers and

injured several others in the Burda village under J ujumura police station. Prior to this theMaoist activities were only confined to abductions followed by ransom. The incident

came as a shock as the Maoists generally target the police, forest officials, contractors

and other businessmen.

This incident has been considered important with regard to the course of Naxal growth in

the underdeveloped and tribal dominated Western Orissa. The timing of the incident

speaks in volumes about the greater aims and ambitions of Naxals in the region. The

incident came barely after nine hours of an important meeting of high-level police officers

held at Sambalpur district headquarter to discuss problems related to the Left wing

extremism in the area. It clearly signals the Naxal game plan of defying the Government

and creating an environment of terror and suspicion. For long Naxal activities in Western

Orissa was considered as a spill-over from J harkhand. However, things have changed

for worse and now the Maoists have created a red corridor from the Sarnda forest of

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J harkhand to Rairakhol forest in Orissa. Earlier it was confined to some parts of

Sundargarh, Keonjhar and Mayurbhanj but now the Maoists have managed to put their

foot in different parts of Sambalpur, J harsuguda, Deogarh and Anugul. The successes of

all counter measures in these areas need a proper coordination among the officials of

Orissa and J harkhand. They must devise a sort of joint strategy to fight the Maoist

threat, but this is what seems to be lacking. So far it has been alleged several times that

in the name of anti-Naxal operations, the J harkhand police harassed the residents of

bordering villages of Orissa. This has been a constant cause of worry for the local

populace, which is being successfully exploited by the Naxals in their favour.

Over last three years the Naxals have strengthened their position in the tribal districts of

Orissa. With their activities the Naxals have managed to spread the message of terror

among the innocent villagers of the area. In this situation it is the foremost duty of the

police and administration to restore the confidence among the local people. And for this

the police have to act real fast and definitely tough. It is very much necessary to

strengthen intelligence gathering system of police and equally important is also the

modernization of the police force. So far the Maoists are banking on the support of the

local tribal and poor rural people.

Punjab

The bomb blasts in Delhi last year at two cinema halls on May 22 show a trend of

desperation within the residual Babbar Khalsa International (BKI) elements who either

are attempting to come over ground or to flee the country. Arguably, it is due to constant

international pressure on Pakistan and its intelligence agency Inter Services Intelligence

(ISI), border fencing, deployment of Special Forces in Indo-Pak borders particularly in

Rajasthan, Gujarat and Punjab, strict vigil at Indo-Nepal check posts, and choking of

arms and drug routes, has forced the left out Punjab militants to reconsider their decision

to execute ISI instructions.

In the last seven months a total of 35 alleged BKI members have been arrested,

including four women cadres. The three BKI militants J agtar Singh Hawara, J agtar Singh

Tara and Paramjit Singh Beora, who were facing trial for killing the former Chief Minister

of Punjab, Beant Singh, had escaped from the high security Burail jail on J anuary 25,

2005 and reportedly fled to Pakistan. Reports too indicated that 13 of the 18 ‘wanted’

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a Hawala operator on his way to Nepal. He had also maintained contact with members

of the organisation in Germany.

Interrogation reports of the arrested cadres indicate that Punjab militants are under

constant pressure from the ISI to produce results and revive terrorism in the State.

Despite lack of public support to militancy, periodic efforts are made by terrorist

coordinators within the country and abroad to rope in their old associates and those

released from jails and family members of slain militants. Apart from BKI, other Khalistan

militant outfits like ISYF-Rode with Kama Ghata Maru Dal of Harmit Bhakna, a Germany

based terrorist outfit, Khalistan Zindabad Force (KZF), headed by Ranjit Singh Neeta,

Khalistan Commando Force (KCF) - Panjar, Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF) and Dal

Khalsa International (DKI), have been making effort to revive militancy in the State.

Further, the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) has been making efforts during the last couple of

years to create bases in Ludhiana, J alandhar, and Pathaankot and Udhampur areas in

J ammu and Kashmir. There are reports that the Punjab militants have so far maintained

close association with the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Al Burq and J ammu Kashmir Islamic

Front (J KIF).

Presently, the BKI is more or less active in the USA, Canada and the UK along with

other European countries like Germany, France, Belgium, Norway, Switzerland and

neighboring Pakistan.

Andhra Pradesh

After the breakdown of peace talks in J anuary 17, 2005, the state has been reeling

under the heat of Naxal violence. Since J anuary last year, there are approximately 254

deaths, including 108 Naxalites, 16 policemen and 130 civilians and political activists.

The YSR Rajsekhar Reddy government in Andhra Pradesh re-imposed the ban on the

Communist Party of India (Maoist) along with its seven frontal organisations on August

17,2005. The other banned organisations: the CPI (Maoist), the Radical Youth League,the Rythu Coolie Sangham, the Radical Student’s Union, the Singareni Karmika

Samakhya, the Viplava Karmika Samakhya, the All India Revolutionary Student’s

Federation and the Revolutionary Writers Association. The ban came as an immediate

fall out of the outrageous killing of Congress legislator Chittem Narsi Reddy and eight

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others by an action team of Naxals at Narayanpet in Mahbubnagar district on

Independence Day last year.

The YSR government could not escape the blame game for recent spurt of violence in

the state because it allegedly took the help of the Naxalites to come to power. Even in

J uly 2004, the YSR government had extended an invitation to the Naxals to come to the

negotiating table ignoring the ground situation. It rolled back anti-Naxal operations and

lifted the ban over them to open talks, unfortunately without much preparation. The

government made the biggest blunder for it gave primary importance to electoral issues

over the national security issues. However, it was more of a fairytale, away from the

reality as both the sides were not at all sincere when they came to the negotiating table.

As there was no agenda, the talks went nowhere. In fact during the peace talks the

Naxals got the much-sought publicity at government’s cost by organising rallies and

village meetings.

Ironically, this was the third time that the ban has been imposed on Naxals. On May 21,

1992, for the first time, the then Congress government had outlawed the erstwhile

People's War Group and its frontal organisations. This followed the killing of a former

minister T Hayagreeva Chary, who was a close aide of former Prime Minister P V

Narasimha Rao. However, during 1995, the then Telugu Desam government led by N T

Rama Rao had relaxed the ban on the People's War and its frontal outfits. The ban was

re-imposed by the Chandrababu Naidu government in July 1996, subsequently; the TDP

government renewed the ban every year.

The ban on the CPI (Maoist) and its frontal organisations is bound to have serious

implications. More than 1700 villages in North Telangana have been classified as Naxal-

affected. The state must prepare itself to witness desperate Naxal attacks in the days to

come, particularly in the districts of Adilabad, Nizamabad, Karimnagar, Warangal,

Mahbubnagar and Khammam, which have now become guerilla zones.

Immediately after the re-imposition of ban, the Naxal spokesperson J anardan sounded

the Naxal game plan. “There will be no peace zone in the state. We will attack wherever

and whoever possible.” As expected the Naxal groups have started coming together in

responding to the ban immediately. The Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist)

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J anashakti (Ramachandran faction) and CPI-ML Pratighatana have merged to form the

new organization -- CPI (ML) that has been headed by K Ramachandran.

Chhattisgarh

Since J anuary 2004, the Naxalites have triggered more than 220 landmine blasts and as

many as 104 landmines were recovered and defused. The non-tarred roads of the state

are another handicap coming in the way of police, making them more vulnerable to

landmine and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks.

Arguably, the Naxal violence has sharply increased in the state of Chhattisgarh after the

formation of Communist Party of India (Maoist). The violence has been characterised by

J an Adalats, targeted attacks on police, police informers, ruling political class and tribal

who are engaged in anti Naxalite movement in Bastar region particularly in Salva

Zudoom (Peace initiative). The Naxals are known to be active in 9 districts out of 16

districts in Chhattishgarh and Bastar region––comprising Dantewada, Kanker and Bastar

and the adjoining Gadchiroli district of Maharashtra. In fact, the Naxals have named the

area as ’Abuz Marh’ (the unknown hill’), made Bastar their home and are controlling their

activities from their base in the nearly impregnable Dandakaranya forest. The Naxal

leadership claims that the entire Bastar region is a ‘liberated zone’, where the rebels are

in a dominant position.

The so-called movement by the Naxals in the state has become a serious problem with

regard to the development of the state. As the Naxals have established their control over

the areas, which are rich in mines and minerals, development works have become

standstill in Dantewada, Kanker, Bastar, Kawardha, Balrampur, Sarguja and other

Naxal-infested districts of the state. The problem is not only affecting economic activities

in the state but also forcing it to adopt an imbalanced model of growth because of the

presence of Naxalites in a majority of the mineral-rich pockets of Chhattisgarh.

Tackling the rising Naxal violence has become a formidable challenge for the stateadministration in all Naxal-affected districts. As of now they have equipped themselves

with sophisticated Kalashnikov rifles, wireless sets and remote control devices. In the

face of eternally ill equipped state security force, the Naxals have established people's

governance and virtually have their own administration in areas which they call 'liberated

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zone'. They issue vehicle passes and charge taxes from people for using the roads or

staying or doing businesses.

In view of the excessive Naxal violence the government really needs to rethink its

strategy over the whole issue. The Singh government has so far formed 139 village

defense committees, to take along the people of the state in dealing with Naxals. The

state government has also launched a counter revolutionary movement in the name of

J an Jagran Abhiyan to spread awareness among people about the ill effects of Naxal

Movement in the state. The unprecedented tribal support for Salva Zudoom, has really

put the extremists on the back foot. On the other hand, the state sponsored J an J agran

Abhiyan is being regarded as instrumental for restoring the confidence among people.

The government must not allow these developments to go in vain rather it should use

them to push forward the agenda of bringing an end to decade old left-wing extremism.

The recent Padeda incident(in which about six poliemen were killed in landmine blast)

even shook the Union Home Ministry, only to carry a comprehensive review of the

situations in Chhattisgarh. The state cabinet already recommended for a ban on Naxal

activities in the state, trying to bring an ordinance to curb any organisation or group of

individuals involved in illegal activities or terrorist activities in the state.

Jharkhand

In the case of J harkhand ,the areas of operations for naxalism ahs been majorly in the

singhbhum ,Hazaribagh,Gaya ,Dhanbad and the coal belt .The acts of Naxalites

/Maoists in the area has been aimed primarily to counter the upper caste Ranvir Sena

and to extend their area of influence.The extension of their zone extended upto north of

Bihar namely districts of Araria,J ogbani and few pockets close to the Nepal border.This

increase in operational area has given a continuity as well as link to the Nepal Maoists

which is discussed in the subsequent section.

Assam

There are frantic calls to the people of Assam to throw out illegal Bangladeshis from the

state. The result, thousands of illegal Bangladeshi migrants have left Dibrugarh, J orhat,

Golaghat and a few other areas in Upper Assam during the last year. What triggered this

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exodus was the deadline imposed by an obscure student body, the Chiring Chapori

Yuva Morcha (CCYM), formed on April 12 last year.

This student group had asked Dibrugarh denizens not to provide the Bangladeshis with

jobs, food and shelter. It had set a deadline of May 7 for the Bangladeshis to leave.

According to the Morcha members, they had to take recourse to drastic measures as

they were fed up of the dilly-dally tactics of the government. With the passing of the

deadline, hundreds of these illegal migrants trooped out of Dibrugarh. The Dibrugrah

example was also enacted in few other towns of Assam. The police also could not take

any action against the members of this outfit as there was no complaint about physical

force being used against anyone. It used the Internet and innocuous mobile messaging

to good effect passing the note around. It remains to be seen if this sort of phenomena

spreads to other areas of Assam and if possible, neighboring States. A similar kind of

situation was witnessed recently in coastal Orissa, for the record.

Assam for long has been facing the problem of illegal migration from Bangladesh due to

its physical proximity. India has fenced parts of the 4,000-km (2,500-mile) border with

Bangladesh, but officials say this has done little to deter migrants bent on leaving one of

the world's poorest countries. Assam shares a 272 km (169 mile) porous border with

Bangladesh, a vast stretch of which is unfenced. Assam’s border with Bangladesh is

largely porous and even in the fenced areas it is alleged that the BSF personnel on duty

allow the illegal migrants to enter Assam in lieu of money. The tragedy of Assam is that

the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunal) Act, IMDT is prevalent whereas in all

other parts of the country the Foreigners Act is applicable to deal with these illegal

migrants. Over two years ago, the government estimated there could be up to 20 million

illegal Bangladeshi immigrants in India, and labeled some of them a security risk.

One of the ludicrous provisions of the IMDT Act is that the onus of proving that a suspect

is an illegal migrant lies on the complainant. Little wonder that there has been very littledetection under this Act. It was the illegal migrant issue that led to the Assam Agitation in

which hundreds of Assamese were martyred. The agitation ended with the signing of the

Assam Accord on 15th August 1985 between the AASU (All Assam Students’ Union),

the AAGSP (All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad) and the then Prime Minister Rajiv

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Gandhi. The vote bank politics have ensured that the Bangladeshis have a free run in

Assam.

The exodus of Bangladeshis from Assam had already taken near international

dimension with Bangladesh threatening to seek United Nations Human Commission for

Refugee’s (UNHCR) intervention.

Always in a denial, Indian Agencies refuted claims of mass exodus and observers

suspected that this development could be exploited by Bangladesh to neutralize the

adverse fallout of the border skirmishes. The State government has deputed some

ministers to assess the situation and has asked the Home Department to prepare a

report. The Government has decided not to take any action against the persons involved

in the anti-Bangladeshi campaign.

Undoubtedly, Assam is sitting on a powder-keg waiting to explode anytime. Whether this

"save the nation, save identity” cry help the already fragile Assam or not, the issue has

become a political hot-potato nobody wants to touch. The various parties are skirting the

issue so as not to be seen taking sides. Something has to done to address the issue of

illegal migrants in Assam which is all set to alter the demography of Assam. In

November 2003, it was between students of Bihar and Assamese and now, the grudge

against Bangladeshis.

.

Uttar Pradesh

The growing influence of the newly formed Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M),

the Naxal outfit, along the Uttar Pradesh's (UP) eastern borders and the rapidity with

which they are expanding their organisation in the State is undoubtedly alarming. Naxals

are looking to the State for fresh bases where they can build a formidable organisation.

The inaccessible hilly terrain and dense forests of the state provide perfect cover for the

Naxalites, who use their own maps to move around. On November 20, 2004 the Naxalite

had ambushed a police party and shot dead at least twenty policemen near a culvert inChandauli district of UP. The incident happened when Policemen and Provincial Armed

Constabulary (PAC) personnel were proceeding on a combing duty in Naugarh police

station area.This was the assertion of their presence in the state after a long time.

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The Naxalites are active in the eastern part of the state since 1969. The then Chief

Minister of Uttar Pradesh C B Gupta accepting their presence in different parts of the

state, attributed their activities to the irregularities and injustices committed by some

village headmen in the distribution of land. Although the government realised it as a

socio-economic problem, it treated the issue as a law and order problem by deploying

Pradesh Armed Constabulary (PAC) squad in Laxmipur district to curb the activities of

Naxals. However, his successors neglected the Naxalite issue and followed a policy of

non-interference.

The incident of November 20 was first major attack on security forces in India after the

merger of two dreaded left wing extremist outfits, the Maoist Communist Center (MCC)

and the People’s War Group (PWG). In Uttar Pradesh the Naxalites have influence over

Mirzapur, Chandauli and Sonebhadra districts while Gorakhpur, Ghazipur and Ballia are

targeted as potential districts to be brought under its influence. At least seven districts of

the state are connected to Maoist affected regions of Nepal and another seven with

Bihar. In addition, border districts of UP are also emerging as safe haven for Maoists

from Nepal. The increasing pressure form the Nepalese army has forced the Nepalese

Maoists to sneak into UP, Uttaranchal, West Bengal and Bihar for respite. On October

3,2005 the Special Task Force of the Bihar police had busted a crucial erstwhile MCC

link with the arrest of nine suspected extremists during three raids. At least two of the

rebels were from adjoining districts of UP. In August this year too the Uttaranchal police

had arrested five suspected Nepalese Maoist sympathizers in Saufutia forests of Udham

Singh Nagar district.

Recent intelligence sources indicated a strong Nepalese Maoist-Naxalite nexus that has

emerged in the region as a serious threat to the internal security of India as a whole and

in particular to five states— UP, Bihar, Uttaranchal, West Bengal and Sikkim. These

states are connected to the Himalayan kingdom along the 1751 km border. It is

observed that there has been regular exchange of men and material between theMaoists in Nepal and Naxalite outfits in India.

Nepal-India Border

According to available information, the Maoists of Nepal have well-established linkages

with India’s left-wing extremist organizations, primarily with the People’s War group

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(PWG) and Maoist Communist Center (MCC). The first signs of contacts were reportedly

registered during 1989-1990 when the two groups started collaborating in order to

expand their influence. Towards this end, began the process of laying a corridor, which

is now widely referred to as the Revolutionary Corridor (RC) extending from Nepal to

across six Indian states, including Bihar, Chhattisgarh, J harkhand, Andhra Pradesh,

Orissa and Madhya Pradesh. The Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ) was organized by

Nepal and Indian members of Naxalite (the popular term for left-wing extremism in India

– the movement originated in Naxalbari ([hence the term Naxal] in the State of West

Bengal in the late 1960s) , meeting at Siliguri in the Indian State of West Bengal during

August 2001. The interaction between Maoist insurgents and the PWG increased with

the sharing knowledge about guerilla warfare, bomb manufacturing techniques and arms

training. Nepal Maoists had sent their delegates to the March 2001 Congress of PWG

held at Abuz Marh in Bastar region of Chhattisgarh. The establishment of CRZ gave a

wider space and platform for all proscribed Nepal and Indian left-wing extremist

organization to strengthen their bases in both countries. Maoists and the PWG have also

formed the India –Nepal Border Region Committee to coordinate their activities in North

Bihar and along the India – Nepal border. A careful examination of expansion of Naxalite

activity in Bihar in the last two years would reveal that growing linkages between the

MCC and the Nepal Maoists are part of their larger strategy to create ‘Compact

Revolutionary Zone’ stretching across Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, J harkhand, and

Bihar to Nepal. The porous Bihar- Nepal border, the general breakdown of rule of law,

poor governance incapacity of the police force provides a context for these left extremist

groups with ease. Reports of April 2000 indicate that the MCC and Maoists were holding

joint training camps in Hazaribagh and Aurangabad. The porous Bihar – Nepal border is

easily permeable. Bihar has eight districts and 54 police stations situated on the border.

In the recent past, the Bihar police have arrested a number of Nepalese Maoists in the

border districts of West and East Champaran, Sitamarhi, Sheohar and Madhubani.

Taking advantage of a general breakdown of law and order, the Nepalese Maoists have

reportedly up bases at several places along the border. Reports indicate the existence of training camps in the forests of Bagha in the West Champaran district, which has

immersed as a safe haven for the Nepalese insurgents. The Bihar police also suspect

that some top leaders of the Nepalese Maoists including Baburam Bhattarai, were /are

hiding in Bihar. Maoists, with the help of Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), have

been attempting to establish links with Naxalite groups such as the PWG and the MCC

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by using the Siliguri corridor in West Bengal. Darjeeling and Siliguri are the important

transit routes. They are in a process consolidating their presence in West Midnapore

district, Bankura and Purulia especially in North Bengal with the help of Kamtapur

Liberation Organisation (KLO). There is also some reportage about the Nepalese

Maoists’ links with insurgent groups active in India North- east like United Liberation

Front of Asom (ULFA), Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), Gurkha National

Liberation Front (GNLF) and Gurkha Liberation Organisation (GLO).

While Nepal is rapidly moving towards another bloodier phase of internecine war,

neighboring countries – China in the north, India in the south and Pakistan fishing from

its own troubled water are beginning to take an interest. Apart from that Inter Services

Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan also help foreign Islamic militants to cross over to India

through the porous Indo-Nepal borders. Reports indicated that the ISI is also supplying

arms to Maoists through militant outfits operating in the northeast region of India. The

relationship further deteriorated when New Delhi halted arms supplies to Nepal and has

subsequently hosted the meetings between Maoists and seven political parties in

November 2005. Nepal’s anger at India’s hosting of the meeting between Maoists and

several political parties was clearly visible. While the king is not satisfied with India’s

support of political parties and Maoists, certain cross-border connection of the Maoists

had posed an even greater threat to India. In a joint statement on September 1, 2004,

senior leaders of the CPN-Maoists of Nepal and CPI-Maoist of India declared that “…

Maoist parties solemnly appeal to the entire oppressed masses, the world over, and

Nepal and India in particular, to raise their voices against every evil design of

imperialism and expansionism to repress the revolutionary cause of the oppressed

people in Nepal & India… we pledge to fight united till all conspiracies hatched by the

imperialists and reactionaries are crushed and the people’s cause of Socialism and

Communism are established in Nepal, India and all over the world”. There is a strong

link between the Indian and Nepalese Maoists. The Nepalese Maoists are mostly trained

and educated in India. Intelligence sources indicated that the erstwhile MaoistCommunist Center (MCC) of India cadres at the J humra hills and Saranda forests of

J harkhand are training the Nepalese Maoists. The CPN- Maoist has long maintained that

unless the Maoists of the South Asia region work together to counter India’s ‘pernicious

role’, ‘final victory’ would elude them. The 1,751-kilometre Indo-Nepal border is porous

17



and the problem of monitoring has become grave with the rise of left extremist in those

areas.

Indo –Bangladesh Border

Geography is certainly part of the problem, and the countries share a 4,095 kilometre

border, with some pockets remaining un-demarcated, though agreements for the

resolution of all issues on the border have long been in existence on paper. Tripura - the

Indian State where the Akhaura incident occurred (one Paramilitary officer was

abducted and killed by Bangladesh security personnel) - for instance, has a 856

kilometre long border with Bangladesh, of which just 200 kilometres has been fenced.

However, barring 6.5 kilometres, the rest of the border is well demarcated. However,

fencing has progressed slowly, despite a long-standing Indian mandate to fence off the

whole area, and this is at least in part because of the Bangladesh Rangers (BDRS)

repeated obstruction of fencing work. BDR men regularly fire at the men engaged in the

border fencing work, and a BSF official disclosed that there had been at least five

incidents of such "unwarranted firing" by BDR troopers on civilians and security

personnel along the border with Tripura between March 1, 2005 and April 21, 2005. On

April 20, the Tripura Director General of Police, G.M. Srivastava stated, "I am not saying

that the Government of Bangladesh is involved in such acts, but there are reasons to

believe that some BDR men, at the local level, are working to delay the construction of

the fencing." There are also a number of small pockets under 'adverse possession' as

well as some 'enclaves' of Indian and Bangladeshi populations in the other country.

While agreements on these have long been in existence, their implementation remains

in abeyance because of tensions along the border, as well as Bangladesh's evident

strategic and tactical interests in obstructing an Indian fence that would put an end to the

movement of terrorist and criminal groups, as well as the large volume of illegal

migration that Dhaka implicitly supports. In some cases, topography also creates

problems. The Belonia sub-division in South Tripura, for instance, has been a repeated

flash-point, because the Muhuri river keeps changing its course, creating vast islands,which both the countries claim leading to border skirmishes.

Under the circumstances, occasional clashes along the border are not unexpected.

However, the torture and cold blooded murder of soldiers is impossible to justify or

18



countenance. India, unfortunately, appears to lack the political will to impose minimal

norms of civilized conduct in interactions with any of its recalcitrant neighbours.

The transient tensions overlie the deep and abiding mistrust and hostility that have

become integral to relations between the two countries. Bangladesh has often accused

India of 'hegemonistic designs'. India, on the other hand, has a long and growing list of

specific complaints, including the presence of terrorist camps, safe havens and

leadership headquarters on Bangladesh soil. While Bangladesh has dealt with these

allegations through a strategy of blank denial in the face of mounting evidence - much of

it available in Bangladeshi open sources - this pattern of 'minimal credible deniability'

often comes under specific strains. Thus, Delhi's note verbale for the extradition of the

United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) 'general secretary', Anup Chetia alias Golap

Baruah, charged with a number of crimes, including murder, in Assam, has been

repeatedly rejected by the Bangladesh authorities - though his presence in that country

is fully documented, since Chetia has been in a Bangladesh jail at Kashimmpur since

1997 on charges of possessing foreign currencies, a satellite phone and several

passports. His prison term ended on February 25 last year, but Bangladesh has refused

to extradite him to India, instead sending its own list of criminals who it claims are

'sheltering' in India. Over the years, there have been repeated incidents of violence,

many of them in Dhaka, involving internecine clashes between various Northeast Indian

terrorist groups housed there, including the top leadership of some of these, and these

have been widely reported in the Bangladesh media. But Bangladesh persists with the

fiction that 'there are no terrorists on Bangladesh soil.'

Delhi has also been concerned with the increasing activities of Islamist extremists and

terrorists on and from Bangladeshi soil as well as the enormous quantum of small arms

and explosives that are moving across into India - most dramatically exemplified by the

massive seizure at Karnaphuli on the Chittagong coast on April 2, 2004, the result of

poor coordination between different Bangladeshi enforcement agencies, some of whichfailed to 'cooperate' with the officials who were overseeing the transaction, of a

consignment of small arms sufficient, as one commentator noted, "to arm a brigade".

Bangladeshi belligerence has also found repeated political expression. In September

19



2004, in an attack described by one Bangladeshi editorial as an "amateurish

outburst",which shows the partisan approach of the media.

Fundamentalist activism in Bangladesh received a major boost in 2001 when militant

Islam stormed its way to the heart of the current regime as J amaat-e-Islami Bangladesh

(J EI) and Islami Oikya J ote (IOJ ), became influential partners of the government led by

Begum Khaleda Zia. Over three hundred terrorist camps, including militant outfits of

Northeast India, are fully active in various parts of Bangladesh. Major Islamic networks

presently operating in the country are J EI, Harkat-ul-J ihan-al-Islami-Bangladesh (HUJ AI-

BD), J amiat-ul-Mujaihdeen-Bangladesh (JMB), J agrato Muslim J anata Bangladesh

(J MJ B), Shahadat-e-al-Hikma, Al-Harakat-ul-Islamia, Harkat-ul-J ehad Islami and Al-

Khidmat. Mushrooming Islamic seminaries in Bangladesh have been providing

necessary fuel for the so-called Islamic J ihad and Pakistan’s proxy war against India.

There are about 9,000 government-registered madrasas and another 15,000 Qawmi

madrasas under the Bangladesh Qawmi Madrasa Education Bord, which are totally out

of government control and have their own curriculum. J EI, the fountainhead of Islamic

fundamentalism in Bangladesh has its bank named the Bangladesh Islamic Bank and it

is all set to open the branches Al Falah Islamic Bank, IslamiTafaqul Sanchayee Bima,

and J amati J iban Bima Corporation. NGO’s like Ibnesina, KZZ Trust, Ashiab, Muslim Aid

and Bangladesh Masjid Mission, under the direct supervision of J EI are exploring ways

to make J EI the single largest party in Bangladesh’s political map by 2011. Pakistan’s

intelligence agency and Bangladesh’s Director General Field Intelligence (DGFI) have

formed a deadly alliance against India.

Indian concerns of the existence of terrorist camps in Hobiganj, Maulvi Bazaar,

Chittagong and Satcherri districts of Bangladesh, among others along the Indian border,

have intensified following such reports. India has pointed out the existence of 100 to 150

such camps to Bangladesh, pinpointing their location. The Camps are allegedly run by

terrorist groups active in Northeast India including the ULFA and National Democratic

Front of Bodoland (NDFB), active in Assam, and the National Liberation Front of Tripura

(NLFT) and All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) that are active in Tripura. Besides getting

shelter and using the Northeastern border as transit route for illicit arms and drugs trade,

these groups are also said to be cooperating closely with the Directorate General of

Foreign Intelligence (DGFI), the military intelligence agency of Bangladesh, and the Inter

20



Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. Following the Royal Bhutan Army's operations

against ULFA (operation All Clear) and other such groups having camps on its soil,

Bangladesh as the hub of anti-India terrorist groups is likely to grow.

Besides, there are also speculations of use of Northeastern Indian territory by Islamistgroups as a transit to infiltrate into J &K. ULFA is also said to be a constituent of the

Bangladesh Islamic Manch, a united council under HUJ I's leadership. Inter-regional

linkages of these groups further worsen the internal security situation in India. For

instance, beyond its intra-regional linkages, ULFA is also reported to maintain

connection with Nepalese Maoists and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The latter

have links with various Naxalite groups alleged to be working towards a compact

revolutionary zone from the forest tracts of Adilabad district in Andhra Pradesh to Nepal,

traversing the forest areas of Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, J harkhand and Bihar. Underthese circumstances where the Government is busy calming J &K, Bangladesh could be

an important front to ensure greater stability.

Northeast Region

The statement of the Union Minister for Development of the North East Region

(DONER), PR Kyndiah on J anuary 21,2006 that the North-East Region is no more

“sensitive” but “strategic” to not only the entire country but also the neighboringcountries---like China, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Myanmar---has a historic sense.

The people of the Northeast region are mostly mongoloid races like that of China,

Bhutan, and Myanmar and inhabited in the frontline areas bordering China, Myanmar,

Bhutan and Bangladesh. Many similarities are there between the people of the

Northeast India and the Southeast Asian countries. According to history, most of the

northeastern people originated from the central Asia as well.

Therefore it will not be very difficult for the Governments of Myanmar, China, and Bhutan

to play politics with India through northeast militants. When the Bangladesh became soft

to northeastern militants, where was the question that these Mongoloid governments in

neighboring countries would not go soft to them.

21



Many Naga villages are there in Northwest of Myanmar, so also Maiteis in Myanmar’s

Mandalay and Rangoon. The Kukis spread throughout the northeast region as much as

Myanmar side. Even numbers of Maitei villages are there in Bangladesh’s Sylhet and

Dhaka areas. Because of these existing historical bonds between the people of the

northeastern region with the neighboring countries, things have become more complex

for New Delhi to tackle the militancy problems of the region.

That is why what the DONER Minister’s describing the region as “strategic” to not only

the entire country but also the neighboring countries has undercurrent meanings.

At the same time, India has its security problems with China, Pakistan, Bangladesh and

Myanmar. Unfortunately this largest democratic country in the world is surrounded by

monarchical, military and despotic regimes and the current Royal coup in Nepal is more

compounded to diplomatic juggernaut of India.

These countries surround the northeastern region leaving the chicken neck area in

Siliguri like a spinal cord to the rest of the country. There are maximum advantages for

the northeast militants in their struggle for sovereignty due to these unfriendly

environments prevailing in the neighboring countries.

New Delhi has been worrying for quite some time, as most of the northeast insurgent

organizations have been operating from inside the territories of Myanmar, Bhutan andBangladesh. There have been talks with Yangon, Dhaka and Thimphu not to allow

northeast militants using their soil to launch anti-India campaign. The insurgency

problems of the region can’t be effectively tackled without the cooperation and support of

Myanmar. Yangon has been engaged cracking down northeast militants holed up in

their territory. Dhaka is yet to respond to New Delhi’s demand.

22



Analyzing the pattern of violence in India with regard to insurgents violence which

excludes deaths in Kashmir is as follows :

1994-2005

Year Civilians Security Force

Personnel

Terrorists Total

1994 1696 417 1919 4032

1995 1779 493 1603 3875

1996 2084 615 1482 4181

1997 1740 641 1734 4115

1998 1819 526 1419 3764

1999 1377 763 1614 3754

2000 1803 788 2384 4975

2001 1693 721 3425 5839

2002 1174 623 2176 3973

2003 1187 420 2095 3702

2004 886 434 1322 2642

2005 913 287 1319 2519

Total 18151 6728 22492 47371

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Fatalities in Left-wing Extremism

2006

States Civilian SF Naxal Total

Andhra Pradesh 2 0 0 2

Bihar 1 0 0 1

J harkhand 3 4 2 9

Chhattisgarh 12 0 3 15

Maharashtra 1 0 7 8

Total* 19 4 12 35

* Data till J anuary 31, 2006

(Note: Compiled from news reports and are provisional)

2005

States Civilian SF Naxal Total

Andhra Pradesh 132 21 167 320

Bihar 25 29 52 106

J harkhand 49 27 20 96

Chhattisgarh 52 48 26 126

Orissa 13 1 3 17

Maharashtra 2 17 8 27

Karnataka 2 6 4 12

Uttar Pradesh 1 0 6 7

West Bengal 5 1 0 6

Total* 281 150 286 717

* Compiled from news reports and are provisional

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2004

States Deaths

Andhra Pradesh 74

Bihar 171

Chhattisgarh 83

J harkhand 169

Madhya Pradesh 4

Maharashtra 15

Orissa 8

Uttar Pradesh 26

West Bengal 15

Other States 1

Total 566

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India data

2003

States Deaths

Andhra Pradesh 140

Bihar 128

Chhattisgarh 74

J harkhand 117

Madhya Pradesh 1

Maharashtra 31

Orissa 15

Uttar Pradesh 8

25



West Bengal 1

Other States -

Total 515

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India data

The increasing level of deaths has in a way forced government to take both harsh as

well as constructive efforts in this regard.

Steps Taken by Government

As the extremists work to consolidate and expand their power, repeatedly declaring their

commitment to 'armed struggle' and rejection of India's 'bourgeois democracy',

regrettably, no such unified effort is in evidence from affected states. Rather the Centre,

with the Union Ministry of Home Affairs, is encouraging other Naxalite-affected States to

follow the Andhra Pradesh example. Seeing developments in Andhra Pradesh, most of

the affected states showed interests either to initiate dialoge or ceasefire. But the

ceasefire in neighboring Andhra Pradesh did not influence much to Orissa government

on its stand on these outfits. Keeping the option of dialogue open with the Naxalite, if

only they come to the negotiating table without preconditions, the Orissa Government

plans to launch a developmental offensive against the ultras. While the Chhattisgarh

government has decided to bring out a surrender policy for the Naxals, the previous

Karnataka Chief Minister, N. Dharam Singh has ruled out a cease-fire or cessation of

police operations against the Naxalites. The West Bengal government is confused to

with whom to initiate peace talks, while Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra,

Uttaranchal and Uttar Pradesh governments are remaining mute on the matter.

The irony is that the state response to Naxalism remains incoherent and directionless.

The Central Coordination Committee (CCC) of Naxalite affected States headed by the

Union Home Ministry has met at least fifteen times since its inception to discuss the

problem, but has not been able to evolve any comprehensive strategy to tackle the

threat. Although the Union Government has recently presented a proposal for a Unified

Command, on the lines of Kashmir and the northeast, some states are of the view that

the formation of the Command would lead to interference in the law and order. Now that

the CPI-Maoist has indicated its inclination to negotiations with other state governments,

26



provided they give up their repressive measures; it is to be seen what steps these

affected state governments will take.

The Ministry of Home Affairs in India is in a Catch-22 situation. In the last six months, at

least seven Naxalite-affected states have written to it making an unusual demand:

amend the Forest Conservation Act (FCA), 1980 to curb the spread of Naxalites. But the

union home ministry personnel are helpless: the Ministry of Environment and Forests,

the nodal authority for the FCA, has refused to entertain any such demands. Outside the

negotiation hall of the Andhra Pradesh (AP)-Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-

Maoist)peace dialogue held on on October 15,2004 in Hyderabad, the naxal

representative asserted that the Forest Conservation Act has very high potential to derail

any peace talks .

During this author’s interactions with several AP state government officials present in the

dialogue, it emerged very prominently that the most important demand of the Maoist,

land reform, was impossible to attend to without amendments to the FCA.

It may seem to many very unrelated an issue to be talked about in the context of the

peace dialogue but both the Union and state governments have off late realised the fact

that Naxalites could only spread due to very restrictive and conservation-oriented forest

laws. Forest laws like the FCA have made forests soulless islands thus alienating tribal

people from the government. Naxalites groups have exploited this cleavage between

government and people to spread in about 125 districts in 12 states. “Settlement of

rights inside forest and access to forest produce are two central issues for us. The

negotiation has to start and revolve around it,” said Ramakrishna, the charismatic state

secretary of CPI (Maoist) who has come over ground after two decades, to this author

during a media briefing in the second week of October.

Orissa, already in the process of initiating direct dialogue with the Maoist, is desperately

trying to put in place a land reform policy before the dialogue starts. However, as its

emissary told recently, it is much easier to amend central laws like POTA or TADA thanto initiate change in forest laws. The forest bureaucracy is just inaccessible and has a

very arrogant protection-mentality. According to him, “Before coming face to face with

the Naxalites we need to do our home works on what we can do and what we can’t. It is

clear that land settlement is proving to be very difficult. That is the reason why we need

to involve the Union government very actively in the process.” As Orissa’s 50 percent of

27



forests is disputed and claimed by both forest and revenue departments, the state can’t

even think of settlement of land rights without amendments to the FCA which has been

applied to all forest areas.

Problems in Administ rative Network

The problems at the root level is manifold and the core in competency to counter it are

numerous:

25percent of the Police Stations and 50 percent of the Police outposts do not have

regular buildings.

Over 37 percent Police Districts work from makeshift Police lines.

Over 70 percent Police Districts do not have a proper control room.

Superintendents of Police in over 34 percent Police Districts are not provided

residential accommodation.

70 percent of the constabulary is without residential accommodation.

The mobility deficiency is approximately 43 percent.

The weaponry available with the Police is insufficient and obsolete.

The communication systems are inadequate, out dated and non-functional in most

cases.

The National Police Commission (NPC) had assessed, over 20 years ago, that the

Constables were required to work an average of 13 hours a day. Presently, they

perform daily duties for even longer hours.

While required to undergo training every five years, Police personnel are provided

training opportunities only once in every 20 years.

The curricula for the training of Policemen, which requires continuing orientation to

modern policing practices with special reference to the emerging crime patterns, has

not been regularly reviewed and changed.

The experience of dealing with the period of serious disorder in Punjab, the insurgencies

in the North East region, the continuing proxy war in J &K and significant disturbanceselsewhere in the country has demonstrated that some of these disturbances may not

have escalated into grave internal security problems, if they had been promptly and

effectively dealt with, at the incipient stages. In this context it may be noted that while

prolonged neglect has led to the presently obtaining inadequacies of the State Police

organisations, a factor, which has seriously impaired their performance, arises from the

28



persistent interference in their functioning by political and extra-Constitutional elements.

As the Police are among the most visible instruments of the national administrative

apparatus its failure to enforce the law effectively has led not only to seriously eroding

the image of governance but also creating a most regrettable impression that lawless

elements can indulge in criminality with impunity.

The 43rd Report to the concerned Parliamentary Standing Committee, the Ministry of

Home Affairs has brought out that 210 of the 535 districts in the country are affected by

grave problems of public disorder such as insurgency, militancy and ethnic strife. In

other words, about 40 percent of the country is facing serious disorders of one or the

other kind. The probable solutions that can be explored are:

Problems can be redefined as border state problems and core state problems, which

can be sorted among the center and state governments

Greater Structural Adjustments

Improved Weaponry

Anti –corruption efforts

Intense dialogue, so as to arrive at conclusions

Improved Infrastructure

Protecting Tribal Rights

Employment opportunities through tax holidays to Investments in those areas

Village Defense Committees

Food security and education

Land reforms and equitable distribution of infrastructure projects

Border state problem can be solved through Stopping Infiltration

Constructive dialogue with neighbors

Strong military might

Large investment in infrastructure

The need of the hour is to break the link that is emerging between various groups andalso at the same time initiating dialogue in the process to iron out the differences in

perception. As it is the need of the citizens also to contribute to the peace process

because “who dies if India lives and who lives if India dies.

internal security challenges

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