NEW YORK

2020NHSMUN

ICCInternational Criminal Court

Update Paper

Email: info@imuna.org

Phone: +1 (212) 652-9992

Web: www.nhsmun.org

Dear Judges,

Welcome to NHSMUN 2020! My name is Dain Yi, and I’m so excited to serve as the Assistant Director of the International Criminal Court (ICC) for Session I. I’m from Montgomery, Alabama, and just like all of you, have been involved in Model UN throughout my high school career. By the end of my four years of high school, I had been able to attend many conferences as a delegate as well as chair a committee at my high school’s conference. I learned and experienced so much while attending NHSMUN as a delegate, and I’m thrilled to share this wonderful experience with all of you this spring!

Currently, I am a freshman at Cornell University, and while I am still undecided on my major, I’m interested in economics and computer science. Outside of the classroom, I love traveling and watching Marvel movies and Disney classics with my friends.

The following paper addresses the most recent developments in the topics pertaining to the situ-ations in Colombia and Nigeria. In Colombia, conflicts between the government and paramilitary groups have continued for decades, during which many were victimized by extreme violence and alleged crimes (including murder and forced displacement). In Nigeria, military conflict between Boko Haram and Nigerian security forces have persisted, negatively impacting the lives of count-less civilians. Both forces have allegedly engaged in various crimes including murder, persecution, torture, and extrajudicial killings.

This paper will help you gain a better understanding of the topics, focus on the key points within each topic, and brainstorm more solutions. While my co-Assistant Director, Andrea, and I have written this update paper to provide an overview of the recent developments in the topics we will discuss in committee, I encourage you all to conduct further research so you may fully understand the details and relevance of these updates and be better prepared for committee. If you have any questions, please don’t hesitate to reach out to the Directors or myself for assistance. Best of luck with your research, and I can’t wait to meet all of you soon!

Best,

Dain Yidain.yi@imuna.org International Criminal CourtSession I

Secretary-GeneralVijittra Puckdee

Director-GeneralAlthea Turley

Chiefs of StaffAlex Burr

Walker Heintz

Delegate ExperienceLuis GonzálezMerve Karakas

Domestic PartnershipsMaura Goss

Odion Ovbiagele

Global PartnershipsRenata Koch

Salmaan Rashiq

Internal AffairsLia Lee

Natalie O’Dell

Under-Secretaries-General

Michael BeeliJill Bendlak

Rose BlackwellAnnica DenktasRahul FrancisOmar Mufti

Jonathan PackerAkanksha Sancheti

John WoodAlisa Wong

Email: info@imuna.org

Phone: +1 (212) 652-9992

Web: www.nhsmun.org

Dear Judges,

Welcome to NHSMUN 2020! My name is Andrea Kimpson and I am delighted to serve as the Vice President of the International Criminal Court (ICC) for Session II. I am so excited to meet and work with each one of you during the upcoming conference! This will be my fifth year at NHS-MUN and my first year as a staff member. NHSMUN was one of the highlights of my high school career and my goal is to make your experience just as memorable and fun as my past four have been!

I am from Columbia, South Carolina and currently attend the College of Charleston in Charleston, South Carolina (Go Cougs!). I intend to major in International Studies and Political Science with concentrations in Latin America and the Caribbean and Public Policy. My MUN journey began as a freshman in high school, and from it all, I have gained invaluable skills, unforgettable experiences, and life-long friendships. I was fortunate to begin attending NHSMUN as a freshman and served in a variety of committees ranging from LEGAL to UNIDO throughout high school. Outside of NHSMUN, I am an active member of my school’s Student Government Association, Honor Board, and Honors College Diversity and Inclusion Board. Aside from those involvements, I am an avid reader (ask me about my favorite book!) and very picky music lover.

As you know, the ICC will be simulating two pre-trial hearings: The Situation in Colombia and the Situation in Nigeria. Both situations have involved violence and intense disruption that has been consistent for at least a decade. Numerous characteristics such as scale, civilian involvement, and political disagreement define the conflicts in unique ways. Furthermore, state-sponsored and non-state actors have been implicated in both situations, complicating the legal response that can be issued by the international community. It is within these complexities that a legal basis for investiga-tion begins to form. This update paper aims to detail recent occurrences that further point toward the need for ICC attention and deliberation.

Moreover, the impact of these situations on real people cannot be overstated. While this is only a simulation, it is my hope that you understand the reality of these topics and approach them with a high level of respect and care. Your responsibility as judges is to think critically and carefully about the evidence outlined within the background guide and this update paper and apply the relevant areas of international law to create informed opinions.

Once again, I cannot wait to meet each and every one of you! If you have any questions or con-cerns about the topics, the ICC, NHSMUN in general, or anything else, please do not hesitate to reach out to myself or any member of the dais.

Best,Andrea Kimpsonandrea.kimpson@imuna.org International Criminal CourtSession II

Secretary-GeneralVijittra Puckdee

Director-GeneralAlthea Turley

Chiefs of StaffAlex Burr

Walker Heintz

Delegate ExperienceLuis GonzálezMerve Karakas

Domestic PartnershipsMaura Goss

Odion Ovbiagele

Global PartnershipsRenata Koch

Salmaan Rashiq

Internal AffairsLia Lee

Natalie O’Dell

Under-Secretaries-General

Michael BeeliJill Bendlak

Rose BlackwellAnnica DenktasRahul FrancisOmar Mufti

Jonathan PackerAkanksha Sancheti

John WoodAlisa Wong

ICC

NHSMUN 2020

Photo Credit: Robert Thivierge

Topic A:The Situation in Colombia

|5Topic A: The SiTuATion in colombiAinTroducTion

Introduction

1 Megan Janetsky, “How to Keep the Colombian Peace Deal Alive,” Foreign Policy, 8 September 2019. accessed 15 December 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/08/how-to-keep-the-colombian-peace-deal-alive-farc-duque-uribe-colombia/.2 Ibid.3 “Pamphlet Announces Rearmament of AUC Paramilitary Organization,” Colombia Reports, 7 October 2019. accessed 15 December 2019. https://colombiareports.com/pamphlet-announces-rearmament-of-auc-paramilitary-organization/.4 Ibid.5 Ibid.6 Ibid.7 Ibid.8 Ibid.9 “In Enemy Territory: A Colombian Social Leader’s Act of Defiance,” Al Jazeera, 4 December 2019. accessed 15 December 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/witness/2019/12/enemy-territory-colombian-social-leader-act-defiance-191204062357300.html.

In order to come to a strong conclusion about the alleged crimes and perpetrators for the situation in Colombia, critical analysis of recent developments, including the current status of paramilitary groups and government responses to these events, is imperative. There has been a resurgence of paramilitary action, and the failure of the government to resolve existing and emerging issues have led to rising civil unrest. In order to determine the criminal responsibility of individuals, along with the chain of responsibility, it is important to assess these recent events, along with reviewing the ICC’s latest annual report. This paper will provide an overview of the resurgence of paramilitary groups, recent government actions, and the new report released by ICC.

Resurgence of Paramilitary Groups

In late August, former commanders of Colombia’s largely demobilized a rebel group, the Revolutionary Armed Forc-es of Colombia (FARC), and released a 32 minute video in which they announced a “new phase of armed struggle.”1 Known best by their wartime aliases, former commanders Iván Márquez and Jesús Santrich were the same men who par-ticipated in negotiating the peace treaty with the Colombian government in 2016.2 The announcement signified a partial breakdown of the 2016 peace agreement which was meant to mark the end of the decades-long conflict.

FARC is not the only paramilitary group that has shown signs of resurgence. In early October, a pamphlet announcing the rearmament of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia), or AUC, spread in Co-lombia.3 The announcement was a great surprise to most, as the AUC demobilized almost 15 years ago. Many former AUC commanders are currently taking an active part in the coun-try’s peace process, while others are in prison or dead. The pamphlet threatened to kill both demobilized and rearmed leaders of FARC and all members of the National Liberation Army (ELN). It also declared the destruction of “the illegiti-mate government of sister republic Venezuela led by Nicolas

Maduro” a military objective.4

Despite the peace deal, the resurgence of parliamentary groups has been causing violence and unrest in Colombia. Recently, 13,000 former FARC guerrillas have stated that they want to contribute to establishing peace, but an estimated 2,200 oth-ers have left the demobilization areas or never demobilized to begin with.5 There are an estimated 20 dissident bands of the FARC that never submitted to the peace accords and may consolidate further in the future.6 Meanwhile, demobilized FARC guerrillas have been victimized by violent attacks. Some 137 former fighters, as well as their relatives, including the 7-month-old baby of a demobilized guerrilla member, have been assassinated since the signing of the agreement.7 Many more have received threats, often from criminal groups claim-ing links to Colombia’s paramilitary groups and those claiming to represent active remnants of such groups themselves.8

Demobilized guerrillas are not the only parties subjected to violence. Paramilitary groups have also been targeting social leaders and government officials. Since the landmark peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC rebels in 2016, threats, attacks, and assassinations of human rights defenders have escalated, with more than 700 social leaders killed across the country.9 Further, according to

6| Topic A: The SiTuATion in colombiAinTroducTion

the Electoral Observation Mission (MOE), seven candidates have been killed, a dozen were attacked, and more than 100 were threatened during the 2019 local elections for provincial governors, mayors and regional legislators.10 The government has attributed these attacks to rebels of the leftist National Liberation Army (ELN), dissident guerrillas from the Revolu-tionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and crime gangs founded by former right-wing paramilitaries.11

Government Actions

Three years after the negotiation of the peace agreement, Co-lombia’s implementation of the promises made in the accords has lagged significantly under the current right-wing President Iván Duque.

Reintegration of former combatants and restitution to vic-tims have been consistently underfunded, and rural areas that were once dominated by the FARC remain undeveloped. Many are now under the control of other paramilitary groups. Key facets of the accords—such as victims’ restitution and rural development—have been bogged down by bureaucratic obstacles along with chronic underfunding, while the coun-try’s transitional justice system has been openly attacked by

10 Luis Jaime Acosta, “Colombian Political Clans Seen Set to Win at Sunday’s Polls,” Reuters, 25 October 2019. accessed 15 December 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-politics/colombian-political-clans-seen-set-to-win-at-sundays-polls-idUSKBN1X41LY.11 Ibid.12 Ibid.13 Ibid.14 Ibid.15 Paul J. Angelo, “Peace Is Slipping Away in Colombia,” Foreign Affairs, 11 October 2019, accessed 14 December 2019, https://www.for-eignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2019-10-11/peace-slipping-away-colombia.16 Ibid.17 Ibid.

Duque’s government.12

The Colombian government has been slow in implement-ing the plan to establish peace with paramilitary groups from the start. Duque came into office promising to “correct” the peace agreement, appealing to segments of Colombian soci-ety that wanted a more punitive deal for the FARC13. How-ever, far-right politicians and voters have continuously insisted that the terms of the deal were too lenient on the ex-insur-gents. Further, the Colombian state has failed to provide for the physical security of many demobilized FARC insurgents, 137 of whom have been assassinated since 2016.14 Killings of political and social activists from across the political spectrum have surged in the same period. Preceding the local elections in October, the first electoral cycle in which the FARC party is participating, at least 26 politicians from right-wing and pro-gressive parties were killed. Suspecting the Colombian gov-ernment, several senior leaders of the FARC declared their rupture with the peace process in August and vowed to take up arms again.15

Duque’s administration has slashed funding for or otherwise inefficiently administered truth and justice initiatives, which are programs aimed at reintegrating demobilized fighters, and efforts to support small-scale farming as well as other alterna-tives to the drug trade. Consequently, tensions have increased between the government and various paramilitary groups.

The Duque administration’s mismanagement has had many destabilizing effects. Since the signing of the peace deal in 2016, hundreds of human rights defenders and social ac-tivists—at least 486, according to Colombia’s human rights ombudsman—have been murdered.16 A significant number of the victims were members of Colombia’s long-neglected Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities.17 Although Duque’s government did not directly carry out these killings, it

FARC commanders appear in a video calling for a return to armed conflict

|7Topic A: The SiTuATion in colombiAinTroducTion

has defunded the truth and justice provisions of the accord.18

Due to increasing violence, dissatisfaction with the presi-dency and civil unrest is also increasing. For the first time in several decades, hundreds of thousands of people from all backgrounds have been marching in large and small cities and even in rural areas of Colombia since late November.19 Over 132,000 Colombians participated in these marches, and local protests are continuing throughout Colombia’s major cities despite several civilian deaths from clashes with police.20

In response to the rearmament of paramilitary groups, Duque launched a new military offensive, a specialized military force 18 Gimena Sánchez-Garzoli, “The Slow Death of Colombia’s Peace Deal,” Foreign Affairs, 30 October 2019.,accessed 14 December 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/colombia/2019-10-30/slow-death-colombias-peace-deal.19 Sandra Botero and Silvia Otero Bahamón, “Colombia is having its largest wave of protests in recent decades. Why?,” The Washington Post, 5 December 2019. accessed 13 December 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/12/05/colombia-is-having-its-larg-est-wave-protests-recent-decades-why/.20 Eduardo Segura, “The Fight for Peace and Justice in Colombia,” Jacobin, 7 December 2019. accessed 15 December 2019. https://jaco-binmag.com/2019/12/colombia-peace-agreement-farc-arms-ivan-duque.21 Ibid.22 Julian James, “Colombian Government Renews Civil War Amid Growing Social Unrest,” International Committee of the Fourth International, 7 September 2019. accessed 13 December 2019. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2019/09/07/colo-s07.html.

in search of the rebels, and offered a 3 billion-peso reward for the capture of those in the video announcement.21 At the same time, it has withdrawn guards assigned to protect the of-ficials of FARC’s political party.22 This in turn announced the resumption of the armed struggle in the face of the govern-ment’s failure to comply with the terms of a 2016 peace deal.

New Report Released by the ICC

In its latest annual report, the International Criminal Court (ICC) stated that Colombia has made significant advances in the investigation of war crimes and crimes against human-ity. The 2019 report highlights the work of the Special Peace

A Colombian flag next to a FARC flag, symbolizing their peace agreement

8| Topic A: The SiTuATion in colombiAinTroducTion

Jurisdiction (JEP) this year as well as advances made in cases related to extrajudicial killings and crimes committed by para-military groups.

According to the Court, some 9,713 former FARC members, 2,291 members of the Armed Forces and 63 third parties (or non-state agents) have committed to participate in the transi-tional justice system.23 The ICC highlighted that the JEP has decided to prioritize seven macro cases, acknowledging specif-ically those that investigate crimes committed in the war-torn provinces of Nariño, Urabá, and Cauca.

The ICC also examined the progress of the ordinary justice system in trials against paramilitary groups and their sup-porters. The ICC noted that the Attorney General’s Office is investigating 1,253 cases against civilians or businesspeople and 794 cases against state agents for crimes related to the development, support, or financing of these groups as of Oc-tober.24

The ordinary justice system has started investigations in five potential cases concerning extrajudicial killings against the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth and Seventh Divisions of the Ar-my.25 Despite reports that stating there could be more than 10,000 victims of these crimes, the Attorney General’s Office only reported 2,268 active cases that involve 3,876 victims.26 According to the report, 10,742 people have been investigated for these crimes. In addition, a total of 20 generals, 182 cor-nels, and 143 commanders are currently under investigation.27

Despite these advances, the Court said it would continue its evaluations of these judicial processes in the ordinary justice system, the Special Peace Jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the Justice and Peace Law. The Court also stated that their preliminary evaluation of Colombia will end in 2020.28

Conclusion

Recent paramilitary and government activities have creat-ed a lack of security caused not only Colombian civilians,

23 “Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019,” International Criminal Court, 5 December 2019. accessed 15 December 2019. https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/191205-rep-otp-PE.pdf.24 Ibid.25 Ibid.26 Ibid.27 Ibid.28 Ibid.

but also many demobilized combatants to reconsider the future of peace. The resurgence of paramilitary groups, along with the lackluster implementation of the peace accords have led to widespread distrust of the govern-ment and a realization of the fragility of peace. Judges are expected to use international law and concrete evi-dence to critically and carefully analyze various aspects of the alleged crimes in Colombia. Some relevant sourc-es of international and domestic law include the Rome Statute, Colombia’s Legal Framework for Peace, and the Justice and Peace Law of Colombia. Judges should also take the recent developments described in this paper and the different perspectives they provide into consider-ation during debate.

ICC

NHSMUN 2020

Photo Credit: U.S. Navy/Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Michael Larson

Topic B:The Situation in Nigeria

10|Topic b: The SiTuATion in nigeriAinTroducTion

Introduction

1 Office of the Prosecutor, “Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019,” International Criminal Court, 5 December 2019, accessed 16 December 2019, https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/191205-rep-otp-PE.pdf.2 John Campbell, “Nigeria Security Tracker,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified 1 December 2019, accessed 16 December 2019, https://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483.3 Campbell, “Nigeria Security Tracker.”4 Ibid.5 Ibid.6 Dionne Searcy, “Boko Haram is Back. With Better Drones,” The New York Times, 13 September 2019, accessed 2 December 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/13/world/africa/nigeria-boko-haram.html.7 Searcy, “Boko Haram is Back”; Office of the Prosecutor, “Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019”8 Global Overview,” Crisis Group, last modified October 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/november-alerts-october-trends-2019#nigeria. 9 Samuel Ogundipe, “Eleven Nigerian Soldiers Killed, 14 Injured in Boko Haram Attack on Military Convoy,” Premium Times Nigeria, 6 Oct. 2019, accessed 2 January 2020, www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/356214-eleven-nigerian-soldiers-killed-14-injured-in-boko-haram-attack-on-military-convoy.html.10 Ibid.

The Situation in Nigeria involving Boko Haram and the Nigerian Security Forces (NSF) has been unfolding for over a decade. High levels of violence and instability have resulted in the death, de-tainment, and displacement of countless numbers of Nigerian citizens. Actions on both the side of the government and the militant group Boko Haram have warranted concern from the international community, resulting in the ongoing Preliminary Investigation currently being conducted by the Of-fice of the Prosecutor (OTP). According to a report on preliminary examination activities by the OTP released on 4 December 2019, Nigeria remains in phase three of the preliminary investigation process, requiring greater inquiry into the admissibility of the potential cases facing Boko Haram and the NSF in terms of complementarity and gravity.1 In the last few months, developments have occurred within the country that indicate a continuance of patterns of violence and disruption, but also point towards new avenues of potential conflict and strife as this situation continues into the next decade. The recent OTP report, combined with the examination of recent Boko Haram, NSF activity, and national proceedings, provide an adequate backdrop to continue exploring the gravity of the Situation in Nigeria.

The violence facing Nigerian citizens is one of unprecedented

scale, 65,446 cumulative deaths have been documented from

May 2011 to December 2019.2 The Nigeria Security Tracker

of the Council on Foreign Relations reveals that from Sep-

tember 2019 to December 2019, there have been 718 cumula-

tive deaths, with the overwhelming majority of these deaths

occurring in Borno State, where Boko Haram maintains a

stronghold and the NSF forces are most active.3 Within this

time frame, the majority of deaths, 174, have been committed

by state actors such as the NSF.4 Additionally, Boko Haram

has claimed 108 lives and the conflicts between Boko Ha-

ram and State Actors resulted in 64 deaths.5 This data sets

the backdrop for the current investigation into both parties

involved in this situation.

Recent Boko Haram Activity

Militants are still “roaming the countryside with impunity” now with more sophisticated technology than the NSF.6 Boko Haram now maintains control of ten zones in northern Bor-no State, near Lake Chad, an area that the OTP noted had increased operations from 1 December 2018 to 30 November 2019.7 On 3 October 2019, an ambush on a military convoy in the Mauli Borgozo area killed eleven soldiers and wounded fourteen.8 According to local news reports, troops were on patrol in the area when the midmorning attack occurred, re-sulting in the aforementioned deaths and casualties, but also the deaths of fifteen civilians.9 From the attack it was reported that Boko Haram gained eleven AK-47 rifles and anti-aircraft gun trucks while also severely damaging other military sup-plies.10 Clashes are further exacerbated by the growing divi-

|11Topic b: The SiTuATion in nigeriAinTroducTion

sion between factions of Boko Haram.

Currently, there are three factions: a faction led by Abubakar Shekau, an Ansaru splinter group, and the ISIS supported Is-lamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).11 ISWAP has been noted to have increased its operations during 2019, especially in the aforementioned Lake Chad region.12 ISWAP is reported to focus on “winning hearts and minds,” rather than following the pattern of the Shekau faction of extremely violent acts and does so by “filling in [the] gaps in governance and service delivery.”13 This focus, combined with its guerilla warfare style fighting, allows ISWAP to create support among civilians that Shekau, Ansaru, and the NSF have not been able to cultivate.14 Notably, this faction has been able to turn some of the ne-glected communities in the Lake Chad region into sources of economic support, even going so far to develop a tax base.15 ISWAP has also become the chief perpetrator of clashes with the NSF, allowing it to obtain a growing supply of weapons and machinery in the midst of the violence.16

All factions of the organization have exhibited hostility to-ward aid organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, resulting in a new potential case brought by the OTP, attacks against personnel or objects involved in humanitarian assistance pursuant to article 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute.17 On 18 July 2019, six members of the non-governmental organization Action Against Hunger were cap-tured on a humanitarian mission by suspected Boko Haram insurgents.18 The ISWAP faction is believed to be responsible

11 Office of the Prosecutor, “Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019.”12 Ibid.13 Campbell, “Boko Haram Evolves”; “Facing the Challenge of the Islamic State in West Africa Province,” Crisis Group, last modified 16 May 2019, accessed 16 December 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/273-facing-challenge-islamic-state-west-africa-province.14 “Facing the Challenge of the Islamic State.”15 Campbell, “Boko Haram Evolves.”16 Ibid.17 Ewang, “Insurgents in Nigeria.”; Office of the Prosecutor, “Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019.”18 Anietie Ewang, “Insurgents in Nigeria Hold 6 Aid Workers.” Human Rights Watch, 25 July 2019, accessed 16 December 2019. https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/25/insurgents-nigeria-hold-6-aid-workers.19 “ISIL-linked group executes 4 hostages in Nigeria: NGO,” Al Jazeera Media Network, 13 December 2019, accessed 16 December 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/isil-linked-group-executes-hostages-nigeria-ngo-191214000540719.html.20 Ibid. 21 Searcy, “Boko Haram is Back.”22 “Global Overview.”23 Ibid.24 Ibid.25 Agnes Callamard, “End of visit statement of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her visit to Nigeria,” Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2 September 2019, accessed 2 December 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24934&LangID=E.

for this kidnapping.19 In September 2019, one hostage was killed and another four were killed later in December.20 Oc-currences such as this influenced the OTP to include the most recent potential cases.

Recent NSF Activity

The NSF is continuing to operate under Operation Lafiya Dole—Peace by Force—which has authorized the actions of the NSF to act in a manner that has resulted in the majority of potential cases.21 Much of the recent actions of the NSF have been centered around the clashes with different factions of Boko Haram.22 In recent years, NSF made significant head-way in combating Boko Haram, however, in the prolonged years of the conflict, the government has faced setbacks with troop demoralization and the expensive needs of continually defending convoys and bases from militant attacks.23

Military strategy has continued to evolve throughout the de-cade of conflict with Boko Haram. It was announced in Au-gust 2019 that the military would begin pulling back troops from outposts in the countryside, which has unfortunately al-lowed Boko Haram to run without hindrance in those areas.24 Strategy has been further complicated by other security issues, such as southern gang violence and land-rights conflicts in the Middle Belt, pulling the attention of the NSF elsewhere.25 There is also the question of corruption in the current strat-egy, which has appeared in the form of profiting from illegal fishing along Lake Chad and taxing passing vehicles, actions

12|Topic b: The SiTuATion in nigeriAinTroducTion

that Boko Haram has been accused of in the past.26

In the most recent report from the OTP, the conclusion was drawn that the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), a paramili-tary group developed to help combat Boko Haram, could be considered part of the NSF for “at least part of the period under examination” given the level of control of the NSF over the CJTF and the participation of the CJTF in military operations.27 Given this development, the newest potential case facing the NSF, conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed groups and using them to participate actively in hostilities pursuant to Article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute, has been applied.28

26 Searcy, “Boko Haram is Back.”27 Office of the Prosecutor, “Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019.”28 Ibid.29 Office of the Prosecutor, “Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations,” International Criminal Court, November 2013, accessed 12 Janu-ary 2020, https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/OTP%20Preliminary%20Examinations/OTP%20-%20Policy%20Paper%20Prelimi-nary%20Examinations%20%202013.pdf.30 Ibid.31 Office of the Prosecutor, “Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019.”

Recent National Proceedings

In order for the ICC to complete the Preliminary Examina-tion for the Situation in Nigeria, complementarity, “an ex-amination of the existence of relevant national proceedings in relation to the potential cases being considered” must be assessed.29 This requires the OTP to consider domestic inves-tigations and prosecutions, where existing, to determine au-thenticity and genuineness compliance with the Rome Statute before moving further with full investigations.30

The OTP has been in contact with the Office of the Attor-ney-General of the Federation and Minister of Justice to un-derstand the scope of domestic proceedings.31 Meetings and

Special forces from Niger prepare to fight Boko Haram

|13Topic b: The SiTuATion in nigeriAinTroducTion

information gained suggest that some investigative and pros-ecutorial steps have been or are being taken by the authori-ties to determine criminal responsibility; however, these steps have been limited in scope and depth.32 A series of challenges such as the “absence of legislative provisions addressing cer-tain categories of conduct” and the “limited cooperation be-tween investigators and prosecutors at pre-investigation stag-es” were reported to have negatively impacted the ability of the Nigerian government to fairly adjudicate both members of Boko Haram and the NSF.33

Even with these challenges, the government has attempted to make progress with the trial and release of those in its cus-tody. On 27 November 2019, 983 people detained for alleged links to Boko Haram were released from government custody, some of whom had been held for several years before being found falsely suspected.34 Those still in custody will remain in government detentions and will undergo a vetting process for potential release in the future.35 During her visit to Abuja, Nigeria and meeting with the Vice President of Nigeria, His Excellency Mr. Yemi Osinbajo, the Prosecutor, Mrs. Fatou Bensouda received a reaffirmation of the commitment by the Nigerian government to cooperate with the ICC and to carry out investigations and prosecutions fairly.36

However, the OTP has noted that Nigerian authorities do not seem to be investigating and prosecuting the same conduct or cases that have been identified by the OTP or any similar iterations.37 Additionally, according to the OTP, “to date, the repeated commitment of the Nigerian authorities to provide the Office with relevant information in this respect has not materialised.”38 These findings point towards an inability or unwillingness on behalf of the Nigerian government to pur-sue justice in the manner prescribed by the ICC.

32 Ibid.33 Ibid.34 Haruna Umar, “Nigeria frees nearly 1,000 people cleared of extremist links,” The Associated Press, 27 November 2019, accessed 2 Decem-ber 2019, https://apnews.com/9448ffcaf7b94445a999b8502b3781dd.35 Ibid. 36 Office of the Prosecutor, “ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, concludes visit to Abuja, Nigeria,” International Criminal Court, 15 October 2019, accessed 12 January 2020, https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1488.37 Office of the Prosecutor, “Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019.”38 Ibid.39 “Nigeria: ICC investigation in Nigeria now inevitable, further delay a waste of time,” Amnesty International, 5 December 2019, accessed 16 December 2019. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/12/nigeria-icc-investigation-in-nigeria/.40 “Willingly Unable: ICC Preliminary Examination and Nigeria’s Failure to Address Impunity for International Crimes,” Amnesty Interna-tional, 2019, accessed 16 December 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR4414752019ENGLISH.PDF.41 Ibid.

A recent Executive Summary from Amnesty International doubles down on the idea that Nigeria is not taking the proper steps to deliver justice and notes that an “ICC investigation [is] now inevitable.”39 In an update to its report “Willingly Un-able: ICC Preliminary Examination and Nigeria’s Failure to Address Impunity for International Crimes,” Amnesty argues that the Situation in Nigeria is admissible under ICC jurisdic-tion on the following grounds: ‘inactivity’ and lack of relevant domestic proceedings, lack of genuine domestic proceedings, and failure to provide information and cooperation with the ICC.40 This assertion was based on an evaluation of the do-mestic investigations and proceedings that concluded that a lack of outcomes, insufficient investigations, focus on civil-ians rather than perpetrators, and “bare minimum” provisions from the Nigerian government indicate that greater ICC in-tervention is required to effectively administer justice. 41

Conclusion

The situation in Nigeria will continue to evolve and change as Boko Haram and the NSF undergo changes in activity and as national proceedings begin to take different shapes. Consider-ing all of these developments in addition to current interna-tional law and legal precedent will either add further evidence to the need for ICC intervention or will suggest that the situ-ation is at an impasse and intervention would only exacer-bate the issue or be ineffective. It is imperative to consider all of the presented information to make an informed decision about the role of the ICC as the situation in Nigeria continues to develop.

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Works Cited

Topic A

Acosta, Luis Jaime. “Colombian Political Clans Seen Set to Win at Sunday’s Polls.” Reuters, 25 October 2019. Accessed 15 December 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-colombia-politics/colombian-political-clans-seen-set-to-win-at-sundays-polls-idUSKBN1X41LY.

This source details the course of provincial elections following a series of violent attacks on candidates. The source also provides information on para-military activity to influence politics.

Angelo, Paul J. “Peace Is Slipping Away in Colombia.” Foreign Affairs, 11 October 2019. Accessed 14 December 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2019-10-11/peace-slipping-away-colombia.

This source summarizes the history of the peace agreement between the Colombian government and paramilitary groups. The source also provides an overview of the situation from the perspective from an outside country and the United States’ stance on the situation.

Botero, Sandra and Bahamón, Silvia Otero. “Colombia is having its largest wave of protests in recent decades. Why?.” The Wash-ington Post, 5 December 2019. Accessed 13 December 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/12/05/colombia-is-having-its-largest-wave-protests-recent-decades-why/.

This source describes the series of mass protests in Colombia beginning in November 2019. The source also discusses the reasons behind civilians’ protests.

“In Enemy Territory: A Colombian Social Leader’s Act of Defiance.” Al Jazeera, 4 December 2019. Accessed 15 December 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/witness/2019/12/enemy-territory-colombian-social-leader-act-defi-ance-191204062357300.html.

This source discusses the 20-year conflict in a Colombian farming community. The source also reports hundreds of murders of Colombian social leaders by paramilitary groups.

James, Julian. “Colombian Government Renews Civil War Amid Growing Social Unrest.” International Committee of the Fourth International, 7 September 2019. Accessed 13 December 2019. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2019/09/07/colo-s07.html.

This source summarizes the Colombian government’s actions since the peace agreement. The source describes the series the breaking of the treaty, in-creased unrest, and the Colombian government’s responses.

Janetsky, Megan. “How to Keep the Colombian Peace Deal Alive.” Foreign Policy, 8 September 2019. Accessed 15 December 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/08/how-to-keep-the-colombian-peace-deal-alive-farc-duque-uribe-colom-bia/.

This source details the increased violence as a result of a resurgence of paramilitary activity. The source also describes the Colombian government’s actions under the Duque administration.

“Pamphlet Announces Rearmament of AUC Paramilitary Organization.” Colombia Reports, 7 October 2019. Accessed 15 Decem-ber 2019. https://colombiareports.com/pamphlet-announces-rearmament-of-auc-paramilitary-organization/.

This source details the contents of a pamphlet that announced the rearmament of AUC. The source also discusses the history of AUC and the effect

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of the pamphlet.

“Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019.” International Criminal Court, 5 December 2019. Accessed 15 December 2019. https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/191205-rep-otp-PE.pdf.

This source reports the latest preliminary examinations made by the ICC. The source contains many updates on the situation in Colombia and includes references to several international and domestic legislation/agreements that are relevant to the case.

Sánchez-Garzoli, Gimena. “The Slow Death of Colombia’s Peace Deal.” Foreign Affairs, 30 October 2019. Accessed 14 Decem-ber 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/colombia/2019-10-30/slow-death-colombias-peace-deal.

This source describes the end of the peace agreement between the Colombian government and paramilitary groups. The source also details the Duque administration’s previous, current, and future provisions.

Segura, Eduardo. “The Fight for Peace and Justice in Colombia.” Jacobin, 7 December 2019. Accessed 15 December 2019. https://jacobinmag.com/2019/12/colombia-peace-agreement-farc-arms-ivan-duque.

This source addresses the deterioration of the peace process in Colombia and the faults of the Duque administration.

Topic B

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018.” United States Depart-ment of State. accessed 2 January 2020. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Nigeria-2018.pdf.

This source outlines some of the human rights abuses committed by the NSF and the Nigerian CJTF.

Callamard, Agnes. “End of visit statement of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions on her visit to Nigeria.” Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2 September 2019. accessed 2 December 2019. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24934&LangID=E.

This source describes the findings of the OHCHR on human rights violations and areas of unrest/concern in Nigeria.

Campbell, John. “Boko Haram Evolves and Persists in Northeast Nigeria.” Council on Foreign Relations, Last modified 17 April 2019. accessed 16 December 2019. https://www.cfr.org/blog/boko-haram-evolves-and-persists-northeast-nigeria.

This source outlines the ISWAP faction of Boko Haram and explores its actions.

Campbell, John. “Nigeria Security Tracker.” Council on Foreign Relations, Last modified 1 December 2019. accessed 16 December 2019. https://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483.

This source provides data about violence in Nigeria.

Chothia, Farouk. “Profile: Who are Nigeria’s Ansaru Islamists?” British Broadcasting Corporation, 11 March 2013. accessed 16 De-cember 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21510767.

This source describes the Ansaru faction of Boko Haram.

Ewang, Anietie. “Insurgents in Nigeria Hold 6 Aid Workers.” Human Rights Watch, 25 July 2019. accessed 16 December 2019. https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/25/insurgents-nigeria-hold-6-aid-workers.

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This source discusses the capture of six aid workers in Nigeria by Boko Haram.

“Facing the Challenge of the Islamic State in West Africa Province.” Crisis Group, Last modified 16 May 2019. accessed 16 De-cember 2019. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/273-facing-challenge-islamic-state-west-africa-province.

This source describes the activity of the ISWAP faction of Boko Haram and the potential ways to combat them.

Gana, M.L. “Militia Participation in Counterinsurgency: The Impetus of Civilian Joint Task Participation in Combating Boko Haram in Nigeria.” RUDN Journal of Political Science 21, No. 3 (2019): 460-469. accessed 16 December 2019. http://journals.rudn.ru/political-science/article/view/22058/17319.

This source examines the reasons civilians have joined the CJTF to combat Boko Haram.

Global Overview.” Crisis Group, Last Modified October 2019. https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/november-alerts-octo-ber-trends-2019#nigeria.

This source provides a summary of recent activity regarding Boko Haram and the NSF.

“ISIL-linked group executes 4 hostages in Nigeria: NGO.” Al Jazeera Media Network, 13 December 2019. accessed 16 December 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/12/isil-linked-group-executes-hostages-nigeria-ngo-191214000540719.html.

This source discusses the murder of five aid workers held by Boko Haram.

“Nearly 900 children released from armed group in north-east Nigeria.” United Nations Children’s Fund, 10 May 2019. accessed 16 December 2019. https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/nearly-900-children-released-armed-group-north-east-nigeria.

This source discusses the release of hundreds of children from CJTF in an effort to stop putting children in armed conflicts.

“Nigeria’s Civilian Joint Task Force.” Council on Foreign Relations, 18 July 2013. accessed 2 December 2019. https://www.cfr.org/blog/nigerias-civilian-joint-task-force.

This source explores the founding of the CJTF.

“Nigeria: ICC investigation in Nigeria now inevitable, further delay a waste of time.” Amnesty International, 5 December 2019. accessed 16 December 2019. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/12/nigeria-icc-investigation-in-nigeria/.

This source discusses the Amnesty International point of view that points toward ICC intervention based on their findings.

Office of the Prosecutor. “ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, concludes visit to Abuja, Nigeria.” International Criminal Court, 15 October 2019. accessed 12 January 2020. https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1488.

This source is a Press Release from the Office of the Prosecutor that discusses the most recent visit to Nigeria and the reaffirmation the nation made to the ICC and the investigative process.

Office of the Prosecutor. “Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.” International Criminal Court, November 2013. accessed 12 January 2020. https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/OTP%20Preliminary%20Examinations/OTP%20-%20Policy%20Paper%20Preliminary%20Examinations%20%202013.pdf.

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This source describes the procedures the policies the OTP follows when conducting preliminary examinations.

Office of the Prosecutor. “Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2019.” International Criminal Court, 5 December 2019. accessed 16 December 2019. https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/191205-rep-otp-PE.pdf.

This source is the most recent update on Nigeria from the Office of the Prosecutor.

Ogundipe, Samuel. “Eleven Nigerian Soldiers Killed, 14 Injured in Boko Haram Attack on Military Convoy.” Premium Times Nigeria. 6 Oct. 2019. accessed 2 January 2020. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/356214-eleven-ni-gerian-soldiers-killed-14-injured-in-boko-haram-attack-on-military-convoy.html.

This source goes into detail about the Boko Haram military ambush on 3 October 2019.

Searcy, Dionne. “Boko Haram is Back. With Better Drones.” The New York Times, 13 September 2019. accessed 2 December 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/13/world/africa/nigeria-boko-haram.html.

This source describes the recent activity of Boko Haram and provides a status of the NSF.

Umar, Haruna. “Nigeria frees nearly 1,000 people cleared of extremist links.” The Associated Press, 27 November 2019. accessed 2 December 2019. https://apnews.com/9448ffcaf7b94445a999b8502b3781dd.

This source discusses the recent freeing of Nigerian civilians from custody after they were found to not be Boko Haram.

“Willingly Unable: ICC Preliminary Examination and Nigeria’s Failure to Address Impunity for International Crimes.” Amnesty Inter-national. 2019. accessed 16 December 2019. https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR4414752019ENG-LISH.PDF.

This source goes into further detail about the findings of Amnesty International that point toward ICC intervention in Nigeria.

The National High School Model United Nations Con-ference (NHSMUN) is a project of IMUNA, a non-profit organization formally associated with the Unit-ed Nations Department of Global Communications (UNDGC). IMUNA is dedicated to promoting global issues education through simulation.

Written by Andrea Kimpson and Dain Yi

Edited by Michael Beeli, Alex Burr, Annica Denktas, Walker Heintz,

and Althea Turley

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