international negotiation 03
TRANSCRIPT
• Isabella has worked as the executive assistant to Martina
for ten years. Isabella has worked overtime on many
occasions when Martina had special projects to
complete. Martina has not given Isabella a raise in her
salary for three years and Isabella is thinking about
looking for a new position which could pay her more
money. Martina is concerned about losing Isabella to
another employer but is worried that her own company
has not made a profit in the last two years. Isabella and
Martina sit down in the conference room to negotiate a
possible raise in salary for Isabella.
• ROLE #1: ISABELLA
• ROLE #2: MARTINA
• ROLE #3: OBSERVER (Take notes and report about
negotation)
5Reference Text: Contract Negotiations, by Gregory A. Garrett, CCH, Inc. (2005), pg. 13.
• Mark H. McCormack, best-selling author of “What They
Don’t Teach You at Harvard Business School,” has stated
the perfect negotiator should have:
• Faultless people sense
• A strong competitive streak
• A view of the big picture
• An eye for the crucial detail
• Unimpeachable integrity
Negotiation planning and preparation.
• Extremely important.
Beginning to interact
• orientation to situation,
• relationship with other side,
• information exchange.
Initial proposal
• offer or demand
• making concessions
• narrowing of differences.
Closing
• Getting commitment.
Preparation and Setting
Goals
Initial Interaction and Offers
Exchanging & Refining Information
Bargaining
Moving toward Closure
Bridging impasse &
make decisions
Finalizing Agreement
Triad of Concerns
Economic
Social
Emotions
• Social• How will others view the
agreement
• Emotional• How will you feel about the
agreement
• Successful Negotiations
• Lewicki and Fisher
• Economic• Will you be satisfied with the
economic results
Triad of concerns
• Subjective. Always check your views, opinions and
analysis of your position
• One’s view of fairness. (Barry Bond’s homerun).
• Be very careful of your client's (and your own) perception
of fairness.
• Frames
• the erroneous belief that the other party’s interests are
directly opposed to one’s own interests when, in fact,
they are often not completely opposed.
• Explored the consequences for outcomes.
• They measured individual fixed-pie perceptions after just five minutes of negotiation
• They found fixed pie predicted individual and joint negotiation payoffs such that fixed-pie perceptions were associated with lower individual and joint profits.
• Negotiators with strong fixed-pie perceptions failed to identify interests that could be profitably logrolled or that were completely compatible.
• Biased information search
• (negotiators’ faulty search for necessary information)
• Biased information processing
• (negotiators’ faulty processing of available information).
• Partisan perceivers believe that their own perceptions map onto objective reality.
• When they realize that the other side’s views differ from their own, they first attempt to “straighten out” the other side; when this does not work, they regard the other side as extremist.
• partisan perceivers tend to view the other side as having interests that are more opposed to their own than is actually the case.
1. Exacerbates conflict1. Partisan perceivers ascribe more negative traits to their
negotiating partner even when partisanship has been randomly assigned right before the negotiation
2. Reduces the likelihood of reaching comprehensive integrative agreements during face-to-face negotiations
• Negotiators discount or dismiss concessions made by the
other party merely as a function of who is offering them
• Experiment• Participants negotiated with a confederate over the policy of their university regarding a
political issue.
• Constant• The antagonism of the negotiating confederate was held constant.
• During the negotiation, the confederate for a time adopted a stubborn position.
• Concession• In two experimental conditions, however, the confederate ultimately made a concession;
in the third (control) condition, no concession at all was made.
• Rating• Subsequently, participants rated the attractiveness and significance of a number of
different proposals, including the ones that had been offered in their negotiation session.
• Results • Non-offered concessions were rated as more attractive and significant than offered
concessions:
• The very fact that their counterpart offered them a concession diminished its value in the eyes of the participants.
• People tend to view A. their own behavior as largely determined by the situation
BUT
B. regard other’s behavior as driven by chronic dispositions
• Larrick and Su (1999) • Demonstrated this bias operated in negotiation.
• Negotiators erroneously attributed tough bargaining behaviors to difficult personalities rather than to situational factors.
• Fundamental attribution error often results from lack of sufficient information about the opponent’s situation.
• People erroneously believe that
A. coercive tactics will be effective in generating concessions when dealing with opponents
BUT B. believe that these same tactics, when applied to the self, will have the opposite effect—that is, to increase their resolve not to concede.
• Rothbart and Hallmark (1988) in-group and outgroup members differed in the judged efficacy of coercion and conciliation as social influence strategies.
• Out-group members perceived coercion as more effective than conciliation when applied to others,
• In-group members perceived coercion as less effective than conciliation when applied to their own social or categorical group members.
• Framing: constructing and representing interpretations.
• Defining key issues and key problems.
• Perspective.
• Separates issue from other ideas.
• Aggregate and process information.
• Language we choose engage. notion of what we are doing: discussion, argument, fight
• Frames persist as long as they are useful.
• When people hold to their frames, conflict can occur.
• Frames can be transformative.
• Change frame, change conversation.
• Frames can be shifted.
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• Make outcomes appear less attractive.
• Make the cost of obtaining goals appear higher.
• Make demands and positions appear more or less attractive to the other party-whichever suits your needs.
• Haga que los resultados aparecen menos atractivos. Haga el coste de obtener metas para aparecer más arriba. Haga que las demandas y las posiciones aparecen más o menos atractivas a la otra partido-cualquiera se adapta a sus necesidades
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• Plan disruptive action:
– Raise the costs of delay to
the other party.
• Form an alliance with
outsiders:
– Involve (or threaten to
involve) other parties that
can influence the outcome
in your favor.
• Manipulate the scheduling of
negotiations:
– One party is usually more
vulnerable to delaying than
the other.
• Acción que disturba del plan: Levante los costes de esperar al otro partido. Forme una alianza con otras: Implique (o amenace implicar) otros partidos que puedan influenciar el resultado en su favor. Manipule la previsión de negociaciones: Un partido es generalmente más vulnerable al retraso que el otro.
05/09/08 26
• Opening Offer
– Where will you start?
• Opening Stance
– What is your attitude? Competitive? Moderate?
• Initial Concessions
– Should any be made? If so, how large?
• Oferta de abertura ¿Donde usted comienzan? Postura de la abertura ¿Cuál es su actitud? ¿Competitivo? ¿Moderate? Concesiones iniciales ¿Deben cualesquiera ser hechas? ¿Si es así cómo grande?
• Negotiators who understand framing may understand how to have more control over the negotiation process.
• Frames may be malleable and, if so, can be shaped or reshaped during negotiation.
• Frames shift and change as the negotiation evolves.
• Los negociadores que entienden enmarcar pueden entender cómo tener más control sobre el proceso de la negociación.
• Los Marcas pueden ser maleables y, si es así se pueden formar o formar de nuevo durante la negociación.
• Los arcas cambian de puesto y cambian mientras que la negociación se desarrolla.
• Ohio negotiation.
• Environmentalist.
• Developers.
• Environmentalists.
• Called polluters developers.
• Conflict.
• Result of nonverbal looks and glances.
• Polarizing language.
• Trust distrust different frames.
• Main role of negotiator / mediator.
• Decide which you are doing: • Building trust.
• Managing distrust.
• Marcos de la desconfianza de la confianza diversos.
• Posicion principal del negociador/del mediador.
• Decida cuál usted está haciendo: • Confianza del edificio.
• Desconfianza de manejo.
• Trust Frame.
• Little step by step process.
• Reliability.
• Competence.
• Distrust Frame.
• Apologies.
• Reparation.
• Say vs Do.
• Marco de la confianza.
• Marcos de la desconfianza de la confianza diversos.
• Papel principal del negociador. Poco proceso paso a paso. Confiabilidad. Capacidad.
• Marco de la desconfianza.
• Apologías.
• Reparación.
• Diga contra hacen.
• Creating positive
expectations.
• Confident expectations
about the other.
• Shape them by:
• Language.
• Clear exceptions.
• Manage expectation.
• Crear expectativas
positivas.
• Expectativas confidentes
sobre la otra.
• Fórmelas cerca:
• Lengua.
• Excepciones claras.
• Maneje la expectativa.
• Tools.
• Boarders.
• Boundaries.
• Processes.
• Not trust building.
• Manages downside risk.
• Distrust binding.
• Prenuptial agreement.
• Herramientas.
• Huéspedes.
• Límites.
• Procesos.
• No edificio de la confianza.
• Maneja riesgo de baja.
• Atascamiento de la
desconfianza.
• Acuerdo Prenuptial.