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International Political Science Association

Madrid 2012 - XXII World Congress of Political Science

IDEOLOGY AND REVOLUTION IN THE XXI CENTURY

Dr. Miguel Ángel Martínez Meucci Universidad Simón Bolívar

martinez.meucci@gmail.com ABSTRACT

Insofar a revolution usually needs a set of ideas to articulate a radical change of regime,

Revolution and Ideology are terms associated. Both concepts emerged from Modernity,

understood as emancipation towards a more rational and fair social order. But nowadays, many

questions arise: What is the role of ideology in today's world? Are we living the "end of

ideologies"? Is this an era of generalized pragmatism? May pragmatism be considered as an

ideology? Could still widespread ideologies make sense of the revolutions in the same way they

did during the XIX-XX centuries? To answer such questions, in this paper we 1) settle pertinent

definitions of revolution and ideology, 2) develop a simple typology of ideologies in terms of its

relationship with social and political change, 3) point out several possible causes of the apparent

current decline/change of the role of ideologies, and 4) discuss their impact on the role that

revolution seems to play in today's world as an idea/mechanism for sociopolitical change.

Keywords: Ideologies, Revolution, Modernity, emancipation.

RESUMEN

En tanto la revolución usualmente requiere una serie de ideas para articular un cambio radical de

régimen, “revolución” e “ideología” son términos en estrecha asociación. Ambos conceptos

emergieron al calor de la Modernidad, entendida ésta como el proceso de emancipación hacia

órdenes sociales más racionales y justos. Pero, a día de hoy, varias preguntas emergen: ¿Cuál es el

rol de la ideología en el mundo de hoy? ¿Es ésta una era de pragmatismo generalizado? ¿Puede el

pragmatismo ser considerado como una ideología? ¿Podrían aún las ideologías más conocidas

otorgar sentido a las revoluciones en la misma manera que lo hicieron durante los siglos XIX y XX?

Para responder a tales interrogantes, en este ensayo 1) se establecen definiciones pertinentes de

los términos “revolución” e “ideología”; 2) se desarrolla una tipología simple de las ideologías en

términos de su relación con el cambio político y social; 3) se señalan algunas posibles causas del

aparente declive o evolución del rol de las ideologías, y 4) se reflexiona en torno al papel que la

revolución parece jugar actualmente como una idea/práctica para el cambio sociopolítico.

Palabras Clave: Revolución, Ideologías, Modernidad, emancipación.

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Introduction

This essay emerges as a further step in the research of the author, who tries to think

a general theory of revolution. In the middle of this task, it is necessary to know the

relationship between revolution and ideology. The concept of ideology is thought here from

the theory of revolution, in order to understand how ideologies are related with revolutions,

especially in today's world. In order to do this, we have to establish some assumptions and

preliminary considerations.

The most important assumption is that both concepts (ideology and revolution) are

deeply linked to modernity, insofar revolution (as we understand it nowadays) only may be

thought in modernity, for it incorporates the idea of progress, deliberately and rationally

sought by humans. Only when the world is not thought anymore as an immanent reality,

when it starts to be conceived as a space for deliberate and rational actions, going beyond

the dictates of religion or tradition, is when the idea of "progress" can take place, as well as

the ability to change political institutions at will, even by force (which is the case of the

revolution).

On the other hand, ideology also comes as such in the field of modernity. Although

this is not the only way to think the term "ideology", those meanings which do not consider

a close link with modernity tend to overlap with other concepts such as "culture", "religion"

and "world view" (Weltanschauung). As considered in this paper, ideology is clearly

different from those terms; in our point of view, the concept becomes useful only when

understood this restrained way, for it refers then to a more restricted phenomenon.

Thinking the concept of ideology from the idea of revolution, and then

understanding the influence of ideologies in revolutions, constitutes a perspective offering

an interesting framework for reflection. It makes us thinking about what could actually be

the pertinent reasons (those we presume to be susceptible of ideological formulation) by

which the social and political conflicts of our time could reach the rank of revolution.

Consequently, it makes us think of the role that both ideology and revolution could have

today, evaluating whether these concepts need to be reformulated or rethought in the XXI

century.

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A) The Concept of Revolution

The theoretical definition of the term "revolution" is a controversial and unfinished

task. Its analytical use presents difficulties of various kinds, depending on the elements

considered in the attempt to produce a definition, as well as the relevance of those items for

philosophical reflection or scientific research. For example, despite it is always said that

Aristotle dedicated a section of its "Politics" to the revolution, we must remember that the

term used by the Greek philosopher was stasis, which, according to Eric Voegelin, referred

to the political struggles that happened when “someone in a position becomes hardened and

offers resistance to the smooth interplay of society, the orders enters into disorder” 1

. The

Latin term “revolution” (which means a complete lap experienced by a material thing)

would come many centuries after; its first use in politics was conservative, indeed, as it

referred to the return to an ideal, original situation.

Many definitions have been produced since then. We consider as especially useful

for social science the concept elaborated by Charles Tilly, who made a distinction among

“revolutionary situations” and “revolutionary outcomes”. The first are much more frequent

than the second, as only some revolutionary situations evolve to produce revolutionary

outcomes, which, on their side, present a relatively abrupt substitution of the ruling political

coalition by another one2. This is, no doubt, a wide definition; it offers the advantage of

permitting an approach to key, positive variables of political change. Nonetheless, from

other (more restrictive) points of view, a revolution necessarily implicates a deep change,

not only in the political institutions, but also social, as well as the birth of a new regime.

Then we see that the concept of “revolution” has originated definitions that can be

wide or restricted. In this essay, we prefer a more restricted concept, due to several reasons.

First, as said in the introduction, we consider revolution as a mainly modern phenomenon.

Indeed, the main feature of revolution is the visible will to change the current political and

social orders, a task undertook on the base of a firm conviction that a fairer order is

possible, this belief assuring to be grounded on reason (neither religion nor tradition). This

is the way of thinking expressed by, for example, Herbert Marcuse, to whom the only way

to justify the violence usually displayed by revolutions is, precisely, the possibility to

rationally conceive a new regime, better than the current one, as well as the will to

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materialize it3. Hannah Arendt, on the other hand, considered that the purpose of revolution

could not be other than the constitutio libertatis, the rational frame of a shared space of

political liberty4. Thus, it is considered that the intent, the justification and the will to

generate a radical change in the structure of political institutions, as well as the capacity to

rationally conceive a new, fairer regime, are essential elements to talk about a revolution.

Second, according to this, we show no interest in calling “revolutions” to every

sudden substitution of power coalitions, but to those regime substitutions that come after

wide popular upheavals and relevant mobilization of several sectors of the population. If

revolution is philosophically defined as a distinct or/and essentially more complex

phenomenon that a revolt, a coup or a civil war, then it could not have any sense to name

“revolution” to all these processes (all of them, however, being able to produce

“revolutionary outcomes”); in fact, by good reasons those other phenomena have their own

concepts and definitions. Again, we consider “revolution”, to a great extent, defined by the

intent and justification preceding it, and not merely by the change of ruling coalition.

When using here the term “justification” is important to remember the use Arendt

gave to this word. The German philosopher argued that “while power relies on legitimacy,

violence requires justification” (tr. MM)5. That is to say, while legitimacy exists on the

basis of rules and facts rooted in the past (uses, consensus and established norms),

justification is oriented to the future, to rationally explain the sense of intended actions that,

being thought in the present, could take us to unforeseeable and potentially dangerous

results. Precisely because revolution tends to be violent (as we have sustained in previous

papers)6, it requires some kind of justification.

This particular character of modern revolution determines its close ties with

ideology. During the Antiquity, the Middle Age and the Ancien Régime, big popular

revolts did not use to be accompanied by a deliberate program for changing the political

institutions. Indeed, the classic slogan in the revolts prior to the American and French

revolutions (and even later) used to be “Long live the King, death the bad rule”, for the

protests were addressed against the exercise of power, not against the legitimacy of the

monarchy; they expressed a claiming purpose, reformist at the most, but not a revolutionary

one.

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Instead, modern revolution is completely linked to the idea of framing a new regime

to achieve progress, that is to say, to widen the chances of development for all the members

of a society through the framing of new political institutions and the popularization of a

new moral sense. This could be possible only when wide, relevant parts of society (usually

the less privileged at the present) not only become aware of this chance for change, leaving

aside the old principles of traditional/religious legitimacy, but also mobilize themselves to

achieve it. All this, to produce a new regime, usually requires a set of ideas and values or a

project for change, by which the revolution could be justified; without that, upheavals

would tend to remain in the rank of mere revolts. As long as these ideas are intended to be

able to mobilize not only a few, highly motivated minorities, but huge masses, they need to

be accessible, understandable by the wide majority of society. At this point, ideas give

place to ideologies, as will be analyzed throughout this paper.

Our preference here by this restricted definition of revolution let us making the

pertinent questions we want to pose. Thinking on ideologies from the perspective of a

theory of revolution (thus making an especial emphasis on the relation between ideology

and revolution in our time) is at last a reflection on the turn that modernity could be taking

now, considered from the point of view of the political conflict that characterizes our

societies in their continuous, not finished process of modernization.

B) The Concept of Ideology

During the last two centuries, there have been many different interpretations and

meanings of the term “ideology”. For example, only the Italian Marxist, Ferruccio Rossi-

Landi, distinguished preliminarily about 11 different concepts of ideology7. The making of

the term is usually attributed to Destutt du Tracy, who proposed, in the context of the

French Revolution, the convenience of developing a “science of ideas”. From his point of

view, such knowledge was of paramount importance, not only to theoretically comprehend

how ideas were related to human behavior, but also to use that knowledge to better “serve

the Revolution”, as long as this was conceived, supposed to produce a “rational order” of

political and social life.

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It is important to underline that: since its very beginning, the notion of “ideology”

was born with the aim to comprehend how ideas work, as well as with the will of using that

knowledge in a practical way, to favor the revolutionary change (mobilization of masses

and framing of a “rational” political and social order). In fact, it can be affirmed that the

practical/functional orientation of the term “ideology” has always be part of its nature,

evolving to become a “set of ideas for action” and distinguishing itself of political

philosophy and political science. There is a wide consensus among many authors in that

sense.

Regimes sustained in traditional/religious legitimacy were not interested in massive

mobilization, but widespread loyalty. Prior to modernity, the world was conceived

essentially as an immanent entity, as an immutable order reflecting the will of God. It was

also a fact that, in Antiquity, old laws used to be taken as the best laws. But when the

unprecedented explosion of revolution popularized the notion that change is not only

natural but good and rational, tradition and religion could no longer be the main principles

of legitimacy. Some kind of new principle was needed, allegedly based on reason, but

understandable enough to the majority of the population. Systems of political ideas evolved

then into ideologies, that is to say, ideas systematically prepared for massive consumption.

It would be mainly Karl Marx who popularized the notion that ideology was

essentially “superstructure”, the dominant class’ system of beliefs (and, by extension, the

general system of ideas of the whole society). According to the German philosopher, those

beliefs are mainly conditioned, if not determined, by the material conditions of production,

definitely representing an instrument for domination. Since then, the term “ideology” has

remained strongly associated to the notion of “false consciousness”. As Néstor Capdevila

has said, “four elemental notions of the term ‘ideology’ may be identified and are

commonly used nowadays, all going beyond the Marxist thought” (tr. MM)8. These are: 1)

the reduction of the consciousness of life, where taking a theoretical position reflects the

own social position; 2) the autonomy of the consciousness regarding the life, so identifying

ideology with the conception of the world (Weltanshauung); 3) ideology as a factor of

social integration, insofar its universal form may be shared by dominants and dominates;

and 4) ideological speech legitimizing the domination of a class by another one (being this

the most popular among all these four interpretations).

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The own Marxist vision, in its more vulgarized and programmatic version,

constituted also an ideology. Insofar Karl Mannheim recognized the relative character of

every kind of social knowledge, he tended to consider all system of ideas as ideology. As

Michael Freeden has said, Mannheim

paved the way towards generalizing ideology as an omnipresent social phenomenon

as well as a group product, to include Marxism itself […] Mannheim hence attempted

to introduce a new epistemology by suggesting that ‘all historical knowledge is

relational knowledge, and can only be formulated with reference to the position of the

observer’9

Some decades later, with the rise of the functionalist paradigm, the scholars focused

their studies on ideology as a phenomenon. According to these approaches, which

constituted the mainstream school during the 50’s and the 60’s, ideologies play specific

functions in the political system (social cohesion, legitimization, mobilization), this being a

subsystem of the wider social system. Ideologies are born as ideas, but become beliefs as

long as they vulgarize in order to mobilize the masses. To this school belonged Parsons,

Bell, Lipset, Aron, Sartori and many others among the more renowned social scientists of

that time.

Given the need to define “ideology” in falsifiable terms, for the purpose of using the

concept on an empirical level, Sartori (following Converse and Rokeach) opposes ideology

with pragmatism. Ideology would be a system of beliefs characterized by fixed elements,

high emotional intensity and closed cognitive structures (“closed mind”). On the other side,

pragmatism would represent a system of ideas made of flexible elements, low emotional

intensity and open cognitive structures (“open mind”). It is relevant to underline what

Sartori says: pragmatism does not exclude beliefs; instead it represents a skeptical attitude

in which still is possible do distinguish among the authority beliefs (“beliefs about how to

believe to whom”; tr. MM)10

. A doubt on this approach regards the possibility of

considering pragmatism as another type of ideology. It is so considered, among others, by

Dowse & Hughes11

. This was indeed a main critic made, during the 60’s and 70’s, against

the position held by Bell, Lipset, Sartori and others. Insofar this position looks at Marxism-

Leninism, on one hand, as typical ideological thought, and on the other consider Liberalism

as highly pragmatic (more “objective” and focused on “reality”), its critics affirmed that

this school was also deeply ideological.

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As the result of the contributions made by the so called “linguistic turn” and the

cultural anthropology to the social sciences, other theoretical schools preferred to use the

term “ideology” to designate a general and widely extended system of beliefs, instead of a

restricted group of ideas more or less organized to direct the political action of the masses.

These approaches are mainly shared by sociologists and anthropologists. According to this

perspective, the ideology has many points in common with distinct phenomena, like culture

or religion, and would tend to be very close to the notion of Weltanshauung or Cosmo-

vision. In that sense, from a structuralist point of view, ideology would be something like

the modern equivalent of religion, its substitute as the legitimizing system of beliefs of a

whole epoch. Lévi-Strauss, among many others, made important contributions to this

approach. As Freeden has said:

Claude Lévi-Strauss focused on cultural symbols such as myths, and by extension on

ideology as modern myth possessing an internal, self-contained logic. Unlike

Althusser, he regarded ideology as a ‘though-of’ order external to objective reality (a

‘lived-in’ order) and more akin to the supernatural […] The function of ideology is

therefore to join together with other mechanisms in imposing, unconsciously form the

perspective of the participants, significant logical forms on content12

According to the previous paragraphs, it is clear that, depending on the chosen

concept, the term “ideology” may refer to a system of beliefs of wide rank, that is to say, to

a predominant cultural system, or to several partial groups of ideas, systematized and

transformed in beliefs, aiming to comprehend the public affairs and direct the political

actions. Here, we will call these two tendencies, respectively, as “cultural perspective” and

“political perspective” in the study of ideologies. However, it is important to emphasize

that, in both cases, the ideology is understood as a system of beliefs. Even if (we dare to

say) in the “political perspective” ideologies keep closer to the rank of ideas than they do

when considered from the “cultural perspective”, none of these two points of view sustain

that ideologies are ideas stricto sensu; Ideologies stand out (and there is some consensus on

that) for their simplifying, schematic and constrictive character. As Ortega y Gasset said

once, “while ideas we have, in beliefs we are” (tr. MM)13

and, indeed, it is precisely that

character of “system of ideas” what is pertinent to underline while studying ideologies. It is

also pertinent to remember here those words of Arendt which say:

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Prejudices represent always in the public-politic space, with good reason, a great role.

They refer to what we share without noticing and to what we do not discuss anymore

because we almost do not have now the chance to experience it directly. All these

prejudices, when they are legitimate and not mere quacking, are previous judgments.

Nobody can live without them, for a life without prejudices would need a

superhuman attention […] But just when the prejudices shock in open conflict with

reality they start to be dangerous and the people, who do not feel protected by them

anymore when thinking, start to made of them the base of that kind of evil theories

that we usually call ideologies or also cosmo-visions14

In conclusion, as Fernando Mires has said following Arendt, ideologies are “petrified

ideas”15

. At the beginning, they start as systems of ideas, but they become beliefs through

the process of its popularization. From a functionalist perspective, we have seen that

ideologies play several, important functions in the social-political systems; they

proportionate relatively simple, organized cognitive schemes to facilitate the

comprehension of the main social and political problems. Ideologies are not an exact

equivalent of religion, nor culture, nor cosmo-vision (Weltanshauung), because their base is

not located on faith, nor tradition, nor customs, but on more or less logical ideas, rationally

subjected to discussion, although transformed in beliefs. From our point of view, they

represent an essentially modern phenomenon, as long as only it was only in the sphere of

modernity that a new legitimacy, based on rational postulates, became necessary regarding

to the masses (these constituted in new political subject) and their mobilization for the

political life.

In this paper, we do not follow the “cultural definition” nor the “political definition”

of ideology, although we prefer to use the concept respect to mainly political affairs. When

referring to general systems of widespread social beliefs, we consider preferable to use

other terms, which explain such phenomena in a more specific way. This obey to practical

reasons, insofar the proliferation of concepts used to refer to similar things, overlapping

each other, deteriorates their analytical pertinence. Indeed, if by “ideology” we should

understand something similar to “religion” or “cosmo-vision”, what is the specific in the

term? How use it with analytical purposes? The “cultural perspective” poses this problem;

instead, we consider here that the “political perspective” offers, at least, the benefit of

alluding to several systems of ideas/beliefs, in a contest to reach the control of politics and

the State, thus highlighting the specifically modern character of ideologies.

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C) A Brief Typology of Ideologies

Although authors like Néstor Capdevila consider “banal” the thesis on the modern

character of ideology16

, in our paper we assume it as a key element to understand its nature

and implications. What kind of implications? First, let´s remember what Leo Strauss said:

Every action is oriented to conservation or change. When we want to conserve we try

to avoid the change towards a worst situation; when we desire to change we try to

update to something better. Hence every political action is directed by our thought on

the best and the worst. A thought on the best and the worst, however, implies a

thought on the good17

Thus the human being, as an ethical/political being, and in order to act, requires

thinking, or at least having some kind of orientation regarding the implications of change

for politics and society. Such an orientation would take him to be in favor or against

change. Before Modernity, when the world used to be conceived as an immanent,

immutable reality, religion and tradition did proportionate that orientation. Under those

heavily hierarchical systems, the members of a polity where asked for obedience and not

for participation; perhaps, the dilemma between change and conservation could not be

considered as politically recurrent. Indeed, this dilemma is typical of Modernity, as it arises

with the display of reason. It is assumed that social/political reality may be modified

according to rational considerations, thus giving place to the idea of emancipation,

evolution and progress. Hence, Modernity is the acknowledgement and acceptation of

change as the natural condition of social/political life.

Insofar reason is considered as a universal human attribute, modernization appears

everywhere, in a sociopolitical dimension, as the subjective incorporation of the bulk of the

citizens to the public spaces and activities. In practice, that means the irruption of masses in

political life, carrying out two problems. One is the need of this new protagonism of the

masses to count with a new, minimal political orientation. Once displaced the old pillars of

pre-modern legitimacy (faith, customs, traditions), that social mobilization is only possible

on the basis of certain ideas or general frames of interpretation of sociopolitical reality,

which we call “ideologies”, considered in plural because there are not only about

legitimizing a regime, but about the opening of politics to everybody’s participation.

Although ideologies become also beliefs, they aspire (and affirm) to be grounded on the

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rational comprehension of the empiric reality, the facts. As they intend to be the rational

basis for the political action of large masses, ideologies necessarily are concerned with

change and action.

On the other hand, this progressive incorporation of all the citizens to the political

life did not use to be peaceful; many times, modernization comes with revolution.

According to Huntington18

, revolution may be defined as a phase in the modernization

process, a generally violent step that take place when the bulk of the population becomes

aware and actively familiarize with the notion of rights, thus claiming for it. Violence tends

to be typical in this phase because of the resistance naturally posed by the elites, who

usually do not accept easily the loose of their privileges. Even when the revolution is

absent, the revolutionary threat could operate as the main incentive to favor a progressive

development and consolidation of democracies. This assumption is made (among others) by

James Robinson & Daron Acemoglu to elaborate their political economy model on

democratization; according to them, “democracy arises when concessions [by the élites] are

not credible and repression is not attractive because it is too costly”19

.

Thus, a deep relation may be recognized between ideology and revolution in the

sphere of Modernity. We do not affirm that every revolution is oriented toward the goals

inherent to Modernity (because it is also possible to talk about “regressive revolutions”,

from a Modern point of view), neither we say that all the ideologies supporting revolutions

have a compromise with those goals. What we say is that revolution, as it may be

understood in our time, is a typically modern phenomenon, a mean for action whose sense

is essentially modern, even if its goals are modern or not. Insofar it implies the irruption of

masses in political life, revolution is deeply related with the rise of ideologies as a

necessary mechanism to think and direct the revolutionary political action (even the

counter-revolutionary one). In a modern society (which, as modern, conceives revolution as

a possible, deliberate way and supposes the incorporation of all the citizens to politics),

ideology (not faith, not tradition, not political philosophy nor political science) becomes the

political though par excellence, as long as it serves to formulate a general frame of

sufficiently coherent ideas, approachable to the masses in order to endorse their political

actions.

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On the previous base, it is plausible and pertinent to elaborate a simple typology of

ideologies, according to their respective position in front of the idea of change, especially

revolutionary change. Hence it is possible to identify, broadly speaking, three general kinds

of ideology:

Revolutionary Ideologies: systems of ideas sustaining the belief that change must be

radical, even violent if necessary. They denounce the current sociopolitical situation

as deeply unfair, presenting themselves as having the intellectual and moral capacity

to offer a more ideal, rational, practicable and fair option.

Reformist Ideologies: systems of ideas assuming change as natural, necessary and

positive, without a total rejection of the virtues and advantages of the current

sociopolitical situation. They considerate that change must be accomplished through

dialogue, without openly violate the statu quo rules if these do not stop “progress”.

Statu Quo or Conservative Ideologies: systems of ideas looking skeptical about

change, usually opposing to it. In any case, they consider that change should be

gradual. In the sphere of Modernity, they appear as the less confident in the

possibilities of reason, more attached to tradition, religion and custom.

On this essay, we are mainly concerned with the role played nowadays by the revolutionary

ideologies. Still they exist? Which are they? Have they some validity or are declining?

What kind of conflict they perceive or pose? Above all: Do they determinate the rise and

making of the revolutions or our time, or are these happening without the support of an

ideological justification as such?

D) “End of Ideologies” o “Ideological Transition Phases”?

To answer those questions, it is necessary to make first a brief review of the well-

known thesis on the “end of ideologies”. As Seymour Martin Lipset said, the idea was

originally sustained by classic Marxism, for it mainly considered ideologies as “false

consciousness”, thus being surmountable by real knowledge. According to Lipset:

Engels argued that “there would be an end to all ideology” unless the material

interests underlying all ideologies remained “of necessity unknown to these persons”.

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That is, insofar as true consciousness existed, as men became aware of their real

interests, ideology –i.e., the elaboration of false consciousness- would disappear20

Years later, Karl Mannheim also explained a probable decline of ideologies21

. The

thesis experienced its zenith during the 50´s and the 60´s, when it was sustained by influent

social scientists which shared a common functionalist approach, being Daniel Bell,

Raymond Aron and Lipset himself among them. The thesis of the “end of ideologies” was

severely questioned by many critics since the late 60´s, in part as a consequence of the

many existing concepts of ideologies (polysemy has accompanied the idea of “ideology”

during its whole existence). Lipset would defend its work later, explaining that the “end of

ideologies” was not meaning the end of all utopia or political though as such. As appointed

by Rejai, Mason & Beller:

The end-of-ideology hypothesis, then, has occasioned a large body of scholarly

output over the past decade. In general terms, this hypothesis seeks to establish a

negative correlation between the degree of economic development and the intensity

of ideological politics within a given country. The hypothesis has held up quite well

in empirical investigations in a number of advanced industrial societies22

At this point it is important to mention the findings of Ronald Inglehart on the rise of

post-materialist values in developed societies23

, which help to support the thesis of a

relative “decline of ideologies”. On the other hand, Michael Freeden (who uses a broader

concept of ideology) is among who reject this thesis; as he says:

If ideology is, as will be suggested here, a permanent and ubiquitous phenomenon,

the end of ideology would signal the end of society itself, a world in which strong and

cohesive political beliefs would neither be held nor acted upon24

When taken to this wide extent, the term “ideology” seems to refer to the

phenomenon though and described by the so called “Frankfurt School”. Horkheimer and

Adorno used the term “ideology” to explain the rise of the absolute “instrumental reason”

during the XX Century, a process that Marcuse said to be producing a “one-dimensional

man”. Hence the rescue of the Modernity project would pass by the recuperation of the

“subjective reason” 25

and its inherent possibilities of emancipation. Later, Habermas would

think the role of science and technique as a “new ideology”:

Scientific-technic progress subject to control becomes itself in support of

legitimation. This new way of legitimation has lost, however, the old character of

ideology. Technocratic consciousness is, on one hand, less ideological than the

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previous ideologies, for it does not have the dull power of a blurring only resembling

a satisfaction of interests, without accomplishing it. But, on the other hand, the

underlying ideology, rather glassy, dominant nowadays, converting science into a

fetish, is more irresistible than old kind ideologies [tr. MM]26

Although Habermas explains the role than science and technique can play as

“ideology”, he accepts that it do not constitute an ideology in its old meaning. According to

this author, what we should call as the more typical “ideological phenomenon” of our time

does not consist anymore in systems of ideas thought for action and transformed in beliefs

(for this still would signify the predominance of reason and politics, the inter-subjective

sphere), but rather the dominant influence exerted by the logics of postindustrial science

and technique (a logic ruling nowadays what Habermas calls the “subsystems of purposive

rational action”) on the sphere of symbolically conditioned interactions (the space for

communicative action and politics as such). This is, as Adorno & Horkheimer would say,

the predominance of “instrumental reason” over “subjective reason”; the essence of our

time´s alienation, which, according to Habermas, “affects the emancipatory interests as

such of the species”27

. That is to say, the depolitization of the nature of human conflict has

a negative influence on political struggles as a way to achieve emancipation, thus

condemning politics to exert mere administrative functions.

On Frankfurt School´s position, Slavoj Zizek affirms that

The notion of “instrumental reason” does not belong anymore to the horizon of a

critique of ideology: “instrumental reason” refers to an attitude not merely functional

on social domination; it rather works like the base itself of the dominance relation28

[tr. MM]

Zizek also points out the nature of the ideological phenomena of our time, distinct to

those corresponding to the traditional notions of ideology:

What we can see now is a third continent of ideological phenomena: not ideology as

an explicit doctrine (convictions articulated on the nature of the man, society and

universe) nor ideology in its material existence (institutions, rituals and practices

which flesh out to it), but the elusive net of implicit attitudes and preconceptions,

quasi “spontaneous”, which constitute an irreducible moment in the reproduction of

“non-ideological” practices (economic, legal, political, sexual…)29

Thus we see that, for the authors linked to the Marxist tradition, ideology has not

declined; it rather has evolved, becoming more ubiquitous and hard to detect. According to

15

this tradition, it is possible to say (still in the key of “false consciousness”) that ideology

has evolved as a hegemonic mechanism (even “totalitarian”, if we follow Marcuse), much

less evident but so much more deceitful, insofar it derives from the “instrumental reason”

and the technocratic consciousness.

Nevertheless, it is possible to ask: Does not constitute the rise of this “instrumental

reason”, this logic apparently developed with the rise of science and technique, a cultural

rather than a properly ideological phenomenon? As long as we will be inclined to think that

there is a more or less deliberate will and a preconceived strategy of domination, we will

tend also to consider “instrumental reason” (Adorno, Marcuse, Horkheimer) or

“technocratic consciousness” (Habermas) as ideologies. If this were the case, one could

guess this is the main “breeding ground” for the deepest political revolutions of our time:

the eventual struggle for the emancipation, for the overcoming of those power speeches and

its derived social practices. However, if we consider these phenomena as cultural aspects

typical of the late capitalism, not deliberately made to exert some kind of domination but

rather as a consequence of the rise of science and technique in their common relation with

the logic of market (all this understood as the natural outcome of a society based on

individual freedom), its ideological character would tend to lose its ground. It would be

rather one more phase in the process of “disenchantment of the world” observed by Max

Weber, in its unstoppable progression towards the rationalization of the social action.

At this point is pertinent remembering the definition of ideology proposed by

Immanuel Wallerstein: “a long-lasting, global program of political action aiming to

mobilize the wider group of people”30

. Ideology, in that sense, would be inherent to

Modernity. It would be even possible to talk about an “ideological trinity”, in which

Liberalism, Conservatism and Socialism are no more than distinct conceptions of a unique,

fundamental, modern ideology. Liberalism would be the central ideology, noting that both

Conservatism and Socialism finally assumed essential Liberal premises. As a consequence,

and as Capdevila affirms when he explains Wallerstein´s though, “the radical critique to

Liberalism would pass by the radicalization of its democratic dimension”31

[tr. MM], given

the fact that Liberalism “is the conception of the world that prevailed over its rivals for its

capacity to politically embody the Weltanshauung of Modernity”. However, according to

16

Wallerstein, the capacity of Liberalism to incorporate its rivals has declined during the last

decades; as Capdevila paraphrases him:

We could be even in front of the end of ideology: “In this new era, the only effective

weapon of dominants soon will be the force”, and it is not sure than the anti-system

forces have “the capacity to reinvent an ideological dimension for their struggles”32

To sum up, we conclude that a certain consensus exists: ideology is not today what

it used to be some time ago. By different ways it is possible to arrive to this conclusion

(even if those ways may differ in all other things). On one hand, structural-functionalist

theorists have pointed out an apparent “end or decline of ideologies”, typical of the

societies which have achieved some degree of development and welfare. On the other side,

those supporting the critic, post-Marxist trend denounce and describe a relatively new

“ideological phenomenon”, more complex and hard to identify, associated with an

allegedly unique, hegemonic or dominant though serving to legitimize several forms of

domination typical of late, postindustrial capitalism. In front of this hegemonic thought,

considered “ideology” (in connection with the old idea of “false consciousness”) by this

critic trend, there is not, apparently, any ideologically organized response (ideological in

the sense that Lenin and Stalin gave to the term: a “subjective force” of the working class,

not as “false consciousness”), nor the more or less spontaneous conformation of political

forces of a truly revolutionary character.

The relation between ideology and revolution will be addressed in the following

section; here we try to produce a preliminary conclusion about the state of ideology in our

time. Two tentative conclusions arise, not necessarily concordant. First, we observe that,

according to almost all the intellectual traditions, today the predominant idea is that

ideology, in its more classic sense, is not anymore an effective vehicle for social

mobilization, and even less for the emancipation of the human being; at much, it may be

considered as an increasingly ineffective mechanism of control and subjection. Second, it

could be affirmed that, even if, on one hand, the concept of ideology endorsed by the

“cultural perspective” (near to the notion of Weltanshauung) continues to be useful to

denominate very current phenomena nowadays (linked to subtle ways of domination), on

the other hand, from what we call here the “political perspective” (which comprehend

17

“ideology” as a rational system of ideas that finally become beliefs), ideologies seems to

have lost to a great extent its validity and effectiveness to signify and mobilize.

What is the cause of the decline and/or modification in the character of ideology?

Some argue this is due to the increasing capacities of the political systems to satisfy their

societies´ demands. Such an expansion would be based on both the ideological synthesis

pointed out by Wallerstein (in which Liberalism constitutes the center of the modern

Weltanshauung) and the sustained, general improvement of the effective performance of

postindustrial capacities to fulfill the requirements of their citizens. Instead, others sustain

the thesis of some kind of “false consciousness” revisited in the idea of the “eclipse of

(subjective) reason”, the depolitization of the inter-subjective sphere and the rise of the

technocratic consciousness. In any case, it is clear that (at least during the last two decades)

the levels of social conflict seems to have drop in the postindustrial societies, in a more or

less inversely proportional way to the rise of satisfaction; this induces to think that the

“need of ideologies” (especially the revolutionary ones), as well as their popularity and

diffusion, seem to be in decline. Hence the deep crisis in which seem to be stuck radical

Left ideologies, in front of a general pragmatism coming as result, to a great extent, of a

Liberal, utilitarian Cosmo vision.

Especially when examined from a “political perspective”, ideologies seem to have

lost their freshness and capacity to both explaining the world and mobilizing for political

action. The apparent overcoming of some of the most important conflicts that originated the

typical ideologies of Modernity would have deprived their sense in today´s world; hence

the Arendt´s reflection on the ideologies, considering them as “petrified ideas”, based on

prejudices and monotonous thoughts, always arisen during revolutionary processes.

According to Arendt, ideologies are among the main problems faced by the need to develop

truly fertile and valuable political action. As she said:

Nowadays, nothing jeopardizes the most the comprehension of political problems and

the fertile discussion on them as the automatic mental reaction conditioned by the

commonplaces of ideologies, all of which were born in the dawn and sunset of

revolutions33

Thus, ideologies would not be something else than “perverse theories”, built on

prejudices that were at the beginning, certainly, judges or genuine ideas. These, on their

18

side, arise together with the need of deep, original thinking, in order to deal with new,

shocking situations usually marked by conflict. Revolutions are of paramount importance

in that sense, as they usually carry out the making of a new political regime. According to

Arendt, revolutions would be the top chance (terrible and exceptional) to achieve the

highest goal of political action: exerting liberty and the settlement of a due space to that

exercise, the constitutio libertatis. This could only be possible throughout real thinking and

spontaneous action; instead, ideologies would not be something else than the killing of the

nature of the activities required to undertake genuine political action.

If we accept the way Arendt consider ideologies, these could be always condemned

to decline, especially when the conflicts that they were created to explain or resolve

experience drastic changes (because they evolve, disappear, change its sense or find some

solution). Rather than explaining the decline of ideologies uniquely by arguing deep

changes in ideological minds and attitudes, we could also talk about the profound changes

experienced in the structures and patterns of the conflicts that originated ideologies. Thus,

each new, big conflict would be, perhaps, the starting point to originate new judgments,

new ideas outlining its possible overcoming. On the other hand, insofar Modernity (by

definition) implies the aspiration of political equality and the mobilization of the masses for

politics, it is hard to conceive a total disappearing or superseding of ideology, for such a

situation would imply an almost total absence of prejudices, as well as the effective

displacement of that double universal tendency that we, human beings, have toward

cognitive consciousness and mental economy (see the Arendt´s previous quotations).

Accepting this hypothesis would mean that, instead of talking of an “end of

ideology” or the coming of an irreversible post-ideological era, it is preferable to think of

large “ideological transition phases”. If ideology tends to evolve from fresh, original ideas,

born to give some response to new conflicts arising in the context of mass society, then new

ideologies could turn up with new, relevant, distinct kind of conflicts. Perhaps these

conflicts are not totally visible during the two decades that followed the end of the Cold

War, but nothing prevents its coming in the future.

19

E) Ideology and Revolution in the XXI Century: Some Preliminary Conclusions.

Some preliminary ideas may be stated, respect to the arguments offered throughout

the previous pages. The main conclusion is: ideologies probably will remain in decline in

the meanwhile, until the rise of some new, huge, radical and unexpected social conflicts

would offer the conditions to the birth of some new ideologies. Deep conflicts as such

(following Arendt) tend to be related with revolutions. Especially the revolutionary

ideologies would be affected by this general hypothesis. According to our point of view,

which prefers to stress the “political perspective” on the study of ideologies, revolutionary

ones are the ideologies par excellence, because they are the most concerned with mass

mobilization; nevertheless, insofar Arendt says that every ideology originates in times of

revolution, the hypothesis may be, in some way, extended to all ideologies. Even

conservative ideologies are born as a reaction against radical change; on the other hand,

when deeply rooted, shared and effective, they tend to lose their ideological character,

evolving into something closer to culture, cosmo-vision, Weltanshauung. Ideologies are in

decline because they are no longer an effective vehicle for social mobilization (being old

answers to new or solved conflicts), or have become part of the cultural register of our time.

Could be valid the opposite affirmation? May be affirmed that revolutions would be

hard to occur without being driven by revolutionary ideologies? If we again follow Arendt,

the answer should be no. Revolutions, especially the most typical, constitute the irruption

of spontaneity in politics, the fall of the current political structures because of an explosive,

suddenly untied desire of liberty. Without that element, it would be difficult to talk about

revolution. On the other hand, a revolution is relatively easy to explain ex post facto, but

almost impossible to predict; they are, by nature, anarchic, disordered processes, in which

political creativity find every kind of chance to express and flourish. The wider the scope of

a revolution, and the deeper its potential for the foundation of a new order, the lesser would

be its ties with ideological considerations. As Arendt said: “The role of professional

revolutionaries usually do not consist in making a revolution, but in coming up to power

once this has happened […] the cause of revolution is not conspiracy”34

(tr. MM).

Nonetheless, it is also true that after a big revolution, some “minor” revolutions tend

to follow it. That is the moment when ideologies (especially the revolutionary ones) take its

20

major strength, as long as that big, spontaneous explosion needs to be given some sense in

order to be understood and reproduced in other polities. New, fresh ideas emerge first in

order to comprehend and organize massive social conflicts; but they transform later in

ideologies when they routinize and become scarcely creative recipes for the making of new

revolutions. Arendt thus affirmed: “Those who went to the school of revolution were

learning and knowing in advance the course that must be taken by a revolution. They were

imitating the course of the events, not the men of Revolution”35

(tr. MM). “History”, thus,

substituted free, creative political action. Considering the previous reasoning, it

hypothetically may be supposed that ideology could only reemerge as a revolutionary

driver on the basis of an interaction among the following three circumstances:

a) The progressive eruption of massive conflicts and discontents, important enough

to conceive the chance of a new, significant phase of emancipation;

b) The presence of despotic sociopolitical orders, perceived as repressive enough to

make sense of a revolutionary action (that is to say, radical and potentially violent),

c) A system of ideas (not an ideology yet) fresh enough, as valid and original as to

foresee a reasonable horizon of change, a “promise land” good enough to deserve a

revolutionary struggle in order to be reached.

To resume: the study of conflict is the key to understand the relation between

ideology (structured ideas, prepared to action) and revolution (action on the base of certain

ideas or ideals). Hence it is required the study of what Habermas has called “the zones of

conflict”, the spaces and patterns of the sociopolitical struggle in our time. According to

this author, these “new zone of conflicts”:

only may erupt there where the late-capitalism society needs to immunize itself (by

the depolitization of the masses) against the questioning of the underlying

technocratic ideology: precisely in the public opinion system administrated by the

mass media. For only there may be rooted the cover up required by the system respect

to the difference between the progress of the subsystems of purposive rational action

and the emancipatory mutations of the institutional frame –between practical and

technical affairs, that is to say36

(tr. MM)

However, even Habermas is skeptical respect to the capacity of this kind of conflicts

to acquire a truly revolutionary dimension. Indeed, a brief look to the principal

revolutionary or pseudo-revolutionary phenomena of our time do not seem to be carried out

21

by a discontent especially directed against that “technocratic cosmo-vision” or “single

thought” denounced by the Frankfurt’s School. Rather, what seems to predominate

throughout all of them is a set of more essential feelings, a wish of freedom, inclusion and

satisfaction of what is universally considered nowadays as basic human needs.

For example, in the case of the so called “Arab Spring”, the weariness respect to

several despotic regimes of long duration, the high rates of unemployment among the

young population and the traditional religious and tribal rivalries seem to play the main

role. In Latin America, in spite of the anti-imperialistic, anti-capitalist rhetoric developed

by those who lead the so called “new Latin American Left”, the true motivations of their

followers do not seem to be directly related with such discourses, but rather with

unsatisfied needs and acute inequalities. Even in the case of the indignados, the Occupy

Movement and other protests as such, it may be noticed the absence of a truly revolutionary

character; it is rather a restoring, claiming, peaceful demand which arose as a response to

the misfortunate financial management that took place in several developed countries.

Thus, what kind of factors can drive revolutions, so having the potential capacity to

endorse the rising of new ideologies? Explanations are always between those who attend to

structural variables (looking for “causes” or, at least, high levels of correlation) and those

who look at the actors, stressing the importance of free will. On one side, structural studies

have underlined the importance of a set of influent variables strongly correlated with the

eruption of revolutions; for example, Jack A. Goldstone suggests that “the roots of

revolutionary crises might lie in the pattern of long waves of population growth and

prices”37

. On the other side, there is the position of those who think as Leon Aron, who

recently has affirmed that:

It was the beginning of a desperate search for answers to the big questions with which

every great revolution starts: What is a good, dignified life? What constitutes a just

social and economic order? What is a decent and legitimate state? What should such a

state's relationship with civil society be?38

Broadly talking, material requirements seem to give place to diverse kinds of

discontents and conflicts, originating new big questions and refreshing the chances for new

ideas to arise about the way the sociopolitical order should be constituted. The popularity of

radical change proposal would increase insofar the new conflicts seem unsolvable. Such a

22

conflict usually is also accompanied by the division of the elites, so weakening the stability

of the statu quo. There will be also some kind of correlation between massive, popular

communication and the launching of protests. Good, plausible ideas, as well as effective

ideal frames for interpreting reality will rapidly appear and grow; sooner or later, they

probably will also popularize, standardize as ideologies, thus becoming able to legitimize

and organize massive mobilization, but losing its initial freshness.

Nowadays, traditional ideologies have hardly the capacity to drive truly revolutionary

actions because the current problems are not exactly those they were made to respond.

Some of those old conflicts have being solved, at least partially. On one hand, today´s

problems and conflicts are new to a great extent; on the other hand, not many among them

seem to be strong enough to trigger revolutions. Probably, today´s problems are not as

acute as those which gave place to the “age of revolution” (in Hobsbawm´s words39

);

nevertheless, they could become more serious with time. What is sure is that giving

response to these problems requires new political thinking, not ideological one. Following

Arendt, political action (not only the revolutionary one) requires always the ability to think

genuinely, beyond the conditioning imposed by ideologies. It is matter of posing the right

questions; it is about (in Heiddeger´s words) “knowing how to think”40

. By now, while the

“new zone of conflict” detected by Habermas in this late-capitalism society do not seem to

be as profound and existential as to drive violent responses, the reason behind the

revolutionary phenomena of our time seems continuing to be the oldest one: the fight

against tyranny and despotism, in order to reach liberty.

Endnotes 1 Voegelin, Eric (1964): “On Aristotle and Revolution”, fragment available in

http://www.fritzwagner.com/ev/aristotle_and_revolution.html (Consulted: Noviembre 18, 2007); originally appeared in CW Vol 11, “Published Essays 1953-1965”, Man in Society and History, 1964, edited by Ellis Sandoz, 2000, pp. 196-197. 2 Tilly, Charles (1995): Revoluciones Europeas 1492-1992, Crítica, Barcelona.

3 Marcuse, Herbert (1970, orig. in German of 1965): Ética de la revolución, Taurus, Madrid.

4 Arendt, Hannah (2004, orig. 1963): Sobre la revolución, Alianza, Madrid.

5 Arendt, Hannah (2006, orig. 1969): Sobre la violencia, Alianza, Madrid.

6 Martinez Meucci, Miguel Á. (2007): “La violencia como elemento integral del concepto de revolución”, en

Politeia N° 39, Vol. 30, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Universidad Central de Venezuela, pp. 187-222. 7 Rossi-Landi, Ferruccio (1980): Ideología, Labor, Barcelona; p. 31.

8 Capdevila, Néstor (2006, orig. 2004): El concepto de ideología, Nueva Visión, Buenos Aires; p. 59.

23

9 Freeden, Michael (1996): Ideologies and Political Theory, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 26. 10

Sartori, Giovanni (19): Elementos de Teoría Política, Alianza, Madrid; pp. 115-137. 11

Dowse, & Hughes, (1999): Sociología política, Alianza, Madrid. 12

Freeden, Michael (1996): op.cit, p. 20. 13

Ortega y Gasset, José (1999, orig. 1986): Ideas y creencias, Alianza, Madrid. 14

Arendt, Hannah (1997): ¿Qué es la política?, Paidós, Barcelona; pp. 97-98. 15

Mires, Fernando: “La maldad totalitaria” (Julio 8, 2011), http://prodavinci.com/2011/07/08/actualidad/la-maldad-totalitaria-por-fernando-mires/ (consulted on July 10, 2011). 16

Capdevila, Néstor (2006), op.cit. Capdevila understands ideology from a religious model, based on the notion of “heresy”. 17

Strauss, Leo (1970, orig. 1968): ¿Qué es filosofía política?, Ediciones Guadarrama, Madrid, p. 11. 18

Huntington, Samuel (1972): “Modernization by Revolution”, en Revolution and Political Change, Duxbury Press, USA; pp. 19-55. 19

Robinson, James & Acemoglu, Daron (2006): Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Cambridge University Press. 20

Lipset, Seymour M. (1990, orig. 1985): Consensus and Conflict, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick and London; p. 82. La cita de Engels por parte de Lipset: Engels, Friedrich, “Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy” (1885), in K. Marx and F. Engels, On Religion (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957), p. 263. 21

Lipset, Seymour M. (1990): op.cit, p. 97. 22

Quoted by Lipset, Seymour M. (1990): op.cit, p. 101. 23

Inglehart, Ronald (2008): “Changing Values among Western Publics from 1970 to 2006”, en West European Politics, Vol. 31, Nos. 1-2, 130-146, January-March 2008, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/publication_559/files/values_1970-2006.pdf (consulted on November 2011). 24

Freeden, Michael (1996): op.cit, p. 19. 25

Horkheimer, Max (2002): Crítica de la razón instrumental, Trotta, Madrid; p. 45. 26

Habermas, Jürgen (2006, orig. 1984): Ciencia y técnica como “ideología”, Tecnos, Madrid; p. 96. 27

Ibidem, p. 97. 28

Zizek, Slavoj: Ideología: Un mapa de la cuestión. Introducción, en http://www.lacan.com/zizek-ideologia1.htm (consulted on Abril 28, 2012). 29

Idem. 30

Quoted by Capdevila (2006), op.cit., p. 65. 31

Ibidem, p. 67. 32

This paragraph belongs to Capdevila (op.cit., p. 69). The sections between quotations marks are quotations of Wallerstein made by Capdevila. 33

Arendt (2004, orig. 1963): Sobre la revolución, p. 308. 34

Arendt, ibídem, pp. 358-359. 35

Arendt, ibídem, p. 76. 36

Habermas, op.cit., pp. 108-109. 37

Goldstone, Jack A. –ed.- (2003): Revolutions. Theoretical, Comparative and Historical Studies, Wadsworth & Thomson Learning, Belmont, USA; p. 17. 38

Aron, Leon: “Everything You Think You Know About the Colapse of the Soviet Union Is Wrong”, in Foreign Policy, July-August 2011 (consulted on November 30, 2011) http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/20/everything_you_think_you_know_about_the_collapse_of_the_soviet_union_is_wrong?page=full 39

Hobsbawm, Eric (1997, orig. 1962): La Era de la Revolución (1789-1848), Crítica, Buenos Aires. 40

Heiddeger, Martin (2005): ¿Qué significa pensar?, Trotta, Madrid.