Revision Notes - International Relations, 1919-39

The post-war peace settlement, 1919-23(Walsh, p.80-96) The aims of the Big Three at the Paris Peace Conference. Agreements to secure a guaranteed peace, to deal with Germany (and other defeated states). Disagreements over how far to punish Germany, how to guarantee peace and prevent another war. Clemenceau (France) argued for a severely weakened Germany which would go some way towards guaranteeing French security break up Germany into its former, smaller states (pre-1871); return Alsace-Lorraine to France; strip Germany of its military forces and capabilities; punish the Kaiser. Lloyd George (Britain) argued for a German punishment, but, he said, it was to be focused on justice, not revenge (it is sometimes argued that Lloyd George occupied the middle ground at the Paris peace conference between Clemenceau and Wilson) restrict Germanys armed forces (transfer the navy to Britain); remove certain territories from Germany to make a workable peace in central Europe; take Germanys overseas colonies (e.g. German South West Africa [Namibia]) Wilson (United States) argued that while Germany should receive some punishment the essential goal was for a peace based on international co-operation his key aim was to establish a League of Nations which was to assist in the process of preserving peace; Fourteen Points for Peace; self-determination for countries in central and Eastern Europe. Key terms of the post-war peace treaties (Versailles, St Germain, Trianon, Neuilly, Sevres). (Details in Walsh, p.86-87; p.92-93.)How far was self-determination applied to the treaties? Were the defeated countries treated equally? Explanation of the compromise agreements made by the Allies at the Paris Conference. Why was compromise essential? - Different reactions to experiences of war (e.g. France wished for restoration of war-damaged towns, revenge for German occupation, compensation for the relations of the 1.5 million French soldiers killed in the war; USA suffered much less, 100,000 war dead.)- Pressure from public opinion and domestic politics (e.g. the French expected a harsh settlement on Germany; Lloyd George was under pressure from a public desiring some aspect of revenge, he had won the 1918 General Election promised to Make Germany pay; Clemenceau was under immense pressure to ensure Germany could never be a threat to France again; Wilson had a major problem in US domestic politics where many had turned their back on Europe and wished to enter into political isolationism in international relations.- Different political values were held by the Big Three. Wilson was an idealist which meant he undertook negotiations from a position of moral principle; Lloyd George was a realist who recognized that Europes interest lay with a peace which would keep Germany in its place whilst allowing trade to prosper; Clemenceau, nicknamed The Tiger, was a dogged negotiator who - Difficulty in providing solutions to the problems. The issues and challenges discussed in the Paris peace conference were often very difficult. Solutions could sometimes be practically difficult to achieve, e.g. the boundaries of new states in Eastern Europe (see Czechoslovakia, Walsh, p.94-95) Reactions to the peace treaties and the effects of them to 1923 (especially in Germany). Impact of loss of territory for defeated powers (also reduced economic foundation). Issue of reparations. Question of fairness within the treaties the notion of the diktat (dictated peace) as none of the defeated countries were able to negotiate. War Guilt Clause imposed on Germany (Article 231) to ensure Germany was blamed for starting the war (thus justifying reparations). Severe limits on military strength left Germany feeling exposed and surrounded by hostile states; navy forced to be handed over to Britain, but scuttled by officers at Scapa Flow (British naval base) before it was handed over.Wilson found it impossible to obtain approval for the USA to enter the League of Nations (the US Congress refused to approve (ratify) the Treaty of Versailles).Reparations question became a thorny issue. 1921 Germany paid small first instalment of 50 million, a final total figure of 6.6bn was settled in 1921, but Germany then defaulted on payment in 1922. To seize the reparations due, French and Belgian troops invaded the Ruhr to take industrial products. The Ruhr Crisis of 1923 caused major turmoil in Germany (see hyperinflation and 1923 Crisis in Germany notes). The Dawes Plan (1924) helped to create a way out of the reparations problem for the short-term.Political instability in Germany was partly caused by the impact of the post-war peace. Right-wing groups accused the Weimar politicians of not putting up enough resistance to the treaty. The idea of the November criminals and the spineless Weimar politicians became a powerful idea on the political right.

International co-operation in the 1920s(Walsh, p.228-243) Greater international co-operation, 1924-29. Dawes Plan, 1924 to spread the payment of reparations over a longer period of time; also to provide for a system of loans backed by the US government to assist in both the payment of reparations and loans to German businesses to help kick-start the economy. International Disarmament, especially the Washington Conferences 1921-22. One part of the League of Nations Covenant set out an aim to work towards disarmament. However, the Leagues promised Disarmament Conference did not open until 1932 (by which time disarmament was much less likely to be achieved in the context of the Great Depression and challenges to international order!). The only attempt by the League to arrange a disarmament treaty began in 1923; the Geneva Protocolfell apart because Britain refused to participate. The only notable talks on disarmament were the Washington Conferences of 1921-22; these took place outside the League of Nations. The outcome was an agreement of the major naval powers to reduce the size of their navies and to agree to ratios of larger ships USA 5: Britain 5: Japan 3: France 1.7: Italy 1.7 Locarno Treaties and Kellogg-Briand Pact. Following the Dawes Plan (1924) and French withdrawal from the Ruhr (completed 1925), the issue of Germanys western borders (particularly with France was addressed under the terms of the Locarno Treaties (Pact, or Agreements), 1925. The key term was the guarantee of all the signatories to agree to observe and protect the existing borders in Western Europe. This gave greater security to both Germany and France (where church bells were rung in celebration at the agreement). Another term allowed Germany to enter the League of Nations (which it did in 1926 as a permanent Council member). (Stresemann and Briand won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1926 for their work on the Pact.)Kellogg-Briand Pact, 1928. To move peace forward the French and Americans proposed a peace pact which condemned war as a means of achieving national goals. A wider pact was agreed which led ot 65 nations signing the Kellogg Pact to condemn war, but it had no specific means of enforcement. It was organisedoutside the League of Nations, although it was intended to strengthen the League. League of Nations (some failures and successes in the 1920s). The League first met in Geneva, Switzerland in 1920. The Covenant laid out the aims of the League (see Walsh, p.232). The two key powers were France and Britain. At first Germany and the USSR were excluded as members. The League was Wilsons grand vision for a more peaceful world after 1918. The League had mixed success in the 1920s. Successes and Achievements Aaland Islands dispute between Sweden and Finland successfully resolved, 1921. Vote undertaken in Upper Silesia to allocate territory between Germany and Poland, 1921. Germany became a member of the League on 1926. The League undertook a wide variety of work through its Agencies, or Special Commissions see Walsh, 239.Failures Vilna Crisis, 1920. Corfu Crisis, 1923 (probably the most significant international incident of the 1920s see Walsh, p237). Failure to make progress on international disarmament (Germany regarded this a unfair when it had been forced to disarm under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, no other state was disarming).Although the League was seen as a good idea by many citizens who regarded it as a means to help avoid another war, it was less well regarded by politicians who felt that being bound into the League restricted their freedom of manoeuvre (see the Conference of Ambassadors used to discuss the Corfu Crisis, 1923, behind the Leagues back).

Impact of the World Depression and the emergence of dictatorships(Walsh, p.244-249) The impact of the Depression and the breakdown in co-operation, 1929-33. The first decade after 1918 had seen some progress in developing peace, even if it was a peace established at first by imposing treaties on the defeated powers of the war. However, the onset of the Depression after 1929 altered the international scene greatly. The Depression affected international relations in a number of ways: It brought to power more aggressive regimes (e.g. Nazi government in Germany; increased influenced of the military in Japanese government) It led to more aggressive actions by some governments (e.g. Japanese invasion of Manchuria, 1931; Italian invasion of Abyssinia, 1935; German aggression under Hitler in attempting to alter the balance of power in Europe) Increase in self-interest among states. This led to a loss of faith in the notion of collective security (this undermined the League of Nations). e.g. sanctions imposed on Italy failed because the USA maintained supplies of oil and steel at a time when it could not afford to stop these exports. Japanese invasion of Manchuria, 1931-33. Why? desire to ensure a market to sell Japanese goods in China (China and the USA imposed tariffs (import taxes) on Japanese goods thus making them more difficult for Japan to sell - impact of the Depression); need to guarantee imports of food at reasonable prices; a possible prelude to a wider Japanese invasion of China; increased influence of Army officers in the Japanese government; the Japanese claimed it was in response to a Chinese attack on its railway at Mukden.China appealed to the League of Nations Lytton Commission established to investigate the situation. Japan continued to press on with its actions (e.g. to declare Manchuria a new, Japanese influenced state of Manchukuo) and to pressurise China (e.g. bombing of Shanghai) even while Lytton Commission was working. The Lytton Commission reported in September 1932 (a full year after it was established) and the result was to largely condemn Japans actions. In February 1933 the Leagues Assembly voted to condemn Japan and demand withdrawal. In response Japan left the League and continued its wider invasion of China. (The Japanese went on to declare war on China with a large scale invasion in 1937 - it was this which created a major crisis in the Pacific region and eventually was a factor which led to war with the USA from 1941.) Failure of the Disarmament Conference, 1932-34. The long-awaited disarmament talks organised by the League finally opened in Geneva in 1932. It was not a good time. The talks were undermined by various factors: The Manchurian Crisis meant many states were more unlikely to consider disarmament at a time when one major power at least was acting in a militarily aggressive way. In addition there was concern at other aggressive governments, e.g. Germany. Some states regarded the process as unfair Germany had been forced to disarm under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, but it was clear that other states were unlikely to disarm to similarly low levels. The arrival of more aggressive governments meant they were less likely to agree to disarm, especially when the intention was present to challenge the international order (e.g. Hitlers declared desires in foreign policy). Practical difficulties also presented themselves, e.g. principle could be agreed (not to bomb civilians), but the means to prevent this (removing heavy bombers) could not be agreed. Germany, a key power in the talks, withdrew from the Conference on Hitlers orders in October 1933 (Germany had already begun secret re-armament). The talks were no longer viable and they formally ended in 1934.The end of the talks showed that international relations had moved into a period where co-operation was much more difficult.

Challenges to peace, 1935-38(Walsh, p.250-269) German re-armament was a significant challenge to international peace. Hitler publically declared Germany was re-arming in March 1935 (with a large rally with speeches). Britain, France and Italy were concerned at this situation. In response they agreed the Stresa Agreement (also known as the Stresa Pact) of April 1935 in which they all agreed to recognise existing treaties and to work to maintain them. This Stresa Front (a supposedly united front against Germany) was designed to warn off Hitler from pursuing any further challenges to the current situation in Europe. Italian invasion of Abyssinia (1934-36). Why? Mussolini wished to revive the notion of a lost Roman Empire by strengthening Italys reputation; to avenge the humiliating defeat to Ethiopian tribesmen in the Battle of Adowa, 1896; to provide political distraction from Italys growing economic troubles at home.WalWal incident, 1934 (clash between Abyssinian troops and Italians), was provoked by Italy and used as an excuse to make demands on Abyssinia. The French negotiated with Mussolini in Jan 1935 Mussolini interpreted this as meaning that the French would accept Italian occupation of Abyssinia. The Italians built up their forces in their colonies of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland preparing for an invasion of Abyssinia. Although the British tried to warn Mussolini off by talking tough in the League, Italy invaded Abyssinia in October 1935. The League did respond swiftly by condemning the Italian actions and (unlike the Manchurian Crisis) imposed sanctions. However, these sanctions failed because some vital imports were left out, e.g. iron and steel, coal, and oil; in addition the USA continued to supply Italy with goods, while the British did not close the Suez Canal to Italian shipping which meant Mussolini could continue to re-supply his forces in Abyssinia more easily. The Italian forces continued their military invasion of Abyssinia which had little chance against the modern forces the Italian could deploy (even using poison gas dropped from aircraft). The British and French were desperate to reach some sort of solution to the problem Foreign Ministers Hoare (Br.) and Laval (Fr.) met in December 1935 to plan a proposal to put to Mussolini. The Hoare-Laval Plan proposed to hand over some territory in Abyssinia and grant Italy economic rights in most of the rest. This plan was as sign that Britain and France were concerned about trying to do a deal (appeasing) Mussolini over the issue; they were concerned that if Mussolini was angered then he might simply join Hitler in pushing for further demands. But the Hoare-Laval Plan never got any further it was leaked to the press and there was a great public and political outcry at what was proposed. The League now suffered as it showed that the British and French (key powers in the League) were not really prepared to follow up their condemnation of Italy, but, rather, were simply planning a deal behind the Leagues back which would reward Mussolini for his aggression. The international response to the Abyssinian Crisis was now in chaos. Instead the Italians persisted in their invasion, entering the capital, Addis Ababa, in May 1936. Meanwhile, Hitler had used the crisis as a smokescreen to re-militarise the Rhineland in March 1936.Consequences for international peace - The League had been dealt a death blow by the Abyssinian Crisis. A major power and permanent member of the Leagues Council, Italy had defied the League while its two principle powers, Britain and France had done nothing to back it. The attempt to impose sanctions had failed. From this point on the League had no credibility as a body which could assist in preserving peace. Re-militarisation of the Rhineland (1936). Part of Hitlers challenge to the Treaty of Versailles. German troops were sent into the Rhineland, in much ceremony, in violation of the de-militarised zone. The British and French did nothing in response (Britain sent a letter of protest.) Hitler later claimed that this was the greatest foreign policy risk he took; it was against the advice of his generals. But he secretly gave the order for the troops to hastily retreat if the French showed signs of entering the Rhineland. Why was Hitler able to get away with it? - Hitler undertook the action while the British and French were partly distracted by the Abyssinian Crisis; there was also no sitting French government at the time as France was going through a period of political turmoil; moreover, the French had increasingly adopted a defensive strategy regarding Germany of Maginot thinking to construct the Maginot Line and preserve Frances security behind it; there was a growing feeling in many political circles in Britain that Germany had a right to modify the terms of the Treaty of Versailles it was felt by some that the unfair treaty was now a cause of problems and therefore should be changed; the Rhineland was largely seen as Germanys own territory anyway, so it was not worth making a fuss about.Consequences Hitler became more bold as a result of his striking success. The Allies seemed to show that they were not prepared to make any physical response to challenges (either in Abyssinia or over the Rhineland). Collapse of the Stresa Front upon the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in June 1935 (see below) the Italians protested to Britain that this was unacceptable. The Stresa Front (see above) had been weakened by this British action. But it was finally undermined by the problem of Abyssinia. Rome-Berlin Axis, October 1936. Following the collapse of the Stresa Front, Britain and Frances inept handling of the Abyssinian Crisis, and the German re-militarisation of the Rhineland, the Italians and Germans agreed a position whereby they would co-operate more over various affairs. Although not a formal alliance, both countries agreed they shared certain interests and would work together more closely. This was soon shown in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) in which both countries gave military support to the right-wing nationalists under General Franco. (Japan was admitted to the Axis when all three countries agreed the Anti-Comintern Pact in November 1936 now there were three states publically declared to challenge the international order.) Austrian Anschluss (1938). Why? for Hitler to annex the land of his birth to Germany; to develop a Greater Germany (Grossdeutschland) which contained all Germanic people; to strengthen Germany as a European power (enlarged Army, mineral resources, e.g. gold); to challenge the Treaty of Versailles; as a stepping-stone to greater German influence in Eastern Europe (Czecholslovakia now looked vulnerable, see map Walsh, p.266)Hitlers first attempt to annex Austria back in 1934 had failed when Mussolini had warned him off, but now Germany was stronger. Hitler encouraged the Austrian Nazi party to stir up trouble in Austria for the government of Chancellor Schuschnigg, and even to prepare plans for a Nazi takeover backed by Germany. Hitler demanded a greater Nazi presence in the Austrian government, especially to appoint Seyss-Inquart (Austrian Nazi leader) to be Minister of the Interior. Greater economic co-operation was also pushed on Austria. Schuschnigg, hoping to prevent further German demands and Nazi pressure, called a plebiscite for March 1938 he hoped to end discussion of a union (Anschluss) between Germany and Austria once and for all. Hitler was concerned about these plans and mobilized his Army for an invasion of Austria. Schuschnigg was forced to step down and Germany invaded at Seyss-Inquarts invitation. A plebiscite was subsequently arranged to approve the Anschluss which was passed by 99.75% (even taking into account dubious Nazi electoral moves, this was an overwhelming approval).Britain and France once again did little in response to the Anschluss. Even if it was a distasteful and worrying action, the British government tended towards viewing Austria as German territory anyway therefore there it was not a major concern.Consequences of the Anschluss greater confidence for Hitler to make further demands in Eastern Europe (which came more quickly now, see 1938-39); Czechoslovakia was especially vulnerable to German pressure (see Sudeten Crisis, Sept 1938) Sudetenland Crisis (1938). Why? for a Greater Germany with all Germanic people to be created (there were 3.5 million Sudeten Germans in the western frontier regions); to expand German influence into central and eastern Europe; to open up a possible wider invasion of Czechoslovakia (the Sudetenland contained all Czechoslovakias frontier defences).Nazis in the Sudetenland (led by Sudeten Nazi leader Henlein) were encouraged to pressurise the Czech government for greater rights. The Allies were very worried by developments. When Hitler demanded self-determination for the Sudeten Germans, British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, flew to meet Hitler to discuss Hitlers demands on the Sudetenland. There were three meetings in September 1938: Berchtesgaden (15 Sept) Hitler laid out his key demand that the Sudetenland be transferred to Germany. Chamberlain essentially agreed to Hitlers demand and returned to London to discuss it with the French and then to persuade the Czechs to hand over the Sudetenland with some form of compensation and an international guarantee of Czechoslovakias defence. Bad Godesberg (22 Sept) Hitler now made new demands that the Sudetenland be handed over at once, with German troops poised to occupy the region. Chamberlain could not agree to such a move. Munich (29 Sept) a Four Power Conference met to discuss the Sudeten question - Hitler (Ger.), Mussolini (It.), Chamberlain (Br.), Deladier (Fr.), (the Czechs were not invited). The Munich Agreement was to transfer the Sudetenland to Germany. (Further territorial losses were also later made to Poland and Hungary). Chamberlain and Hitler signed an additional agreement to never to go to war with one another again and to solve any future problems by consultation this was the famous piece of paper which Chamberlain declared brought peace for our time. Consequences of the Sudeten question Czechoslovakia was left to the mercy of Germany (invasion of March 1939); it was clear that the Allies would not fight to protect Czechoslovakia; Hitler regarded the Allies as spineless and in turn this encouraged him to push on with expansion in Eastern Europe in 1939; the USSR became deeply suspicious of the Allies intentions fearing an attempt by the Allies to allow Hitler to push eastwards towards Russia. The concept of an ineffective League of Nations. By 1937 it was clear that the League of Nations had failed as a credible peace-keeping body. It had been undermined by the Manchurian and Abyssinian Crises. The Allies had struck deals behind the back of the League. By 1937 the British and French adopted the policy of Appeasement to deal with challenges to the international order in Europe.

Appeasement, 1935-38(Walsh, p.250-2; p.258-269, p.273) Dealing with Mussolini over Abyssinia - an early example of appeasement see Stresa Agreement; failure to impose full sanctions on Italy; Hoare-Laval Plan. Anglo-German Naval Agreement, 1935 -dealing with Hitler to try to negotiate a solution to Germanys demands without aggravating the situation. Lack of Allied response to the Rhineland incident -Britain merely sent a letter of protest. Re-militarisation of the Rhineland was regarded as Germany entering its own backyard. Britain may also have wished to seem reasonable in dealing with Germany. Lack of Allied response to Austrian Anschluss once again there was a desire to seem reasonable in the response and not to inflame the situation unnecessarily. Germany was seen as partially justified in seeking to unite with what were German people after all. The Munich Agreement this was the most notable example of appeasement. It showed all the hallmarks of trying to avoid war whilst dealing with an aggressor. The Czechs were not consulted, the negotiations were conducted by Chamberlain under the (false) assumption that this was Hitlers last demand in Europe. Reasons for appeasement arguments for and against the policy.For that the policy was conducted using reasonable negotiations Hitler was a reasonable man, re-adjustment of the Treaty of Versailles was reasonable; the policy was carried out to avoid another devastating war (and one that would be even worse this time around with civilians under threat from aerial attack); the British had to negotiate as there was insufficient military strength by 1937 (a government report of that year suggested that an aerial campaign by a major air force against Britain would produce 1.8million casualties in 60 days) the air defenceprogramme (Spitfires and Radar) had to be given time to develop; Britain was gripped by the impact of the Depression and had not the resources to devote to re-armament; some on the political right believed that Communist Russia was a greater threat that Nazi Germany.Against the policy only served to bow to pressure from aggressors (Winston Churchill constantly argued from 1936 that a stronger stance against Hitler was essential if European stability was to be maintained); dictators were encouraged by the lack of tough response (e.g. Mussolini over Abyssinia, Hitler over Austria and Sudetenland); the policy was based on errors of judgement (Chamberlain misjudged Hitler) and missed opportunities (failure to step in to prevent re-militarisation of the Rhineland); it drove the USSR away from the Allies thus preventing any possible credible alliance against Hitler. Significance of appeasement for future developments in 1939. Hitler now had an opportunity to take the rest of Czechoslovakia (March 1939); Hitler believed that the Allies were weak and ineffective (he privately called the Allied leaders little worms); Hitler was encouraged to take further action beyond Czechoslovakia and to target Poland; the USSR became very suspicious of both German ambitions and Allied actions (especially as Stalin had not been invited to Munich). Reasons for the failure of appeasement it was based on a false assumption that Hitler had limited aims in Europe; it only served to divide the opposition against Hitler (e.g. the Czechs were less inclined to resist once Br. and Fr. had declared they would not protect Czechoslovakia; Russia was unprepared to strike deal with the West); Britain and France did not have sufficient strength to be able to combine negotiation with threats; Hitler was only encouraged to take further actions thus undermining the policy even further.

The collapse of peace, 1939(Walsh, p.270-272) German occupation of Czechoslovakia, March 1939. Following seizure of the Sudetenland, Germany invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia. Thisterritorycould in no way be justified as Germanic. The occupation of Prague was greeted with hostility from the Czech people. The Czech government under President Hacha chose not to fight knowing that the western Allies would not offer any military support. This aggressive action by Germany spelled the end of any attempt by the Allies to negotiate with Hitler appeasement was dead and had been proved to fail. The British and French simply protested to Germany. Anglo-French guarantee to support Poland if attacked, March 1939 in direct response to the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the return of Memel (to Germany from Lithuania in March 1939) the British and French issued a guarantee to Poland and Romania to defend these countries if Germany attacked. The key fear was that Hitler would pressurise Poland by demanding the return of Danzig and the Polish Corridor. German-Italian Pact of Steel, May 1939. In April 1939 Hitler formally ended his 1934 co-operation agreement with Poland and the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement. Instead, in May, he drew closer to Italy with a formal military alliance (thus going further than the earlier Axis agreement). German pressure on Poland, June-August 1939. Hitler was unconcerned about the Allies threat in the form of the guarantee to defend Poland. During the summer of 1939 he pushed for the Polish government to grant concessions to the German people in the Polish Corridor and to allow unrestricted access to Danzig. The Nazis encouraged the German people of Danzig and in Poland to protest against the Polish government. Hitler had earlier declared to his generals It is not Danzig that is at stake. For us it is a matter of expanding our living space in the east. There is no question of sparing Poland and we are therefore left with the decision to attack Poland at the earliest opportunity. Nazi-Soviet Pact, August 1939. Reasons for provided mutual security for both Germany and the USSR there would be no risk if immediate war between the two; it was targeted against a common enemy, Poland, which both countries wished to see destroyed; it removed the threat of an alliance between Britain, France and the USSR which could place a serious check on Hitlers desires; Stalin was deeply distrustful of the West after appeasement and failed negotiations in 1939; a forward position taken with occupied Polish land might well be useful in a future war against Germany. Note be careful the Nazi-Soviet Pact must in no way be seen as an alliance between Germany and Russia, it simply a short-term agreement which was acceptable to both countries at the time.Significance of it guaranteed that Germany would invade Poland (which it did within 10 days) now that it was free from any possible Russian resistance; the pact left Britain and France to fight Germany alone; it left Poland exposed to attack from two-fronts (Germany in the west and the USSR in the east Russia invaded on 17 September). German invasion of Poland, September 1939. Hitler, convinced that the Nazi-soviet Pact guaranteed the security he required order his Army into Poland. All summer preparations had been underway for this attack, now Hitler had his moment. He was convinced that even if Britain and France did fulfill their pledge to defend Poland there would be little they could do in practice (he was correct they would not engage in serious action until 1940 and even then only when Germany attacked!). Reasons for outbreak of war in 1939 Britain and France could no longer stand aside; appeasement was dead, now action had to happen if the Allies were to retain a shred of credibility; Britain and France had to stand up to Germany rather than risk a Europe dominated by German power; Germany and Russia had clear reasons for carving up Poland between them; the Nazi-Soviet Pact was the critical short-term cause of war.