international safety standards for the storage of spent fuel
DESCRIPTION
International Safety Standards for the Storage of Spent Fuel. PHIL METCALF International Conference on Management of Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power Reactors Vienna 31 May – 4 June 2010. Developments since 1994. Safety standards developments Increased enrichment Increased burn up - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
International Atomic Energy Agency
International Safety Standards forthe Storage of Spent Fuel
PHIL METCALF
International Conference on Management of Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power Reactors
Vienna 31 May – 4 June 2010
2 International Atomic Energy Agency
• Safety standards developments• Increased enrichment• Increased burn up• Advanced fuel design • MOX • Re-racking• Burn up credit • Storage > design lifetimes
Developments since 1994Developments since 1994
3 International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety Case & Assessment Predisposal
DS 248
Storage of SpentNuclear Fuel
4 International Atomic Energy Agency
1. Government responsibilities2. National policy & strategy3. Regulatory responsibilities4. Operator responsibilities5. Safety/Security6. Interdependences7. Management systems8. Waste minimization9. Characterization and
classification10. Waste treatment11. Waste storage12. Waste acceptance for
processing, storage and/or disposal
13. Prepare safety case and supporting safety assessment
14. Safety case scope and regulatory compliance
15. Safety case documentation
16. Periodic safety review17. Facilities location and design 18. Facility construction and
commissioning 19. Facilities operation, maintenance,
emergency preparedness 20. Decommissioning 21. Nuclear safeguards 22. Existing facilities
5 International Atomic Energy Agency
1. INTRODUCTION
2. PROTECTION OF HUMAN HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT
3. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIESGENERALGOVERNMENTOPERATORSAFEGUARDS & PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS
4. MANAGEMENT SYSTEMSPENT FUEL MANAGEMENTRESOURCE MANAGEMENTPROCESS IMPLEMENTATION
5. SAFETY CASE AND SAFETY ASSESSMENTDOCUMENTATION OF THE SAFETY CASE
6. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS FOR STORAGE OF SPENT FUELGENERALDESIGN COMMISSIONING OPERATION DECOMMISSIONING
Storage of SpentNuclear Fuel
6 International Atomic Energy Agency
APPENDICESI SPECIFIC SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS WET & DRY STORAGE
II CONDITIONS FOR SPECIFIC FUEL TYPES
ANNEXES
I SHORT TERM AND LONG TERM STORAGE
II OPERATIONAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS FOR WET AND DRY STORAGE
III EXAMPLES OF OPERATING PROCEDURES
IV RELATED IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS PUBLICATIONS
V SAFETY ASSESSMENT (EXTERNAL NATURAL PHENOMENA)
VI SAFETY ASSESSMENT (EXTERNAL HUMAN INDUCED PHENOMENA)
VII POSTULATED INITIATING EVENTS (INTERNAL PHENOMENA)
7 International Atomic Energy Agency
GENERALGENERAL
• May be considered waste or resource – safety issues the same – differing circumstances;• Open fuel cycle – direct disposal • Closed fuel cycle – reprocessing • Uncertain• All involve storage – months to decades• Sometimes uncertain lifetime• Wet or dry storage (facility or casks)
8 International Atomic Energy Agency
• Safety ensured by: • Containment of radionuclides • Criticality safety• Heat removal• Radiation shielding • Inspection and retrievability
• Functions ensured by• Proper siting/location • Design• Construction and commissioning • Operation • Decommissioning (considered in design)
9 International Atomic Energy Agency
• Storage not ultimate solution • Requires end point e.g. reprocessing or
disposal to ensure safety • NPP design lifetime - few decades• +/-50 y experience of storage • +/-100 years design lifetimes used • Considering rate of industrial and
institutional change, periods beyond 50 y deemed ‘long term’ in the context of this Safety Guide
10 International Atomic Energy Agency
• Up-to-date guidance on design, operation and safety case for all storage facilities
• Consider different fuel types NPP & RRs• Different periods, including > design lifetime • Guidance to meet Safety Requirements:
• Safety of Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities• Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste• Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities • Management System for Facilities and Activities
OBJECTIVEOBJECTIVE
11 International Atomic Energy Agency
SCOPESCOPE
• Co-located • Own sites• Not specifically operational storage• Water cooled, others e.g. gas cooled, RR • Degraded or failed fuel in canisters• No detailed guidance on physical protection • Security/safeguards interactions
12 International Atomic Energy Agency
• Workers and public• Present and future generations• Normal and accident conditions• Justification• Dose and risk limitation - constraints• Optimization of protection
Basic Safety StandardsBasic Safety Standards
13 International Atomic Energy Agency
Safety Case & Assessment Predisposal
DS 248
Safety CaseSafety Case
14 International Atomic Energy Agency
System DescriptionSite and waste characteristics, Safety Functions, Design Options
Safety Case Context• Safety objectives• Safety principles • Regulations
Safety Strategy• Waste treatment, minimization• Interdependencies•Shielding, containment,•Defence in depth
Integration of Safety ArgumentsNormal operation, anticipated operational ocurrences, accidents,
waste treatment and waste productN
on radiological Environm
ental Im
pact
Non-radiological
Operational Safety
Site / Engineering
Assessments
Stakeholder & Regulatory Involvem
ent
Limits, controls & conditions
Managem
ent of uncertainty
Iteration and design optimozatio
Managem
ent System
Managem
ent System
Radiological impact
Models
Calculations
Scenarios
15 International Atomic Energy Agency
ConclusionConclusion
• Guidance on:• Roles and responsibilities• Design• Operation• Decommissioning • Safety case
• Need for inter-comparison and harmonization of use
16 International Atomic Energy Agency 16