internet social movement muslim.pdf

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Connecting the Actual with the Virtual:The Internet and Social Movement Theory in theMuslim WorldThe Cases of Iran and Egypt

MELISSA Y. LERNER

Abstract

The rapid expansion of Internet use in the Muslim world has called into question

what roleif anythis medium can play in political action in these countries.

This paper seeks to analyze the extent to which the Internet offers space for an

expansion of social movement theory in the Muslim world. It relies on a numberof case studies from two Muslim countries, the One Million Signatures Campaign

and Weblogistan in Iran, and the Kefaya Movement and Muslim Brotherhood

blogging in Egypt. When placing Internet use in the context of political scientist and

historian Charles Tillys repertoire of social movement characteristics (worthi-

ness, unity, numbers, and commitment) and political scientist Robert Putnams

theory that the Internet can isolate individual users, it appears that the key to

the successful collaboration of the web and social movements is an adaptive

dynamic, through which groups function in both the cyber-world and the real

world. This paper presents a potential vision for the future of the Internet and

Islamic activism based on the assumption that an online element will help generatesome of the elements of Tillys social movement repertoire, particularly if the Internet

is used to inspire sympathetic individuals to real world political action.

Introduction

The advent and increasing popularity of the Internet, particularly in the Western world,

has inspired a rich literature forecasting the impact of the World Wide Web on communi-

cation, politics, participation, and public opinion. In democratic countries, including the

United States and in the European Union, the Internet has become an integral fixture of

popular culture, andby extensionpolitical culture. Long-established newspapers,

political parties, and organizations all maintain websites that serve as another medium

through which to attract readers, members, and volunteers. Chatrooms, message

boards, and instant messaging programs offer immediate and sometimes anonymous

methods of communication with people all over the world.

More recently, blogs or weblogs have become a pervasive feature of the cyber-world.

The number of blogs increased exponentially after easy-to-use blog software became

available free of charge in 1999.1 Blogs are online postings commonly displayed in

reverse chronological order, and can resemble informal diaries or more journalistic

commentaries on political and social events.2 They are usually accompanied by a

comment board that viewers can use to post opinions related to the entries that they

read. Blogs have reinforced the communication methodology of the Internet: the

decentralized interactive exchange of opinions and information that blogs exemplify3

Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2010


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phenomenon, while still relatively new, has shown potential for great impact. In fact,

political scientists studying the recent tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan have found

that, in an environment where opposition websites online were continually shut down

or hacked into, an advocacy blog played a significant role in influencing Askar Akayev,

the Soviet-affiliated ruler, to step down from power.4 This situation suggests that

blogs, as an element of the Internet at large, can effectively inform and shape public

opinion, with major political consequences.

The Muslim world has also entered the Internet age, and has become familiar with the

phenomenon of blogging. The influx of web use in the Middle East has elicited various

responses from scholars of the region. Often, these reactions to the role of the Internet in

Muslim countries have focused on the potential for the web to contribute to social move-

ments in various countries, particularly those aimed at democratization. There are two

conflicting schools of thought. One views the Internet as an expansive alternative to

the dangers associated with traditional social movement actions. The other is concerned

that the Internet will hasten isolation and encourage anonymity. Many scholars have

embraced the web as the answer to limited political opportunity, and a facilitator fordemocratic change. There are few who fail to acknowledge that the Internet and social

movement theory have interactedand will continue to do soin Muslim-majority

countries. The other school predicts that the spread of the Internet will indulge risk-aver-

sion among those displeased with the status quo by allowing them to express dissent

anonymously.

Scholars have found a name and place in social movement theory for the processes of

political action in the Muslim world. The term Islamic activism describes the mobil-

ization of contention to support Muslim causes.5 Islamic activism is meant to encompass a

plurality of movements in Muslim countries, including propagation movements, terror-

ist groups, collective action rooted in Islamic symbols and identities, explicitly politicalmovements that seek to establish an Islamic state, and inward-looking groups that

promote Islamic spirituality through collective efforts.6 Social movement theorists

establish that Islamic exceptionalism is false by asserting that activism in Islamic

countries shares many of the same drivers and manifestations as activism in non-

Muslim societies. The dynamics, process and organization of Islamic activism highlight

its commonality with other protest movements and reaffirm that Islamic activism is not

sui generis.7 Social movement theorists believe that Islamic social movements are driven

by political opportunity and restraint structures, resource mobilization, and framing.

Theorists seek to identify a set of shared characteristics amongst various types of social

movements. Political scientist and historian Charles Tilly calls this a shared reper-

toire.8

In this repertoire, he identifies four characteristics: worthiness, including

sober demeanor and neat clothing; unity including matching . . . costumes,

singing and chanting; numbers; and commitment including resistance to repression

among other things.9

This vision of social repertoire, therefore, is replete with public and

physical demonstrations of solidarity and devotion to a cause. However, even writing as

late as 2004, Tilly does not include a virtual or online element to this unified, politico-

historical theory of social movements. While Tilly does not find the Internet to be a

central element in the social movement repertoire, there is a possibility that the web

and blogs can be manipulated so as to demonstrate worthiness, unity, numbers, and

commitment to a cause.

Some political scientists fear that the Internet will not enhance the virility of the social

organizations requisite for democratic development or maintenance, but rather will chip

556 Melissa Y. Lerner


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an unparalleled transmitter of free and easily accessed information; yet, there is no proof

that information alone can produce the type of social capital and community ties

required for the development and sustenance of democracy.10 Low barriers to access

and publication can actually have an adverse effect by providing a confusing, distracting

surfeit of information.11 Also, while the anonymity of the Internet does have its benefits,

online communication lacks the important social cues implicit and taken for granted in

face-to-face communication.12

Putnams most important finding for the impact of the

Internet on social movements is that participants in computer-based groups find it

harder to reach consensus and feel less solidarity with one another as they develop a

sense of depersonalization and are less satisfied with the groups accomplishments.13

The anonymity and isolation of Internet membership in various groups may replace real-

world interactions to the detriment of the solidarity and singular purpose associated with

social movements.

This article seeks to analyze the extent to which the Internet offers space for an

expansion of social movement theory in the Muslim world. Scholars certainly have a

vision of how the web should be used by Islamic activists, specifically to promotehuman rights, civil liberties like free speech, andultimatelydemocratization.

Until now, however, the Internet has not been able to establish itself as a substitution

for some of the more familiar expressions and strategies of social movements. Websites

and blogs are not a free platform for expression, and cannot avoid many of the

restraints that authoritarian governments have successfully placed on social move-

ments in the past. Yet, harsh government retaliation indicates the recognition of

authoritarian rulers that the Internet has an important role to play in the political tra-

jectory of the Muslim world that may threaten their interests. The key to the successful

collaboration of the web and a social movement seems to be a sort of amphibious

group dynamic, with which its membership functions effectively in both the cyber-world and the real world. A likely prediction for the future of the Internet and

Islamic activism is that an online element will help generate some of the elements of

Tillys social movement repertoire, specifically when utilized to inspire sympathetic

individuals to palpable political action. Without demonstrable political activities,

social movements risk losing their followers to the disconnected anonymity predicted

by Robert Putnam.

While exploring the role of the Internet in Islamic activism, this paper will examine two

countries to illustrate varying levels of engagement with virtual resources in the face of

undemocratic governments. First, the case of Irans blogging culture demonstrates the

potential for the Internet to appeal to very different groups, sometimes espousing

undemocratic views. This case study shows that the Internet is not a zone free of inter-

ferenceas many democratic activists intent on the democratization of Iran had

hopedbut rather has been subjected to government incursion and cooptation. The

One Million Signatures Campaign provides an instance in which the Internet has

helped garner support for an organization that still relies primarily on face-to-face com-

munication. Next, Egyptian state responses to various anti-government Internet

resources have raised the stakes of virtual and physical protest. The Kefaya Movement

illustrates the successes and limitations of social movements reliance on the Internet

as a forum for disseminating reformist messages and challenging traditional authoritar-

ian control. Muslim Brotherhood bloggers exemplify the range of social movements that

have found a voice on the web. Considered together, these case studies illustrate the

range of Internet-based strategies developed by social movements and the attendant

Connecting the Actual with the Virtual 557


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Spreading the Web

Internet use in the Muslim world has been rapidly expanding, despite variations in access

across nations. Overall, the Arab world has been marked by slower growth in Internet use

than elsewhere in the world, reaching only 2.45% of the total population of Arab nations

and Iran by the end of 2001.14

For the most part, Internet users consist of the elite ofthese nations because of the high costs of computers and web access subscriptions in

many of these countries, and also because of the English language knowledge required

to use many Internet programs and navigate the web.15 To some extent, the Internet

cafe phenomenon has helped men and women overcome these barriers, providing

them with more affordable access and, in some cases, training in Internet use.16

Scholar Deborah Wheeler suggests that [a]ccess to the Internet in cafes could parallel

access to newspapers in coffee houses during the late nineteenth century.17 In short, the

Internet has become the newest alternative source of news, information, and opinion for

citizens of non-democratic societies of the Muslim world.

Websites and blogs are two manifestations of how the Internet is used by protest move-

ments. A website can, in essence, provide a mobile and widely accessible headquarters

for an organization. Websites can serve multiple purposes, the two most common of

which are spreading their [the organizations] message to the outside world and com-

munication . . . primarily to their own people [members of organizations].18

The open,

ad hoc information-sharing system promoted by the expanding Internet universe

coincides with the choice of organizations operating under authoritarian regimes to

adopt decentralized structures that are more difficult to repress.19

This has proven

especially useful because organizations have tapped into the willingness of sympathetic

voices abroad to host websites for their causes. This strategy bypasses some authoritarian

governments strict Internet surveillance or limited infrastructure in a particular country.

For example, the Islamic Liberation Party website is hosted by Imperial College London;

the Palestine Times website lists an address in Leeds in the United Kingdom.20 At the

same time, website addresses can be moved quite effortlessly, allowing groups to

quickly rebound after government authorities shut down their current site.21 The Inter-

net offers an unparalleled level of flexibility to organizations that want to reach their

membership and like-minded individuals, both within and outside of the confines of

their country, through websites that function as portable headquarters.

Scholars seem to agree that blogs, while not necessarily a primary causal factor in poli-

tics and policy outcomes, have started to play a role in this sphere. Blogs are seen as an

alternative to traditional print media and their attendant shortcomings. Blogs are con-

sidered more democratic in their bottom-up approach to gathering and sharing infor-mation.

22In the United States alone, blogs have helped air politicians dirty laundry,

influence legal decisions, set party agendas in Congress, and determine foreign policy

strategies.23

In these arenas, blogs have captivated decision-making elites, as well as

ordinary citizens; the former utilize blogs in major political decisions.24

In many

instances, blogs are only a tangential element in politics. Their greatest effect has been

a change in the way people communicate and spend time learning about their interests.

In the Information Age, the Internet has certainly become a part of social move-

ments, both in the free world and under less open conditions. When political space for

protest is lacking, cyberspace creates different opportunities for expression. When a

countrys regime controls resource mobilization, the World Wide Web can connect like-minded individuals and help them pool together funds for action. Grassroots campaigns

have been redefined in the modern world through the use of the Internet United States



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Presidential candidate, Howard Dean, gained prominence during the 2004 presidential

campaign as he used his blog to inspire followers.25 The 2008 presidential campaign in

the United States is the most recent manifestation of an Internet-based social movement

that inspired real political action that resulted in the election of President Barack Obama.

He used his website for resource mobilization which helped him raise more money for his

election campaign than any American political campaign before.26 In the end, Mr.

Obama was able to use the Internet to extend visibility and actually inspire his followers

to vote for him on Election Day, resulting in his election to the presidency. Mr Obamas

success was not predicated upon his savvy web design (although it might have helped

engage Internet users), but rather upon his ability to translate peoples interest in the

web-based elements of his campaign into tangible political action and an actual vote.

It is this combination of online activity and learning and offline participation in

activism that makes the Internet an intriguing element in the development of social

movement theory.

Iran: the Land of Weblogistan

The Internet has been a part of Iranian culture for well over a decade. The first email was

sent from Iran in 1993.27 By 2001, 420,000 Iranians were using the Internet;28 this

number had more than doubled to 1.2 million in 2003.29 In June 2007, the Islamic

Republic of Iran was ranked as the country with the highest percentage of Internet

users in the Middle East with 38.6% of its population online, and estimates have pre-

dicted 25 million users by 2009.30 The Internet gained popular traction in Iran with

the 1997 presidential election in the country, and has since become a regular element

of Iranian politics. In 1997, Mohammad Khatami and his opponent Ali Akbar Nategh

Nuri both established official campaign websites.31

Later, in the 2005 election, manycandidates used websites and blogs as an element in their bid for office.

32

The phenomenon of Iranian blogging has emerged at the forefront of Internet scholar-

ship in the Middle East. In 2001, when Iranian blogging took off, its participants dubbed

this online community of publishers and posters Weblogistan (literally the land of the

Web).33 One of the first blogs in Persian was established in September 2001 by Hossein

Derakhshan, an Iranian journalist who had recently moved to Canada.34 With the help of

Derakhshans online guide to creating blogs in Persian (Farsi) script, the number of Farsi

blogs exceeded 100 within two months.35 Recent estimates establish the number of

Persian language blogs at about 60,000, verifying the rapid expansion of Weblogistan

into a serious source of information for Persian-language speakers.36

Political scientists often link the popularity of the Internet and blogging to the Islamic

Republics history of dependence on new technology to disseminate its revolutionary

message. Numerous sources explain that [t]he Islamic revolution of 1979 was meant

to put into practice the supposed affinity between scientific revolution and faith.37 In

the 1970s, this merging of the scientific and the religious was encapsulated in Imam Kho-

meinis use of the advanced audiocassette players and short-wave radio to spread his

revolutionary rhetoric in Iran.38 When the Internet first emerged, the Iranian govern-

ment was actually eager to tap into this new medium as the next iteration of its commit-

ment to a technologically advanced religious society. Consequently, the government

pursued a non-censorship policy at first, to affirm the original ideology of the Islamic

Republic as a supporter of modern technology as a means to promote and secure its

authority.39 To reinforce this ideology, many high-level government figures have used



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conservative circles, where individuals are committed to preserving the status quo.

Current bloggers include such high-profile individuals as members of the Iranian parlia-

ment or Majlis,40 President Ahmadinejad, and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.41

Irans most important clerics have used websites to disseminate their religious scholar-

ship and speeches as Webatollahs.42 These instances emphasize the importance of

the Internet to the government as well as to its detractors. Many initial reports about

Weblogistan have focused on the promise of the Internet to provide a free and unregu-

lated space for critics of the Islamic Republic of Iran to express their dissenting views.

Scholars who espoused these claims saw the Internet as the next frontier for successful

activism in Iran. Yet the profile of bloggers and Internet users does not fully support

this Wild West vision of the Persian blogosphere.

Drawing upon a history of technological innovation, scholars continue to emphasize

the potential of the Internet, especially blogs, as a source of uninhibited information-

sharing and information-gathering. In particular, these narratives frame Weblogistan

as the domain primarily of reformist voices. One scholar describes how the Internet

has opened a new domestic arena of contestation, accommodating numerous dissidentgroups online, even as politics has become more of a limited pursuit in the real spaces

of everyday life.43 This analysis boldly asserts that the Internets role is as a replacement

for increasingly difficult and risky public activism, suggesting that virtual activism can

serve as a viable wholesale alternative to traditional real-world activism. One especially

hopeful voice is that of Nasrin Alavi, whose book We Are Iran focuses on the reformist

tone of a number of weblogs translated from Farsi.44

Alavi echoes the opinion of other

researchers in stating that websites and blogs have made it possible for young Iranians

to express themselves freely and anonymously.45 Alavi even suggests that recent

attempts by the Iranian government to establish a national intranet that would separate

Iranian users from the rest of the Internet could not stifle this revolutionary spirit. ForAlavi, it seems that [t]he rate of change of technology might well be working in

favour of free speech, even as the Chinese authorities have not been fully able to

contain the free flow of information.46 However, even with its imperfections, the

Great Firewall has proven harmful and, at times, fatal to the ideal of unbridled online

discourse, demonstrating that technological innovations on both sidesthat of free

speech and that of online content controlare in close competition.

Researcher Babak Rahimi identifies a number of instances in which dissident groups

have successfully used the Internet to criticize the government. Websites have served as

government watchdogs, in many cases serving as the first platform for investigative jour-

nalism. For example, in 2002, the reformist website Emrooz.org publicized the plans of

Khamenei supporters who wanted to open a chain of brothels called houses of chas-

tity.47 That same year, another reformist website broke the news about a meeting

between one of Saddam Husseins sons and a senior leader in Irans army.48 When ver-

ified by the proper authorities, these stories became national news and a source of embar-

rassment and consternation for those in power. Finally, in 2001 reformist Mohsen

Sazgara posted a letter critical of Khamenei on Gooya.com; this letter was eventually

sent to the Associated Press and helped bring worldwide attention to the abuses of the

Iranian government.49

Still, none of these examples support the claim that the Internet is a workable alternative

platform for social movements, even as they do provide otherwise unavailable infor-

mation. This can be an important step in inspiring opposition to the government.

Access to otherwise restricted facts may help inspire dissident sentiments, or even



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information is a central function of the Internet, this alone does not a social movement

make.

The real question is whether the Internet can mobilize followers to engage in the cause

actively. In 1999, the Internet played only a limited role in widespread student protests in

Iran.50 Primarily, the web was important because it helped students keep in contact with

each other even after government crackdowns made it impossible to meet publicly.

Again, in 2003, the Internet became part of student protests, insofar as some students

avoided encounters with the plainclothes militia and agents of the conservatives posted in

public places by organizing street demonstrations in chat rooms and on weblogs, using

the internet as a mode of communication between activists.51 This more closely con-

forms to the idea of the Internet as a setting for the planning phases of Islamic activism

actions. The case of the 2003 protests is an instance in which the Internet was used more

effectively by anti-government forces to mobilize followers and organize them for public

demonstrations. These examples do not validate the concern that the Internet will

encourage people to rely on anonymity as a guarantee of safety from repressive govern-

ment authorities, potentially dissuading them from any public protest. Putnam wouldwarn that if the Internet supplants face-to-face communication, increased isolation is

likely.52 However, in the hands of Iranian student groups, the Internet has contributed

to solidarity instead of undermining it.

The Iranian Government Responds

Online participation in Islamic activism is not without its consequences. Initial reports of

the Internet as a free, safe, and anonymous zone for dissent in Iran have rapidly proven

incomplete and untrue. There are four ways in which this view of the Iranian blogo-

sphereand Iranian web use, in generalare challenged. First, many Iranian blogsare not reformist publications that scholars have fixated on as a potential path to demo-

cratization. In addition, the Internet is now dramatically censored. Moreover, blogs have

become sources of evidence for the government when it wishes to punish the opposition.

Finally, because of increased censorship and hostility from the government, those in

Weblogistan have developed a manner of criticizing the incumbents that is far less

overt; in short, Weblogistan has created a form of self-censorship.

A Virtual Milieu

Much has been made of the reformist nature of Weblogistan. However, a recent study

published by Harvard Law scholars John Kelly and Bruce Etling that maps the themes

of Weblogistan content, undermines this optimistic depiction of the online community.53

Their analysis establishes four broad categories for Iranian blogs: secular/reformist,

conservative/religious, Persian poetry and literature, and mixed networks.54 Kelly and

Etling challenge the view of the Iranian blogosphere, which, with the exception of Ahma-

dinejads blog, focuses on bloggers who are found within just one of these structures

[secular/reformist] . . . a large group dominated by expatriates and reformists and featur-

ing frequent criticism of the Iranian regime and its political values and philosophy.55

Kelly and Etling emphasize that the blogosphere in Iran is not dominated by reformist

voices. It is a varied community, divided by cleavages along the lines of gender,

anonymity, and philosophy. These multitudinous and specific online identities are

reminiscent of the Internet-induced cyberbalkanization that Putnam warns may



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community.56

Just as high-profile reformist blogs challenge the government

conservative/religious blogs focus intensely on politics and support the philosophy

and legitimacy of the Islamic Republic and the Supreme Leader, if not always particular

government policies and politicians.57

Nevertheless, despite increased and varied Inter-

net use, the web still remains inaccessible to a large segment of Iranian society, and the

traditional cleavages of class and wealth apply to Internet access to this day.58

The vast array of blogs and their messages may confuse or distract Internet users,

leading to a web overload, instead of cultivating their opinions and inspiring or bolstering

political stances. Access to the Internet can be used to spread many types of messages,

many of which are not associated with calls for democratization or even with brands of

Islamic activism embraced by the West. Kelly and Etlings study examines the ways

in which the Internet can serve as a portal for antidemocratic as well as liberalizing

voices, contrary to some scholars portrayal of Weblogistan. The Internet is a powerful

source of information, not ruled solely by dissidents opposed to the management and

message of the Islamic Republic.

Methods of Censorship

After the 1997 election of Khatami, the environment has proven increasingly difficult

for reformist or dissident voices on the Internet. The first assault on the freedom of the

Internet came on 7 November 2001, with a declaration from the Supreme Council for

Cultural Revolution that all Internet Service Providers (ISPs) must remove anti-

government and anti-Islamic sites from their services, and that all internet service

providers should be placed under state control.59 The pace of website blocking

quickened after the start of the Iraq War in 2003.60 These measures have dramatically

constrained expression via the web, limiting the scope of this alternative space for activism.While many hoped that the Internet would remain an adaptable and unregulated

territory, the government has treated it as an analogue of the traditional media, managing

to censor content and undercut these optimistic predictions. With these policies, a

history of restricting the press in Iran has spread to the Internet. Historically, editors

and authors are susceptible to repression under the Iranian Penal Code.61 In February

2004, a new supplement to the law laid out specific sentences for publishing information

damaging to Irans national security or revealing sensitive information about the govern-

ment, and created 20 types of web-based offenses.62 The government also set up a

special unit charged with investigating and punishing Internet crimes.63

It is undeniable

that [t]he Iranian government is a vigorous censor of the Internet as the government

forces ISPs to block access to a large number of websites, including many blogs. 64 In

fact, the OpenNet Initiative reports that the majority of blocked blogs fall under the

secular/reformist category identified by Kelly and Etling.65 This means that, in

Iran, Internet users may actually access a blogosphere in which the dominant and acces-

sible voices are those that express strong support for the government. The government

has also ruled that all Iranian Internet users must be restricted to a slower connection,

so as to frustrate plans to upload or download large files from the Internet.66

Targeting Bloggers

Beyond simply filtering websites available for viewership in Iran, the government has

adopted more extreme methods of repression, including physical intimidation. Specifi-



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Iranian officials have been able to demonstrate that actions performed in the virtual

world have serious consequences in the real world. Specifically, the authorities have

extended the public morality-based limits on speech to apply to blog content; at the

same time, conservative and religious leaders have worked to connect blogging to a

perceived cultural assault from the West.67 This approach to limiting online dissent

has significantly undermined the unique nature and supposed immunity of the Internet.

Arrests based on banned content demonstrate that the Internet isin the eyes of the

authoritarian Iranian regimeanother form of speech that can be censored with relative

ease as simply another media incarnation. Arrests over the years have shattered the

perception that blogs could serve as an alternative to more standard filtered Internet

sites and the regulated print media of Iran.68

Each blogger arrest has changed the landscape of prohibited speech and political

activity in Iran, to the detriment of freedom of expression. Especially since blogging is

perceived to be one of the most innovative and raw means of communication, these

developments have been seen as putting incredible constraints on dissent in Iran. One

of the first bloggers to be arrested was Sina Motallebi, in April 2003.69

The Iraniangovernment used Motallebis arrest to send a message at a time when blogs were still a

developing form of communication in Iran. A high-ranking interrogator told Motallebi,

Now we make you an example for other webloggers and will show them that weblogging

is not a free [means of expression] without any cost. We will show that they must pay the

expensive costs of their writings in this way.70 Motallebis detainment and interrogation

reshaped the connection between self-expression and legal responsibility. The incident

also indicated how quickly the Iranian government was able to assess the threat posed

by blogging culture and repress this emerging medium.

Other cases further illuminated the Iranian governments method of online surveil-

lance, reasoning for arresting bloggers, and strategy for prosecuting these cybercrimes.Blogger Omid Memarian, detained in October 2004 for his blog statements, was also

active in Irans limited civil society; however, his online postings formed the basis for his

arrest and the evidence for his prosecution.71 Another writer, Arash Sigarchi, faced

many charges initially, but was eventually prosecuted solely based on the content of his

blog.72 These two cases reveal the dangers inherent in the form that blogs take.

Previous entries are archived and are usually available to all readers through a link on

the blog homepage. This automatic archival system provides convenient documentation

to those who wish to hold bloggers accountable for their words. This system has facilitated

the Iranian governments extension of traditional speech limitations to blog content. In

this respect, there are some pitfalls common to both online and traditional print media.

These arrests have brought the online world into the real world, blurring the distinction

that many observers had hoped was more pronounced. The ability of the government

to easily use blog content in support of repression suggests that the Internet is not really

a way to escape the constraints of limited political opportunity. Rather, the Iranian govern-

ment has adeptly transferred its restrictions on expression to the Internet realm.

Social movement theory proposes that external factors contribute to the shape and

trajectory of various activist trends. This structuralist approach includes the degree of

political system receptivity to challenger groups, the prevalence of allies and opponents,

[and] the nature of state repression among the variables that determine opportunity

structure.73 Since the Iranian government has been able to apply many of the same

incentives and disincentives for political challengers to the virtual protest platform, the

opportunity for expression has been constrained in this sphere as well. Physical attacks



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that campaigns undertaken on the Internet have many of the same brutal consequences

as traditional forms of protest in Iran. These tactics also raise the price of joining an

online activist community, deterring people from engaging in the connective aspects

of the Internet and instead heightening the potential for Putnams predictions of isolation

and reclusion.

Self-Censorship from Within the Online Dissident Community

Knowing that the government is now closely monitoring their words and what the

attendant consequences of this scrutiny can be, bloggers have decided out of an

impulse for self-preservation to regulate the nature of their message. The charges

brought against bloggers usually concern direct critiques of powerful Iranian officials.74

Scholars propose that Persian blogging has matured since its 2001 inception and has

since create[d] its own customs so as not to challenge the legitimacy of the Iranian

republic.75 Once the bloggers themselves consider overt criticism of the status quo

too risky, the Internet loses its place as an especially appealing means for reform and

democratization in Iran. Additionally, once the candor of dissident voices disappears,

the attraction of the Internet for activists disappears. Without frank discussion of the

issues, bloggers can no longer be considered a source of otherwise restricted information.

Just as many of these online activists have started to scale back the intensity of their

publications, the Iranian government has pursued an aggressive policy of cooptation.

The decision by the Information Dissemination Supreme Council of Iran to enforce the

morality code by guiding the content of weblogs is strengthened by internal restraint

from the bloggers themselves.76 When President Ahmadinejad created his personal

blog, he did so with the acknowledgment that blogs were important carriers of ideology

and state propaganda, especially in exposure to youth and to international public

opinion.77 The Iranian government has had some success in using the methods of its

opponents to forward just the opposite philosophies: that the Islamic Republic is a

strong state, tolerant and respective of minority rights, and capable of harnessing

modern technology to its advantage. This strong, pro-government voice that has grown

concurrently with the wavering voice of protest threatens to overpower online activism.

The Campaign for One Million Signatures

In light of the controversy surrounding the limits of bloggings efficacy for the transform-

ation in Iranian society, the case of the One Million Signatures campaign is an interesting

case study of how the Web and traditional social movement characteristics interact. The

One Million Signatures Campaign was launched on 27 August 2006, and is committed

to collecting one million signatures for a petition to the Iranian government in protest of

a body of laws that discriminate against women.78 As a result of government reaction to

their actions, 43 members of the campaign had been arrested by February 2008.79

The

website was blocked for the eleventh time on 28 June 2008.80

The campaign has found creative ways to use the Internet for advocacy. They have

established mailing lists, through which they communicate with their supporters, specifi-

cally informing them when they have changed their web address in response to govern-

ment censorship.81 The Internet provides the women of the campaign with a way to

reach out to international supporters, who are encouraged to sign petitions demonstrat-



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reached in face-to-face interactions or who live outside of Iran.82

The Internet also offers

a way for the campaign to garner contributions from donors.83

The One Million Signatures Campaign website offers Internet users a way to learn

about the women involved with the organization. A section entitled Focus on the

Campaigner includes brief interviews with members who talk about how they became

involved, what tasks they perform in connection with the campaign, and what effects

the campaign has had on their self-perception. One interview, in particular, reveals that

the Internet does have the potential to translate interest into tangible mobilization.

When asked how she became involved with the campaign, Hoda Aminian said,

I found the Campaign on the Internet.84 Closest to blogging, the Face-to-Face

section includes personal entries from members of the organization, who write about

their own experiences gathering signatures, the effects of Iranian laws on their way of

life, and the lessons they have learned from involvement in the campaign.85 Some of the

profiles include links to the members personal blogs; in turn, some of those arrested

have been charged because of their blog writing and posts on the Campaign site.86 In

societies where activist visibility is dangerous, such as Iran, [t]he use of social networksand informal resources for mobilization is especially common.87 The Campaigns

personalized website layout transfers the benefits of informal connections between

activists in the real world to an online format. Thus, the Campaigns website relies on

the feeling of intimacy with other protestors, seemingly simulating the real-life

interactions that Putnam favors, even as it uses an internationally accessible medium

that enables its resources to be easily moved in virtual space.

Despite the usefulness of its Internet resources, the One Million Signatures Campaign

continues to rely on the power of recruiting people to the cause through direct interaction

with Iranian citizens. Initially, the Campaign obtained signatures primarily by traveling

door-to-door and speaking with women in their homes. When this became more difficultdue to government interference, the organization began to collect signatures in public

spaces by provoking debates about womens rights.88 The Campaign has continued to

sponsor seminars advocating greater rights for women and educating Iranians about

the repressive aspects of the current law.89 Even the many women detained for their

involvement in the Campaign have found ways to empower those whom they encounter

in jail. These women are held in the public ward of Evin, a womens prison, where they

have inspired respect in their fellow prisoners and even their guards; consequently, they

are treated well while serving their sentences.90

Clearly, the strength of this organization

lies in its person-to-person advocacy.

The One Million Signatures Campaign demonstrates the ways in which the Internet

can be used artfully as a supplement tobut not a replacement fortraditional forms

of social movement mobilization and advocacy. Applied adeptly, it can be a strong

tool for education and dissemination of a movements message. The One Million

Signatures Campaign website includes material to engage its viewers politically.

The online petitions with their many signatures help the organization demonstrate

strength in numbers, a part of Tillys social movement repertoire. Updates on the

condition of detained members also illustrate commitment and unity of the membership.

In these ways, the Campaign website has been able to establish certain social movement

criteria farther from the governments view.

At the same time, the Campaign has not tried to use the Internet to entirely replace

offline political activism. Nor has the Campaign acted as if web use can help members

avoid the risks of social movements for governmental change in authoritarian regimes.



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is still done in the houses and coffee shops of Tehran. In the face of a hostile political

atmosphere, members of the Campaign have demonstrated great skill in finding

spacehowever limitedin Iranian society to advocate an end to gender discrimination

and mobilize women, despite the threat of detainment and harassment.

Summing Up the Iranian Scene

To date, the Internet and blogs have not served the democratizing role in Iran that many

political scientists had predicted. There is a sizeable presence of dissident voices in

Weblogistan, but there are also many antidemocratic voices that are not subjected to

the same government scrutiny and censorship as those championing democracy. The

state has also found ways to detract from the novelty of the Internet by applying familiar

legal codes and developing new laws to deal with web-based sedition. Physical repression

and jail sentences have made real the consequences of online activism, reducing the

applicability of theories that view the Internet as a separate and insulated platform for

politics. The Internet in Iran seems most useful for mobilizing resources, such as volun-teers, and reflecting an organizations support. The specific experience of the One

Million Signatures Campaign in Iran suggests that social movements are still most

successful when they operate in the real world and seek to strengthen these actions

with an online resource. Just as political activists have had to adapt to government repres-

sion in the streets of Tehran, so too must they continue to develop new ways to use the

Internet to their advantage while avoiding government incursion into the online world.

Egypt: Introduction of and Reaction to the Internet

In Egypt, the Internet has had mixed success in expanding political opportunity fordissent. The highly repressive government of President Hosni Mubarak has relied on

emergency rule in an attempt to legitimize violations of human rights and civil liberties

in Egypt for over 27 years. At the end of 2001, only 0.86% of the Egyptian population, or

600,000 individuals out of the population of 68 million, were using the Internet.91 In

2008, a Central Intelligence Agency report estimated that six million Egyptian citizens

were online.92 As is the case elsewhere in the Arab world, unequal access in Egypt has

focused Internet use in the hands of the elite and the highly educated.93

Since its introduction in Egypt, the Internet has been highly monitored by the Egyp-

tian government. The government opened up the ISP sector to private competition in

2002, which helped a greater portion of the Egyptian public gain access to the Internet.94

Still, the largest ISP in Egypt, T-Data Company, is owned and operated by the state.95

This arrangement makes it relatively easy for the government to determine which

websites are available to a majority of Egyptian Internet users. Cairo attempted to

prescribe a limited role for the Internet by encouraging some businesses to tap into

globalization trends through the use of information and communication technologies

(ICTs).96

Still, Mubaraks commitment to blocking objectionable sites critical of the

government enables him to extend his authoritarian rule to the Internet.

The Egyptian government has relied primarily on two arguments for limiting Internet

access. First, in line with the Mubarak governments state of emergency, the Internet

has been described as a threat to Egypts national security. In September 2002, the state

established a unit in the police force charged specifically with monitoring the Internet.97

Later, in November 2002, President Mubaraks office proposed a telecommunications bill



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and National Security.98

Another strategy to curtail certain Web content has been

pursued by the vice department of the Interior Ministry, which prosecutes individuals

on charges of pornographic or homosexually oriented content.99 In conjunction, these

two means of classifying illegal or dangerous Internet activity lend the state the ability

to prosecute artists and political activists alike. This has made the Internet a very

dangerous place to express minority opinions or engage in any semblance of free

expression. In this hostile environment, however, various individuals and groups have

still attempted to challenge the status quo.

Those who have done so have met outright repression from the government. For

example, many bloggers who established themselves as sleuths dedicated to uncovering

government abuses experience unjust treatment at the hands of the Egyptian authorities.

Wael Abbas is one of the most famous of this group of men and women in Egypt. He

writes a prominent and popular blog, called Misr Digital.100 Abbas is recognized by

many international human rights and news sources as an influential activist in Egypt;

his website lists accolades from Human Rights Watch, the International Center for

Journalists, CNN, and the BBC.101

In 2007, Abbas described his work and that of hiscolleagues as establishing a new school of journalism.102 In response to their commit-

ment to revealing government abuses, many of these individuals have suffered personal

attacks.

One blogger claimed he had been beaten so many times at rallies that it no longer

matters.103 Another blogger, Abdel Kareem, was sentenced to four years in prison

because of his harsh words about the religious institution Al-Azhar University and

President Mubarak.104 In response, his supporters have established the Free Kareem

campaign, complete with a blog and website.105 Such responses to harsh government

policies among bloggers are important as they establish the concept of an online commu-

nity, in which bloggers are connected to one another and have shared interests. The abilityto cultivate these informal bonds over the Internet can help overcome bloggers inclination

to create competing sources of information. To some extent, then, government retaliation

may be bringing these individuals closer together.

Aside from these individual watchdog journalists, two social movements in Egyptthe

Egyptian Movement for Change (Kefaya) and the Muslim Brotherhoodhave turned to

the Internet and blogging to bolster their critiques of and challenges to the Mubarak gov-

ernment.

Kefaya: An Online Supplement to an Offline Movement

The Egyptian Movement for Change, or Kefaya, demonstrates the limitations of the

Internet as a form of government protest. The movements success and decline hinged

on the promise and limits of alternate forms of communication. Kefaya, the Arabic

word for enough, reflects the movements opposition to President Hosni Mubaraks

continued emergency rule, as well as his plans to turn over the government to his

son.106

The grassroots movement was particularly notable for its bold demonstrations

against the Mubarak government, specifically its tactic of taking to the streets without

waiting for government permission and thus opening further space for public

protest.107

The organization made an impact in Egypt and internationally in large part

through its successful use of information technology, particularly the Internet. The

Kefaya website was popular because it allowed members and sympathizers to anon-

ymously post their complaints about the government.108 This interactive format invited



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and networking. In response to likely censorship of traditional print media and previous

successful use of alternative communication to mobilize Egyptians for demonstrations,

the Kefaya movement used emails to its original members, text messages, website adver-

tisements and outreach to bloggers to help bring people to its events.109

Specifically,

Kefaya members used the blog Wehda Masrya, meaning Egyptian Unity, to solicit

support for a 2007 rally in favor of freedom of the press.110

Kefayas ability to translate online interest into attendance at a street protest is an

important feature that contributed to the movements influence on the government.

The organization was able to motivate individuals to move beyond passive or anonymous

online participation. This suggests that some aspect of the websites design and structure

convinced Egyptian citizens of the worthiness of this cause. The success of Kefaya,

however, is still measured in terms of traditional social movement repertoire, specifically

the number of people who attended a public protest in the streets of Cairo and their

commitment to the cause despite predicted violence.

While the Kefaya movement maintained its own website, its first method of publicity

and outreach was through relationships with nonconformist bloggers. Some bloggerspersonal philosophy coincided quite nicely with Kefayas message of dissent, making

their collaboration a natural choice.111 Bloggers were able to command the attention

of the international media, while reaching out to politically conscious Egyptian citizens

and encouraging their attendance at Kefaya events.112 This method demonstrated the

technological and political savvy of Kefayas leaders. At least temporarily, the grassroots

movement was able to cleverly use already popular forms of online communication as a

way to propagate its message of reform and demands for peaceful democratization.

Response from the Egyptian State

However, the Egyptian state was quick in its response to thwart Kefayas success. On

May 4, 2008, Mubaraks government blocked the Kefaya movements website, www.

harakmasria.org, through the state-owned T-Data Company.113 The government knew

that this would only partially resolve the problem of Kefayas success. Next, the state

pursued means of physical repression to thwart the social movement. Protestors were

beaten and tortured and detained without charges.114 The state began to target journal-

ists, including those who used non-traditional media for their reports. These retaliations,

similar to those pursued by the Iranian government, complicated the distinction between

virtual and actual dissent and punishment. As in Iran, the Internet in Egypt is not recog-

nized as a separate sphere for political action governed by entirely separate cultural and

legal codes. Government reactions have overturned any belief that the Internet could

significantly expand limited political opportunity structures already in place.

Kefayas Fate

These attacks had several consequences for Kefaya. They clearly delineated the risks

associated with support for the grassroots movement, whether in public demonstrations

or via online activity. While these may have served as insufficient deterrents for com-

mitted activists, they raised the costs for other members of the movement. At the

same time, the arrest and detainment of important leaders of the Kefaya movement

necessarily changed the focus of the organization. As more and more protestors were

abused and treated unfairly, the Kefaya movement was forced to direct attention and

http://www.harakmasria.org/http://www.harakmasria.org/http://www.harakmasria.org/http://www.harakmasria.org/


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combine its policy of targeting the Kefaya leadership with a government-owned media

barrage undermining the movement.115 Mubarak and his cohorts fell back on circulating

the traditional damaging rumor that Kefaya was somehow a proxy for the United States

government.116

Despite its eventual demise, Kefaya changed the political environment in Egypt in its

moments of popularity and success. Kefaya was able to use the Internet as a tool for

mobilizing followers into traditional forms of protest. Because of this, the Kefaya case

study challenges the presumption that the Internet causes isolation and dissuades

those dissatisfied with the status quo from direct challenges to the government. A

RAND report states that Kefayas successful use of the Internet and bloggers to

widely publicize human rights abuses perpetuated by the government forced the state

to make some concessions. The government prosecuted some of the perpetrators of

violence against protestors.117 This compromise eroded the states authority to a

certain extent. Few contest that the governments crackdown on Kefayas various

means of communication was only one of many forcesboth internal and situa-

tionalthat contributed to the demise of Kefaya. This assessment reinforces the viewthat an effective Internet presence was also only one of many factors that contributed

to the movements success. However, it was an important and adaptive one.

The Muslim Brotherhoods Modern Medium

The Kefaya experience has provided additional lessons for activists and the state. The

blogging model has since spread to conservatives in Egypt. Specifically, the Muslim

Brotherhood has turned to the blog as a medium for challenging the governments

detainment of a number of its members. The Muslim Brotherhood blogging phenom-

enon took root after the mass arrest of Al-Azhar students and Muslim Brothers, whichresulted in the formation of a website and a number of blogs in February 2007.118

The style of these blogs, which rely on video clips, interviews, and photographs to

uncover government abuses of the Brotherhood, resemble that of more liberally

minded bloggers, specifically Wael Abbas.119 This similarity suggests that a learning

process is taking place among Egyptian activists of all stripes regarding best practices

for online dissent.

One of the strongest voices behind the Brotherhood blogging movement is Abdel

Monem Mahmoud. Mahmouds blog, I am Ikhwan is published online in both

English and Arabic and received over 2000 hits in the first 6 months after its October

2006 launch.120 However, in clear support of the claim that [t]he Egyptian regimes

repression of the Muslim Brotherhood and its repression of liberal bloggers are part

and parcel of the same despotic impulse,121

Mahmoud was detained for 45 days in

2007.122 However, violence against the Muslim Brotherhood did not dampen the

groups demand for recognition as a political party.123 Thus, whether liberal or conser-

vative, online voices that challenge the government are taken seriously in Egypt and are

treated in the same repressive manner by the authorities.

The Promise of Egyptian Blogs

The trajectories of these two blogging movements in Egypt, Kefaya and the Muslim

Brothers, illustrate the Internets very limited potential for success as a tool for

expanding political opportunity and facilitating resource mobilization and support in



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those using the Web. Internet filters and website blocks, combined with physical

intimidation and arrests, prove that the Egyptian state perceives the blogging pheno-

menon as a real threat to its authoritarian rule and one that it will not stand for.

While utilizing repressive tactics to halt the online aspects of these social movements,

the state has also been forced to make some concessions in light of the information

that blogs have made widely available on an international scale. These results offer

hope for the Internet as a weapon in the arsenal of brave activists against

authoritarianism.

Role of the Internet in Civil Society

Social movement theorists have identified the importance of opportunity structures and

resource mobilization for the success of Islamic activism, and how these factors are

constrained under authoritarian regimes. Scholars such as Charles Tilly have classified

the various elements of social movement repertoire.124 Political scientists like Robert

Putnam have identified informal networks as a help to democratization and havewondered whether the Internet may be a hindrance to this process.125 Many scholars,

pundits, and activists held high hopes for the potential of the Internet to aid in the

development of civil society and active protests.126 In spite of these predictions, the

evidence from the Muslim worldspecifically Iran and Egyptis mixed. There is a

role for the Internet in promoting and strengthening social movements; but the Internet

is not a panacea for the threats these movements face.

The cases of the One Million Signatures Campaign in Iran and the Kefaya movement

in Egypt prove that Internet use can be an important activist tactic. Both of these social

movements successfully relied on virtual resources to inspire people to take tangible pol-

itical action. In both countries, cultural attitudes have not significantly slowed the accep-tance of the Internet as a means of activism, which could hinder a social movements

opportunity for action.127 Active members of the One Million Signatures campaign

found the cause online, became linked into the community, and translated their

virtual empowerment into concrete action on the streets of Tehran. Their personal

website mimics the one-on-one interactions that still form the foundation of the Cam-

paign. The Kefaya movement successfully tapped into the online blogger community

to find mouthpieces for their cause and inspire people to attend mass street demon-

strations in the face of cruel government retaliation. The interactive nature of the

website engaged users politically, and left them hoping for a more direct outlet for

their frustration.

At the same time, the experiences of these organizations reveal the limitations of the

Internet. Censorship, cooptation, and government retaliation against prominent Inter-

net-based figures constrain the online possibilities for these movements. The Internet

is heavily regulated through the application of both older, tested legislation and new,

adaptive codes. Savvy antidemocratic Internet users threaten to create the online

din that Putnam warns can overshadow liberal messages.128

Furthermore, govern-

ments choice to rely on physical violence, human rights abuses, and civil liberties viola-

tions to silence virtual dissent makes real the punishment associated with any type of

challenge to the government. The rising costs of repression may lead to government con-

cessions, such as in the case of Egypt. On the other hand, the tendency of bloggers to

moderate their messages in response to authoritarian crackdowns may help the govern-

ment stifle voices of democratization so that they do not need to make any sweeping



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Conclusion

These case studies demonstrate that the Internet is not the arena of free speech and

democratization that many scholars had believed it to be. But the future hardly looks

bleak. The promising evidence from Iran and Egypt is threefold. First, Putnams greatest

fears that the Internet would encourage a retreat into anonymity and away from politicalparticipation remain unfulfilled. The manner in which these social movements have

complemented face-to-face interaction with Internet communication proves that the

two can exist in harmony. The Internet need not supplant traditional forms of protest.

This leads to the second point. Online activism has merely proven to be another social

movement innovation, rather than a replacement for effective signs of commitment

and challenges to the government. Finally, despite government crackdowns, Islamic acti-

vists have refused to abandon their struggle. Whether through a blog or a meeting in a

shop in Tehran, these groups continue to challenge the status quo and ruffle the feathers

of the authoritarian regimes under which they live.

With the support of international media and the help of private, unfiltered ISPs, the

Muslim blogging community can continue to uncover regimes human rights abuses

and challenge undemocratic practices. By politicizing citizens and providing uncensored

information when possible, the Internet continues to serve as a developing forum for

debates about the role of government and its treatment of its citizens. An integral

aspect of a social movement is its ability to inspire and reach out to a broad coalition

of society in a straightforward way. Increasing affordability of Internet access may

make this phenomenon even more far-reaching in the near future.

At this point, the Iranian and Egyptian cases cannot do much more than show ways in

which the Internet can be successfully incorporated into social movements as another

supplementary means of mobilization, communication, and education. But it is imposs-

ible to forget that the street demonstration, taken for granted today as a form of activism,

was a tactic adopted slowly over time.129 The Internet and, specifically, blogs are still

relatively new resources upon which activists may draw. They may be the street

protest of tomorrow, an expression of the social movement repertoire that continues

to evolve in the coming years.

Acknowledgements

The author extends thanks to Dr Mirjam Kunkler for her guidance with picking a topic,

finding additional sources, and restructuring and improving this article.

NOTES

1. Daniel W. Drezner and Henry Farrell, Introduction: Blogs, politics, and power: a special issue of

Public Choice, Public Choice, Vol. 134, 2008, p. 2. There were an estimated 70 million blogs on

the Internet in 2007.

2. Elizabeth M. Bucar and Roja Fazaeli, Free Speech in Weblogistan? The Offline Consequences of

Online Communication, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 40, 2008, pp. 403404.

3. D. Drezner and H. Farrell, Introduction: Blogs, politics, and power, op. cit., p. 2.

4. Svetlana V. Kulikova and David D. Perlmutter, Blogging Down the Dictator? The Kyrgyz Revolu-

tion and Samizdat Websites, International Communication Gazette, Vol. 69, No. 29, 2007, pp. 29

31.5. Quintan Wiktorowicz, Introduction, in Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Approach, ed. Quintan

Wiktorowicz, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 2.



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7. Ibid., p. 3. Emphasis from text.

8. Charles Tilly, Social Movements 17682004, Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2004, p. 4.

9. Ibid.

10. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone, New York: Touchstone, 2000, p. 172.

11. Ibid., 173.

12. Ibid., 175 176.

13. Ibid., 176.

14. Deborah L. Wheeler, Blessings and Curses: Women and the Internet Revolution in the Arab

World, in Women and Media in the Middle East: Power through Self Expression, ed. Naomi Sakr,

London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2004, 139 140.

15. Edmund Ghareeb, New media and in the information revolution in the Arab world: An assess-

ment, The Middle East Journal, Vol. 54, No. 3, Summer 2006, p. 416.

16. D. Wheeler, Blessings and Curses, op. cit., 141.

17. Ibid.

18. Michael Whine, Islamist organizations on the Internet, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 11,

No. 1, 1999, p. 125.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., pp. 127, 129.

21. As explained later, the One Million Signatures Campaign regularly moves its websites to avoidIranian government censorship.

22. Deva Woodley, New competencies in democratic communication? Blogs, agenda setting and

political participation, Public Choice, Vol. 134, 2008, p. 114.

23. D. Drezner and H. Farrell, Introduction: Blogs, politics, and power, op. cit., pp. 35.

24. Ibid., p. 11.

25. Ibid., p. 3.

26. United States: Flickring here, twittering there, The Economist, Vol. 388, No. 8593, August 2008.

27. Babak Rahimi, Cyberdissent: The Internet in Revolutionary Iran, Middle East Review of Inter-

national Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3, September 2003, pp. 101102.

28. D. Wheeler, Blessings and Curses, op. cit., p. 141.

29. B. Rahimi, Cyberdissent, op. cit., p. 102.

30. Liora Hendelman-Baavur, Promises and Perils of Weblogistan: Online Personal Journals and theIslamic Republic of Iran, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2007, p. 80.

31. Ibid., p. 86.

32. Ibid.

33. E. Bucar and R. Fazaeli, Free Speech in Weblogistan?, op. cit., p. 403.

34. Nasrin Alavi, We Are Iran: The Persian Blogs, Brooklyn, NY: Soft Skull Press, 2005, p. 1. Derkhshan

goes by the online name Hoder (E. Bucar and R. Fazaeli, Free Speech in Weblogistan?, op. cit.,

p. 404).

35. E. Bucar and R. Fazaeli, Free Speech in Weblogistan?, p. 404.

36. John Kelly and Bruce Etling, Mapping Irans Online Public: Politics and Culture in the Persian

Blogosphere, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School, 2008, p. 2.


38. Ibid., p. 106.

39. Ibid.

40. J. Kelly and B. Etling, Mapping Irans Online Public, op. cit., p. 9.


42. L. Hendelman-Baavur, Promises and Perils of Weblogistan, p. 87.

43. B. Rahimi, Cyberdissent, pp. 107-8.

44. N. Alavi, We Are Iran, op. cit.

45. Ibid., p. 7.

46. Ibid., p. 346. Unfortunately, increasing cooperation from Western technology providers (such as

Google in China) has helped repressive governments control the information that their citizens

can access. See Clive Thompson, Googles China Problem (and Chinas Google Problem),

New York Times, 23 April 2006.

47. B. Rahimi, Cyberdissent, p. 108.

48. Ibid.49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.



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51. Ibid.

52. R. Putnam, Bowling Alone, op. cit., p. 179.


54. Ibid., p. 13.

55. Ibid., p. 12.

56. R. Putnam, Bowling Alone, op. cit., p. 177.



59. Ibid., p. 109.

60. Ibid.


62. L. Hendelman-Baavur, Promises and Perils of Weblogistan, op. cit., p. 84.

63. Ibid., p. 85.


65. Ibid., p. 37.

66. L. Hendelman-Baavur, Promises and Perils of Weblogistan, op. cit., p. 86.

67. E. Bucar and R. Fazaeli, Free Speech in Weblogistan?, op. cit., p. 405.

68. Ibid., p. 407.

69. Ibid., p. 406.70. Ibid., p. 407.

71. Ibid., pp. 409-10.

72. Ibid., pp. 411-412.

73. Q. Wiktorowicz, Introduction, op. cit., 14.

74. Case in point, Arash Sigarchi was eventually held responsible for three of the original five charges

brought against him. In the end, the content of his blog was able to support only three crimes: insult-

ing Khomeini, insulting Khamenei, and criticizing the Islamic republic (E. Bucar and R. Fazaeli,

Free Speech in Weblogistan?, op. cit., p. 412).

75. Ibid., p. 413.

76. L. Hendelman-Baavur, Promises and Perils of Weblogistan, p. 88.

77. Ibid.

78. Sussan Tahmasebi, Answers to Your Most Frequently asked questions about the campaign, http://www.changeforequality.info/english/spip.php?article226 .

79. Ibid.

80. Change for Equality Blocked for Eleventh Time, 28 June 2008, http://www.change4equality.com/

english/spip.php?article304 .

81. Email, Dr Mirjam Kunkler to Melissa Lerner, Fwd: News: Change for Equality One Million

Signatures Campaign, Iran, 11 December 2008.

82. About One Million Signatures Demanding Changes to Discriminatory Laws, 28 August 2006,

http://www.change4equality.com/english/spip.php?article18 .

83. Ibid.

84. Interview by Sussan Tahmasebi, Focus on the Campaigner: Hoda Aminian, 4 December 2008,

http://www.change4equality.org/english/spip.php?article411 .

85. Face to Face, 27 December 2008, http://www.changeforequality.info/english/spip.php?rubrique3 .

86. Maryam Hosseinkhah was detained on 18 November 2007 for her contributions to the One Million

Signatures campaign website and the Zanestan website, associated with the Womens Cultural

Center (Maryam Hosseinkhah, Detentions and Summons against Campaigners for Gender Equal-

ity, 24 February 2008, http://www.change4equality.com/english/spip.php?article225 ).

87. Q. Wiktorowicz, Introduction, op. cit., p. 12.

88. Discussion with Mirjam Kunkler, Princeton University, 11 December 2008.

89. See About One Million Signatures Demanding Changes to Discriminatory Laws on the One

Million Signatures Campaign website.

90. S. Tahmasebi, Answers, op. cit.

91. D. Wheeler, Blessings and Curses, op. cit., p. 140.

92. Nadia Oweidat et al., The Kefaya Movement: A Case Study of a Grassroots Reform Initiative, Santa

Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008, p. 22.

93. D. Wheeler, Blessings and Curses, op. cit., p. 145.94. Hossam Bahgat, Egypts Virtual Protection of Morality, Middle East Report, No. 230, Spring

2004, p. 23.

http://www.changeforequality.info/english/spip.php?article226http://www.changeforequality.info/english/spip.php?article226http://www.change4equality.com/english/spip.php?article304http://www.change4equality.com/english/spip.php?article304http://www.change4equality.com/english/spip.php?article18http://www.change4equality.org/english/spip.php?article411http://www.changeforequality.info/english/spip.php?rubrique3http://www.change4equality.com/english/spip.php?article225http://www.change4equality.com/english/spip.php?article225http://www.changeforequality.info/english/spip.php?rubrique3http://www.change4equality.org/english/spip.php?article411http://www.change4equality.com/english/spip.php?article18http://www.change4equality.com/english/spip.php?article304http://www.change4equality.com/english/spip.php?article304http://www.changeforequality.info/english/spip.php?article226http://www.changeforequality.info/english/spip.php?article226


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95. The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, Egypt: Coincide Hosting the Largest Communi-

cation Conference in Africa, an oppositions Web Site is being Blocked Egyptian Government

should Unblock Kefaya Homepage, 12 May 2008, http://anhri.net/en/reports/2008/pr0512.shtml .

96. For more information on this trend, see Heba El Sayed and Chris Westrup, Egypt and ICTs: How

ICTs bring national initiatives, global organizations and local companies together, Information

Technology & People, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2003, pp. 7692.

97. H. Bahgat, Egypts Virtual Protection of Morality, p. 23.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid.

100. Abbass blog,Misr Digital: An Independent Egyptian Blog, is updated almost daily and can befound at

http://misrdigital.blogspirit.com.

101. Ibid.

102. Stephen Franklin, Arab bloggers pay toll for truth; Journalists challenge authority in unfriendly

environs, Chicago Tribune, 22 July 2007, p. 3.

103. Ibid.

104. Ibid.

105. More information about Free Kareem! Campaign to Free the Brave Egyptian Blogger Abdelkar-

eem Nabil Soliman is available at http://www.freekareem.org.

106. Manar Shorbagy, The Egyptian Movement for Change Kefaya: Redefining Politics in Egypt,Public Culture, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2007, p. 177.

107. Ibid., p. 190.

108. N. Oweidat et al., The Kefaya Movement, op. cit., p. 20.

109. Ibid., p. 21.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid., p. 23.

112. Ibid., pp. 2324.

113. Egypt: Coincide Hosting the Largest Communication Conference in Africa, an oppositions Web

Site is being Blocked; Egyptian Government should Unblock Kefaya Homepage, The Arabic

Network for Human Rights Information, http://anhri.net/en/reports/2008/pr0512.shtml .

114. N. Oweidat et al., The Kefaya Movement, op. cit., p. 28.

115. Ibid., p. 31.116. Ibid., p. 32.

117. Ibid., p. 50.

118. Marc Lynch, Brotherhood of the Blog, Guardian.co.uk, 5 March 2007.

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid.

121. Ibid.

122. S. Franklin, Arab bloggers pay toll, op. cit., 3.

123. Michaelle Bowers, The Egyptian movement for change: Intellectual antecedents and generational

conflicts, Contemporary Islam, Vol. 1, 2007, p. 81.

124. C. Tilly, Social Movements, op. cit.

125. R. Putnam, Bowling Alone, op. cit.

126. See, Quintan Wictorowicz, Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory: A New Direction for Research,

London: Routledge, 2002; Aghil Ameripour, et al., Conviviality of Internet social networks: An expla-

natory study of Internet campaigns in Iran,Journal of Information Technology, Vol. 25, 2010, pp. 244

257; MarlynTadros, Knowing thePromises, Facing theChallenges:The Role of theInternetin Devel-

opment and Human Rights Campaigns and Movements in the Arab Middle East, in Charting Trans-

national Democracy: Beyond Global Arrogance, ed. Janie Leatherman & Julie A. Webber, New York:

MacMillan Palgrave, 2005, pp. 175 194. See also Yanuar Nugroho, Adopting Technology, Trans-

forming Society: The Internet and the Reshaping of Civil Society Activism in Indonesia, International

Journal of EmergingTechnologies and Society, Vol.6, No. 2, 2008,pp.77 105. These provideonly a small

cross-section of the scholarship that has arisen over the past decade related to social movements, civil

society, and the Internet in the Araband, more broadly, the Muslimworld.

127. Q. Wiktorowicz, Introduction, op. cit., p. 14. Wiktorowicz explains that political opportunity

structures is too narrow a term, since a movements opportunity is also ruled by cultural, social,

and economic factors (pp. 13 14).128. R. Putnam, Bowling Alone, op. cit., p. 173.

129. C. Tilly, Social Movements, op. cit., p. 11.

http://anhri.net/en/reports/2008/pr0512.shtmlhttp://misrdigital.blogspirit.com/http://www.freekareem.org/http://anhri.net/en/reports/2008/pr0512.shtmlhttp://anhri.net/en/reports/2008/pr0512.shtmlhttp://www.freekareem.org/http://misrdigital.blogspirit.com/http://anhri.net/en/reports/2008/pr0512.shtml


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