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Interpretation and Epistemic Evaluationin Goldmans Descriptive Epistemology

JAMES R. BEEBESaint Louis University

One branch of Alvin Goldmans proposed scientific epistemology is devotedto the scientific study of how folk epistemic evaluators acquire and deploy theconcepts of knowledge and justified belief. The author argues that such adescriptive epistemology, as Goldman calls it, requires a more sophisticatedtheory of interpretation than is provided by the simulation theory Goldman

adopts. The author also argues that any adequate account of folk epistemiccon- cepts must reconstruct the intersubjective conceptual roles those conceptsplay in discursive practices. In other words, descriptive epistemology alsorequires a theory of communicative action and an account of the practicalabilities agents must have to engage in discursive practices.

I.

Alvin Goldman, the most prominent proponent of reliabilism inepistemology, has in recent years expanded and developed his ver-sion of reliabilism in new directions.

1One significant feature of

these developments is the division of his comprehensive naturalistic

epistemology into two distinct branches: normative scientificepistemology and descriptive scientific epistemology. Thedescriptive branch is devoted to the descriptive study ofepistemic folkways, the epistemological analogue to folkpsychology. This branch aims to produce psychologicallyexplanatory theories of how and why folk agents form the beliefsthat they do. This includes explaining how folk epistemic evaluatorsacquire the concept of justification and use it to make epistemicjudgments without necessarily attempting to identify the propertyof justification itself (Goldman 1994, 314). In contrast, the project ofnormative scientific epistemology evaluates

Received23 August 2000

I have benefited greatly from comments and criticisms given by James Bohman andparticipants in the Second Annual Philosophy of Social Science Roundtable.

Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 31 No. 2, June 2001 163-186 2001 Sage Publications 163


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164 PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES/June 2001

ordinary beliefs and belief-forming processes for their justificationand reliability and formulates suggestions for improving folkepistemic practice.

2Goldmans best known work on reliabilism and

his recent book on social epistemology are exercises in normativescientific epistemology.

3

Although I am sympathetic to Goldmans general commitment toconstructing a scientific epistemology that is rooted in the cognitiveand social sciences, I will argue that the descriptive branch of scien-tific epistemology, as it has been developed by Goldman, is deeplyproblematic. The two broad areas of difficulty I will concentrate onconcern Goldmans accounts of interpretation and epistemic evalua-tion. A necessary precursor to descriptive epistemological explana-

tions of folk beliefs is the interpretation of those beliefs, butGoldmans only discussion of interpretation is found in his defenseof simulation theory (Goldman 1992c). I will argue that simulationtheory cannot provide descriptive epistemology with a satisfactorymethod of interpretation and that Goldmans failure to addressthe difficulties pre- sented by interpretation should lead to areconsideration of Goldmans methodological prescriptions fordescriptive epistemology. Descrip- tive epistemology should besupplemented with resources developed by the social sciences todeal with interpretation.I will also argue that Goldmans intellectual virtue prototype

theory of folk epistemic evaluation (cf. section II below) isinadequate because it neglects conceptual-linguistic practical

abilities evaluators need to engage in the practice of epistemicevaluation.PaceGoldman, reconstructing the social belief-formingmethod of epistemic evaluation, involves more than identifyingthe form of mental representations used by evaluators cognitivesystems. Because possession of these conceptual-linguistic abilitiesis necessary for the possession of the belief-forming method ofepistemic evaluation, explicating these practical abilities is essentialto any adequate explanation of that method. I conclude thatGoldman does not cast his methodological net wide enough toprovide descriptive epistemology with sufficient resources tointerpret folk beliefs or to explain epistemic evaluation.Section II sets the stage for the criticisms that follow by providing

a more complete account of the nature of descriptive epistemology,

while section III discusses the difficulties interpretation presents toGoldmans position. In sections IV and V, I build up an account ofthe conceptual-linguistic abilities involved in epistemic evaluationfrom an account of the abilities required for participation in anydiscursive


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Beebe/GOLDMANS DESCRIPTIVE EPISTEMOLOGY 165

practice in an effort to reveal important aspects of epistemicfolkways that are neglected by Goldman.

II.

Because Goldmans descriptive epistemology is often misunder-stood, it will be helpful if I explain more of the details andexplanatory aims of his project. Goldmans scientific epistemologyis much wider in scope than traditional epistemologies because itincludes the descriptive study of epistemic folkways in whattraditionally has been a strictly normative endeavor. An important

innovation of this descriptive study is that it gives as muchattention to the study of folk epistemic evaluators (i.e., those whoattribute knowledge) as it does to the study of folk epistemic agents(i.e., those who acquire knowledge of the external world).Epistemic evaluators, but not necessarily epistemic agents, possessand deploy the concepts of KNOWLEDGE and JUSTIFICATION.Goldman (1992a, 157) recommends that descriptive epistemolo-

gists investigate the form of representation of epistemic concepts inthe minds of folk evaluators. As an example of what descriptiveepistemology can do, he proposes the following two-part theory offolk epistemic concepts, drawing on recent cognitive scientificresearch into the representation of concepts and prototypes.

One component is the theory of representation and judgment. It saysthat epistemic evaluators mentally store certain prototypes of goodand bad belief-forming processes (epistemic virtues and vices). Virtuepro- totypes would include various perceptual processes, memorypro- cesses, and good inferential processes. When a question arisescon- cerning the justificational status of a target belief, the evaluator(more precisely, the evaluators cognitive system) considers what heknows about the process(es) that produced the target belief and triesto match this information to the virtue prototypes. If he finds asufficiently close match, the target belief is judged to be justified; if nosufficiently close match is found, or if its processes match those ofvice prototypes, then the belief is judged to be unjustified.

4(Goldman

1994, 314-15)

The second component of the theory addresses the question of howthe virtue and vice prototypes are selected or acquired in the firstplace. This component appeals to reliability: virtue prototypes arechosen for their (judged) reliability, vice prototypes for their (judged)

unreliability. (Goldman 1994, 314-15)


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The task for descriptive epistemology, then, is (1) to explain howeval- uators acquire epistemic virtue prototypes; (2) to discoverwhich prototypes commonly appear on folk lists of epistemicvirtues and vices; and (3) to explain how prototypes are used inepistemic evaluation. Carrying out these tasks obviously requires agreat deal of input from the cognitive sciences.Goldmans two-component theory of epistemic appraisal is an

explanation of the mechanics of a particular belief-forming method.Goldman also thinks that descriptive epistemology should explainwhy evaluators hold many of the particular beliefs they do. As asec- ond example of what descriptive epistemology can do,Goldman uses his intellectual virtue prototype theory plus further

facts about epistemic evaluators to explain hotly contestedphilosophical issues such as the epistemic status of the beliefs of Mr.Truetempa widely discussed counterexample to reliabilism.Truetemp, according to the story, has a device (variously called a

tempucomp or a doxatemp) implanted in his skull thatprovides him with reliably true beliefs about the temperature of hisimmediate environment.

5Truetemp is unaware of the existence of

the device and, consequently, of its reliability as well.6Goldman

thinks he can explain why we are reluctant to attribute knowledgeto Truetemp, even though Truetemps unusual cognitive faculty isstipulated to be highly reliable. The tempucomp, Goldman claims,most closely matches prototypes of our perceptual faculties. Likevision, the tempucomp provides Truetemp with noninferential

beliefs about physical features of his immediate environment.Unlike normal perceptual modalities, however, its use is notaccompanied by any sensory awareness. As a result, thetempucomp fails to be a strong match with any of the com- monintellectual virtue prototypes. Because stored perceptual proto-types are only partially activated, epistemic evaluators are less thanfully confident in attributing knowledge to Truetemp (Goldman1994, 315). Moreover, because of the tempucomps stipulatedreliabil- ity, it does an equally poor job of matching storedprototypes of intellectual vices. Thus, it also fails to be a clear caseof the failure of knowledge. Goldman explains that thetempucomps partial matching to both virtue and vice prototypesprevents clear evaluative intuitions from forming and leads to the

seemingly irresolvable disagreement found among philosophersconcerning the case.

7

Goldmans explanation does not answer the question of whetherTruetemp really has knowledge or justified belief. That is a questionfor normative epistemology, while the foregoing explanation is an


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exercise in descriptive epistemology. In general, descriptiveepistemological theories include descriptions of the form EvaluatorE takes Ss belief that p to be justified or Most folk take visual per-ception to be generally reliable but not prescriptions such asEvalu- ator Eshouldtake Ss belief that p to be justified or Mostfolkshouldtake (or arejustifiedorcorrectin taking) visual perceptionto be generally reliable. Some philosophers, such as Peter Markie,object to this approach to the study of epistemic folkways. Markiewrites,

The problem with this new epistemology is that it does not tell uswhat we want to know. Some beliefs are epistemically justified andsome are epistemically unjustified. We want to know what it is for a

belief to be epistemically justified and what it is for one to beepistemically unjustified.... The new epistemic theory neveranswers our question in any of these forms. It starts to do so... butinstead of following through with an account of the differencebetween virtuous and vicious epistemic processes, it gives uspsychological descriptions of peoples behavior as epistemicevaluators. (Markie 1996, 813)

Markie fails to see that Goldmans intellectual virtue prototype the-ory of epistemic evaluation falls under the descriptive branch of sci-entific epistemology. He does not seem to realize that the normativequestions that trouble him are the very questions the normativebranch of Goldmans scientific epistemology is designed to address.

At no point does Goldman claim that all there is to the property

of justification is our conception of it, as represented by our listsof epistemic virtues. Nor does he claim that we should eliminate thenotion of genuine justification from our epistemic vocabulary. Com-menting on the diversity of intellectual virtue prototypes used byfolk evaluators he writes,

Since some of these opinions [concerning the reliability of variouspro- cesses] may be true and others false, peoples lists of virtues andvices may have varying degrees of accuracy. The real status of atrait as a virtue or vice is independent of peoples opinions about thattrait. How- ever, since the enterprise of descriptive epistemology is todescribe and explain evaluators judgments, we need to advert to thetraits theybelieveto be virtues or vices, i.e., the ones on theirmental lists. (Goldman

1992a, 175 n. 5)

Since Goldman claims that the real status of a trait as a virtue orvice is independent of peoples opinions about that trait, he is obvi-ously not reducing reliability to what folk evaluators take to be reli-ability. It follows that any account of what in fact appears on thevirtue


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lists of folk evaluators will be independent of an account of whatshould appear on those lists. Hence the two branches of scientificepistemology.

8

III.

Although Goldmans descriptive epistemology is not problematicfor the reasons Markie suggests, it does face other difficulties. Fore-most among these concerns is its approach to the interpretation offolk beliefs.

9For the most part, Goldman ignores the need for

interpretation in the investigation of folk beliefs. When he does

consider interpretation, he defends a highly problematicinterpretive method and shows little regard for proper normativeconstraints on interpretation.

A.

Before descriptive epistemologists can provide causal explana-tions of folk beliefs, they must first identify and understand thebeliefs they seek to explain. At no point does Goldman acknowledgethat identifying folk beliefs might require descriptiveepistemologists to engage in interpretation and, consequently, availthemselves of interpretive tools developed by various socialscientific methods. In cases where there is tremendous uniformity in

beliefs and values between descriptive epistemologists and thesubjects they study, perhaps interpretation can occur with relativeease. But effortless interpretation occurs in only a narrow range ofcases and, since descriptive epistemology purports to be universalin scope, its practitioners must be trained to deal with morecomplex situations. Moreover, as we will see below, Goldmansfailure to take seriously the challenges posed by interpretation alsoleads him to underestimate its explanatory possibilities.When Goldman does discuss interpretation, it is only in the

context of his defense of simulation theory rather than in hisaccount of descriptive epistemology. Simulation theory purports tobe a correct account of how folk agents attribute beliefs to oneanother. At no point does Goldman claim that social scientists and

scientific epistemologists actually do or should rely uponsimulation as their method of interpretation, but he does notpropose any alternative method. According to simulation theory,folk agents do not employ a theory of mental states in making beliefattributions; instead, they


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ascribe mental states to others by pretending or imagining themselvesto be in the others shoes, constructing or generating the (further)state that they would then be in, and ascribing that state to the other.In short, wesimulatethe situation of others, and interpret themaccordingly. (Goldman 1992c, 17)

Simulation theory is not intended to provide conditions that arecon- stitutive of mental state possession (Goldman 1992c, 30). It onlypur- ports to give an account of the procedure used [by the folk] inascrib- ing mental states to others (1992c, 30). On Goldmansinterpretation of simulation theory, which accords well with hisprocess reliabilism in epistemology, simulation is process drivenas opposed to theory driven (1992c, 21).

Thus, if one person simulates a sequence of mental states of another,they will wind up in the same (or isomorphic) final states as long as(A) they begin in the same (or isomorphic) initial states, and (B) bothsequences are driven by the same cognitive process or routine.(Goldman1992c, 21)

Simulations employ ordinary cognitive processes that are run off-line. That is, processes that would ordinarily issue in actual beliefsare fed imaginary or hypothetical initial states or beliefs, and theprocesses generate beliefs about what the interpreter would do inthe imagina- tively projected circumstances.

B.

However, simulation theory leaves unresolved problems of inter-pretive indeterminacy. Simulations rarely determine unique beliefcontents that can be ascribed to other agents. In any given situation Iimagine myself to be in, I can imagine myself forming any numberof differing beliefs. Not only does simulation theory ignore thispossibil- ity, it also fails to provide interpreters with resources todecide between the indefinite number of possible belief ascriptionsopen to them in any interpretive situation. If it is plausible to thinkthat interpreters do have the capacity nonetheless to dealsuccessfully with such interpretive indeterminacy, then simulationtheory has failed to capture ordinary interpretive abilities.Moreover, Goldman does not face up to the problem of what

makes an interpretation successful or correct. Given Goldmansveritism, I assume he would maintain that interpretations arecorrect if and only if it is true that the beliefs ascribed as a result ofsimulations are the


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ones target agents actually hold. In other words, there must be acorre- spondence of content between a belief correctly ascribed anda target mental representation. Although this sounds plausible, it isnot much help for descriptive epistemologists in the field. It will notaid them in determining which interpretations are true and whichare better or worse than others. This maxim might serve as a usefulregulative ideal for interpreters, but there needs to be practicalprinciples that guide and constrain interpretation.One reason for thinking that simulation theory cannot provide

the appropriate constraints on interpretation is that it does notallow for the descriptive theorists interpretations to be accountablein any way to those being interpreted. Simulations are undertaken

from an exclu- sively first-person point of viewIproject myselfinto what seems tometo be your epistemic situation andIimaginewhat beliefsIwould form and thenIattribute those beliefs to you.This procedure ulti- mately results in the interpretation beingimposed on the target agent by the interpreter. While it remains truethat some impositions might be true, it is unlikely that the methodof imposition is very reliable particularly when we consider theindefinite number of ascriptive options interpreters face. IfGoldman were to propose an alternative to simulation fordescriptive epistemology, he would need to resolve the issue of howsubjects interpretations of their own beliefs might constrain expertinterpretations. Given Goldmans conviction that expert opinionalways trumps folk opinion, it is doubtful that subjects self-

interpretations would play much of a constraining role.10

Some defenders of interpretive social science such as JamesBohman (1991, chap. 3) argue that interpreters undertake a moralresponsibil- ity to represent correctly the beliefs of those beinginterpreted. On Bohmans dialogical theory of interpretation,interpretations should be such that target agents could in principleagree to them in some context of public reason. According to thismodel, imposing interpretations on others violates intersubjectiveresponsibilities and normative expectations established by therelationships created in the process of interpretation. Ifinterpreting entails a moral responsibility to speak correctly onbehalf of another, then Goldmans descriptive epistemologists mayhave a moral reason for maintaining some account- ability to folk

subjects.In addition to moral considerations and doubts about the

reliability of imposition, another reason that interpretations shouldbe accountable to those being interpreted is that belief contextsare, as philosophers of language put it, opaque contexts.Interpretations that are


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merely extensionally correct are inadequate in discursive contextsoutside of logic. If, for example, an interpreter ascribed the beliefSuperman is a wimp to Lois Lane, we might question the inter-preter on why she did not ascribe the seemingly more plausiblebelief Clark Kent is a wimp to Lois Lane. Appealing to theextensional equivalence of the names Superman and Clark Kentwould not be an adequate defense of such an interpretation. In thewords of Frege, although the two names and the two sentencesusing them have the same reference, they have different modes ofpresentation. Inter- preters are not (and should not) be interestedmerely in picking out the right objects of agents beliefs. If it is thebeliefs of agents in which descriptive epistemologists are most

interestedas opposed to the external objects designated by thereferring tokens of folk belief con- tentsthen they should beinterested in the particular, intensional aspects of beliefs. And it isprecisely these aspects concerning which those being interpretedcan provide valuable guidance and which can be accessed incommunicative interaction with them.

C.

As in simulation theory generally, Goldman neglects the back-ground of shared and accessible beliefs, assumptions, and practicesthat makes interpretation possible. Descriptive epistemologists willbe trying to understand one form of life only in the categories of

another (Geertz 1971, 14). Because the backgrounds of the descrip-tive epistemologists cannot be made fully explicit and assessed allat once, their interpretations will always be partial, indeterminate,perspectival, and circular. The fact that they are scientific experts,as opposed to ordinary folk, does not automatically make theirinterpre- tations complete, determinate, or nonperspectival. A moreglaring deficiency in Goldmans descriptive epistemology, however,concerns his neglect of the social, cultural, and historicalbackgrounds in which folk beliefs are formed and acquire theirsignificance.Although Goldman acknowledges the important impact that

non- social contextual features can have on belief formation, heignores social features such as shared epistemic norms and values

that may (perhaps tacitly) guide folk evaluators when makingepistemic assessments. Goldman does not include the empiricalstudy of epistemic norms and values in folk practices as a part ofdescriptive epistemology because he seems to think he knows apriori what descriptive epistemologists will find: that every folkevaluator in the world is a


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reliabilist.11 Goldman believes that the concept of JUSTIFIEDBELIEF has a universal veritistic corethat is, that all evaluatorsultimately think of epistemic justification in terms of the truthconduciveness of the cognitive processes that produce beliefs. Bybuilding this rather convenient but empirically unsupportedsupposition into his proposed methodology for descriptiveepistemology, what the relevant epistemic values and norms of folkevaluators are ceases to be an empirical issue for Goldman.Because of the supposedly shared veritistic core of the concept of

justification, descriptive epistemologists are instructed only to inves-tigate the various items that appear on evaluators intellectual virtueand vice lists, since this is the only relevant respect in which their

epistemic evaluative perspectives will differ. In other words, theconditions that folk evaluators believe must be satisfied for an itemto count as an epistemic virtue will be the same (i.e., the sufficientlyhigh truth conducivity of the process in question), though they maydis- agree about which items satisfy those conditions. OnGoldmans model of folk epistemic evaluation, evaluators will turnout to be better or worse reliabilists insofar as the prototypes theychoose for their virtue lists are more or less reliable. If they choosehighly reliable prototypes for their virtue lists and highly unreliableprototypes for their vice lists then scientific epistemologists willjudge them to be good reliabilists. One of the things we might verywell want to know about epistemic folkways is the degree ofreliability of common intellectual virtue prototypes. However,

there is undoubtedly more to epistemic folkways than this, butGoldmans overly restrictive focus on the reliability of intellectualvirtue prototypes precludes other issues from coming into view.

12

We might, for example, also be inter- ested in folk theories ofrational belief or whether the norms of folk evidentialism aresufficient to underwrite principles of good eviden- tial support.

13

Even if Goldmans supposition of universal reliabilism shouldturn out to be true, it needs to be offered as the result of empiricalinvestigation rather than a priori legislation or definition.Descriptive epistemologists might find that many folk evaluativebeliefs are influenced by evidentialist, coherentist, responsibilist,or other internalist norms.

14They might also find that the feature

singled out by folk evaluators as determining epistemic status is

not any good-making feature of cognitive belief-forming processesas Goldman thinks. Instead, they might make epistemic assessmentson the basis of relations of content between beliefs and theirgrounds or between beliefs and the


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perceptual experiences they are based upon. Likewise, folkevaluative standards that involve epistemic duty or responsibility ordoing ones epistemic best will not be concerned with subpersonalcognitive processes but rather with epistemically virtuous orvicious states of per- sons. An adequate descriptive epistemologyshould be open to inves- tigating and discovering the actualepistemic values and norms that inform epistemic folkways.

D.

Goldmans exclusive focus on subpersonal cognitive processesand his disregard for the empirical study of folk epistemic norms

and values lead him to an overly narrow conception of theexplanation of belief. We have noted that descriptiveepistemologists are given the task of offering causal explanations ofbeliefs and belief-forming processes. In each of the cases Goldmancites as exemplary descriptive epistemological explanationsforexample, those explaining judgments of prototypicality and of theepistemic status of hypothetical Truetemp and evil demon victims

15

the target beliefs are all noninferential and result fromsubpersonal cognitive processes.

16In each of these cases, Goldman

appeals to causes of beliefs that are not also reasons. He fails toaddress the issue of whether reasons can be causes and whetherexplicating the reasons for a belief can also explain that belief.Goldman does not consider the kinds of explanations of belief

developed by rational choice theory, ethnomethodology, orinterpre- tive social science, and he provides no reason to think thatthe only valid explanations of belief are those that appeal tosubpersonal causal processes.In many casesparticularly when we are dealing with cognitive

biasesit is important for experts not to give subjects reports oftheir reasons too much credence. It is an essential feature ofpsychological explanations of cognitive biases that they will appealto causal factors unknown to ordinary agents. However, in casesthat do not involve cognitive biases (or socially caused ideologicaldistortion, though Goldman does not consider this), ignoringsubjects reasons is far from the best way to explain their beliefs.Reasons can be causes of belief, and explanations of reasons can be

explanations of the causes of belief.Although I have not offered a comprehensive solution to the chal-

lenges interpretation poses to Goldmans descriptive epistemology,his methodological prescriptions do not even acknowledge thatthere


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are such challenges. Incorporating into descriptive epistemologyinter- pretive tools from various social scientific approaches tointerpreta- tion can provide Goldman with resources to deal withthese difficulties and broaden the range of explanatory optionsopen to descriptive epistemologists.

IV.

The difficulties that face Goldmans theory of folk epistemicevaluation stem from his exclusive focus on the form ofrepresentation of intellectual virtue prototypes to the neglect of

other relevant considerations. A key factor that motivates hisexplanatory concern with representation is his belief that for a[belief-forming] method to be used, it must be represented in thecognizers head (though not necessarily consciously) (Goldman1992d, 130). Thus, if we want to understand the social belief-forming method of epistemic evaluation, Goldman suggests that weexamine the various mental representations upon which (typicallysubpersonal) operations are performed in the process of formingevaluative beliefs. If the method in question is an algorithm, itseems appropriate to claim that the algorithm must be fullyrepresented in the mind of the cognizer. However, I will argue thatthe method of using intellectual virtue prototypes to form epistemicevaluative beliefs is constituted at least in part by the conceptual-

linguistic practical abilities evaluators exercise while using theproto- types. Although the intellectual virtue prototypes may berepre- sented in the cognizers head, the ability to use thoseprototypes to make evaluative judgments and to recognize thenormative and practical significance of doing so is not itself arepresentation. Any adequate explanation of epistemic evaluationshould explicate the relevant practical abilities that make thismethod possible.Intellectual virtue prototypes, I submit, receive much of their life

from the intersubjective conceptual roles they play in discursivepractices. Moreover, evaluators acquire the social belief-formingmethod of epistemic evaluation by learning to participate indiscursive practices in which determining the appropriateness of

performances is in part a function of determining the epistemicstatuses of beliefs. Mas- tery of both discursive practices and theconceptual roles of epistemic concepts requires the development ofconceptual-linguistic abilities, some of which I will explicate below.Possession of these conceptual- linguistic abilities is necessary forpossessing the method of epistemic


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evaluation. Goldmans narrow focus on mental representations pre-vents these abilities from falling under the purview of his version ofdescriptive epistemology.In this and the following section, I will build up an account of the

practical abilities involved in epistemic evaluation from an accountof the abilities required for participation in any discursive practice. Ishall adopt a hypothetical reconstruction of these practical abilitiesthat is couched in philosophical language and follows Brandom(1994) to some extent, though I will also refer to social scientificstud- ies that provide empirical support for my claims along theway. The relevant conceptual-linguistic abilities include (1)mastering the concepts essential to a particular practice; (2)

learning the significance of occupying and attributing the normativestatuses (e.g., being entitled to perform some action or form abelief) essential to that practice; (3) possessing practical inferentialabilities that enable practitioners to recognize interrelations betweennormative statuses and conceptual contents; and in some cases, (4)being able to take up an objective validity stance.

A.

Consider how engaging in the social practice of going to a movietheater requires the exercise of the first two practical abilities. Onemust learn the concept of a MOVIE TICKET and appreciate the nor-mative significance of purchasing and possessing one. One is attrib-

uted the normative statusentitled to enter the theaterby the tickettaker only if one possesses a ticket purchased at the ticket window.Appro- priate tickets can only be obtained from those who areentitled to sell ticketsyou cant print them up yourself, even if yoursare identical to the ones dispensed at the ticket window. And thepurchase of tickets can be facilitated only by pieces of metal andpaper that arelegal tender for all debts, public, and privatea furthernormative status.To participate fully in the practice of moviegoing, it is not enough

to know all of the nonnormative facts about theaters. Knowing thatone person sits behind a window accepting pieces of paper andmetal and dispenses other small pieces of paper, that anotherperson stands at the door accepting the pieces of paper dispensed

by the first person, and so on, is not sufficient for mastery of thissocial practice. One must also understand the significance ofoccupying and attributing the normative statuses involved. It isagents mastery of the normative significance of social interactionthat make their actions both intelligi-


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ble and accountable (Garfinkel 1967). In mastering the relevant nor-mative statuses, practitioners will also have mastered the key con-cepts of the practiceconcepts such as MOVIE TICKET, TICKETWINDOW, USHER, and SALESPERSON. Social concepts such asthese are partly constituted by the normative statuses attributeddur- ing their application in a practice.

B.

Full participation in discursive practices also involves the practicalinferential abilities mentioned in (3) above. In discursive practices,the primary normative statuses are entitlements to beliefs and infer-

ences (and actions

17

). Since to have one belief one must have many,being able to recognize basic inferential relations betweenconceptual contents is necessary for being properly credited withhaving any beliefs at all. For example, if Wendy expresses the beliefthe ball is red, Wendys interlocutors will take her to becommitted to the balls being colored since the ball is redobviously entails the ball is colored. If she denies that it iscolored, they may begin to doubt whether she grasps the conceptualcontent of RED, COLORED, or RED BALL. Of course, beforearriving at this conclusion, Wendys interlocutors will most likelysearch for some explanation that makes sense of her unusualbehavior and preserves the default assumption that she knows whatshes talking about. But this rationalizing explanation of her

behavior presupposes the point I am urging here, namely, thatunderstanding the content of a belief means understanding otherinferentially related contents.The beliefs an agent currently has also constrain what further

commitments she is entitled to undertake. Since believing that theball is red is incompatible with believing that it is green, if Wendybelieves that the ball is red, her interlocutors will take her to lackentitlement to believe that it is green. If, after expressing the beliefthat the ball is red, Wendy also expresses the belief that it is green,evaluators may (should the opportunity arise and be otherwiseappropriate) draw her attention to the incompatibility, call her toaccount for her new commitment, or at least take her to lackentitlement to the conjunctive commitment the ball is red and the

ball is green. Undertaking incompatible commitments is perhapsunavoidable, insofar as we cannot foresee all of the logicalconsequences of our commitments. But if the incompatibility shouldbe obvious to anyone who has mastered the conceptual contentsin question or if the agent has been


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shown that two or more of her commitments are incompatible andyet persists in both commitments without providing a suitableexplana- tion, one is faced with the possibility of attributing eitherirrationality or a lack of conceptual mastery to the agent.Similar inferential relations also hold between entitlements. If, for

example, John is entitled to believe that Brown is in Barcelona andanyone entitled to believe that Brown is in Barcelona is entitled tobelieve that Brown is in Catalonia, then John is entitled to believethat Brown is in Catalonia. If John does not realize that he is entitledto believe that Brown is in Catalonia, his belief that Brown is inBarce- lona is not thereby called into question. Failing to recognizethe scope of ones entitlement does not violate any epistemic norm

or obliga- tion. But Johnsbeing ableto appreciate the entitlement-preserving inferential relation above when it is made known to himis necessary for Johns mastery of the conceptual contents andnormative statuses involved in his belief.These three cases illustrate three kinds of inferential relations

that obtain between beliefs and entitlements to those beliefs:commitment- preserving, incompatibility, and entitlement-preserving inferences, respectively. Grasping the conceptual contentof any single doxastic commitment can occur only against abackground of inferentially related contents.

18Furthermore, the

perceivable inferential relations that obtain between conceptualcontents are utilized by practitioners to hold one anotheraccountable for their actions and expressions of belief (cf. Garfinkel

1967; Heritage 1984, chap. 6).

C.

Finally, the ability to take up the objective validity stance isrequired for engaging in discursive practices in which practitionersmake claims that purport to be objectively valid.

19In social practices

that do not involve objective validity, the normative statuses attrib-uted by practitioners are such that the community could not bewrong about them. For example, who conventionally counts asmarried within a particular community or what special obligationsone incurs by spitting in front of the chiefs hut are determined notby how the world is independently of what members of the

community happens to think about it but rather by the norms of thecommunity.Individualswithin a community can be wrong aboutwhich people are married or what the local standards for marriageare, but thecommunitysstan- dards cannot be false.


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In contrast, discursive practices typically involve objectivevalidity claims. Performances within a practice are candidates forbeing objectively valid only if practitioners take up both the formaland the substantive sides of the objective validity stance.

20The

formal aspect is characterized by the stance-taker s beingcommitted to there being something objective to which thecorrectness of her claims must answer. This is a commitment to thepossibility that everyone in the linguistic community could bewrong about the content of even uni- versally accepted validityclaims. In other words, it is the denial that anyones believing that pis sufficient for the truth of p. It also serves as a framework withinwhich agents interpret the objective validity they claim for their

own beliefs and the causes of others conflicting opinions (cf. Pollner1974, 1987). The substantive aspect of the objective validity stanceconcerns what particular participants take to be the case or whatpropositionally contentful commitments and objective proprietiesare embedded in the norms and conceptual roles of discursivepractices.

21

If practitioners do not take up the formal aspect of the objectivevalidity stance, their utterances and beliefs cannot be candidates fortruth and epistemic justification. They must (at least implicitly) takethemselves to be saying something objectively correct or incorrect. Ifthey do not take up the substantive side of the stance, the side thatprovides their claims with propositional content, we have the sameresult. Someone cannot very well have a true belief about the world

if there is nothing (no content) that they believe to be true of theworld.

V.

A.

I now want to sharpen my focus and reflect on how the generalconceptual-linguistic abilities outlined above display themselves inthe particular discursive practices in which agents acquire and exer-cise the social belief-forming method of epistemic evaluation. Con-sider the following belief states:

a. Jane believes that snow is white.b. Jane believes that snow is white and snow is white is true.c. Jane believes that snow is white as a result of a reliable belief-formingprocess.


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d. Jane believes that Tom believes that snow is white.e. Jane believes that Tom believes that snow is white and that snow iswhite is true.

f. Jane believes that Tom believes that snow is white as a result of a reli-able belief-forming process.

Having the beliefs expressed in (a) through (c) requires only thatJane master the conceptual content of the belief snow is white(and whatever inferentially related conceptual contents arenecessary). The interpretive and evaluative beliefs expressed in (d)through (f) are the result of the social belief-forming methods ofinterpretation and epistemic evaluation and require additionalconceptual resources. In particular, (d) through (f) require that Jane

master the concepts of BELIEF, JUSTIFICATION, RELIABLE,PROCESS, and perhaps TRUTH (depending upon how explicitJanes endorsement of the truth of snow is white is in [e]).

22

In addition to the differences in conceptual resources required forthe various beliefs listed above, competence in epistemic evaluationalso requires rather complex abilities associated with undertakingand attributing commitments and entitlements. In forming thebeliefs expressed in (a) through (c), Jane simply undertakes adoxastic commitment to the content of the claim snow is white.In (d), instead of undertaking that commitment, Jane merelyattributes to Tom a commitment to snow is white. In (e), Janeboth attributes to Tom a commitment to snow is white andundertakes a commitment to it her- self. In (f), Jane both \attributes

to Tom a commitment to snow is white and ascribes to Tom acorresponding entitlement to that commitment. Epistemicevaluators, then, must be able to take up hybrid attitudes towardtarget agents beliefs.

B.

The principle that mastering any particular conceptual contentinvolves mastering further inferentially related conceptual contentscan be applied to the contents of epistemic evaluative beliefs. Con-sider again Janes evaluative belief:

f. Jane believes that Tom believes that snow is white as a result of a

reliable belief-forming process.

Suppose that Goldman is correct in thinking that ordinary epistemicevaluators make epistemic assessments on the basis of truth-linked


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standards such as reliability. In other words, suppose that Jane atleast tacitly subscribes to the reliabilist account of justification. Thus,

g. Jane believes that a belief is justified iff Jane (or Janes cognitivesystem) believes that that belief was produced by a reliable cognitiveprocess or method.

If (f) and (g) correctly describe two of Janes beliefs and yet shedenied that Tom was justified in believing that snow is white, wemayif we could find no rational explanationdoubt whether sheunderstood the concepts JUSTIFIED or RELIABLE.

23If Jane believed

that Toms beliefs were produced by a reliable process and thatRandys beliefs were produced by an unreliable process and yet

treated Toms beliefs as no more authoritative or trustworthy thanRandys, we might have similar doubts. Mastery of normativeepistemic concepts like JUSTIFICATION is, in part, constituted byan evaluators ability to recognize the appropriate circumstances ofapplication of the concept and the inferentially articulatedconsequences of doing so. In other words, epistemic evaluatorsmust master a critical subregion of the intersubjective conceptualrole of normative epistemic concepts. Learning these concepts andthe normative statuses associated with them enables agents toengage in the social belief-forming method of epistemic evaluation.Even if evaluator Jane had an accurate list of intellectual virtue

and vice prototypes represented in her long-term memory, if shedid not master the intersubjective conceptual role of epistemicevaluative concepts such as KNOWLEDGE or JUSTIFICATION, shecould not form beliefs with any evaluative epistemic content at all.The subpersonal pattern-matching process that comparesobserved behaviors with stored intellectual virtue prototypes doesnot utilize conceptual contents. Epistemic evaluations acquireconceptual content only by being caught up in inferential relationsand in practices of giving and asking for reasons. Computers can beprogrammed to compare pat- terns, but they cannot form evaluativebeliefs. Inquiring into the mechanics of epistemic evaluation, then,requires more than an examination of the form of representation ofepistemic concepts and prototypes. It also calls for an examinationof the conceptual-linguistic practical abilities evaluators exercise

while making use of intellectual virtue prototypes.According to Goldman (1992b, 198) belief-forming methodscount as social methods if they are modes of doxastic response tothe opin-


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ions and messages of others.24 Our brief examination of thepractical abilities involved in epistemic evaluation reveals thatbelief-forming methods such as epistemic evaluation are social inmore than this single respect. To begin with, evaluators must beable to employ each of the conceptual-linguistic abilities discussedabove from within different social perspectives. For instance,recognizing the significance of occupying a normative status meansbeing able to recognize how ones interlocutors ought to treat you inlight of that status. In other words, recognizing oneself asoccupying(from the first-person perspective) a normative status meansrecognizing the appropriate circumstances of application andrelevant consequences ofattributing (from the second-person

perspective) that status to oneself. With regard to inferentialrelations among concepts, recognizing the significance of beingcommitted (first person) to a particular conceptual content meansrecognizing when it is appropriate for others to treat you (secondperson) as entitled to such a commitment and what con- sequencesfollow from treating you as so committed or entitled. Third,understanding the significance of undertaking the objective validitystance means understanding how performances undertaken fromthat attitude (first person) should be understood by ones inter-locutors (second person). In particular, it means recognizing thatones interlocutors can hold ones claims accountable to theobjective facts and norms that determine the correctness of onescommitments.

A final social dimension to the conceptual-linguistic abilities cen-tral to epistemic evaluation concerns the normative statuses andcon- cepts that those abilities take as their objectsthat is, as thematerial that is manipulated in the exercise of these abilities. Thesestatuses and concepts are provided to evaluators in the first instanceby their linguistic communities. Although evaluators that take upthe formal objective validity stance in the application andattribution of these concepts and statuses have an interest in theobjective correctness of their claims, typically practitioners cut theirteeth not on what really counts as occupying the normative status inquestion or what really counts as falling under the extension of aconcept but rather on what the practitioners linguistic communitytakes occupying the normative status to consist in and what the

community takes to fall under the concept. The fact that acommunity understands a normative status in a certain way is notsufficient for the normative status actually being that way, sincewhat participants commit themselves to in insti- tuting concepts,normative statuses, and discursive practices often outruns whatthey take themselves to be committed to. But the norms


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and conceptual roles instituted in a linguistic community are typi-cally causally sufficient (and perhaps practically necessary) forpracti- tioners to be able to appreciate the significance of thoseconcepts and normative statuses and eventually to take uphypothetical or critical stances toward what their contemporariestake to be correct. There is more, then, to the social character ofepistemic evaluation than being a doxastic response to theopinions and messages of others. The conceptual-linguisticabilities of epistemic evaluators are exercised within perspectivesand contexts that are essentially social.On Goldmans approach to folk epistemic evaluation, all that

descriptive epistemologists need to investigate are the beliefs of folk

evaluators and the form of representation of acquired methods andconceptual prototypes. Epistemic folkways in general and folkepistemic evaluation in particular are more complex than Goldmanallows, and any explanation of them should include theconsideration of a broader range of relevant features than thosesuggested by Goldman. Thus, descriptive epistemology should availitself of methods that can explicate the complex practical abilitiescompetent evaluators exercise in discursive practices.

25

VI.

Although Goldmans plan for a scientific epistemology shows a

great deal of promise, the accounts of interpretation and epistemicevaluation he offers are deeply problematic. What little Goldmansays about interpretation is offered in defense of an inadequatetheory of interpretation and shows little regard for the actualcomplexities and explanatory possibilities of interpretation. Heleaves unexplained the interpretive abilities folk agents use tointerpret one another and descriptive theorists employ to interpretthe folk. Furthermore, his intellectual virtue prototype theoryignores and does not attempt to explain the practical abilities thatmake it possible for competent agents to acquire and exercise thesocial belief-forming method of epistemic evaluation. At the veryleast, these abilities involve the mastery of normative statuses andconceptual contents and the capacity to take up complex social

perspectives and attitudes toward ones own and others use ofsocial concepts and normative statuses. More- over, there is noevidence from interpretive social science to support Goldmansclaims about how ordinary agents evaluate beliefs.


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Consideration of agents interpretive and evaluative abilitieswhich Garfinkel (1967) shows are exercised with a reflexivity andaccountability that Goldman ignoresundermines the strong dis-tinction Goldman wishes to draw between epistemic agents andepistemic evaluators. The lack of a hard and fast distinction betweenagents and evaluators suggests that the related distinction Goldmandraws between normative and descriptive scientific epistemology ismerely methodological, dependent upon the stance of the investiga-tor, and does not distinguish two kinds of science. Consequently,Goldmans methodological blueprint for the descriptive study ofepistemic folkways is inadequate as it stands.

NOTES

1. The primary sources for Goldmans new reliabilism are Goldman (1992a) and(1994). His old reliabilism is best represented by Goldman (1986) and (1992e).

2. According to Goldman, normative scientific epistemology is concerned withthe

formulation of a more adequate, sound, or systematic set of epistemic norms, in someway(s) transcending our nave epistemic repertoire (1992a, 156).

3. The ultimate source of epistemic normativity for Goldman is truth, so thecontrast

between descriptive and normative scientific epistemology is based on the differentrole that truth plays in the two disciplines. Normative epistemology tries to ascertainwhether folk beliefs are true and whether folk belief-forming processes are truth con-ducive. Descriptive epistemology does neither.

4. We are assuming here, of course, that this evaluative process can occur withoutevaluators explicitly or consciously representing the process to themselves in the fash-ion imagined.

5. Compare Lehrer (1990, 162ff) for a recent statement of the counterexamplefrom

its creator.6. The story of Truetemp is supposed to be a counterexample to the externalist

char-acter of reliabilism, according to which knowers do not need to know that the condi-tions for knowledge obtain. Internalists suggest that the epistemic status of Truetempsbeliefs seems questionable because he does not have higher order beliefs about hisbeliefs or about the reliability of his faculties (cf. Lehrer 1990).

7. Goldmans explanation of the wide divergence in opinion regarding Truetempcan gain some measure of support from simulation theory, which Goldman defends inother contexts (cf. section III). I speculate that part of the problem for epistemic evalua-

tors considering the Truetemp case may be their inability to simulate the exercise ofTruetemps strange faculty. Simulation works by feeding hypothetical inputs to actualprocesses and seeing what the results are. One cannot very well run an off-line pro-cess-driven simulation (cf. below) if one does not possess the process in question. Theconditions for successful simulation that Goldman postulates are:

Thus, if one person simulates a sequence of mental states of another, theywill wind up in the same (or isomorphic) final states as long as (A) they

begin in


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the same (or isomorphic) initial states, and (B) both sequences are drivenby the same cognitive process or routine. (Goldman 1992c, 21)

The second condition is not met in the case of Truetemp. Truetemps epistemicsitua- tion is too far removed from ordinary experience to support a very successfulsimula- tion. The inability of ordinary evaluators to simulate bizarre cognitivesituations like Truetemps should give pause to epistemologists who attempt to drawdecisive conclu- sions about the nature of knowledge or justified belief from sci-fiexamples.8. Further evidence that Goldman has not given up on normative epistemology

can be found on every page of Goldman (1999). As always, he allows no otherapproach to epistemic normativity than veritismthat is, the truth conducivenessof the process, method, or institutional arrangement in question.9. Several of the following criticisms are due to Bohman (1991, 2000).

10. James Bohman (2000) avoids the pitfalls that attend both the categorical accep-

tance of folk self-interpretations and the complete exclusion of folk input from theinterpretive process by proposing a dialogical theory of interpretation. On his account,the normativity of correct interpretations stems from norms embedded in the processof public discourse and ordinary communicative interaction rather than from any priv-ileged interpretations. Interpreters, he claims, should allow their interpretations to beconstrained by the self-interpretations of target agents while maintaining the possibil-ity of criticizing them.11. Compare Goldman (1992a, 160 et passim).12. The problem here is akin to one faced by rational choice theories. Goldman is

assuming that all evaluative beliefs are formed on the basis of something like expectedveritistic value, similar to the rational choice theorists expected utility. But asAmartya Sen (1979) and others have shown, such rational choice explanations have dif-ficulty with cases where commitments and values other than utility come into the pic-ture. Goldmans belief in the universality and exclusivity of veritist values may enabledescriptive epistemologists to explain a wide range of folk epistemic behavior. How-ever, it is quite probable that it will fall short in many cases since it does not allow roomfor folk evaluators being committed to other epistemic principles and norms.13. There is another way in which Goldmans assumption that everyone is a

reliabilist distorts the true nature of epistemic folkways. Goldman maintains that evenif criteria for determining the justification of beliefs other than truth conducivity areemployed by the folk, those criteria will nonetheless be selected for their truth conducivity.Having evidence or being able to defend ones beliefs, for example, are epistemicallydesirable according to Goldman because they are more likely in some cases to lead totruth than not having evidence or a defense. However, folk evaluators may deny thatthey are veritists. The fact that they determine justification on the basis of a standardthat Goldman (and perhaps other epistemologists) takes to be truth conducive does notmean that it is correct to say that the folk evaluator in question formed an evaluativebelief on the basis of veritistic or truth-linked criteria. A thicker, more detailed, and con-textually sensitive description of epistemic folkways is required.14. It is surprising that Goldman does not open descriptive epistemology up to

these possibilities, since by his own admission the findings of descriptive epistemology

do not in any way impugn his principles of normative scientific epistemology. If all folkevaluators turned out to be epistemological internalists, this would not undermineGoldmans externalist conviction that justified belief consists in reliably formed belief.


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15. Compare Goldman (1992c, 1992d, 1994).16. Not all beliefs are noninferential and even noninferential beliefs can be indirectly

influenced by reasons subjects possess. As an example of the latter, having good reasonto believe that rational beliefs are beliefs formed on the basis of adequate evidencemight induce unconscious dispositions to assent to certain kinds of noninferentialclaims but not others. If descriptive epistemology is to explain why people hold thebeliefs they do, it seems that it should also include rationalizing explanations that expli-cate such reasons.17. For the sake of simplicity, I consider only entitlements to beliefs and inferences in

this section. See Brandom (1994, chap. 4) for how this model can be extended to includethe normative significance of actions.18. Although failure to master inferentially related conceptual contents can often

undermine an agents entitlement to a doxastic commitment, mastering these relationsand contents is not sufficient to generate epistemic justification. Some form of truth-conducive justification, such as reliabilist justification, is required. The mastery of infer-

ential relations between concepts bears primarily on whether one can be credited withhaving a purported belief at all.19. Something like the objective validity stance is taken up by speakers making

validity claims about moral and legal norms, where they purport to make claims areuniversally valid but the correctness or validity is not determined by how the world isindependently of what members of the community happen to think about it. I haveomitted detailed discussion of this issue for greater simplicity of exposition.20. Melvin Pollners (1974, 1987) investigations of mundane reasoning about the

real world in everyday settings provide evidence for the role that agents objectivevalidity stances plays in making sense of interactants validity claims and in dealingwith conflicts of experience and testimony.21. Approving of particular uses of concepts means licensing the inference from the

circumstances of application of those concepts to the consequences of their use.Intersubjective conceptual roles, then, indirectly embody commitments to belief con-tents and inferences.

22. Its not always clear whether to attribute mastery of the concept TRUTH tosomeone who has no word for it but takes things to be true by practically relying uponthem in belief and action. Some claim that an understanding of TRUTH is implicit in thehaving of any belief. Others claim that using the concept TRUTH involves higher orderbeliefs and abilities.

23. That is, we might doubt whether (f) and (g) accurately describe her beliefs.24. Goldman writes,

What distinguishes social methods is that their inputs are opinions orcommunicational acts of other people, or the cognizers beliefs about these.The output of social belief-forming methods need not have any social con-tent. (Goldman 1992b, 198)

25. For example, Garfinkels (1967) project of ethnomethodology, JrgenHabermas (1984) theory of communicative action, and Robert Brandoms (1994)discursive practice theory of conceptual content.


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REFERENCES

Bohman, James. 1991.New philosophy of social science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. . 2000. The importance of the second person. InEmpathy and agency in the humansciences, edited by H. Kgler and K. Stueber. Boulder, CO:Westview.Brandom, Robert. 1994.Making it explicit. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press.Garfinkel, Harold. 1967.Studies in ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall.

Geertz, Clifford. 1971. Thick description. InThe interpretation of cultures. New York:Basic Books.

Goldman, Alvin I. 1986.Epistemology and cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-sity Press.

. 1992a. Epistemic folkways and scientific epistemology. InLiaisons: Philosophymeets the cognitive and social sciences, edited by Alvin I. Goldman. Cambridge, MA:MIT Press.

. 1992b. Foundations of social epistemics. InLiaisons: Philosophy meets the cogni-tive and social sciences, edited by Alvin I. Goldman. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

. 1992c. Interpretation psychologized. InLiaisons: Philosophy meets the cognitiveand social sciences, edited by Alvin I. Goldman. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

. 1992d. Strong and weak justification. InLiaisons: Philosophy meets the cognitiveand social sciences, edited by Alvin I. Goldman. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

. 1992e. What is justified belief? InLiaisons: Philosophy meets the cognitive and socialsciences, edited by Alvin I. Goldman. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

. 1994. Naturalistic epistemology and reliabilism. InMidwest studies in philosophyXIX: Philosophical naturalism, edited by P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein.Min-neapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

. 1999.Knowledge in a social world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Habermas, Jrgen. 1984.The theory of communicative action. Vol. 1. Boston, MA: BeaconPress.

Heritage, John. 1984.Garfinkel and ethnomethodology. Cambridge: Polity Press.Lehrer, Keith. 1990.Theory of knowledge. Boulder, CO: Westview.Markie, Peter J. 1996. Goldmans new reliabilism.Philosophy and PhenomenologicalResearch56:799-817.

Pollner, Melvin. 1974. Mundane reasoning.Philosophy of the Social Sciences4:35-54. . 1987.Mundane reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Sen, Amartya. 1979. Rational fools. InPhilosophy and economic theory, edited by F. Hahnand M. Hollis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

James R. Beebe is a doctoral candidate in the philosophy department at Saint LouisUni- versity. He is writing on issues in naturalized epistemology concerning whether

and how the traditional problems of epistemology should be handed over to thecognitive and social sciences.

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