People’s Democratic Republic of Korea Nuclear Program: An Analysis 1

People’s Democratic Republic of Korea Nuclear Program: An Analysis

Jeffrey T. Hall

INTL 620: Nonproliferation Analysis

Essay One

888 Trombley Road

Grosse Pointe Park, Michigan 48230

Email: jhall90@lakers.mercyhurst.edu

Instructor: Dr. Kimberly Gilligan

People’s Democratic Republic of Korea Nuclear Program: An Analysis 2

A Brief History of the People’s Democratic Republic of North Korea’s Nuclear Program

The People’s Democratic Republic of Korea’s (PDRK) nuclear program began in 1962 when it declared a state of “all-fortressization” which was a precursor to the hyper-militarized PDRK of today. After asking the Soviets for assistance in developing a nuclear weapons program in 1963 and being refused, the PDRK later asked China for their assistance in the same capacity but were again denied (Lee Jae-Bong, 2008.)

Despite being denied assistance from the Soviets and Chinese in their efforts to develop a nuclear weapons program, the PDRK did receive a commitment from the Soviets, including the training of nuclear scientists, to help them develop a peaceful nuclear program for power generation purposes (Lee Jae-Bong, 2008.)

In 1963, the Soviets provided assistance to the PDRK during the design, planning, and construction phases of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center (Moltz and Mansourov, 2000.) Completed in 1965 and situated in the county of Nyŏngbyŏn of the North Pyong'an Province, approximately 90 kilometers north of Pyongyang, the center would later produce the fissile material for all three of the known PDRK’s nuclear weapons tests conducted in 2006, 2009, and 2013 which generated yields of less than one kiloton, two to seven kilotons, and six to nine kilotons, respectively (IAEA, 1996; MacLeod, 2013.)

Having ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985 in response to pressure from the international community over their nuclear weapons development program including the operation of facilities for uranium fabrication, conversion, and high-explosive detonation tests, the PDRK did not execute the required safeguards agreement with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) until 1992 (www.globalsecurity.org, n.d.; IAEA, 1993.)

Then, while verifying the PDRK’s compliance with the terms of the initial declaration in 1993, the IAEA found “strong evidence” that the safeguards required by the initial declaration were not only incomplete but inaccurate as well (www.globalsecurity.org, n.d.) Specifically, IAEA inspectors had found inconsistencies between the amount of plutonium product and nuclear waste that the PDRK had declared and what was actually found during their inspections and subsequent analysis. In an effort to resolve the inconsistencies detected and to determine the “completeness and correctness of the initial declaration provided,” the IAEA requested that the PDRK grant inspectors access to additional information and to two additional sites which the IAEA suspected were nuclear waste storage facilities (IAEA, 1993.)

The PDRK refused the IAEA request for additional data and inspections despite the threat of sanctions being imposed. Accordingly, the IAEA reported its non-compliance to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) prompting a response from the PDRK that it was withdrawing

People’s Democratic Republic of Korea Nuclear Program: An Analysis 3

from the NPT; this did not occur, however, as the PDRK suspended the declaration before it took effect (www.globalsecurity.org, n.d.; IAEA, 1993.)

Then, as a result of negotiations between the PDRK and the United States over the future and direction of the PDRK’s nuclear program, the United States agreed “to facilitate the supply of two light water reactors to North Korea in exchange for North Korean disarmament” under terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework. The United States had reasoned that these types of reactors were considered "more proliferation-resistant than North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors” but still not “proliferation proof” (Arms Control Association, n.d.; Dosfan.lib.uic.edu, 1994.)

Years later in 2002, a United States delegation led by Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly visited the PDRK to confront them over their failure to implement the terms of the Agreed Framework alleging specifically that they had a uranium enrichment program (Kelly, 2004.) Although both parties’ would later disagree over the context and content of the meeting, Kelly had come armed with data from the United States IC—questionable data according to some experts—that indicated that the PDRK had developed a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program with the capacity to produce enough HEU for two or more weapons per year in further defiance of the NPT and Agreed Framework and openly confronted PDRK officials (Kelly, 2004.)

In response to Kelly’s accusations, the PDRK officials denied having any intent of producing nuclear weapons using enriched uranium and challenged Kelly to produce any evidence to the contrary (Kelly, 2004.) Interestingly, even though PDRK officials had denied any intent in producing nuclear weapons during the meeting, they stated categorically that they had the right as a sovereign state to possess them for defensive purposes, although they did not currently possess any such weapons (Kelly, 2004.) As a result, according to Kelly, “relations between the two countries, which had seemed hopeful two years earlier, quickly deteriorated into open hostility.”

At that juncture, the Agreed Framework was essentially dead, with the United States blaming the PDRK for its failure and vice versa. The United States argued that a PDRK facility capable of producing HEU would constitute a violation of the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula which states “The South and the North shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities” (Carnegie Endowment, 2009.) The PDRK, in turn, accused the United States of implementing a "hostile policy" that resulted in the delay of fuel oil shipments to the PDRK which “effectively nullified” the agreement while listing the PDRK as a member of the "Axis of evil" resulting in its being targeted by the United States military for preemptive nuclear strikes (KNCA, 2002; Bush, 2002; Pike, 2009.)

Although the objectives of the Agreed Framework were never fully realized, the effort that went into negotiating, drafting, and implementing the terms and conditions of the agreement was not completely in vain. As a result of the signing of the Agreed Framework, the PDRK did

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not restart work on two nuclear power plants that was frozen pursuant to the agreement. These two plants, had they become operational, would have “had the potential to produce enough weapons-grade plutonium to produce several nuclear weapons per year.” Additionally, the Agreed Framework halted plutonium production in Yongbyon plutonium complex for a period of eight years starting in 1994 and ending in 2002 (Harrison, 2007.)

On January 10th, 2003 the PDRK formally withdrew from the NPT becoming the first state to ever do so. In response, a group of six states consisting of the PDRK, Japan, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States began what became to be known as the Six Party Talks in an effort to curtail the PDRK’s nuclear weapons program.

The Six Party Talks agenda included security guarantees for the PDRK over their fear of the Bush administration taking military action against them; the construction of light water reactors in response to the failed Agreed Framework agreement; the peaceful use of nuclear energy; the resumption of normal diplomatic relations which the United States and Japan; the lifting of economic and trade sanctions which have crippled the PDRK’s economy; and irreversible and verifiable disarmament in which the United States and Japan demanded a full and immediate dismantling of the PDRK’s nuclear program so that it could never be restarted, while the remaining states favored a more incremental approach.

From 2003 to 2007, five rounds of talks yielded little net results. Apparent gains in the fourth and early fifth rounds never materialized or were reversed due to outside events. Then in the third phase of the fifth round of talks, the PDRK agreed to shut down its nuclear facilities in exchange for fuel aid and steps towards the normalization of relations with the United States and Japan (Xinhua, 2006.)

The PDRK, upset over the UNSC’s Presidential Statement issued on April 13, 2009 that condemned the PDRK’s satellite launch failure, declared on April 14, 2009 that it would pull out of the Six Party Talks and that it would “resume its nuclear enrichment program in order to boost its nuclear deterrent North Korea has also expelled all nuclear inspectors from the country” (Landers, 2009.)

The Future of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Nuclear Program

The PDRK presents unique problems and challenges for those states wishing to prevent the continuing development of its nuclear weapons program. Having withdrawn from the NPT, it is difficult to assess the progress that the PDRK has made in its efforts to continue to produce fissile material for use in nuclear weapons program. The reason for this is obvious: without direct and unfettered access to the PDRK’s nuclear facilities, the IAEA cannot determine with any degree of certainty exactly where the PDRK is in the process. Since being kicked out in

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2009, the agency has only been able to speculate about the PDRK’s progress towards nuclear proliferation.

One thing that the IAEA does not need to speculate about, however, is the grim fact that the known nuclear tests that the PDRK conducted in 2006, 2009, and 2013 have produced successively higher yields over time.

For example, the last known nuclear weapons test conducted by the PDRK in February, 2013 had an estimated yield that varied from six kilotons to as much as forty kilotons depending on the reporting organization.

It is clear that the PDRK’s technical progression has resulted in more powerful nuclear devices capable of inflicting mass destruction in the event that the devices were miniaturized to the extent required by the PDRK’s current weapons delivery systems.

We can only expect that the PDRK’s progression towards the production of a deliverable nuclear explosive device will continue over time until the PDRK’s leaders fully commit their state to nonproliferation.

Until that occurs, the PDRK will continue to be an unsettling influence not only on the Korean peninsula, but in the Far East more generally.

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REFERENCES

1. Korean News Service, Tokyo (kcna.co.jp), 10 January 2003, Statement of PDRK Government on its withdrawal from NPT.

2. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/PDRK/nuke.htm , n.d.3. http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeaPDRK/fact_sheet_may2003.shtml , 1993.4. The U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework at a Glance , Fact Sheet, Arms Control

Association.5. Non-Proliferation Treaty. Dosfan.lib.uic.edu. October 21, 1994. Retrieved March 1,

2012.6. Lee Jae-Bong (December 15, 2008 (Korean) February 17, 2009 (English)). U.S.

Deployment of Nuclear Weapons in 1950s South Korea & North Korea's Nuclear Development: Toward Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (English version). The Asia-Pacific Journal. Retrieved April 4, 2012.

7. James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov (eds.): The North Korean Nuclear Program. Routledge, 2000. ISBN 0-415-92369-7.

8. "Research Reactor Details – IRT-PDRK" . International Atomic Energy Agency. 30 July 1996. Retrieved 14 February 2007.

9. MacLeod, Calum (12 February 2013). "Obama calls North Korea nuclear test a threat to U.S.". USA Today. Retrieved 12 February 2013.

10. James A. Kelly (July 15, 2004). "Dealing With North Korea’s Nuclear Programs". U.S. Department of State. Archived from the original on 2004-08-03.

11. http://www.isis-online.org/publications/PDRK/PDRKenrichment22Feb.pdf 12. "NPP" . (n.d.) Carnegieendowment.org. Retrieved 2009-06-09.13. "Conclusion of non-aggression treaty between PDRK and U.S. called for" . KCNA. October

25, 2002. Retrieved 2009-06-09.14. Jump up "President Delivers State of the Union Address". Georgewbush-

whitehouse.archives.gov. 2002-01-29. Archived from the original on 8 June 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09.

15. Jump up, John Pike. "Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts]". Globalsecurity.org. Archived from the original on 10 June 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-09.

16. Selig Harrison (October 25, 2007). "A U.S. Foreign Policy Expert Urged ‘Continued Backing’ of Nuclear Talks". Embassy of the Republic of Korea in the United States of America. Retrieved 2009-06-09.

17. Xinhua (2006-12-18). "6-party talks: 2nd phase, 5th round". Retrieved 2006-12-19.18. Landler, Mark (2009-04-15). "North Korea Says It Will Halt Talks and Restart Its Nuclear

Program". The New York Times. Retrieved 2010-05-23.