intrinsic finks

Scots Philosophical AssociationUniversity of St. Andrews

Intrinsic FinksAuthor(s): Randolph ClarkeSource: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 232 (Jul., 2008), pp. 512-518Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and theUniversity of St. AndrewsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208643 .

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The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 58, No. 232 ISSN 003 i-8og4

July 2008 doi: 10.nn/j.1467-9213.2007.545.x

DISCUSSIONS

INTRINSIC FINKS

By Randolph Clarke

Dispositions can beftnkish, prone to disappear in circumstances that would commonly trigger their characteristic manifestations. Can a disposition be finkish because of something intrinsic to the object possessing that disposition? Sungho Choi has argued that this is not possible, and many agree. Here it is argued that no good case has been made for ruling out the possibility of intrinsic finks; on the

contrary, there is good reason to accept it.

A finkish disposition is one that will be eliminated in circumstances that would

commonly trigger its manifestation.1 For example, a wizard stands ready to protect a

fragile glass by quickly altering its microstructure should it be struck, so that the glass will not then break. Though the glass is currently fragile, it will immediately cease to be so if it is struck, and hence its fragility will not be manifested.

In this case, as in many other examples, the finkishness of the disposition is

apparently due to something extrinsic to the object that has that disposition. Can a

disposition be finkish as a result of something intrinsic to the thing possessing it? As we might put the question, can there be intrinsic disposition finks? A number of

philosophers deny this possibility.2 1 shall argue that no good reason has been given for denying it, and that on the contrary, there is good reason to accept the

possibility. By 'dispositions' I mean the powers and liabilities that things have to produce or

undergo (or prevent or resist) changes.3 Sometimes in saying that some object 0 is

disposed to § in circumstances c, we mean that 0 is likely to ty in c. But an object can have a power (a disposition) to <|> in c even if it is not likely to <|> in c - in fact, even if it

certainly will not. This possibility is on view, for example, in standard cases of finks.

1 D.K. Lewis, 'Finkish Dispositions', The Philosophical Quarterly, 47 (1997), pp. 143-58; C.B. Martin, 'Dispositions and Conditionals', The Philosophical Quarterly, 44 (1994), pp. 1-8.

2 See, e.g., S. Choi, 'Do Categorical Ascriptions Entail Counterfactual Conditionals?', The Philosophical Quarterly, 55 (2005), pp. 495-503; D. Cohen and T. Handfield, 'Finking Frank- furt', Philosophical Studies, 135 (2007), pp. 363-74; T. Handfield, 'Unfinkable Dispositions', Syn- these, forthcoming. In conversation and correspondence I have found this view widespread. 3 Cf. D.M. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs (Cambridge UP, 1997), p. 70; G. Molnar, Powers: a Study in Metaphysics (Oxford UP, 2003), p. 57; S. Mumford, Dispositions (Oxford UP, 1998), p. 10. Though some might wish to distinguish dispositions from powers, both of these terms may be correctly applied to the type of thing that is my subject here.

© 2007 The Author Journal compilation © 2007 The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford 0x4 2DQ, UK, and 350 \fein Street, Maiden, ma 02148, USA



INTRINSIC FINKS 5 1 3

In judging whether intrinsic finks are possible, we should take care not to be led

astray by this other use of 'is disposed to'.

1. Some examples Mark Johnston discusses a shy but prescient chameleon which is green in the dark.4

Being green, it has a disposition to appear green to standard viewers in standard circumstances. (Perhaps being green just is having this disposition, or perhaps in virtue of being green a thing has this disposition; either view suffices for the

example.) But because of its shyness and its prescience, both intrinsic properties of the chameleon, it knows if it is about to be placed in viewing conditions, and

immediately blushes bright red. It thus loses its disposition to appear green in just the circumstances which commonly trigger a manifestation of that disposition.

The chameleon's skin is green. The finkishness of the skin's disposition to appear green is due to something extrinsic to the skin. But a chameleon with green skin is a green chameleon, just as a ball with a red surface is a red ball. The finkishness of the chameleon's greenness is due to intrinsic properties of the chameleon.

Johnston (p. 231) also offers a non-imaginary case that is very similar. Rhodopsin is a photoreactive chemical in the rods of our retinas. It is crimson in the dark, but

exposure to more than low light bleaches it to transparency. Because of intrinsic

properties of rhodopsin, it loses its colour in circumstances that would standardly trigger a crimson thing's appearing crimson. (As he remarks, rhodopsin is not perfectly shy: it appears crimson in very low light.)

One might try to resist these examples by claiming that an object can be of a certain colour without having a power to appear so-coloured.5 The claim would

require some defence; but in any case, examples not involving colours are easily enough supplied.

A man might be strong, with a power to lift heavy objects. He might acquire a new (intrinsic) property possession of which will sap his strength when (and only when) his hands touch heavy objects. When not touching such an object, he

possesses his power; this is what he will lose should he touch a heavy object. He might be able to mask the effect of his strength-removing property by wearing

gloves. Putting on gloves does not make him strong. It merely ensures that he will

stay strong when he attempts to lift something heavy; it prevents the manifestation of an intrinsic fink.

2. Against an argument for impossibility

Why would anyone, or anyone who accepts the possibility of finkishness, think that there cannot be intrinsic finks? A popular analysis of dispositions designed to

4 M.Johnston, 'How to Speak of the Colors', Philosophical Studies, 68 (1992), pp. 221-63, at

p. 231. The example is sometimes described as a case of masking. Both a mask and a fink prevent the manifestation of the disposition in question in circumstances that would ordinarily trigger that manifestation. But whereas a fink eliminates the disposition, a mask does not. If we take it that the chameleon ceases to be green when the lights go on, the case here is one of

finking. Johnston himself calls it a case of 'altering' (p. 232), which he distinguishes from masking.

5 This objection was suggested by an anonymous referee.

© 2007 The Author Journal compilation © 2007 The Editors of The Philosophical Quarterly



514 RANDOLPH CLARKE

accommodate finks is neutral between intrinsic and extrinsic factors that might fink a given disposition. This is the analysis proposed by David Lewis:

Something x is disposed at time t to give response r to stimulus s iff, for some intrinsic property B that x has at /, for some time t ' after t, if x were to undergo stimulus s at time / and retain property B until t ', s and #'s having of B would

jointly be an ^-complete cause of #'s giving response r.6

(An ̂ -complete cause is 'a cause complete in so far as havings of properties intrinsic to x are concerned, though perhaps omitting some events extrinsic to x\) The chameleon has an intrinsic property such that if the chameleon were presented to observers in the light and retained that property, it would look green. The strong man has an intrinsic property such that were he to attempt to lift a heavy object and retain that property, he would succeed in his attempt. (In each case, the intrinsic

property in question would play the appropriate causal role.) An argument against the possibility of intrinsic finks is advanced by Sungho

Choi. Our attributions and denials of dispositions, he maintains (p. 499), are guided by two tests.

The conditional test is roughly that whenever the following counterfactual conditional is true, we are inclined to believe that [object] x has [disposition] D: if x were to

undergo the characteristic stimulus of Z), it would exhibit the characteristic manifestation of D.

Of course, in finkish cases the conditional test would be misleading; an object possessing the disposition would fail to produce the manifestation given the stimulus, and (in the case of a reverse fink) an object lacking the disposition would produce that manifestation were it subjected to the stimulus. In such cases, Choi holds

(pp. 499-500), we must rely on the nomic duplicate test.

It goes roughly that for most ordinary [intrinsic] dispositions, when it is clear enough that a perfect [intrinsic] duplicate of x subject to the same laws of nature as x (a 'nomic

duplicate of *') has Z), we are inclined to believe that x has D; and that when it is clear

enough that a nomic duplicate of x does not have D, we are inclined to believe that x does not have D.

The nomic duplicate test, according to Choi, trumps the conditional test, should the two conflict. When the former gives us clear advice, he says, we go with it. However, when it fails to offer clear advice, our judgement depends on the result of the conditional test (p. 500).

Choi's tests are not intended to provide an analysis of dispositions. It might thus seem that they are ill suited to settle whether it is possible to have a certain dis-

position together with an intrinsic fink of that disposition. But the intent, I take it, is that we may apply these tests (in thought) to putative examples of intrinsic finks as a

procedure for determining whether the examples are genuine - whether, in the

6 Lewis, p. 157. I do not endorse this analysis. In fact I think it falls prey to cases involving masks; for discussion, see A. Bird, 'Dispositions and Antidotes', The Philosophical Quarterly, 48 (1998), pp. 227-34. However, it delivers no reason to rule out the possibility of intrinsic finks.




INTRINSIC FINKS 515

examples, the dispositions in question are indeed possessed by the relevant objects. Applying the nomic duplicate test, we (supposedly) see that it is not altogether clear whether an intrinsic duplicate of the chameleon has a disposition to look green, or whether an intrinsic duplicate of the man has a power to lift heavy objects, etc. The counterfactual test yields the verdict that none of these things has the disposition in question. Hence it is right to judge that they do not.

While some might not find it clear enough that the duplicates have these dis-

positions, to others it may seem perfectly clear that they do. Moreover, when one is

dealing with finkish cases, one certainly cannot rely on the conditional test; this is the lesson taught by examples like that involving the wizard.

If there were nothing more to say, perhaps the result would be a standoff, a dialectical stalemate. But there is more to say.

For one thing, Choi's tests do not in fact rule out (finkish) intrinsic finks. Suppose a sorcerer stands ready to remove the strong man's strength-removing property, should the man touch a heavy object, and to do this so quickly that the man's

strength is not then removed. The man is not now touching any heavy object. As Choi sees it, it is not clear enough, by the nomic duplicate test, whether a duplicate lacking a similarly committed sorcerer has a power to lift heavy objects. But by the conditional test, the man accompanied by the sorcerer has this power: he would lift

any such object that he tried to lift. Hence Choi's procedure implies that the man has this power. Yet his strength has an intrinsic fink, albeit one that is itself finkish.

If it is correct to judge that the man accompanied by the sorcerer has the power in question, then an intrinsic duplicate unaccompanied by any similar sorcerer is also so empowered. For the presence or absence of the sorcerer is irrelevant to whether a man has this power. (The principle here is just the one on which the nomic duplicate test is based.) Yet the duplicate's power has an (unfinkish) intrinsic fink.?

Moreover, Choi's tests do not tell the whole story about how we determine what

dispositions things have. We often have multiple conditional tests for a given dis-

position. Something that is green standardly appears green in normal lighting; it also

commonly reflects light that registers in a characteristic way on a spectrophoto- meter. A strong man typically succeeds in lifting heavy boxes when he tries, in

impressing us when he flexes his muscles, and so forth. An object might pass some conditional tests for a given disposition while failing others.

It might be objected that, for example, a disposition to appear green is distinct from a disposition to reflect light that registers in a certain way with spectrophoto- meters. Arguably, however, this is a single disposition described in two different

ways. A disposition is commonly a power to produce various kinds of effects with various co-causes.8

7 As Choi has noted in correspondence, given the plausible assumption that the power in question here is intrinsic, his procedure generates contradictory results. If the two tests are

applied to the duplicate unaccompanied by the sorcerer, the verdict (as Choi sees it) is that the man lacks the power to lift heavy objects. If the tests are applied, as in the text, to the man

accompanied by the sorcerer, the verdict is that he has that power. Yet since the power is intrinsic, intrinsic duplicates must either both have it or both lack it.

8 Cf. J. Heil, From an Ontological Point of View (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), p. 198.

© 2007 The Author Journal compilation © 2007 The Editors of The Phibsophical Quarterly



5 1 6 RANDOLPH CLARKE

Furthermore, in many standard cases of dispositions, we find intrinsic structural features which, given the laws, suffice for the possession of those dispositions. Having a certain molecular structure and bonding suffices, given the laws, for being soluble. We need not take into account all of a thing's intrinsic properties in determining whether it has a given disposition. Hence, in many cases, there is a third kind of test for the possession of a given disposition: determine whether the object has an intrinsic property possession of which has been found to suffice for having the

disposition. (This 'constitution test' is an operationally useful one. Employing it, one can test for fragility without destroying a valuable object; and perfect intrinsic

duplicates are not easy to find.) Suppose we have found some intrinsic property P, possession of which, our

evidence indicates, suffices for something's being green. It seems clear enough by the constitution test that an object possessing P is green. If an object which possesses P also has another intrinsic property which causes it to lose the property P as soon as it is exposed to light, it seems clear enough, by the same test, that this latter object too is green. Further, the constitution test seems to trump both of the others.

Choi considers a case of this sort, where the structural property M has been found to be common to fragile glasses. A glass that has an intrinsic disposition to lose its M if struck (so that the glass will not then break) is not fragile, he maintains

(p. 500). It is not disposed to retain M if struck, and 'this disposition is essential for

ordinary glasses to be fragile'. But being fragile is one thing; being disposed to remain fragile if struck is another.

(Imagine a disposition that randomly comes and goes, without cause. An object possessing that disposition is not disposed to retain it, and so is not disposed to retain it should the standard triggering conditions obtain. Still, the object possesses the

disposition!) A glass can be fragile while lacking the disposition to remain so if struck. Indeed, a fragile glass in the presence of an extrinsic fink (such as the wizard) is

disposed to be caused to lose its fragility if it is struck. The wizard, we may suppose, stands ready to alter the glass because he has taken

a special liking to it. He likes it because of its beautiful shape. Hence, even in this

example, the disposition in question, fragility, is finkish in part because of some intrinsic property of the object possessing that disposition. (It is because the glass has that shape now, we may suppose, that the wizard would save it were it struck now.) There seems to be no principled way of accepting finks while ruling out intrinsic finks. This consideration should guarantee their possibility, given compelling reasons for accepting finkishness in the first place.

One could say about the strong man that he does not have a power to lift-heavy- objects, but only a power to lift-heavy-objects-while-wearing-gloves. But equally, one could say that the glass does not have a disposition to break-when-struck, but only a disposition to break-when-struck-in-the-absence-of-a-wizard. There is no need to make this move in the first case if it is unnecessary in the second.

One might think that even if dispositions can be finkish, they will be manifested

given their respective stimuli, provided the circumstances are ideal (cf. Mumford, p. 88). (The presence of a fink might be taken to render the circumstances other than ideal.) But if one allows that the circumstances of a given disposition can




INTRINSIC FINKS 517

include other properties with which the disposition is co-instantiated, the thought does not rule out intrinsic finks.

3. Options for the denier

Suppose that a certain object 0 has some intrinsic quality P, possession of which, given the laws, suffices for having a certain disposition D.9 (By 'quality' I mean a property that is not itself a pure power; shape and crystalline structure are examples. Whether such a property is also a disposition I leave open.) So 0 has D.

If a second object n also has P, it thus has disposition D. Suppose that n also (and unlike 0) has some additional intrinsic properties. Still, since n has P (and having P

nomically suffices for having Z>), n has D. It seems that one of these additional properties Q,could be such that having it will

cause n to lose P, and so lose Z), should n be subject to conditions that standardly trigger the manifestation of D. (We may suppose that in the circumstances, w's having D depends on its having P.) The triggering conditions have not arisen, and so n has P, and thus D. w's disposition D is finkish owing to an intrinsic property of n.

What could make it impossible for such an object n to possess a property such as Q? One might suggest that any intrinsic quality P possession of which nomically suffices for having some disposition is, in part, the absence of any such property Qj An

implication would be that having a property such as shape or crystalline structure cannot, after all, nomically suffice for having any disposition whatsoever. Moreover, some will be put off by the suggestion that some property is, in part, the absence of some other property.

Alternatively, one could take P and Q,to be distinct, and maintain that any such

property P necessarily excludes any such property Q.10 One would thereby be committed to admitting necessary (dis)connections between distinct properties. It would then be strictly necessary that if having P nomically suffices for having Z), then hav-

ing P nomically suffices for lacking the distinct property Q. What could explain the impossibility of laws allowing for possession of both such

properties? One might say it is simply that having a property which (given the laws)

9 If L states the laws of nature, then D\L => (Vx) (Px => Dx)]. 10 Prior, Pargetter and Jackson maintain that an intrinsic property B that is ordinarily the

causal basis for a given disposition can, in some instances, have its normal effect 'swamped' (prevented) by some distinct intrinsic property S of the object in question, and that in such a case the object lacks the disposition. See E.W. Prior, R. Pargetter and F. Jackson, 'Three Theses about Dispositions', American Philosophical Quarterly, 19 (1982), pp. 251-57, at p. 253. Their case differs from putative cases of intrinsic finks, as in their case (what is ordinarily) the causal basis is not said to be lost in the standard stimulus conditions. Nevertheless, the case as described appears incoherent. Prior et al. take a causal basis (in the case of a deterministic disposition) to be a property of the object in question that, together with the stimulus, 'is the causally operative sufficient condition for the manifestation' (p. 251). If having B is, together with the standard stimulus, a sufficient condition for manifestation of the disposition, then it is not possible to add further intrinsic properties to an object possessing B that will prevent that manifestation, given that stimulus and continued possession of B. Perhaps by 'sufficient' Prior et al. mean sufficient in the circumstances. Still, can there not be some intrinsic property that is (together with the stimulus) sufficient tout court for the response? As Mumford (pp. 104-5) interprets the case, the causal basis would have to be some property that excludes any such property as S. But how would the exclusion work, unless B is, in part, the absence of S?




5 1 8 RANDOLPH CLARKE

does what Q,does strictly implies lacking D. However, it seems that for a typical disposition E, whatever intrinsic quality R some object has (so long as that quality is not, in part, the absence of some property), it is nomically possible for that object (while retaining R) to acquire a new property possession of which would cause it to lose R should there arise circumstances that would normally trigger the manifestation of E. (If R is an essential property, it seems nomically possible for the object to

acquire some further property possession of which would cause the object to cease to exist should the standard triggering conditions for E arise.)

One might, then, deny that there can be any intrinsic quality possession of which suffices (given the laws) for having a disposition. No such quality is itself any disposition, and no matter what intrinsic qualities an object has, this cannot nomically suffice for its having any disposition at all. Only having some such property and

lacking some other property can nomically suffice. It is accepted by many that causally sufficient conditions for the manifestation of

a given disposition may have to include the absence of possible defeating conditions in addition to possession of the disposition and the occurrence of the relevant stimulus. But the position entertained here goes further. It holds that in addition to whatever qualities an object has, something further, some absence, is required for the mere possession of any disposition.

None of these moves is particularly attractive. One or another might be worth

making if there were good reason to make it, but no such reason has been produced. It might be better to accept that the putative examples of intrinsic finks are just what

they appear to be. Intrinsic finks are possible. Perhaps, even, they are not so uncommon. ' l

Florida State University

1 ' For thoughtful comments on earlier versions, I want to thank Lauren Ashwell, Sungho Choi, Toby Handfield, John Heil, Charles Hermes, Neil Levy and an anonymous referee.




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