Introduction

THOMAS O’BRIEN∗ and SUKANYA PODDER

Cranfield University

Non-state armed groups play a significant role in determining the security of individualswithin the state and, in some cases, the stability of the state itself. This special issue exam-ines the use of religion and ideology as legitimisation strategies by such groups, through arange of case studies. A central feature of all the groups covered is the use of violence toachieve their respective goals. The application of violence varies depending on the groupand the context within which they operate. At one end is Al Shabaab, which has adoptedviolent means to challenge a weak state and require the adherence of the communities itoperates within. By contrast, the Basij militia uses violence to maintain order and suppressdissent, with the tacit support of the state. Another common theme is the absence of effec-tive mechanisms for expressing opposing views within the respective regions and states,leading to reliance on the use of violence.1 This introductory essay provides a frameworkwithin which the actions of non-state armed groups can be interpreted and examinesjustifications for the use of violence by such groups. Although groups differ in scale,scope, and repertoire of action, an examination of the underlying processes can enhanceunderstanding of the behaviour observed.

The introduction is divided into four sections, which establish a framework againstwhich the cases can be considered. The first section outlines the origins and motivationsfor the emergence of non-state armed groups, through the lens of contentious politics.Central to the emergence of non-state armed groups in such a context is the existence ofa sense of injustice, driven by factors such as state repression, cleavages within the commu-nity, or economic divisions, that leads to claims being made against the state. In the secondsection, the focus turns to forms of non-state armed groups and the specific challengesposed by each. This section also considers the importance of perceived legitimacy to differ-ent types of non-state armed groups and the nature of desired goals. The third section con-siders the adoption and implications of non-state armed groups’ use of collective violenceand how this impacts their ability to generate legitimacy among the subject population. Thefinal section provides an overview of the cases examined in the issue.

∗Corresponding author. Email: thomas.obrien1@gmail.com1Charles Tilly argued that state capacity and democracy shape the levels of violence in individual states. Low-capacity undemocratic regimes see the most extensive and diverse forms of violence, as the weakness of thestate allows ‘so much room for petty tyranny (on the part of officeholders, warlords and other predators)’. SeeC. Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 232.

Politics, Religion & IdeologyVol. 13, No. 4, 429–437, December 2012

ISSN 2156-7689 Print/ISSN 2156-7697 Online/1212/040429-9 # 2012 Taylor & Francishttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2012.729144

Origins and Motivations

The context-specific reasons for each group coming into existence can be understoodwithin a broader framework of underlying origins and motivations. Matters of religionor ideology lie at the core of the origins of most non-state armed groups, providing legiti-macy and justifying actions against a state perceived to be unjust. The complex role ofideologies in revolutionary groups seeking to challenge the state is identified by Johnston,who argues that:

Most movements have at least some ideological foundations, which may animatemovement adherents to make great sacrifices. For other movements, ideologiesmay be nothing more than rhetorical shrouds that cover self-interested questsfor power and wealth.2

Differences based on religion or ideology have been the cause of many conflicts through-out history, at both the state and sub-state level. Additional consideration is required inorder to understand the factors that result in religious or ideological differences resultingin the formation of sustained non-state armed groups.

Lessons from the field of contentious politics can be usefully applied in assessing thereasons for the emergence of non-state armed groups and the motivations that sustainthem. In a key text, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly defined contentious politics as:

. . . episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of clams and their objectswhen (a) at least one government is the claimant, an object of claims, or a party tothe claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one ofthese claimants.3

This definition captures the broad scope of contentious politics, while also identifyingthe core essence of claim-making that underlies and drives actions. The range of actionsadopted to advance these claims can vary considerably from strikes and petitions toarmed insurrections. Applying lessons from contentious politics to non-state armedgroups therefore involves clarification of the goals underlying the actions of suchgroups. This requires an understanding of who is making the claim, against whom,and for what purpose. Contentious politics is broad in scope, ranging from demon-strations, riots, and strikes through to civil war and revolution.4 The state can also bea claimant, either directly through interaction with society or through proxies, such asstate-sponsored armed groups.

A key factor behind the formation of non-state armed groups is state repression.5 Asnoted above, contentious politics is concerned with the making of claims involving thestate. Where the state refuses to recognise these claims and instead chooses to use forceto suppress them, conflict can ensue. The events in Libya and Syria during 2011 and2012 illustrate this response: armed groups formed to challenge regimes perceived to beunjust and illegitimate, the state in turn made extensive use of escalating repression to

2H. Johnston, States and Social Movements (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), p. 139.3D. McAdam, S. Tarrow and C. Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001),p. 5.4S. Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2011).5K. Schlichte, ‘With the State Against the State? The Formation of Armed Groups’, Contemporary Security Policy,30:2 (2009), pp. 246–264.

430 T. O’Brien and S. Podder

control claim-making behaviour.6 The calculation made by opponents in such a situation isthat the potential costs of inaction outweigh those of arming and engaging the state in con-flict.7 However, the calculation changes over time, where violence has persisted over time aculture of violence may become embedded, leading to violent acts becoming normalised.The decision to maintain armed opposition is also shaped by the reaction of externalactors, such as support from diaspora communities. These external actors can strengthenthe group by providing financial support or moral justifications for the actions beingundertaken.

Following on from the importance of repression in fostering opposition, the existence of ahistorical cleavage or tension within the community may be a factor in mobilisation. Suchcleavages represent differences that can be used to develop a unified opposition (drawingon religious, ideological, or ethnic bases, for example) to the state. They also point to thepossibility that the state can call on participants on its side of the division to control or chal-lenge the opposition. In this way, it can be argued that non-state armed groups are not necess-arily in opposition to the state and can in fact be used to do its bidding, as seen in Iran withstate-sponsored militias attacking protestors during the 2009 election related protests.8

The final reason that has been identified for the emergence of non-state armed groupsrelates to economic interests. Davis argues that the focus on political motivations ofnon-state armed groups can overshadow underlying issues associated with securing econ-omic stability and desire for control over resources.9 In the absence of effective statecapacity, such groups may be able to secure access to resources through the control ofterritories or the provision of security in the absence of state oversight.10 The increasingdemand for natural resources globally and from emerging states, particularly China, hasmeant that securing territory and resources can be a lucrative source of income for non-state armed groups. Although the foundations of such groups may be in perceived injustice,economic resources can play an important role in supporting the cause or become thereason for the continued existence of the group.

The variation in origins and motivations of non-state armed groups leads to questionsregarding the form these groups take and the actions adopted to pursue their goals. Thecases in this issue cover a range of groups in differing geographical, political and socialcontexts, yet they are cohesive through their longevity and relatively established character.The next section considers their forms, assessing the ways in which such groups evolvefrom expressing opposition to perceived injustice to groups presenting a sustained claimthrough the use of violence. In doing so, it explores whether there are common featuresassociated with groups that make the transition to persistent armed opposition, settledor otherwise.

6G. Joffe, ‘The Arab Spring in North Africa: Origins and Prospects’, Journal of North African Studies, 16:4 (2011),pp. 507–532; D. Lesch, ‘The Arab Spring – and Winter – in Syria’, Global Change, Peace and Security, 23:3 (2011),pp. 421–426.7J. Goldstone and C. Tilly, ‘Threat (and Opportunity): Popular Action and State Response in the Dynamics of Con-tentious Action’ in J. Aminzade, D. Goldstone, E. McAdam, W. Perry, S. Sewell Jr., S. Tarrow and C. Tilly (eds)Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 179–194;H. Johnston, States and Social Movements (Cambridge: Polity, 2011).8V. Tahmasebi-Birgani, ‘Green Women of Iran: The Role of the Women’s Movement During and After Iran’s Pre-sidential Election of 2009’, Constellations, 17:1 (2010), pp. 78–86; S. Golkar, ‘Politics of Piety: The Basij and MoralControl of Iranian Society’, Journal of the Middle East and Africa, 2:2 (2011), pp. 207–219.9D. Davis, ‘Non-State Armed Actors, New Imagined Communities, and Shifting Patterns of Sovereignty and Inse-curity in the Modern World’, Contemporary Security Policy, 30:2 (2009), pp. 221–245.10C. Call, ‘The Fallacy of the “Failed State”’, Third World Quarterly, 29:8 (2008), pp. 1491–1507; C. Thies, ‘OfRulers, Rebels, and Revenues: State Capacity, Civil War Onset, and Primary Commodities’, Journal of PeaceResearch, 47:3 (2010), pp. 321–332.

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Forms of Non-state Armed Groups

The emergence of non-state armed groups is shaped by the social and political context. Thiscontext also plays an important role in determining whether such groups are able to estab-lish positions of strength and increase the likelihood of achieving stated goals. Central to theform the group takes is the level of state capacity. Where state capacity is low, armed groupsare more able to exercise control without fear of sanction from the state. In contrast, wherecapacity is high, these groups will be required to operate clandestinely, making use of exist-ing social connections to build opposition against the state and undertake scatteredattacks.11 In this way, the context which led to the emergence of the armed group leadsto a degree of path-dependence, as successive decisions taken by the group regarding prac-tices and strategies limit the ability to change course and become embedded in the organ-isational structure.

Differences in organisational form derived from the context have led to the consolidationof a range of different forms of non-state armed groups. Examining these forms, Krauseand Milliken have identified five broad categories: ‘(1) insurgent groups; (2) militantgroups; (3) urban gangs and warlords; (4) private militias, police forces and security com-panies; and (5) transnational groups’.12 Although these categories share commonalities,distinct features enable categorisation in this manner. Insurgent and militant groupsoperate in a more conventional manner, targeting the state to gain territory or seekredress for perceived injustices respectively. By contrast, urban gangs and warlords differdue to a focus on ‘the pursuit of illicit profits through control over natural resources,drugs, trafficking in people, kidnapping’,13 with the state being seen as a threat ratherthan opponent. Transnational groups differ again in that they target the state, but aremore focused on generating ‘spectacular and terror-provoking’14 actions that challengesocietal structures, rather than simply gain control of territory.

The category of private militias, police forces and security companies raises an importantpoint regarding non-state armed groups. While these groups operate autonomously of thestate, they are not necessarily independent or beyond its control. There is a long history ofstates using unofficial groups to attack opponents, when direct attacks by state forces arenot possible. Under the Franco regime in Spain, the state permitted ultra-rightist thugsto carry out unofficial enforcement, thereby leaving the state to portray itself as moderate.15

Iran provides a contemporary case, where the Basij militia have developed an importantrole in enforcing the will of the regime.16 These groups work at the behest of theregime, but present a threat to the security of the general population. They represent anincrease in the devolution of violence from the state to non-state groups. In cases of lowcapacity this can lead to greater instability as state-sponsored groups may seek to establishcontrol in the face of competition and opposition from non-state groups.

A factor linking these different forms of non-state armed groups is the need to establishand maintain legitimacy, internally and externally. Perceived injustice or the desire to gaincontrol over resources may allow the formation of an armed group, but maintaining cohe-sion is more difficult. Examining the significance of legitimacy, Schlichte argues that: ‘innerlegitimacy provides essential cohesiveness for the internal hierarchies of armed groups. Loss

11Call, op. cit.12K. Krause and J. Milliken, ‘Introduction: The Challenge of Non-state Armed Groups’, Contemporary SecurityPolicy, 30:2 (2009), pp. 202–220. See also P. Brooker, Modern Stateless Warfare (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010).13Krause and Milliken, ibid., p. 204.14Krause and Milliken, ibid., p. 205.15P. Preston, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain (London: Methuen, 1986).16Golkar, op. cit.

432 T. O’Brien and S. Podder

of legitimacy leads to a group’s ultimate failure’.17 In addition to internal legitimacy, thesearmed groups also need to develop and maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the population.The sources of legitimacy are much clearer in the cases of insurgent and militant groups,which can call on the population for support in the face of perceived injustice. Transna-tional groups (such as Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah) are able to point to a core ideologyand, given their dispersed network character, are less reliant on grounded legitimacy.Groups focused on illicit aims and those linked to the state will find greater difficulty ingeneration of legitimacy, as they are dependent on the spoils of conflict and supportfrom the state respectively. This sets them apart from, and potentially at odds with, thepopulations within which they operate, making it difficult to generate stable sources oflegitimacy.

The forms of non-state armed groups are diverse and complicated. The categories exam-ined are not mutually exclusive and groups can and do move between them as changes inthe external context require. However, one feature that all these groups share is the use ofviolence to pursue their aims. It is therefore necessary to understand the nature and featuresof collective violence as perpetrated by such groups.

Adoption and Implications of Collective Violence

Taking into account the variations in origins, motivations, and forms of non-state armedgroups, the unifying factor is the use of collective violence. Charles Tilly defined collectiveviolence as:

. . . social interaction that. . . immediately inflicts personal damage on personsand/or objects. . . involves at least two perpetrators of damage, and. . . results atleast in part from coordination among persons who perform the damaging acts.18

The core of the definition is focused on co-ordination for the purposes of causing damage.As noted above, the formation of such groups is often undertaken to pursue a claim againstthe state, through the use of means that are seen as most effective. In the absence of oppor-tunities for the open expression of claims, the result can be reliance on collective violence inorder to force the state to recognise and accept the claims made or at the more extreme endto overthrow and replace the state itself.

The adoption of collective violence by a group raises the stakes, as the risk of state repres-sion is increased by the violation of accepted societal norms and legal codes. This inevitablyleads to questions regarding targets of collective violence. The state as the focus of claimsbecomes a legitimate target, but questions are raised about those communities and individ-uals aligned with the state. Does support for the state make such groups suitable for target-ing by the non-state armed group? The answer depends on a number of factors that areexplored through this special issue, but of central importance is the need for the groupto be seen as legitimate in the eyes of the population/community it is representing.Where a group loses the support of the community or comes to be seen as illegitimate,the chances that it will be destroyed or defeated by the state increase.

Modes of collective violence vary considerably between groups and are shaped by anumber of factors, including differences in origin, motivation, and form outlined above.Turning again to Tilly, modes of collective violence are distinguished by the ‘extent of

17Schlichte, op. cit., 249.18Tilly, op. cit., p. 3.

Introduction 433

coordination among violent actors’ and the ‘salience of short-run damage’.19 An examin-ation of the nature of violent actions along these two dimensions provides some indicationof the role of collective violence in the actions of the group concerned. By their nature, non-state armed groups will tend to rank higher on the measure of coordination, as they havebeen formed to challenge the state as a unified entity.20 In contrast, the salience of violenceis likely to vary more widely. Although such groups adopt violent means, the extent towhich it is used is likely to be shaped by the nature of the threat they face. In thecontext of severe repression the use of violence takes on a far more prominent role thanif the state allows participation. Legitimation also plays a role in determining the salienceof violence, as subject communities may seek to limit the use of violence where the costsin terms of state retaliation are too high.

Although non-state armed groups adopt violence as a strategy to achieve their ends, thisdoes not preclude the possibility of negotiated settlement. This possibility is shaped by thenature of the regime, as the highest levels of violence occur in low-capacity undemocraticregimes, further limiting opportunities for negotiation.21 In the absence of formal per-mitted channels to express concerns, individuals and communities must find other waysto press their claims (legitimate or otherwise) on the state. Once violence is adopted as aform of action, the chances of reverting to non-violent means, such as negotiation, aremuch more constrained and require recognition of a need for change. Concluding hisbook examining three decades of contentious politics in El Salvador and Guatemala,including violent protests by non-state armed groups and extreme levels of state-sponsoredviolence, Brockett argues:22

. . . after the first waves of state murders of nonviolent urban challengers intensi-fied in both countries, there could only be an acute awareness of the high degree ofrisk, including to one’s own life, that any political contentious activities brought.And yet contention continued as the waves of violence built, resumed once thewaves of repression waned, and continues today. . . Beyond self-interest andrational calculation, political contention in situations of intense grievances andhigh risks is finally determined by uniquely individual configurations of hopeand fear, conviction and doubt, anger and love.

This illustrates that the motivations and costs involved in the adoption of collective violencemake de-escalation in order to undertake negotiations far more difficult and unlikelywithout significant changes in the external environment. It also demonstrates the impor-tance of emotions and other less tangible factors in the decision to take action.

The form of the non-state armed group will also play an important role in determiningthe spatial configuration and location of the group. Where a group has moved from rovingto settling in a particular location the use of violence will change, shifting from mobile andsporadic attacks on a greater force to protecting defined borders and territory. Holding ter-ritory also places pressure on the group to deepen bonds of support from within the subjectpopulation, entailing a reduction in or more targeted use of violent actions. By contrast,

19Tilly, op. cit., pp. 14–16.20This is complicated slightly in the case of organisations that are forced to operate relatively independently of oneanother to avoid detection by the state. Although such groups are likely to possess a unifying religious or ideologi-cal drive, the opportunities for coordination will be lower, leading to scattered attacks.21Tilly, op. cit., p. 232.22C. Brockett, Political Movements and Violence in Central America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2005), p. 328.

434 T. O’Brien and S. Podder

groups operating in a more mobile manner may be more able to use violence against awider range of targets, while still retaining support. The key distinguishing factor herewould seem to be the form of the group, with organisational structures and practicesplacing constraints on the actions that can be undertaken.

The range of non-state armed groups is diverse, with differences in form determined bythe context within which they emerge. State repression of groups within society is animportant element in forging a collective identity that can encourage formation and main-tenance of a non-state armed group over time. Where this pressure touches on existing cul-tural, religious, or geographical cleavages, the chances of escalation increase further, ascollective identities and grievances are already present. The social, political, and economiccontext shapes the opportunities and threats that these groups face, in turn determining therange of possible actions at their disposal. Finally, the adoption of violence is justified by theabsence or ineffectual nature of non-violent channels to express discontent and press claimson the state. Each of these factors combine in different contexts to produce the unique arrayof non-state armed groups covered in this special issue.

The Contributions

The articles in this issue examine the ways that religion and ideology are instrumental inlegitimizing popular support for the actions of non-state armed groups. They explorethe conditions under which non-state armed groups either thrive or decline and ways inwhich the survival of these groups can be intricately related to the provision of state-likeservices and social welfare. This theme is premised on the failure (perceived or real) of gov-ernance by the state at multiple levels and the need to challenge this failure, making claimsthrough the adoption of violence. The collection features papers from an internationalgroup of scholars from a multiplicity of disciplinary backgrounds, allowing for a diverserange of cases and interpretations. The articles examine the complexity of armed groupand community interaction using original perspectives that comprise a mix of theoretical,conceptual, and empirical case study approaches.

In the first paper, Mona Sheikh examines the role of religion in the justification of vio-lence through an exploratory analysis of the communication and recruitment material ofthe Pakistani Taliban. The findings suggest that religion plays a dynamic and multi-layered role in justifying the end use and purpose of violence. It becomes an object to bedefended from threats and creates a (blurred) limit on war through its interplay withpopular imagery and myth.

In his study of post-revolutionary Iran, Saeid Golkar uses the case of the Basij militia inunderstanding the role of semi-formal pro-government militias in society. The use of theBasij as a force for exercising political control over society through the recruitment, indoc-trination, and organization of Iranian citizens has manifested in the areas of local defence,community surveillance and policing, and the suppression of dissidents. This strategy ofpolitical coercion through the use of non-state armed groups has had significant socialand political impacts on the relationship between civilians and both state and non-statearmed actors.

David Jones and Michael Smith challenge the orthodoxy that dominates terrorismstudies regarding non-state armed groups, namely that the survival or durability of theorganization or network is central to the terrorist mission. Approached from this perspec-tive, the ideology or political religion of the group is subordinated to the core purpose of thegroup, which is understood to be survival for its own sake. Through a study of the evol-ution, development, and degradation of the Southeast Asian jihadist organization Jemaah

Introduction 435

Islamiah, their paper tests this hypothesis. It finds, in contrast to organizational andnetwork theory, that the group mission is not particularly flexible and that the crucialexplanatory variable affecting both the recourse to violence and attempts to counter it,lies in the ideological agenda that the theory dismisses.

Sukanya Podder examines the changing dynamics of civilian support for the MoroIslamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Mindanao, Philippines. The research analyses theMILF’s use of religion and ideology for legitimizing its insurgent goals and relates theseto the civilian support base for the MILF using the same lens. The findings suggest thatwhile religion and ideology have been important factors in mobilizing civilian sympathiesand support (both material and non-material), these are not enduring in their appeal.Changing dynamics of control with expanding state military presence (rather than per-formance) together with conflict-related impacts such as displacement, physical insecurityand loss of property and lives have resulted in weakening the influence of religion andideology as legitimizing strategies in a society marked by multiple levels, forms andsources of violence.

Oscar Mwangi highlights the role of Islam in consolidating the position of Al Shabaab asan armed group in Somalia. It examines the process through which the Al Shabaab hasattempted to solicit community support to secure popular legitimacy. Using the politicalprocess approach as an analytical framework, the article argues that state collapse inSomalia has created political opportunities for Al-Shabaab to adopt the deployment ofSomali nationalism and xenophobia, propaganda, social transformation, and the provisionof social services as strategies to acquire legitimacy. The findings demonstrate that there is arelationship between the local-level governance void created by state collapse and Al-Sha-baab’s use of Islamism as a political ideology to execute these strategies to legitimise itself.By doing so, it has in the process delegitimized the country’s Transitional Federal Govern-ment hence portraying itself as providing an alternative to local-level governance inSomalia.

Rashmi Singh focuses on Hamas’s use of religion and ideology to legitimize its use of pol-itical violence within the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. In particular, she exam-ines the mechanism through which Hamas has appropriated and (re)interpreted a corecomponent of Palestinian national identity, i.e. the culturally entrenched and socially res-onant norm of Palestinian heroic warfare that manifests itself as active and passive heroicresistance under conditions of occupation. This has effectively enabled the group to estab-lish political legitimacy, garner civilian support, and justify its use of political violence. Thearticle underscores the interplay between the active and passive faces of heroic resistance byillustrating how Palestinian active (i.e. armed) resistance is founded upon the elements ofsumud (steadfastness) and sabr (patience), which are in fact the key signifiers of passivePalestinian identity and resistance. Hence, passive and active signifiers of resistance arelocated as an enduring feature of the Palestinian national struggle, used and re-used inthe politico-ideological tracks of successive political organizations. The findings suggestthat Hamas’s particular practice and discourse of territorial struggle has not only propelledand reinterpreted this norm but in doing so, has blurred traditional boundaries betweencivilians and combatants while also continuing to foster the notion of ‘heroic warfare’ inPalestinian society.

Nikolaos Biziouras uses the historical case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)in Sri Lanka, for understanding the critical role that religious organization, ideologicalfitness, and state capacity can play in the formation, institutionalization and consolidationof non-state armed groups. The paper uses a historical lens to explore the processes ofethnic mobilization of the Tamils through a Tamil religious re-awakening during theBritish colonial period. Religious practices were invoked to consolidate the social

436 T. O’Brien and S. Podder

dominance of the Vellalar caste and blocked the upward economic, social and politicalmobility of the other Tamil castes, thus enabling the emergence of lower-caste groupssuch as the LTTE in the 1970s. Later the LTTE’s ideology privileged its nationalist goalsover Marxist doctrinal purity because of the group’s commitment to improved intra-Tamil caste equality; an ideological approach which only increased the LTTE’s legitimacywithin the Tamil community and solidified its institutionalization as a viable Tamil group.

In the final contribution, Jason Miklian examines the emergence and strengthening ofthe Maoist insurgency in India. Adopting a political ecology framework, the paper showshow the extraction of natural resources can act as a source of grievance and providesupport for non-state armed groups. Examining the actions of the key actors, the paperargues that a failure of effective governance by the state and abdication of responsibilityfor ethical and environmental impacts by the multinational mining corporation generatedgrievances among the indigenous population. The Maoists were then able to use the grie-vances around broken promises and the negative impact of resource extraction to generatesupport and attract recruits.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the contributors to this special issue for their effort. Com-ments on earlier drafts of this introduction by Petra Makela, Tom Hamilton-Baillie and thecontributors assisted in reformulating the arguments made. Support provided by the editorwas also crucial in enabling the project to come to fruition.

Notes on Contributors

Thomas O’Brien is a Lecturer in the Centre for International Security and Resilience(CISR), Cranfield University. His research examines democratization, contentious politics,environmental politics and human security. Previous work has appeared in ContemporaryPolitics, Conflict, Security & Development, and the British Journal of Sociology.

Sukanya Podder is Lecturer in International Development at the Centre for InternationalSecurity and Resilience, Cranfield University (Shrivenham). She is editor of Child Soldiers:From Recruitment to Reintegration (with A. Ozerdem, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). Recentarticles have appeared in Strategic Analysis, Civil Wars and International Peacekeeping.Current research interests include post-conflict statebuilding, security sector development,and rebel group recruitment and reintegration.

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