DSCTC / ESCTD235 JOINT 16 EOriginal: English

NATO Parliamentary Assembly

SUB-COMMITTEE ON TRANSATLANTIC DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION (DSCTC)

SUB-COMMITTEE ON TRANSITION AND DEVELOPMENT (ESCTD)

MISSION REPORT

OTTAWA, CANADABATH AND BOSTON, UNITED STATES

26 - 30 SEPTEMBER 2016

www.nato-pa.int 19 December 2016

This Mission Report is presented for information only and does not represent the official view of the Assembly. This report was prepared by Ethan Corbin, Director of the Defence and Security Committee.

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I. INTRODUCTION AND MISSION OVERVIEW

1. Canada stepped up its international security commitments at NATO’s Summit in Warsaw in July 2016. Ottawa is committing approximately 450 soldiers to Europe as it will assume leadership of a battalion heading to Latvia in 2017 as part of NATO’s new enhanced forward presence in the area. In addition, Canada will continue to commit resources at home and abroad in support of broader international stability, from management of the Syrian refugee crisis to security and development assistance in Afghanistan.

2. While the increasingly complex international security environment is forcing Canada to reconsider its international security commitments, it also understands the need to reinvest in its North American security commitments, which now include a tri-coastal security commitment as Canada’s Arctic coast becomes increasingly accessible.

3. As it seeks to meet the range of security requirements identified in its recent national defence review as well as Warsaw Summit pledges, the Trudeau government, however, confronts serious defence budget pressures and a range of dilemmas related to force modernisation and the procurement of major defence systems. Canada’s defence budget currently hovers around 1% GDP, about half the commitment made by all NATO member states at the Wales Summit over two years ago. At the same time, Canada has acted with alacrity, generosity, and innovation in its policy of bringing Syrian refugees from Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and elsewhere in the region to settle in Canada. These were the critical messages delivered to a delegation of NATO Parliamentarians that visited Ottawa from 26-28 September.

4. As such, Canada is working to bring what it can to the table: from defence capacity building projects in Iraq, to being a framework nation for the new NATO battalion to be stood up in Latvia, to development and security assistance to places like Afghanistan and beyond. A key challenge, however, lies in convincing the Canadian public that this demands financial sacrifices at home.

5. Canada also needs to refocus attention on North American security, which means building up its naval and air capabilities via the procurement of new large weapons platforms from the F-35 joint strike fighter to a modern fleet to guard its Arctic coastline. Vice-Admiral Ron Lloyd, Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy, told the delegation that Canada needs multipurpose destroyers and a new class of frigates to carry out both anti-submarine and air defence missions. In addition, Canada will also seek to improve its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms.

6. Canada’s contributions to global security, however, are not simply military. The Trudeau government has made refugee resettlement a top policy priority and rapidly mobilised personnel, resources, and diplomatic capital to bring in a very large number of Syrian refugees in a short period. Over the last year, the Canadian government has taken in 26,000 Syrian war refugees, demanding a massive coordination effort across federal government ministries, provincial and local governments, international partners, and civil society organisations both within and beyond Canada.

7. Canada conducts both a government-led effort and a private resettlement programme engaging Canadian civil society organizations and citizens directly in the process. This dual strategy has greatly facilitated a highly complex initiative entailing identifying possible refugees to bring to the country, full screening, medical check-ups, transportation to Canada, the provision of housing, food, health care, and other basic social services, settlement and community integration, language training and ultimately employment. Canadian officials noted they expect 90% of the new Syrian refugees will eventually be on the path to Canadian citizenship.

8. In discussions with officials, delegation members noted that the situation in Canada is very different from that of Europe. Canada’s geographical isolation allows it the time to screen refugees

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while its geographical breadth has made it possible to settle these refugees across the country. Several members nonetheless suggested that Canada’s unique engagement of civil society in this process offers a fresh approach that might be useful for other Allied countries. Canada has begun to share its experiences with several interested countries.

9. Twenty-six national parliamentarians from 14 allied countries participated in the visit to Canada, the Bath Iron Works in Maine and Boston and Harvard Universities. The delegation, led by the Norwegian MP, Sverre Myrli, and the French MP, Francis Hillmeyer, consisted of members of the NATO PA’s Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation and the Sub-Committee on Transition and Development. The delegation of NATO Parliamentarians visited Ottawa from 26-28 September 2016, Bath (Maine) on the 29 th and Boston and Cambridge (Massachusetts) on the 30th.

II. CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY

10. John McKay, the Parliamentary Secretary of the Minister of National Defence, met with the delegation to kick off a day of discussions about Canadian Defence policy. Together the round table discussions revolved around the following programme: - The Government of Canada’s Defence Policy Review, including persistent and emerging

challenges, defence budgeting and priorities;- Canada’s role in NATO and post-Warsaw Summit commitments; - The Government of Canada’s assessment of the Syrian conflict and its resulting migration

and humanitarian crises; and,- The role of the Departments of National Defence and Global Affairs Canada in the

resettlement of Syrian refugees to Canada.

Canada’s Defence Policy Review

11. The delegation’s visit to Ottawa came on the heels of Canada’s publication of its new defence policy. From April to July 2016 the Department of National Defence (DND) conducted an unprecedented public consultation to support the development of the policy. The Canadian public, industry, allies, partners, parliamentarians, and other key stakeholders were consulted on three basic key areas related to Canadian Defence policy: the principal challenges to Canadian security, the role of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in addressing these challenges, and the necessary resources and capabilities needed to achieve the desired defence goals.

12. As John McKay told the delegation, the public submitted over 20,000 submissions to the Defence Policy Review and almost 5,000 participants contributed comments and votes using the online discussion forum. In parallel, the DND and parliamentarians undertook in-person discussions, roundtables, and meetings with defence experts, industry representatives, academia, indigenous leaders, and international allies and partners. Mr McKay noted the government’s pleasant surprise to see such a high-level public response and, therefore, interest in the development of Canadian defence policy.

13. John McKay told the delegation, that while they were still tallying the results, it was abundantly clear that NATO will remain a core part of Canadian defence policy, and cooperation with Allies and partners will be a key driver of Canada’s defence policy going forward.

Canada’s Post-Warsaw Commitments

14. For many reasons, the Warsaw Summit in July 2016 will be remembered as a seminal event for the Alliance in the post-Cold War era; perhaps one of the less-discussed, but highly critical, outcomes was the re-emergence of Canada as a key player in a wide-range of Alliance defence activities. Canada’s post-Warsaw pledges give the country a clear role in the maintenance and

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strengthening of the trans-Atlantic security Alliance’s defence and deterrence posture, its efforts at cooperative security, and ability to respond capably in the event of a crisis.15. John McKay noted in a virtual laundry list of new international security commitments for Canada post-Warsaw: $465 million dedicated to help fund the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF), as well as women and children; contributions to NATO’s capacity-building efforts in Iraq; the deployment of a frigate as part of NATO Task Force part of reassurance efforts; and, working to dedicate resources to continued reassurance measures on the Eastern Flank, the most visible being Canada’s leadership of the Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) battle group in Latvia.

16. John McKay told the delegation that while Canada is making important security contributions in the Baltics and Afghanistan, its current level of defence spending has led to delays in key procurement projects. McKay stressed to the delegation that Canada understands the changes in international security environment require Canada to play a new, wider role at home and abroad.

17. David Perry, a Senior Analyst at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, however, reported that current and predicted funding levels prevent the military from carrying out these plans. As a result, Canada will either have to find more funding or reduce its ambitions. The current disconnect between ambitions and funding, he suggested, is not sustainable.

Canada’s Defence Policy Review – An Academic Perspective

18. In general, David Perry put a damper on the enthusiasm of the morning’s discussion about Canada’s Defence Policy Review and the new procurement priorities. The central takeaway of Perry’s comments was that there is simply not enough money to execute the plans on the books in Ottawa, which will result in the government having to make many tough choices in the near-term resulting in the loss of several key capabilities.

19. David Perry noted that the government is maintaining a 19 billion CDN budget (about 1% of GDP) and this amount will not change in near future. The budget also notes the same amount dedicated to capital equipment purchases, which is currently approximately 12-13%. While this number is projected to head toward 15%, he continued, it is very unlikely it will expand any further beyond this. Dr. Perry did indicate there is a planned increase budget spending, wherein defence spending will take up an additional 3% of the total budget, but this increase is too small to change the defence sector allocations in any significant way.

20. David Perry continued by stating that only small increases, as currently budgeted will present huge problems for Canadian defence, particularly for necessary items such as life extensions for existing platforms, as well as significant necessary equipment modernizations. It will also result in the underfunding of ISR projects, where there has been a cross-government consensus to use such projects to help increase operational tempo. David Perry noted that a principal problem is that money gets “stuck easily” moving from the budgeting process to allocation to various services and procurement projects. Dr. Perry noted some progress in fighter aircraft procurement and shipbuilding projects, but much needs to change to have meaningful recapitalization across the services. He noted pessimistically that procurement processes have “gone nowhere” in the last two years, due to insufficient funding and project follow through.

21. He concluded by noting that status quo is not fiscally viable, and therefore requires significant governmental action to push through much needed changes. He noted that Canada’s stated ambition to increase its contributions to UN peace operations would likely interfere with its ambitions in NATO operations and exercises. In addition, David Perry predicted Canada would like to refocus its relationship with Russia, but is not sure how this will translate into practice: Canada does not believe Russia to be a reliable partner for cooperation, but it is unsure how to translate this into Canadian defence policy.

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22. David Perry stated quite clearly, that there is a much stronger need for Canada to defend North America and Canada then there have been in decades. He concluded that the United States will increase pressure on Canada to invest much more in collective regional defence, which will require multi-billion dollar investments in order for Canada to pull its respective weight. This sentiment was generally echoed throughout the day’s discussions on Canadian defence policy.

Internationally Displaced Populations and Canadian Security

23. When discussing the current challenges posed globally by the displacement of millions of people as a result of conflict and climate change, Canadian interlocutors noted the size and scope of the problem is astounding. As such, they noted a whole-of-government effort to focus resources effectively where and when possible for Canada to be an effective contributor to a solution. As John McKay told the delegation: “There are currently north of 4.8 million Syrians displaced, which is 15% of the total Canadian population – these are incredible numbers.” John McKay also underscored the various nefarious angles to the problem as well by noting the problem of the complex criminal networks profiting from the internationally displaced populations. As will be discussed in more detail below, Canada has already welcomed almost 30,000 Syrians, but Canadian parliamentarians noted that the current refugee crisis is likely just the tip of the iceberg, given the impending problems of climate change as a serious driver of mass migration. By way of example, McKay noted the problems of water scarcity in the Middle East, as well as the likely flooding of the coastlines globally as polar ice caps continue to melt. The defence implications of such matters, Canadian interlocutors noted are still being studied, but there was agreement that they will be significant challenges.

III. CANADA’S MARITIME POLICY

24. The delegation also heard from the Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), Vice-Admiral Ron Lloyd. VAdm Lloyd was accompanied by Chief Petty Officer 1st Class Michel Vigneault. The Vice-Admiral gave the delegation a presentation on: the plans and priorities of the Royal Canadian Navy; the renewal of Canada’s maritime fleet; and Canada’s shipbuilding procurement strategy.

25. Vice-Admiral Lloyd noted straight away that the 21st century is a maritime century. As such, he continued, upholding maritime norms has to be an Alliance priority. He noted that a rules-based maritime order is underwritten by the Alliance’s sea power – enormous amount of trade flows through eight principal chokepoints and across our common ocean and seas. There is a general trend toward rising naval budgets, he continued, as many nations understand the strategic link between sea power and future economic prosperity. Vice-Admiral Lloyd noted the growing challenges to operating in the maritime spaces of the Alliance as well; noting in particular that the future would also include an Alliance focus on the Arctic – but also noted that the growing global interest in the Arctic goes well beyond the five coastal Arctic states.

26. According to Vice-Admiral Lloyd, the strategic context driving the defence planning in Canada was the need for a capable tri-coastal navy. He continued that Canada would also continue to strive to be a maritime leader in the Alliance. The Vice-Admiral stated Canada’s strong support for the increased tempo of exercising in the Alliance in recent years. He said quite clearly: “Exercises are essential for demonstrating readiness, confirming interoperability, and serve as the glue of the Alliance’s military power.”

27. When noting the efforts underway to renew Canada’s maritime resources, Vice-Admiral Lloyd was quite enthusiastic. Vice-Admiral Lloyd noted that the entire Royal Canadian Navy is currently undergoing a wide-ranging programme to bolster its naval capacity, extend the life cycle of its current fleet via refitting and modernization investment, and to procure a range of new vessels. In total the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy will invest approximately 30 billion

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CDN to develop an Arctic-capable fleet, frigate-class surface warships, and long-range auxiliary supply ships.

28. He noted that a centrepiece of the future fleet was the frigate modernization program. The programme, Lloyd continued, would total 4.2bn CDN and is currently on time and on budget. To bolster the capacities of the Royal Canadian Navy’s Arctic coastal responsibilities, significant investment is being made in a new Harry DeWolf-class offshore patrol ship. Replenishment ships, he continued, are being built at shipyards in the West and Quebec.

IV. CANADA’S REFUGEE POLICY

29. Canada’s contributions to global security, however, are not simply military. Dawn Edlund the Associate Assistant Deputy Minister in the Department of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship and the official with overall responsibility for Canada’s resettlement policy told the delegation that the surge of nearly 26 thousand Syrian refugees into Canada over a very limited period of time has demanded a massive coordination effort, engaging 15 federal government ministries, provincial and local governments, international partners and civil society organizations both within and beyond Canada. The Trudeau government has made refugee resettlement a top policy priority and rapidly mobilized personnel, resources and diplomatic capital to bring in a very large number of Syrian refugees over a very short period of time.

30. Canada’s Department of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship took the lead on the effort and availed itself of a government operations coordination centre to manage this highly complex effort. Dawn Edlund described Operation WelcomeRefugees to the delegation and the manner in which the Federal Government, provincial and local authorities, civil society groups and private systems forged a partnership to ensure that the conditions were in place to make possible rapid integration of these refugees into Canadian society. Corporate Canada donated millions of dollars to help underwrite the effort and Canadians from all sectors of society offered tremendous financial and in-kind support.

31. Dawn Edlund told the delegation that her department had 600 members of staff working on this project. The International Migration Office had 300 people working in the field along with countless international organizations, local partners and NGO’s. Authorities and aid workers in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey also played an essential role and helped Canada establish clearing centres needed to begin the screening process prior to the refugees’ departure for North America. The Canadian military deployed doctors and equipment to processing centres in Jordan and Lebanon to facilitate medical screening. Security screening is comprehensive and a number of applicants have been refused because of concerns about their backgrounds.

32. The newly elected Trudeau government had accorded this initiative a very high political priority, and called on Canadian society at large not only to endorse the effort but also to participate actively in it. Dawn Edlund suggested that what has proved an ultimately successful undertaking provides a powerful example of what can be accomplished when there is a shared sense of national purpose in a moment of international crisis. But even with that support and the resources Canada enjoys, the challenges were many. Canadian officials have acquired a long list of valuable lessons learned and are sharing these with their partners.

33. One of the critical lessons has been that it is essential to begin the integration process even before the refugees arrive in Canada. There was, for example, an effort to introduce the refugees to Canadian police officials before they arrived in Canada so that they fully understood that the police were there to protect their rights and security. This imparted an important lesson about the nature of Canadian government and society and provided an important degree of reassurance to a highly-traumatized population harbouring deeply ingrained fears of state authorities. The integration program has had to cope with many refugees suffering from post-stress disorder.

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Illiteracy has also posed unique problems and young people arriving in Canada are frequently well behind in their education because of the war. Canada has undertaken special efforts to support women while working to inculcate newly arrived migrants in the social mores that characterize relations between men and women in Canadian society.

34. Canadian authorities screened and interviewed refugees prior to their departure in order to ensure that they were indeed fleeing from conflict and that they posed no risk to Canada. All possible information was collected, and trained visa authorities followed any leads suggesting individuals might pose security risks. Immigration processing centres were set up at the airports in Montreal and Toronto and this helped authorities handle the large increase in traffic precipitated by this migration. On the day of their arrival, refugees were given their social service numbers so that they were positioned to access all of Canada’s basic social services.

35. The delegation learned that Canada conducts both a government-led effort and a private resettlement program that has engaged Canadian civil society organizations and citizens directly in the process of refugee resettlement. Private sponsorship programs began in Canada in 1978 when Vietnamese refugees were brought for resettlement into Canada. Studies have suggested that the private program has been more successful in integrating Syrian refugees into Canadian society. That said, it is worth noting that government sponsored refugees tend to be in more dire circumstances and on average are less well educated that the privately supported refugees. In any case, this dual strategy has greatly facilitated a highly complex initiative that entailed identifying possible refugees to bring to the country, full screening, medical check-ups, transportation to Canada, the provision of housing, food, health care, and other basic social services, settlement and community integration, language training and ultimately employment. Arriving Syrians have serious health and dental issues and their presence has put pressure on some local health providers. This has required a degree of mobilisation to provide additional medical and social support where the concentration of refugees is relatively high.

36. Finding housing for newly arrived refugees has proven particularly challenging. The privately sponsored refugees often move to communities where they have relatives and where the private sponsors themselves live. The government tries to match relocation with job skills and job availability so that breadwinners can find work quickly. Syrian refugees are accorded the right to work the very day they arrive in Canada and this has been critical to the integration process while reducing the burden on public and private funders. Vocational training has been expanded to facilitate this process and special programs, such morning apprenticeships and afternoon language classes.

37. It is also important to consider the special requirements of those arriving in Canada. So if, for example, a deaf child arrives in Canada, an effort is undertaken to locate that family in a region where there are schools and support services for deaf children. More than half of those arriving in Canada are under the age of 18 and this has required the state to provide extra resources to schools with swelling populations of refugees.

38. There is no definitive study on the actual impact on the macro economy of this large influx of people but previous studies do suggest that the arrival of higher educated migrants contributes to job creation and productivity increases relatively quickly. Foreign credential and degree recognition continues to pose problems, but the provinces are working to assess skills and help refugees receive the training to have proper accreditation needed for particular kinds of work.

39. Michael Qaqish, a City Councillor in Ottawa outlined the kinds of support local authorities are providing to refugees and the problems cities such as Ottawa confront in integrating this influx of vulnerable people into their communities. He suggested that the extra burden on the local health care system has been particularly noticeable and schools have had to make a significant adjustment to take in Syrian students and integrate them into the educational system. Ottawa is expecting 2000 Syrians to arrive next year which is four times the normal flow of refugees into the

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city. He said that the entire community including NGO’s must be mobilized to make this work and Ottawa has risen to the challenge.

40. Louisa Taylor, Director, Refugee 613, noted that the city has accrued a great deal of knowledge from past influxes of refuges from Hungary, Vietnam and Somalia among other countries. These groups have become very well integrated into the life of the city and now play leadership roles. She noted that churches and mosques in the city have banded together to provide support and to foster a sense of solidarity among the communities. Engaging different faith communities in this endeavour has built a buffer against potential backlashes. This broad effort has allowed an impressive degree of integration and networking throughout the city that otherwise would not have transpired. In essence the refugee crisis has helped bring Ottawa closer together. Louisa Taylor noted that visionary leadership has been critical to making this effort and their capacity to unleash compassion has left the community far stronger. This point was stressed repeatedly over the course of the meetings.

41. Federal income support for refugees is only expected to last for one year, at which point support becomes the responsibility of the hosting province. It is expected that 90% of those who have arrived will eventually become Canadian citizens. Canadian officials are still debating how to approach the matter of family reunification with family members who have not arrived in Canada. There is not yet a comprehensive policy on this matter. Canada has essentially refrained from taking unaccompanied children, considering the significant risks of human trafficking. It works with NGOs in the region to provide support for such children.

42. In discussions with officials, delegation members noted that the situation in Canada is very different from that of Europe. Canada’s geographical isolation has allowed it the time to screen refugees while its geographical breadth has made it possible to settle these refugees across the country. Several members nonetheless suggested that Canada’s unique engagement of civil society in this process offers a fresh approach that might be of use to other allied countries. It might be useful, for example, to develop a handbook explaining the Canadian approach to the current Syrian refugee crisis. The bottom-up nature of private sponsorships is unique and many countries could benefit from adopting elements of this program. Canada has begun to share its experiences with several interested countries. The United Nations High Commissioner for refugees (UNHCR) has also sought to derive lessons learned from Canada’s engagement of the private sector and The Open Society and Canadian government are now undertaking a joint project to further share the Private Sponsorship model that Canada has initiated.

43. Michael Casasola, Resettlement Officer at UNHCR discussed the global refugee picture. He noted that there has been a justifiable focus on the problems in Syria but the global challenge is mounting. UNHCR conducts a world-wide refugee survey. Mr. Casasola discussed the sheer numbers of resettlement cases the UN is handling—in other words moving refugees from temporary to more permanent places of settlement. UNHCR worked very closely with Canada on the resettlement project and helped in matters like assessing the vulnerability of particular refugees, identifying their medical problems and learning which of these would be interested in moving on from the region to Canada. It identified 22 thousand people in a very short period of time. UNHCR is currently looking for four hundred thousand places to resettle Syrians and 4 billion CDN to help meet their immediate needs. It has also held a summit meeting with world leaders which was partly dedicated to reaffirming the principles of the Refugee Convention.

44. The UNHCR has insisted on additionality as far as private sponsorships go. In other words, what private citizens do should be in addition to what the government is doing, not in place of it. It also wants to ensure a degree of fairness so that refugees from other conflicts are also cared for. It wants refugees to have access to citizenship in their host countries so that they are assured that they are welcome and integrated. It is important their rights be respected. This is particularly important given the rise of Islamophobia in some Western circles. It also stresses the need for family reunification policy so that families settling away from the conflict have a means to live with those members of the family who are endangered in the conflict area. Finally, UNHCR believes

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that it is vital to work with host communities so that there is broad societal engagement with the notion of hosting and welcoming refugees.

V. THE CANADA-EU FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

45. The discussion on the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) was essentially a debate between Daniel Drache, Professor of Political Science at York University, Ontario, who stated that Canada should be very cautious about embracing a free trade agreement with Europe and, and Patrick Leblond, an Associate Professor at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, who suggested that deepening the trade relationship with Europe makes great economic sense.

46. Dr. Drache noted that third generation trade deals differ fundamentally from earlier liberal trading arrangements. While earlier deals had successfully focused on reducing or eliminating tariffs and quotas, the new arrangements focus more on regulations. This, he argued, is more politically problematic as many societies do not want to forfeit their power to regulate and to control the corporate sector. He also suggested that he job creating capacity of third generation trade deals is vastly over-stated and expressed his view that these deals are more focused on investment protection than they are on job creation. There are growing concerns that large multi-nationals are using these deals to insulate themselves from national regulation and that this will make them even less accountable.

47. It is thus not surprising that Germany, Austria and France are threatening to withdraw support for CETA, particularly at a time when public support for TTIP is eroding on both sides of the Atlantic.

48. Europe only consumes 5% of Canadian exports and Canada is largely exporting natural resources and light equipment. Canada’s most important markets remain the United States China, Japan and Mexico. 30% of Canada’s European trade is with the United Kingdom so Brexit will significantly reduce Canada’s overall share of trade with the European Union. This has made the deal less attractive on both sides. In light of all these factors, Dr. Drache suggested that the best option might be to adopt a go-slow approach and to take time to ensure that current critics could live with a revised deal.

49. Patrick Leblond sharply disagreed with Dr. Drache’s analysis and said that while trade deals that liberalize commercial relations produce winners and losers, the gains from the additional trade precipitated by the agreement would significantly offset the losses. He warned that social policy and trade policy ought not be conflated although they often are. Trade policy is a very blunt instrument for achieving social ends, he warned, and the gains from trade can help finance support for those who may lose from greater liberalization. He also said that the EU is Canada’s second largest market and so it made sense to seek greater access to it. He noted that Canada was an important investor in Europe and that investor protections would only deepen the trading relationship. He also challenged the notion that governments would lose their sovereign powers to regulate as a result of CETA.

50. Dr. Leblond was optimistic that CETA will be ratified as it provides an opportunity for the EU to show that it is still in business in the wake of Brexit. Of course, the UK will now not be a party to the agreement and will have to negotiate a separate arrangement with Canada. While regulatory cooperation is complex, there are great benefits if common standards or mutual recognition are agreed.

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51. Akaash Maharaj, Chief Executive Officer, Global Organisation of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC) met the delegation to discuss his organization’s work on corruption and the critical role parliamentarians play in fighting it. Many see parliamentarians as part of the corruption problem, Mr. Maharaj noted, but he also suggested that there can be no solution to this scourge without the active engagement of national parliamentarians. Strong parliaments correlate with low levels of corruption and it is important to empower parliaments to exercise scrutiny and demanded that governments be accountable to the people. This is the single most compelling tool in the fight against corruption.52. The corruption problem is serious, particularly in poorer countries. He noted that for every dollar of foreign aid, ten dollars is lost to corruption in developing countries. GOPAC estimates that the world loses $6 trillion to corruption each year and could have easily achieved the Millennium Development Goals if these resources had been put to their proper use. He argued that corruption may pose the greatest threat to global peace insofar as it is provoking grave instability across a wide range of countries. It delegitimizes the state, foments public grievances and unrest, engenders radicalism and undermines the state’s capacity to detect and respond to threats.

53. Corruption was, for example, a critical catalyst for the uprisings that shook the Arab World in 2011 and it was a primary factor in the Ukrainian revolution as well. It has also precipitated a crisis of confidence in a number of democracies and left them vulnerable to external manipulation. This has been exploited by countries like Russia, which is not only deeply corrupt, but which also uses corruption as a tool of its foreign and security policy. The NATO Council’s Warsaw Communique identified both corruption and poor governance as security challenges that undermine democracy, the rule of law and economic development.

54. Mr Maharaj said that engagement in Afghanistan has helped clarify the risks associated with endemic corruption. Building a viable state and security forces have been consistently undermined by public venality, and this has left that country deeply insecure. Afghanistan ranks 172nd of the 175 on Transparency International’s corruption perception index with one third of households reporting that they have had to pay bribes in order to receive basic public services. It is also believed that more than half of the money the United States spent on reconstruction was stolen. Today 26% of Afghans identify corruption as the single greatest public enemy while only 7% assign that role to the Taliban.

55. In light of these problems, achieving lower levels of corruption should be an intrinsic goal of development support. Aid should be measured in terms of outcomes not the value of the investment and aid should be made conditional in order to ensure that it is properly spent. Mr Maharaj also suggested that anti-corruption measures should become an essential element of military doctrine, particularly as the nature of war evolves. Countries engaged in conflict will have to keep an eye on winning the peace and even militaries should have an anti-corruption strategy in place. If money is used to co-opt local power brokers, he suggested, it is likely to undermine broader strategic goals. Flooding a theatre of conflict with Western cash is dangerous, particularly if there is no capacity to absorb those funds. It is also important not to oversell military engagements. Afghanistan was too often sold as an effort to build a democracy, and this was unrealistic and triggered expectations that could not be met. The West may need to dramatically lower expectations in future conflicts. Democracy is the work of generations and sometimes the goal of destroying dangerous enemies should be sufficient justification for an intervention. Building democracy is a nearly impossible goal over the short-to-medium term.

56. But that does not mean that assistance toward laying the foundation for functioning and more open and transparent society should not be undertaken. The international community can have leverage and should consistently apply conditionality to aid to ensure that development funds are not used for corrupt purposes and national parliamentarians should insist on this. Anti-corruption programs in schools are vital because there is evidence that the values undergirding anti-corruption can be taught. Support for parliaments in developing countries is critical because parliaments play such a central role in demanding transparency and accountability and dismantling

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the kind of regulations that make corruption so easy in so many countries. GOPAC has been working on all of these fronts with parliaments in vulnerable countries.

57. Along these lines, Ukraine has emerged as a major priority for GOPAC. Mr. Maharaj suggested that Russia had felt that they had bought and paid for Viktor Yanukovych and his overthrow reflected public disgust with pervasive corruption. The gas industry proved a particularly nefarious source of corruption and had been used to bribe public officials. Ukraine requires international support, he said and anti-corruption efforts should be a top priority for Western policy makers working with Ukraine. Russia also has a very deep culture of corruption but it will be the task of Russians themselves to challenge and clean up this system.VI. BATH IRON WORKS

58. The delegation was able to travel to Bath, Maine to visit the Bath Iron Works (BIW) naval shipyard. BIW is one of the largest shipyards in the United States currently building warships for the US Navy. The shipyard has been building military vessels for the US Navy since its founding in 1884, the shipyard has been responsible for the construction of battleships, frigates, cruisers, and destroyers. Bath Iron Works ships have a reputation in the United States Navy as being among the best-built warships in the Navy. A particular success story for the shipyard has been its design and build of the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, considered among the most advanced surface warships in the world. BIW became a subsidiary of General Dynamics in 2005.

59. The DSCTC chose to visit BIW due the shipyard’s production of the controversial new stealth destroyer programme, the Zumwalt-class guided missile destroyer. Originally designed as a replacement platform for the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, the Zumwalt programme has been steadily reduced in size and scope over the last decade. Due to cost overruns and a rebooting of the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, the Zumwalt has been cancelled with a total of three ships in final construction or sea trials.

60. As the delegation learned during its discussion with BIW officials, the Zumwalt-class destroyer has a low radar cross-section; an integrated power system that can send electricity to the electric drive motors or weapons. A much smaller crew mans the Zumwalt and ship is in theory designed to be less expensive to operate than comparable warships. Its wave-piercing tumblehome hull form means the ship’s sides slope inward above the waterline. This construction has the benefit of reducing the radar cross-section (RCS) by returning much less energy than a conventional flare hull form.

61. Originally 32 Zumwalt-class ships were planned, with 9.6 billion USD research and development costs spread across the class. As the delegation learned the ship’s costs quickly surpassed estimates, thus the planned production declined, winnowing the final number to three. The reduction in planned production of the DDG (guided-missile) destroyers caused a significant rise in unit cost of the ship to 3.96 billion USD (excluding R&D costs), making it among the most expensive vessels ever designed and built by the Navy. By mid-2016, the total program cost was 22.5 billion USD with an average cost of 7.5 billion USD per ship. The decision to restart and modernize the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers meant the DDG models were halted in favour of the older destroyer model, which would be in service to the US Navy until at least 2040.

62. The delegation learned of the very large economic impact the shipyard has on the state of Maine. The shipyard’s quality and history were a clear point of pride for the company and the region. The delegation was then taken out in the water to get a view of the Zumwalt and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers currently in production in the shipyard’s dry docks and in the water preparing for final fitting to ship out to their respective port of call.

VII. BOSTON UNIVERSITY

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63. Ambassador Robert Loftis, the Director of Graduate Studies and Professor of the Practice of International Relations, spoke on the on the war in Syria and Iraq. He opened his remarks by suggesting that although the situation in Syria remains desperate, there is a genuine opportunity for stabilisation in Iraq, where the problems are essentially political and frequently concern the capacity of government to be more inclusive. The United States has once again become militarily engaged in Iraq and currently has four and half thousand combat troops in that country. They are providing critical support, air strikes, special forces and advice to the Iraqi government. It is not likely that the United States will significantly increase its military presence in the country. President Obama has drawn a lesson that Western military intervention in this region has been largely unsuccessful and significant western troop presence rapidly becomes part of the problem. Dr. Loftis suggested there should be no discussion of a break up of Iraq and that diplomatic efforts should focus on building a broad consensus on how the state is to be managed. Although the United States has developed a close working relationship with the Kurds in Iraq, it has not advanced the idea of Kurdish separatism as this undermines the notion of a unified Iraq to which the United States is dedicated.

64. In the case of Syria, the prospects for resolution are far dimmer and an end to the bloodshed solution might only be possible by breaking up of the country. The situation in Syria has moved beyond the capacity of any external power to exercise significant control over the situation. Russia has participated in the military campaign but it cannot control the situation or its primary ally. Russia has tied itself to Assad but this is an enormously risky bet. For its part, the United States is not in a position to work with many of the opponents of the Assad regime nor can it negotiate on their behalf as its leverage is so limited. Even when it finds groups with which it can work, its support might actually delegitimize those groups. There are myriad actors in this crisis and the US administration has decided that playing the military card would ultimately prove counter-productive. Ambassador Loftis indicated that it was very important to provide a high level of humanitarian support to those affected by the conflict.

65. Dr Kaija Schilde, Assistant Professor of International Relations, spoke on Meeting Wales Summit Defence Spending Commitments. Although NATO has focused on the 2% of GNP guideline, there are compelling arguments that this yardstick may be flawed. There are other metrics that better reflect both capabilities and contributions to collective security. German officials raised this issue at the Warsaw summit when they pointed out that in the context of a shrinking economy a country would potentially not have to increase defence spending to achieve the 2% goal. This would mean no net increase in capabilities. Improvements in the efficiency of defence spending may well be a more important indicator that defence monies are being put to effective use. Greater efficiencies can be achieved, for example, by pooling and sharing, niche specialization, and collective force and capability planning. Allied countries might ultimately be better off by finding a metric for measuring capability improvements rather than focusing on spending percentages as such. It is worth noting that in the 1990s although US defence spending fell, the manner in which forces were restructured, and funding was reallocated actually improved capabilities over the longer term. The US example suggests that investment in new capabilities rather than spending on legacy equipment will pay long-term capabilities dividends. Defense spending as such is often more a function of economic growth than any compelling security obligation and reveals only so much about changes in capabilities. That said, the 2% can be politically useful and provide a degree of leverage to those pushing for enhanced investments.

66. Dr. Jessica Stern, Research Professor of International Relations and Political Science, spoke on US Approaches to Confronting the Terrorist Challenge. She focused her remarks on the process of radicalization in the West and made a distinction on those trained directly by Daesh and those who have been inspired by Daesh. Daesh itself is now on the defensive in several of the countries in which it has established a presence. In both Iraq and Syria that terrorist group is now losing territory. But this could create problems in the West as Daesh has vowed to take the fight into Western countries.

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67. As the recent attacks in a Florida night club demonstrated, there are clear dangers posed by self-radicalized individuals who can access Daesh propaganda to justify their own horrific crimes. These people are often mentally ill and harbour deep personal grievances. The ideology of Daesh resonates with them as it plays directly on their own personal sense of humiliation and provides both a broad narrative to explain it and an alleged vehicle to rectify it. Daesh often claims that it seeks recruits who are drowning in an ocean of disgrace and it proposes to remove the “garment of that disgrace.” Disenfranchised youth are particularly vulnerable to this line of argument. Europe may be more vulnerable here than North America although the Somalian community in the United States has been particularly targeted. But it is important to recognise that many of those joining these groups are criminals who have linked up with ideological criminals. It is very important to engage those who have renounced this ideology for insights needed to devise preventive anti-terrorist policies. Such people can also provide an important counter-narrative to dissuade young people from falling into the terrorist trap. Dr Stern also suggested that it is important to engage the mothers of young people as they are in a position to exercise influence over their children.

68. Dr Stern noted that Western governments, civil society and the private sector have become far more sensitive to the dangers posed by these shadowy groups and have, for example, begun to focus on social networks as posing a particularly difficult challenge. Facebook is now taking down pages that advance the cause of Daesh or seek to recruit adherents. Twitter has been less proactive while smaller social network companies have less resources and personnel to exercise control over the content of postings on their sites.

69. Dr William W. Grimes, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, spoke on The Economic and Diplomatic Dimensions of the US Pivot to Asia. The United States, he indicated, confronts several critical flash points in Asia.

70. Firstly, North Korea’s nuclear program has advanced to the point where it should now be characterized as a nuclear state. Efforts are nonetheless needed to impede the development of that country’s nuclear program. It might be particularly fruitful to focus on slowing its ballistic missile program.

71. The second flash point concern Chinese claims in the South and East China Seas and in the Japan-China Sea. Although Japan has a credible military force that will factor in how its dispute with China will play out, the Philippines and Vietnam are outmatched by China’s navy and both have implicitly relied on the American naval presence in the region to keep a lid on regional tensions. There is a certain asymmetry here as the Chinese have the advantage of location while the United States does not have much incentive to risk a great deal over man-made atolls that are not militarily significant. At the same time, the new government in the Philippines has been highly critical of the United States and this could mark an important watershed in US relations with regional partners. Dr. Grimes suggested that there is a growing risk of unintentional collision between China and the United States, and that ways to manage the rivalry in a safer less confrontational manner are needed.

72. More broadly, China is now understood to pose the most serious strategic challenge to the United States and will continue to do so over the coming decades. Russia, he said, is a declining power that can make a terrible nuisance of itself but it simply lacks the capacity to play the kind of role that China has begun to play on the global stage. Some in the United States have clung to a hope that a democratic India might eventually act as a counterweight to China in the region. But these hopes are overblown. India is unwilling to play this role and would certainly not do so in close cooperation with the United States. They are far more interested in their narrative of independence and non-alignment. China’s real Achilles heel is the long-term legitimacy of the Communist Party. Its ideological claim on the state has dissipated and it confronts serious domestic challenges linked to governance issues. The state does a very poor job of collecting taxes and local Party authorities have used expropriation as a revenue raiser. This has generated enormous public anger and could eventually trigger a legitimacy problem. The number of incidents of civil disobedience, most of

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which involve Han Chinese, has alarmed the party. These problems may be exacerbated as China comes to grips with the problem of industrial overcapacity.

73. Finally, the state of the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations reveals the degree of uncertainty characterising the US approach to Asia. Dr. Grimes said that it is highly unlikely that Washington will ratify this broad trade arrangement over the next two years as both presidential candidates have announced their opposition to it. But it does represent an effort to advance an American vision of openness and shared prosperity for the region. In this sense, the United States offers a more attractive version of international society than does either China or Russia and this trade pact embodies some of the values the Americans promote. The question is whether the American public will ever embrace it.

VIII. HARVARD UNIVERSITY

74. Former US Ambassador to NATO, Nick Burns, welcomed the delegation to the Harvard Kennedy School of Government for a luncheon discussion to round out the week’s visit to Canada and the United States. Ambassador Burns began the discussion with some introductory remarks about the United States’s enduring commitment to Euro-Atlantic security, particularly via NATO. Ambassador Burns noted he was encouraged by the July NATO summit in Warsaw, particularly by the decision to move forward with the new enhanced forward presence in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The addition of the battalions and increased support given by the United States to NATO initiatives in the Alliance’s eastern territories via the quadrupling of the European Reassurance Initiative, Ambassador Burns noted, were a clear sign of the new credible deterrence model by NATO in the face of a very complex security environment.

75. Ambassador Burns also discussed the encouraging signs being seen in European reinvestment in their domestic defence industries. The halting of declining defence spending, and the modest upturn in investment, across the Alliance address the real dilemma of burden sharing in the Alliance. Ambassador Burns noted that comments by the Republican presidential candidate, Donald Trump, were clearly not well articulated, but they did address an issue that has been debated for quite some time in the Alliance: The Alliance’s European member states can and must do more to bridge the growing defence capabilities gap. As Ambassador Burns noted, we cannot, particularly in this current security environment, have a multi-tiered Alliance. By working together more closely, he concluded, we will find a way to solve the security challenges facing all of our states.

76. Ambassador Burns opened the floor to discussion with the delegation. The lively discussion centered on the dilemmas of spurring increased defence spending in a persistently stagnant economic environment, the growing trends of populism in politics across the Alliance, and the problems of split threat perception. Ambassador Burns had also invited some of his graduate students to attend. Not only did the students listen, they contributed to the discussion by asking very pertinent questions of the assembled European lawmakers.

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