ROSE ROTH / GSM / ESCEW

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NATO Parliamentary Assembly

ROSE ROTH MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST

SPECIAL GROUPSUB-COMMITTEE ON EAST-WEST ECONOMIC

CO-OPERATION AND CONVERGENCE

SEMINAR REPORT

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Political and Security Changes in North Africa:Implications for Peace and Co-operation

in the Euro-Mediterranean and Transatlantic Regions

MARRAKECH, MOROCCO

3-5 APRIL 2013

www.nato-pa.int 14 May 2013

This Seminar Report is presented for information only and does not necessarily represent the official view of the Assembly. This report was prepared by Paul Cook, Director of the GSM, and Andrius Avizius, Director of Committee on the Civil Dimension of Security.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................1

II. NATO AND THE MENA REGION.............................................................................................2

III. THE SITUATION IN THE SAHEL.............................................................................................4

IV. A REVOLUTION UNDERWAY: AN UPDATE ON THE SITUATION IN SYRIA.......................5

V. THE IRANIAN CHALLENGE TO MIDDLE EASTERN AND GLOBAL SECURITY..................7

VI. POST-REVOLUTION TRANSITION IN THE MENA REGION: PROGRESS AND ROADBLOCKS.........................................................................................................................8

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Euro-Atlantic community’s assistance to the post-revolutionary transition and stabilization of the broader Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is critical during this period of uncertainty and insecurity. However, it must be managed carefully, avoiding meddling and taking into account local sensitivities and recognising the region’s heterogeneity. In order for stability to be enduring, a comprehensive approach is needed. This requires engaging all relevant countries of the region as well as international and regional bodies and broadening the scope of co-operation in order to encompass issues ranging from hard security to political and socio-economic development.

2. This was the broad message of a NATO Parliamentary Assembly Seminar held in Marrakesh Morocco from 3-5 April 2013. The meeting was organised in collaboration with the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors of Morocco, held under the high patronage of King Mohammed VI and was also supported by the Swiss Government.

3. Entitled Political and Security Changes in North Africa: Implications for Peace and Co-operation in the Euro-Mediterranean and Transatlantic Regions, the seminar engaged parliamentarians from 25 NATO member and partner countries as well as legislators from Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal. The gathering marked the 82nd Rose Roth Seminar and included in the discussions a number of leading experts, government officials, representatives of international organisations and members of the diplomatic community.

4. Participants explored the myriad of security challenges of post-revolution transition in the MENA and Sahel regions. With regard to the Sahel, H.E. Mr Assarid Ag Imbarcaouane, Vice President of the National Assembly of Mali, thanked France as well as Mali’s neighbours and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) forces for the sacrifices they have made in helping Mali re-establish order in the north of the country. He warned, however, that while key cities like Timbuktu have been recaptured, the security situation in Mali remains highly precarious. Heavy arms from Libya have flowed into the region and this illustrates the degree to which these security challenges must be understood in regional terms. Several speakers noted that efforts are now needed to begin an inclusive dialogue among the factions in this ethnically diverse region in order to build a lasting peace.

5. In addition to the existence of violent armed groups, Moroccan representatives pointed out that the Western Africa region also faces a number of other security challenges, including organized crime, human and drug trafficking (the region has become a hub for cocaine trafficking), illegal migration, piracy and environmental threats. Rabat actively promotes the approach of granting autonomy to certain areas as a means of enhancing the security situation in the region. NATO PA President Hugh Bayley (United Kingdom) noted that these challenges pose not just a threat to the Sahel but to the world. He urged parliamentarians to find ways to cooperate closely to address these grave threats.

6. Participants also explored conditions in countries such as Syria where transition has provoked instability and even civil war. Several speakers warned that the situation in Syria, tragic as it is, could get still worse. Even after the fall of Bashar al-Assad the violence might continue due to the heterogeneity of the rebel movement and the increasing prominence of extremists. Concerns were expressed that the Syrian conflict was altering regional geopolitics by exacerbating the sectarian stand-off between the Shia and Sunni countries and reigniting sectarian conflicts within countries such as Iraq and Lebanon. Efforts to end violence in Syria will be futile as long as internal and external stakeholders maintain a ‘zero-sum game’ approach to the conflict.

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7. The participants widely agreed that further strengthening of democratic institutions and implementation of meaningful reforms was key to the region’s long-term stability, because the lack of rule of law and exclusion of certain groups from the political process provides fertile ground for terrorists and separatists. In his keynote address, NATO Assistant Secretary General Ambassador Dirk Brengelmann cited Morocco as an example of a country in the region which has developed a very stable approach to reform and transition. Through the leadership of the King, Morocco adopted a new Constitution that made the parliament the only source of law-making and gave new rights to citizens. These reforms allowed Morocco to absorb some of the shocks and to keep Morocco ahead of the curve of the Arab upheavals.

8. In addition, several speakers were concerned about the political developments in Egypt. Mounting economic problems and the growing polarisation of the authorities and the opposition could lead to greater unrest and the involvement of the military to restore order cannot be ruled out, NATO parliamentarians heard. The president still has the opportunity to avoid this scenario by engaging in dialogue with the opposition and thus broadening his support base in order to implement substantial reforms. Unfortunately, according to several of the seminar speakers, the political will to seek compromise is not evident in Egypt at the moment.

9. In terms of NATO’s role, the Alliance ought to harmonize and de-conflict its efforts with those of other regional and international stakeholders, the participants heard. It is necessary for NATO and its member countries to continue applying specific approaches to each country in the framework of the NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue. Several speakers suggested broadening the scope of the MD to give more prominence to political, socio-economic and human rights aspects. Diego Mellado Pascua, Acting Head of the Democracy and Electoral Observation Division (European External Action Service) reaffirmed this view in his outline of the EU’s outreach and partnerships with the countries of the region, which he described as a critical priority for the Union. It was recognized, however, that the Euro-Atlantic community’s support is proving politically and economically trying given the economic and fiscal difficulties confronting many allied countries.

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10. Since the end of the Cold War, Rose-Roth Seminars have been a primary vehicle for parliamentarians to work with their counterparts in or neighbouring the Euro-Atlantic space who are charged with managing political and economic transition. These gatherings are a means of sharing knowledge, expertise and experience on democratic development and security sector reform while helping NATO member parliamentarians better understand political, economic and strategic developments in the region. The NATO PA GSM provides a forum for parliamentarians from NATO countries and the MENA region to discuss political and security issues and to enhance co-operation.

II. NATO AND THE MENA REGION

11. The leaders of the Moroccan parliament, Mohamed Cheikh Biadillah, Speaker of the House of Councillors, and Karim Ghellab, Speaker of the House of Representatives, both praised the value of co-operation with NATO and argued in favour of deepening relations with the Alliance and its Parliamentary Assembly. The Alliance’s role is very important in helping to transform the region into an area of stability and prosperity, the speakers said. They emphasised that the current seminar is organised under the high patronage of the King of Morocco Mohammed VI, a gesture normally extended only to very special events.

12. Nabil Adghoughi, Director-General for Bilateral Relations and Regional Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, Morocco, stressed that developing closer trans-Mediterranean and transatlantic relations is one of the key strategic foreign policy directions for Morocco, along with increasing cohesion of the Maghreb region and participating in global frameworks such as the United Nations. This dialogue with NATO and the EU is based on mutual respect, non-discrimination and the capability of each country to decide at what pace they want to develop co-operation with the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Mr Adghoughi called for strengthening this dialogue and adapting it to the new strategic environment, where MENA is no longer a peripheral issue for NATO and occupies is a central place on its agenda.

13. The President Hugh Bayley thanked the Moroccan hosts and noted that the transatlantic community needs to assess what is transpiring in the MENA region, and forge new approaches to helping it develop in a stable and ever more open fashion. This is not a zero sum game, the President stressed. The Alliance has shared interests with this region and needs to work closely with key governmental, parliamentary and civil society actors.

14. Ambassador Dirk Brengelmann discussed NATO’s approach to a rapidly changing MENA region. He noted that the transformation that took place in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War was remarkably successful to a large extent thanks to a proactive approach by NATO and the EU. Now, for the last two years, the Arab world is undergoing an unprecedented agitation as the people of the region have risen up seeking dignity, democracy and the rule of law. These changes brought new hopes, but also new uncertainties. For Syria, the revolution brought new suffering from the hands of brutal leaders.

15. Ambassador Brengelmann noted that the people, economies and security of the Euro-Atlantic community and the MENA region are interlinked and need to be addressed jointly. The co-operation has been ongoing for years now, within the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, launched in 1994, and other formats. The Alliance highly appreciates the contribution of Morocco and other MENA countries to NATO-led operations, such as the Operation Unified Protector designed to enforce the UN Security Council and the Arab League resolutions concerning Libya.

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16. The speaker stressed that NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue stood the test of time and proved to be an effective tool for developing co-operation with the region. It is a unique forum to discuss shared security issues and to develop practical military-to-military co-operation. Looking ahead, the Mediterranean Dialogue should continue to provide assistance to the region in the field where NATO has particular expertise – the security sector reform. NATO experts could help building security sector institutions and drafting defence concepts. NATO would continue developing tailored co-operation in specific areas through individual partnership co-operation programmes, such as improving the armed forces’ interoperability, having joint exercises or training courses, and developing local capabilities to fight against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and piracy. The one-size-fits-all approach would not work as countries of the region require different levels of assistance from NATO.

17. NATO must also work hand-in-hand with other regional and international partners and stakeholders that are active in the MENA region, Ambassador Brengelmann stressed. He explained how NATO is increasing co-operation with other partners: for instance, with the UN and the EU on issues such as border security and disarmament, with Russia and China on counter-piracy, and with the African Union on logistical issues.

18. Assarid Ag Imbarcaouane said that seminars like this provide a unique opportunity for Malian politicians to learn more about NATO, and to better understand its values and its agenda towards the MENA region. In particular, he suggested that the Alliance should do more to show that it is not just about soldiers and bombs, and that it has a significant non-military – humanitarian and political – dimension as well. He also urged NATO, whenever it embarks upon a military mission in the region, to take into account collateral effects on the neighbouring countries.

19. In response, Ambassador Brengelmann stressed that not all of NATO’s programmes with the region are of military nature. For instance, it offers assistance in the field of disaster relief and emergency response. Also, when discussing individual partnership programmes with regional partners, the Alliance always raises issues of democracy, human rights, gender equality and the rule of law – not only because NATO is an alliance based on values, but also because the long-term security and stability can only be achieved when these values are protected.

III. THE SITUATION IN THE SAHEL

20. Developments in Mali and the Sahel in general were a big theme of the seminar. Members of the Assembly as well as representatives of the MENA countries praised the French intervention as well as the role played by Mali’s neighbours and ECOWAS forces and what they have managed to achieve. But there is was also a sense that the situation there remains very dangerous and that the problem goes well beyond the borders of Mali. Security has not been fully restored and parts of the countryside and some towns and cities are not entirely safe. The recent terrorist attack in Timbuktu shows that Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is operating in this lawless region of the Sahel, making this a challenge with global implications.

21. Mr Adghoughi said that Morocco is extremely concerned about the situation in the Sahel, as it is becoming a hub of terrorist activity, human, weapon and drug trafficking, piracy, illegal border crossing and even environmental threats. He and other speakers from the region strongly supported the idea of a comprehensive approach to these challenges that would involve all relevant regional and international stakeholders.

22. Rabat also promotes the idea of expanding the principle of autonomy to certain regions in the Sahara as the most promising way to curb growing insecurity. Autonomy is offered to Western Sahara, questions on the status of which were raised by some members of the NATO PA.

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23. Nicole Ameline (France), Vice-President of the NATO PA, underscored the importance that France attaches to the Sahel region. France and its NATO and African led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) partners’ actions resulted in significant decrease of terrorist activity in northern Mali as the militants suffered significant people and technology losses. However, one needs to remain vigilant, and the attacks in Timbuktu are a reminder of that.

24. France’s military presence is temporary, but the withdrawal will be implemented in a responsible and prudent manner, Ms Ameline said. She also emphasised that the key objective now is to help the Malian army to prepare itself for full responsibility for the country’s security. For the achievements of the intervention to be sustainable, the role of the EU training mission and the AFISMA (to be transformed into UN's Multi-dimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali – MINUSMA) will be critical. The speaker also underlined the importance of the top-level Mali aid donor conference to be held in Brussels in May 2013.

25. However, over the long-term, the key to genuine stability in Mali depends largely on the political consolidation and reconciliation within the country. Ms Ameline welcomed the establishment of the Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission in Mali. The upcoming elections in July will be a critical step in the country’s political consolidation.

26. Ms Ameline also pointed out that there are important lessons for the Euro-Atlantic community to be drawn from the Malian crisis. It showed time and again that the credibility of our Alliance in this region depends to a large extent to our having adequate military capabilities. There is also a need to step up the Euro-Atlantic solidarity and to streamline the decision-making process among the Allies. Crisis detection and prevention mechanisms need to be strengthened as well.

27. Mohamed Benhamou, President of the African Federation for Strategic Studies, stressed that it would be a mistake to consider the Sahel as an isolated region. The challenges that stem from or affect the region transcend its boundaries. Poverty and governance problems are important factors destabilising the region, but, Mr Benhamou argued, the external factors are even more critical. Due to its geographic location and porous borders, the Sahel became a region where cross-border criminal groups, including human, weapon and drug traffickers (the region has become a global hub for cocaine and small weapon trafficking) can operate relatively freely.

28. The militants driven out of Libya and Algeria also exploited the power vacuum and lawlessness in the Sahel. These groups are very flexible and they adapt quickly to the changing security situation. As the French-led international intervention defeated their larger units, they now tend to operate in smaller groups and change their tactics to that of guerrilla fighters. The rising fundamentalism and the presence of AQIM, which is very well armed, pose very serious threats on a global scale, Mr Benhamou noted. He saw no alternative to a truly inclusive, multi-dimensional international response to these threats. Socio-economic assistance should be an integral part of this response, and the speaker called on the developed countries to offer a “Marshall Plan” for the Sahel.

29. Mr Imbarcaouane noted that the French-led intervention was extremely timely as his country was on the verge of succumbing to the terrorist threat. He paid tribute to those French soldiers as well as soldiers from other ECOWAS countries that have sacrificed their lives helping Mali and the entire African continent. He stressed that Mali, as well as some neighbouring countries, is facing international, rather than home-grown, terrorism.

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30. Mr Imbarcaouane told participants that Mali has a roadmap towards stability that entails re-establishment of government control over the country’s territory, the formation of the reconciliation committee and the conduct of presidential and legislative elections. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA) should not be excluded if they wish to take part in political life and accept the secular nature of Mali’s politics. However, they need to lay down arms first. Malian authorities are prepared to redouble their efforts addressing the needs of the Tuareg community, Mr Imbarcaouane, noted.

31. Yoma Golom Routouang, member of the National Assembly of Chad, drew the participants’ attention to the fact that not only Mali, but a much broader region – some 11 ECOWAS countries – are affected by armed conflicts. These conflicts undermine the region’s economic development. Chad – through its diplomacy – has sought to build peace with countries on its borders. It also provided military assistance, upon request, to neighbours stricken by violence, including most recently to Mali. Gilbert Le Bris (France) stated that the Chadian troops have been brave, well trained and have been very helpful.

IV. A REVOLUTION UNDERWAY: AN UPDATE ON THE SITUATION IN SYRIA

32. Seminar participants spent a great deal of time discussing the situation in Syria, which is quite desperate and the problems are immense. Refugee flows are posing enormous burdens on countries in the region and particularly on Jordan which now may have as many as 1 million Syrians living as refugees there. The conflict is fanning the flames of sectarian tension and it is pitting the Shia and Sunni worlds against each other.

33. Dr Mohamed Taj-Eddine El Houssaini, Vice-President of the Centre for Andalusian Studies and Civilisations Dialogue, discussed the diplomatic efforts to reach peace in Syria. He noted that the war is becoming a proxy war where non-Syrian actors are playing an ever more important part. Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iran, western countries and Russia are all part of this crisis, the speaker said. Since the UN and the Arab League are unable to find a diplomatic solution, the key nations in and around the region will have to take steps to reconcile their divergent interests in order to find a solution to the Syrian crisis. The dilemmas for western countries are many as there are signs that fundamentalist groups are increasingly dominating the opposition fighters.

34. Salam Kawakibi, Deputy Director and Director of Research, Arab Reform Initiative, himself a Syrian, gave a very emotional description of the situation on the ground and appealed for Western intervention. This is not a civil war, it is a war against Syria, waged by the brutal regime, Mr Kawakibi said. About 100,000 people have been killed, and about 3 million are displaced as a result of the conflict, the participants heard. This outrageous brutality is not a new phenomenon in Syria – the regime has been supressing any signs of the opposition activity for decades. He regretted that the al-Assad regime has been looked at favourably by the international community in the past. It has been erroneously seen as a secular one, whereas it de facto promoted Islamism and jihadism. According to another legend, the al-Assad regime is described as an Alawite regime. Alawites make up only 12% of the population and it is a minority which is a victim of this situation. They have been made hostages of the regime. Several opposition leaders are Alawites, Mr Kawakibi said.

35. Increasingly, the international community is accused of being irresponsible. Syrian diaspora is providing more aid than international community. It is often argued that only Russia and China are responsible for the international community’s inaction, since European and American leaders very early in the game told that the regime must go. But the Western powers also have their share of responsibility as they do not have a vision for Syria’s future. Islamaphobia in the Western world is also part of the problem, Mr Kawakibi said.

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36. Dr Christopher Phillips from the University of London discussed the security situation in Syria and its regional implications. He said that the Syrian state is in the process of a slow collapse. Opposition forces now control large swathes of northern and eastern Syria. They are currently slowly expanding across eastern and southern Syria, hoping to eventually reach Damascus from either direction.

37. It is clear, by now, that al-Assad himself will never give up power. The fact they have adopted a scorched earth policy and manipulated Syria’s minorities, especially the Alawites, into believing this is a war of survival, suggests they would rather rip Syria into sectarian fiefdoms than give up power. Al-Assad has been supported on this cynical and destructive path by key international allies Russia, Iran and Hezbollah, who have variously provided diplomatic support, finance, weapons and fighters. None has any particular love of al-Assad, but all fear an opposition victory might ‘flip’ Syria into a Saudi/western sphere of influence, Dr Phillips said.

38. Efforts by western countries, Turkey and the Gulf states to form a united opposition in exile, the Syrian Opposition Coalition, have largely failed, with differences emerging over ideology, personal ties and external backers. Jihadist fighters who completely reject the Opposition Coalition, are growing in numbers, swelled by foreign fighters and using the distribution of aid in war torn areas to win local support. Even if al-Assad falls, the chances are that a civil war of some sorts will continue, Dr Phillips warned.

39. In terms of the wider region, he argued that the trend towards Sunni-Shia sectarianism is a major danger. It is being played out in Syria today but could have far reaching negative consequences across the region in the future. The majority of Syrians have thus far resisted sectarian violence, but this could change and, if it does, it is hard to see how Syrian society could ever be rebuilt.

40. The speaker presented four recommendations to NATO members to consider. Firstly, Syria’s neighbours need more economic and security support not least to help with the millions of refugees. Secondly, he cautioned not to arm the rebels. Whatever the intentions, weapons are likely to fall into the wrong hands, he said. Thirdly, efforts need to be made to persuade the regional powers backing either side to back down from their zero sum approach. Finally, there is a need to return to the UN. Compromises need to be made on all sides to prevent Syria’s disintegration. Russia being allowed to maintain its influence in a transition government that involves some elements of the old regime should be considered.

V. THE IRANIAN CHALLENGE TO MIDDLE EASTERN AND GLOBAL SECURITY

41. Senator Raynell Andreychuk (Canada), the GSM Rapporteur, presented her report on Iran’s challenge to Middle Eastern and Global Security. She first noted that Iran’s nuclear programme has constituted one of the primary challenges to global peace and security. It is invariably shaping the security environment in which the Alliance operates; yet, it has proven difficult to build an international consensus on how to best manage the crisis. Although united in implementing a sanctions regime against Iran, the US and its allies have, at times, been divided on possible courses of action. The rapporteur suggested that the international community needs a better understanding of how domestic politics shape Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and how Iranian domestic actors - meaning the Iranian society, the regime and even the oppressed opposition- engage on this issue. But the concerns, interests and possible responses of other key regional actors in the Gulf, the broader Middle East, as well as those of Russia and China must be factored in Western strategy.

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42. As a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and a Comprehensive Safety Agreement, Iran is entitled to employ nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. International concerns over its nuclear military capabilities and intentions stem from Tehran’s failure to declare significant parts of its programme to the IAEA, which has put Iran in violation of the NPT and the Agreement. Iran’s leaders have persistently questioned not only the evidence gathered by IAEA experts but also the Agency’s mandate to investigate violations of nuclear obligations.

43. On the diplomatic level, the UN Security Council has adopted six resolutions to address Iran’s nuclear programme. They are legally binding and include progressively more severe sanctions on Iran and Iranian entities and persons. Iran seems to be using negotiations as a stalling method whilst progressing in its nuclear developments.

44. Senator Andreychuk suggested that the nuclear issue is part of a greater strategic challenge. Iran lies at the very centre of the world’s most important petroleum hub. Its position on the Strait of Hormuz and the Caspian Sea is of enormous strategic importance. Any disruptions of traffic in these areas would have a very adverse global impact. Israel sees the Iranian challenge in existential terms—at least for the moment. For its part NATO is not a central actor in the Iranian crisis, although four of its members are. Still the Alliance clearly has a stake in the outcome. If Iran procures a working nuclear weapon, for the first time ever, the Alliance would confront two nuclear armed countries on its immediate borders – a significant evolution of the military situation that would demand an important adjustment in NATO strategy and force posture. NATO countries, however, are divided on how to cope with the Iranian challenges. This division is one reason that Iran is essentially not on the Allied agenda, although NATO’s limited missile defense programme is under development largely with Iran in mind.

45. There are several risks involved in an Iranian nuclear acquisition. A nuclear armed Iran could prove a catalyst to regional nuclear proliferation. Nuclear accidents, theft or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons would also pose compelling potential threats. Iran might also be tempted to share nuclear technology with its allies, partners or even sell it to distant states seeking these capabilities. A nuclear Iran would be a more aggressive regional actor and might impose limits on Western deployments in the region, thereby complicating efforts to combat terrorism and piracy and to keep open the sea lanes of communication in the region.

46. The rapporteur asked if diplomatic and economic measures fail to convince the leadership to end its nuclear military programme, would there then be an attempt to devise a military solution to the crisis? Clearly any attack on Iran’s critical and often-hardened nuclear assets would be very difficult militarily and it would be enormously challenging to limit any such operation. Building a consensus for any such action, moreover, would prove very difficult.

47. The rapporteur concluded by suggesting NATO must carefully monitor the evolving situation and constantly reassess the approach it takes to cope with it. The international community will need to establish shared criteria that will help it understand when Iran is about to get to nuclear threshold. The focus ought to be on negotiating a settlement. The challenge lies in deepening international solidarity on these key points and keeping open the lines of communication to Iran’s leaders.

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48. Members raised several points in the discussion. Firstly the report ought to mention the matter of creating a nuclear free zone in the Middle East—an issue that some analysts and governments take very seriously. The paper should also discuss the Turkish offer to help Iran enrich nuclear fuel in exchange for compliance with its NPT obligations. A number of members suggested that the paper must stress how important it is to achieve a political solution to the crisis, although several members indicated that this does not necessarily imply that a military option should be ruled out. Indeed, an implicit international military option may be an essential tool for the negotiations. But obviously resorting to a military response would have potentially catastrophic implications and so it must remain a final option. This means that intensive diplomacy engaging key countries like Russia and China is also essential. One member also suggested that the report ought to touch upon the history of Iran’s nuclear ambitions to give the current situation a deeper sense of perspective. It was also noted that the need for a missile defense system ought to be raised in the paper. Another member suggested that the impact of sanctions needs to be explored more deeply. Finally several members suggested that the problem is so serious that it might be worthwhile organizing a conference to focus on the Iranian nuclear challenge in all of its dimensions.

49. Senator Andreychuk thanked the members for their suggestions, agreed that the report would have to be updated along the lines of this input, including an analysis of upcoming elections, the impact of sanctions and the human right situation in the country.

VI. POST-REVOLUTION TRANSITION IN THE MENA REGION: PROGRESS AND ROADBLOCKS

50. The participants widely applauded timely efforts of Moroccan leadership to implement democratic reforms. These reforms allowed Morocco to absorb some of the shocks and to keep Morocco ahead of the curve of the Arab upheavals. The democratic transformation of other countries of the region is more haphazard and the latest developments in Egypt are of particular concern, the participants heard.

51. Kenza El Ghali, member of the Moroccan parliament, said that, as a result of the recent constitutional reforms, the powers of the parliament have been significantly increased. Parliament is now the only source of law-making in Morocco. It has also acquired additional government oversight and budgetary powers.

52. In addition, the citizens of Morocco now have more opportunities to participate directly in the political process and submit legislative bills. Civil society (including human rights and women organisations) were widely involved in the process of drafting the new Constitution. The Constitution also guarantees full protection of cultural, ethnic and linguistic diversity. Ms El Ghani suggested that the Moroccan model and experience could be followed and replicated in other countries undergoing democratic transformation.

53. In his presentation, Dr H.A. Hellyer, from the Brookings Institution, focused on the situation in Egypt. He noted that the revolution in this country is still in progress as many of the problems inherited from the Mubarak’s regime have yet to be solved.

54. Egypt badly needs meaningful reforms, but the current government lacks broad popular mandate to implement them unopposed (ironically, the Egyptian military – the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) – enjoyed broad legitimacy necessary to implement revolutionary reforms, but it lacked willingness to do so). President Morsi has been barely elected and the reforms he is undertaking are mostly designed to shore up his power rather than to implement the Tahrir square’s demands for justice and human dignity.

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55. The formidable state security apparatus – a key pillar of Mubarak’s regime – has been dismantled, but during the transitional period of the SCAF rule it was not replaced by the rule of law. State institutions continue to erode, which can have very dire consequences and result in the breakdown of public order.

56. If current trends continue, the consolidation of the Egyptian revolution would be prolonged. The current situation is unsustainable, particularly as the economy continues to deteriorate. Unless the leadership takes urgent steps towards dialogue with the opposition and national reconciliation, the situation is likely to become explosive, Dr Hellyer warned.

57. The role of the international community assisting the democratic transformation of the region was also an important theme of the seminar. Professor Michael Clarke, Director General, RUSI, discussed if parallels can be drawn between the transition in South-Eastern Europe and that of the MENA Region. He noted that the situation is quite different – not only because there were fewer ideological barriers between the western and eastern European countries, but also because the West itself was undergoing a period of economic growth.

58. The geopolitical situation has changed considerably since the 1990s, as the assumption that the West will always be prosperous and powerful can no longer be taken for granted. New centres of power are emerging on the global scale. In addition, new processes such as sectarianism are being unleashed across the region. Therefore, Professor Clarke argued that the transformation of the MENA region is likely to be slower and less straightforward, but it can still be a success.

59. Mr Kawakibi agreed that one cannot depict processes taking place in the region in terms of either black or white. While the situation in Egypt is a cause of concern, one should not underestimate the remarkable transformation of Libya, where political processes – including the elections won by the liberals, the active civil society and the formation of political party system – proved many sceptics wrong, Mr Kawakibi noted. Tunisia is also, in many respects, a success story.

60. He agreed that the situation in Central and Eastern Europe was very different and suggested analysing the experience of democratic transformation in Spain, Portugal and the Latin America instead. Mr Kawakibi also warned the Western governments willing to support civil society organisations to ensure that this support does not go to artificial NGOs or government-controlled organisations.

61. Greg Power, Director of Global Partners and Associates, discussed the parliamentary dimension of democratic transformation in the MENA region. He said that the development of the parliamentary democracy faces a number of challenges, particularly the existing gap between theoretical powers that parliaments have and the ability of MPs to use this to the fullest. The political party system is still weak: problems exist at both ends of the scale – from too many parties to dominance of one party. Many new parties face issues of discipline and lack of trust. The Islamist parties have longer traditions and can rely on extensive social networks, but they are used to being in opposition and are not always comfortable taking responsibility. Government officials also often do not feel they are responsible to parliaments. Parliamentarians do not always realise the distinction between the executive and legislative branches. The understanding of the parliamentary culture that people in western countries take for granted is still missing in the MENA region. But it took decades to develop this culture in western countries, and it cannot emerge overnight in the MENA region. The speaker was positive that it will eventually develop in MENA as well.

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62. Linda Duffield from the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD) explained the role of her organisation in supporting the reform process in the Arab World. She stressed that Western partners should respect national sovereignty and be careful not to meddle in domestic politics. The local institutions must lead the reform efforts, while our societies should provide assistance. WFD works with many parliaments in the region helping to develop systems for oversight, budgetary scrutiny, auditing and parliamentary research, training new MPs and in particular supporting women MPs. WFD brings expertise not only from the UK but also from other countries of the region. WFD seeks contact with all major political players, including those emphasising the Islamic values, as well as with youth and other civil society organisations.

63. Stephen McInerney, Executive Director of the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), spoke about the US support for an evolving MENA region. The total amount of US aid to the region has increased 20% since the Arab uprisings. However, this support is now limited by pressures on US economy and the federal budget. As a result, the US has imposed 10% cuts in foreign assistance worldwide. According to the speaker, the US aid support to the region is currently USD 8 billion. About 80% of it is in the form of military aid and 14% of assistance is economic. The remaining 5% goes to support democracy and governance. About half of that governance goes to support parliaments and the rule of law. One third is given to civil society. The rest goes to promote pluralism and election monitoring.

64. In terms of recipients, Libya now receives a large amount of aid, while under the previous regime it received nothing. Egypt has for decades been one of the largest recipients of the US assistance. The military assistance to this country has remained unchanged, but the economic assistance to Egypt has been held up by Congress due to the concerns about the developments in this country.

65. The US is criticised for failing to incentivize progress on human rights. US diplomatic engagement is often seen as focused on security and stability in a narrow short term way at the expense of democracy building. The US does want to help ensure the stability of the region but they ignore the political dimension of this transition. The US must realize that the economic and security problems in the region have political roots, Mr McInerney pointed out.

66. In terms of the military side, the US has been generally reluctant to use military force due to the past traumas. Libya was an exception. However, there has been little or no reluctance to provide weapons and equipment to governments of the region, including authoritarian regimes, the speaker said. In the wake of the Arab uprisings, the US arms sales to the Arab world more than tripled, the participants heard. Some see this trend as a way to bolster defense against Iran, while others see it as a way to bolster these countries from domestic change. Concluding his presentation, Mr McInerney said that the US has been trying hard to earn credibility in the region, but this challenge has yet to be met.

67. In his presentation, Diego Mellado Pascua, Acting Head of Division for Democracy Support and Election Observation, European External Action Service, focused on the EU support for democracy building in the MENA region. He noted that the region is a top and long-term priority for the EU. The Union has adapted its policy taking into the account processes taking place in the region. Support for democracy and democratic transition is at the heart of this policy. This democracy-focused approach is designed to support policies that were underway and to refrain from meddling. Democratic traditions must be home-grown, Mr Mellado stressed. The EU’s ‘more for more’ approach is designed to extend support to those countries that are ready to be more advanced.

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68. The EU policy towards the region is also based on 3 Ms: Money, Mobility and Market. The EU offers financial support designed to help the reform process, especially judicial reforms, fight against corruption and economic reforms. The EU will also commit itself to facilitate mobility of people of the region by making it easier to travel to the EU. Market access is also an important pillar of the EU-MENA partnership. The EU wants to facilitate this access, and is, for instance, looking at the possibility of signing a deep and comprehensive free trade area agreement with Morocco.

69. In its effort to support the reform process, the EU seeks to deal not only with the governments of the MENA region, but is also looking at working with and funding civil society. This is a key element of the EU’s new democracy-centric approach towards the region, Mr Mellado noted.

70. Giji Gya, representing the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF), discussed her organization’s contribution to democratic oversight of the security sector in the MENA region. DCAF, uniting 61 member states, aims to help these countries to improve security sector governance and make it more transparent and accountable. They work with a broad range of institutions, including police, the armed forces, intelligence services, justice sector, penal institutions, border authorities, parliamentary oversight bodies and ombudsman institutions as well as with the private sector, civil society and media.

71. Parliament’s role in the democratic oversight of the defence and security sector is critical. National constitutions ought to include respective provisions. DCAF assists in parliaments’ capacity building in this area, including by providing research products and databases to new parliaments and governments. DCAF’s products are available in 30 languages. DCAF co-ordinates its efforts with other international organisations, including the NATO PA, OSCE and UNDP. DCAF has projects in most of the MENA and GCC countries. It tries to encourage local ownership of the co-operation projects. It also pays considerable attention to gender issues.

72. The seminar also addressed the economic aspects of the region’s transformation. Dr Simon Neaime, Chairman, Department of Economics, American University of Beirut, said that the average economic growth rate in the MENA region is expected to be 2.2% in 2013 (down from 6.4% in 2008) – below the world’s average but higher than in most developed economies. Problems in the developed world have a negative spill over effect on the MENA region. The level of Foreign Direct Investments remains low. Given the low level of intra-regional trade, the inflexible monetary policies and the possibility of political and/or military turmoil, the region’s economic outlook is not very positive. Consequences of political/military turmoil on growth, employment, poverty, human development indices (health and education) have not yet fully unfolded. The existing macroeconomic imbalances are a source of concern, and if appropriate measures are not taken, this might lead to a debt crisis in some countries. Further social unrest cannot be ruled out, Mr Neaime warned.

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