introduction to csrmesh
DESCRIPTION
Introduction to CSRmeshTRANSCRIPT
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August 2014
Introduction to CSRmesh
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2 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014
CSRmesh overview
CSRmesh creates a mesh network from existing CSR Bluetooth Smart & Smart Ready devices
CSRmesh enables you to increase the scale of what you can control via your mobile device
This presentation is an overview of the CSRmesh capabilities that are enabling innovative products for The Internet of Things
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3 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014
CSRmesh network
CSR1010
BLE CSR1010
BLE CSR1010
BLE
Lighting Heating
CSR1010
BLE
module
CSR1010
BLE CSR1010
BLE
Switches
CSR1010
BLE
Thermostats
Sensors
OR OR
Android iPhone PC
Allows you to control anything from
anywhere in the world
Access
CSR1010
BLE
module
CSR1010
BLE
CSR1010
BLE
CSR1010
BLE
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4 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014
Extends range of Bluetooth Smart by repeating messages No setup required, no hub or access point required for local network
Minimal propagation delay tens of milliseconds for node to node
Messages can be sent to an individual node or to a group Flood mesh no routing tables
No single point of failure
Simple provisioning Smartphone application and QR codes
The network is secure Messages are encrypted to prevent eavesdropping
Optional authentication to prevent man-in-middle attacks
CSRmesh features
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5 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014
The network is robust Messages are sent on 3 separate channels
Channels co-exist very well with WiFi
Uses proven CSR silicon CSR101x, CSR8811, CSR8670 etc.
Communicates directly with the phone Unlike ZigBee, Z-wave or any other proprietary protocol
Simple bridging to Bluetooth Smart Ready devices no additional components
Low power consumption 20x times less than WiFi
CSRmesh features
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6 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014
CSRmesh
CSR1010 BLE
S1
CSR1010 BLE
L4
CSR1010 BLE
L3
CSR1010 BLE
L2
CSR1010 BLE
L1
CSR1010 BLE
L5
CSR1010 BLE
L8
CSR1010 BLE
L7
CSR1010 BLE
L6
Tx range S1
Tx range L1-L3
Tx range L4-L5
Tx range L6-L8
Broadcast
Re-Broadcast hop1
Re-Broadcast hop2
Re-Broadcast hop3
Smart phone
Config. &
Control
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7 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014
Devices are organised into secure networks Up to 65535 devices per network
Networks are secured using a network key
Can be pre-generated or derived from a pass phrase 39MargettStreet => 0x56e62270cacd25283c01f2eee3d7e92b
All devices within network are trusted devices
can send messages to any other group of devices
CSRmesh networks
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8 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014
Devices can be in "multiple networks"
e.g. Hotel Room Lock (guest, maintenance, room service)
e.g. Hotel Room Lighting (guest, maintenance)
Knowledge of one network key does not enable access to other network keys or their functionality
CSRmesh networks
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9 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2013
All messages within the same network are encrypted with the network key
Used to identify messages within the network
Prevents messages to be relayed to different networks
Message-based authentication rather than device-based authentication
Network key
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10 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2013
Device is a single node in the network
All communication in the network is performed between devices
Devices are associated with the network during association process
At any point in time, device can exhibit one of the roles:
Source
Relay
Destination
Device
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11 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2013
Device is uniquely identified with 128-bit Device UUID
Public Bluetooth addresses have to be purchased from IEEE
Random addresses are not centrally managed and have only 46 bits of uniqueness
Device may still have a Bluetooth address in order to allow direct connections
Device identification
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12 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2013
128-bit identifier is a significant impact on the packet size
Only limited set of commands are allowed using full 128-bit Device UUID
After association in the network, protocol layer alias full 128-bit UUID with short 16-bit Device ID
Device identification
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13 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014
Messages from single devices Each device within the network is configured with a unique 16-bit
DeviceID
Devices can be organised into groups
Messages are sent to destinations Either a DeviceID or a GroupID
Broadcast to all devices in the network (id 0x0000)
GroupIDs can therefore be considered to give semantics
Living Room Set Light to 100%
Messages and groups
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14 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014
Reliable and best effort transactions
Best effort transactions
Reliable transactions
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15 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014
While rotating dimmer switch
only send LIGHT_SET_LEVEL_NO_ACK message
When dimmer switch stops moving
send LIGHT_SET_LEVEL message
Example dimmer switch
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16 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014
RGB lights can be changed over time
send LIGHT_SET_RGB with color and duration
LIGHT_STATE is sent to acknowledge this command
then LIGHT_STATE is sent once at commanded color
Example RGB light
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17 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014
Devices are identified using a 128-bit UUID no MAC Address from IEEE is required
self-management of allocated UUIDs
5,316,911,983,139,663,491,615,228,241,121,378,304 devices
For simple provisioning, in addition to broadcasts, devices can publish QR code with their 128-bit UUID
Devices can also publish a 64-bit Authorisation Code for extra security
either as part of the QR-Code
or as a Short Text code
NDhd-pbbD-Hb9D-9frR-b68T
CSRmesh provisioning
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18 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014
Secure device association to the network and distribution of the network key
Public key exchange to prevent eavesdroppers
Authorisation codes are used to prevent man-in-the-middle attack
Message encryption and authentication Prevents against eavesdropping, replay and man-in-the-middle
attacks
All messages also have Message Authentication Code
Network security
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19 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014
To protect against replay attack, each message is sent with a sequence number
Handled by higher layers
Messages with old sequence numbers are discarded
To protect against eavesdropper attack, a public key security algorithm is used
This enables a public key to be exchanged, preventing a third party from being able to listen in to the exchange of the Network Key
To provide security against a man-in-the-middle attack, an Authorisation Code is used
This code is never transmitted over the mesh network, and can be encoded in a QR code or Short Text string
Security
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Consumer grade Protection from replay attacks
Uses public key exchange to protects from eavesdropper attack
Network key can be generated from the passphrase
Secure but doesnt protect from man-in-the-middle attack
No Authorisation Codes (QR code can still be used for device UUID)
MITM attack requires expensive equipment
Security levels
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21 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014
Industrial grade Protection from replay attacks
Uses public key exchange to protects from eavesdropper attack
Network key can be pre-generated and stored on another medium or generated from the passphrase
Uses Authorisation Codes (QR code or Short Text) to prevent from man-in-the-middle attacks
May require installation
Security levels
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Step 1a Installation
Device has a Barcode Scan barcode using App
App securely distributes
a network key to device
App knows about switch
Switch is now part of Network
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Step 1b Installation
Device has a Barcode Scan barcode using App
App securely distributes
a network key to device
App knows about light. Switch and light are now part of Network
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Step 2: Configuration
User connects switch with light in App
App programs Light to be in Group 1
App programs Switch to be in Group 1
Any number of lights or switches can be in a single group
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25 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014
Step 3: Use
User presses switch to turn light on
Group1: PowerOn
User presses switch to turns light off
Group1: PowerOff
Messages are secure and quickly & reliably delivered, even in a very large building
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26 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014
Mesh architecture
System consists of three main elements
Network of devices that use broadcast mechanism for communication
Set of message formats that allow devices to send and receive messages
Set of protocols that define behaviour of the devices P
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Mesh architecture
System is organised into three hierarchical layers
Bearers
Transport layer
Protocol layer
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Mesh architecture: bearers layer
This layer defines how transport layer messages can be transmitted to one or many devices
Bearers should be able to transmit and receive messages
Bluetooth Smart
non-connectable advertisements
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29 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014
Mesh architecture: transport layer
Transport layer provides a service to transmit messages across devices in the network
Has no information regarding devices around
No routing
Devices in the network can receive and transmit messages
Some devices in the network can also retransmit messages within the network
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30 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014
Mesh architecture: transport layer
Devices that can retransmit messages are called relay capable devices
Endless retransmission protection
time-to-live counter
only new messages are retransmitted (relay capable device does not retransmit messages that it has seen before)
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31 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014
Mesh architecture: protocol layer
Defines multiple protocols that implement device specifics
Mesh Association Protocol
Used to associate devices to the specific network
Mesh Control Protocol
Enables control and monitoring of devices within a specific network
Grouped by models
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Config Server model Device discovery within the model, ID assignments, models
implemented etc.
Group model Controls grouping of the devices by physical location or semantic
meaning (Kitchen, Living Room, Security control etc.)
Power model Power state of the device on, off, standby
Switch model Controls individual switches and changes state of the other
devices or groups
Light model Controls brightness and colour of the light
Models
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Firmware model Requests and controls the firmware update procedure
Ping model Pings specific device or group of devices in the network and
allows estimation of the network physical topology
Relay model Remotely controls relay capabilities of the device (and bridging to
the other technologies)
Data model Allows streaming of the data in custom format
Battery model, Sensor model, Event model, Volume model, Wall Clock model etc.
Models
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CSRmesh development resources
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35 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014
CSRsupport www.csrsupport.com/CSRmesh
Open to everyone with CSR Energy access or with a purchase of CSRmesh development kit
CSRmesh library
Application examples on-chip and Android
iOS and PC versions are under development
Documentation
Specification will be open publicly Additional help through forum and wiki
wiki.csr.com/wiki/CSRmesh
forum.csr.com
Resources
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36 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014
CSRmesh development board
Part number: DB-CSR1010-10185-1A
New demo vehicle for CSR Mesh applications
RGB LED
2 push buttons (dimmer or volume control)
Slide on-off switch
External IC temperature sensor
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37 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014
CSRmesh development kit
Part number: DK-CSR1010-10184-1A
Comprises
3 CSRmesh development boards
Programmer and cables
Quick start guide
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CSRmesh 1.0 Targeted for consumer lighting
Light capabilities: on/off, dim, RGB, grouping, configuration, network management, over-the-air update control
CSRmesh 2.0 Adds home automation support
HVAC, home appliance, commercial lighting
Additional capabilities: sensor data, synchronised events, proximity, beacon messages, remote control and other
CSRmesh milestones
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39 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2013 39 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014
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