introduction to csrmesh

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August 2014 Introduction to CSRmeshPrepared for Hieu Bui Van - cse.hcmut.edu.vn - Thursday, September 25, 2014

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Introduction to CSRmesh

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  • August 2014

    Introduction to CSRmesh

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  • 2 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    CSRmesh overview

    CSRmesh creates a mesh network from existing CSR Bluetooth Smart & Smart Ready devices

    CSRmesh enables you to increase the scale of what you can control via your mobile device

    This presentation is an overview of the CSRmesh capabilities that are enabling innovative products for The Internet of Things

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  • 3 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    CSRmesh network

    CSR1010

    BLE CSR1010

    BLE CSR1010

    BLE

    Lighting Heating

    CSR1010

    BLE

    module

    CSR1010

    BLE CSR1010

    BLE

    Switches

    CSR1010

    BLE

    Thermostats

    Sensors

    OR OR

    Android iPhone PC

    Allows you to control anything from

    anywhere in the world

    Access

    CSR1010

    BLE

    module

    CSR1010

    BLE

    CSR1010

    BLE

    CSR1010

    BLE

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  • 4 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    Extends range of Bluetooth Smart by repeating messages No setup required, no hub or access point required for local network

    Minimal propagation delay tens of milliseconds for node to node

    Messages can be sent to an individual node or to a group Flood mesh no routing tables

    No single point of failure

    Simple provisioning Smartphone application and QR codes

    The network is secure Messages are encrypted to prevent eavesdropping

    Optional authentication to prevent man-in-middle attacks

    CSRmesh features

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  • 5 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    The network is robust Messages are sent on 3 separate channels

    Channels co-exist very well with WiFi

    Uses proven CSR silicon CSR101x, CSR8811, CSR8670 etc.

    Communicates directly with the phone Unlike ZigBee, Z-wave or any other proprietary protocol

    Simple bridging to Bluetooth Smart Ready devices no additional components

    Low power consumption 20x times less than WiFi

    CSRmesh features

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  • 6 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    CSRmesh

    CSR1010 BLE

    S1

    CSR1010 BLE

    L4

    CSR1010 BLE

    L3

    CSR1010 BLE

    L2

    CSR1010 BLE

    L1

    CSR1010 BLE

    L5

    CSR1010 BLE

    L8

    CSR1010 BLE

    L7

    CSR1010 BLE

    L6

    Tx range S1

    Tx range L1-L3

    Tx range L4-L5

    Tx range L6-L8

    Broadcast

    Re-Broadcast hop1

    Re-Broadcast hop2

    Re-Broadcast hop3

    Smart phone

    Config. &

    Control

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  • 7 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    Devices are organised into secure networks Up to 65535 devices per network

    Networks are secured using a network key

    Can be pre-generated or derived from a pass phrase 39MargettStreet => 0x56e62270cacd25283c01f2eee3d7e92b

    All devices within network are trusted devices

    can send messages to any other group of devices

    CSRmesh networks

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  • 8 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    Devices can be in "multiple networks"

    e.g. Hotel Room Lock (guest, maintenance, room service)

    e.g. Hotel Room Lighting (guest, maintenance)

    Knowledge of one network key does not enable access to other network keys or their functionality

    CSRmesh networks

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  • 9 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2013

    All messages within the same network are encrypted with the network key

    Used to identify messages within the network

    Prevents messages to be relayed to different networks

    Message-based authentication rather than device-based authentication

    Network key

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  • 10 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2013

    Device is a single node in the network

    All communication in the network is performed between devices

    Devices are associated with the network during association process

    At any point in time, device can exhibit one of the roles:

    Source

    Relay

    Destination

    Device

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  • 11 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2013

    Device is uniquely identified with 128-bit Device UUID

    Public Bluetooth addresses have to be purchased from IEEE

    Random addresses are not centrally managed and have only 46 bits of uniqueness

    Device may still have a Bluetooth address in order to allow direct connections

    Device identification

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  • 12 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2013

    128-bit identifier is a significant impact on the packet size

    Only limited set of commands are allowed using full 128-bit Device UUID

    After association in the network, protocol layer alias full 128-bit UUID with short 16-bit Device ID

    Device identification

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  • 13 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    Messages from single devices Each device within the network is configured with a unique 16-bit

    DeviceID

    Devices can be organised into groups

    Messages are sent to destinations Either a DeviceID or a GroupID

    Broadcast to all devices in the network (id 0x0000)

    GroupIDs can therefore be considered to give semantics

    Living Room Set Light to 100%

    Messages and groups

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  • 14 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    Reliable and best effort transactions

    Best effort transactions

    Reliable transactions

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  • 15 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    While rotating dimmer switch

    only send LIGHT_SET_LEVEL_NO_ACK message

    When dimmer switch stops moving

    send LIGHT_SET_LEVEL message

    Example dimmer switch

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  • 16 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    RGB lights can be changed over time

    send LIGHT_SET_RGB with color and duration

    LIGHT_STATE is sent to acknowledge this command

    then LIGHT_STATE is sent once at commanded color

    Example RGB light

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  • 17 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    Devices are identified using a 128-bit UUID no MAC Address from IEEE is required

    self-management of allocated UUIDs

    5,316,911,983,139,663,491,615,228,241,121,378,304 devices

    For simple provisioning, in addition to broadcasts, devices can publish QR code with their 128-bit UUID

    Devices can also publish a 64-bit Authorisation Code for extra security

    either as part of the QR-Code

    or as a Short Text code

    NDhd-pbbD-Hb9D-9frR-b68T

    CSRmesh provisioning

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  • 18 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    Secure device association to the network and distribution of the network key

    Public key exchange to prevent eavesdroppers

    Authorisation codes are used to prevent man-in-the-middle attack

    Message encryption and authentication Prevents against eavesdropping, replay and man-in-the-middle

    attacks

    All messages also have Message Authentication Code

    Network security

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  • 19 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    To protect against replay attack, each message is sent with a sequence number

    Handled by higher layers

    Messages with old sequence numbers are discarded

    To protect against eavesdropper attack, a public key security algorithm is used

    This enables a public key to be exchanged, preventing a third party from being able to listen in to the exchange of the Network Key

    To provide security against a man-in-the-middle attack, an Authorisation Code is used

    This code is never transmitted over the mesh network, and can be encoded in a QR code or Short Text string

    Security

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  • 20 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    Consumer grade Protection from replay attacks

    Uses public key exchange to protects from eavesdropper attack

    Network key can be generated from the passphrase

    Secure but doesnt protect from man-in-the-middle attack

    No Authorisation Codes (QR code can still be used for device UUID)

    MITM attack requires expensive equipment

    Security levels

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  • 21 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    Industrial grade Protection from replay attacks

    Uses public key exchange to protects from eavesdropper attack

    Network key can be pre-generated and stored on another medium or generated from the passphrase

    Uses Authorisation Codes (QR code or Short Text) to prevent from man-in-the-middle attacks

    May require installation

    Security levels

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  • 22 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    Step 1a Installation

    Device has a Barcode Scan barcode using App

    App securely distributes

    a network key to device

    App knows about switch

    Switch is now part of Network

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  • 23 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    Step 1b Installation

    Device has a Barcode Scan barcode using App

    App securely distributes

    a network key to device

    App knows about light. Switch and light are now part of Network

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  • 24 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    Step 2: Configuration

    User connects switch with light in App

    App programs Light to be in Group 1

    App programs Switch to be in Group 1

    Any number of lights or switches can be in a single group

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  • 25 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    Step 3: Use

    User presses switch to turn light on

    Group1: PowerOn

    User presses switch to turns light off

    Group1: PowerOff

    Messages are secure and quickly & reliably delivered, even in a very large building

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  • 26 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    Mesh architecture

    System consists of three main elements

    Network of devices that use broadcast mechanism for communication

    Set of message formats that allow devices to send and receive messages

    Set of protocols that define behaviour of the devices P

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  • 27 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    Mesh architecture

    System is organised into three hierarchical layers

    Bearers

    Transport layer

    Protocol layer

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  • 28 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    Mesh architecture: bearers layer

    This layer defines how transport layer messages can be transmitted to one or many devices

    Bearers should be able to transmit and receive messages

    Bluetooth Smart

    non-connectable advertisements

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  • 29 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    Mesh architecture: transport layer

    Transport layer provides a service to transmit messages across devices in the network

    Has no information regarding devices around

    No routing

    Devices in the network can receive and transmit messages

    Some devices in the network can also retransmit messages within the network

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  • 30 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    Mesh architecture: transport layer

    Devices that can retransmit messages are called relay capable devices

    Endless retransmission protection

    time-to-live counter

    only new messages are retransmitted (relay capable device does not retransmit messages that it has seen before)

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  • 31 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    Mesh architecture: protocol layer

    Defines multiple protocols that implement device specifics

    Mesh Association Protocol

    Used to associate devices to the specific network

    Mesh Control Protocol

    Enables control and monitoring of devices within a specific network

    Grouped by models

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  • 32 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    Config Server model Device discovery within the model, ID assignments, models

    implemented etc.

    Group model Controls grouping of the devices by physical location or semantic

    meaning (Kitchen, Living Room, Security control etc.)

    Power model Power state of the device on, off, standby

    Switch model Controls individual switches and changes state of the other

    devices or groups

    Light model Controls brightness and colour of the light

    Models

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  • 33 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    Firmware model Requests and controls the firmware update procedure

    Ping model Pings specific device or group of devices in the network and

    allows estimation of the network physical topology

    Relay model Remotely controls relay capabilities of the device (and bridging to

    the other technologies)

    Data model Allows streaming of the data in custom format

    Battery model, Sensor model, Event model, Volume model, Wall Clock model etc.

    Models

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  • CSRmesh development resources

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  • 35 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    CSRsupport www.csrsupport.com/CSRmesh

    Open to everyone with CSR Energy access or with a purchase of CSRmesh development kit

    CSRmesh library

    Application examples on-chip and Android

    iOS and PC versions are under development

    Documentation

    Specification will be open publicly Additional help through forum and wiki

    wiki.csr.com/wiki/CSRmesh

    forum.csr.com

    Resources

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  • 36 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    CSRmesh development board

    Part number: DB-CSR1010-10185-1A

    New demo vehicle for CSR Mesh applications

    RGB LED

    2 push buttons (dimmer or volume control)

    Slide on-off switch

    External IC temperature sensor

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  • 37 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    CSRmesh development kit

    Part number: DK-CSR1010-10184-1A

    Comprises

    3 CSRmesh development boards

    Programmer and cables

    Quick start guide

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  • 38 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

    CSRmesh 1.0 Targeted for consumer lighting

    Light capabilities: on/off, dim, RGB, grouping, configuration, network management, over-the-air update control

    CSRmesh 2.0 Adds home automation support

    HVAC, home appliance, commercial lighting

    Additional capabilities: sensor data, synchronised events, proximity, beacon messages, remote control and other

    CSRmesh milestones

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  • 39 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2013 39 Confidential Cambridge Silicon Radio Limited 2014

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