inventing ourselves

7/25/2019 Inventing ourselves

1/4

Inventing our selves

- . . the latter. But Foucault conceives of power

ivity within (ces

_from

the

macro

to

the

micro _

throuashthat

.

-'hicb

t

152

verses

a: ; : a ~ : e r e d , held in check, administered,

steered, g ~ i d : ~

P e r s o ~

are r ~ l ~ ~ h e y are led by

o t h ~ r s or have come

to

direct or

reguJat by

means

o f ~ h i c Foucault, 1979a;

Miller and

Rose, 1988,

1990 . To anal ~ t h e 1 r o 1 i

actions (

the self

and power,

then, is

not a matter of

lay the

reJa.

t

ons between . mentin

.

h h our autonomy is

suppressed by

the

state,

but

0

r

1

. 8 the

ways m

w

ic .

nvestigar

. which subiectivity has become an essential

obiect

t iog

the

ways m

J

d d

J

arget a

f

Ce

rtain

strategies,

tactics,

an

proce

ures

of

regulation

nd

resource

or

d

d

h

h

.

der

the

terms

that are

a c c o ~ e

so ig

a

political value .

To cons1 b l h . . m

our

ton

omv fulfillment, respons1 J ity, c 01ce - from thispers .

present - au

Pect1ve

. .

1

to question whether

they mark

a

kmd of culmination oferb

is certam Y . . ica

l

t

. But

this

does

not unply that

we

should

subject

these

terms t

evo u

10n.

. . . . o a

. . 'or example bv cla1mmg that the rhetonc of reedom 1s an ideoJ .

cnt1que, , 08J

l ask for the workmgs

of

a pol1t1cal system that secretly demes it.

Wi

~ : o : : d

rather, examine the ways

in which

t b e ~ e

ideals

of

the

self

are

boun:

up

with

a profoundly

a m b i ~ u o u s

set

of relat10ns

between human subjects

and

political

power.

Following Foucault, I have

suggested

that we use the

term government as a portmanteau notion to encompass the multiple strat-

egies, tactics, calculations,

and

reflections that have sought to

conduct

the

conduct of human beings (Foucault, 1986a; Gordon,

1986,

1987;

see this

volume, especially Chapters

1 and 2 .

We

can explore these relations along three interlinked dimensions.

The

first

dimension,

roughly political , Foucault

termed

governmentality ,

or

'men-

talities of

government : the

complex of notions, calculations,

strategies,

and

tactics through which diverse authorities - political, military, economic,

theological, medical, and so forth - have sought to act upon the lives

and

conducts

of

each and

all

in

order to

avert

evils and achieve such desirable

states as health, happiness,

wealth, and tranquillity (Foucault, 1979b).

From

at least the eighteenth century, the

capacities of humans,

as subjects, as

citi

zens,

as individuals, as selves, have emerged

as a central target and

resource

for

authorities.

Attempts

to

invent

and

exercise

different

types

of

political

rule have b 1

een

mt1mate Y lmked

to conceptions of

the nature

of

those who

are to be

ruled The auto b. . .

th

.

h .

nomous su ~ e c t I V t y

of the

modern

self

may

seem

e antJt es1s

ofpolif

J

ratio f h .

ica

power. But Foucault s argument suggests an explo

n o

t

e

ways

m

whi h th. . . . . l

feature

of

c

is

autonom1zat1on

o the self is itself

a centra

Th c o n t ~ m p o r a r y

governmentality.

e second dunension

s

d

tional . However .t . uggeste by Foucault s writings is roughly institu-

l

I entads constru1 . . . . .

ea

way,

that

is

t ,

ng mst1tut1ons

m a particular

technolog1-

th

0

say,

as

human

tech

1

rough

the

asylum to

th no

og1es .

Inst1tut1ons

from the

pnson,

as practices

that put

le

workplace, the

school and the home

can e seen

the

hum b m P ay certain a . .

th d . an eings that inhab

t h

ssumpt10ns

and

ob1ect1ves concerrung

e esign

of

institutional

1

t em (Foucault, 1977). These

are

embodied in

space, the arrangements

of institutional time

and


2/4

overning nt rprising individuals

153

d

es of

reward

and

punishment,

and the

operation of systems

vitY

proced

. u ~ g m e n t s .

They

can

be

thought

of

as

'technological'

in that

acu an

JU . f h . . .

of

r t n ~ the

c a \ c u \ a t ~ d

orchestration o .t

e

act1v1t1es of humans under a

neY

see

. na\ity directed toward certain goals. They attempt to simulta

t .

a\

ratio

. . . f . d' d

pracuc

maximize

certain capac1t1es o

1n

i v ~

uals

and constrain others in

neous\y with particular knowledges (medical, psychological, pedagogic)

rdance d ( .b' l' d' . . . .

acc

0

toward

particular en s respons1 11ty, 1sc1phne, diligence, etc.).

In

what

and d

with

what consequences are

our

contemporary notions of subjec

~ a y s

a ~ o n o m y

and enterprise

embodied within

the

regulatory practices

of

a

uve au , ( . f )

. .

tive\y

'modern iorm o lle.

dtsunc . .

r

. . . f

The third ~ \ ~ e n s 1 o n ior 1 n v e s t 1 g a t ~ o n . o the o e ~ self corresponds to a

h\y 'ethical fie\d, 1nsof

ar as

ethics is understood

in

a 'practical' way as

roug

. d . '

odes

of eva\uat1ng

an

acting upon oneself that have

obtained

in different

~ i s t o r i c a periods (Foucault, l 986a,

1 9 8 8 ~

see my discussion in Chapter l

of

this

vo\ume).

Foucault examined these in terms

of

what

he

called 'technolog

ies of

the

self', techniques which permit individuals

to

effect by their own

means

or with the he\p

of

others

a

certain number

of

operations

on

their own

bodies

and souls, thoughts, conduct

and

way

of

being, so as to transform

themselves in order to

attain

a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom,

perfection, or immortality (Foucault, 1988,

p.

18). Ethics are thus under

stood

as means by which individuals come to construe, decipher, act upon

themselves in relation to the true

and

the false, the permitted and the forbid

den, the desirable and the undesirable. Along this dimension, then,

we

would

consider the ways in which the contemporary culture of autonomous subjec

tivity

has been embodied

in

our

techniques for understanding and improving

our

selves in relation to that which is true, permitted, and desirable.

'Enterprise culture'

can be

understood in terms of the particular connec

tions that

it

establishes between these three dimensions. For enterprise links

up a seductive ethics of the self, a powerful critique of contemporary institu

tional and political reality,

and an apparently coherent design for the radical

transformation of contemporary social arrangements. In the ~ t i n g s of ne.o

\iberals' like Hayek and Friedman, the well-being of both poht1cal and social

existence is to be ensured not by centralized planning and u r e a u c r a c ~ but

through the 'enterprising' activities and choices of a u o ~ o ~ o u s ent1t1es

businesses, organizations, persons - each striving to max1m1ze ~ t s ~ : ' n advan-

. t by means of tnd1v1dual and

tage by inventing and promoting new pro3ec s

local calculations of strategies and tactics, costs and benefits H a y ~ k , l9_76

;

nose

1993) Neohberalism

Fnedman

\982

for an extended d1scuss1on, see N '

' ' f r l h1losophy It

const1-

is thus more than a phenomenon at the level o po itica P . . ld

f how authonties shou use

tutes a mentality of government, a

co1:1ception

. h ds they should

their powers in order to improve national well-being, t e en d .

. h th y should use, an '

cruc1a

y,

seek, the evi\s they should avoid, t e means e

e nature of the persons upon whom they m ~ s t ~ c : . . n g a political rationality

Enterprise is such a potent language for art1cu a

1


3/4

54

Inventing our selves

because

it

can

connect

up

these general political defbe .

. i th . 1 J ration .

mulation of speci c programs at simu taneousJy b s WJth tb

d

.ffi .

pro

leni

. e o

tional practices

in

many

i

erent

socia

ocales,

and

p .

at1ze

o r o ~

.

r

. h Th

rovide

r . O' lllQ

g

uidelines

for transforming

t

em.

e vocabulary

of

ent . attonales

b ' 1 d

erpnse

th alld

a political rationality to e

trans

ate into attempts to us

enab'--

.

1

h govern

JtS

S

ocial economic,

and

persona

existence

t

at

have come to asPects

f

'

1

d .

k

appear o

atl

c Enterprise here not on y esignates a ind of oraanizat Problem.

0

Jona/ fo

individual units

competing

with one another on the market b

t

nn,Wirb

d

f

' u

tnore

ally

provides an

image

of a rno e o

activity to be

encouraaed . g ~ e r .

1 h

. . h

c

m

amuJtu

of arenas of

life -

the schoo t

e university,

t

e hospital,

the GP de

. .

h

s

surge

the factory and business o r g a n 1 z a t 1 0 ~ t e. am1 y, and the apparatus of

welfare. Organizations

are

problernat1zed in terms of their lack of ent

~ J a J

k d h

erpnse

which epitomizes their wea nesses

an

t eir ia1 ings. CorrelativeJv th

. d 1 . h J ey are

to be reconstructed by promoting an ut1

iz1ng

t e enterprising

capaciti

each

and all,

encouragin.g them to conduct

the 11selves with b o l d n e s s ~ :

vigor, to calculate for their

own advantage

to dnve themselves hard

and

t

accept risks

in

the pursuit

of

goals. Enterprise can thus be given a

t e c h n o l o g ~

ical

form by experts

of

organizational life,

engineering human

relations

through architecture, timetabling, supervisory systems, payment schemes

curricula,

and

the like to achieve economy, efficiency,

excellence,

and compet-

itiveness. Contemporary regulatory practices - from those

which

have sought

to revitalize the civil and public services by remodelling them as private or

pseudoprivate agencies with budgets and targets to those which have

tried

to

reduce long-term unemployment by turning the unemployed individual

into

an active job seeker - have been transformed

to

embody

the

presupposition

that

humans

are, could

be or

should be enterprising individuals, striving

for

fulfillment, excellence, and achievement.

Hence

the

vocabulary

of

enterprise links political rhetoric and regulatory

p r ~ g r a 1 1 s to

the

self-steering capacities

of subjects

themselves. Along this

third

dimension

of political

rule,

enterprise forges a link between the ways

w ~ are governed by others and the ways we should govern ourselves. Enter-

f e ~ ~ ~ b ; : e

d e s i ~ n ~ ~ e s an array.

f

rules

for t ~ e

conduct

of

one s

v e r y d a ~ ~ ~ i s

.

e r ~ . JnJt1at1ve

ambition, calculat1on, and personal respons1bi11ty.

The enterpns1ng self wi mak . f . . . . .

. e

an

enterpnse o its life seek to max1m1ze

1ts

own

human

capital

t

be '

pro1ect itself a

future

and

seek

to shape itself in order

0

come that which it h

active self and a

1

1

~ i s es to be.

The enterprising self

is thus both an

ea cu

at1ng

self.

lf

h .

acts upon itself

1

n d a se t at calculates about itself and that

~

er

to bette t

lf.

E

0

rm of

rule

that is intrinsicall ~

1

s ~ , nterpnse that is to say, designates a

n

the

ways

in

which Y

ethical: good government is to be grounded

For many critics t h ~ e r s o n s govern themselves.

apoth

is vocabulary f .

Such

eosts

of the

'capitalist

illu . ,

0

enterprise JS obfuscating rhetoric:

the

a r t i c u ~ ~ a s s e s s ~ e n t

is facile.

T ~ ~ o ~

that

persons

are sovereign individuals .

tng

eth1caJ

presupposit. anguage

of enterprise

is only

one

way

of

ions

that a .

re very widely shared; that have


4/4

overning

enterprising individu ls

155

mmon ground for almost all rationalities, programs

and

e

o

fortn

a

in advanced liberal

democratic

societies.

G o v e m m ~ n t

in

cotfl

. s of ru . d b h . d

r b l l 1 q u ~ . . not characterize y t e utopian ream

of

a regulative ma-

ieues

is

.

f

h . l b

such

soCthat

will penetrate a r e g 1 ~ n s o t

1

e

soc1ha

?dy, and administer them

chioerY on good. Rather, since

at

east t e nineteenth century, liberal

for

~ ~ : ; ; g h t

bas been structured by the opposition between the consti

p01 1uc

11

. .,.,its of government

on

the one hand and on the

other

the desire

t ona hu h . l d .

tll ~ r r a n g e things s u e ~ t d ~ t socia ~ c o n o m c processes turn out for the

to . hout the need ior irect po it1ca

intervention

(Rose and Miller 1992)

b St

w1t

. . .

h f h .

Thus

the

formal

h ~ 1 u t a t ~ o n s

ofn

td

.e

powedrs

o t

estate

have entailed,

s

their

corollary,

the

prohf r ~ t 1 o n o ~ . ~ p e r s e a ~ r a y ~ f

programs

and mechanisms,

d

upled from the direct acttv1t1es

of

the pubhc powers, which nonetheless

eco .

h d .

mise

to shape events in t e

omains

of work,

the

market and the fam-

pro

h bl l

ily to

produce sue

pu 1c va ues

as wealth, efficiency, health, and well-

being

.

The autonomy

of

the . e l ~ is thus.not the eternal antithesis

of

political

power, but one

of

the ob1ect1ves and instruments

of modem

mentalities

and

strategies

for the conduct

of

conduct.

Liberal democracy, if understood as

an

art of government and a technology

of

rule, has long been bound up with

the

invention of techniques

to

constitute the citizens

of

a democratic polity

with

the personal capacities and aspirations necessary to bear the political

weight that rests on them (Rose, 1993). Governing in a liberal-democratic

way

means governing through the freedom and aspirations of subjects rather

than in spite

of

them. The possibility

of

imposing liberal limits

on

the extent

and scope of political rule has thus been provided by a proliferation of

discourses, practices, and techniques through which self-governing capabili

ties

can be installed

in

free individuals in order

to

bring their own ways

of

conducting and evaluating themselves into alignment with political objec

tives.

A potential, if always risky

and

failing, solution to the problem of the

regulation of private spheres produced by liberal democratic political

m ~ n -

talities has thus been provided through the proliferation ofexperts r o u n d ~ g

their authority

on

knowledge

and

technique: medics, social workers,

J ? S Y C ~ a -

trists, psychologists, counselors,

and

advisers (Rose,

1987

.

Govei:n1ng

in a

liberal democratic way depends

upon

the availability

of

u e ~

_echniques that

will shape, channel, organize, and direct the. e ~ s ~ n a l c a p a c 1 ~ 1 e s and

e l v e ~

of

individuals under the aegis

of

a claim to ob1ect1v1ty, n e u t r a l ~ t y , ~ n d t e c ~ r u c a l

efficacy rather than one

of

political partiality. T h ~ o u ~ h the ~ ~ r r e c t an::e:s

established by the apparatus

of

expertise, the objectives of h b e r ~ l , ~ . -

1

.

th

the selves of democratic citizens.

ment

can be brought into. a ig1;1ment

w1

been made both thinkable

And contemporary mutations 1n government have be

and practicable by the u l t i t u d ~ of

e c h n o l o ~ i e s

~ h : ~ ; ~ ~ n ~ ; a u : : n ~ : =

bled for enjoining and emplacing the regu ate r

selves.

inventing ourselves

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