investigating conflict, power, and status within and among groups

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2004 35: 44Small Group ResearchJane Sell, Michael J. Lovaglia, Elizabeth A. Mannix, Charles D. Samuelson and Rick K. Wilson

Investigating Conflict, Power, and Status Within and Among Groups

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10.1177/1046496403259813 ARTICLESMALL GROUP RESEARCH / February 2004Sell et al. / CONFLICT, POWER, STATUS

INVESTIGATING CONFLICT,POWER, AND STATUS WITHIN AND

AMONG GROUPS

JANE SELLTexas A&M University

MICHAEL J. LOVAGLIAUniversity of Iowa

ELIZABETH A. MANNIXCornell University

CHARLES D. SAMUELSONTexas A&M University

RICK K. WILSONRice University

This article investigates the concepts and perspectives of conflict, power, and status devel-oped across the disciplines of political science, psychology, and sociology. Although the dif-ferent disciplines, at times, have different assumptions about actors and interactions, there isa great deal of similarity. This similarity allows one to uncover some general principles thatapply to group behavior. This article advocates and illustrates using institutional rules toanalyze the research within and across areas.

Keywords: power; status; conflict; institutions; small groups

Conflict, power, and status are central concepts in social sciencedisciplines. Most human interactions, from family interactions tonation-state interactions, involve at least one and often all of these.Political intrigues provide an example: When the discovery of adouble agent within the CIA was made public in 1993, the ques-tions invoked illustrated the importance of all of these concepts.What are the resources at stake? How do these resources result inpower of one group over another? Has the status of the nation-states

44

SMALL GROUP RESEARCH, Vol. 35 No. 1, February 2004 44-72DOI: 10.1177/1046496403259813© 2004 Sage Publications

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involved changed as a result of the incident? What conflicts willresult from the incident? In this article, we demonstrate why theseconcepts are so important and how the similarities and differencesin different disciplines affect the questions posed and answered.

ORIENTING DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

Although the definition of a group may be tightly circumscribedfor some purposes, the general approach taken across the disci-plines is to define the attributes of the group and then investigatehow certain attributes may affect the fundamental operations ofthat group. So, for example, groups vary from dyads to a great num-ber of actors, and to actors nested within different structures. Theactors can be individual persons or they can be collective actorswho represent an entire group, organization, or structure. Thedegree of interdependence among group members also varies con-siderably but is always present to some degree.

Different disciplines tend to focus on different aspects of groupphenomena. Psychology and economics tend to focus on the indi-vidual decision maker or actor, whereas political science and soci-ology tend to emphasize the structures or constraints that surroundthe actors. The intersection of the disciplines provides the focus forthis article. This intersection defines much of the research on power,status, and conflict and addresses how the actor or actors and thestructures or constraints change through the process of interactions.These interactions are typically viewed as types of exchanges withinor among groups and are motivated by actors wishing to increase ormaintain their collective or individual resources.

Sell et al. / CONFLICT, POWER, STATUS 45

AUTHORS’NOTE: We are grateful to Scott Poole and Andrea Hollingshead for their encour-agement and their comments on numerous drafts. We gratefully acknowledge research sup-port from NSF grant SES-9986562, Social Psychology and Decision, Risk & ManagementSciences programs. The generosity of those involved in this grant enabled us to learn a greatdeal from each other and from the other research groups. In particular, we would like toacknowledge the support and intellectual contributions of Charles P. Hermann. Correspon-dence concerning this chapter should be addressed to Jane Sell, Department of Sociology,Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas 77843-4351; e-mail: [email protected].




Conflict can be defined as an awareness, by the parties involved,of differences, discrepancies, incompatible wishes, or irreconcil-able desires (Boulding, 1962). This is a broad definition and cansubsume other definitions such as those offered for intragroup con-flict, where the conflict is between the motive to compete and themotive to cooperate. The literature on conflict in small groups canbe classified into two broad areas: (a) conflict over resources, and(b) conflict over information (De Dreu, Harinck, & Van Vianen,1999). Research on mixed-motive interactions deals with conflictover resources, including such topics as bargaining and negotiation,coalition formation, and social dilemmas. In contrast, research onconflict over information focuses on intellective or evaluativeissues, emphasizing the relations between various types of intra-group conflict and group performance.

Many scholars, across many disciplines, have been concernedwith conflict. Simmel (1955) and Coser (1956) wrote about thepositive functions of conflict, and Deutsch (1973) emphasizedsocial psychological theories that might promote successful con-flict resolution. Richardson and Wang (1993) argued that these“positiveapproaches” to conflict generated thecontemporary problem-solving approaches taken by many conflict resolution theorists andpractitioners.

Often, the resolution or maintenance of conflict involves power.Social power, as it has come to be defined in recent research, is theability to gain favorable outcomes at another’s expense (For discus-sion, see Willer, Lovaglia, & Markovsky, 1997). This definition ofpower is similar to Weber’s (1968) definition and to French andRaven’s (1959) development of power and its different bases. It hasalso been noted that power does not have to involve direct interac-tion. It can involve indirect relations (see Willer, 2003).

Social power can arise from exchange processes as often studiedby sociologists and social psychologists, or from redistribution ofresources often studied by political scientists. Recent progress inthe study of social power as exchange stems from a fertile period oftheoretical development that began in the late 1950s. Homans(1958, 1961) adapted behaviorist psychology to the sociologicalstudy of groups with the concept of social behavior as exchange.

46 SMALL GROUP RESEARCH / February 2004




He proposed that interactions between individuals are rewarding orcostly by degrees and that people respond positively to rewards andnegatively to costs. For Blau (1964), power then arises during thecompetition for scarce resources (material or social). Thibaut andKelly’s (1959) social psychology of groups advanced the conceptthat social power is produced by the dependence of some groupmembers on others. More specifically, they proposed that individu-als in a group compare their expected outcomes within the groupwith alternative outcomes that may be available to them.

Emerson’s (1962, 1964) power-dependence theory of social rela-tions has had arguably the most impact. It specifies social power asrelational. To have power is to have power over someone rather thana more general conception of power as the capacity to accomplishsomething. The power-dependence theory united behaviorist con-ceptions of social behavior as exchange with the idea that depend-ence is produced by the availability of alternatives. The moredependent an individual is on a social relationship, the less powerthat individual has.

As Molm (1997a) points out, many of the early exchange theo-rists did not consider redistribution or coercion, which put them atodds with most political theorists. For example, some politicaltheorists defined power as equivalent to coercion (e.g., P. A.Bacharach & Baratz, 1963; Bierstedt, 1950; Lasswell & Kaplan,1950). For these political theorists, the source of power is usuallyfound in institutional mechanisms or rules that assign the right tomake a decision, the right to enforce a decision, or the right to pri-vate information that grants advantage—the type of power linkedto French and Raven’s (1959) legitimate and coercive sources.

Intimately related to power is status. Status is defined as a posi-tion in a social network. This is a purposely broad definitionbecause it includes positions such as mother or father as well aspositions such as middle class or minority. It is important to notethat these statuses involve status beliefs—beliefs about the socialworth of the individuals who occupy these statuses, such that a per-son who occupies one position is “better than” a person who occu-pies another position (Sewell, 1992).





Status often provides an organization function for groups, in thatit defines a structure in which power use (and the lack of power use)is acceptable. The acceptable use of power can make a group func-tion relatively smoothly but may at the same time generate anacceptance of inequality. In addition, power use can generate nega-tive sentiment and interrupt the process by which power usetranslates to status (for further status distinctions, see Lovaglia &Houser, 1996; Walker et al., 2000; Willer, Troyer, & Lovaglia, 2001).

Many social scientists have suggested that status significance isacquired through resources (e.g., Weber). In a well-developedarticulation of one process through which nominal characteristics,such as race and sex categories, might acquire status value and sta-tus beliefs, Ridgeway (1991) developed and then tested aspects ofstatus construction theory. This theory posits one mechanismthrough which a characteristic previously not status valued mightacquire status value. According to the theory, members differ in thelevel of material resources they possess, they differ on nominalcharacteristics, and resources are correlated with the “state” orcategory of the characteristic (Ridgeway, 1991, 1997).

Because power can be used to acquire resources, and control ofresources confers power, Ridgeway’s (1991, 1997) analysis impliesthat power and status are related concepts. We conceive of power asan ability to extract advantage from others despite their resistance.Thus, power is largely independent of the expectation and attitudesof group members. Status, however, is conferred to an individualbased on group members’ expectations of that individual’s contri-butions to valued group goals. Thye (2000) has also shown thathigh status increases the resources that individuals acquire throughexchange. Power use, however, often produces resistance and con-flict that can interfere with status attainment (Lovaglia, 1997;Willer et al., 1997).

INSTITUTIONAL RULES

How are power and status used to resolve or maintain conflict?Because the research within and across the research areas of power,





status, and conflict is so incredibly varied, we will address andorganize this question within the general context of institutions.The study of the development and evolution of institutional rules isone of the primary foci of political science. These rules are generallaws or principles that specify who may do what and when theymay do it. Institutional rules may be formal or informal, stable orunstable (see Crawford & Ostrom, 1995, for a discussion of thegrammar of institutional rules). Using this perspective enablescomparison of groups who have vastly different purposes and com-position. So, for example, the same rules allow us to analyze bothinformal work groups such as the one writing this article and verystructured groups such as the CIA. There are four types of institu-tional rules that are particularly important for understanding smallgroups. These include boundary rules, aggregation rules, positionrules, and information rules.

The boundary rules define who is and who is not in the group andcan detail the permeability of the group—whether members caneasily enter or exit. Permeability of the boundaries determines theextent to which norms developed within the group can be main-tained and shared and the extent to which the group can imposesanctions. If anyone can join the group at any time, then the mem-bership is likely to constantly change, and in-group identity is mostlikely not strong. The threat of sanction will be very weak if indi-viduals can easily exit (see Hirschman, 1970, for a general explana-tion of the nature of exit). Boundary rules of membership to theCIA, for example, are very rigid, and penalties for breaking thenorms can be extremely harsh.

The aggregation rules define how the group decides a collectivechoice. There are many rules that can be used. Three are particu-larly common: majority rule, unanimity, and “anyone” rule. Becausegroups are not (usually) completely homogeneous, aggregating theindividual preferences of group members is crucial. Simple major-ity rule is a common rule. However, the unanimity rule is some-times used, whereby everyone is required to agree before the groupchooses. The costs for such a rule can be high because if anyoneobjects, the task of negotiating an acceptable choice can take sometime. It is easy to see how such a rule can quickly lead to paralysis.





Groups also use an anyone rule, in which any actor can impose agroup choice.

The position rules define who can act at any point, and so define,to a great extent, authority. For example, in most groups, certainpositions are granted authority over other positions and thereforedefine hierarchy in a group. Likewise, a nonhierarchical group isone in which all members occupy an identical position. The CIAprovides a clear example of a strong hierarchy defined throughposition rules. An informal work group provides a clear example ofa weak, almost nonexistent hierarchy.

The information rules describe how information is shared andwhat each actor can know. The information linkages determine theextent to which each member knows what other members havedone (or what they are planning). Information conditions can varyfrom complete information (everyone sees what everyone else hasdone to this point) to extreme one-sided information. Hidden infor-mation is a control mechanism. In the CIA, hidden informationwould be common, as it maintains control and also security. In theinformal work group, information is usually complete for bothefficiency and cohesion.

We will use these institutional rules to examine how conflict,power, and status relate to each other. Although we examine theinstitutional rules independently, it is clear that the effects of anygiven rule can be increased or decreased by its juxtaposition withanother rule or other rules.

CONFLICT

As noted earlier, the literature on conflict in small groups can beroughly divided into the two broad areas of conflict over resourcesand conflict over information.

CONFLICT OVER INFORMATION

Among those working in the areas of conflict over information,there are two broad traditions. One research stream comes from





negotiation researchers who have expanded their work on dyadicnegotiations to the group level. In this tradition, the emphasis hasbeen placed on classic negotiation concepts such as distributiveversus integrative solutions, best alternative to a negotiated agree-ment, and reservation prices. At the same time, economists andpolitical scientists have been very concerned with the institutionalstructure within which small groups negotiate. Integral to theseapproaches have been considerations of coalition formation, aggre-gation rules, and agenda mechanisms.

The other research stream comes from scholars studying teamsmore broadly, usually within organizational settings. The goal hereis to understand how group input variables such as diversity andskills lead to various group processes and thereby affect group out-come variables such as satisfaction and performance. Thus, in thisresearch, conflict is often treated as a mediating variable.

In this last stream of research, there has been a debate regardingwhether agreement or disagreement within groups is advantageous(Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992). One key to unlocking this complexrelation lies in the differentiation of conflict as either relationshipor task related. Relationship conflict is an awareness of interper-sonal incompatibilities and is generally detrimental to individualand group performance, member satisfaction, and the likelihoodthe group will work together in the future (Jehn, 1994; Jehn &Mannix, 2001; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Shah & Jehn,1993). Task, or cognitive, conflict is an awareness of differences inviewpoints and opinions pertaining to the group’s task. In contrastto relationship conflict, moderate levels of task conflict have beenshown to be beneficial to many kinds of group performance. Teamsperforming complex cognitive tasks benefit from differences ofopinion about the work being done (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven,1990; Jehn, 1994; Jehn & Mannix, 2001; Shah & Jehn, 1993).

CONFLICT OVER RESOURCES

Conflict over resources can be further delineated by whether theresources involve some kind of binding agreement or whether thereis no opportunity for such agreement. This distinction is captured





by the historical connections with cooperative game theory, whichinvolves binding agreements, or noncooperative game theory, whichdoes not. At the core of both cooperative and noncooperative gametheory is a rational choice model. Such a model assumes a self-interested actor who consistently and contingently acts in accor-dance with principles of expected utility. Development and elabo-rations of this rational model have certainly occurred. The modeldoes not necessarily exclude social factors that might be involved,such as group identity, trust, or beliefs about others (for discussion,see Kreps, 1990).

Coalition formation. One of the most obvious and important dif-ferences between multiparty and dyadic negotiations is the poten-tial to exclude group members from final agreement through coali-tion formation (Caplow, 1956; Gamson, 1961; Luce & Raiffa,1957; Murnighan, 1986; Riker, 1962). Two very different tradi-tions have emerged. One, which predominates in the political sci-ence and economics literatures, finds that coalitional instability isrooted in the conflict over individual preferences and relies heavilyon noncooperative models of game theory. The second approach,derived from cooperative models of game theory and found in thebargaining literature drawn from social psychology, points toprocesses that lead people to join together.

The noncooperative literature suggests that the lack of bindingagreements creates unstable coalitions that tend to rely on a collec-tive choice mechanism (e.g., majority voting). Unfortunately, thereis no mechanism that gives a consistent social choice: Differentprocedures can lead to different outcomes (Arrow, 1951). Fiorinaand Plott (1978) demonstrated this in a laboratory setting withsmall groups, showing that instability over final choices is commonand that coalitions quickly form and dissolve without much impacton outcomes.

Instability over outcomes is mitigated in predictable ways byinstitutional rules imposed on the negotiation setting. If an actor isgiven the right to veto divisions of a good, then there is substantialstability over outcomes (Wilson & Herzberg, 1987). The ways inwhich an agenda is ordered affect outcomes (Wilson, 1986). Who





gets to construct the agenda is also crucial (see McKelvey &Ordeshook, 1990, for a survey). There are many institutional fea-tures that relate to aggregation rules and to position rules that mat-ter for the types of coalitions that form and the kinds of outcomesthat are chosen. Many of these rules have been mathematicallymodeled and thoroughly tested in the laboratory.

The cooperative literature, most often the focus of social psy-chologists, found that in determining individual outcomes, thepower balance of the group is clearly one of the most importantvariables. Indeed, power has been called the “essence of bargaining”(S. B. Bacharach & Lawler, 1981). However, research has shownthat psychological factors such as distribution norms, discountrates, and expectations of future interaction, as well as structuralfactors such as agendas and decision rules, interact with the negoti-ator’s power to affect the ability of a group member to maximize hisor her outcome (Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1985; Komorita &Hamilton, 1984; Thompson, Mannix, & Bazerman, 1988).

The opportunity for coalition formation can affect the optimalityof the group’s negotiated agreement for all concerned. Members ofunequal-power groups are more likely to reject collaborative groupdecision making and move toward more competitive and distribu-tive negotiation strategies. As a result, the overall performance ofthe team is reduced because some individuals are denied a level ofresources needed to perform effectively (Mannix, 1991, 1993).

Social dilemmas and mixed motives. Social dilemmas are per-haps the most studied phenomena within investigations of conflictover resources. Social dilemmas are settings in which an actor’sshort-term self-interest competes with the group interest (see Dawes,1980; Ostrom, 1990, 1998). These dilemmas arise in many instancesinvolving interdependence, and such instances range from twoactors making romantic commitments to nation states forging alli-ances. Especially influential theoretical formulations of socialdilemmas include Olson (1965) on free riding, Hardin (1968) onthe tragedy associated with the commons, and Ostrom (1990) ongoverning the commons (see Schroeder, 1995, for a brief historicaloverview).





Within the social dilemma research, two types of institutionalrules affecting procedures within the group have received a greatdeal of attention. One concerns the communication possibilitiesamong group members. The robust result of 25 years of research isthat discussion facilitates cooperation (see Sally, 1995, for a review).Reasons for this effect include the development of commitments(Kerr, 1995; Kerr & Kaufmann-Gilleland, 1994; Orbell, Van deKragt, & Dawes, 1988) and the development of in-group identity(Brewer & Kramer, 1986). “Cheap talk” or simply sending signalsis not sufficient to increase cooperation (Wilson & Sell, 1997).

The other rule involves the sanctioning system. Although someresearch demonstrates that rewards for cooperation are more effec-tive than punishment for competition (Komorita & Barth, 1985),there is also support for concluding that sanctioning systems thatpunish noncooperative behavior can be effective structural mecha-nisms for eliciting high levels of cooperation (Ostrom, Walker, &Gardner, 1992; Sato, 1987; Sell & Wilson, 1999; Yamagishi,1988). Recently, concern has been expressed that sanctioning sys-tems may be inherently problematic because such rules can haveunintended consequences such as increasing pessimism amonggroup members about others’ cooperation, and so may serve toexacerbate the very problem the sanctioning system was designedto correct (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). In addition, the initialestablishment of a sanctioning system is no trivial task, becauseraising resources from group members to support the system repre-sents a “second-order” social dilemma (Yamagishi, 1988). Relat-edly, some research examines the conditions under which groupmembers voluntarily prefer to change the institutional rules (SeeSamuelson & Messick, 1986a, 1986b, 1995.)

POWER IN GROUPS

Power is activated with conflict over access to material, social,and informational resources. In political science, power is thecapacity to redistribute resources, wresting them from one individ-ual or group and granting them to another. Exchange researchers





see power as the ability to gain favorable outcomes at another’sexpense, a process that can be more or less voluntary.

POLITICAL POWER AS REDISTRIBUTION

Political scientists have been interested in the ways in which thedesign of specific institutional rules affects the ways in whichgroups redistribute resources. Unlike much of the research onsocial dilemmas, in which individual incentives lead to everyonebeing made worse off, the focus by many political scientists hasbeen with the ways in which individuals who have private incen-tives use rules to make themselves better off at the expense of othergroup members (see Knight, 1992). The consensus in political sci-ence is that institutional rules are important for deciding who getswhat and that those rules rarely guarantee that everyone is leftbetter off.

SOCIAL POWER AS EXCHANGE

Exchange relations are usually conceived by group processresearchers as voluntary, resulting in benefit to both parties to anexchange (Emerson, 1972; Homans, 1961). Punishment or coer-cion occurs when one individual is less well off after an interactionthan before it (e.g., a robbery victim). A qualitative distinctionbetween exchange and coercion, however, may not be theoreticallyrelevant (Molm, 1997a). After coercion, a person may be better offhaving submitted than having refused. A robbery victim, for exam-ple, exchanges money for life. Coercion can be seen as the end of acontinuum on which reward levels between exchange partnersbecome increasingly unequal past the point where one partner’sreward becomes negative, which is a cost. Coercive power can thenbe analyzed in the same kinds of exchange settings that were usedto investigate reward power (Willer, 1987). Thus, the conception ofpower used by political scientists, as the appropriation of resources,can fit into the exchange perspective.

Molm (1989, 1994, 1997a, 1997b) used a nonnegotiated exchangesetting to investigate coercive power. In these settings, individuals





had opportunities to reward or punish others. Molm found thatcoercive power must be intentionally used, unlike reward power, inwhich unequal rewards can be passively accepted. Coercion wasmore likely to be used when the prospect of mutually rewardingexchange was low, possibly because coercion is risky, jeopardizingfuture opportunities for mutually beneficial exchange.

Negative emotional reactions that accompany power use alsolink power to conflict (Molm, 1997a). Consonant with two estab-lished theories of conflict, bilateral deterrence and conflict spiral,punishment promotes conflict (Lawler, 1986; Lawler, Ford, &Blegen, 1988). And because unequal power in exchange relationscan produce negative emotion, even without punishment or coer-cion, power differences in exchange relations may often promoteconflict.

EMERSON’S POWER-BALANCING MECHANISMS

In Emerson’s (1962, 1964) power-dependence theory of socialrelations, the more dependent an individual is on a social relation-ship, the less power that individual has. In the theory, dependenceresults in two ways. First, the more a person values resources con-trolled by another, the more dependent that person is. Second, themore available those valued resources are outside the relationship,the less dependent that person is.

Power-dependence theory also assumes that power use promptsthose subjected to power to mitigate its negative consequences.Emerson (1962) presented four power-balancing mechanisms throughwhich power use leads eventually to equal power. In Emerson’s (1969)most memorable statement, “To have a power advantage is to use it,and to use it is to lose it” (p. 391). The power-balancing mecha-nisms follow logically from the desire of low-power individuals toimprove their access to valued resources or reduce the costs ofunequal exchange: (a) Low-power individuals can reduce the valuethey place on resources controlled by others; (b) low-power indi-viduals can cultivate alternative sources of valued resources cur-rently controlled by others; (c) high-power individuals can increasethe value they place on resources controlled by others; (d) high-





power individuals can be denied alternative sources of valuedresources currently controlled by others. Low-power individualscommonly use strategies to promote power balance. Such strate-gies include valuing simplicity (Mechanism a), more directlysearching out alternative sources (Mechanism b), deferent behav-ior to “give status” to high-power individuals (Mechanism c), andcoalition formation (Mechanism d).

Power-dependence theory is elegant and logically coherent, andthe power-balancing mechanisms are commonly observed at work.The theory has found wide application, especially in business andthe study of organizations (S. B. Bacharach & Lawler, 1980, 1981;Pfeffer, 1981, 1992). But power-dependence theory fails to explainwhy social relations characterized by power use and dominance areso widespread, and why social inequality appears to be a major fac-tor in social relations for the foreseeable future. Whereas the firstpart of Emerson’s (1969) famous statement, “to have power is touse it” (p. 391), has been supported by research even when a high-power actor has no intention of using it (Willer & Skvoretz, 1997),the second part defies common observation. Powerful people notonly seldom lose power but often seem to use their power to gainmore power.

Explaining the discrepancy between the implications of Emer-son’s theory for social equality and the continuation of socialinequality is a major project for future theory and research. Oneapproach is to investigate “power-unbalancing mechanisms” over-looked by the theory. Whereas low-power individuals actively seekto balance power, high-power individuals may just as actively seekto maintain or increase power imbalance. Furthermore, high-powerindividuals may be able to exploit their power advantage to blockattempts to balance power (Molm, 1997a). Examples of powerunbalancing mechanisms include colonization to develop alterna-tive sources of valued resources, and political repression to reduceopportunities for low-power individuals to form coalitions (Lovaglia,Skvoretz, Markovsky, & Willer, 1999).

Pursuing the first proposition of power-dependence theory,that dependence is related to the value an individual places onresources, remains an important but uncompleted goal (Emerson,





1980; for some recent ventures, see Chai, 2001, and Kanazawa,2001). Emerson’s second proposition, that dependence is related toalternative sources of valued resources, began a major subfield ofresearch that attempts to explain and predict the power held byoccupants of positions in an exchange network. Analysis of evensmall networks of five or six positions can be difficult due to a com-plex pattern of exchange relations. As the number of network posi-tions increases linearly, the number of potential patterns of networkrelations increases exponentially.

Relative power of positions in simple networks constrained to asingle type of exchange relationship can be analyzed by succes-sively estimating the alternatives available to each position in aseries of exchange opportunities. Consider an exchange network,A-B-C, in which B may exchange with either A or C, but A and Cmay not exchange with each other. If B is only allowed oneexchange, then A and C must bid for the one opportunity for profit.A and C bid against each other, successively offering more of theavailable profit to B. The power of B in this exchange network isindicated by the result of a series of exchange opportunities inwhich B comes to command nearly all the available profit, leavingonly a token amount for A or C. This type of network has beentermed strong power, in that B can eventually acquire nearly allavailable resources (Cook, Emerson, Gillmore, &Yamagishi, 1983;Markovsky, Willer, & Patton, 1988).

Other simple exchange networks exhibit self-limiting power dif-ferences between positions. Add one additional position to theexchange network in the previous example, A-B-C-D. Position Ahas no alternative to exchange with Position B, giving B the powerto demand a greater than equal share of potential profit. Position C,however, is equally powerful with respect to D. Thus, B and Chave equal power and will likely divide profit equally when theyexchange. Thus, A needs only to offer slightly more profit to B thanC does. Also, because C will have an attractive alternative offerfrom D, B’s profit advantage will remain modest. Predicting theexact amount of B’s profit advantage is the goal in such “weakpower” networks (Markovsky, Skvoretz, Willer, Lovaglia, & Erger,1993).





Finding a workable general formula for predicting power in net-works of increasing size and complexity has proven an attractivechallenge for researchers in several analytical traditions: a graph-theoretic approach (Lovaglia, Skvoretz, Willer, & Markovsky,1995), a game-theory approach (Bienenstock & Bonacich, 1993), aself and identity approach (Burke, 1996), an expected value model(Friedkin, 1992), and a rational choice model (Yamaguchi, 1996).Although the different approaches have had varying degrees of suc-cess in predicting the power of positions in the simple exchangenetworks that have been empirically investigated, a general solu-tion for a broad range of complex larger networks remains elusive(Lucas, Younts, Lovaglia, & Markovsky, 2001).

Conceptualizing coercion in an exchange setting dramatizes theconnections between power and emotions in group processes.Power can produce strong negative emotion in those on whom it isused, both coercively (Molm, 1991) and in exchange (Willer et al.,1997). Exchange relations, in contrast, are characterized by com-mitment and positive emotional bonds that increase with repeatedexchange (Lawler & Yoon, 1993, 1996). In resolving these con-trasting effects, Lawler and Yoon (1998) showed that positive emo-tion resulted when exchange relations were characterized by mutualdependence, and not when there were power differentials.

Emotion also links power use to status within groups. Powercomes from individual advantage conferred by social position, asin an exchange network. Status comes from the prestige granted toan individual by group members who expect that member to pro-duce valuable contributions to the group. Several well-testedtheories of status in groups predict that demonstrated powershould increase the influence and prestige of a powerful person,leading to an increase in status. A causal relation between poweruse and increased status, however, proved difficult to demonstrate(Lovaglia, 1997). Emotion mediates the effects of status on influ-ence. Negative emotion decreases the influence of a partner, andthe effects of emotion combine with other status information todetermine influence (Lovaglia & Houser, 1996). Willer, Lovaglia,and Markovsky (1997) showed that power use could produce thosenegative emotions that had been found to decrease influence. They





concluded that power use could increase influence if the negativeemotional reactions that accompany power use could be contained.Building on Ridgeway’s (1982) work linking group motivation tostatus, the perception that power use is group motivated may allowpower use to increase influence (Walker et al., 2000; Willer et al.,2001).

STATUS

Status has been examined from a number of different perspec-tives. One of the most developed research programs in sociologythat focuses upon status is expectation states theory. As Knottnerus(1997) stated, expectation states theory has a metatheoretical con-cept of a “state organizing process,” which provides a generalframework for the construction of theories of interpersonal pro-cesses (Berger, Wagner, & Zelditch, 1992). Knottnerus argued thatthere are several different models underlying expectation statestheories, some quite different from others.

Status characteristics theory is one of the oldest and well devel-oped of the research areas within expectation states. The generalquestion addressed is how do status characteristics generate andthen sustain inequalities of power and prestige? The dependentvariables, power and prestige, are usually conceptualized in termsof the influence one member has over another, the rate of participa-tion of any given group member, the opportunities given to act, andfinally, compliance. Summary statements of the theory involved inthis process can be found in Berger, Conner, and Fisek (1974);Berger, Fisek, Norman, and Zelditch (1977); Berger et al. (1992);and Humphreys and Berger (1981).

Briefly, the process is described as a burden of proof process.That is, unless some characteristic or event intervenes, status char-acteristics organize our interactions such that those who are higherin social status garner higher amounts of power and prestige thanthose lower in status. The burden of proof rests on a demonstrationthat social status should not be used as an indicator. The processoccurs in several steps, none of which is posited to necessarily be





conscious. Status characteristics theory, while not specifying spe-cific institutions or rules, does specify that the theory applies onlyto settings in which the group is motivated to succeed on a grouptask, and that group members are willing to consider other mem-bers’choices or opinions in the completion of the task. This impliesthat the boundary conditions are well defined while the specifica-tion of aggregation, position, and information rules is unclear. Onecould argue that this enables the importation of more general soci-etal rules and institutions. In fact, a branch of expectation states the-ory, legitimization theory, does consider this importation idea ex-plicitly by consideration of how the surrounding society supportsthe valuation of certain types of characteristics over others.

There are two types of status characteristics within status char-acteristics theory: specific and diffuse. Specific status characteris-tics are those associated with a specific ability, such as the ability todo needlepoint or mathematical ability. These contain two or morestates that correspond to an expectation or assessment of how theindividual will perform in the completion of a task. A diffuse statuscharacteristic, as the name implies, is a characteristic that also pos-sesses at least two states of differential evaluation. Connected witheach state there are associated specific performance expectationsand associated general performance expectations “without limit asto scope” (Webster & Foschi, 1988).

There are, of course, other formulations that address the role ofstatus. So, for example, dominance theorists proposed that humansdisplay behaviors that simply signal their interpersonal dominanceand submission (Mazur, 1983; Mazur et al., 1980; Ofshe & Lee,1981). These theorists have demonstrated parallels between pat-terns in human groups and the dominance patterns or peckingorders seen in many nonhuman social species. Other formulationshave addressed the idea that some status characteristics are derivedfrom evolutionary processes by which some groups were facedwith very different problems from others. This argument is mostoften associated with evolutionary psychology (Buss & Kendrick,1998; Cosmides & Tooby, 1994). In addition, social role theory(see Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Karau, 1991; Eagly & Wood, 1999)argued that some status characteristics are prompted by the charac-





teristics of the situation and that these characteristics are primarilybased on the structure of roles and resources existent in society.

STATUS COMPOSITION OF GROUPS

One focus of status characteristics theory is group compositionand how this affects the manner in which status organizes inter-action. As previously mentioned, many studies have been con-ducted on the burden of proof process and how this relates to statusdifferentiation.

This work emphasizes that it is not necessarily the status charac-teristics of the individual group members per se that are importantin predicting and explaining the interaction and consequences ofthe group but rather the composition of the group—the differentialsin member status. So, while the status characteristics are clear, it isimportant to separate out the effect of the status of an individualfrom the effect of the status composition of a particular group.Although not just addressing status, Moreland and Levine (1992)developed some principles to examine issues about group compo-sition. They stated that a characteristic attracts more attention as thediscrepancy in its distribution increases. For example, the more thenumber of women and the number of men diverge, the greater thesalience of gender.

WHAT IS THE PROCESS INVOLVEDIN STATUS GENERALIZATION?

The burden of proof process is exceptionally resilient, but canthat process be decreased or changed? This question has beenraised in a few formulations that specifically consider the processor dynamics of generalization processes. Once status characteris-tics are activated within a group, they are reinforced over time.Once deference is granted at Time 1, it acts as reinforcement for theperson to whom the deference was granted, and an indicator to theothers in the group is expected. In this manner, initial status differ-ences cumulate in a self-fulfilling fashion. So, this indicates thatinitial interactions are particularly important for groups because





they begin a trajectory for behavior. This would especially be thecase for groups in which boundaries are fixed.

Another aspect of process is related to this: Once the burden ofproof process starts or has been historically supported by institu-tions (as in the case of many diffuse status characteristics such asrace/ethnicity and gender), it becomes more and more difficult todeter or even diminish. Studies that have examined this issue foundthat it takes some extraordinary interventions. So, for example,Pugh and Wahrman (1983) and Wagner, Ford, and Ford (1986)examined conditions under which the effects of sex might be dimin-ished, and Freese and Cohen (1973) and Freese (1974) examinedconditions under which generalization based on age might bedecreased. One long-term research and application program headedby Cohen (See Cohen, 1982, 1993; Cohen & Roper, 1972) isdirected toward school settings. Early studies tried different kindsof interventions to help diminish status differences between major-ity and minority children. One effective strategy was termed the“inconsistency” intervention, in which a minority child learned aspecific skill or ability and then taught this skill to a majoritychild. This inconsistency principle dampened the effect of dif-fuse status characteristics by introducing specific status charac-teristics that contradicted the state or evaluation of the diffuse sta-tus characteristics.

The program was applied to other kinds of labeling, includingreading ability (Tammivaara, 1982). In addition, other strategieswere developed throughout the program. Some of these strategiesemphasized factors discussed and developed within the expecta-tion states tradition. So, for example, Cohen’s program emphasizedthe use of reference actors, those actors who possess the same dif-fuse status characteristics as the minority children (M. J. Webster &Sobieszek, 1974). Other interventions included norms of coopera-tion and equal participation and a curriculum that emphasized chil-dren working together on tasks that involve many different abili-ties. This last strategy, in particular, was not one emphasized withinthe expectations states tradition and suggests a line of research thatcan be interpreted as investigating varying institutional rules.





SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

As we illustrate, there is an enormous breadth in the researchconcerning power, status, and conflict. We have organized our dis-cussion by examining how the three concepts are conceptualizedwithin and across disciplines and how their conceptualizationsaffect the questions asked and answered. We use the institutionalmechanisms of boundary rules, aggregation rules, position rules,and information rules to further constrain our discussion. Webelieve that specifying an institutional framework forces research-ers to delineate more completely the specific rules and tasksinvolved in the group. In this manner, cumulation across disci-plines and research areas becomes more likely. Commonalities(and differences) are exposed and can be analyzed in widely vary-ing groups from tightly structured, hierarchical groups like the CIAto informal groups such as the one authoring this article.

Using the institutional rules framework provides a way to con-ceptualize across disciplines and across the three concepts. It hasalso uncovered the nested nature of questions about group pro-cesses. Groups interact within particular environments and theseenvironments allow, enable, or prohibit certain patterns of behav-ior. In answering how power and status relate to conflict, knowl-edge of the institutional rules is indispensable. These rules legiti-mize some kinds of behavior and, as a consequence, delegitimizeothers.

Boundary rules, for example, indicate who is and is not a memberof the group. When conflict occurs between parties over resources,the dispute can be rephrased as one in which the group membershipand thus ownership of resources is contested. Boundary rules canbe imposed from authorities in the form of restraints about who isable to work with, live with, or interact with whom. So, for exam-ple, caste systems set powerful boundary rules and, when acceptedas legitimate, work well to decrease conflict between castes, andquestions of who deserves resources or information do not arise. Insuch a case, the boundary rules minimize conflict by creating par-ticular statuses (or castes) that are fully legitimized and determine





power relations. Although redistribution of power is possible, itwould have to be accompanied by a radical change in boundaryrules. When boundary rules are well established but questioned onthe basis of legitimacy, conflict is likely.

Aggregation rules define the procedure or process by whichdecisions are made within groups. Sometimes these rules are madeexplicit through legitimized sources. How is conflict affected bythe aggregation rules? Again, legitimation creates differences. If anauthority endorses a particular aggregation rule, conflict over therule itself will be less likely. If an authority does not explicitlyadvocate an aggregation rule, then the more commonly accepted aparticular aggregation rule is, the more likely it will be incorpo-rated. If relationships or networks are “commonly accepted,” this isan indication of a type of legitimation (specifically, endorsement)as well. Rules of position relate directly to power and statusbecause they specify who has the most position or network power.Different rights, privileges, and responsibility characterize leader-ship positions and organizational structure. Again, if leadershippositions or particular rules about positions are in place, then con-flict is less likely. Stability, of course, does not directly relate toequality. Stable systems can be democratic or completely autocratic.

Status formulations suggest that even when there are no explic-itly written or defined rules, there are informal, sometimes uncon-scious but clearly patterned rules about decision making. Theseinvolve the burden of proof process, and the status hierarchiesinvolved could vary from position (e.g., position in an exchangenetwork), to occupational status (e.g., doctor vs. garbage collec-tor), to diffuse status (e.g., man vs. woman).

Finally, information rules dictate what information is availableto whom. These rules determine what various group membersknow about the nature of the exchange network, the positions avail-able, and the various statuses. Asymmetrical information is oneimportant way in which some actors gain power over others. Infor-mation involving uncertainty or risk can dramatically alter ways inwhich actors weigh information, make choices, and consequentlyinteract.





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Jane Sell is a professor of sociology at Texas A&M University. She is interested inexploring a wide range of issues related to group cooperation: conditions affecting





legitimacy, disruptions to groups, and stereotyping. She is presently investigatinghow initial interactions among group members might affect cooperation in subse-quent social dilemmas.

Elizabeth A. Mannix (Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1989) is professor of manage-ment and organizations in the Johnson School of Management at Cornell University.Her current research includes work on knowledge sharing in virtual teams, the impactof types of diversity on team interaction and performance, and a cross-cultural studyof negotiation processes over time.

Michael J. Lovaglia, professor and chair of the Department of Sociology at the Uni-versity of Iowa, investigates power and status processes. His book, The Personal Useof Social Psychology (McGraw-Hill, 2000) presents in an accessible way researchthat readers can use.

Charles D. Samuelson is associate professor and associate department head in theDepartment of Psychology at Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas. Hereceived his Ph.D. from the University of California–Santa Barbara in social psychol-ogy. His current areas of research include decision making in social dilemmas, coop-eration and conflict in common-pool resource dilemmas, and computer-mediatedcommunication in small groups.

Rick K. Wilson (Ph.D., Indiana University, 1982) is the Herbert S. Autrey Professor ofPolitical Science at Rice University. He has active research lines in legislative politi-cal institutions, cross-national experimental economics, and bargaining behaviorbetween individuals. Much of this research is driven by behavioral game theory.





investigating conflict, power, and status within and among groups

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