79TH CONGRESS SENATE DOCUMENT2d Session S No. 244

INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBORATTACK

REPORTOF THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATIONOF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATESPURSUANTe TO

S. Con. Res. 27, 79th CongressA CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO INVESTIGATE THE

ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR ON DECEMBER7,1941, AND EVENTS AND CIRCUM-STANCES RELATING THERETO

AND

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF MR..KEEFETOGETHER WITH

MINORITY VIEWS OF MR. FERGUSON AND MR. BREWSTER

JULY 20 (legislative day JULY 5), 1946-Ordered to beprinted with illustrations

UNITED STATESGOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFIOC

WASHINGTON: 194690179

,JOI NT ('0M.COMMTTE1IE ON THlE INVl',STICATION OF THIE 1'PEARLHARBOR ATTACK

- V' ALB1N W. 11ARtKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, ChairmanJERE COOPER, IRepresentative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman

WALTBU P. GEORE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative fromSC'OT'' W. LUCAS, Senator from IlitioIs PennsylvaniaOQWEN BREWSTER, Seontor from Maine BERTRAND) W. GEARHART, Representa-110MBIRt FEGJSON, Seuator from Mihcl tive from Californiagan I FRANK 1B. KEEFE, Representative from

J. BA YARDI) ClARK, Representative from W.isconlsinNorth Carolina

COUNSEL

(Through January 14, 1946)WIlLIAM D. MITCHELL,, Getteral Coun.slGERIIlAI) A. Gtshil,,, Chief Assistant (CounselJUIE f. RANNAFORD, Anashtant CounselJO`IN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel

(After January 14, 1940)SnTvI W. RICHARDSON, General CoUnselSAMIULE1,r , KAUFMAN. Associate Gencral Counsel.JOHIN E. MANHTN, A88iRtant CounselB'DWARD P. MOROAN, As8i8tant CounselLOOAN J. LANs, Assistant Counsel

II

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

UNITED STATES SENATE ANDHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

lion. KENNETH MOKELLAR, Washington, D. (., July 20, 1946.President pro temnpore of the Senate.

1ion. SAM RAYBURN,Speaker of the House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT AND MnR. S'Pl.AK1ER: PuIrsuant to Senate Con-current Resolution No. 27 (as extended), Seventy-nintll Congress,first session the Joint Coongressional Cominittee on the Investigationof the Peari Harbor Attack has completed its work with a view to afull and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events andcircumstances leading up to or following the attack made by Japa-nese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii onDecember 7, 1941.The committee has endeavored faithfully to discharge the duties

assigned and respectfully submits herewith its report.Sincerely yours, ALBEN W. BARLEY,

Chairman.JERE COOPER,

Vice Chairman.'HJ

CONTENTS

PageFor word- XiIntroductory statement - - ------ XIIIPart I. Diplomatic background of the Pearl Harbor attack--1

Japanese record of deceit and aggresdon-.1Fundamental differences between American and Japanese policies ---- 4Steps taken by the United States to meet the threat of Axis aggres-

sion- 10Initial United States-Japanese negotiations: 1941-.- -- 13Japanese proposal of May 12- 14Japanese reaction to German invasion of Russia - - ---- 15Temporary cessation of negotiations-16Freezing ofasset---18Resumption of negotiations and proposed meeting of President

Roosevelt and Premier Konoye- 19Japanese proposals of September 6 and27--_______ 26Advent ofthe Tojo Cabinet- 28Arrival of SaburoKurusu-. 30Negotiations versus deadlines------------------- 32Japanese ultimatum of November 20 and the modus vivendi- - 32United States memorandum of November 26-.- 38Fraudulent nature of Japanese diplomacy-November 28 toDecember 7__----- 42

Diplomacy and military liaison in Washington ............... 43Conclusions -- 47

Part II. The Japanese Attack and itsaftermath.- 53Formulation of the plan and date for execution-- 53Nciture of theplan----------------------------- -- 54D tparture for the attack.. .... -56Execution of the attack -- 57

Air phase--- :------ 57Submarine phase ---- 62

Withdrawal of the strikingforce-. I. .. I . 03Damage to United States naval forces and installatioms " a result of

theattack.I ,-, 64Damage to United States Army forces and installations " a result of

the attack - ------- 65Japaneseloses--65Summary comparison oflosses--- 65State of readiness to meet the attack ' 66

Attack asurprise- 0. .. --. 66Personnel:-----66Antiaircraft----- -------- 67Aircraft-------08------.... . 68

Action taken following theattak- 68Defensive forces and fAPilies of the Navy ati awa4 - 69Defensive forces and facilities of the Army at Hawaii---- 70Comparison of strength and losses: Japanese attacking .force andHawaiian defensive forces------ 70

Part III. RospousibImi" in Hawaii-, 75Consciousness of danger from air attack-----4-_---- 75%;Adnair}l, Ximmal' Awarenewp of danger fom air Stt"&k._ . . . 75d General Short's awareness of dangerfrom air attack 79

Plans for thi defons of Hawe0Uau ostfvontXier ............. 81Concept oftheowarln'thePacf --o-- - 87Conolusions with rpet to oonscouqawgs ofd uap fromp asit'attaik--8----------8

V

VI CON1TENTS

Part 111. Responsibilities in flawaii--Contjpued PageInformation sul)l)lied Adiniral 1iinnielbfy Washington indicating the

imminiience of wvar 89Information silpp)lie(d General Short by Washington indicating theimminence of wrw ------r. -- --- 100

Action taken by Admiral Khininel pursuant to warnings and ordersfromin Washington .- 4103

Dispatch of October 16 from Chief of Naval Operations-103D.)ispattch of Nov'emnber 24 from Chief of Naval Operations ..-- -- 104'Thi "War warning" dispatch of November 27-104

Evalhiation of the "War warning" dispatch of November 27-107Oil where, the attack might come-107Other dispatches received on November27- 108"lPsychological handicaps" indicated by Admiral Kimmel-109rrlth "War warning" and training-110The term "Defensive deployment" and failure to institute distantreeonnaissaTneC- 110

Action which was not taken upon receipt of the "War warning"- 117E'stiniate and action taken by G6neral Short with respect to the warn-

ing dispatch of November 27-119No warning of attack on Hawaii------------------------------- 120Dispatches indicating threat of sabotage-121"D)o-Don't" character of the November 27 dispatch and "Avoid-

an ve of war" 123Commnanwding general's reliance on the Navy-125Interference with training ---- ------- --- ---- --- -------.125

The order to undertake reconnaissance-126TIhe Short rl-e --------------- 128Action Which wvas not taken upon receipt of the November 27 dis- 1

patch - -- - 129Tl'he "Code destruction" intelligence 130General Short's knowledge of destruction of confidential matter by

Japalnese conls1late --- ------------------------ 131The "Lost" Japanese carriers-1adlo intelligence a't Hawaii-133The "NTori" call- 107Detection of .Jal)aiese submarine 6n morning of December 7-138IRadar detection of Japalnee raiding fotce 140Other intelligence received by Army and Navy in HawaiiL- I. 142

Channels of iltelligenlee - 142The "M'alnifla message"-142r'ul(e Hlonoliliul press.------------------------------------------- 142

'Firc role of espioatige in the attack . 145LIiaison between Admiral Kimimnel and General Short- 150EI*stiinate of the situdti6n 153

Part IV. Responsibilities In Washington-_-'- 159Basing the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii 'B--159I)cfensive facilities available in Hawaii- 163Transfer of Pacific Fleet units to the Atlantic -- 167"ABC'OT)" understanding? ----------- ------ 168Avoidance of war----------.-------------.172Intelligence available in Washington- ' 179

T'he1"Magic"..,,.. 179Policy with respect to dissemination of magic - 180

"Ships inl harbor" repl)orts ---181Nature of consular espionage -------------------------- - 181C(onclusions with respect to "Ships in harbor" rpots -- 189

The "Windscodle"---~- ;i~,. ,191T}Xe"Vill~lc --------------------------- -------<------ -- 19"Ifidden word" code ,------ 192The "Deadline messages"----.-----' -----i- ------ pr 193Dispatches indicating fraudulent nature of negotiations after Novem'-.

ber 28, 1941------ 195States of diplormatie negotiations And the ArMy dlispatch 6f Novein-

her 27 198--_--.--- --------- 198Failure to follow-up oh the Short Iepy of N6rveuiber 28 - 201The "B3erlin message" .----------.--- ! 204Code destruction Inte6ligenftce.. - - '- ---- - 205The McCollum dispatch ^ * '*'^" 206

CONTENTS vu

Part IV. Responsibilities In Wa'shington-Continued PageEvents of December 6 and 7, 1941-209

The "Pilot message"- 210The fourteen part memorandum-- 211

First thirteenparts- 211Analysis and significance of first thirteen parts proper-212Military significance of "Pilot" and "13-part" messages

apart from messages proper-219The fourteenth part' 221

"One o'clock" and final code destruction messages- 222Events attending transmittal of the December 7 dispatch 224Choice offacililities-225Significance of the "One o'clock" and code destruction messages.. 226

Significant messages translated after the attack-228Intelligence concerning Hawaiian defends-228Considerations responsible for delays in translations- 230

Conclusions with respect to Intelligence available in Washington whichwas not supplied Hawai-232

Estimate of the situation in Washington- 234Nature of responsibilities --237

Duties in Hawaii --- 237Duties in Washihgton -- 238

Unity of command --240General observations --245

The "Wyman Matter" --245The Philippine Attack -- 246Prior inquiries concerning the Pearl Harbor attack-246

Part V. Conclusions and recommendations-- 251Conclusions with respect to responsibilities- 251Recommendations- 252Supervisory, administrative and organizational deficiencies in our

military and naval establishments revealed by the Pearl Harborinvestigation.- 253

Operational and intelligence uiork requires centralization of author-ity and clear-cut allocation of responsibility - 254

Supervisory officials cannot safely take anything for granted in thealerting ofsubordinates- .254

Any doubt as to whether outposts should be given information shouldalways be resolved in favor of supplying the information 255

The delegation of authority or the issuance of orders entails the dutyof inspection to determine that the official mandate is properlyexercised- - 255

The implementation of official orders must be followed wi'th closestsupervision 256

The maintenance of alertftess to responsibility must be insuredthrough repetition-- 256

Complzieficy and procrastination are out of place where sudden anddecisive action are otp e 'essence 2.-257

The coordination and- proper evaluctioi of intelliinece in times ;ofstress must be insured by continuity, bf service< andicentralizationof responsibility, in. cornPeteiU official '257

The unapproachable or 'superior attitude of offlcidil is fat1lX : TheMreshould never be any hesitancy in asking for clarifiedtion of in-structions or in seeking advice on matters thit tre i doubt 258

There is no substititdeor imaination 'an resourefulness on thepart of supervisory and intelligence officials-2B

Communications must; be charaderized by clarity, forthrightness,andappropriatenes-269

There is great danger in careless paraphrase of information receitiedand every effort should bemade to insure that the paraphrasedmrialr feas the truemeaiing of the orginL ., 260

Procedures must be sufficiently flexible to meet the exigencies of'u-USUal sitloationt- 261

Restriction of highl cndentialmniforttation to a ??tivrittin $tt*nber of wals, while often neary, shuld not be carried to thepoint oY prejudicing the work of the organization-261

There is great danger of being blinded by the self-evident- w- 262Officas should at al times give subordinates th benefit of uignifi-

cant Mnformaion-,-*-_--- 262

CONTENTS

Part V. Conclusions and recommendations-Continued PageSupervisory, administrative and organizational deficiences in our

military and naval establishments revealed by the Pearl Harborinvestigation-ContinuedAn official who neglects to familiarize himself in detail with his

organization should forfeit his responsibility- 263Failure can be avoided in the long run only by preparation for any

eventuality 263Officials, on a personal basis, should never countermand an officialinstruction--------------------------------------- 263

Personal or official jealousy will wreck any organization- 264Personal friendship, without more, should never be accepted in lieu

of liaison or confused therewith where the latter is necessary to theproper functioning of two or more agencies- 264

No considerations should be permitted as excuseforfailure to performa fundamentaltask- 265

Superiors must at all times keel) their subordinates adequately in-formed and, conversely, subordinates should keep their superiorsinformed-265nThe adminiistrative organization of any establishment must be de-

signed to locatefailures and to assess responsibility-265in a well-balance(l organization there is close correlation of rcsponsi-

bility and authority----- 266Committee members signing the report-266Additional views of Mr.Keofe-- 266

Appendix A. I-ior investigations concerning the Pearl Harbor attack --- 269The Roberts Commission-269rjhe Hart Inquiry-269The Army P'earl Harbor1Board--. 269The Navy Court of Inquiry-270The Clarke Inquiry-270The Clausen Investigation-270The Hewitt Inquiry-271

Appendix B. Names and positiohs of principal Army and Navy officials inWashington and at Hawaii at the time of the attack along with the lead-ing witnesses in the various proceedings- 275

Organization and personnel of War Department-275Army Air Forces-275

Organization and personnel of Navy Department-276Organization and personnel of Hawaiian Department-276

Hawaiian Air Force-277Staff of Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and United States

Pacific Flcet-277Organization and personnel of Fourteenth Naval District-278

List of -witnesses appearing before the Joint Committee and their as-signments as of December 7, 1941-278

List of leading witnesses in prior proceedings who did not testify beforethe Joint Committee and their assignments as of December 7 1941.-. 279

Appendix C. Communications from the President of the United Statesrelating to the Pearl Harbor investigation-- 285

Appendix D. Review of the diplomatic conversations between the UnitedStates and Japan, and related matters, from the Atlantic Conference inAugust 1941 through December 8, 1941-291

Introductory statement-291Brief r6sum6 of the Japanese-American conversations prior to the

Atlantic Conference- .--------- 293The Atlantic Conference (August 10-14, 1941)-300Pret ident Roosevelt warns Japan against further aggression and at thesame time offers to resume the Japanese-American conversations(August 17, 1941)- 302

Japan protests United States shipments of oil to Russia (August 27,1941).------------------------------------------------------- 305

Premier Konoye sends a personal, message to President Roosevelturging the proposed "Leaders Conference" (August 28, 1941) - 3-- - 06

VIII

CONTENTS

Appendix D-Continued PaceGermany suspects treachery (August 29-30, 1941)-307President Roosevelt replies to Premier Konoye's message (September3,1941)-310

Japan presents new proposals in a new form (September 6 1941) 311Ambassador Grew supports the proposed "Leaders Conference"

(August-September, 1941)-314Japan determines its minimum demands and its maximum concessions

in the negotiations with the United States (September 6, 1941) 316The United States asks Japan to clarify Its new proposals (October 2,1941)- 319

Germany demands that Japan warn the United States that war be-tween Germany and Italy and the United States would lead to warbetween Japan and the United States pursuant to the TripartitePact (October 1941)-325

The Konoye Cabinet falls, and Ambassador Nomura asks permissionto return to Japan (October 16, 1941; October 18-November 5,1941)- 326

The Tojo Cabinet formulates its "Absolutely final proposal" (Novem-ber 5, 1941)-- 331

Ambassador Grew warns that war with Japan may come with "Dra-matie and dangerous suddenness" (November 3, 1941)-335

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek appeals to Great Britain and theUnited States for aid (October 28-November 4, 1941)-337

Japan delivers its next-to-last proposal to the United States (November10, 1941)-344

The 'rojo Cabinet refuses to consider any suggestion less favorable toJapan than its" Absolutely final proposal" (November 1S-19, 1941). 355

Japan delivers its "Absolutely final proposal" to the United States anddemands an agreement on that basis (November 20, 1941) - 360

The United States replies (November 26, 1941)-------------------- 363The Tojo Cabinet makes a pretense of continuing the Japanese-American conversations and at the same time moves additional,Japanese troops into southern Indochina (November 27-December7,194 1)- 387

The invasion of Thailand by Japanese forces from French Indochinaappears imminent (December 1-7, 1941)-405

Germany tells Japan the time is ripe to strike at the United States,and promises to join with Japan in war against the United States(November 29,1941)- 409

President Roosevelt returns to Washington as the far eastern situationmoves rapidly toward a climax (December 1, 1941) --411

President Roosevelt asks the Japanese Government to explain itspurpose in moving additional troops into southern Indochina(December 2, 1941) --415

The Japanese Government claims its troop movements in FrenchIndochina are for the purpose of defense against an attack by theChinese (December 5, 1941) --421

The last hours (December 6-8, 1941) --424Appendix E. The "Winds Code" --469

Establishment and nature of the "Winds Code" --469Efforts to monitor --- 471Considerations bearing on the possibility of a message in execution ofthe "Winds Code" having-been received prior to December 7,1941. 471

Considerations militating against likelihood of "Winds Code" executemessage having been received prior to December 7, 1941-475

Appendix F. Geographical considerations and Navy and Army instaila-tions - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --489

Geographical considerations-489Navy and Army installations- 490

Navy ------------------------------------490Army-491

Illustrations------. ----------- 490

FOREWORDOn Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, the United States and

Japan were. at peace. Japanese ambassadors were in Washington inconversation with our diplomatic officials looking to a general settle-ment of differences in the Pacific.At 7:55 a. m. (Hawaiian time) over 300 Japanese planes launched

from 6 aircraft carriers attacked the island of Oahu and the American,Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii. Within aperiod of less than 2 hours our military and naval forces suffered a totalof 3,435 casualties in personnel and the loss of or severe damage to:188 planes of all types, 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, and 4 miscel-laneous vessels.The attack was well planned and skillfully executed. The Japanese

raiders withdrew from the attack and were recovered by the carrierswithout the latter being detected, having suffered losses of less than100 in personnel, 29 planes, and 5 midget submarines which had beendispatched from mother craft that coordinated their attack with thatof the planes.One hour after Japanese air and naval forces had struck the Territory

of Hawaii the emissaries of JApan delivered to the Secretary of State areply to a recent American notes a reply containing no suggestion ofattack by Japan upon the United States. With the benefit of informa-tion now available it is known that the Japanese military had plannedfor many weeks the unprovoked and ambitious act of December 7.The Pyrrhic victory of having executed the attack with surprise,

cunning, and deceit belongs to the wax lords of Japan whose dreams ofconquest were buried in the ashes of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Historywill properly place responsibility for Pearl Harbor upon the militaryclique dommnating the people of Japan at the time. Indeed, thisresponsibility Premier Tojo himself has already 'assumed.We come today, over 4 years after the event, not to detract from

this responsibility but to record for posterity the facts of the disaster.In another sense we seek to find lessons to avoid pitfalls in the futureto evolve constructive suggestions for the protection of our nationalsecurity, and to determine whether there were failures in our ownmilitary and naval establishments which in any measure may havecontributed to the extent and intensity of the disaster.

xi

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

On November 15, 1945, the Joint Congressional Committee on the-Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Atoack held its first public hearingspursuant to Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 27, Seventy-ninthCongress, first session, as follows:'

IN THE SENATE 0F THE UNITED SATESSimr xa at 19

Mr. BASIlr submitted tbo t ooncurwt resolution; which waseonsided, mod nd agreed to

BZnsZA(X 11, 194

House 011U

CONCUZUWKT RUSQLUTONRecoled by, the Senae (the HRouse -foJ prcnapiues cancurrinl), That there is

hereby established a joint commlttee Qn the Investigation-of the Pearl Harborattack, to be eorniposed of five Members of the Sehate (not more than three ofwhom shall be members of the majority party, to be appointed by the Presidentpro tempore, and five Members of the House of Representatives (not more thanthree of whom shl be Members of tb majority party) to be appointed by theSpeker of the House. Vacancies In the membership ofthe committee ohall notaffect the power. of the remaintig members to execUte the functions of the com-mittee, and shall be filled in the same manner as i the ease of the original selection.The committee shall select a chairman anda vioe chairman from among its mem-bers.

SEc. 2. The committee shalt inke a full and complete investigation of thefacts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the attackmade by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory 9f Hawaiion December .7, 1941, and shall report to the maste and the House -of Repre-sqntative z ot later than snway 3, 19, the results of it. Investigation,toethor with such.rrommerdtions as it may deem advisable.

Stc.3. e testimony of any persn"inthei armed services, and the fact thatsuch person testified before the jbint dommitbse boio provided for,. taU not beused against him in any court proceeding, or 1wl against him in examining hismi1itry status for credits In the vice to which hie belongs.

SBsC 4 (a) The corxnmitte, or any dulry authorized subcommittee thereof, isauthorized t' sit and act at suchl and time during the sessions, reeves andadjourn periods of the Serntysnith. s (prior to January 38, i4> torequire by subpeAei or otherie the ttn 61 such witnesses and the pro-duction ot such books, papers, and documasts, t minister such oaths, to takesuch testimony, to procure s4ch rlttnX and binding and to make such epndi-tures a It dees advisable. e cost of senograp'hic services to report uchhearings shall not tbe in excess of 25 cents per hundied ords.

(b)The committee is empowered to appoi and Ox the comption of suchexperts, consultjtats, and clerical and sheographic assstats aaIt deems necessary,but the compenacUn so fixed sll not exAed the competition p ed underthe Cla~slcatlon: Act of 1923, au amended, for compaabie i.

(c) The expense of the eor it which shell not e d $25 O0, shall bepaid one-hl from the contingent fund of the Senate and Qas-baitrianz the cone'The authority of the ooznmlttn ltbtobe 5nS. Con. Va. No. 0.1K, bo.tthe Senate on September 6 1945, andeGon la by 3 Housn of e st U.1,and m extended by both uonU.3 eb. 0.,7btiS4ntRs., jtw No.

54.79th Cong., 2d s_.fl.

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

tingent fund of the House of Representatives, upon vouchers signed by thechoirnlani.

Passed the Senate September 6, 1945.Attest: LESLIE L. BIFFLE,

Passed the House of Represenitatives September 11, 1945. Secretary.Attest:

'SOUTH THIMBLE,Clerk.

Ol 70 days subsequent to November 15 and pridr to and includingMay .31, 1945, open hearings were conducted in the course of whichsome 15,000 pages of testimony were taken and a total of 183 exhibitsreceived incident to an examination of 43 witnesses.Of nasistance to the committee and its work were the testimony and

eXhil)its of seven prior investigations concerning the Pearl Harborattack, including inquiries conducted by the Roberts Commission, 2Admiral I'homnas C. Hlart,' the Army Pearl Harbor Board,4 the NavyCourt, of Inquiiry,5 Col. Carter W. Clarke,' Maj. Henry C. Clau-Senl,7 all(l Admiral II. Kent Heiitt.l For purposes of convenientreferencee there has been set forth in appendix A to this report a state-men1t COnTernI'nlig the scope and character .Qf each of these prior pro-ceedings, the records of which. total 9,754 printed pages of testimonyfrom 318 witnesses and the attendant 469 exhibits. The'r'ecords ofthese proceedings have ben incorporatedd as exhibits to the record ofthe committee which encompasses approximately 10,O0,000 words.

All witnesses appeared under oath and were afforded the fullestopportunity to offer any and all information which was regarded ashaving any relationship whatever to the disaster. In the course ofexamination by committee counsel and the committee membersthemselves, an effort was made to elicit all facts having an immedi-ate or remote bearing on the tragedy of December 7, 1941. It isbelieved the committee has succeeded though its record in preserv-ing for posterity the material facts concerning the disaster.

Tihe figures and witnesses in the drama of Pearl; Harbor ran thegamut of officials of the executive branch of the Goveriiment. Theprincipal personalities in the picture were the rPresidenit of the. UnitedStates, Franklin D. Roosevelt; the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull;the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson; the Secretary of Navy,Frank Knox; the Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall; the Chief ofNaval Operations, Harold R. Stark; the commander in chief of' thePacific' Fleet, Husband E. Kimmel; and the commanding general ofthe Hawaiian Department, Walter C. Short. In appendix B to thisreport there are set forth the names 'and positions of the ranking Armyand Navy officials il Washington anid at Hawaii at the time df theattack along with the principal witnesses in the various proceed"ngs-The committee's inVe(tination has extended to the files of all

pertinent )ranches of thie Government. Instructionsi in this regardfrom the Presidelit of the United States, Harry S. Truian, to vartiodsdepartments will be found in appendix C to this report. The comn-mittee through its counsel requested Miss Grace Tully, custodian. ofthe files of thfe late President Roosevelt to furnish the committee all

For proceedings of the Roberta pommission, see coinmfit exhibit $.oi13.* For proceedings oWithv. Hart lquiryi ste cqmittee Axhltit Noe. 14 ;.I4 For proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, see committee exhibit No. 145For proceeding of the Navy Court of Inquiry, see committee exhibit No. 148.

* For proIedigsof th&('Carke investigation. see committee exhibit No. 147.7 For report of Inves otiton conducted by Major Clausen, see committee exhibit No. 148.' For proceedings of the Hewitt inquiry, see committee exhibit No. 149.

XIV

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT XV

papers in these files for the year 1941 relating to Japan, the imminenceof war in the Pacific, an-d the general Far Eastern developments.She furnished such papers in response to this request as she consideredmight be involved and stood ready to testify before the committee atany time.

All parties in interest have attested to the fact that they have beenafforded a full, fair, and impartial public hearing before the committee.All witnesses who retained counsel-Admiral Stark, Admiral Kimmel,and GeneralShort-were given the opportunity to be examined bytheir counsel if they so desired, and to submit questions to committeecounsel to be asked other witnesses.The following action was not taken by the committee for the reasons

indicated:(1) Former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson was not called

before the committee as a witness for the reason that his health wouldnot permit. Mr. Stimson did, however, submit a statement- underoath for the committee's consideration and the answers supplied byhim to interrogatories propounded were considered by the committee.He supplied the portions of his personal diary requested by committeecounsel and informed the committee that the portions of his dilirynow in evidence are the'only portions thereof having any relationshipto the Pearl Harbor investigation.

(2) Former Ambassador to Japan Joseph-Grew appeared before thecommittee as a witness and testified to material appearing in hispersonal diary having a relationship to the events and circumstancesof the Pearl Harbor attack. _Dn the basis of his personal representa-tion that no additional material pertinent to the subject of the com-mittee's inquiry appeared in his diary beyond that to which he hadtestified, the committee did not formally request or otherwise~seek torequire the production of Mr, Grew's complete diary.

(3) A request by one member of the committee or the appearanceof the former Prime Minister of Englanid, Mr. Winston Churchill,was disapproved by a majority of the committee. At the time MrChurchill was a guest in the United States and it was not felt that heshould with propriety be requested to appear as a witness,.

(4) A request by one member of the committee for productionby the State Department of all papers relating to the so-called TyierKent case was disapproved by a majority of the committee. ilheState Department had advised that- these papers were in no waypertinent to the subject of the committee's inquiry, and, addlit.iontll,;members of the committee had discussed the question with Mr.Kent who advised that he possessed nokfacts that would in any- wayhave relationship to the Pearl Harborattack.iFormer Secretary of State Cordell Hull appeared before thW comb

mittee but was forced to retire by reason of failing health beforecompletion of the examination by all members of the committee.Mr. Hull subsequently responded to interrogatories propounded bythe committee.The committee has conceived its duty to be not only that of indicat-

ing the nature and scope of responsibility for the-disaster but also ofrecording the pertinent considerations relating to the greatest defeat inour military and naval history. Only through a reasonable amountof detail is it possible to place events and responsibilities in their properperspective and give to the Nation a genuine appreciation of thesalient facts concerning Pearl Harbor. For this reason our report is

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

of somewhat greater length than was initially believed necessary. Itis to be recalled in this connection, however, that the over-all recordof the committee comprehends some ten million words. It was felttherefore that the story of the antecedent, contemporaneous, and suc-ceeding events attenllhing the disaster could not be properly encom-passed within a report any more concise than that herewith submitted.We believe there is much to be learned of a constructive character

as a result of the Japanese attack from the standpoint of legislationand, additionally, for guidance in avoiding the possibility of anothermilitary disaster such as Pearl Harbor. Accordingly, iL the sectiondevoted to recommendations there are set forth, mn addition to therecommendations proper, a series of principles, based on errors re-vealed by the investigation, which are being commended to our mili-tary and naval services for their consideration and possible assistance.Our report does not purport to set forth or refer to all of the enor-

mous volume of testimony and evidence adduced in the course of thePearl Harbor investigation. It is believed, however, that the ma-terial facts relevant to the disaster have been outlined in the report.The committee's record and the records of all prior investigationshave been printed and are available for review and study. It is to beborne in mind that the, findings and conclusions are based on thefacts presently in our record after an exhaustive investigation.We desire to acknowledge particular gratitude to those who have

acted as counsel to the committee for their excellent work during thecourse of thle investigation and for their magnificent assistance incompiling the facts for the committee in order that we might drawour conclusions, which are necessarily those of the committee only.

In the following pages an effort has been made to present a reviewof the diplomatic and historical setting of the Pear] Harbor attackfollowed by a picture of the Japanese attack itself. Set forth there-after are separate -treatments of responsibilities in Hawaii on the onehand and responsibilities in Washington on the other. Situationsexisting in our Army and Navy establishments having a proximate orcausative relationship to the disaster have been distinguished fromthose which, while not to be condoned, are regarded as having nodirect or reasonable bearing on the conditions prevailing at Hawaiipreceding and in the wake of the Japanese attack on Sunday moving,December 7, 1941. To assist in following and better appreciatingthe story of the attack there has been outlined in appendix F thegeographical considerations and military installations playing a rolein and relating to the disaster.Throughout the report italics have been freely employed to facilitate

reading and to bring out more clearly matters regarded as of particularimportance.

XVI