ipv6 wifi internet security 23-27 may 2016, bangkok

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International Telecommunication Union IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok, Thailand 26 May 2016 – Session x By Ronald van Kleunen (CEO Globeron Pte Ltd) [email protected]

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Page 1: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

International Telecommunication Union

IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok, Thailand

26 May 2016 – Session x

By Ronald van Kleunen (CEO Globeron Pte Ltd) [email protected]

Page 2: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

2 2

Session x: WiFi Internet Security

Objective: To learn overall topics on implementing security measures in Wifi networks including its monitoring from IPv4 and IPv6 perspective.

Demonstration of implementing Wifi security measures

Page 3: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

Wireless Security Initiatives by ITU and WiFi Organisations

3

Page 4: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

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SSC – Smart Sustainable Cities and CyberSecurity

Integrated Management

ITU–T Study Group 20 IoT

ITU-T Focus Group FG-SSC-0090-R7

An ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU–T)

Technical Report on “Cybersecurity, data protection and cyber

resilience in Smart Sustainable Cities” takes a direct approach to

its discussion of the most prominent cyberthreats to smart cities.

ITU

Page 5: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

Consists of member organizations – primarily equipment vendors Certifies Wi-Fi equipment for interoperability Promote adoption of IEEE 802.11 standards in the market

Consists of member

individuals Design and document network protocols, such as:

802.3 Ethernet 802.11 Wi-Fi 802.15 Bluetooth 802.16 WiMAX

Certifies Products

Set Local Regulations

Creates Standards

WI-FI ORGANIZATIONS

1.3

Page 6: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

WIRELESS TRAINING & EDUCATION - VENDOR NEUTRAL WIRELESS CERTIFICATION ROADMAP

Expert Level #108 Trainer Level CWNT Learning Partner Level 1st in APAC since 2005

Certified Wireless Technology Specialist

Certified Wireless Network Administrator

(RF,Antenna, Protocols, Spectrum analysis, Site Survey)

Security Analysis Design

Expert Level

Page 7: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

Wireless Communication Layers in the stacks

7

Page 8: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

PROTOCOLS AT EACH LAYER (TCP/IP VS OSI MODEL)

7 Application

6 Presentation

5 Session

4 Transport

3 Network

2 Data Link

1 Physical

Application

Transport (Host-to-host)

Internet

Link (Network Interface or

Network Access)

TCP/IP Model OSI Model

DNS, DHCP, LDAP, HTTP, FTP, TFTP, SNMP, SMTP, POP3, IMAP4, SMB

TCP, UDP

IPv4, IPv6, ARP, IGMP, ICMP, IPSec, RIP, OSPF

Ethernet, Wi-Fi

Page 9: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

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WIRELESS INFRASTRUCTURE OVERVIEW

Wireless – Wireless - Access - Wired - Wired - Wired - Access - Wireless - Wireless Client Medium Point Medium Bridge/Switch Medium Point Medium Client

Page 10: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

10

WIRELESS COMMUNICATION LAYERS – OSI LAYERS

IPv4 IPv6 IPv4 IPv6

Wirele

ss

Wirele

ss

Page 11: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

Wireless Tools operate at OSI layers 1 and 2

11

Page 12: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

SPECTRUM ANALYZERS – OSI LAYER 1

Page 13: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

OSI LAYER 2 - DISCOVERY / SCANNING

Beacon: Status and capability information that is broadcasted at a scheduled interval Probe Request: A request from a client for most of the same AP information that is found in a beacon Probe Response: A response from the AP to a client that sent a correct probe request

Active Scanning Passive Scanning

Beacons

Beacons

Beacons

Beacons

AP Discovery

Page 14: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

OSI LAYER 2 - WLAN PROTOCOL ANALYZERS

Page 15: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

OSI LAYER 1 AND 2 - RF SITE SURVEYS AND MONITORING

Page 16: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

WIRELESS INFRASTRUCTURE AND NETWORK ACCESS CONTROL (NAC)

Ensures all appropriate policies and security

mechanisms are met by endpoints

Policies are applied to enforce security on a

network

Includes requirements like antivirus software

version and scans, OS updates, security patches,

firewalls, user restrictions, etc.

RADIUS Directory

Services WLAN

Controller

Authentication & Authorization

Posture Assessment

Quarantine

Remediation

NAC

Appliance

NAC Endpoint

WPA/WPA2 network authentication

NAC posture assessment and response

Page 17: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

ENTERPRISE WIPS TOPOLOGY (WIRELESS INTRUSION PREVENTION SYSTEMS)

WIPS Server WIPS Console

WIPS Sensors WIPS Sensors

Page 18: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

Wireless operates at Layer 1 and 2, why bother about IPv4 and IPv6 ?

18

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Wireless Access Points (AP) are layer 2 devices, but require an IP address to a wireless LAN or cloud controller for management purposes

The wired side requires a dual stack or NAT (Network Address Translation)

features. Similar for Wireless Routers (Layer 3). Both can setup a tunnel

to centralised management devices.

Wireless LAN and Cloud controllers and Wireless Network Management Systems require a dual stack to support adoption of the Wireless access points and secure communications between them via secure tunnels

Wireless Sensors (Access Points in “listening” mode) require a dual stack

Wireless Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (WIDPS) require a dual stack

IPV4 AND IPV6 RELATIONS TO WIRELESS INFRASTRUCTURES

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Network related services:

DHCPv6 (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) to support IPv6 addressing to issue IP address to Access Points and Sensors (e.g. large wireless network deployments) for stateless and statefull auto-configuration

(IETF RFC 3315, 3319, 3633, 3646, 3736, 5007, 6221)

ICMPv6 - Internet Control Message Protocol version 6 (IETF RFC 4443)

Mobile IPv6 or MIPv6 (IETF RFC 6275) to allow mobile device users to move from one network to another while maintaining a permanent IP address

DNS extensions (IETF RFC 3596, 3901, 4472)

Routing extensions (IETF RFC 6564)

(because of IEEE 802.11ac and 802.11n distributed forwarding designs)

Enterprise class environments require RADIUS (Remote Access Dial-in User Services) and related options to include IPv6 addressing

LDAP (Light weight Directory Access Protocol)

IPV4 AND IPV6 RELATIONS TO WIRELESS INFRASTRUCTURES

Page 21: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

Wireless Security Risks

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Exponential increase of wireless networks (WISP, Hotspot, Corporate/Home, Neighbours, Ad-Hoc, Direct) and many end-user devices

Wireless is an extension of the wired network, but wireless propagation goes further than you think

Different type of devices on the network, each having their own security settings (and limitations)

Many (wireless) freeware tools on the internet to “hack” the network

Lack of end-user awareness how wireless communications work

Policy creation (if any) and enforcement

WIRELESS SECURITY RISKS

Page 23: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

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Default configurations of wireless equipment

Limited end-point security

Unauthorized implementations of wireless networks

(e.g. contractors, employees setting up their own wireless networks)

“Tethering”

End users not familiar with corporate use policy and limited knowledge how to recognize / enforce security

Lack of 24x7 wireless security monitoring and reporting

No standardization on wireless design and wireless security

but in progress with WiFi industry experts

WIRELESS SECURITY RISKS

Page 24: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

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Airline and agreements with telecom providers

Mobile hotspot with wrong SSID delayed an airplane in Australia

(2nd of May 2016)

Software Defined Radios (SDR) how many radios are on an airplane

Boeing 737 – passengers

A380 – passengers with mobile phones (Cellular, WiFi)

No standardization on policies

Some airlines allow mobile devices continuously on some airlines don’t allow it, but there is no policy enforcement

WIRELESS SECURITY RISKS - AVIATION

Page 25: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

WIFI – EXAMPLE OF WIRELESS SECURITY ISSUES

25

Hacker

INTRANET

INTERNET

Desktop

Rogue APs

Non-Compliant APs

Municipal Wi-Fi

Leaking Wired Traffic & Insertion

Hotspot Phishing

Hotspot Evil Twin

Mobile User

Laptop

AP

Server

Page 26: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

WIFI - WIRELESS VULNERABILITIES

Type Attacks

Reconnaissance

Rogue APs

Open/Misconfigured APs

Ad Hoc stations

Sniffing/Eavesdropping

WEP, WPA, LEAP cracking

Dictionary attacks / Brute Force / Rainbow Tables

Leaky APs

Masquerade

MAC spoofing

HotSpot attacks

Evil Twin / Wi-Phishing attacks

Insertion

Multicast / Broadcast injection

Routing cache poisoning

Man in the Middle attacks (MITM)

Denial-of-Service

Disassociation

Duration field spoofing

RF jamming

Page 27: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

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MOBILE – EXAMPLE OF WIRELESS SECURITY ISSUES

Home Location Register

Visitor Location Register

Mobile Station Controller

Base Station Controller

Base Transceiver Station

International mobile subscriber identity

International Mobile Station Equipment Identity

Vulnerabilities: • IMEI • BTS – BSC • HLR • VLR

Page 28: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

MOBILE - WIRELESS VULNERABILITIES

Type Attacks

Reconnaissance Baseband Fuzzing (Rogue BTS)

Sniffing/Eavesdropping (Telco’s Protocol Analysers?)

Masquerade IMEI spoofing (using MTK/SDK boards)

Insertion

IMSI Detach, send multiple Location Update Requests

including spoofed IMSI. Prevent SIM from receiving calls

and SMS (only backend HLR is off), but still can call and

SMS

Denial-of-Service

Request Channel Allocation

(Flood BTS and possible BSC)

RF jamming

IMSI Flood (pre-authentication) and overload HLR/VLR

IMSI Detach also disconnects user

Page 29: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

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iPhone/iPad/iPod

Android

Blackberry

Windows phone

Tethering / Hotspot using a mobile phone Termination by service providers

Case: hotel USD 600.000 fine by FCC

and public council WiFi provider USD 750.000 fine by FCC

Naming of hotspots

http://mashable.com/2016/05/02/qantas-wifi-scare/#P9g.PDs.IGqX

MOBILE DEVICE SECURITY

Page 30: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

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BlueTooth

Virus / Worms / Malware

Listening to phone calls (headset) or car audio systems

Changing languages (“DoS”)

Car Hacking via Bluetooth (Controlling the car)

NFC (Near Field Communication)

Credit Cards with NFC communication

Transportation cards (“Bus”, “Train”)

Toll gates using wireless cards

Hotel Key cards

ZigBee

Home Automation equipment

Floor Controllers

Thermostats

OTHER WIRELESS SECURITY RISKS

Page 31: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

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http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/20/technology/security/drone-phone/

http://ht3.cdn.turner.com/money/big/technology/2014/03/20/t-drone-steals-phone-info.cnnmoney_620x348_dl.flv

20 March 2014 Snoopy - Drone can steal what's on your phone via WiFi (kind of a HoneyPot attack)

The research will be presented at the Black Hat Asia cybersecurity conference in Singapore 25-28 March 2014

Page 32: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

WiFi Security measures Demo

32

Page 33: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

Live Demonstration

Wireless Security and protection using a

Wireless Intrusion Prevention System

Page 34: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

Disclaimer

All demonstrations are done in

compliance with the laws in Thailand

(Thai Computer Crime Misuse Act)

Demonstration:

1. What is Radio Frequency (RF) WiFi ?

2. DoS – Denial of Service attacks

3. Evil Twin and impersonation attacks

4. Rogue clients and

Rogue Access Points (AP) mitigation techniques

4. WiFi Forensic analysis

5. 24x7 Wireless Security Compliance reporting

Page 35: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

Education – Standardization in the organisation by having certified personnel who understand the wireless

security risks and use the same terminology.

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Skilled wireless professionals

Certified Wireless Trainer

Certified Wireless & Cabling installers and the right wireless + cabling measurement tools

Certified Wireless Support teams

Certified Sales Person Selling Wireless

Certified Wireless Auditor

Certified Wireless Designer and Technical Specialist

Certified Wireless Professionals & Customer

Customer

Customer

Page 37: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

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aligned with ISO/IEC 27001 ISMS standard

Wireless Service Security Management System (WSSMS)

Note: Wireless = Mobile/Cellular, WiFi and indoor/outdoor mission/business critical wireless technologies

.

aligned with ISO/IEC 20000 ITSMS standard

Wireless Service Management System (WSMS)

Standardization

Page 38: IPv6 WiFi Internet Security 23-27 May 2016, Bangkok

International Telecommunication Union

End of Session