1

THE IMPACT OF IRAQ ON HUMANITARIANISM

Gianni Rufini

PRDU – York University 2005

In the last twenty years, humanitarianism has gone through a dramatic evolution of its role, technical

profile and ethic framework. Changes have normally been triggered by the most politically sensitive

crises, whereas the relationship of the humanitarian community with the political establishment has

swung between sympathy and idiosyncrasy. Such dynamics has largely undermined all the efforts to

establish a virtuous interaction of the two dimensions, based on respect of roles and commitment to

humanitarian law, at the same time as it has stimulated and fuelled the diversification of visions among

the concerned institutions and organisations.

This is the case for the war in Iraq, which has highlighted the increasing vulnerability of the

humanitarian system vis à vis the uncertainty of the political environment, the growing role of state

actors and the increasing security threats, like the events in the fall of the second year of occupation.

On 7 September 2004 the NGO community was shaken by news of the kidnapping, in Baghdad, of

two Italian aid workers, Simona Pari and Simona Torretta, soon become familiar as "le due Simone"

(the two Simonas). The two young women were employed by a solidarity organisation called "Un

ponte per…", active in Iraq since the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991. After a secret negotiation and

the likely payment of a ransom by the Italian Government, the two Simonas were eventually released.

On 19 October, Care International's Margaret Hassan - 20 years in the country, married to an Iraqi -

was also kidnapped. Care, which had maintained assistance programs in Iraq throughout the 1990s

including the run-up to war, announced the closure of all activities in the country. After one month

Hassan was killed. Between the two events, almost all NGO expatriates had been withdrawn from

Iraq.

Getting prepared for the war

2

The crisis in Iraq had begun under a very negative star for humanitarians. The build up to the conflict

took place throughout 2002. By the last quarter of that year the probability that there would be a major

conflict had become apparent to most in the aid community. The UN started contingency planning for

a possible conflict in October with the first of the so-called 'Versoix meetings'1. Due to the political

constraints at the Security Council, preparation had to be done in secrecy and participants were bound

to confidentiality.

Nonetheless, information leaked and the predicted scenario was scaring: “the collapse of essential

services in Iraq could lead to a humanitarian emergency of proportions well beyond the capacity of

U.N. agencies and other aid organizations.”, “as many as 500,000 could require treatment to a greater

or lesser degree as a result of direct or indirect injuries”, “the outbreak of diseases in epidemic if not

pandemic proportions is very likely” , “the nutritional status of some 3 million persons countrywide will

be dire and that they will require therapeutic feeding”, “It is estimated that there will eventually be

some 900,000 Iraqi refugees requiring assistance” plus 500.000 IDPs2 . Although another meeting, at

ODI in London, drew a less pessimistic picture: “Overall, conditions are certainly poor, but people have

saved up an average of about five weeks of food in addition to rations; people are preparing for a

siege. The government in Baghdad has been locating shallow wells to provide water in case of siege.

If a military administration wanted to provide essential humanitarian goods rapidly once the area is

stabilised, that potential for humanitarian protection now exists in a way that it hasn't in recent years”3

1 Versoix is a suburb of Geneva, where numerous humanitarian and UN organisations have their meeting and training facilities 2 Likely Humanitarian Scenarios - "strictly confidential" UN draft. Geneva, 10 December 2002 This "strictly confidential" UN document examines "Likely Humanitarian Scenarios" in the event of a war in Iraq. It was written to assist with UN contingency planning for safeguarding the wellbeing of a population most of whom the document acknowledges are "highly dependent" upon a Government ration for their basic needs. The existence of this document was first reported in The Times (London) on 23 December 2002, in an article entitled "UN chief issues secret orders for war in Iraq". It is published at http://www.casi.org.uk/info/undocs/war021210notes.html 3 ODI - Transcripts from the meeting ‘Iraq: war, law and humanitarian protection’. Held at the Overseas Development Institute. London, 22 January 2003

3

and recommended humanitarian organisations to rather play an active role in seeing that international

humanitarian law was applied.

Whatever the forecast, the big issue was whether and under what conditions humanitarians could

work in a conflict where belligerents are "our belligerents" and whether financing for relief should be

accepted from those same governments who fought the war. From Kosovo to Afghanistan, this

dilemma has repeatedly animated the humanitarian debate. Agencies' reactions to such dynamics are

diversified: some have withdrawn into their ethical fortress, others have accepted mingling with

politics. All have suffered from the contradictions inherent in the choice between following the funding,

for ensuring continuity and development for their action, and remaining consistent with principles, thus

preserving their credibility. This has brought a polarization between "interventionists" and "neutralists",

which underlies all classifications of the humanitarian world.

In January 2003, the Pentagon informed NGOs that the U.S. military's plans did not include policing or

protection and that not much could be done in terms of humanitarian assistance by the occupying

force, at the beginning of the conflict, thus falling well short of the threshold required for the U.S. to

meet its obligations under International Humanitarian Law. “With the UN planning to evacuate in the

event of hostilities and NGO capacity in Iraq and the wider region extremely limited, there will be a

humanitarian vacuum that the U.S. will have a responsibility to fill. The prospect of a quick hand over

to the UN and NGOs to take care of the Iraqi population is illusory”.4

Also, the decision was made to concentrate coordination and planning concerning humanitarian aid in

the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), under the Department of

Defence. This included the authority to release permits for access to International NGOs. The Office's

CEO was Jay Garner, a retired general with an experience of Iraq who was, until just a few weeks

earlier “an executive at a leading defence contractor working on missile systems that would be used to

4 ibidem

4

bomb Baghdad. Although a Pentagon official said Jay Garner's new role does not constitute a conflict

of interest, ethics experts say the appointment raises troubling questions”.5

Across the aid community there was confusion about why the coordination of a post-conflict Iraq

should be headquartered at the Pentagon. InterAction6, in a letter to President Bush, advocated for the

coordination to be placed under civilian authorities: “The relief professionals at the U.S. Agency for

International Development and at the Department of State, not members of the military establishment

at the Pentagon, know best how to conduct emergency assistance operations (...) U.S. AID and State

are familiar with the principles of independence and impartiality under which we must operate.” The

letter also stressed that to “force nongovernmental organizations to operate under DoD jurisdiction

complicates our ability to help the Iraqi people and multiplies the dangers faced by relief workers in the

field”. 7

The concern about military-civilian relations was very high. The Versoix meeting report warned: “For

years, as part of the debate over the role of the post-modern armed forces the military have attempted

to carve a niche for themselves in the direct delivery of assistance instead of the previous stance of

providing logistics and engineering support to humanitarian organisations. This is very much an

uncharted field that has, a priori, more "cons" than "pros". US/DOD is the most proactive military

establishment in the prosecution of such a role—see the extensive utilization of military/civil affairs

staff in Afghanistan”8.

5 USA: General/Defense Contractor to Rebuild Iraq. Conflict of Interest? - By David Lazarus - San Francisco Chronicle. 26 February 2003 6 The largest US alliance of nongovernmental organizations conducting overseas relief and development, based in Washington DC 7 Letter of Feb. 5, 2003. Reported by Mary E. McClymont, CEO InterAction, 7 April 2003 8 Likely Humanitarian Scenarios, op. cit.

5

The second "Versoix" meeting, on 12 and 13 January 2003, "turned out to be quite a large event with

attendance from all major UN humanitarian and development agencies, UN staff from different

agencies based in Iraq and eight surrounding countries, IOM, the Red Cross Movement, and the three

NGO networks that are members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)"9. On 15 January,

the French daily "Le Monde" published a report on the "Versoix II", and a confidential UN document,

revealing different scenarios for humanitarian operations, appeared on the Internet.

In a meeting in February, American NGOs complained that the dialogue between aid organizations

and the military had been handled poorly, which had undermined previous progress. “This has

resulted in bringing levels of trust to an all-time low." Aid agencies hoped to find new channels of

communication. There was considerable scepticism, however, that the military would share its plans or

be willing to adjust them. As one participant expressed it, the USG administration was in the process

of "militarizing the entire aid process and they have been reluctant to be forthcoming in any detail

because they don't want to be second guessed or criticized. They plan to call in NGOs only if and

when they need them. In the military's eye, partnership means control.” 10

Some commentators invited NGOs to negotiate their involvement on a firm stand: “Despite financial

incentives to join the fray, humanitarian organisations have ample reason to fear that an aid effort

which is simply an extension of a political-military agenda will cut them off from reaching many of

those in urgent need. Perhaps it is time for a radical approach. Humanitarian agencies that resist

being taken for granted should stipulate the conditions under which they are prepared to become

involved in aid activities during or after an eventual war. Rather than politicising humanitarian action,

their initiative would underscore the importance of maintaining their neutrality and independence. In

the meantime, the United States and other military forces that prosecute an eventual war would 9 Meeting on Contingency Planning and Preparedness for Iraq “Versoix II”. Geneva, 12 and 13 January 2003, ICVA Note for the File. 10 Summary: Roundtable on Humanitarian Action in Iraq. From a meeting held on 3 February, 2003 hosted by the Institute for the Study of International Migration (ISIM) - Georgetown University - Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.

6

themselves be obliged to accept the responsibilities of belligerents under international humanitarian

law to stanch the wounds they inflict”. 11

The broad understanding in the community was that the space for NGOs was seriously shrinking, at

the same time as many corporate contractors were pre-assigned contracts concerning rehabilitation

and logistic activities. These seemed interfering with the domain of humanitarian organisations,

suggesting an attempt to "corporatize" aid.

The humanitarian response timeline

In the advent of the war, some agencies had hundreds of local staff and the UN had over 1,000

international staff in country, including monitors of the Oil-for-Food program and 60 staff for the UN

country team. In addition, over 3,000 national staff were working in Iraq under the UN Oil for Food

program. The ICRC, at its peak, maintained 130 foreign aid workers in Iraq. On Day-1 of the war, the

ICRC and MSF were the only international humanitarian organisations that could claim having some

presence, albeit merely symbolic (8 ICRC and 5 MSF staff), in the country.

More than 150 NGOs had based their operations in Jordan, Syria, Iran and Kuwait: they were well

equipped and prepared to intervene with supplies and personnel, but forbidden to cross the border.

The military authority envisaged keeping NGOs out of the country until the end of hostilities. Later,

agencies would be allowed to carry out trans-border operations to assist IDPs, while keeping their

project headquarters abroad. Given the existing constraints, the best efforts made in terms of

preparedness had consisted of setting up camps and stocking food, blankets and other items for the

predicted 1.4 million refugees and IDPs.

11 Larry Minear - Agencies should resist being taken for granted in Iraq. AlertNet, 17 Jaunary 2003

7

In a statement of 20 March, Save the Children UK firmly urged "the warring parties to uphold their

obligations with regard to the protection of civilian populations (Article 48 and 50 of Protocol I of the

Geneva Conventions)12 and to refrain from using military ordnance that harms civilians" and to

"guarantee full and secure access to affected populations for adequate humanitarian supplies" with a

"clear separation between impartial humanitarian action and the role of the military”. 13

On the same day, the Coalition forces launched early morning air strikes at sites near Baghdad.

Ground war began in the afternoon near Kuwaiti border. On 28 March, with the port of Umm Qasr

partially cleared of mines, a British ship made the first sizable humanitarian delivery. On 9 April,

American commanders declared that Saddam's regime no longer ruled Baghdad. Crowds went on

looting rampages. Looters ransacked government offices, embassies, hospitals, businesses and the

Iraq National Museum. Unexpectedly, there was a very limited movement of displaced people, who

numbered a few thousands.

Under International Humanitarian Law, the occupying power has certain responsibilities. It has to

ensure that the needs of the inhabitants of a territory are met in terms of assistance, food, water,

hygiene. The occupying power has a duty to cooperate with humanitarian agencies and others, or it

may devolve this responsibility to the humanitarian agencies. But after the first weeks of combat, it

became evident that the Coalition forces had no capacity for ensuring basic assistance to the

population, whose situation was becoming critical, especially because of the lack of drinkable water,

the disruption of sanitation and the risk of epidemics. Unfortunately, the occupiers were also

neglecting public order and security in the streets, allowing looting and widespread violence.

12 The UK is a party to Protocol I. Iraq and the United States are not a party to Protocol I, although key provisions of Protocol I are reflected in the US military code. However, the fundamental provisions of Protocol I, including all the rules on the conduct of hostilities, are considered part of customary international law and are therefore binding on all states. 13 Save the Children Statement on the War in Iraq – Brussels, 20 March 2003

8

Eventually, in the 4th week of war, the blockade for NGOs was gradually released. It was only as late

as 20 April that they were allowed to begin assessment in the field. On 1 May, U.N. international staff

returned to the capital for the first time since the war, and began to assess emergency humanitarian

needs. But the situation remained unclear as far as the "humanitarian space" was concerned: were

there neutrality of humanitarian operations, autonomy from the military, clear separation from the

political level, acceptance of local communities and leaders, safety for aid workers, and actual needs?

At the end of May, agencies complained that "levels of criminal activity are not reducing in Baghdad.

Many NGOs are recommending to their staff essential movements only and are enforcing a curfew a

lot more restrictive than that imposed city-wide by the Occupying Forces. Elements of the former

regime (including military and intelligence structures) are turning to organized crime. Violent crime is

on the increase. On average there are five attacks involving small arms or grenades against US

Forces in Baghdad daily. Hostage taking of wealthy Iraqi citizens is on the increase. There is concern

is that this may spread to the humanitarian community”14.

In June, as NGO operations began to flow more regularly, tension rose between American agencies

and the US Administration. InterAction denounced that "The Bush administration is wielding its

financial clout to make charitable relief organizations that receive U.S. government money serve the

interests of U.S. foreign policy”. The US Government claimed that "aid agencies in the field should

identify themselves as recipients of U.S. funding to show a stronger link to American foreign policy”15.

Some NGOs agreed to undergo USAID clearing before releasing statements to the press.

The season of massive attacks against humanitarian agencies began with the blasts of the UN (19

August 2003) and ICRC (2 October) headquarters, causing the death of a large number of

14 United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq (UNOHCI) - Talking Points UN Inter-Agency Daily Briefing, Larnaka, Cyprus, 23 May 2003 15 U.S. NGOs feel the squeeze from Bush administration - Reuters. Washington, 24 June 2004

9

humanitarian officials, including the much beloved Sergio Vieira de Mello. In several phases of the

conflict, agencies repeatedly pulled out from and returned to Iraq, with their troops of expatriate aid

workers.

In the fall of 2003, the situation on the ground became more difficult as resistance to occupation

developed. In a Mission report by Mary Kaldor and Yahia Said it was noted that "Many people,

especially men, hate Saddam Hussein and the Americans in equal measure. They are angry at the

ever-growing list of Iraqi casualties both civilian and military. They feel humiliated by the rapid

American victory, their failure to liberate themselves, and by the patronising and sometimes insensitive

behaviour of the occupiers. A similar ambiguity characterises the dominant view of the 'resistance'.

They feel it is wrong and they hate the violence but nevertheless few Iraqis stand up publicly and

oppose the attacks. Sometimes, they even express satisfaction when Americans are killed”.16

Understanding the difficulty of operating in a very unsafe environment, and an ambiguous political

framework, International NGOs decided to minimize their visibility on the ground, while supporting

local clergy and mosque committees for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection. It is

true that “these arrangements allow their own organisations to keep a low profile, while minimising the

need for outsider-led humanitarian action and encouraging local responsibility and solutions”17 but

they probably had negative effects on the perceived neutrality of agencies, and legitimized non-

controllable local actors.

In the Spring 2004, the alert for aid workers' security reached a peak. “Insecurity and armed conflict of

note persisted last week in Falluja and Baghdad, and threatens to spread to the holy city of Najaf.

16 Regime Change in Iraq. Mission report by Mary Kaldor and Yahia Said - Centre for the Study of Global of Governance at the London School of Economics. November 2003 17 Greg Hansen - Humanitarian Action in Iraq. Emerging Constraints and Challenges - Humanitarianism and War Project, 27 April 2004

10

Mounting civilian casualties and deaths, many reportedly women and children, have caused alarm

amongst the international community. The prevailing insecurity has given rise to a growth in the

targeting of foreigners as political targets, and is now severely restricting the ability of non-government

organisations (NGOs) to work in all parts of Iraq. The United Nations (UN) and its NGO partners

continue to operate, in large part due the tireless efforts of Iraqis, though under extremely difficult

circumstances”18.

The kidnappings of aid workers in September 2004 showed how little effective such a strategy was, as

far as safety was concerned. In November, Médecins Sans Frontières decided to pull out from Iraq

because of escalating violence in the country and the danger to its staff. "It has become impossible for

us, as an international humanitarian organisation, to guarantee an acceptable level of security for our

staff, whether they are expatriates or Iraqis," said Gorik Ooms, director-general of MSF-Belgium19.

The rationale of a presence

Iraq is not a major humanitarian crisis. On 3 October 2003, Oxfam reported that "While there is no

humanitarian crisis as such, many Iraqis live in poor conditions with insufficient access to basic

services such as food and water, electricity, fuel, and healthcare”20. There is widespread poverty and

unemployment, criminality and diffused violence, and disruption of a large part of public services.

Nonetheless, there is no lack of food, the number of refugees and IDPs is declining at a reasonable

rate, water is scarce but still sufficient. Sanitation is in a critical state but no risk of major epidemic is

envisaged, and health services are working, although in a very difficult condition. "Iraq is a classic

18 Week in Review – Iraq Situation Report - United Nations, 12-18 April 2004 19 Al-Jazeera.net - 5 November 2004 20 ReliefWeb - 3 October 2003

11

rehabilitation and development operation, there is no humanitarian emergency here. The situation I

found in Bosnia is much worse than this one”21.

What are evident are the cumulative effects of sanctions and the current general disregard for human

life by combating parties of all types, which keep the number of casualties very high. A survey recently

released by the Lancet, a British medical journal, based on a study carried out by American

researchers, calculated that the death rate since the invasion had increased from 5 percent annually

to 7.9 percent. That works out to an excess of about 100,000 deaths since the war22. The figures

remind us of those of the 1991 Gulf War aftermath, when the victims were 150.000 to 250.000. In the

following 12 years, the excess mortality reached the brutal level of 500.000 to one million deaths

caused by the war. After 1991, Iraq dropped from 96º to 127º place in the Human Development rank,

an unprecedented case.23

The sieges of Fallujah and other insurgent cities have created acute humanitarian needs for a limited

time, and serious concerns for both the non-combatants and the combatants. In an appeal in

November 200424, Amnesty International demanded: "Unequivocal orders for the proper treatment of

unarmed and wounded insurgents must be issued or reinforced to all US and Iraqi military and civilian

personnel. US and Iraqi forces should be clear that under international law they have an obligation to

protect and provide necessary medical attention to wounded insurgents who are no longer posing a

threat, as well as to civilians". There was also evidence of war crimes, disclosed by the US television

21 Testimony of Ugo Bernieri. Italian Red Cross official 22 The Lancet medical journal - "Mortality Before & After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: Cluster Sample Survey." www.thelancet.com/journal/vol364/iss9445/contents. The project was designed by Les Roberts and Gilbert M. Burnham of the Center for International Emergency, Disaster and Refugee Studies at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health in Baltimore; Richard Garfield of Columbia University in New York; and Riyadh Lafta and Jamal Kudhairi of Baghdad's Al-Mustansiriya University College of Medicine. 23 Figures from “The Human Costs of War in Iraq” - Center for Economic and Social Rights. New York, 2003 24 Amnesty International - Urgent action needed to prevent war crimes. ReliefWeb, 16 November 2004

12

network NBC, like the deliberate shooting of unarmed and wounded fighters “who pose no immediate

threat is a war crime under international law and there is therefore an obligation on the US authorities

to investigate all such reports and to hold perpetrators of such crimes accountable before the law.

Such investigations should be open and transparent and the findings should be made public. Any

potential witnesses should be protected." In these cases, response should be provided by the ICRC,

with the Iraqi Red Crescent, and a few specialised organisations, should the Coalition forces allow

them into the cities.

In fact, most organisations are engaged in rehabilitation activities, distribution of drugs and supplies for

hospitals, limited demining, school and education. Activities in the area of development rather than

humanitarian assistance, and whose level could be easily handled by Iraqi counterparts. In principle,

local resources can provide almost all the required skills. Still before the war, a common sentiment

heard within Iraq was expressed by the manager of an international NGO to the researchers of the

Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR): ““This isn't Afghanistan - there is a functioning

government system that, politics aside, makes, for example, the food distribution system the best in

the world. The [US Government] should support and reinforce the existing system instead of

developing a parallel system of international NGOs who will take forever to mount a parallel

infrastructure.”25

Most observers comment that there is no evident need for a large number of expatriates in Iraq, and

the presence of most foreign workers is not justified by actual operational necessities. Many

International NGOs have concluded that the extent of needs does not justify facing the difficulties and

political constrains of the situation. Particularly considering, the security threats.

25 see note 23

13

However, some NGOs have been working for years in the country and do not see why they should

leave now, when the needs have become more acute and the Iraqi communities lack a point of

reference to streamline the reconstruction process.

Given the high level of politicization of this crisis, there is a number of organisations who are affirming

their right to be there, in a somewhat symbolic political confrontation with the Coalition's Governments,

as an expression of their opposition to war. This is the case for a group of Italian NGOs gathered

under the umbrella of the so-called "Iraqi table”26 Some of these organisations have a strong political

profile and cannot be defined as “humanitarian”, though they deliver humanitarian assistance and

participate in the sectoral meetings. Other, more pragmatic, NGOs have decided that as long as there

is work to do, they will do it, as a means of keeping the agency going in an age of scarcity of

resources to work anywhere else. Amongst agencies in the field, the big divide is between those who

receive financing from the belligerent governments and those who don't.

On the other hand, financing is widely available. Even refusing to consider the US official aid, which

most NGOs find ethically incompatible with their mandate, the European Community alone pledged

€200 million from its budget for 2003 and 2004. €40 million was released in December 2003 and €160

million in May 2004. The allocation has largely been channelled through UN thematic funds and NGOs

to support work on emergency rehabilitation of water and sanitation, health and education (€90

million), employment generating schemes (€60 million) as well as promotion of the political process,

transitional justice and human rights (€10 million)27. ECHO channelled almost €100 million to Iraq

during 2003, responding to needs arising before, during and after the war28.

26 “Tavolo di solidarietà con le popolazioni dell' Iraq" – www.tavoloiraq.org 27 European Commission - UN forum: Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary Affairs) - EC04-112EN. Brussels, 3 May 2004 28 ECHO - Assisting the Iraqi population - http://europa.eu.int/comm/echo/field/iraq/index_en.htm

14

In a broad sense, Humanitarian organisations in Iraq have focussed on "keeping the control of the

territory": being there, affirming their independence, representing the West's sense of guilt, getting

funding, reacting to the corporate invasion, contending the field with the military, in a dramatic

asymmetrical confrontation, in which their best asset, the acceptance by the local communities, is

hampered by the attacks of militias and criminals.

This is shown to be a shortsighted strategy that has neither improved the situation of the Iraqis nor

allowed a positive influence by NGOs on the political processes, which should have been the main

priority.

"The primary humanitarian aim is not to occupy as much of humanitarian territory as possible. Even if

you can occupy it, it is unlikely you will be able to hold it, or do all you want on it, if you have not first

overcome those who do not want you to have it. Instead, the strategic aim is rather to protect and

assist the civilians on this territory and to defeat your opponents who are causing their suffering or

preventing their protection. To achieve this may not involve taking humanitarian space or discussing

humanitarian access at all."29

Humanitarianism and politics

There is a broadly agreed view, in the community, that the war in Iraq represents a very negative

event for humanitarianism. In fact, it paradigmizes a critical state of relations between humanitarians

and politics, following l'age d'or of the 1990s, when humanitarian concerns seemed to draw the

political agenda. Although, some wonder whether such a golden age has ever existed.

A large part of the contentious issues concerns the interpretation of the founding principles of

humanitarianism: the obligation to assist, which stresses the independence of aid from any

29 Hugo Slim - A Call to Alms. Humanitarian Action and the Art of War. HD Opinion – Geneva, 2004

15

consideration of interest or opportunity; neutrality, the moral stance or position of third parties in other

people’s wars; and independence of aid, from any (political) influence. Neutrality aims to ensure

respect and immunity for non combatants in a conflict, and allow them to operate unmolested by the

warring parties. These concepts have been internalised in international law through the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the four Geneva Conventions (1949) and the Additional

Protocols of 1977, and repeatedly reviewed in a process whereby grim experience, reflective practice

and juridical precedent over more than a century have developed the ensemble of doctrine, ethics and

practice that is now termed ‘humanitarianism’.

The principle of neutrality has been the core of a large discussion since the World War II, and an

engine of diversity in the humanitarian community, with three main historical strands or traditions that

have been important in the evolution of modern humanitarianism: the religious, the ‘Dunantist’ and the

‘Wilsonian’.

Organisations in the oldest of the three, the religious tradition, see their humanitarian programmes as

combining social and religious goals. Their views of neutrality can be very varied, but normally they do

not proselytise in any direct way.

Dunantist humanitarianism is named for Red Cross founder Henry Dunant. Dunantist organisations

seek to position themselves outside of state interests and are strictly neutral, maintaining the solely

purpose of saving all human lives as central to their action.

‘Wilsonian’ humanitarianism is named for President Woodrow Wilson, who hoped to project US values

and influence as a force for good in the world. Wilsonians have a practical, operational bent and see a

basic compatibility with humanitarian aims and foreign policy objectives. 30

Dunantists and Wilsonians represent the extremes of a spectrum which encompasses all humanitarian

organisations, where the balance between the rigid adherence to neutral principles and the adoption

of political goals diversifies the identities in the humanitarian arena.

30 Abby Stoddard, “Humanitarian NGOs: challenges and trends” - HPG Briefing Number 12, July 2003

16

In the multiplication of crises and relief actors that marked the years between 1985 and 1999, the

concern for neutrality tended to decline among relief agencies:

1. Factional warfare, emerged after the end of the Cold War, challenges the definitions of

impartiality and neutrality that are critical to the concept of “humanitarian space”. The scale and

fluidity of conflicts forces agencies to make choices as to where they operate. But when aid is

insufficient or differentially distributed among needy groups, humanitarian organisations are

inevitably seen as culpable actors in a discourse of perceived discrimination and vulnerability.31

2. There is a perception that unconditional humanitarian assistance is not effective. Certain

minimum conditions have to be put in place if aid were to be effective in aiding and protecting

victims of conflict. These include: consent of warring parties; security; independent access for

assessment; and monitoring of needs and distributions. 32

3. The so-called “New Humanitarianism”, supported by large part of the political spectrum,

proposes a model which pursues crisis management, stabilisation and democratisation, and

whereas humanitarian aid is no longer a substitute for political action but the primary form of

political engagement responsible for delivering a liberal peace33. This implies a view of the

traditional humanitarian principle of neutrality “as on the one hand morally repugnant and on

the other hand unachievable in the complex political emergencies of the post Cold war

world”34.

31 Responding to conflict in Africa - Mark Bowden - February 2001 32 Mark Duffield and Joanna Macrae – in ‘The new humanitarianisms: a review of global humanitarian action’, HPG Report 11, Overseas Development Institute, London, 2002. 33 Eriksson, J. - The international response to conflict and genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda experience. Synthesis report. Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, Danida, Copenhagen, 1996

Macrae, J. - Aid and War: Reflections on current debates, Paper presented at a workshop for Oxfam Staff, Birmingham, February 1996, Oxfam, Oxford. 34 Fiona Fox - Draft Presentation -Seminar on Politics and Humanitarian Aid: Debates, Dilemmas and Dissension Commonwealth Institute, London -1 February 2001

17

While Dunantists reject this model, arguing that it allows partisan politics to dictate the nature and

scale of external assistance, thus transforming humanitarian action into ‘political action’35, the

Wilsonians are far more sympathetic with the emerging trends and accept to diverse extents the

“coherence” between humanitarian action and military-political operations, although experience shows

that the achievements of this approach are dubious if not counter-productive36.

At the turn of the century, the diversification within the humanitarian community is wide. Agencies

position themselves in relation to the balance between neutralism and interventionism, as well as

between charitable spirit and right-based approach (see below an arbitrary attempt of graphic

description of such diversity).

35De Waal, Alex and Rakiya, O. 1994. Humanitarianism Unbound, Africa Rights Discussion Paper, Number 5, specifically criticise (excluding ICRC) operating in Africa arguing that neutrality for them is an aspiration rather than a fact. Macrae, Joanna and Leader, Nicholas. 2000. The Politics of Coherence: Humanitarianism and Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, Humanitarian Policy Group Briefing Number 1, London: Overseas Development Institute. Ryfman, Philippe. La Question Humanitaire. Histoire, Problématique, Acteurs et Enjeux de l'Aide Humanitaire International, Paris: Ellipses. 1999 36 André Pasquier, Constructing Legitimacy - Seminar on Politics and Humanitarian Aid: Debates, Dilemmas and Dissension Commonwealth Institute, London -1 February 2001 Duffield, M. Aid policy and post-modern conflict:a critical review, Birmingham, University of Birmingham. 1998

18

In an effort to reconcile major divergences on these themes, the inter-agency work to draft the

common Code of Conduct for the Red Cross family and NGOs, intentionally omitted to mention

neutrality in the text, though asserting the need for agencies not be used to further a particular political

or religious standpoint (Art. 3) and not to act as instruments of government foreign policy (Art. 4)37.

After ten years, the level of implementation of the Code of Conduct, in this sense, seems

unsatisfactory.

Humanitarian assistance has always been carried out under extreme political conditions, and thus it

has always influenced the political economy of conflict and has been influenced by political

considerations. What is new regards the development of a specific framework for relationship between

humanitarian relief and politics, which Macrae identifies as a “Third Way foreign policy that defined

37 Principles of conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in disaster response programmes. Geneva, 1994.

19

national self-interest in terms of good international citizenship. An important implication of the rights-

based approach to foreign policy is that states that abuse human rights forego the right to be treated

as legitimate members of the international community, and become the object of international scrutiny,

censure and occasionally military intervention”38. This “Third Way” encompassing different political

traditions, provides the moral justification for some of the developments following the “September 11”

attack.

After the war in Afghanistan (2002), whose uncertain legitimacy has a negative influence on relief

operations and the security of aid workers, the occupation of Iraq has widened the divide between

those agencies who have accepted to collaborate with the occupying forces, those ones who refuse

collaboration and work in the country independently, and the organisations convinced that there is

simply no humanitarian space at all in Iraq.

The peculiar characteristic of the Iraqi crisis is that all the elements of contradiction and constraint that

humanitarianism has already experienced over the years, overlap in the same context: donors who

become belligerent, poor political analysis, sharp clashes with governments, competition with

corporate, tied aid, impotency of the UN, violations of humanitarian law, insecurity and bad relations

with the military; all due to the extent of the vested interests around the war and post-war. The impact

that this may cause on humanitarian ethics could be as violent as that of the Rwanda crisis. It is

throwing into relief the flaws in the system but hopefully will provoke an equal impulse for change.

The most significant aspects of the Iraqi process mirror the core issues of the crisis of

humanitarianism, as they emerge from the debate that has animated the humanitarian community in

the last decade:

38 Macrae, Joanna. 2001. Aiding Recovery? The Crisis of Aid in Chronic Political Emergencies, London: Zed Books.

20

1. Iraq, along with Afghanistan, represents the most serious case of "humanitarian co-option into

war aims, posed by belligerent funding and military encroachment into humanitarian activity,

which is seen as causing a dangerous blurring of belligerent and humanitarian interests and

action"39. In recent years, "humanitarian action itself is increasingly subsumed or integrated

into other - essentially political - realms"40. On both shores of the Atlantic, there is a concern for

putting humanitarian assistance under the direct control of governments, integrated with other

foreign policy tools: military, diplomatic, financial, bilateral and multilateral. Humanitarian

organisations' ethical concerns about independence, neutrality, impartiality and International

law are little consistent with political priorities and goals. If some organisations have decided to

overcome such concerns and cooperate with these policies, most of them have declined.

Therefore, the American Government is looking at the corporate environment as a way to

provide humanitarian assistance through contractors, while the European Union is prepared to

use public Civil Protection services and, in part, the military41.

Such challenges are part of a longer term trend, begun in the mid-1990s and made explicit in

the concept of “humanitarian war” adopted to define the Kosovo War, albeit one that has

accelerated in recent years both from a cumulative effect and from the political consequences

of 9/11. "That trend includes: the routine labelling of interventions as "humanitarian" that are

essentially political and military in nature; the undermining of the independence, neutrality, and

impartiality of assistance and protection efforts; the special burden placed on NGOs,

particularly American ones, given the high-stakes politics involved; the difficulties of functioning

in insecure settings and of developing rules of engagement and disengagement for the

39 ibidem 40 Antonio Donini, “The Forest and the Trees,” in OCHA, The Humanitarian Decade: Challenges for Humanitarian Assistance in the Last Decade and into the Future - New York, 2004, Volume 2, 127-140. 41 The European Union’s Rapid Reaction Force, has recently deployed for the first time 1,400 soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2004. It is conceived as a military device aimed at carrying out peacekeeping and stabilisation operations, as well as providing support to, or direct delivery of, humanitarian assistance.

21

humanitarian community as a whole; and the predominantly Western character, culture, and

accountability of the humanitarian apparatus”42.

2. The second element is the decline of Humanitarian organisations' advocating capacity and

political influence. The polarization imposed by the “war on terror” in the political arena has

created a negative environment for concerns about neutrality, impartiality and independence.

When all enemies become “terrorists” it is difficult to hold the point that all life is intrinsically

valuable.

Humanitarian advocacy has also been sacrificed to pragmatism. In the first “classic”, inter-state

war in years, with the clear definition of a state of occupation, the International humanitarian

law should still be a valid tool for a strong action at a legal and political level. The 1907 Hague

Regulations and the 4th Geneva Convention (articles 55 to 61) lay down the duties and

responsibilities of an Occupying Power, from providing adequate food and medical supplies for

the population (art. 55); to maintaining hospitals, public health and hygiene (art. 56); to

ensuring that education facilities stay open and allowing religious freedoms.

After the Kosovo crisis in 1999, NGOs have spent considerable energy and time in fighting

(and, ultimately, losing) a rearguard battle to protect humanitarian action from politicization,

instead of trying to "humanitarianize politics", by putting International law obligations and

humanitarian considerations on the political table. Of course, this implies considering the

political costs of receiving official financing. “These need review as part of a thoughtful, long-

term strategy by and for NGOs. Such a review might help restore integrity to the non in non-

governmental”, which in “future will require NGOs to situate themselves more clearly in relation

to the political, military, democratization, and development aspects of international

interventions, a difficult task given their own commitments to human security, democratic

42 The Future of Humanitarian Action. Implications of Iraq and Other Recent Crises - Workshop Report - Feinstein International Famine Center. The Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy. Tufts University, 9 October 2003

22

values, and participatory development” and this “may require review of current relationships

with the U.S. and other donor governments and stepped up efforts in the areas of advocacy

with governments and education among northern publics”.43

3. The third worry is about being there. The Iraqi case highlights what we have experienced in

several crises, from Somalia to Afghanistan: that humanitarian organisations should be more

careful when deciding whether to engage in such extreme political situations, where credibility,

safety and humanitarian coherence are at stake, while there is not an absolute and

unquestionable need for them to be there. If they decide to enter such a ground, they must

have a very high level of specialization and be able to fit into the operational environment. It is

obvious that NGOs based in a belligerent country and expatriate aid workers may face

enormous difficulties, and it would make sense to give in to these pressures. Although many

organisations take a principled stand about the “right to be there”, the blurring of roles between

civilian humanitarian agencies, commercial contractors, military forces, occupation authorities,

religious bodies and Iraqi authorities represents a very hazardous environment for any

coherent and independent humanitarian action.

Problems of the same kind exist in Afghanistan and could spread to other countries where

comparable situations exist, developing prejudice and ultimately hostility towards humanitarian

organisations. We have to surrender to the evidence that levels of acceptance of “westerners”

in some countries are very low, and the “predominantly Western character, culture, and

accountability of the humanitarian apparatus”44 is becoming a burden, hampering the capacity

to accomplish the mission. This is something Americans have faced for a long time, often

inducing USAID to finance non-american NGOs in order to deliver assistance in certain areas.

The problem in Iraq is now extended to all foreigners, sometimes including other Arabs.

43 Ambiguity and Change: Humanitarian NGOs Prepare for the Future - The Feinstein International Famine Center. Tufts University, August 2004 44 see note 33

23

Priority should be given by the aid community to strengthening the capacities and supporting

the action of genuinely humanitarian Arab NGOs, while International NGOs could better invest

their energy in sound advocacy and policy-making, to monitor and advocate for the respect of

International Law and humanitarian principles.

This has been on the NGO agenda for more than a decade now, translated into terms like

“capacity building”, “empowerment” and “de-centralization”, but pursued with scarce

coherence. “A key challenge for the future is not only how NGOs interact with other sectors but

what relationships might develop within the NGO sector itself. The larger North-South divides

that have impacts on other global processes also influence NGO relations. Already the trend is

for better endowed northern NGOs to “subcontract” with less well-resourced southern NGOs.

While the language of “partnerships” is often used, resource flows remain critical in defining

these relationships.” 45

4. In the field, an effort should be made to clarify the different identities and mandates of “real”

humanitarian NGOs, development organisations, solidarity movements, and others.

Despite the inevitable competition, International NGOs have always formed a solidary body of

organisations, structured in platforms, coordinations and umbrellas. In reality, the common

definition of “NGOs” (as well as “civil society” or “non profit”, or “voluntary”) covers a wide

diversity of roles, approaches, goals and capacities. Unity above differences is important for

promoting common interests and policies in the North, but may create a dangerous confusion

in the field, in the midst of a serious crisis, with a negative impact on the way in which the

neutrality, independence and impartiality of humanitarian work is perceived by the parties.

Indeed, their perception of humanitarian action has a direct influence on the degree of

acceptance of humanitarian actors and therefore sometimes also on their actual safety. A clear

45 see note 42

24

definition of roles must be consistent with the diversity of technical skills, mandates, behaviours

and relations.

Everybody has a duty to contribute to humanitarian response, there is no sovereignty for relief

and cooperation, but organisations with different mandates should not advertise themselves as

“humanitarian”. There is a need to clarify and underline the peculiarity of the humanitarian

approach.

5. Interaction with military and other security actors is as critical as in Afghanistan but further

complicated by the considerable presence of private security. “the private security business

thrived. Private contractors providing security in Iraq numbered an estimated 20,000 in early

June, making international private - security firms the second-largest contributor of “troops”

after the United States. Dozens of new security firms cropped up to meet the demand for

security needs. Some were hired by the U.S. government to protect U.S. civilians in Iraq or to

carry out military-related tasks; others were hired by private contractors to protect their

employees working on reconstruction projects”46.

In a paper in October 200447 the UN reminds us that “Humanitarian organisations that interact

and/or coordinate with the military and/or other security actors in Iraq need to be aware of the

constraints and limitations they may face. Their adherence to the key humanitarian principles

mentioned above is crucial for their credibility as a humanitarian actor.” And remarks that

“procedures adopted by one humanitarian agency/organisation might have implications for all

the others, i.e. if one agency is perceived as cooperating closely with the military, or if one

agency is seen to have armed personnel in their vehicles such might also be assumed of all

the others by the local population”. Military forces are prepared to engage in relief activity

46 Bathsheba Crocker - Reconstructing Iraq’s Economy – in The Washington Quarterly. Autumn 2004, vol. 4

47 Unami - Guidelines for Humanitarian Organisations on Interacting with Military and Other Security Actors in Iraq. 20 October 2004

25

themselves or persuade humanitarian agencies and like-minded civilian agencies to distribute

assistance in areas under their control, in order to gain legitimacy with local communities. In

many ways, the strongest argument against this policy is sustainability; the security of staff

depends on their independence, and this will determine whether agencies are able to operate

in the long term.

6. The other side of the coin is the increased engagement of the military in force-protection and

psychological operations, which includes the distribution of assistance, “often seen as critical in

the process of gaining the trust of local communities, leading to a crucial 'stabilisation' effect.

(…) Political and military decision makers have evolved increasingly sophisticated doctrine on

how they should relate to civilians, or undertake tasks typically civilian in nature. In some

environments, this engagement will also be driven by a desire to extract information of military

value and to serve military objectives.”48 The Italian contingent is in Iraq with a parliamentary

mandate for protection and delivery of humanitarian assistance, nonetheless is repeatedly

engaged in protracted combat in Nassirya. There is no legal reason why military forces should

not be involved in the provision of relief. In law, it is the relief, not the body delivering it, that

needs to be impartial. Providing such assistance can very often be a duty of the military, and

certainly the duty of the state. Just as certainly, we might want to dispute the use of the word

'humanitarian', in such cases.49 This type of engagement began in Africa and the Balkans, in

peacekeeping contexts, and has often been endorsed by a large part of the NGO community.

But Iraq is a case where no such interpretation is possible. As MSF remarks in an article about

48 SCHR Position Paper on Humanitarian-Military Relations in the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance. Final version. Geneva, 18 October 2004 (revision of the 2001 version) 49 In May last year, MSF complained to the United States and other coalition forces about the distribution of a leaflet in southern Afghanistan that included a picture of a young Afghan girl carrying a bag of wheat. The leaflet said that if humanitarian assistance was to continue, Afghans needed to pass information to the soldiers about all insurgent forces in the country, including remnants of the the former Taliban regime and members of the al-Qaeda terrorist group. (Afghanistan: US, UK Subverting Relief Aid - IPS, 3 August 2004)

26

the humanitarian language debate, we must “agree to talk about: humanitarian intervention

when referring to civilian action, military intervention when referring to military action, and to

forget the fallacious slogans of military humanitarianism, and military-humanitarian

interventions”50.

As Oxfam stated in a paper of March 2003, “Humanitarian aid is most effectively delivered by

civilian humanitarian agencies under UN leadership. Military involvement can compromise the

effective delivery of aid and lead to unintended consequences, potentially threatening the

security of civilian aid workers. Any war in Iraq, however, may prove to be exceptional.

Extreme insecurity may limit civilian agencies' ability to work. If there is an occupation,

international law obliges occupying forces to ensure the supply of food and other necessities.

Military forces must be prepared to provide aid if Iraq is too insecure for civilian agencies to

operate”51.

In Iraq, humanitarians have entered a very dangerous realm: an extreme political crisis but with low

humanitarian needs, and where all the players have a narrow view of issues like rights and protection.

In part, they were simply unaware of the inherent risk. In large part, they have considered moral issues

like showing the good face of the West, or matters of social and political identity involving taking side,

together with problems of visibility and resources. All this has pushed organisations into a political

game they cannot play without putting at stake their mission and mandate, their independence and

accountability; and shows that sometimes preserving the integrity and credibility of humanitarianism

may involve giving up the idea that you "have to be there" anyway.

50 Tanguy, Joelle, 'Intervention, Protection and Humanitarian Assistance at a Crossroads', Paper delivered by MSF at the World Affairs Council, San Francisco, 28 March 2000. 51 Iraq: Humanitarian-Military Relations, Oxfam Briefing Paper, March 2003.

27

Eventually, the occupation will end, and Iraq will become peaceful and secure enough to allow the

reconstruction process. At that time, the contribution of International NGOs will be important to build a

fair and sovereign civil society, but they need to get prepared now for the political challenge that this

will imply.