ON THE EVE OF CRUCIAL ELECTIONS IRAQ

nowlebanon.com

Iraq on the eve of crucial electionsHosham Dawod, anthropologist at the CNRS – Paris

The Iraqis are gearing up to elect

its National Assembly for a four-year term once the electoral law is defini-tively adopted. The elections are set to be held, in principle, on January 21, 2010. The electoral law was first adopted by the Assembly on November 8, 2009 but it is still raising objec-tions from the presidency and the Kurds. Still, a section of the law pertain-ing to voting modes will not be challenged. Two different lines of reasoning were at odds then. The first aimed to preserve the system in use so far, which the Iraqis refer to the “closed-list” [system], i.e. complete proportional representation. The implementation of this system would see Iraq repre-sented as a single electoral district. This would call on voters yet again to cast their ballots for a list composed of Shia, Sunnis, Kurds or any other ethnic

or religious minority so that society is politically fragmented along religious, sectarian and ethnic lines. The second election mode, which was ultimately adopted by the majority, consists of voting for “open lists,” in other words according to a local proportional system, whereby the people elect several candidates in each province (one MP for every 100,000 voters).

Once the law is definitely adopted, everyone agrees that the upcoming elections are of crucial impor-tance for the country’s future. Nothing will be spared, especially since all political sides are witnessing internal divisions. The Shia and Sunnis are running for the elections in a scattered order whereas the Kurds are finding it difficult to preserve their unity. Given the plurality of lists, some are getting a head start compared to others.

The Iraqis are set to head to the polls towards the end of January 2010. Meanwhile, the political scene is being entirely reconstructed, unless what is at stake is a decomposition of a political field, which has been defined so far according to religious or ethnic loyalty.

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Nuri al-Maliki’s “new” State of

Law coalition

Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki gives rise to as much hope as concerns. Maliki is depicting himself

as the guarantor of national unity and the defender of [the Iraqi] State and order. When he launched his “State of Law coalition” on October 1, 2009, he explained his main campaign slogans, namely citizen-ship, Arabism and loyalty to Iraq, the prevalence of a strong central state and the co-option of political figures according to local bases. It is worth noting that the Iraqi political scene has been witnessing the appearance of cracks for months now, as it is shifting its focus on more pragmatic movements with a national flavor rather than religious and sectarian ones. Religious parties are unable to come up with policies that are shared by everyone, but does not nonetheless entail that the people have lost faith in them; rather, it means that the Shia and Sunni parties

and organizations, which have been using Islam for the past six years as leverage to attain and remain in power, have fallen into disrepute. It is to Nuri al-Maliki’s credit that he has anticipated this major shift in the public opinion. A large swath of the population came to realize that the management of state affairs requires, first and foremost, determina-tion, toughness and skills, not just faith. Like other political and religious officials, Al-Maliki understood that there is no such thing as a Shia or Sunni economy; rather, a modern economy was needed. The fact that he won the latest local and regional elections (in January 2009) gave him the impression that he is a player who is not to be overlooked when it comes to forming the new Iraqi government. In reality, however, yesterday’s allies, who have become today’s “foes,” are not taking kindly to this, particu-larly within the Shia community. Hence, it is becom-ing increasingly obvious that we no longer have

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divergent spiritual points of view, but rather two political logics fighting for power. As an indirect consequence, religious and sectarian mobilization tends to lose ground progressively to the benefit of the more traditional political mobilization.Nuri al-Maliki’s announcement of his electoral coalition comes within this framework. This coalition includes various political movements and figures who have some key objectives in common, such as: restore the country’s sovereignty, establish a credible federal state, ensure the prevalence of federal laws over local ones, allow for regional autonomy while not undermining the power of the central authority, build loyal armed forces and fight regional interference [in Iraq’s internal affairs]. In other words, the aim is to have the majority of Iraqis believe that the prime minister has understood what they have been desperately waiting for since 2003. Despite the recent security difficulties, Maliki’s speeches still draw favorable reactions, especially since the latest local and regional elections. There-fore, he will do everything to win again in January.

His former allies in the Shia alliance are confronted to a dilemma. As an Iraqi proverb goes, “the best choice is a bitter one.” On the one hand, if they accept Al-Maliki’s proposal to form a broad national coalition, they should also abstain from challenging his leadership and grant his supporters a relative majority of parliamentary seats within this new coalition. On the other hand, if they let him form his own coalition (as they have chosen to do), the prime minister’s list is still, in all likelihood, capable of winning a relative majority of Shia votes. The ideal behavior for these parties would have been to hold on to “composed” Al-Maliki who would have damp-ened his ambitions while remaining part of the united Shia coalition. Everything has been done to bring him to bend, but he has remained steadfast and has clearly stated his conditions, such as acknowledging him as the coalition’s leader and granting his friends, who are Dawa Party affiliates and allies, the majority of seats within the Shia coalition in the upcoming National Assembly. Maliki’s demands also included evicting his real or presumed foes, such as his rival former PM Ibrahim Jaafari, or even getting rid of the Sadrist Movement [i] . Al-Maliki is aware of the importance of the Sadrist

The prime minister knows quite well that his main electoral base is still the Shia bastion. Therefore, he is going to have to broaden the

scope of his mobilization.

A FEW CHARACTERISTICS OF NURI AL-MALIKI’S “NEW” STATE OF LAW COALITION

It includes few national parties (except for the Islamic Dawa Party and Dawa’s other branch led by National Education Minister Mohammad al-Khuzai). All other parties are weak political organizations which nonetheless represent a sizeable number of Sunni and Shia tribal leaders;

Figures with local support bases were co-opted by Al-Maliki who wishes to pull out the same achievement as in the January 2009 local elections;

This coalition is more of a gathering around Al-Maliki’s person than a political line of thought that has been discussed and debated with the other movements and parties, hence the presence of important figures of his own Dawa party (including his adviser Sadek al-Rikabi, Ali al-Adeeb, Sami al-Askari, etc.);

Many former and new ministers as well as several figures representing religious minorities are appearing by his side;

A few women have joined this coalition, such as Safia al-Suhail who was formerly on Iyad Allawi’s list.

The new Iraqi national coalition

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The history of this new coalition comprising a major-ity of Shia goes back to several months during which the talks rekindled clear and insurmountable disagree-ments. It is mainly composed of ten parties and political organizations, in addition to several so-called “independent” figures of varying influence. What does that coalition lead to? It is largely shaped by the Shia political parties even though some Sunni figures have joined it. Astonishing though it may seem, the two eternal Shia foes, i.e. the Sadrists and Al-Hakim’s party, joined forces, both being motivated by their (declared or implicit) hostility toward Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki. Strong pressure exerted by Iran provides yet another probable reason for this rapprochement. As for Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, his stance is of a more complex nature. On the one hand, he wishes to preserve his neutrality vis-à-vis those inter-Shia divergences even if some within his close circle are implicitly in favor of the “Shia people’s” unity. But Sistani, on the other hand, does not want to grant moral backing to a Shia govern-ment that has been conspicuous by its lack of success. There is probably another dimension to this story: The grand ayatollah is aware of the extent and dimension of Iran’s involvement in Iraq and some-times, his position is objectively close to Iran’s while he steers away from it under other circumstances. Nowadays, he remains silent regarding the events occurring in his native country (Iran) since June 2009. Everyone knows that Sistani’s silence cannot be interpreted as a form of support for Ahmadinejad’s regime and for the [Iranian Revolution’s Supreme] Guide Ali Khamenei. Being a cunning strategist, Sistani wants to avoid making this disagreement worse by opposing Iran’s political allies in Iraq.

movement and, at the same time, of the controversies it gives rise to among the people. Thus, he would be difficult for him to legitimize his state of law rhetoric while striking alliances with forces, which he himself has referred to as “outlaws”. In truth, and for all his outwardly “federative” speech, Al-Maliki wants to subordinate all Shia to his own self while, at the same time, leaving the door to his coalition open for other lay or Sunni movements, tribal leaders and Arab nationalists who are hostile to the Kurds, such as in Mosul and Kirkuk. Yet political reality in Iraq hovers between two positions: the public opinion, on the one hand, the majority of which wishes to break free from aggressive identity constraints and, on the other, the post-Saddam political class which is still attached to an essentialist action and representation mode, i.e. one that is based on the plurality of identities within the Iraqi society. Al-Maliki has positioned himself in the middle, albeit while keeping an eye on his main objec-tive, i.e. remaining in power. He knows that all Iraqi political movements, be they Shia, Sunni or Kurds, are divided. Accordingly, it is still too early to give an accurate reading of divides and the strength of alliances, even in these pre-electoral times. Neverthe-less, the prime minister knows quite well that his main electoral base is still the Shia bastion. Therefore, he is going to have to broaden the scope of his mobilization while securing a reserve of votes for himself within his own community. Thus, one should not disregard the idea of a potential rapprochement taking place either before or after the elections between Al-Maliki’s list and the new Shia-dominated national coalition if either of them feels threatened or marginalized.

Even the Kurds are divided

A natural coalition among Iyad Allawi, the former Baathists

and Sunni parties

An Iraqi policy caught halfway between heaven and earth

A FEW CHARACTERISTICS OF NURI AL-MALIKI’S “NEW” STATE OF LAW COALITION

The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), formerly led by the late Abdel Aziz al-Hakim.

The Sadrist Movement led by Moqtada al-Sadr.

The Badr Organization led by Hadi al-Ameri: In reality, this organization was a paramilitary branch of the ISCI.

The Dawa Party – Iraq Command: A branch of this movement actually joined the new coalition whereas the other branch remained by al-Maliki’s side within the government.

The Islamic Dawa Movement, which is mainly based in Basra.

The Anbar Salvation Council, a Sunni movement led by Sheikh Hamid al-Haïs.

The National Reform party led by Ibrahim al-Jaafari.

The Solidarity Group led by Mohammad al-Haidari.

The Iraqi National Congress led by of Ibrahim al-Chalabi.

The Islamic Virtue Party.

Other parties of minor importance, such as the Muslim Ulema Council (Basra branch, Sunni), the Al-Adala Group and other Turkmen, Christian and Faili Kurd (Iraq’s Shia Kurds) movements or figures, etc.

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Beyond their sour relations with the prime minister, the Kurds are not immune themselves to internal divisions and divergences of opinions. The latest legislative elections in Iraqi Kurdistan have shown the population’s deep discontent vis-à-vis the regional government, which is being accused of corruption, nepotism and misuse of public funds. For the first time in the past two decades, the Kurds are showing the others a disunited façade. The new electoral system (local proportional vote) is bound to exacerbate their internal divisions, except for the issue of Kirkuk [ii]. With the exception of Al-Hakim’s party, the Kurds do not have many allies in Baghdad and their reputation as “kingmakers” has taken a heavy hit. Therefore, they will not be rushing to join the new Iraqi national coalition, which is composed of the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and the Sadrists, and certainly not the list led by Nuri Al-Maliki. They know that the former includes staunch opponents to the loose federalism advocated by the Kurds, namely the Sadrists and Ibrahim al-Jaafari and, at the same time, they are locked in an all-out war with the prime minister. The Kurds are, thus, still strong in their region but are vulnerable in Baghdad.

Despite his alliance with the United States and other Gulf countries, former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, a secular Shia, is going along with former Baathists, Sunni parties, anti-Kurd Arab nationalists in Mosul and all those who were disappointed with the Shia govern-mental coalition since 2005. His list, which is co-headed with Saleh al-Mutlaq, a former Baathist nostalgic, is unlikely to change the electoral landscape in the Shia section of Iraq, but it may seriously under-mine the current prime minister’s plans to form an electoral alliance that goes beyond the prevailing sectarianism, as it would force him to refocus part of his mobilization rhetoric essentially on the Shia population. Thus, though secular himself, Iyad Allawi is indirectly leading to the repetition of the sectarian and ethnic divides. His strategy is to bet on an irreme-diable divide within the Shia community, on the Kurds’ withdrawing their support of the Shia, on Iran’s neutrality and on the unconditional support of the United States and Gulf countries. While not impos-sible, so many hypotheses are still difficult to achieve.

Iraq is only just starting to make a break with the devastating fusion of religion and politics. An analysis of the past few years clearly shows that it is not enough to believe in God in order to claim to be managing a modern economy, a complex society and a state of law. Certainly, six years following the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the majority of the Iraqi political class still believes in heaven. Yet due to the pressure exerted by the public opinion, it is focusing henceforth on earthly matters, such as initiating national reconciliation, rebuilding the country, fighting corruption, restoring sovereignty, putting an end to regional interference [in Iraq’s internal affairs], consolidating the state of law, etc. Indeed, this is where the future of Iraq is playing out.

Finally, the independent group led by former Oil Minister Ibrahim Bahr al-Uloum is weak and has no electoral significance. However, it illustrates the division between Shia oil technocrats, some of whom support al-Maliki while others support the new coalition. Hence, while the former oil minister has chosen to join the new Shia coalition, the current minister Hussein Shahrestani and a number of independent Shia figures have joined al-Maliki. In any case, the next oil minister is likely to remain a Shia figure!

[i] Iraqi Shia movement labeling itself as close to the Sadr family; it is led nowadays by a young cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr. Its stronghold is in Baghdad’s suburbs and in the South of the country. Between 2003 and 2007, this movement tried to supersede the state and the legitimate power of state institutions, leading to an inevitable clash with the central government. Ever since March 2008, Al-Maliki’s government has been locked in an all-out war with the Sadrists, and hundreds of them have been killed or imprisoned. The movement’s leader has taken refuge in the Iranian city of Qom. Still, despite its relative weakness, the Sadrist doctrine, which joins contestation and messianism, still has strong support bases among the poorest of Iraqi Shia.

[ii] The province of Kirkuk represents a challenge for the Kurds who wish to bring it under the jurisdiction of an “autonomous Kurdistan.” However, the province witnessed massive Arabization in the 1990s and is now a bone of contention between the Kurds, Sunni Arab organizations and Turkmen supported by neighboring Turkey. The city of Kirkuk is even commonly referred to as the “Kurdish Jerusalem.”N

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