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ISSUE 1 2015

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ISSUE 1, 20154

Welcome to the inaugural issue of IRAS, a journal which showcases and celebrates the academic achievements and also the creative genius of students and graduates who locate themselves in the International Relations and Asian Studies major area at the University of Western Sydney.

Editor’s Letter

34Pyongyang

46Graduation Photos

48Bibliography

10

Seoul, a modern city of industrialisation, urbanisation, technology and integrated transportation. However, there is also a softer side of Seoul, a side that you only get to know through personal experience.

Seoul Has my Soul

6

I have heard this phrase many times before, being an Australian-born Egyptian myself. I have a unique status in Egypt, not quite a native not quite a foreigner either.

Umm El Donya - Mother of the World

12

On 29 November 1946, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 181 on the question of Palestine. The Resolution contained a plan to end the British Mandate, and to partition the territory – assigning territory to an Arab State.

The Palestinian Question: Is there an Answer?

18

For over six decades, Australia’s formal alliance with the United States has formed the cardinal point of its foreign policy.

Reassessing the Australian-American Alliance

While there has been growing focus in the international community on humanitarianism and the question of intervention, The Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) fierce defence of Westphalian sovereignty has prevented a regional, unconditional acceptance of these newly developed Western norms.

Can ASEAN Reconcile Humanitarianism and Sovereignty?

24 28

India has in the 21st century been catapulted into global power status on the world stage as a result of its economic upsurge, inclusion in global discussions and a strengthened strategic relationship with the United States.

Will India’s Future be Peaceful and Prosperous?

20

A year ago I received a seemingly unassuming email from Dr Walton inviting students to participate in short term international tours relevant to students enrolled in the International Relations and Asian Studies (IRAS) Major, one of which was HPAIR.

The Harvard Project for Asian and International Relations

38

Conflicting with Australia’s acknowl-edgement of important human rights frameworks is the rigid endeavor to militarily deter asylum seekers arriving by boat.

Illegal Maritime Arrivals: Are They Illegal?

32

The recent executions in Indonesia of eight prisoners saddened many around the world, including myself. Two of these men were Australian citizens Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran, who were convicted for drug smuggling. Do I believe that they committed a serious crime? Yes, most definitely.

A Self-righteous and Cruel Tirade

42

I paused between two stands, one filled with sake and the other with wine. Nothing was further from the peaceful quiet of the towering trees, punctuated occasionally by broadcast announcements from an invisible train station.

Japan Journals

14

The idea of Democratic Peace idea originates from Immanuel Kant’s “Perpetual Peace”, which stipulates that constitutional republics would never vote to go to war except in self-defence.

What’s your Problem Dude?

Editor’s LetterWelcome to the inaugural issue of IRAS, a journal which showcases and celebrates the academic achievements and also the creative genius of students and graduates who locate themselves in the International Relations and Asian Studies major area at the University of Western Sydney. I am sure you will agree that there is much to admire.

It is perhaps necessary to add a quick word about some of the opportunities which beckon for students in the International Relations and Asian Studies major area. Those opportunities are essentially twofold:

• Expertly-taught units of study on such topics as global governance, Australian-Asian relations, and East and Southeast Asian history;

• An array of study abroad options, including the International Summer Study Program at the University of Seoul (see p. 6, “Seoul has Captured my Soul”); the Harvard Project on Asian and International Relations (see p. 16-17, “HPAIR Retrospective”); and a Japan study tour (see pp. 32-34 “Japan Journal”); as well

as longer-term exchange opportunities with our partner institutions around Asia and the world.

I should also note that, from 2016, my colleagues and I in the International Relations and Asian Studies major area will deliver our units of study online synchronously with the more traditional on-campus delivery. We very much look forward to conversing with our students in what is, for us, this new online space.

A final word: our students’ personal stories are varied and fascinating. So, too, are the careers which our graduates forge for themselves. To provide just a few examples: one recent graduate now works as an archivist at the National Archives of Australia, another works as a high-flying Sydney real estate agent, and yet another works in the international office at a metropolitan university. All these stories contribute to the success story that is International Relations and Asian Studies at UWS. I trust you will enjoy the following pages as much as I do.

Dr. Peter MauchDirector, Online Academic Programs Senior Lecturer, International Relations and Asian Studies

School of Humanities and Communication Arts University of Western Sydney

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Egypt (as Egyptians will often tell tourists) is considered Umm El Donya – the Mother of the World.

I have heard this phrase many times before, being an Australian-born Egyptian myself. I have a unique status in Egypt, not quite a native but not quite a foreigner either.

Still, I take great pride in being able to keep up with the 22 million Egyptians crammed into Egypt’s capital city, Cairo. I can jaywalk six lanes of traffic, catch a bus while it’s still moving and navigate the extremely complex microbus system just as well as the next Cairene. But even for me, landing in Cairo is still an overwhelming experience.

by Sarah AbbassVisual Essay

Umm El Donya - the Mother of the World

The air is heavy with pollution, the traffic is constant and extremely loud and it’s hot, even in winter. And yet I can’t help but love Cairo. It’s vibrant, historically rich and culturally unique. On the outskirts of the city stands the famous Pyramids of Giza, the last remaining ancient wonder of the world. Through the city runs the life-sustaining Nile River. And in the city’s centre is Tahrir Square, the epicentre of Egypt’s 2011 Uprising and the Arab Spring.

It is unsurprising then that Egyptians often proudly declare that their country is Umm El Donya.

by Sarah AbbassVisual Essay

Street art on Mohamed Mahmoud Street, Cairo, sometimes referred to as ‘Martyr Road’ Top: A mural by Ammar Abu Bakr of a 19 year old graffiti artist, Hisham Rizq killed in July 2014 in mysterious circumstances. Left: “Metamorphosis” by Ammar Abu Bakr of 20 year old, Bassem Mohsen Wardany who was killed by the police in 2013.

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Seoul has

Seoul: a modern city of industrialisation, urbanisation, technology and integrated transportation. However, there is also a softer side of Seoul, a side that you only get to know through personal experience. It is the history of the city, its urban renewal, parks, food, culture and above all the people of this city which cause it to have such a profound impact on those who travel there.

From the 26th June – 28th July 2014, I, along with four other students from UWS (Kate, Rhiannon, Christiane and Sajjad) was honoured to be selected as an exchange student to study in the International Summer School Program at the University of Seoul (UOS) in South Korea. This program welcomes students from various universities across the world, including Australia, Canada, China, France, Hong Kong, Mexico, Netherlands, Spain, Thailand, the UK, the US, and many more to study at UOS with leading academics including our own Dr. David Walton.

Together, all students were partnered with local Korean students from UOS who, while officially acting as our buddies, very rapidly became some of our closest friends.

Naturally, classes made up a significant portion of our time. All students were able to choose up to two units in subjects ranging from economics, Korean language, history and international relations with the option of an additional unit in Exploring Asian Culture. I took International Relations and International Relations in East

Asia classes, the contents of which are not taught at UWS. Classes were held from 9am-12pm and 1pm-3pm about 3-4 times a week, but despite this significant portion of time spent in

my soul

by Mitchell McMartinStudent Essay

class I would argue that most people enjoyed the classes. We were able to take units not available at UWS from leading international academics and the classes involved a mix of international students in the program and Korean students, both Korean ‘buddies’ and local students. Not only did this provide us with various perspectives on the unit content but it also facilitated the

fostering of friendships across cultures However, the UOS Summer School program was about more than just the classes. It was primarily a cultural immersion program, one designed to

leave you with an appreciation and understanding of South Korean culture and life. Included in the program was a series of activities and tours ranging from learning Taekwondo, watching a NANTA show (think blue man group but with chefs) to taking a tour of the old city wall among others. The highlights however, were the tours to Gyeongbokgung Palace, the Joint Security Area (JSA) and a four day field trip to Jeju Island. Our trip to the JSA, or Joint Security Area, was eagerly awaited by everyone. The JSA is the site within the Korean DMZ where North and South Korean soldiers face each other across the border straddled by those famous blue conference buildings. We even got to technically cross the border into North Korea, albeit within the neutral confines of one of the conference buildings. Also thoroughly enjoyed by everyone was our four day trip to Jeju. The highlights of this trip were our visit to the Alive Museum where you can pose in 3D images, an afternoon at the beach and a visit to Seongsan Illchulbong, one of the New Seven Wonders of the World.

Yet, despite all of these fantastic experiences, by far the most memorable ones were those spent with new found friends on the program, both the international students and the Korean buddies. Over the course of a month we shared birthdays together, spent evenings talking and having fun together and the afternoons either playing various sports on the university’s oval or studying together. We spent numerous nights at the local pub enjoying Soju and the local noraebang (karaoke) and we all

got our Gangnam Style on in Gangnam, some a lot more than others. Together we were introduced to the delicacies of Korean food by our buddies, from kimchi to bulgogi and bibimbap, the fun of Korean BBQ and the awesomeness of McDelivery (that’s right, McDonalds delivered to your door). Our buddies also proudly showed us around their city, from the tourist hotspots of Myeongdong and Namsan Tower to the hidden local secrets of city lookouts and natural getaways amongst the urban jungle. We even survived a flight through a typhoon together.

These experiences bring me back to my opening paragraph. Despite being fantastic experiences, it is not the study experience nor the sightseeing which define the way in which I remember my time in Korea. Rather, it is the friendships made during this time that mark my memory. It is the experiences, laughter, sadness and joyful times spent with those friends that define the experience and make it one of the most enjoyable moments of my life. It is this softer side of Seoul, its people and their generosity rather than the place itself which makes this city so remarkable. Thus, after only a month in Korea, Seoul has captured my soul.

Bachelor of Arts/Bachelor of Laws

On 29 November 1946, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 181 on the question of Palestine. The Resolution contained a plan to end the British Mandate, and to partition the territory – assigning territory to an Arab State, to a Jewish State, and establishing an internationally administered zone for the old city of Jerusalem (or a Corpus Separatum). The plan was accepted by the Jewish authorities, and rejected by the Arab states, and so began the most intractable conflict of modern times.

The UN has attempted to interpose itself between the warring parties from the very beginning – dispatching mediators, envoys, and peacekeeping missions [UNTSO (1948), UNDOF (1973), and UNIFIL (1983)] to broker and then monitor ceasefires. Yet, the underlying conflict remains unresolved.

The last attempt to forge peace through final status negotiations was at the 2000 Camp David Summit convened by President Clinton and attended by Yasser Arafat, and Ehud Barak. A lot of history has passed by since the last and best chance for peace at Camp David,

the Second Intifada (2000-2005), Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from settlements in the Gaza strip, the building of the security wall, the Hezbollah war (2006), the death of Yasser Arafat (2004), the decline of the Israeli Labour Party, the rise of Hamas and its takeover of Gaza, the 2008 Gaza war, and the recent 2014 Gaza War.

The UN Security Council has adopted more resolutions on ‘the Palestinian question’ than any other subject on its agenda. Yet, none of these resolutions have been adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter – which means they are not binding. Since the 1970s, the United States has used its veto to block any overly condemnatory resolutions aimed at Israel. The policy has essentially paralysed the Council.

In short, the peace process is comatose. The Quartet – UN, US, EU, and Russia – is next to ‘useless, useless, useless’ (Kalman, 2015), while John Kerry’s overtures for peace have fallen flat following the Gaza conflict.

Yet, signs of shift in the dynamics of the issue are beginning to be noticed. Clearly, the recent announcement of Fatah and Hamas rapprochement and the establishment of a unity government have far-reaching ramifications. In Washington, Netanyahu is not an administration favourite – with the Israeli leader labelled, by White House officials as: ‘chicken shit, recalcitrant, myopic, reactionary, obtuse, blustering, pompous, Aspergery’ (Goldberg, 2014). After the mid terms in November Obama might choose to allow this lingering resentment to play out at the UN.

On the other side of the wall, sits the relative moderate Mahmoud Abbas, the head of Fatah and the president of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Abbas is committed to final status negotiations, has renounced a violent struggle, and favours a return to negotiations. He has even gone as far as conceding that ‘the Arabs’ refusal to accept the partition decision was a mistake that he is trying to rectify (Eldar, 2011).’ Abbas, however, is burdened by internal divisions and now must contend with Hamas as part of a unity government.

The Palestinian Question: Is There An

Answer?

Opinion

THE PROSPECT OF A DIPLOMATIC AVALANCHEDuring Netanyahu’s third and most centralist government he was forced to shift the base of his Likud led coalition to include Yesh Atid, the Jewish Home, and the Hatnuah. The new coalition, however, did not force a new wave of thinking on the Palestinian question.

In the past it was easy to doubt Netanyahu’s serenity on a two-state solution. He has been described as the ‘mayor of Jerusalem’, a man according to The Times of Israel (2014) with a ‘near-pathological desire for career preservation’, who lacks the political courage to move forward on the Palestinian question.

Prior to his re-election in March of this year, Netanyahu issued a rather definitive proclamation against the establishment of Palestinian state. The position certainly buttressed Netanyahu against the concerted challenge posed by the centre-left Zionist Union (led by Isaac Herzog and Tzipi Livni) in the dying days of the campaign.

The election result, set against rising tensions in Jerusalem and the continued Israeli encroachment into the prospective Palestinian capital of Al-Quds (East Jerusalem), may now trigger a diplomatic avalanche at the UN.

The US is currently reassessing its diplomatic strategy vis-a-vis Israel (Sink & Talev, 2015). This may signal a partial lifting of the US diplomatic shield (i.e. the veto), which has been used to block strongly worded resolutions condemning Israel. However, Obama is likely to wait until a nuclear deal is concluded with Iran before allowing action on the Palestinian question to proceed.

Added to the mix is the issue of Palestinian membership of the UN. Under the banner of ‘Palestine 194’ has adopted a unilateral approach to self-determination. A change policy would certainly lend impetus to Abbas’ drive (known as the 194 campaign) for de-facto statehood through admission to the UN.

As part of this campaign, Abbas recently called for an ‘immediate resumption of negotiations between Palestine and Israel to demarcate the borders, reach a detailed and comprehensive agreement, and draft a peace treaty between them.’ Jordan also tabled a draft resolution in late September, which, as reported by What’s in Blue (2014) ‘sets a timeframe for a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.’ In December, the draft was voted down, but not vetoed [eight affirmative, two negative (US and Australia), and five abstentions], as the required nine affirmative votes were not garnered.

The UK and France are currently reformatting and softening the Jordanian draft, with a date for circulation and a vote yet to be confirmed. In the end, any resolution on the Palestinian question will be non-binding (not enforceable), which means it can be ignored. However, the weight of Israel international isolation, the leverage applied by the diplomatic avalanche at the UN, coupled with a weakening of US support may cause Israel to re-evaluate to reluctantly commit to final status negotiations.

LIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL The problem is one of moderation and compromise. The parties have hardened their hearts to such ideals, which raises the question: can a peace agreement wait until the right leaders exist on both sides?

It is therefore the job of the UN and its members to help create the conditions most favourable to a recommencement of the process. Its members should be wiser and more constructive in their approach to the Palestinian question. As a special report in The Atlantic (2013) makes clear, the question is not going to be addressed through rhetorical and condemnatory statements, but rather through a conversation about the substantive issues of the future peace: territory; Jerusalem and the holy sites; the right of return for Palestinian refugees; security arrangements; and the issue of Israel settlements.

In the end, the UN cannot force the issue, as only a bilateral agreement concluded between a unified Palestinian Authority and the State of Israel will result in lasting peace.

About the author: Peter Nadin is an independent researcher based in Sydney, Australia. He has worked previously as a project associate at the United Nations University (UNU). His research interests include the politics of the UN Security Council and UN Peacekeeping Operations. Peter holds a Bachelor of Social Science/Arts (Hons) and a PhD from the University of Western Sydney.

by Peter NadinBachelor of Social Science/Arts (Hons) & PhD

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What’s Your Problem, Dude?

adjudicating the controversy of Democratic Peace Theory (DPT).

The idea of Democratic Peace idea originates from Immanuel Kant’s “Perpetual Peace”, which stipulates that constitutional republics would never vote to go to war except in self-defence. The Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) is a modern interpretation of this text, and holds that democratic nations do not fight other democratic nations, because they have incentives to find alternatives. The contemporary DPT debate focuses on asking the following questions: what constitutes a democracy, can one define ‘war’, are democracies are more accountable than autocracies, and do they externalize their norms and information to foster trust and respect? Many critics of the DPT underlie in their argument that DPT is merely a mask for American imperial power. Pro-DPT theorists respond to this argument in two ways, by either denying the claim, or making the utilitarian argument: do the means matter more than the end, which is perpetual peace for the most number of people?

Juleigh LangenbergOpinion

The major theorists responsible for these ideas include Immanuel Kant, Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Michael W. Doyle, James Lee Ray, Stephen R. Rock, Spencer R. Weart, Sebastian Rosato and Bruce Russett. For the purposes of this analysis, Woodrow Wilson will be included into important players and theorists, as he is referenced by the major players, Russeett and Rosato. The analysis will begin with outlining the specific argument of both Russett and Rosato, examining the nature of their evidence and publication. A discussion will follow, critically analysing key contentions and issues.

Russet evaluates DPT for the prospective outcomes that it could spread peace for the most people, and that it could offer a chance for fundamentally changed state relations. (Russett 1993, 58) He postulates that DPT cannot be fairly evaluated until the post WWII era because democracy had not fully developed conceptually in the nations that were ‘democratic’, and until 1945 there had not been enough democracies in the international system to judge DPT by. He discredits the importance of Woodrow Wilson and his 14 points as these conditions meant that ‘elements of trade and democracy were never given a fair chance’ [internationally]. (Russett 1993, 65)

Russet defines war as large scale institutionally organised violence, resulting in battle fatalities of 1000 or more. He excludes from his definition subversively organised intervention of other governments, and conflict outside of internationally recognized sovereignty. This eliminates civil conflict and liberation conflicts that may occur before a state is recognized as sovereign from its neighbours. (Russett 1993, 69-71) He defines democracy as having longevity of rule (1 year minimum), popular election and representation, and a substantial percentage of the population eligible for the vote. (Russett 1993, 72-73) He argues that these parameters are central and necessary, owing to the need to evaluate the

DPT by contextual criteria rather than at face value. He cites the ‘best known compilation of wars’ to test his argument in a context that other academics commonly agree upon, finding no ‘democracies’ have gone to war with one another in nearly 200 years. (Russett 1993, 80)

Russet makes a highly contextual argument, seeking to define the parameters of his terms by historical and quantitative measures in order to evaluate the theory. He uses norms such as the ‘commonly accepted list of wars’ to be as impartial as possible, and give legitimacy to his objectivity. It is worth noting that his original essay occurred in his own book, and was not peer reviewed or subject to the scrutiny that a journal article may be.

Rosato argues that the DPT is flawed because its normative and institutional logics are not always true, and they cannot be used to generate other true statements about the nature of democracy. (Rosato 2003, 585-586) His main issues in the normative logic are that democracies do not externalize their domestic norms and do not trust and respect one another when their interests clash. (Rosato 2003, 586) He also takes issue with statements generated by institutional logic, ideas which flow from the idea that democratic institutions make leaders more accountable. He terms these statements “the five casual mechanisms: public constraint, group constraint, slow mobilization, surprise attack, and information.” (Rosato 2003, 587)

He does not dispute the statement that democracies have rarely gone to war with one another in the last 65 years, but suggest that instead of ‘democracy’ causing this, it is better attributed to ‘imperial peace’ as generated by US hegemony. (Rosato 2003, 599) He concludes that if DPT is flawed, then it is only being used as a pre-text by the US to intervene in countries, rendering a need for review of ‘security’ strategies. (Rosato 2003, 599-600)

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Rosato methodically tests the DPT logic, by first accepting the statement at face value and substantiating the initial claim. He then applies the logic to other pre-suppositions about democracy, to test for consistency in generating true statements. (Rosato 2003, 85-86) His piece was published by the American Political Science Review, and thus relies on other political science sources for its evidence. This potentially renders problems with his sources, as they could be opinion and framework pieces, rather than empirical studies.

While there are many minor discrepancies between the two articles, the main issues can be narrowed down to whether or not democracies and war should be empirically defined, and if the end result of relative peace is more important than the logic of the premise itself. One other issue worth noting is that many of Rosato’s concerns go uncontested by Russett, such as his ‘five causal mechanisms’ of institutional logic. This is due to the chronology of publication, and the nature of argument used in each article, which can cause the appearance of Russett being more heavily critiqued than Rosato.

SHOULD DEMOCRACIES AND WAR BE EMPIRICALLY DEFINED?The controversial issue here is whether or not democracy and war should be subject to interpretation; by applying a definition, the outcome (or premise) is fundamentally altered. Russet is all for context, offering the definition that a state must be recognized externally as sovereign, with 12 months longevity of leadership, popular representation, significant population numbers eligible for vote for a democracy. (Russett 1993,

72-73) The issue that Rosato takes with this is that by calling a nation ‘insufficiently democratic’, nations intentionally legitimise their actions of war. (Rosato 2003, 591) Rosato points out that Russett considers even 19th Century England and France as insufficiently democratic. Considering those nations are the “classic liberal democracies”, they should be sufficiently liberal to be judged as democracies engaged in conflict. (Rosato 2003, 590) While Rosato rightfully points out a logical contradiction in Russett’s argument, this does not undermine the fact that those regimes were not ‘truly’ democratic by a contemporary understanding. This is where the controversy arises, because to adjudicate on this issue requires one argument’s logic to trump the other; there is no common ground.

DOES THE END RESULT OF RELATIVE PEACE MATTER MORE THAN THE LOGIC IN THE PREMISE ITSELF? Ultimately both theoreticians argue that democracies appear to go to war less frequently than non-democracies, however they differ over whether the logic driving this conclusion is ultimately the most important thing. Russett argues not, stating that ultimate peace is the goal, and the role that democracy has in creating this is undeniable. (Russett 1993, 81) Rosato objects to the use of DPT logic, not because democracies do go to war with other democracies, but because DPT is used for other criteria such as the security agenda in foreign policy – and perhaps wrongfully. (Rosato 2003, 588) It is controversial of Russett to say that DPT logic doesn’t matter, as long as the end result is good for most people. Rosato calls this ambiguity to question, contending that this kind of

Juleigh LangenbergOpinion

un-concentrated argument is what becomes manipulated into an ideology for US imperial power. What this contention ultimately comes down to, is whether one consents to the utilitarian argument made by Russett: perhaps the US is using DPT for some of its own purposes, however most people are living at peace. This contradiction is hard to ignore, because as Rosato points out: while militaristic peace may abide between contextual ‘democracies’, there is still war waged in the name of ‘intervention for human rights’. (Rosato 2003, 588) This is one big issue in the DPT: should ‘interventions’ in the name of democracy count as democracies engaging in acts of war?

One of the issues complicating this contention is that Russett openly admits that a central aspect of post WWII democracy is the joint and indispensable notion of US collective Security. (Russett 1993, 66) This does not matter to Russett, who pursues that utilitarian argument that the most number of people still experience peace as a result of DPT. However, given Rosato’s article is testing for US interests in application of the DPT, it is problematic for him, and contributes to the debate of whether DPT logic is problematic or not.

It can be seen from the two articles that a myriad of issues plague the theory of Democratic Peace. For Russett, the main contradictions in his argument can be found in his attempts to define democracy, and exclude the majority of history from the concept. Rosato struggles more to refine his argument; he does not set parameters for ‘democracy’ to be judged by. His argument is also plagued by an undercurrent of the US security agenda, preventing him from engaging with the theory itself on a contextual level.

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English, and it does not possess a similar open and free political environment like the United States. While the United States certainly does not possess a flawless record, there are far more similarities between Australia and the United States than Australia and China on these issues that invariably foster an intimate political relationship.

In short, as Australia prepares for changes in the balance of power in the 21st century, it must also consider the role of the United States in the pursuit of Australian strategic interests. Nevertheless, for the foreseeable future, the U.S. alliance still greatly benefits Australia in many aspects. While there are costs to any alliance, there is not yet any substantial reason for Australia to withdraw from the relationship.

About the Author: Andrew Kelly is a PhD student, working under the supervision of Dr. Peter Mauch. His thesis examines the early history of the ANZUS alliance.

Opinion Andrew Kelly

Many commentators have been particularly critical that Australia has served as little more than a subservient ally

to the United States

R e a s s e s s i n g t h e Australian-American

A l l i ance

Fulbright Program, have facilitated many exchanges between Australian and American scholars and their host institutions for decades. These factors must also be considered as part of any potential reassessment of the political relationship.

Even if policymakers in Canberra considered withdrawing from the U.S. alliance, there is no suitable power that could offer similar benefits to those that Australia currently enjoys through its close ties to the United States. For the foreseeable future, the United States will remain the dominant global power. China, its nearest strategic rival, does not yet have a comparable political, military or diplomatic global reach. While the Chinese economy should soon became the largest in the world, there is no guarantee that it will be more stable than the U.S. economy has been for the past century. Moreover, outside of high-level strategic considerations, China has a poor human rights record, most of its population does not speak

For over six decades, Australia’s formal alliance with the United States has formed the cardinal point of its foreign policy. Forged in the early Cold War through the formation of the 1951 ANZUS Treaty, this alliance initially provided the bedrock to meeting Australia’s post-war security needs but has since evolved to include intimate strategic, economic and cultural ties between the two countries. Yet ever since Australian involvement in the Vietnam War—and, more recently, committing Australian troops to the American cause in Afghanistan and Iraq—there has been increasing debate about whether the U.S. alliance should remain the cornerstone of Australian foreign policy. Many commentators have been particularly critical that Australia has served as little more than a subservient ally to the United States and that the benefits of this alliance do not outweigh its costs.

Should, then, Australia reconsider its close allegiance to the United States? Such a reassessment must certainly

take into consideration that the ANZUS Treaty does not require Australia to act according to American demands and that the alliance has never impeded Australia’s sovereign capacity to make its own foreign policy choices. In other words, it is important to remember that Australian decisions to support U.S. decisions are not made blindly. Foreign policy decisions are designed to serve Australian national interests and it should not be surprising that maintaining a close relationship with the most powerful nation in the world would address these interests. It should also be unsurprising that two democratic, capitalist and predominantly English speaking nations would often have overlapping foreign policy interests anyway.

The alliance, however, encompasses much more than military and security aspects. The Australian-American relationship also has considerable economic and educational dimensions. Economic ties were formalised by signing a Free Trade Agreement in 2004. Educational links, such as the

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A year ago I received a seemingly unassuming email from Dr Walton inviting students to participate in short-term international tours relevant to students enrolled in the International Relations and Asian Studies (IRAS) Major, one of which was HPAIR. It was the type of email many of us are guilty of never pursuing, myself included. Indeed it was initially the promise of overseas travel which made me want to know more. Yet despite my shortsightedness then I’m now extremely grateful for the opportunity as it led to an incredibly rewarding and fun experience.

Since 1991 HPAIR has held an annual conference for university students to discuss the most pressing issues facing the Asia-Pacific region with leaders in government, business, and academia. The 2014 HPAIR Asia Conference was held in Tokyo, with delegates accommodated in the historic Imperial Hotel, and assisted by a team of Harvard and Keio University students. The conference offered a broad range of panels and seminars for students to choose from, all of which were conducted either at the Tokyo International Forum, or Keio University.

Given my particular IRAS electives I decided to attend the Security and Diplomacy panels, seminars on Human Rights and Japanese Politics, and participate in the Security and Diplomacy Case Study exercise.

It is unsurprising that the greatest lesson I took from the experience was witnessing (and thereby reinforcing) firsthand what we have been taught all along. When a Japanese professor and a Korean diplomat spoke of their opposing views on the likelihood of realizing a unified Korea in the near

future, our delegates engaged in the conversation by questioning the fundamental obstacles to reunification based on what we had learned in Asia in the World. My surprise in discovering that Japan is trailing in the progressive fields of asylum seeker recognition and contemporary human rights developments reminded me of what had been stressed in our Human Rights Law lectures - the need for international covenants and treaties to be continuously monitored and buttressed. The tenuous Sino-Japanese relations, and the long-standing US-Japan alliance, discussed by a panel including Ministers from Japan’s Ministry of Defense and Professor Ezra Vogel, focused on Japan’s response to the East China Sea dispute. This again was a topic we have been introduced to, and explored in detail throughout The Asian Century unit. Our delegates also took a leading (and very successful) role in the Security and Diplomacy Case Study sessions which simulated a multilateral negotiation scenario based on the P5+1 Iranian nuclear negotiations. For those who have completed the Politics of Australia-Asia Relations unit this will sound very familiar; indeed, it was structured and conducted exactly as our workshop assessment had been. Like visiting a monument you had previously only known from postcards, it was wonderful to see the hours of lectures and readings essentially come to life. The conference schedule also allowed adequate time in between sessions and in the evenings for students to enjoy all that Tokyo has to offer – and it’s a lot! A free hour or two was spent wandering around the nearby upmarket shopping district of Ginza. My interest in Japanese history led me to stroll through the very avenues the Imperial Procession passed through during the Meiji

by Mario AmorBachelor of Arts/Bachelor of Laws

Essay

The Harvard Project for Asian and International Relations (HPAIR)

2014 Asia Conference

A Retrospective

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Restoration constitutional promulgation, the Nijubashi Bridge, the surrounding gardens, and indeed the Imperial Palace itself. Further, a free morning took me to Yoyogi Park where casual ‘cosplayers’ and competitive dance troupes were entertaining crowds. Lunch breaks were typically spent trying many hole-in-the-wall ramen joints in and around the labyrinth that is Tokyo Station. One was spent visiting the controversial Yasukuni Shrine; a word of advice: be particularly wary of committing a faux pas around here! Evenings were equally, if not more, entertaining. Our delegation enjoyed a few well-earned drinks in Roppongi at a pop-up Godzilla bar, complete with a large and animated statue of the monster. On another evening we found ourselves being dazzled by the lights and crowds of Shinjuku, and wound up watching a quirky (and highly recommended) robot cabaret show. The following night we were joined by delegates from other universities in looking for a karaoke room in Shibuya. And on numerous occasions Professor Lee was kind enough to treat us to amazing

restaurants, and join us at the historic Old Imperial Bar. Naturally, the details of what happened on tour, stays on tour.

I am, however, more than happy to share that the tour was well worth my while. In addition to appreciating how our taught theory is applied in practice by leaders and academics, the conference also offered other benefits. Panelists were willing to mingle after each session, offering students the unique opportunity to directly discuss matters with key stakeholders in international politics. It was even possible to do so outside the seminars - one of our delegates met Kevin Rudd whilst having breakfast. With over 550 students from over 60 countries participating, it was inevitable that interesting conversations would be had. A significant aspect of this was engaging with other like-minded students from a myriad of backgrounds. As multicultural and diverse as Sydney and UWS is, and as open-minded as I thought I was before the conference, talking to these students has led me to take an even more expansive view of

the world. For instance, I was surprised at the extent of knowledge that several Indian and Japanese delegates possessed of Australia’s contemporary asylum seeker and immigration policies; and, how this had affected their views of Australia and her role in the Asia-Pacific. Moreover, it served as a reminder of the challenges faced by representatives in regional and worldwide affairs,

especially in trying to accommodate for the differences and similarities of multiple perspectives. It has effectively shaped my outlook to go beyond naïve idealism and to appreciate pragmatic measures where necessary and appropriate. But above all, the shared journey strengthened my relations with my fellow UWS delegates. For all these reasons and more, the next time

you receive an apparently unassuming email offering an opportunity to extend your learning beyond the set lectures and assessments, do take the time to read and explore it. I can guarantee that you will gain so much from doing so, and trust that the University will do everything it can to assist you. And in a year from now, I look forward to reading your retrospective.

by Mario AmorBachelor of Arts/Bachelor of Laws

Essay

22 issue 1, 2015 23

ASEAN was founded on principles of “independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and…the right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference,”1 reflecting the traditional interpretation of Westphalian sovereignty. However, there is no doubt that there is an emerging global consensus in the last few decades that the international community must act where sovereignty has been used as a facade to protect state sponsored crimes against civilians, including crimes against humanity and genocide. While these systemic human rights abuses, such as the genocide committed by the Cambodian Khmer Rouge regime, have traditionally considered by ASEAN as an domestic issue and should not lead to an intervention, the case of Myanmar clearly shows that ASEAN believes that there are some acceptable justifications for intervention.2

To reconcile the two views, sovereignty should not be defined in terms of “freedom from external control,”3 as it is understood by most developing nations.4 It is in essence, the exercise of “final and absolute political authority in the political community, with ‘authority’ understood as the right to rule.”5 In recognising this supreme power, there is a mutual agreement between each State to not intervene in internal State matters. However, understanding the difference between authority and autonomy is fundamental to the peaceful coexistence between this absolute sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. In basic terms, a sovereign state can exist without being completely autonomous. Just consider the sovereignty of Scotland with its limited autonomy within the United Kingdom. In cases like these, it is the ability of the State to enter such treaties that is itself an exercise of its sovereign authority, even if the treaty limits the State’s ability to exercise its independence.6 In fact, the very existence of ASEAN is a reflection of this exercise of authority by Southeast Asian States.

Therefore, the problem is not in the concept of humanitarianism, but rather in the nature of the intervention, the circumstances under which it may be carried out and the states that undertake the responsibility to intervene. The problem for the ASEAN nations, as primarily developing nations, is that they are “struggling to create themselves as viable, legitimate political entities…in a political environment characterised by serious divisions.”7 As a result, a key concern is use of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) document, to give developed nations a means to legitimately invade developing nations, since most ASEAN nation are not in a position to challenge such a move. These developing nations are already focused primarily on state building and as a result, are attempting to stabilise their conflict prone region. This is problematic as the R2P is limited to situations

such as genocide and crimes against humanity, which are arguably a part of the state development process.8 Certainly, parallels may be drawn with the development of Europe in earlier centuries, which was hardly a peaceful process.9 Most of the ASEAN nations were victims of Europe’s brutal treatment through its development phase, and many of the contemporary problems they face today are a direct result of past European policies.10

In 2008, in the wake of Cyclone Nargis and the refusal of the Myanmar government to aid victims of this disaster, ASEAN among the rest of the international community called on the R2P for the right to intervene to assist victims of the humanitarian crisis.11 However, a clear line was drawn between the situation in Myanmar and the R2P specified triggers for intervention, although it was argued that refusing humanitarian assistance in such a time of need would be itself a crime against humanity.12 Regardless, while ASEAN argued that Myanmar should not be forced into accepting aid, it did take on a mediator role between the UN and the Myanmar regime and eventually assisted in coordinating aid delivery. This appeared to be an ad hoc development when compared to their lack of engagement with Cambodia and East Timor during earlier humanitarian emergencies.13 However, ASEAN’s support for intervention, even in the capacity of providing aid, by the usually conservative association, indicates the impact of changing international norms and how ASEAN has contextualised them into the region.

Despite the fact that the intervention was far more limited and only occurred with Myanmar’s consent, rather than the coercive intervention envisioned through the R2P, the Myanmar situation created a lasting impact on ASEAN.14 The governments within the region have since acknowledged a need for the association to develop the capacity to respond to similar emergencies in the future.15 Although ASEAN still displays some reluctance to engage with the R2P directly, the idea that the organisation should play a responsive role for its member states in such emergencies conveys a clear shift from its traditional norms. “Meaningful normative change ultimately depends on the successful fusion of foreign ideas with local ones…in a process of constitutive localization in which local actors determine the extent of norm diffusion and adoption [which]…is evolutionary rather than revolutionary.”16

From this perspective, ASEAN’s views on sovereignty were not likely to remain stationary, nor make a sudden shift from one extreme to another. Instead, these changes were a part of a gradual process of change, influenced by both international and regional developments. On the other hand, this would also mean that ASEAN would not be likely to ever endorse

Can ASEAN reconcile humanitarianism and sovereignty?

While there has been growing focus in the international community on humanitarianism and the question of intervention, The Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) fierce defence of Westphalian sovereignty has prevented a regional, unconditional acceptance of these newly developed Western norms. However sovereignty and humanitarian intervention are not inherently incompatible, and the changing perception of sovereignty at an international level has challenged contemporary regional views on non-interference. The unique case of Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar is a clear example that shows the region can and has progressed towards a more flexible definition of sovereignty. This reconstruction of sovereignty has allowed elements of humanitarianism to weigh against ASEAN’s traditional stance against intervention. The fact that the Myanmar military government eventually accepted external intervention within their territory in the form of aid suggests that the ASEAN states may be open to adopting a regional agreement in the future with a moderated stance on intervention. However this would be contingent on these international norms being ‘localized’ with regional norms, or more specifically, redefining the triggering events for intervention. To this end, the ASEAN member nations’ common historical experiences and views on sovereignty have allowed for greater consensus, leading to a gradual change towards more limited view of the non-interference principle. However, this progression will be constrained by the fact that the ASEAN nations are primarily still in the development stage of state building.

by Neha GauriStudent EssayBachelor of Arts/Bachelor of Laws

24 issue 1, 2015 25

the R2P in its entirety, due to its completely contradictory nature to the regional norm of non-interference. The fact that the R2P authorises the use of force in any form would make it difficult to integrate with regional values.

Therefore, the principle of non-interference as understood by the region has been a process of evolution towards co-operative engagement, as ASEAN continues to avoid the use of practical coercion. However ASEAN has recognised that “sovereignty also entails the responsibility of a State to protect its people. If it is unable or unwilling to do so, the international community has the responsibility to help that State achieve such capacity and such will and, in extreme necessity, to assume such responsibility itself”17 Despite these comments, it has been argued that ASEAN may agree with this in theory, but would not adopt this interpretation given that the region is “ripe with separatist conflicts and the… regular occurrence of…humanitarian emergencies.”18 However the Myanmar case study suggests that if a R2P type of regional agreement was developed to focus on crisis prevention and management for intra-ASEAN States, humanitarian emergencies in Southeast Asian would be managed significantly better.19 This would be especially important in dispelling some of the concerns of intervention by the ‘powerful’, developed nations, as such an agreement would likely preclude any military intervention and would be organised by ASEAN on a regional level. Such an agreement would be “non-threatening, focused on prevention and can guide the development of the ASEAN human rights body and dispute settlement mechanisms by providing an umbrella framework of non-coercive methods to prevent conflicts, respond to humanitarian needs and mediate in existing conflicts to prevent escalation into a full blown crisis that would cause widespread suffering and political instability.”20

What is particularly interesting about these changes is that ASEAN was initially set up primarily for economic purposes, and was not to be used as a forum to address ‘domestic’ issues in accordance with Westphalian sovereignty. When ASEAN was created, non-interference allowed the states to focus on “domestic consolidation in the wake of decolonisation and helped limit the risks of destabilising external interference and international conflicts.”21 This developed strong relationships based on common experiences and future goals along with mutual respect for State sovereignty and security.22 A key example of the extent to which this consensus has changed, would be ASEAN’s disapproval of Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia in 1979 although it arguably “halted the genocidal regime of the Khmer Rouge…the association…was a driving force in ensuring Cambodia’s seat at the UN was occupied by the Khmer Rouge until 1992.”23 Putting this into the context of

contemporary ASEAN after 2008, gives some perspective as to how it has evolved.

Despite this change, most believe it is unlikely that ASEAN will ever adopt the R2P because is does not adhere to the six fundamental norms of the ‘ASEAN Way’. These have been identified as State equality, no use of force, non-intervention, no use of ASEAN as a forum to address bilateral disagreements, use of diplomacy and mutual respect between States.24 It has been argued that the intervention following Cyclone Nargis was an ad hoc event and does not indicate any future developments towards humanitarianism from ASEAN, as such changes would contradict these underlying norms.25 In this case, it was suggested that non-traditional security threats have led to ASEAN to review its non-intervention principle, with ASEAN concluding it would encourage greater interaction on an international level but would not go against its principles.26 However, even the slight flexibility in the interpretation of sovereignty indicates a change from ASEAN’s previous stance. However the barrier to this change draws back to the fundamental difference between developing and developed States. Developing states are forced to focus on their own lack of domestic security. While developed nations focus outwards with their tradition interpretations of international security, countries in the process of development face their greatest conflicts within the state.27 Confronting and stabilising these forces would require these States to exercise as much sovereign authority as possible which would result in the concept being framed in terms of a State’s ability to exercise control over its internal affairs.28 This would suggest that once these developing nations have reached a level of internal stability, their interpretation of security and sovereignty would be redefined.

There is little doubt that ASEAN’s interpretation of interventionism has varied widely from that of Western nations. However, this was shaped largely by its colonial experiences and process of development currently experienced by its member nations. Cyclone Nargis is simply an example showing that ASEAN has began to consider humanitarianism within its definition of sovereignty, even if it was within a limited scope. As developing nations, they should not be compared against developed nations that have already reached their potential, but should instead be considered within the context of their development. For this reason, a regional agreement between the ASEAN nations would be far more useful than attempting to force some adaption of the R2P on the region. The security threats faced by the ASEAN States are unique to that region and should be addressed on that basis.

1 Article 2, “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.”

2 Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect,” 275.

3 Neuman, “International Relations Theory,” 7.

4 Ibid.

5 Narine, “Humanitarian Intervention,” 467.

6 Ibid.

7 Day “Globalization and Political Ethics,” 218.

8 Ibid.

9 Ayoob, “Subaltern Realism,” 38.

10 Ibid.

11 Caballero, “Cyclones and Humanitarian Crises,” 137.

12 Ibid 143.

13 Ibid 149.

14 Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect,” 272-273.

15 Ibid 273.

16 Acharya, “Whose Ideas Matter?” 5.

17 Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect,” 267.

18 Caballero, “Cyclones and Humanitarian Crises,” 149.

19 Ibid

20 Ibid 150.

21 Bellamy, “Between non-interference and sovereignty,” 184.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid 185.

24 Guilloux, “Myanmar: Analyzing Problems,” 388-389.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ayoob, “Subaltern Realism,” 38.

28 Ibid.

Footnotes:

by Neha GauriStudent EssayBachelor of Arts/Bachelor of Laws

26 issue 1, 2015 27

Will India’s future be peaceful and prosperous, or unsettled and conflict-ridden?

India’s rapid rate of growth has certainly boosted the likelihood of a peaceful and prosperous future for the nation as its economic ascension has deemed it an emerging global power. The nation’s expanding economy, combined with its enormous population and possession of nuclear weapons all serve as indicators of India’s “imminent greatness”.4 Leading international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, have ranked India as the ninth-largest economy in terms of gross domestic product in 2011.5 The United States National Intelligence Council, taking note of the expanding reach of India’s navy, anticipated India becoming an assertive military power in the region.6 Whilst all these developments would purport a thriving future for India, the nation still faces many challenges which could alternatively lead India’s future down a different path. These challenges immediately become apparent in the nations stagnating rate of growth which has dropped substantially since the end of 2010.7 It becomes clear that in an “international environment marked by economic turbulence”8 India’s future is not as predisposed to succeed as would appear.9

Accompanying India’s economic ascension on the world stage has been its foreign policy in the 21st century which is becoming increasingly defined by its pragmatism in international affairs.10 India’s shift in foreign policy from a non-aligned approach to a more pragmatic one carries with it major ramifications for the nation’s future, both gainful and taxing. As India is becoming increasingly recognised as an emerging global power, it has been able to more actively engage in negotiations on an international level.11 Some examples of this can be seen through India’s central role in negotiations on climate change at Copenhagen in 2009 and also through their involvement in international dialogue forums such as IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). 12 This greater degree of involvement in global affairs supports the claim that India’s future has the potential to be a peaceful one. It is indeed the nation’s current approach to foreign policy which has “sought to ensure that India would not be marginalized in the emergent global order”.13 Perhaps the greatest example of pragmatism in India’s foreign policy can be seen in the nation’s nuclear deal with the United States; that is, the India-United States Civil Nuclear Agreement. It is, however, the nation’s ties with the US on the basis of this agreement which carry with them the potential of a taxing future for India; “ties with the US carry both opportunity and risk”.14 This risk becomes apparent when you consider America’s shaky relationship with China and its “determination to reinforce [their] strategic primacy in Asia”.15 Indeed, analysts view the Indo-US deal as attempts by America to “shore up influences in South Asia by

building up rival arsenals”.16 In such a way, the United States’ support of a “strong and resilient democratic India” can be translated on a global scale to the US attempting to form a “strategic counterweight to an increasingly assertive, and sometimes threatening, communist China”.17 Given India’s relationship with the US, the development of a strategic clash on the world stage would see India pitted against China. The potential for such a clash to develop between a US-backed India and China owes much to America’s tainted view of China through an ideological lens, playing on fears and resentments latent since the Cold War which would permit the communist nation to be perceived with “suspicion at best and a threat at worst”.18 The outcomes of such a clash certainly resemble a conflict-ridden and unsettled future for India. The risk that India’s relationship with the US bears lies therein. It becomes clear that whilst India’s foreign policy has sought to strengthen the nation and would in most instances purport the nation’s prosperity, it has also brought to surface a number of challenges which threaten the potential for a peaceful future in India.

Whilst India’s increasing involvement in international affairs and inclusion in global forums may be interpreted as a “success story at a global level”,19 the nation is faced with myriad challenges at a regional level. These challenges concern themselves with strategic rivalries between nations in the Asian region and are particularly detrimental to India due to the “continent’s conflicting political and strategic cultures and weak regional institutions”.20 Perhaps the most pressing of these challenges is the strategic rivalry between India and China on the political arena.21 Indeed, “China rivals India for power in Asia”22 and will accordingly seek to undermine India’s expansion and growth so as to keep its own supremacy intact.23 On the world stage, this will translate to China sandbagging India’s attempts to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.24 In addition to this, China will also look to exploit India’s growing market on the economic front.25 The intensifying competition between China and India will only serve to escalate tensions between the nations and further “increase the risk of serious strategic miscalculations in Asia”.26 The potential for a conflict-ridden future for India lies therein. The reality of the situation is that India will likely fuel the fire that is its rivalry with China as its Look East policy is strictly concerned with a greater involvement in the Asian region; “economic interest … is compelling India to exploit this region”.27 Indeed, it is through a “network of east-west roads and energy pipelines”28 that India will be allowed greater play in the region. Myanmar represents one such nation which India has looked to exploit for their natural resources.29

India has in the 21st century been catapulted into global power status on the world stage as a result of its economic upsurge, inclusion in global discussions and a strengthened strategic relationship with the United States.1 Whilst India’s position in the emergent global order has profitable ramifications for the nation’s future, it has also presented the nation with myriad obstacles and challenges both internal and external. Determining whether India’s future will be peaceful and prosperous, or unsettled and conflict-ridden is therefore problematic as it is “a country where predictions are both ubiquitous and foolhardy”.2 It becomes clear that India must carefully navigate the political minefield that is its international affairs if it wishes to indulge in a successful future, as a failure to do so will prevent the nation from “living up to the expectations generated”.3

by Peter JakimovStudent EssayBachelor of Arts/Bachelor of Laws

28 issue 1, 2015 29

As China is heavily invested in Myanmar30 as well as many nations in the region, a strategic clash is likely to ensue between the nations. It becomes evident that China remains apprehensive and even opposed to India’s emergence in the global order and views its Look East policy as an attempt to “encroach on Chinese strategic space”,31 thereby fueling the rivalry between the nations. Accordingly, India’s involvement in this region may be construed as the “escalation of tensions in an already conflictual geopolitical environment”.32 Where South Asia is concerned, these challenges become apparent when you consider that the region “is still one of the most dangerous places on earth”.33 This is owed largely to “intra-state conflicts and insurgencies” which have, over the past decade, destabilised many countries within the region.34 It becomes evident that India will need to confront these challenges in order to secure a peaceful future for its nation. This will prove to be a difficult task for India as the “tense inter-state relations” in Asia certainly make it “one of the least integrated regions in the world”.35

Despite being catapulted into global power status, India still remains a nation internally inflicted by corruption, security threats and a waning democratic order; there exists a “growing gap between a rising economy and a falling polity”.36

Politically, India has “declined into a state of paralysis”37 as corruption and an absence of strong national leadership remain characteristic of the nation’s governance. Indeed, an increasing level of corruption in Indian government has undermined the parliamentary system and caused the people to lose faith in their democracy.38 That “113 of [the] 543 members of the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Indian parliament, should have criminal cases pending against them”39 is especially troubling for India’s future. As a result, “an indispensable and impressive system is today overrun by unprincipled and unimpressive operators”.40 This is also true of India’s elite within the democratic order who are reluctant to engage with the nation’s rising status41 as an absence of strategic thinking pervades the government.42 This is owed greatly to the frequent amount of individualistic decisions made within India’s foreign policy apparatus.43 This lack of “top-down instruction” within India has rendered long-term planning “virtually impossible”.44 It is the absence of such a “Pax Indica”45 which will destroy the prospect of a prosperous future for India. Internal security presents another area of crisis in India further demonstrating the nation’s frailty.46 Indeed, India has “one of the world’s highest rates of terrorism” as underground extremists such as “Pakistan-aided Islamists in Kashmir and elsewhere” beset the nation.47 It becomes evident that India’s democratic order is significantly flawed and this reality only increases the likelihood of an unsettled future for India characterised by internal conflict. In order to secure a peaceful future for itself, India must first eradicate these problems within its borders; “until it is fixed, India will

remain a story of private success and public failure; it will not be able to call itself a truly successful nation, let alone a great power”.48

Perhaps the greatest affliction plaguing the Indian nation and diminishing its chances at a peaceful and prosperous future is that of poverty. With twenty-two percent of India’s population living below the poverty line,49 the nation faces significant internal challenges in the years ahead. Whilst the economic development of the nation is certainly a “necessary condition for lifting the poor, it is not a sufficient condition”.50 For all its economic growth, India still has not been able to abolish the poverty within its borders.51 Despite being one of the largest economies in the world, India has ranked quite low on the Human Development Index at “134th among 182 nation-states according to the Human Development Report 2009”.52 In addition to this, India is experiencing an uneven growth of its populace with the increase of an uneducated and underprivileged population in the poorer parts of the country, particularly north India, and a reduction in the amount of literate and educated people in the south.53 The implications of such an unbalanced growth in population will mean “the poor reproducing their poverty and illiteracy and dragging the country down”.54 In the face of a rapidly growing middle class, millions of Indians are still living in poverty with “little access to clean water, good schools and functioning health services.55 With little access to these necessities in life, India is suffering from within as a major proportion of its population is unable to engage with the nation’s democracy and governance.56 In order for India’s future to be a successful one, it must first and foremost, confront poverty and work towards its eradication; a “failure to accomplish this will be a real threat to India’s future”.57

Whilst India has experienced growing economic prosperity in the 21st century, it has not been able to “create and secure a stable environment”58 in which its rise on world stage can be allowed to flourish. The “bottom-up policymaking process”59 that is the embodiment of India’s current foreign policy apparatus is just one example of the nation’s backwardness. This combined with poverty, corruption and terrorism within the state make it clear that India’s future is “fraught with uncertainty”.60 Whilst these obstacles to a prosperous future for the nation stem from internal conflict, India will also have to guard against external challenges threatening its future; that is, to prevent “increasingly overt strategic competition … from descending into a strategic clash”.61 India’s future certainly has the potential to be a peaceful and prosperous one; however it is undoubtedly confronted by a variety of challenges. Therefore, it is the manner in which the nation deals with these challenges which will determine whether a prosperous future for India becomes a reality.62

1 Chadda, Why India Matters, 213.2 Tharoor, The Elephant, the Tiger and the Cell

Phone, 433.3 Kavalski, India and Central Asia, 19.4 Miller, “India’s feeble foreign policy,” 14.5 Chadda, Why India Matters, 4.6 Ibid.7 Ibid., 99.8 Kavalski, India and Central Asia, 211.9 Ganguly, India since 1980, 188.10 Destradi, Indian Foreign Policy and Security in

South Asia, 1.11 Ibid.12 Ibid.13 Ganguly, India since 1980, 187.14 Chellaney, Asian Juggernaut, 208.15 Ibid.16 Mohanty, Foreign Policy of India in the 21st

century, 130.17 Bhasin, The Big Three, 127.18 Ibid., 103.19 Destradi, Indian Foreign Policy and Security in

South Asia, 1.20 Chellaney, Asian Juggernaut, 271.21 Bhasin, The Big Three, 109.22 Mohanty, Foreign Policy of India in the 21st

century, 371.23 Bhasin, The Big Three, 109.24 Ibid.25 Ibid.26 Chellaney, Asian Juggernaut, 271.27 Mohanty, Foreign Policy of India in the 21st

century, 182.28 Chadda, Why India Matters, 198.29 Ibid., 197.30 Ibid.31 Chellaney, Asian Juggernaut, 269.32 Kavalski, Central Asia and the Rise of

Normative Powers, 135.33 Destradi, Indian Foreign Policy and Security in

South Asia, 1.34 Ibid.35 Ibid.36 Das, India Grows at Night, 184.37 Ibid., 5.38 Tharoor, The Elephant, the Tiger and the Cell

Phone, 434.39 Ibid.40 Ibid.41 Miller, “India’s feeble foreign policy,” 14.42 Ibid., 17.43 Ibid., 15.44 Ibid., 16.45 Kavalski, India and Central Asia, 19.46 Chellaney, Asian Juggernaut, 255.47 Ibid.48 Das, India Grows at Night, 48.

49 Tharoor, The Elephant, the Tiger and the Cell Phone, 435.

50 Das, India Grows at Night, 5.51 Gupta, Red Tape, 3.52 Ibid.53 Tharoor, The Elephant, the Tiger and the Cell

Phone, 437.54 Ibid.55 Das, India Grows at Night, 5.56 Tharoor, The Elephant, the Tiger and the Cell

Phone, 435.57 Ibid.58 Destradi, Indian Foreign Policy and Security in

South Asia, 1.59 Miller, “India’s feeble foreign policy,” 16.60 Ganguly, India since 1980, 12.61 Chellaney, Asian Juggernaut, 211.62 Ganguly, India since 1980, 188.

Footnotes:

by Peter JakimovStudent EssayBachelor of Arts/Bachelor of Laws

30 issue 1, 2015 31

32 issue 1, 2015 33

The recent executions in Indonesia of eight prisoners saddened many around the world, including myself. Two of these men were Australian citizens Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran, who were convicted for drug smuggling. Do I believe that they committed a serious crime? Yes, most definitely. Do I believe that their punishment was justified? Absolutely not. For almost a decade, Andrew and Myuran worked tirelessly to repent for their sins by creating beneficial programs for their fellow inmates, and they completely turned their lives around in the process. But yet, this wasn’t enough to convince President Widodo that the executions should be overturned. Instead, in the months and weeks prior to the state-sanctioned murders, Indonesia

chose to enforce their punishment by degrading and humiliating the men and their families in the most unimaginable way. Using excessive police force to move the boys to their final prison cells, allowing the upper echelon of the police force to take ‘selfies’ next to the bewildered prisoners, limiting their final hours with family, forcing their loved ones to endure the media throng without any assistance, refusing to allow any photography of Andrew’s wedding on the eve of his death but then releasing secretly obtained photographs from security guards – the list goes on, far beyond the constraints of this article. It is painfully hard to find a shred of dignity in how the men and their families were treated. As Myuran’s mentor, Ben Quilty, eloquently asserted in his eulogy, it was

a “self-righteous and cruel tirade” by Indonesian authorities, who showed no compassion, mercy or humanity for the reformed men even in their final hours. Subsequently, such actions have made me question, what qualities do we want in our leaders? As the opening quote illustrates, revenge is never the answer. State-sanctioned murder is never the answer. If President Widodo sought to make a point about his power, I believe he failed. Instead of showing strength and leadership, he showed barbaric fear and political desperation. Leaders need to have the courage to stand for mercy and humanity, regardless of where they fall on the political spectrum. If our leaders are unable to extend compassion to the broken or the lost, then they fail to lead us at all.

Opinion by Roshana AseervathamBachelor of Arts and Law

About the Author: Roshana is an Arts-Law student who completed her Bachelor of Arts in 2012. She subsequently completed a BA (Honours); her thesis, entitled “The Theme and Variations of War Rape: Is Rape a Weapon of War?”, earned her First Class Honours. Roshana is currently completing her Law degree.

“You will achieve more in this world through acts of mercy than you will through acts of retribution”

– Nelson Mandela.

A self-righteous and cruel tirade

34 issue 1, 2015 35

Pyong-Photographic series of North Korea by Alexander Warton

yangThe Juche Tower

36 issue 1, 2015 37

The Pyongyang Street Scene

Train Yard

Illegal Maritime Arrivals:

Are they I l legal?

Conflicting with Australia’s acknowledgement of important human rights frameworks is the rigid endeavor to militarily deter asylum seekers arriving by boat. Given her international obligations, the current pending global asylum seeker issue, and Australia’s comparably minimal intake of refugees, why is it that the Australian government has initiated a cross Departmental operation to ultimately deter asylum seekers arriving by boat? On September 9th 2013, the Coalition was voted in by the Australian public and put forth the controversial ‘stop the boats’ or Operation Sovereign Borders policy. While this policy is essentially achieving its intention, I argue that the measures taken to attain these results will be detrimental to Australia’s future in both the region as well as the international arena.

Student Essay Kate Hinton

The stop the boats’ policy advocates a strong stance on deterrence. To justify this, the Prime Minister Tony Abbott remarked in a joint press conference on 3rd December 2013 that “every person who comes illegally to this country by boat... is a person who vindicates the people smugglers” (Prime Minister of Australia, 2013) hence, validating their business. Though the military-led border security initiative of turning back the boats appears brutal, we learn that these measures are intended to provide the maximum deterrence to people smugglers by denying them a product to sell and, in turn, to prevent another 900 people perishing at sea (between 2008 and 2013 under Labor- Australian Border Deaths: Monash University). An indicator of successful deterrence is the number of asylum seekers failing to return to UNHCR in Indonesia; dropping from about 50% in April 2013 to just 2% a year later. The no show rate generally signified that another route to destination countries was pursued, most commonly by a dangerous boat. However, with such a drastic shift in figures, as well as reports that not a single boat has made it to Australia since 19th December 2013 (written on 23/08/2014), it is evident that the policy of deterrence has been received clearly. Australia’s endeavour to deter these illegal maritime arrivals (IMA’s) is to ultimately deter a life risking journey. To do otherwise, it could be argued, would be to deny the spirit of the Refugee Convention, which is ultimately to protect refugees.

Another argument in support of the ‘stop the boats policy’ is the economic impact of IMA’s. Under the previous government, the total cost to tax payers to manage IMA’s increased from $85 million in 2007-08 to $3 billion in 2013-14. The Coalition argues that this money could have been better spent on infrastructure for the Australian pubic, but rather has been forced to counter an issue the previous government was unable to manage.

Though there is much support for the ‘stop the boats’ policy, many oppose it for humanitarian, political and legal reasoning. Firstly, there is a strong view, especially amongst groups such as the Australian Greens, that the approach and response to IMA’s should be humanitarian not military. They argue that the deterrence method used in the policy, though military run and enforced, will not outweigh a genuine fear of persecution

and, hence, will not stop asylum seekers attempting to reach protection, however the means. The Australian Greens propose that increasing Australia’s humanitarian intake by 10,000 to total an intake of 30,000 per year, will give incentive and guide asylum seeks to select a safer channel of seeking protection in Australia; choosing to register with the UNHCR and lodge an offshore protection visa application, rather than risking their lives at sea.

As a further incentive to asylum seekers to choose the preferred, and safer, channel, there are suggestions that the Australian government could pressure and provide support to increase the capacity of UNHCR in common transit countries. The UNHCR operates in countries without national asylum systems to process refugees, including Indonesia which is a major transit point for asylum seekers on their journey to Australia. The processing system in Indonesia is known to be poorly managed, have low capacity and inadequate resources. With such a negative reputation, it is understandable that people smugglers have a market to sell their product to, and the consumer is easily enticed. If the government were to take these suggestions and increase the humanitarian intake, as well as promote an adequate and fair asylum processing system in transit countries, Australia would essentially be deterring unsafe passage by promoting their preferred channel, offshore protection visa lodgement through the UNHCR as opposed to IMA, in a compassionate, practical and, attainable approach.

Another perspective on the policy is that the refugee quota is politicised by the government. Australia is the only country to process refugees in a dual system by separating the onshore (IMA) and offshore (UNHCR or offshore refugee visa applicants) intakes and is in no way reflective of any direction given by the Refugee Convention. The public perception associated with asylum seekers arriving by boat is commonly negative and often associated with terms such as ‘queue jumpers’ or ‘illegals’. Australia’s dual processing system further enhances these adverse views as IMAs once they are processed and granted a visa, are classed as ‘Special Humanitarian Entrants’. These places are also used by refugees to propose family members who are offshore and

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still at risk of persecution and, hence, is where the Australian public associates onshore arrivals as ‘stealing’ the places of those who have gone through the official processes to be accepted into Australia, so as to arrive onshore lawfully, with a valid visa. Asylum seekers are a global humanitarian matter and should not be used as a weapon for domestic political gain, yet Australia’s ‘stop the boats’ policy conveniently correlates extremely well with the negative connotations relating to the dual processing system in place.

The Coalition’s ‘stop the boats’ policy does not fit with Australia’s international legal obligations for three reasons. To begin with, Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention recognises that the seeking of asylum can require breaking immigration rules and outlines that the “...states shall not impose penalties on account of their illegal entry or presence...”. While Australian domestic law deems IMA’s as arriving illegally and therefore denies them entry, international law does not; the person either has a valid fear of persecution or does not and is entitled to appropriate fair assessment to determine this, regardless of their mode of travel into the country. For Australia to refuse asylum seekers and potential refugees, without fair assessment of their protection claims, they are breaching both the right to seek asylum and as well Article 31 of the Refugee Convention.

Secondly, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Convention Against Torture (CAT), the Human Rights Commission (HRC) and its Protocol as well as its own domestic law, Australia has broad non-refoulement obligations which prevent the removal, expulsion or return of refugees from Australia to a country where they are in danger of death, torture or other mistreatment, including arbitrary detention. The principle of non-refoulement is non-derogable in Australian domestic law and is widely recognized as customary international law, applying to not only refugees but also asylum seekers pending determination of the validity of their protection claims. Though the Australian

Defence Force is detecting and intercepting Suspected Illegal Entry Vessels (SIEVs) before they are able to reach Australian water, which is already against international laws as mentioned above, the Australian government is waiving their responsibility to ensure that the occupants of the SIEVs are returning to a safe country. Australia is ignoring their obligations under non-refoulement laws and not accepting responsibility of potential refugees purely because the SIEVs were intercepted and turned away before being able to reach Australian territory. I propose that this is also breaching Article 26 of the Vienna Convention, as Australia is not abiding by its obligation “in good faith”.

To conclude, the Australian Government’s ‘stop the boats’ policy is directly breaching a number of international laws which it is signatory to, by using its sovereign powers as an excuse to protect its borders. Under Article 27 of the Vienna Convention “A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as a justification for its failure to perform a treaty”, meaning domestic law does not supersede the authority of binding international treaties. Also, the Coalition’s promise to “restore real promises that live up to...” former Prime Minister John Howard’s declaration to “decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come” clearly emphasizes the Government’s intentions of implementing and manipulating domestic law as a weapon against the rights of refugees under international laws and treaties.

In our ever-globalising world, Australia must strive not only for national interests but also for those of the region and international community. After analyzing the arguments for and against the policy, it is apparent that although the government has achieved its intentions in detecting and interception SIEVs, to the likes and dislikes of many, it does not fit with Australia’s international legal obligations. For this reason, I propose that unless international treaties are upheld, they are essentially made redundant and by breaking such treaties, Australia is effectively deteriorating its stance, regionally and globally.

Student Essay Kate Hinton

Regionally, the policy has not improved or even stabilized the bilateral relations of Australia and Indonesia. Each state endeavours to maintain its sovereignty; both states will implement domestic policies to protect their interests and borders rather than cooperation to achieve a common goal. In response to this stubbornness and lack of communication, I suggest that Australia initiate an agreement which is not only for domestic political interest but for the interests of our neighbour Indonesia, as well as to seek to contribute to the global issue of asylum seekers. One significant positive impact of such an engagement would be that deterrence would not only be based on the destination country, Australia, but also a major transit country, Indonesia.

On a global scale, Australia has only weakened her influence as a state, by breaking international treaties. Without universality, international law is irrelevant and in response to Australia’s actions following the ‘stop the boats’ policy, I suggest that is it crucial to Australia’s standing in the international community that the government reconsider their future approaches to global matters such as the asylum seeker issue. Being an important middle power, Australia must strive for cooperation and without evidence of them doing so, future engagements may be compromised.

In conclusion, the ‘stop the boats’ policy has created major debate for the Australian public and political parties. In support of this policy is a strong stance on state sovereignty aimed at military run deterrence and economic protection, and opposed to the policy is the view that the Australian government is wrong to militarise and politicise a global humanitarian matter. Along with this, the breach of numerous international treaties and laws has drawn me to the conclusion that although the policy has reached its intention domestically, the actions to achieve this result have created potential tensions both regionally and internationally for Australia. From this, I propose that the Australian government reconsider and create a change in policy that will not only benefit it immediately domestically, but also the relations of states in the region, and its international influence.

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Day

Standing before the towering Daibutsu, it would be hard to argue Buddhism was anything less than Japan’s most lasting cultural import from the mainland. It is true that Yamato Japan sought legitimation and greater power through connection with Chinese authority. In the Nara period, rulers attempted to recreate a Chinese-style centralised state in Japan. Japanese literature, such as the Kojiki, followed the Chinese lead while sculpture too emulated Chinese and mainland styles. However, these influences waned over time. The emergence of the samurai class set Japan in a vastly different political direction to China and Korea, the development of hiragana fostered a distinctly Japanese canon and style of literature, and distinctly Japanese-style sculpture flourished in the Heian period. What remains is the Daibutsu and the hundreds of Buddhist temples all over Japan. Religiously, philosophically, artistically and politically Buddhism has played a central role in Japanese history. Both the Chinese architecture of the Todaiji and the imposing Daibutsu reflect the Nara period’s imitations of mainland culture. From our historical vantage point, we may ponder which influences waned, which set down true roots, and approach the greater question – why?

Day

In the martial architecture of Kamakura’s Zen temples, I saw the development of warrior culture. Throughout Japanese history, the need to legitimate rule through cultural achievement and sophistication has endured. As it concerned the Three Great Unifiers and the Meiji oligarchs, so it concerned the new military rulers of the Kamakura bakufu. These military men sought, initially through imitation of the refined Kyoto aristocrats, that legitimation.

Yet, naturally, the military elite’s unique values and experiences generated their own culture. The daring adventure of the Heikemonogatari is quite different to the restrained introspection of Sei Shonagon’s Pillow Book, yet both are exquisite literature. To turn the chanoyu cup sharply or softly, which now stands as more or less cultured? So I feel it was in the architecture of these temples, in the practice of Zen, in the Golden and Silver Pavillions, and in all other outpourings of military attempts at culture. What began as politically expedient imitation developed into something exquisite in its own right.

DAY

I paused between two stands, one filled with sake and the other with wine. Nothing was further from the peaceful quiet of the towering trees, punctuated occasionally by broadcast announcements from an invisible train station, than Natsume Soseki’s description of Japan’s ‘fire bell awakening’ in the Meiji Era.

The synthesis of Japan and West, tradition and modernity, seemed to me one of perfect balance. I sensed no incongruity in chrysanthemums on traditional robes, on the gold buttons of a European military jacket, on the banners of a Shinto shrine, on the prow of a modern warship. The Meiji Restoration’s work of meshing tradition with swiftly adopted modernity, the upheaval, the fears and uncertainty of the era appeared entirely submerged in the success of its mission.

The Tokyo I encountered projected supreme self-confidence, a confidence of shrines and train stations, buttons and banners, a confidence in both Japanese tradition and Japanese modernity. If something uniquely Japanese was lost in the Restoration, then something also distinctly Japanese was invented to take its place, something that served as a vehicle to bring the Japanese identity safely into the modern era.

Reading Journa l

Raen TurnerJapan Journals

Day

Kyoto may well be considered the birthplace of Japanese culture. It was in the mid-Heian era that a slow movement towards indigenous cultural achievement overtook the Asuka and Nara legacy of Chinese imitation. Since the overwhelming first influx of mainland culture, Japan had time to digest the culture they had adopted wholesale.

The decline of the Tang dynasty and the cessation of Japanese embassies to China gave further space for distinctly Japanese culture to reassert itself. In comparison to the heavily Chinese architecture of Todaiji, we saw distinctly Japanese shrines, discussed the development of Japanese literature from the Kojiki and Nihongi to the Genjimonogatari, the development of Japanese poetry and fashion, among the many aspects of developing Japanese history. Furthermore, it was the style of Kyoto aristocrats that military elite initially imitated in their quests for legitimation. If any one place may claim to be the birthplace of a culture, surely it is Kyoto.

Day

I was hopelessly conflicted.

After the debate I had felt, as comfortably as one may, that the atomic bombs were justified. Perhaps the sheer normality of the city made it easier to accept the logic, the difference between defeat and surrender, the role of the bombs in empowering the peace party, psychological shock, and all those other well turned arguments.

After the A-bomb museum I felt that nothing could justify such horror. What a helpless feeling, to understand that I could not argue, even after seeing the detached skin and nails of a victim, that those countless deaths were any less horrific than those burnt alive in collapsed buildings in Tokyo, than those killed in the vicious fighting of Okinawa.

Two narratives: first, that the atomic bomb was justified, second, that it was a horror humanity must never see repeated. I saw in the eloquence of the debate and the power of the museum the role of historians in framing these narratives; I saw in historians lawyers arguing their cases.

Leaving Hiroshima I felt a profound sense of unease.

Day

If Kyoto then stands as the birthplace of Japanese culture, there would be a certain poetry in naming it Japanese culture’s cemetery. There would be evidence for such a claim. As we stood at Kiyomizu-dera I saw a city as nondescript as any in its modernity. Practicality demands old buildings be destroyed, new ones erected. Japanese culture, however, is not destroyed with these buildings. On the walk to Kiyomizu-dera I passed many people in kimonos, while on the streets below geisha went silently to and fro in streets that felt as though they had not changed in a thousand years. We ate in small restaurant were the humour and hospitality of our hosts was truly ageless. All around were preparations for festivities, and in the heart of Kyoto the Gion Shrine. Culture necessarily must change – to freeze culture is to kill it. That is not to say things have not been lost, but beautiful things are always lost in the passage of history. If Sei Shonagon’s world has been lost, her people have not.

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June 7 – Tokyo

The Meiji period (1868-1912) was characterised by increasing Westernisation as Japan struggled to evolve from an agrarian, feudal society to an industrialised, modern one. It was in this era that the capital was moved to Tokyo. However, as Jansen (2002) states, by the late Meiji years it was believed that this “flood of Western influence” (p. 456) should be balanced by a retention of a distinctive Japanese identity through the restoration of imperial rule and native Shinto religion. The Meiji Shrine, which we visited this morning, reflects this dual focus upon antiquity and modernisation. For example, there are barrels of sake (Shinto influence) on one side of the path and barrels of wine (Western influence) on the other. We then visited the consumer regions of Tokyo. These areas reflect the balance initiated in the Meiji era – they have a clear Western influence but have retained a sense of being uniquely Japanese. This Westernisation has continued to draw a negative response. According to Schencking (2013) many Japanese people argued the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake was retribution for “the sinister spread of Western culture” (p. 126) in urban areas of Tokyo. Despite this “perceived disintegration of Japanese society” (Schencking, 2013, p. 126), these urban districts felt as ‘Japanese’ as the historical sites that we visited.

June 8 – Kamakura

In 1192, after defeating the Taira clan in the Gempei War, Minamoto Yoritomo became the first shogun of Japan and established a military government in Kamakura. From the twelfth century the Kamakura bakufu, “Japan’s first warrior government” (Mass, 1995, p. 1), thus held effective control of the nation. However, as Craig (2002) demonstrates, the aristocrats in Kyoto retained nominal power, so the bakufu emerged “on top of an existing order, not one that had collapsed” (p. 37). The Kamakura era also saw the expansion of several Buddhist sects, including the Zen sect. The temples we visited today – Engakuji and Kencho-ji – are part of this Zen sect. This is best represented by the temples’ elaborate gardens and artworks, which are particularly notable when contrasted to the relatively modest Meiji Shrine that we visited yesterday.

In Kamakura we also visited Tsurugaoka Hachimangu, a Shinto Shrine. This shrine reflects the entanglement of Buddhist and Shinto practices which occurred in this era because, until the Meiji period when the religions were separated, the shrine also acted as a Tendai Buddhist temple. Finally, it is interesting to note that the continued borrowings from China during this Nara era are reflected architecturally in both the temples and shrine that we visited today.

TravelJournal

Rebekah Ward Japan Journals

June 10-11 – Kyoto

Kyoto was the capital of Japan from 796 until 1869. Despite Kamakura emerging as the true centre of control from 1192, the aristocratic Kyoto retained nominal power because the Emperor remained here. This is reflected by the Heian Jingu Shrine, which we visited, which deifies two Emperors of the era. Most of the places that we visited in Kyoto – including the Kinkaku-ji temple; Heian Jingu Shrine; and Nishiki Market are mentioned in Kawabata’s novel The Old Capital. Furthermore, as we saw with Tsurugaoka Hachiman-gu in Kamakura, Shinto and Buddhist practices became entangled during this era. However, whilst the peasants largely retained their traditional Shinto practices, albeit with adapted Buddhist elements, the nobles increasingly adopted the Chinese culture. The religious duality of the era is thus less evident in Kyoto where Buddhist temples became firmly entrenched as “Chinese history became the mirror in which [the Japanese aristocracy] saw itself” (Craig, 2002, p. 24). We visited the elaborate Ginkakuji (‘Silver Pavilion’) and Kinkaku (‘Golden Pavilion’) Zen Buddhist temples. These reflect the ornate Zen culture (as seen by their decorative gardens) and the nature of Kyoto in this era as the aristocrats focused upon the arts. This so-called ‘high culture’ of Kyoto is captured by both Sei Shonagon’s The Pillow Book and Kawabata’s The Old Capital.

June 12 – Hiroshima

On August 6, 1945 the US dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima hoping to end World War II in the Pacific by forcing Japan to surrender. Our visit to Hiroshima centred, logically, upon memorials to this. We visited the Peace Memorial Museum and Peace Park, including the Children’s Peace Monument; Eternal Flame; and Atomic Bomb Dome. The museum was sobering in its depiction of the destruction wrought by the bombings, upon the city and Japan as well as upon specific individuals and their families. Despite this, I think it is important to note that the atomic bombings brought a swift end to WWII and “forestalled sacrifices on both sides far surpassing those at Hiroshima and Nagasaki” (Asada, 1998, p. 511). Furthermore, as Asada (1998) argues, despite Japan facing military defeat from mid-1944 Japanese leaders continued to prepare for a homeland battle as they “failed to translate defeat into surrender” (p. 479). With the US refusing to negotiate and preparing to invade Japan, the ‘shock-value’ of the bombings was needed to pressure the government to seek the imperial decision that eventually led to Japan’s ‘unconditional’ surrender on August 15.

June 9 – Nara

In 710 AD, Nara was established as the first permanent capital of Japan. During this era there was a broad “adoption of the high civilisation of China” (Craig, 2002, p. 12). These borrowings can be seen in the Nara National Museum and Todai-ji Temple which we visited today – particularly regarding architecture and religion. In terms of religion, there was a proliferation of Buddhism. Craig (2002) asserts that although Buddhism spread slowly in Nara Japan, it penetrated society more deeply than it did in China. Both the temple and the museum clearly reflect this. The Nara National Museum celebrates artifacts of historical Japanese-Buddhist art, including in the Buddhist Sculpture Hall. The Todai-ji Temple was a head Buddhist temple and houses a large statue of Vairocana Buddha. At Todai-ji we explored (to varying degrees of success) the religious myth associated with this statue – that is, if you can fit inside its nostril you will be enlightened in your next life. The extensive borrowings from China in this era are also reflected architecturally in Nara. The city is modelled upon the Chinese capital, Chang’an, with a grid-like layout, and the Todai-ji Temple mirrors Chinese architecture with its large, wooden main hall, ornamental design and curving roof.

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Roshana Aseervatham

Sarah Abbass

Juliegh Anne Langenberg

Craig Venson

Godrej Umrigar

GRADUATIONAlex Kirkpatrick

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CONTRIBUTORS

DESIGN & LAYOUT

Gynelle Juan & Katy OsmondRabbit Hole teaching studio

school.hca.uws.edu.au/rabbithole/

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily the views of the staff or students at the University of Western Sydney. Content in this catalogue is copyright and permission from the individual contributors must be obtained before reproduction. For more information about the International Relations and Asian Studies

program at UWS click here.

Sarah AbbassMario Amor

Roshana AseervathamNeha GauriKate Hinton

Peter JakimovAndrew Kelly

Alex Kirkpatrick

Juleigh LangenbergMitchell McMartin

Peter NadinRaen Turner

Godrej UmrigarCraig Venson

Rebekah Ward Alexander Warton