irfan ahmed vassil roussev william johnson saranyan senthivel
TRANSCRIPT
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Irfan AhmedVassil Roussev
William Johnson Saranyan SenthivelSneha Sudhakaran
Greater New Orleans Center for Information Assurancegnocia.cs.uno.edu
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A SCADA Testbed On-going Research Efforts Course on Industrial Control System (ICS)
Security
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Historian
Power
Distribution
EtherNet/IP
HMI
Modbus
Ethernet
Switch
Field Site 1
Control Center
Gas Pipeline
Field Site 2
Wastewater
Treatment
Field Site 3
PROFINET
PLCPLCPLC
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Cyber attacks and Vulnerabilities Cyber attacks on the testbed vs. similar SCADA
systems in industry Small scale physical model put limitations
does not offer a large set of parameters and variables from physical process
Limited data for network traffic analysis
Limited number of PLCs and ICS protocol support
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Research Prototype Evaluation Testing on testbed enforces the constraints of a
typical SCADA system 24/7 availability requirement of SCADA services
Resource-constrained embedded devices
Interaction of cyber and physical worlds
ICS communication protocols Difficult to add security functionalities in PLCs proprietary firmware/OS
Limited tools/techniques to access and modify firmware/OS code in PLC
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Useful for Digital Forensic research Tools and techniques to extract and analyze
digital artifacts from
HMI and other SCADA services
PLCs
ICS Network traffic
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Demonstration of physical processes Varied programming software support PLCs of three vendors, each using different
programming software
Schneider Electric - SoMachine Basic
Allen-Bradley - Studio 5000
Siemens - SIMATIC STEP 7 Varied SCADA protocol support EtherNet/IP
Modbus
PROFINET
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Topics Introduction to industrial control
systems (ICS)
PLC programming
ICS network protocols
ICS vulnerabilities and cyber attacks
ICS security solutions Hands-on PLC:Allen-Bradley’s Micrologix 1400 B
Program PLC to control Traffic Lights
Implement man-in the middle attack
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PLC Vendors
GE, Mitsubishi, Allen Bradley, Omron, WAGO, Siemens, Automation Direct, and Schneider
PLCs
Micro820, ControlLogix, 1214 TIA, CJ1M, and Fanuc 90/30
Protocols
CC Link, PROFINET, DNP3, Modbus, EtherNet/IP, PCCC, BAC, FL-Net, MC, FINS, and CJ2,
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No fieldbus I/O support No connectivity with the cloud No IoT appliances in the testbed
So called industrial internet of things