irony in the semantics-pragmatics interface

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Irony in the semantics-pragmatics interface: A

reconstructional model

November 11, 2010 inWeb-Posters

[email protected]

see (brief) poster

version :http://www.eotvos.u-szeged.hu/~vozparag/komlosi_irony.pdf

1. Introduction

In my presentation I would like to show that terms like opposition, contrary and

negation are very vague in verbal irony researches. I will show that it is not enough

to take only pragmatic features into account, but the semantic features are also very

important to get a more detailed picture about verbal irony. The emerging question

is what we mean when we say opposition, contrary, negation and why authors are

forced to take a stance concerning the relationship between irony and

opposition/contrary/negation.

I will sketch a framework inspired by Grices (1975/1989; 1978/1989) ideas (although

one that is not strictly Gricean) to study the phenomenon from a pragmatic point of view,

incorporating Gioras definition of irony.[2]Giora (1995, 2003) views irony as a figure of

speech, an ironic utterance to be interpreted in a two-stage model, which involves both

what is said and what is implicated by the speaker. The pragmatic meaning of irony

maintains both at the same time, and they remain in interaction with each other.[3]A

crucial question is the relation between what is said and what is implicated. I will present

Gioras suggestion in (2.2.) and I will advance on my own modified view at the end of the

paper (section 5. and 6.). There is an important difference between Grices and Gioras

approaches, despite the fact that both are two-stage models. Based on traditions of

language philosophy, Grice speaks about the reconstruction of inferences by the hearer.

Gioras model, however, is a processing model of comprehension, which stands on a

cognitive base (supported by empirical findings). My approach is a reconstructional one,

which represents a kind of deliberate (conscious) guessing by the hearer, I think one ofthe functions of irony is to keep the hearer alert.
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As we will see, it seems reasonable to clarify the notions of opposition, contrary,

negation, which task I fulfill in section 3. In section 3.1 I speak about the types of

opposition, then in 3.2 the intended meaning of ironic utterances will be modified

compared to Gioras (1995, 2003 and section 2.2.) approach with the pragmatic and

semantic analysis of negation, double negation, and neg-raised negation. The intended

meaning of an ironic utterance is the interaction between what has been said and at least

one suggested meaning. In section 4. I present the role of hyperbole and litotes in

recognition of irony, which is tightly related to the polarizing tendency (Horn 1989;

Osgood and Richards 1973). In section 5, based on the results of the previous sections, I

suggest that the prototypical irony expresses the speakers perspective-shift (critical

attitude), it draws attention to the deflection and difference between what has been said

and at least one suggested meaning. The intended meaning of the ironic utterance is theinteraction of these (at least) two. Context may dismiss, but also keep up suggested

meanings (cf. Giora 2003). The difference between what has been said and at least one

suggested meaning are often polar or logical contraries (cf. section 3.1), due to the

attached hyperbole or litotes.

2. Irony is unlike opposition (demarcating and distancing from opposition)

Ever since Grice (1975/1989) the pragmatic approaches to irony have attempted to showalternative operational means, other than simple opposition. Despite the fact that such

research trends acknowledge the existence of opposition without exception; in their irony-

theories other notions get a central role, as it can be seen in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Surviving Gricean notions (1978/1989)

[Figure 1. is available only in poster form.]

Grice (1978/1989) studied irony, considering notions like PCI, contradictory proposition,

pretense, critical attitude, inappropriateness, familiarity and indirectness,

expectation.AlthoughGrice did not develop these notions into a coherent theory, they

became key notions in the later studies of irony. The notions of familiarity and

indirectnessplay an important role in Gioras works (1998, Giora and Fein 1999, 2003),

just as negative critical attitude in the approach of Wilson and Sperber (1992/2007), while

pretense is the cornerstone of Clark and Gerrigs study (1984) and inappropriateness is a

central notion in Attardos model (2000). Finally, expectation is an important notion in


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Martin (1992) and Giora (1995; 2003; Giora and Fein 1999,). The notions in Fig. 1. may

appear in different theories, and the authors often combine several ones (into one). I noted

the ones most characteristic of the authors.

2.1. Wilson and Sperbers view of irony (1992)

Wilson and Sperber (1992/2007 and Wilson 2006) voice a fundamental criticism against

the Gricean view of the relationship between irony and opposition. They treat figurative

meanings as literal meanings; therefore their model is a one-stage model. They see irony

as indirect quotation while parody is a direct quotation. An ironist speaking ironically

reports an opinion which is not his own. They treat irony as a negative, critical attitude.

They bring examples (1) in which irony does not involve opposition:

(1)Context: You have invited me to visit you in Tuscany. Tuscany in May, you write, is

the most beautiful place on earth. I arrive in a freak cold spell, wind howling, rain lashing

down. As you drive me home along flooded roads, I turn to you and exclaim the

following:Ah, Tuscany in May!

One of their arguments against the oppositional view is that it does not express a

complete proposition; hence it cannot be true or false. It follows that there is no complete

proposition and it cannot be contradictory with another proposition. We can bring at least

two objections against their argument. (i) The utterance Ah, Tuscany in May is an

incomplete propositional form at the semantic level, but its propositional form will be

completed at a pragmatic level with the constituents of the context (cf. free enrichment,

Carston 2004) (ii) Contradiction between two propositions is only one of the types of

opposition. I am going to present other types of opposition later (section 3.).

2.2. Irony as an indirect negation form (Giora 1995)

Let us examine briefly Gioras indirect negation view. Indirect negation is in contrast

with direct negation:

1. it does not have a scalar interpretation

2. it does not have linguistic markers

3. it avoids unpleasant value and


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4. it involves less than, more than and opposite interpretations

Giora says that irony may express not only opposition, but less than more than

interpretations as well. If we see the next example, however, we can notice that Gioras

definition does not fit it.

(2) What a beautiful white wedding dress she has! Context: Contrary to the traditions and

expectations (i.e. the brides dress is white), the brides dress is pink.

According to Gioras approach, the possible intended meanings of the speaker should be:

The brides dress isless than white*

The brides dress is more than white*

The brides dress isoppositeto white

The problem is that less than and more than refer to a smaller or bigger amount of

something. We need a more general explanation! The meaning of the ironic utterance is

the interaction between what is said: What a beautiful white wedding dress she has and

what is implicated: the wedding dress is not white or the wedding dress is not white, itspink. The meaning of opposite is vague, as it can be:white/pinkorwhite/not-

white orwhite/black.

The nature of the problem is that Wilson and Sperbers and Gioras approaches envisage

no difference between simple, polar, logical, non-logical contraries or

contradictions,although they play an important role in the mechanism of irony.

3. The nature of opposition and negation

3.1 Opposition

It seems necessary and desirable to clarify the use of the terms opposition and contrary

and differentiate their meanings. I am trying to accomplish this task based on Horn

(1989). The vagueness about opposition emerges from the pragmatic approaches of irony,

and a deeper semantic analysis is required.

Figure 2. Types of opposition


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[Figure 2. is available only in poster form.]

We can see three types of opposed terms: white/pinkare simple contraries (non-

logical); white/blackare polar contraries (non-logical); white/not-white are logical

contraries. Note the next example:

(3) What beautiful flowers you have brought to me!

Context: Your boyfriend is standing in front of view with a teddy bear.

We should reconsider our notion of opposition. In my opinion, irony expresses a

difference (at least a simple opposition as white/rose in (2) orflower/ teddy bearin (3))

from something and takes something out of a given category (see more examples insection 4.)

3.2.Negation, neg-raised negation and double negation

The two types of negation are the so-called (1) external negation, which is treated as a

propositional operator (a mode of prediction); and the so-called (2) internal negation,

which is treated as an operation on the predicate. The truth-value of a statement and the

truth-value of its external negation cannot be identical at the same time. In the case of thetruth-value of a statement and the truth-value of its internal negation, both can be false,

but not true at the same time (Horn 1989: 140). Based on the previous section, applying

external negation upon a statement results in contradiction, while applying internal

negation on a predicate results in contrary between the predicate and its negative.

On the other hand, from a pragmatic point of view, negation has euphemistic and polite

local colour if the negated expression (good not good) has a positive value or it is

relatively weak on its scale. The further the negative particle is from the negated

expression; or the bigger chunk it refers to, the less certain the interpretation is (Horn

1989: 339341). Euphemism can be detected with the help of R-based implicature (see

Horn 1984/1998, 1989). Lets see double negation, which often appears when one speaks

ironically. It is also a kind of double negation when a statement, which already contains a

negation, is said with an ironical intention, as in (4). Thinking in the classical logical

frame, A and A are equivalent; at the pragmatic level, however, they have

different meanings. Double negation always indicates either (i) hesitation or uncertainty,or (ii) diffidence or (iii) irony (Hintikka 1968: 47).


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(4) Some of his words were not Sunday school words. (Mark Twain)

If (4) is an ironic utterance, and if we can find out its suggested meaning via implicit

negation, the utterance can have more than one suggested meanings due to the uncertainty

of double negation. According to Horn (1989: 338), both neg -raised negation and

double negation are used to keep various interpretations alive, thus it results in the

vagueness of the intended meaning. The neg-raised negation is a mild form of doubting

andbased on the verbs type in the higher-clause (factiv/not factiv)it may or may not,

have a litotic and euphemistic feel (see Horn 1989: 339341). Notice that the mitigative

feature of neg-raising is a very point of engagement of negation and irony. The

phenomena of neg-raising and double negation are similar to the interpretation of an

ironic utterance: when an utterance is considered ironical, then the implicit negation canoperate at a higher level, over the given utterance. In the case of utterances used

ironically, implicit negation works over what has been said, which can result in double

negation, as we have seen in (4), where one of the two negations is implicit and it is

similar to neg-raising, both of them negate at a higher level and both of them have

euphemistic or polite flavour. These characteristics of the different types of negation

make the interpretation of the utterance uncertain. Implicit negation is more uncertain

than the other two, because of its unmarked form. The cues for implicit negation are also

uncertain. We can see this uncertainty-scale through examples (5a5e).

(5a) The painting isnt nice.

(5b)I suppose the painting isnt nice.

(5c)I dont suppose the painting is nice.

(5d)I dont suppose the painting isnt nice.

(5e)I suppose the painting you have chosen isnt nice. (Context: Going to a van Gogh

auction.)

In the utterance with the ironic intention (5e), does the speaker negate I suppose or the

painting isnt nice implicitly, or both at the same time? If we arent thinking in the

classical logical frame, where A and A are equivalent, then all three interpretations

are possible and allow different intended speaker meanings.


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3.2.1. Contraries with and without direct negation

Based on the previous section, applying external negation upon a statement results in

contradiction, while applying internal negation on predicate results in contrary between

the predicate and its negative. It can be seen how the two types of direct negation can

result in two types of opposition, namely contradictories and logical contraries (C 2). Two

other types of opposition polar contraries (C3) and simple contraries are not created

with negation (see examples above in Figure 2.). Considering these, it is not easy to tell

whether irony communicates the opposite of what has been said or not (cf. Grice

1975/1989; Wilson and Sperber 1992/2007), or whether irony is a form of negation and

the ironist negates indirectly an opinion accepted by everyone, or not (cf. Giora 1995,

2003).

3.3. Summary of the section

Theoretically, we can reach the same conclusion as Giora (1995, 2003; Giora and Fein

1999) did in an empirical way, namely that there is an interaction between what has been

said and what has been implicated, and what has been said cannot be replaced with what

has been implicated. They will remain in interaction, while contextual information can

disambiguate the pragmatic meaning. But in the case of irony, the speakers intention is tokeep up the ambiguity/vagueness of the pragmatic meaning, similarly to double negation

and neg-raised negation.

(6) Definition:

Irony expresses a difference or category-shift between what has been said and at least one

suggested meaning. The intended meaning of the ironic utterance is the interaction of

these (at least) two. Context may dismiss, but also keep up suggested meanings.

4. The role of hyperbole and litotes in the case of recognizing irony

The example below (7) shows us how the Hungarian Two-tailed Dog Party[4]creates

contraries to be ironical and to draw attention to the exaggerated promises of

advertisements. [The billboard (7) is avaible in poster form.]

(7) Car. Guarantee for development.
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- Even more exterminated species!

- Even larger ozone hole!

- Even more occupied Arabic countries!

Defeat your planet with us!

Cars Against Humans Association

Notice that this car commercial is polarizing the state of affairs (i.e. exterminated species,

ozone hole, etc.) which is in conflict with the expectations of society. The car guarantees

more exterminated species, a larger ozone hole, etc. These are polar contraries (C3) ofthe expectations of society. From this point of view, the first utterance of (7) implicates

that a car guarantees devastation. As we can see in (7), in most cases irony refers to

sharply contrasting polar contraries (black/white). In a rhetorical sense, this exaggeration

is a hyperbole, and it can not be ignored that irony usually occurs with hyperbole or

litotes(see more Kreutz 1995, 1996; Nemesi 2005, 2009). According to empirical studies,

irony most often occurs with hyperbole, litotes, sarcasm and metaphor.

Because of these associated figures of speech, I suppose this is one of the reasons why itis difficult to define the essence of irony. We have to pay attention to these occurrences

and we have to distinguish irony from other figures and topoi. The reason why what is

saidand what is implicated are thought to be opposites (namely polar contraries) in the

case of ironic utterances, is the universal tendency of the speculative mind which is

labelled polarizingtendency (Horn 1989; Osgood and Richards 1973). Polarizing

tendency means that the phenomena are placed into the range of polar contraries,

imposing a dichotomy on concepts such

asgoodand bad, white and black, lightand dark,GodandEvil. Hyperbole and litotes

might serve as cues in order to show/detect easily irony.

5. From category-shift to perspective-shift

The closer examination of Opposed terms (see Figure 2.) reveals that those critiques

which say that irony communicates not simply the opposite of what was literally said are

rather vague. Separating the different types of opposition (section 3.1.), we could see that

ironic utterances are not simply an opposition in the common sense.


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Reconsidering white/pinkas simple contraries in example (2), then white/black(in Figure

3.) ordevelopment/devastation aspolar contraries (C3) in (7), and hot/not hotasstrong

(logical) contraries (C2)in (8), finallyDefeat your planet with us/not-Defeat your planet

with us as Contradictories in (7) we can see that in the case of ironic utterances each type

can occur.

(2) What a beautiful white wedding dress she has! Context: Contrary to the traditions and

expectations (i.e. the brides dress is white), the brides dress is pink.

(8) What a hot tea! Context: Drinking some already cold tea, because the waiter bought it

late.

(9) What lukewarm water! Context: Hot summer day when I order cold mineral water and

get a lukewarm one.

Notice in (8) how the physical context of an ironic utterance modifies which opposition

plays a role in it. From the given contexts it can be seen that polar contraries (C3)

(cold/hot) play a role in the implicated meaning in (8). Hot/warmare simple contraries, in

which case all the terms of the scale can make pairs with hot, except cold. If lukewarm

water is given, contrary to the expectations (cold water), we can speak about simple

contraries in (9). The third possibility ishot/not-hot, which are strong (logical) contraries

(C2), which interpretation is also available in (8), because the tea can be anything but not

hot.

From the utterances point of view: summarising what we have seen so far, it is worth

taking opposition into account, when thinking about irony. But what can we do with these

results? In my view, irony is at least difference, category-shift(i.e. not white,but pink,

green, etc.)from the utterances point of view. Irony expresses that a certain thing can beanything but what the speaker is actually saying.

From speakers point of view: the speaker uses irony to show a deflection from what is

said and to emphasize a distance from the state of affairs. The speaker uses irony to take

something out of a given category (white/pink; flower/teddy bear), to put himself out of a

given group which has opinions/expectations other than those of the speaker. As for the

speaker and the listener, irony aims at accomplishing derailing from an already existing


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perspective. The speaker creates a distance and addresses criticism towards the target, and

doing so they define their identity in relation to others.

5.1. Summary of the section 4. and 5.

I would like to emphasize that irony most often occurs with hyperbole or litotes.

Presumably, due to this fact, the judgment arises that irony is a polar opposite (C 2). We

have to pay attention to this co-occurance and we have to distinguish irony from other

figures of speech. My proposal is that irony is a difference or category-shift in language

from the utterances point of view. What is a category-shift in language from the point of

view of the utterance is a perspective-shift from the speakers point of view. Due to the

analyses of the types of opposition and negation, by not giving up on the oppositional

account but rather re-interpreting it instead, we are not far from the idea of Wilson and

Sperbers (1992/2007). They treat irony as a critical attitude, when the speaker reports an

opinion (cf. perspective) which is not his own. One can acknowledge that we are

reconceptualising the Socratic notion of irony, which urges the listener to doubt his or her

own mental states, thus forcing him or her to shift perspectives in order to accommodate

novel pieces of knowledge.

6. Summing up the results

First of all, with the semantico-pragmatic analyses of opposition and negation we have

seen that the ironic utterance is the presentation of difference, deflection, that is, we

distinguish two things with the help of irony, which procedure I call a category-shift. At

speaker-level, irony is a perspective-shift, the speaker uses an ironic utterance to create a

distance (cf. critical attitude in Wilson and Sperber 1992/2007) from something and to

force the listener to doubt his or her own knowledge, opinion; thus forcing him or her to

shift perspectives in order to accommodate to novel pieces of knowledge.

Secondly, theoretically we can reach the same conclusion as Giora (1995, 2003; Giora

and Fein 1999) did in an empirical way. In the case of irony, what has been said and what

has been implicated will remain in interaction, due to the nature of negation (see in

section 3.2.) and the goal of using irony is that contextual information should not

disambiguate the pragmatic meaning. In the case of irony, the speakers intention is to

keep up the ambiguity/vagueness of the pragmatic meaning, similarly to double negation

and neg-raised negation.


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Thirdly, in most cases, irony is accompanied with the figures of overstatement (hyperbole

and litotes), which might help to clarify the speakers point of view, therefore irony

accompanied with hyperbole and litotes is easier to recognize. Although due to the

overstatement, the intended meaning of irony is often considered as the opposite of what

has been said, the intended meaning of pure (without overstatement) and

accompanied irony should not be confused.

The semantico-pragmatic analyses of irony, which mainly studied the notions of negation,

opposition, contrary and contradiction (cf. Horn 1989); and also hyperbole and litotes,

define the prototypical irony as follows: irony expresses the speakers perspective -shift

(critical attitude), which draws attention to the deflection and difference between what

has been said and at least one suggested meaning. The intended meaning of the ironicutterance is the interaction of these (at least) two. Context may dismiss, but also keep up

suggested meanings (cf. Giora 2003). The difference between what has been said and at

least one suggested meaning are often polar or logical contraries, due to the attached

hyperbole or litotes.

References:

Attardo, Salvatore 2000. Irony as relevant inappropriateness, Journal of Pragmatics 32,793826.

Clark, H. R. Gerrig 1984. On the Pretense Theory of Irony, Journal of Experimental

Psychology: General, 113, 121126.

Carston, Robyn 2004: Relevance theory and the saying/implicating distinction, in: Horn,

Laurence R.Gregory Ward szerk.: The Handbook of Pragmatics, Cambridge, MA MIT

Press, 633656.

Gibbs, Raymond W.Herbert L. Colston szerk.: 2007: Irony in Language and Thought,

Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Taylor & Francis Group, New York, London.

Giora, Rachel 1995. On Irony and Negation,Discourse Processes19, 239264.

Giora, Rachel 1997: Understanding figurative and literal language: The graded salience

hypothesis. Cognitive Linguistics, 8/3, 183206.


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Giora, Rachel 1998: Irony, in J. Verschueren, J-O. stman, J. Blommaert and C. Bulcaen

szerk.:Handbook of Pragmatics, 121, John Benjamins.

Giora, Rachel Ofer Fein 1999: Irony: Context and salience. Metaphor and

Symbol, 14/4, 241257. Republished in:Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. Herbert L. Colston

szerk.: 2007: Irony in Language and Thought, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Taylor &

Francis Group, New York, London, 201216.

Giora, Rachel 2003: On our mind: Salience, context, and figurative language. New York:

Oxford University Press.

Grice, H. Paul 1975/1989. Logic and conversation. in: Studies in the way of words,

Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 22 40. [First publication in Peter Cole

Jerry L. Morgan (eds.): Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 3: Speech Acts, New York:

Academic Press]

Grice, H. Paul 1978/1989. Further Notes on logic and conversation, in: Grice 1989: 41

57. [First publication in Peter Cole (ed.): Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9: Pragmatics, New

York: Academic Press, 113128.]

Horn, Laurence R. 1989. A natural history of negation. Chicago: The University of

Chicago Press.

Horn, Laurence R . 1984/1998. Toward a new taxonomy for pragmatic inference: Q- and

R- based implicature, in: Deborah Schiffrin (ed.): Meaning, form and use in context,

Washington D.C. : Georgetown University Press, 1142. Republished in: Asa Kasher

(ed.): Pragmatics I: critical concepts. London: Routledge, 383418.

Hintikka, Jaakko 1968. Epistemic logic and the methods of philosophical analysis.

Australasian Journal of Philosopy 46/1, 3751.

Kreutz, R. J R. M. Roberts B. K. Johnson E. L. Bertus 1996. Figurative language

occurrence and co-occurance in contemporary literature, in: R. J. Kreuz M. S.

MacNealy szerk.: Empirical approaches to literature and aesthetics, Norwood, NJ, Ablex,

8397. [Hivatkozza Nemesi Attila Lszl 2005: Az alakzatprodukci empirikus

kutatsnak dilemmi, in: Ivask Lvia szerk.: rthet kommunikci, Szegedi

Tudomnyegyetem Mdiatudomnyi Tanszk, 6276.]


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Levinson, Stephen C. 2000. On the notion of a generalized conversational implicature, in:

Levinson, Stephen C.: Presumptive meanings, The theory of generalized conversational

implicature, Cambridge, MA, The MIT Press, 1172.

Martin, Robert 1992. Irony and universe of belief. in: Lingua 87, 7790.

Nemesi Attila Lszl 2005: Az alakzatprodukci empirikus kutatsnak dilemmi, in:

Ivask Lvia szerk.: rthet kommunikci, Szegedi Tudomnyegyetem Mdiatudomnyi

Tanszk, 6276.

Nemesi Attila Lszl 2009. Az alakzatok krdse a pragmatikban, Loisir Knyvkiad,

Budapest.

Osgood, C., and M. M. Richards. 1973. From Yang and Yin to and or but. Language 49.

380-412.

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Wilson, Deirdre 2006. The pragmatics of verbal irony: echo or pretence? In: Lingua 116,

17221743.

[1]The research reported here was supported by the project TMOP-4.2.1/B-

091/1/KONV-2010-0005, Kutategyetemi Kivlsgi Kzpont ltrehozsa a Szegedi

Tudomnyegyetemen

[3]Gioras view (1995) says more about irony than this: she identifies the Conditions for

Irony Well-Formedness(1995). She supported her two-stage interaction model withempirical findings (Giora and Fein 1999), and she formedThe Graded Salient

Hypothesis to explain so called figurative meanings (1997).

[4]The English version of the official site:http://mkkp.hu/indexangol.html
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