is reminiscence working?: accounting for the therapeutic benefits of reminiscence work with older...

IS REMINISCENCE WORKING?: Accounting for the Therapeutic Benefits of Reminiscence Work with Older People

DAVID MIDDLETON* Loughborough University

KEVIN BUCHANAN Nene College

ABSTRACT This article examines the terms of the debate over the ‘therapeutic’status of reminiscence work with the elderly. We argue that the declared needfor empirical evidence in terms of ‘psychological’ consequences for participants can in large part be understood as deriving from an argument concerning the designation of reminiscence work as a ‘therapy: We aim to illustrate some shortcomings of conventions in evaluative research that focus on operationalized psychological variables. We argue that such approaches do not take into direct analytical account the relevance of ‘anecdotal’ claims for the ‘benefis’ of reminiscence work and their implications for the societal location of the older people within networks of care practices. Our approach is informed by recent developments in discourse analysis that focus on representational variability in accounts as an important analytical resource.

INTRODUCTION

Group reminiscence has become a popular component of care and community work with the elderly in both the United Kingdom and the United States. This has led to a growing body of literature discussing the possible ‘social’ and ‘psychological’ benefits for participants and the status of reminiscence as a ‘therapy’. Group reminiscence is seen as providing a forum in which older people are encouraged to talk with each other about

*Direct all correspondence to: David Middleton. Department of Human Sciences, Loughborough University, Loughborough, Leicestershire LEI I 3 TV, United Kingdom.

JOURNAL OF AGING STUDIES, Volume 7, Number 3, pages 321-333 Copyright @ 1993 by JAI Press Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. ISSN: 08!JO-4065.

322 JOURNAL OF AGING STUDIES Vol. ~/NO. 311993

the events and experiences of their lives. Discussions tend to be thematically structured- schooldays, work, domestic life, the wars, and so on-and a small industry has grown up supplying pictures, sounds and artefacts from the first half of this century, as prompts for reminiscing (see for example, Help the Aged 1981; Age Exchange 1988; Winslow Press 1989). The growing use of reminiscence work in the care of older people is just one strand of a wider concern to provide resources for cultural engagement, embracing such activities as oral history, adult education, and community publishing. Such is the popularity and burgeoning growth of reminiscence work that some have characterized it as a ‘social movement’, with an agenda which is as much political as it is therapeutic or recreational (Bornat 1989). Alongside these developments, there has been a corres- ponding growth of a research and practice literature examining the efficacy of, and offering guidance on, reminiscence work (e.g., Butler 1963; McMahon and Rhudick 1964; Lewis 1971; Coleman 1974, 1986; Kiemat 1979; Lesser, Lazarus, Frankel, and Havasy 1981; Ryden 1981; Norris 1986, 1989; Norris and Abu El Eileh 1982; Gibson 1989).

A common assumption informing reminiscence work is that the activity of ‘reminiscing’ is in some way beneficial for people in the later stages of life. Establishing the grounds of this beneficiality beyond apparent self-evidency has, however, proved difficult (Bornat 1989). The majority of studies examining issues of evaluation have adopted ‘before and after’ conventions, measuring indices such as “depression and self esteem” (Perrotta and Meacham 198 l), “mood” (Fallot, 1980), “cognitive functioning” (Bender, Cooper, and Howe 1983; Baines, Saxby, and Ehlert 1987), “life satisfaction” (Hobbs 1983) and “social behavior” (Kiernat 1979; Bender et al. 1983; Baines et al. 1987).

This orientation to the evaluation of the efficacy of reminiscence work has a number of implications. First, such research work, focused as it is on the measurement of operationalized concepts displaced from the actual terms of conversational engagement within reminiscence sessions, omits direct analysis of the social pragmatics of talk. In previous work we aimed to demonstrate that the rhetorical organization of reminiscence talk has implications for understanding the consequences of participation in reminiscence sessions. We argued that reminiscence groups can be seen to afford varieties of interactional work pertinent to the situation of the elderly, such as the maintenance and reestablishment of identities and membership (‘re-membering’); and accounting for potential and actual frailties associated with ‘aging’; (Buchanan and Middleton 1991; Middleton and Buchanan 1991; Middleton, Buchanan, and Suurmond 1991).

Second, we have argued that to treat the talk which takes place in reminiscence groups as one instance of a generic activity ‘reminiscing’ is to ignore the diversity of conversational acts which might be so named (Middleton and Buchanan 1991). In addition, to account for the value of reminiscence work within a framework of theory associating the generic activity ‘reminiscing’ with ‘old age’, is also to ignore the particular set of social relations and practices within which reminiscence groups are brought into being (Buchanan and Middleton 1992). This is not to say that the theorizing of the association between reminiscence and aging is of no import. It is rather to point out that this theorizing does not stand outside the realm of social action. As such, it makes up a domain of discursive action, whose pragmatic orientation and constructive effects are analyzable.

Is Reminiscence Working? 323

Third, evaluation through ‘before and after’ comparisons of operationalized ‘psychological’ measure does not consider how gerontological accounts of reminiscence and aging have worked to argue for the ‘social repositioning’ of older people (Buchanan and Middleton 1991). Nor do they consider the ways in which care workers involved in reminiscence work formulate the association between reminiscence and old age in talking about their work. These formulations have a direct consequence in the organization of care practices. Such formulations can be seen as constituting a ‘community of discursive understanding’, in that they serve as a resource for practitioners in making sense of and accounting for their work, and are thus integral to the ongoing constitution of reminiscence work as an arena of practice (Buchanan and Middleton 1992).

As we have already indicated, one of the striking features of discussions about reminiscence work is the discrepancy between ‘anecdotal’ reports and enthusiasm concerning the ‘benefits’ of participation in reminiscence groups and a continuing acknowledgment that there is a lack of ‘hard evidence.’ This issue is referred to many areas of the literature, from academic articles and conference papers (Merriam 1980; Thornton and Brotchie 1987; Bornat 1989; Norris 1989) through to training manuals (Gibson 1989). Responses to this state of affairs have varied from suggestions that the research enterprise has barely started, and will eventually corroborate anecdotal reports of benefits (Bornat 1989; Gibson 1989), to suggestions that research into reminiscence should be abandoned (Thornton and Brotchie 1987).

In this article we examine the terms of the debate over the ‘therapeutic’ status of reminiscence work. We argue that the declared need for empirical evidence in terms of ‘psychological’ consequences for participants can in large part be understood as deriving from an argument concerning the designation of reminiscence work as a ‘therapy.’ In doing this we aim to illustrate some shortcomings of conventions in evaluative research that focus on operationalized psychological variables. Such approaches do not take into direct analytical account the relevance of ‘anecdotal’claims for the ‘benefits’ of reminiscence work and their implications for the societal location of older people within networks of care practices.

Discourse Analysis

Our approach is informed by recent developments in discourse analysis (see for example Potter and Wetherell 1987; Billig 1987; Edwards and Potter 1992). One of the key resources we have used in our previous discussions is the variety of ways in which ‘reminiscence’ is represented in the talk and writing of those involved with reminiscence work (Buchanan and Middleton 1991, 1992). In such discussions, variability in the representation of reminiscence can be seen as arising in part from uncertainties concerning the status and implications of being ‘elderly’, and the problematics of care and therapeutic expertise. Instead of treating such variability as a methodological and conceptual problem to be eliminated before work can begin our analyses demonstrated the formative influence of the dilemmas engendered by such uncertainties.

In focusing on variability we examine people’s pragmatic use of language. Language, whether talk or text, is a form of social action that people use resourcefully to accomplish


things. One way of analyzing what people are doing with language is to examine how its use varies according to the varieties of purposes language, in talk and text, is taken by participants as achieving. Wetherell and Potter (1988) have written a succinct introduction to the analysis of language as “action orientated”. The central feature of this particular discourse analytic approach is the examination of the constructive and flexible manner in which language is used.

For example, reminiscence work is sometimes represented a ‘therapy’ and at other times is explicitly referred to as something other than therapy. The purpose of the discourse analytic approach is not to decide between these two positions. Evidence and ‘rational’ argument is not taken as some absolute arbiter of what is meant, or intended, by the ascription or not of terms associating reminiscence with ‘therapy’ and the ‘therapeutic’. The focus of the analysis becomes one of explicating what is being accomplished by these different representations, how are they used by authors and speakers to advance different kinds of argument. The debate about the ‘therapeutic’ status of reminiscence is just one way in which reminiscence is marked and defined as an activity, no matter what conclusion is drawn concerning its relative benefits, or not, to participants. Whatever status, it is given as ‘oral history’, ‘pastime’, ‘defence mechanism’ ‘therapy’ or ‘social movement’, it is in the arguments for and against such representations that ‘reminiscence’ is constituted.

These representations have implications beyond the immediate context of reminiscence work. When people talk about the benefits of reminiscence for older people, this talk exemplifies and embodies assumptions about the nature of older people and what it is ‘to be old’. Such shared assumptions do not simply represent the ‘reality’ of old age. They are ways of representing old age that are culturally available repetoires of interpretation (see Potter and Wetherell 1987; Wetherell and Potter 1988 for an extended discussion of “interpretative repetoires”). Just as there are different and contradictory ways of representing the nature and value of reminiscence, so too there are different and contradictory ways of representing the nature of aging. Arguments about reminiscence work can be located as part of arguments about the nature of aging and other cultural concerns that impinge on the practice of reminiscence work with older people.

Furthermore, in characterizing variability in representation as ‘argument’, we are marking the relevance of previous discourse analytic work which shows talk and thinking to have a rhetorical or argumentative structure (Billig 1987), and thus to embody contradictory or opposing views on its object (Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton, and Radley 1988); Middleton and Edwards 1990; Edwards and Potter 1992). One consequence of such work is that it directs us not merely to a consideration of variability, but to a consideration of contradictory representations of reminiscence and reminiscence work, as a means of identifying their functions and consequences in relation to broader social issues.

REMINISCENCE AND THERAPY

The ‘evidence problem’ is bound up with debates about the status of reminiscence work as a ‘therapy’, and the consequences of this for the formulation and evaluation of the purported benefits of reminiscence. In line with our interest in the pragmatics of


language use, our discussion will concern itself, not with the question ‘is reminiscence work therapy?‘, but, with the pragmatic consequences of describing reminiscence work as ‘therapy’. The questions therefore becomes: on what grounds might people plausibly describe reminiscence work as ‘therapy’ (or not), and what are the consequences of such descriptions?

Why Call Reminiscence ‘Therapy’?

The description of reminiscence work as ‘therapy’ can plausibly be accounted for in terms of care workers positive experiences of such work, and their perception that it has benefits for elderly participants (e.g. Cook 1984; McRae 1982; Norris and Abu El Eileh 1982). The label ‘therapy’can be taken as articulating the view that the activity affords benefits more substantial than other ‘group activities’ such as a game of ‘bingo’ (lotto) or a ‘sing song’. It might also be seen as marking a similarity in form between group reminiscence and more established practices of ‘group therapy’, a link made explicitly in some accounts of reminiscence work (e.g. Lewis and Butler 1974; Ebersole 1976; Lesser, Lazarus, Frankel, and Havasy 1981; Poulton and Strassberg 1986; Bender 1991).

Further grounds for referring to reminiscence as a ‘therapy’ are afforded by the fact that the ‘special significance’ of reminiscence in later life was first proposed in a clinical context, by the gerontologist Robert Butler (1963). Butler suggested that reminiscence contributed to a process of ‘life review’ in old age, and argued for its relevance to psychotherapeutic practice within a psychodynamic framework. His work is cited in the introductions to most of a steady stream of papers on reminiscence published since then. Many of these accounts are not specifically concerned with the process of ‘life review’. More often than not, their citation of Butler prepares the grounds for hypotheses, or claims, that reminiscence has significance for older people, and that this might be turned to therapeutic advantage (e.g. Kiernat 1979; Cook 1984; Molinari and Reichlin 1984)

There are a number of reasons then, why a care workers using reminiscence with older people might plausibly describe their work as ‘therapy’. In essence, such a description can be seen as marking the fact that such work is considered to offer ‘special’ benefits to participants. An additional consequence is that it potentially locates their work in an arena of practice, with its own history and an accumulated body of practical and theoretical knowledge.

Reminiscence and ‘Psychological’ Evidence

The use of the label ‘therapy’, however, has other implications besides those mentioned above. While it may have seemed plausible from the point of view of social workers, care assistants, librarians etc, to describe their reminiscence work with older people as ‘therapeutic’, psychologically orientated research, in particular the work of clinical psychologists has taken issue with such a description, arguing that the label is inappropriate and illegitimate. A frequently cited paper putting forward this argument was published in the British Journal of Clinical PsychoIogy by Thornton and Brotchie in 1987. After surveying wide range of research looking at the prevalence, functions and benefits of reminiscence, they concluded:

326 JOURNAL OF AGING STUDIES Vol. ~/NO. 3/l 993

It is possible to make a case for reminiscence as an enjoyable pastime which may lead to positive changes in communication and social behaviour among both normal and confused elderly persons. The most positive effects on the elderly person may result from the greater knowledge and understanding of their individual experience on the part of staff members involved in reminiscence groups. These are important goals and Bender et al. (1983) discuss reasons for the usefulness of such groups in residential settings. Nevertheless, the role of reminiscence as a therapeutic tool is doubtful, and it seems that at least as far as the normal and confused elderly are concerned, it is best regarded as a diversionary activity. (Thornton and Brotchie 1987, p. 101, emphasis in original).

The implications of the term ‘therapeutic’ as it is used in this extract, and its

consequences for the status of reminiscence work, are markedly different to those outlined in the previous section. Clearly, reminiscence is being denied the status of

therapy, and it is the terms and consequences of this denial which interest us here. First, reminiscence work is denied legitimacy as ‘therapy’ in virtue of the inadequacy of the empirical evidence reviewed in the article. The criteria of adequacy used in the article

are those of traditional experimental research. Among the shortcomings identified are

lack of controls, questionable validity and reliability of measurement scales, small or unrepresentative samples, and inconsistency of definition and measurement of

reminiscence across studies. In almost all cases, the reviewed studies of group reminiscence used pre/post test measures of psychological constructs such as mood,

self esteem, life satisfaction, depression and so on. ‘Therapy’ here, then, is an activity

which would produce changes in such empirical measures, and, importantly, changes in the ‘state’ of individual participants.

Second, the extract grants that “positive changes” and “positive effects” may result from reminiscence work, but, by implication, they are not considered to warrant the

description, “therapeutic”. Here again, in that these “positive effects” involve changes

in social relationships and interaction, and these are ruled out of court, “therapeutic”

change is equated with within-individual change. Third, reminiscence is demoted from the status of ‘therapy’to that of a “pastime”

or a “diversionary activity”. Despite having “positive effects”, and meeting “important

goals”, reminiscence work is trivialized. As a consequence of not meeting Thornton

and Brotchie’s criteria for ‘therapy’, it appears to have been accorded the status of something akin to card or board games.

This interpretation is underscored by Thornton and Brotchie’s penultimate paragraph, in which they suggest that research into reminiscence be abandoned in favor of alternative approaches, one being “Rachman’s (1980) concept of emotional processing in which affective and cognitive disturbances related to events in the past

may be reduced by habituation training” (Thornton and Brotchie 1987, p. 102). This alters significantly the remit of reminiscence work, in that this recommendation is made only with respect to depression in the elderly, whereas in general reminiscence work has had a far broader focus. However, the point here is that the potential consequence of this critique is the removal of reminiscence work from the agenda of psychological research and practice altogether, in favor of a replacement which conforms more closely to Thornton and Brotchie’s criteria: one that is unambiguously concerned with


individual change, and one which has (presumably) been validated by empirical evidence.

The Pragmatics of ‘Therapy’

Such critiques of reminiscence emanating from psychologists have not passed unnoticed in the reminiscence literature. Thornton and Brotchie’s paper has been referred to in a number of subsequent papers written by proponents of reminiscence work (Bornat 1989; Norris 1989). The interesting things about these responses is that they were not centrally concerned with the question of whether or not reminiscence is ‘therapy’, nor with the need for more research evidence (although this was mentioned). Rather, these accounts concerned themselves with the pragmatic consequences of using the label ‘therapy’. One theme common to these accounts was that the ‘therapy’ label would potentially make reminiscence work “an activity only carried out by appropriately qualified professionals” (Norris 1989, p. 27), and thus curtail its extent and variety.

For example, Bornat (1989) argues:

One of the strengths of reminiscence work with older people is the openness in terms of process and skill base. (. . .) By avoiding the label therapy we can continue to enjoy the advantages of working flexibly and in a variety of settings (Bornat 1989, p. 20).

The “openness.. . of process and skill base” can be taken as referring to the loosely defined nature of reminiscence work, which both makes it adaptable for use in a “variety of settings”, and makes it accessible to a wide range of ‘practitioners’-care assistants, nurses, librarians, and so on. In support of this ‘pragmatic’ argument, it was argued that others deploy the ‘therapy’ label in an equally pragmatic fashion, attaching it to

activities such as reading, gardening or music making, merely “to validate them as legitimate activities in which professional people are entitled to engage” (Norris 1989, p. 26).

These accounts then, shifted the basis of the argument from research evidence of therapeutic benefits (as used by Thornton and Brotchie), to the pragmatics of using the therapy label. Activities were labelled ‘therapy’ for pragmatic reasons, not because (or not only because) they offered ‘therapeutic’ benefits. Thus, both the designation of reminiscence work as therapy and also the resistance to such a designation could be seen as an example of this pragmatic work.

This pragmatic argument is explicitly concerned with preserving the extent and variety of reminiscence practice. There is more than this at stake here, though, since (arguably) the very nature of reminiscence practice would change if it became a therapy practiced by professionals. This possibility is implied by a further feature of responses to Thornton and Brotchie, a feature which also appears in other accounts of reminiscence work. This is the invocation of what we have referred to elsewhere as the ‘ordinariness’ of reminiscence (Buchanan and Middleton 1991; 1992). For example, Norris (1989), as a prelude to discussing the pros and cons of calling reminiscence ‘therapy’, offers the following account:

Perhaps one of the most important features of reminiscence work is its immediate appeal. Unlike other techniques, approaches or models such as reality orientation,


which are designed to facilitate communication with older people, reminiscence as a phenomenon is something which both elderly people and those who care for them can naturally and intuitively relate to from their own experience (Norris 1989, p. 26).

This reference to the “immediate appeal” of reminiscence as something which both carers

and cared-for alike can “naturally and intuitively relate to” is echoed in a number of accounts of reminiscence (e.g. Norris 1989; Gibson 1989). The “appeal” of reminiscence

work is accounted for in terms of practitioners; and participants’ “own experience” of reminiscence, as a commonplace of everyday life; it arises from the fact that both are

seen to have common knowledge and experience of the activity they are engaged in. The practitioner-‘client’ relationship, implicit in this account, is one based on equality

of knowledge and experience. This relationship can be contrasted with the therapist- client relationship implicit in Thornton and Brotchie’s account of therapy. In this latter

account, the therapist is cast as expert, and the social relationship is thus, by definition,

unequal in terms of the knowledge and experience of therapist and client. The danger in calling reminiscence ‘therapy’, then, is that the relationship based on commonality

of knowledge and experience might no longer hold, and that this would in turn undermine its fundamental “appeal”. It is difficult to see Thornton and Brotchie’s

“habituation training” having the same “immediate appeal” as reminiscence work, either

for care assistants or for their elderly charges. Thus, in the face of critiques such as that of Thornton and Brotchie (1987), proponents

of reminiscence work have not responded by unequivocally asserting that reminiscence

is therapeutic. Instead, they have put forward the ‘pragmatic’ argument outlined above,

one which is concerned explicitly with the consequences of using the ‘therapy’ label, and implicitly with the kinds of social relations that ensue from using or not using such

a description.

The Contradictions of the ‘Therapy’ Label

In the light of the above discussion, we can identify at least two potential contradictions inherent in the designation of reminiscence work as ‘therapy’. First, there is the contra-

diction between the social relations implied by the term ‘therapy’ and those held to be of central importance to reminiscence work. The importance of an egalitarian practitioner- client relationship to reminiscence work is implicit in the responses to Thornton and

Brotchie’s critique, but is also explicitly voiced in recent accounts of reminiscence work as involving, or indeed bringing about, an egalitarian relationship between care workers and ‘clients’, or even a reversal of power/ knowledge relations (e.g. Norris 1982; Gibson 1989, p. 11). This view can be seen as an extension into the institutional arena of the

concerns of community-based reminiscence work, growing out of adult education and literacy projects, and explicitly concerned with the empowerment of marginalized sections of the community (Lawrence and Mace 1987; Bomat 1989). The more conventional account of therapeutic intervention put forward by Thornton and Brotchie is potentially antithetical to this position, in that it involves an inherently unequal relationship, in which

the client’s voice is subordinate to that of the expert-indeed the client’s own accounts

may be appropriated by the expert and interpreted in the expert’s terms.


The second, related contradiction arising from the use of the ‘therapy’label concerns our earlier point about the way in which, as a consequence of the encounter with clinical psychology, claims for the benefits of reminiscence tend to be couched in terms of individual psychology such as self esteem, mood, memory and cognitive function. Such an approach discounts that many of the benefits claimed for reminiscence can be understood in terms of the communicative pragmatics of social relationships. Such benefits would include those involving ‘democratization’ and empowerment referred to above, and also those noted by Thornton and Brotchie (op tit), involving changes in “communication and social”, and in staffs knowledge and understanding of the older people in their care. (Even the oft-claimed improvement in ‘self-esteem’(see for example Perrotta and Meacham 1981) is, we would argue, an inherently social-relational change, despite the individualistic prefix).

CONCLUSION

An examination of the terms of the debate turning on the designation of reminiscence work as ‘therapy’ brings into focus the nature and benefits of reminiscence work as construed by its practitioners and proponents. We now consider the implications of the preceding argument for the kinds of research which might be best placed to evaluate claims for the benefits of reminiscence work. Proponents of reminiscence work have used the ‘pragmatic’ argument outlined above to counter assertions that there is no ‘hard evidence’ to justify the description of reminiscence work as therapy. This heads off the immediate threat to the ‘legitimacy; of reminiscence practice, but there still remains the problem of what reminiscence work is if it’s not ‘therapy’, and also the problem of the lack of evidence to back up claims of its benefits for older people. These two problems are related in that both threaten the legitimacy of reminiscence work as an arena of practice.

As well as the ‘pragmatic’ argument, there is another response to the criticism of ‘inadequate evidence’: that such evidence will eventually be forthcoming, when enough of the right research is done (e.g. Bornat 1989; Gibson 1989). These accounts often serve as another context for the invocation of the ‘ordinariness’ or ‘immediate appeal’ of reminiscence, as a warrant for such predictions:

. ..[W]e have in reminiscence work an approach of wide immediate spontaneous appeal. This must not be lost, minimised or dismissed while we await the outcome of rigours research studies. We know from experience that reminiscence “works” for many older people. Herein lies its appeal and its scarcely yet explored possibilities (Gibson 1989, p. 53).

We have argued that the “appeal” of reminiscence inheres in the kinds of social relations that it engenders, and that the benefits claimed for such work are implicated within the communicative pragmatics of social relations (Buchanan and Middleton 1991). The problem in producing evidence, and indeed the problem of defining reminiscence work as an arena of practice, may reflect the fact that such benefits are not directly addressable within the research conventions and issues of individualistic psychological research (a similar point is made by Pilgrim 1990, with regard to psychological research on


psychotherapy). If such conventions are to be the only arbiters of ‘evidence’, there is very real danger that the “appeal” of reminiscence work will be “lost, minimised or dismissed” (Gibson 1989).

As Thornton and Brotchie’s position makes clear, to construe the benefits of reminiscence in individual psychological terms closes off from direct analytic concern the communicative pragmatics of the social relationships potentially engendered in

reminiscence work as merely “diversionary” (p. 101). We would argue that the central feature of reminiscence groups is that they are arenas of conversation, and the social relationships of reminiscence work (and whatever transformations in social relations emerge from it) inhere in the ways of speaking that such groups afford (Middleton and Buchanan 1991).

We have argued elsewhere that reminiscence work is fundamentally concerned with the rights of older people to a voice in their relations with others (Middleton, Buchanan, and Suurmond 1991). The approach adopted by psychologists in addressing reminiscence work has tended to marginalize such concerns and transform it into something else- a component of established ‘therapies’(cf Norris 1989 on reminiscence- based activities), or an ‘diversionary activity’ with no claims to therapeutic status, and potentially no funding or institutional support. In short, it has marginalized the sociality of the reminiscence enterprise. This has the consequence of denying voice both to older people who participate in reminiscence groups, and to the practitioners who seek to identify and characterize just what is about reminiscence that “works” for them.

Although practitioners have consistently attested to the benefits of such work, empirical investigation has so far failed to substantiate these claims. This failure has tended to result in the dismissal of practitioner claims, rather than the rethinking of research strategies. This debate gives the impression, then, of scientific and ‘common sense’ accounts of reminiscence and aging passing one another by, an impression reinforced by the absence of explicit mention of scientific accounts in interviews we have conducted with practitioners (Buchanan and Middleton 1992).

Gubrium and Wallace (1990) have discussed some of these issues in relation to theories of aging. They present data showing how care workers, older people and their relatives, invoke diverse ‘theories’ of aging in discussing the appropriateness of a particular care regime. They draw attention to the parallels between this “ordinary theorizing” and the theorizing of age done by social scientists, and argue that the separation and the degree of differential status of these two modes of theorizing are unwarranted. They observe that ordinary theorizing shares many characteristics of its scientific counterpart, while scientific theorizing, like ordinary theorizing, bears the mark of lived experience and ideology. They suggest a rapprochement between the two, recommending that “scientific theory takes serious consideration of ordinary theorizing” and “science no longer has a corrective function with respect to ordinary theorizing, but becomes . . . a professional source of insights for understanding experience.. .” (Gubrium and Wallace 1990, p. 148).

In like vein reviewing reminiscence work from a discourse analytic perspective changes the focus of the research enterprise. Instead of studying reminiscence as an unambiguously definable activity or process which has determinate functions or effects, reminiscence is studied as something shaped by peoples’ attempts to grapple with the problems and dilemmas inherent in care work and participation in reminiscence


activities. Variability in the way people represent reminiscence in writing and talk, instead of being a problem to be solved or eradicated, becomes a major resource in

understanding this constructive process. The discourse analytic approach illustrated in this article socializes the research

agenda concerning the efficacy of reminiscence activities. It allows claims that reminiscence ‘works’ to be taken as key resource worthy of serious analytical attention in the study of care practices associated with aging. Furthermore it provides a model

for other debates on the efficacy or otherwise of care and support interventions with

the elderly.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We gratefully acknowledge members of the Loughborough University Discourse and Rhetoric Group (DARG) for their analytical comments on material presented in this article.

REFERENCES

Age Exchange. 1988. Lifetimes: Age Exchange Reminiscence Resources. (Photo pack). Age Exchange Reminiscence Centre, 1 I, Blackheath Village, London, SE93 9LA.

Baines, S., P. Saxby, and K. Ehlert. 1987. “Reality Orientation and Reminiscence Therapy.” British Journal of Psychiatry 15 1: 222-23 1.

Bender, M. 1991. “The Social and Clinical Uses of Reminiscence with Persons Who Have Long Term Disadvantage.” Paper presented at Reminiscence Reviewed, the Annual Conference of the Oral History Society, Lancashire Polytechnic, Preston, Lancashire, 23 March, 1991.

Bender, M.P., A.E. Cooper, and A. Howe. 1983. “The Utility of Reminiscence Groups in Old People’s Homes.” Unpublished paper available from the London Borough of Newham.

Billig, M. 1987. Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Billig, M., S. Condor, D. Edwards, M. Gane, D. Middleton, and A. Radley. 1988. Ideological Dilemmas: A Social Psychology of Everyday Thinking. London: Sage.

Bornat, J. 1989. “Oral History As a Social Movement: Reminiscence and Older People.” Oral History (Autumn): 16-24.

Buchanan, K. and D.J. Middleton. 1991. “Reminiscence Reviewed: A Discourse Analytic Perspective.” Paper presented for Reminiscence Reviewed, the Annual Conference of the Oral History Society, Lancashire Polytechnic, Preston, Lancashire, 23 March, 1991.

Buchanan, K. and D.J. Middleton. 1992. “Discursively Formulating the Significance of Reminiscence in Later Life.” Paper prepared for Discourse and the Professions, ASLA International Conference, 26-29 August, Uppsala, Sweden.

Butler, R.N. 1963. “The Life Review: An Interpretation of Reminiscence in the Aged.” Psychiatry 26: 65-76.

Coleman, P.G. 1974. “Measuring Reminiscence Characteristics from Conservation as Adaptive Features of Old Age.” International Journal of Ageing and Human Development 5: 281- 294.

~. 1986. Ageing and Reminiscence Processes. Chichester: Wiley. Cook, J.B. 1984. “Reminiscing: How It Can Help Confused Nursing Home Residents.” Social

Casework (February): 90-93. Ebersole, P.P. 1976. “Reminiscing and Group Psychotherapy with the Aged.” In Nursing and

the Aged, edited by I.M. Burnside. New York: McGraw-Hill. Edwards, D.E. and J. Potter. 1992. Discursive Psychology. London: Sage.


Fallot, R.D. 1980. “The Impact on Mood of Verbal Reminiscing in Later Adulthood.” International Journal of Ageing and Human Development lO(4): 385-400.

Gibson, F.G. 1989. Using Rminiscence (Parts 1, 2 and 3). London: Help the Aged Education Department.

Gubrium, J.F. and J.B. Wallace. 1990. “Who Theorises Age ?” Ageing and Society 10: 131-149. Help the Aged. 1981. Recall. (Audio-visual package). London: Help the Aged Education

Department. Hobbs, A. 1983. “A Study to Determine Some Effect of the Help the Aged’s Recall Audio-visual

Programme.” Unpublished Dip. Psych. dissertation, The British Psychological Society, Leicester.

Kiernat, J.M. 1979. “The Use of Life Review Activity with Confused Nursing Home Residents.” American Journal of Occupational Therapy 33: 306-33 1.

Lawrence, J. and J. Mace. 1987. Remembering in Groups. London/Colchester: Exploring Living Memory and Oral History Society.

Lesser, J., L.W. Lazarus, J. Frankel, and S. Havasy. 1981. “Reminiscence Group Therapy with Psychotic Geriatric Inpatients.” The Gerontologist 21: 291-296.

Lewis, M.I. and R.N. Butler. 1974. “Life Review Therapy: Putting Memories to Work in Individual and Group Psychotherapy.” Geriatrics 29: 165-174.

Lewis, C. 1971. “Reminiscing and Self-Concept in Old Age.” Journal of Gerontology 26: 240- 243.

McMahon, A.W. and P.J. Rhudick. 1964. “Reminiscing: Adaptational Significance in the Aged.” Archives of General Psychiatry 10: 292-298.

McRae, I. 1982. “Growth and Development for Elders: Reminiscence, an Underused Nursing Resource.” Nursing Papers 14(l): 48-56.

Merriam, S. 1980. “The Concept and Function of Reminiscence: A Review of Research.” 7’he

Gerontologist 20: 604-609. Middleton, D.J. and K. Buchanan. 1991. “Some Rhetorical Resources in Remembering

Collectively.” Multidisciplinary Newsletter for Activity Theory 9110: 12-19. Middleton, D.J. and D. Edwards. (eds.). 1990. Collective Remembering. London: Sage. Middleton, D.J., K. Buchanan, and J. Suurmond. 1991. “Communities of Memory: Issues of

‘Remembering’ and Belonging in Reminiscence Work with the Elderly.” Paper presented at the British Psychological Society’s Psychologists Special Interest Group in the Elderly (PSIGE) Annual Conference ‘Thriving into the Nineties,’ Grey College, Durham

University, 20th June. Molinari, V. and R.E. Reichlin. 1984. “Life Review Reminiscence in the Elderly: A Review of

the Literature.” International Journal of Aging and Human Development 20(2): 81-92. Norris, A. 1989. “Clinic or Client? A Psychologist’s Case for Reminiscence.” Ornl History

(Autumn): 26-30. Norris, A.D. 1986. Reminiscence with Elderly People. Bicester: Winslow Press. Norris, A.D. and M.T. Abu El Eileh. 1982. “Reminiscence Groups.” Nursing Times 78: 1368-

1369. Perotta, P. and J.A. Meacham. 1981. “Can a Reminiscing Intervention Alter Depression and

Self Esteem?” International Journal of Aging and Human Development 14( 1): 23-30. Pilgrim, D. 1990. “Researching Psychotherapy in Britain: The Limits of a Psychological

Approach.” In Deconstructing Social Psychology, edited by I. Parker and J. Shotter. London: Routledge.

Potter, J. and M. Wetherell. 1987. Discourse and Social Psychology. London: Sage. Poulton, J.L. and D.S. Strassberg. 1986. “The Therapeutic Use of Reminiscence.” International

Journal of Group Psychotherapy 36(3): 38 l-398. Rachman, S. 1980. “Emotional Processing.” Behaviour Research and Therapy 18:51-60.


Ryden, M.B. 1981. “Nursing Intervention in Support of Reminiscence.” Journal of Gerontological Nursing 7: 461463.

Thornton, S. and J. Brotchie. 1987. “Reminiscence: A Critical Review of the Empirical Literature.” British Journal of Clinical Psychology 26: 93-111.

Wetherell, M. and J. Potter. 1988. “Discourse Analysis and the Identification of Interpretative Repetoires.” In Analysing Everyday Explanation: A Case Book of Methods, edited by C. Antaki. London: Sage.

Winslow Press. 1989. Products Catalogue. Winslow Press, Telford Road, Bicester, Oxon OX6 OTS.

is reminiscence working?: accounting for the therapeutic benefits of reminiscence work with older...

Documents