is there a marxist psychology? by mohamed elhammoumi

P1: JtR0521849993c02 CB895-Sawchuk 0 521 84999 3 December 12, 2005 16:40

2

Is There a Marxist Psychology?

Mohamed Elhammoumi

We do not want a brand-new and trivial name from history. We want a namecovered by the dust of centuries. We regard this as our historical right, as anindication of our historical role, our claim to realize psychology as a science.We must view ourselves in connection with and in relation to the past . . . Thatis why we accept the name of our science with all its age-old delusions as a vividreminder of our victory over these errors, as the fighting scars of wounds, asa vivid testimony of the truth which develops in the incredibly complicatedstruggle with falsehood.

(Vygotsky, 1927/1997a: 336337)

La psychologie ne detient donc nullement le secret des faits humains, sim-plement parce que ce secret nest pas dordre psychologique [Psychology byno means holds the secret of human affairs, simply because this secret isnot of a psychological order].

(Politzer, 1928: 170)

Pourquoi la theorie? Comme le plus court chemin vers la realite.(Verret, 1999: 10)

introduction

Vygotsky, whose premature death occurred at the age of thirty-seven in 1934,was a serious loss to Marxist psychology. He will be remembered for threethings. Firstly, he played a major part in reviving the Marxist approach topsychology, which had been suppressed by the positivismscientism versionsof Marxism. Secondly, in his major works, Vygotsky made a positive andoriginal application of Marxs method, which in Marxs works often sufferedfrom vulgar dialectical materialism. Thirdly, Vygotsky is the Feuerbach ofpsychology, but not yet the Marx of psychology.

Vygotsky had read many texts by Marx and on Marxism. His ideaswere grounded in a philosophy that was both dialectical and materialist.

23


24 Mohamed Elhammoumi

Doubtless, he did possess the necessary skills philosophical, political, liter-ary, economic, historical and cultural to bring to a successful conclusionto the extremely complex and difficult task he had set himself. This taskwas to create psychologys own Das Kapital, which is based on dialectical andhistorical materialism. Materialism maintains that there is an objective con-crete reality that exists outside of human perception, and social totality isperceived as a concrete historical totality. To paraphrase John Locke, thereis nothing in human thought that is not first in society. Or, to extend theimplications, each of us is constituted by social relations and is inseparablefrom ongoing social processes of change. My attempt has been to make in-telligible a range of social relations, or relational forms in which individualactivity derives its content, sense, or meaning from its placement within theextended and interconnected social relations (Se`ve, 1966, 1975; Shames,1984, 1987, 1990; Elhammoumi, 2001a, 2002, 2004). Dialectical material-ism maintains that all constituents of concrete reality as well as human men-tal life are in a constant state of change that occurs according to certainlaws of development and change. Historical materialism is the applicationof dialectical materialism to human society, including human higher mentalfunctions. In this perspective, a Marxist approach to psychology is an ensem-ble of principles that apply to the study of human higher mental functions,including consciousness, personality, and all spheres of human activity. InVygotskys conceptions, Marxs theoretical framework (Marx, 1963, 1971a,1971b, 1973) offered an intellectual tool for analyzing the psychologicalfabric of human higher mental functions. Vygotskys psychology is rooted inthe principles of Marxs philosophy. He was committed to Marxs writings,but did Marxist psychology under the influence of Vygotsky rise to the levelof Marxs thought or stay at Feuerbachs pre-Marxist categories?

vygotsky: the feuerbach of marxist psychology

For the last eight decades since 1920, Marxist psychology has not achievedits goals. Most of its leading psychologists, such as Lev Vygotsky, GeorgesPolitzer, Henri Wallon, Alexis Leontiev, Alexander Luria, Serge Rubenstein,Rene Zazzo, Klaus Holzkamp, Lucien Se`ve, Ethel Tobach, Carl Ratner, andCarl Shames, among others, operated within the categories of the pre-Marxist research program. In other word, Marxist psychology, in its presentform, operates at the level of Feuerbach, not yet Marx. Three stages wereidentified in the evolution of a Marxist psychology. The first stage can becharacterized to some extent like that of the young left Hegelians (WilhemReich, Henri Wallon, Georges Politzer, Alexander Luria, Alexis Leontiev,Rene Zazzo, Klaus Holzkamp, and Lucien Se`ve, among others); the secondstage can be characterized like that of Feuerbachs pre-Marxist categories(Lev Vygotsky, Carl Ratner, and Carl Shames), and the third stage is Marxsradical categories. In my view, Marxist psychology has not yet been able tomove from the Feuerbachian categories to Marxist categories. In this critical


Is There a Marxist Psychology? 25

review, I focus on Marxist psychologists and their theoretical inspirations.Since the 1920s, Marxist psychologists have presented their concepts andideas in a much more artful form, and confused by the use of a new termi-nology, so that these thoughts may be taken by nave people for recent phi-losophy (Lenin, 1908: 20), in other words, for Marxist psychology. Naveradical psychologists have taken Austro-Marxist School, German criticaltheory, Freudo-Marxism, Pavlovs Materialism, Soviet Psychology, FrankfurtSchool, Berlin Critical Psychology, Western Marxist Psychology, and otherforms of Materialist Psychology for a truly Marxist psychology. In this respect,Vygotsky pointed out:

When the eclectic and unprincipled, superficial and semi-scientific theory ofJameson is called Marxist psychology, when also the majority of the influential Gestaltpsychologists regard themselves as Marxists in their scientific work, then this nameloses precision with respect to Marxism. I remember how extremely amazed I waswhen I realized this during an informal conversation. I had the following conversa-tion with one of the most educated psychologists: What kind of psychology do youhave in Russia? That you are Marxists does not yet tell what kind of psychologists youare. Knowing of Freuds popularity in Russia, I at first thought of the Adlerians. Afterall, these are also Marxists. But you have a totally different psychology. We are alsosocial-democrats and Marxists, but at the same time we are Darwinists and followersof Copernicus as well. (Vygotsky, 1927/1997a, Vol. 3: 341)

As Marxism controlled the social organization in the Soviet Union to agreat extent, the early goal of the Marxist psychologists was to establisha psychological model following Marxist philosophy. They part from theassumption that changing the social relations of production that govern thepatterns of society can change human nature. Vygotsky (1997b) argues:

From the standpoint of historical materialism, the fundamental causes of all socialchanges and all political upheavals must be sought not in peoples minds . . . andnot in their views of eternal truths and justice, but in changes in the means ofproduction and distribution. They must be sought not in philosophy, but in theeconomics of each epoch. Thus, in mankind the production process assumes thebroadest possible social character, which at the present time encompasses the en-tire world. Accordingly, there arise the most complex forms of organization of hu-man behavior with which the child encounters before he directly confronts nature.(p. 211)

This theoretical framework led Vygotsky to emphasize the role of various so-cial relations (social relations of production, social interaction, cooperation,collaboration, etc.) in individual development. He developed the conceptof the zone of proximal development in which the axis individualsocietyis dialectically constituted. The chickenegg dilemma of priority of the in-dividual or the society has been solved according to the following formula:In potentiality, the human individual is prior; in actuality, society as an ex-pression of social relations is prior. This brings us to the Marxist argumentthat human individuals are full of undeveloped potential that can only be



realized after the structural reorganization of the social relations of produc-tion of the entire social organization of the society. In other words, humanpotential can be fully developed only in a society in which the social rela-tions of production are regulated by the formula, each according to his/herneeds.

An investigation of the full range of Soviet and Western Marxist psychol-ogists thinking will be examined in detail within the context of Marxism.

soviet and western marxist psychologists: are theymarxist or young left hegelians?

In the mid-1920s, Lev Vygotsky formed the Troika, a group of youngMarxist psychologists who gathered at Moscow University in the turbulentyears of the rise of Stalinism from 1925 to 1934. The central figures were LevVygotsky, Alexander Luria, and Alexis Leontiev. Many others were attractedto their ideas.

The Troika was an intellectual group of psychologists whose commontheme was the ongoing application of Marxs dialectical method and philo-sophical conclusions to the study of human higher mental life. Their views ofpsychology were radical and critical of the competing schools within Sovietand Western psychology.

Vygotskys initial formation was as a member of the radical youngMarxist school of social criticism, which emerged in Russia after the rev-olution of 1905 and which contributed to the ferment of ideas leading tothe revolution of October 1917. Initially influenced by Marx, his earliestwritings were devoted to the critique of art, literary critics, and philosophyfrom a radical humanist perspective. However, he soon came to appreciateMarxs ideas that human consciousness, rule-governed behavior, and activ-ity have their roots in material conditions and socially organized practicalactivity. Henri Wallon and Georges Politzer were reaching similar conclu-sions as a result of their experiences with psychology in France (Wallonsdialectical psychology [1925], and Politzers concrete psychology [1929/1969]).Vygotsky collaborated on a number of works attacking his contemporarieswho drew their theoretical inspirations from Pavlovs physiology, Freuds psy-choanalysis, Darwins natural selection, behaviorism, hermeneutics, Hegelsidealism, and positivismscientism for their idealism. From this emerged theculturalhistorical theory of human higher mental functions, the theorywhich, Vygotsky says, served as the guiding thread for his psychological stud-ies throughout the remainder of his life.

Vygotsky and his colleagues made an important contribution toward aMarxist psychology, but their efforts were at the level of Feuerbach, not yetMarx (Carl Shames, 1984 1988, 1990; Elhammoumi, 2000, 2001a, 2001b,2002, 2004). Vygotsky and his colleagues (Leontiev, Luria, and others) weresimilar to the young left Hegelians who tried to put an end to Hegels



idealistic philosophy. The same ambition attracted Vygotsky and his col-leagues to put an end to the idealistic schools that dominated psychologyand brought it to a deep crisis. In his critical review of Hegelian philosophyVygotsky pointed out that:

When Hegel strives to subordinate the unique activity of man to the category oflogic arguing that this activity is the conclusion, that the subject (man) plays therole of a component of the logical figure conclusion this is not only stretchingthe point, it is a game. There is a profound point there, a purely materialistic one.We must reverse it: mans practical activity must bring the repetition of variouslogical figures a billion times in order for these figures to become axioms . . . Andfurther: Mans practice, repeated a billion times, anchors the figures of logic in hisconsciousness. (1987, Vol. 1: 88)

And he added that:

What is man? [Human being] for Hegel, he is a logical subject. For Pavlov, it issoma, an organism. For us, man [human being] is social person = an aggregate ofsocial relations, embodied in an individual (psychological functions built accordingto social structure). (1989: 66)

Vygotsky suggested, correctly in my view, that what drew Marx to Hegel wasapparently Hegels ability to anchor the realm of human freedom in thevicissitudes of human history. In this respect, Vygotsky is the Feuerbach ofMarxist psychology. According to Vygotsky,

L. Feuerbachs wonderful phrase might be taken as the motto to the study of de-velopment in abnormal children: That, which is impossible for one, is possible fortwo. Let us add: That which is impossible on the level of individual developmentbecomes possible on the level of social development. (1993, Vol. 2: 218)

It was Feuerbach who prepared the road to Marx and the conceptualiza-tion of Marxist philosophy. In his article Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic,Marx viewed Feuerbach as the only one who has a serious, critical attitudeto the Hegelian dialectic and credited him for having laid the foundationof genuine materialism and real science (Marx, 1844: 197). If Vygotskyis the Feuerbach of Marxist psychology. Who will be the Marx of Marxistpsychology? In my view, Marxist psychology is in need of its own Marx, aMarx who will rework and rebuild on the Feuerbach (Vygotsky) of Marxistpsychology. In conclusion, Soviet psychology and Western materialist psy-chology have produced the Feuerbach of psychology (in this case, Vygotsky),but not yet the Marx of psychology.

the struggle for a marxist psychology

The struggle for a Marxist psychology in dialectical thought is far frombeing a new one. It was the object of long and searching discussions anddebates between the years 1920, 1930, and 1940 involving the principal



theoreticians of the various tendencies of Marxist thought, notably LevVygotsky (1923, 1925, 1927, 2003), Henri Wallon (1925, 1936, 1937, 1946,1951), Pavel Blonsky (1928), Georges Politzer (1928, 1929), Wilhem Reich(1929, 1934), Konstantin Kornilov (1930), Sergi Rubenstein (1934, 1945),Otto Fenichel (1934), Junius Brown (1936, 1938), Alistair Browne (1937),Reuben Osborne (1937), Angel Flores (1938), Burrill Freedman (1939,1940), and Pierre Naville (1946), a discussion carried on in numerous arti-cles, monographs, and books of very high intellectual investigations. To un-derstand the origins of these scientific investigations, we must first of all placethem in the context of Marxist thought of the 1920s and 1930s. Psychologistsworking within Marxs theoretical framework were not aware of fragmenta-tions and versions of Marxism. The 1920s and 1930s were characterized bya break with the dialectical Marxist tradition and the progressive triumph ofhistoricism and scientism. The methods of natural science became the effec-tive tools to investigate human phenomena in general and human highermental functions in particular. Thus, psychologists working within Marxstheoretical framework had come back to the idea of a radical division be-tween sciences and social engineering, division between academic thoughtand socialist thought or, in Marxs view, division between judgments of factand judgments of value. The conception of scientism rapidly became domi-nant among the main theoreticians of the so-called orthodox Marxism whotransformed the dialectical concept of social organization into a concept ofnatural science. Most Marxist psychologists at that time were less informedabout the conflicts within Marxism. The determinist movement triumphed.We must remember that Marx was not a determinist and the Third Thesison Feuerbach is a good example. In a letter to J. Bloch, Engels (1890/1978,p. 204) asserted that, if somebody says that the economic element is theonly determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless,abstract, senseless phrase.

Marxist psychology is, of course, a complex subject. Psychologists workingwithin Marxs thought held a variety of views of psychology, often brilliantlyformulated but not always consistent.

some ideas about the project of marxist psychology

In general, I think most work in Marxist psychology has stayed too close toboth the form and content of bourgeois psychology and psychoanalysis. Inaddition Western psychologists with an interest in Marxist approaches topsychology have tended either to turn to psychoanalysis, such as Freudo-Marxism, Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, and other positivism versionsof Marxism, or to concentrate upon demonstrating the limitations of West-ern Bourgeois psychology. The leading thinkers of the Frankfurt School(Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, Fromm) as well as Wilhem Reich attemptedto reinterpret Freuds concepts in order to develop a new mode of thought



for understanding topics such as authoritarian personality, alienation, falseconsciousness, unconsciousness, prejudice, ideology, communication, sex-ual repression, sexual alienation, dialectic of civilization, and antagonism.The use of psychoanalytically based concepts has not led to the developmentof a genuine Marxist psychology (Reich, 1929, 1934). In this battlefield,a Marxist approach to psychology was suppressed. Marxist psychologists(Leontiev, Luria, Holzkamp, Zazzo, and others) did some very importantwork and have made some real contributions, particularly in the field ofhuman mental development, but in general I think they tried to produce aMarxist version of psychology that has the same form as pre-Marxist psycho-logy, fitting neatly into the same academic categories: cognition, motivation,perception, intelligence, attention, development, etc. This is understand-able in the context of the academic politics at that time, but in the long run,I think Marxist psychology will look very different. As you can see, Marxistpsychologists (this is now past tense) have stayed within a too narrow set ofideas and here I would include Leontiev, Holzkamp, and, in fact, just abouteveryone. In the next section, human activity, both abstract and concrete,will be examined as the fabric and the basis of human life.

abstract and concrete activity

Marxist psychologists tended to understand abstract and concrete activityin a positivist sort of way, as though we can take the individual and draw achart of when he is engaging in abstract activity and when he is engaging inconcrete activity. I think this contradiction is at the core of all ontology andthe elements cant be separated, and the resolution of the contradictionwill result in an entirely new individuality. Western Marxist psychologists(Se`ve, Holzkamp, and others) had also come under great pressure fromthe psychoanalysts who claimed they didnt have enough understandingof the field of psychology and from others who claimed they didnt haveenough understanding of biology this resulted in a debate that consumedtheir energies and yielded no concrete advance of Marxist psychology (Se`ve,1966, 1977, 1984). So in general they havent had any allies for a moreradical interpretation. As a result, they have been hesitant to re-enter a fieldwhere they were easily accused of being non-professional in psychologyon one hand and in Marxism on the other hand.

What I said about a more radical starting point for Marxist psychology is vi-tal. I do believe that Vygotsky, Leontiev, and Se`ve were genuinely attemptingto produce a Marxist psychology, and they made some important contribu-tions, but this is just a beginning still at the level of Feuerbach, not yetMarx. The question then is, what now? I have several preliminary concernsrooted in a fundamental question: How will a Marxist psychology develop?

1 Will Marxist psychology spring from itself, or through some transfor-mation of existing psychological content? This raises the general question



of the development of Marxist science. Does it develop as an elaborationof its own categories, or through some kind of assimilation and transforma-tion (Lucien Se`ve speaks of critical assimilation) of existing science (Se`ve,1978)? Here, I think Marxism needs a Marxist theory of the developmentof Marxist theory.

2 One way or another, I think it is important to study the evolution ofbourgeois psychology as it confronts and tries to resolve its own contradic-tions and limitations. Here, as in other sciences, as in society itself, thereare internal dynamics in which insoluble contradictions are created and theneed for revolutionary transformation comes from within, as well as seem-ingly from the outside. In other words, Marxism doesnt come to psychologyonly as an outside agitator but from its own internal needs as well.

An important factor I think is the very gradual emergence of temporalityas a theoretical dimension. I have very little evidence of this, but I know ithas to happen. I think it is important to trace the development from theoriginal mechanical, naturalistic conceptions, to the spatial-based systemicand interpersonal conceptions systems theory, field theory, and variousinterpersonal theories to the emergence of temporality as a dimension. Ithink it is ultimately here that Marxism can find its link at the most funda-mental level, and this is Vygotskys and Se`ves deepest contributions seeingthat Marxism is ultimately about temporal logic, or the temporal relationsof life (Shames, 1987; Elhammoumi, 2002, 2004).

3 Finally with regard to academic psychology whereas it is true thatpsychology, as with the other sciences, will sooner or later have a need forMarxism, this will be resisted for a very long time. In other words, Marx-ism is the humus of every particular thought and the horizon of all cul-ture (Sartre, 1960: 17). Mainstream psychology will prefer fragmentation,dualisms, reductionism, and meaninglessness to a full confrontation withMarxism. Why? There are no neutral moments in Marxism, no neutralterrain. The attempts to create such a neutral terrain have done so by de-naturing and altering Marxism. Every moment, every category, every aspectis revolutionary, pointing to the need for social transformation. So, frankly,I think the call for academic psychology to recognize the contribution ofMarxism will not be heeded.

My effort was an attempt to apply Marxs concept of value-form, abstractand concrete labor, alienation, etc. I believed, and still believe that this isthe core of Marxist psychology: alienation and the dialectic of abstract andconcrete, individuality as a form. It is from these attempts that I have con-cluded that Marxist psychologists never transcended the positivist positionof Leontiev.

The contradiction between abstract and concrete is an ontological factthat pervades and in a sense forms our existence itself. So the individ-ual doesnt engage in these activities, but, as a form, is created by thecontradiction at the core of all activities. Vygotskys and Se`ves concept ofindividuality-forms is unclear on this. What is the form of forms? How



can we avoid positivist interpretations here? The form of all forms is alien-ation, or this contradiction itself. I have discussed this with colleagues manytimes, but I am still not clear as to their final thinking on it. I do nothesitate to push such a radical assertion (the individual-form). Today, Ihave tried to go beyond this, in a sense in that I am trying to under-stand everything in terms of temporal relations. I think we need a specifi-cally Marxist theory of time, and the difference between abstract and con-crete will ultimately be expressed in terms of relation-to-time (Shames &Elhammoumi, personal correspondences). Here, I think Vygotsky, Leontiev,and Se`ve have laid the groundwork seeing Marxism as ultimately a the-ory of temporal relations that is, all the relations can ultimately be ex-pressed temporally, but I dont think these authors have developed this suf-ficiently. In the next section, I will discuss the challenge of Marxist activitytheory.

activity theory

Activity theory actually could and should be based on a Marxist concept ofspatio-temporality. In this sense, it really would and should be a formativeconcept. But, firstly, as I said, we dont really have a Marxist concept of time,and activity has been reduced to a positivist concept. It seems to me thattime, with regard to human affairs, has either remained external, as in pos-itivist thought, or internal, as in hermeneutics, Heidegger, etc. For Marx, itmust combine the two and this is the meaning of Marx combining socialand natural history, and in fact the basis of his overcoming all duality ofclassical thought. This is what Im trying to think about and this is whereI think a truly Marxist psychology must originate but Im afraid my lifehas not allowed much time for theoretical pursuits in recent years. I wantto say a few more things about abstract activity. When I wrote this chapter, Ilooked up as much as I could find on Marxs concept of abstract labor and,amazingly, despite the centrality of this concept, there was very little deepresearch on this question. Everyone simply takes it for granted, and therehave been few attempts to look at it more directly and really examine thisconcept. The concept raises profound logical and philosophical questions.What is it; whose labor is it? I tried to think this through more than hadbeen done. When you look at it, you can see the time dimension as funda-mental. For Marx, abstract labor is defined as the time creating value, whereasconcrete labor is the time creating use-value. But are these different periods oftime performed by the same person? Or is it an ontological relation that ismore fundamental than the individual, a relation of the essence to tem-porality, within which individuality is formed? How to conceptualize this?Labor as such is an abstraction conception, concretely; it comes into realbeing only in divided form. This divided form gives birth and produces so-cial relations and antagonisms. In my opinion, the more we look at it, themore we find this concept to be incomprehensible using ordinary concepts



of time and individuality. Here I think we are up against the conceptual limitsof Marxs work itself, where we truly have to go beyond the pre-Marxist con-cept of time and the individual as a pre-existing individual, functioning inexternal, natural time. Of course, we now know that this conception isa product of the modern era. We then added internal, hermeneutic time,brought to its height in Heidegger. So the Kantian duality between the nat-ural and the social is expressed in the duality between time as inner humanexperience and as purely outer reality. With the mechanistic separation ofbase and superstructure, and the Feuerbachian individual, Marxists havenever challenged this. We need an Aufhebung, in which time is both naturaland social, just as the subject of human activity must become the essence that is, as Vygotsky and Se`ve said, the subject does not have a human form.This essence is both social and natural. Hegel, toward the end of the Logic,said that forms of alienated being could be expressed in terms of tempo-ral shapes. In this sense, property relations are ultimately temporal relations ownership over someone elses labor and its products is ownership of thattime. Unfortunately none of this was developed, and the whole human coreof Marxist thought remained in a Hegelian stage. Another example is the wayMarxists have thought about free time. Traditionally, we have thought thatMarxism tells us that the individual needs more free time in order to de-velop as an all-around personality and this is given as the goal of socialism.The Grundrisse certainly seems to be telling us this. In my opinion, this isa very linear simplistic way of thinking that doesnt get at the fundamen-tal point of Marxism: ontological transformation the transformation to anew type of being. Interestingly, when you look at the German Ideology, inmany places, Marx is not saying free time, as in the simplistic usage oftime after work for pursuit of leisure, etc., but freed time. Maybe I ammaking too much of the difference, but the second seems to imply a quali-tative change in relation to time, not a simple quantitative addition of moreleisure time. It seems to me to imply a liberated relation to time. In anycase, I think we have to respectfully recognize that Marx was here at his con-ceptual limit. It simply wasnt possible for him to theorize or even imagine theontological transformation that his theory calls for at the individual level,and his own language reflects a certain ambiguity on this. He speaks of theindividual, even though the whole point of the Grundrisse is the social pro-duction of the individual (unfortunately this is incorrectly translated in mostEnglish versions, into social production by the individual). When we recognizethe individual as a produced form, then we have to find the way to theorize thetransformation to the next form which of course is not just another form,because it is the negation of the type of form that has characterized all historyin class society. The abolition of class, property, and money is also the aboli-tion of individuality, as we have known it, toward a more fluid individuality.This change is already happening in many ways. So these are the things Imthinking about these days.



For me, the idea of Marxist psychology is inseparable from the idea ofbringing to life and literally to earth a Marxist vision of human nature as wellas human future and the scientific understanding of how we might get fromhere to there. I literally believe this cant be done without a great elaborationand development of Marxist human scientific visionary thought.

Although it is true that the Soviet psychologists derived most of theirinfluence from Western psychologists, isnt it true that there was influencein both directions? Berlin in the twenties and early thirties was alive with newthinking systems approach, ecological approach, Marxist psychoanalysis,field theory, etc, all of it influenced in some way by Marxism and much of itmaking its way to the Soviet Union. This relation was cut off under Stalin,when Pavlovism became the official psychology.

I believe anyone who takes the individual as a starting point is guiltyof Feuerbachianism, and this includes every Marxist psychologist, despiteall their efforts to base their theories on social historical dynamics. Thekey, I think, is to discard the individual for the individual-form. The bar-rier between individual and social determinations is thus overcome. EvenHolzkamp, despite all his efforts, seems to have failed to truly overcome thebarrier between relations and individual. This is true of Wallon, Politzer,Leontiev, Zazzo, and others.

I think Marxism is a developmental, transformative process and that theform of Marxist knowledge is different from its pre-Marxist form. In otherwords, Marxism at this time of its history is not a completed body of knowl-edge but a transformative process in relation to bourgeois thought in whichnew forms and transforming content are in a dialectical relation. I think thatMarxists in all areas of science have suffered losses due to this expectationthat there would be a Marxist physics, Marxist biology, Marxist psychology,Marxist sociology, Marxist anthropology, and so on, that somehow corre-sponded to its equivalent positivist version. But whatever all this means, Ithink a fundamental fact is that Marxism is a study of the historical movementof forms and particularly the historical origin of the commodity-form andthe individual-form. All of psychology must be subsumed under the under-standing of this motion. Put another way: alienation and de-alienation. Thisis what I am trying to get at in the idea of the contradiction between abstractand concrete activity as the fundamental ontological issue and its negationas the basic fact in a new ontology. Unfortunately, this is a grand conception,and I havent made much progress myself in elaborating it.

conclusion

As I said, I am particularly interested in the possible emergence of temporalconceptions to replace spatial ones. I really believe Vygotsky, Leontiev, Se`ve,and others have opened doors to a true advancement and development ofMarxist psychological thought. They have shown how Marxism can return



to itself after a self-alienation in humanism and anti-humanist conceptions.After reading Heidegger, particularly Being and Time, and understandinghis vast influence on twentieth-century thought both existentialist andanti-humanist I have a deeper appreciation for Vygotsky, Leontiev, Se`ve,and others. I truly believe they are the first to find the key to breakingthe grip of Heideggerianism and allowing Marxism to fill the spaces thatHeidegger occupied for much of the twentieth century. However, whenyou see Heideggers formulation on the human essence and how this wasabsorbed into both existentialism and anti-humanism, you can see in whatway these authors moved this forward. Interestingly, I havent seen anythingfrom the Vygotskians putting this all together. I suppose it is more importantto support the myth that anti-humanism, post-structuralism, and post-modernism are Western Marxist creations. Here, of course, is an example ofpeople running in horror from Stalinism and embracing Heidegger instead.But this is just one example of the embrace of bourgeois thought.

In conclusion, psychology is in need of Marxism because Marxism is abrilliant tool for interpreting human higher mental functions and changingruled-governed behavior and consciousness. Marxist psychology of the lastcentury was predominantly Feuerbachian, which led to a definite close elab-oration of a unified and integrative theoretical framework of human highermental functions.

Is there a Marxist psychology? Marxist psychology, as I said, existed onlyin its infantile Feuerbachian form. In this chapter, we viewed Vygotsky asthe only one who had serious, critical insight into the competing schoolswithin Soviet psychology and credited him for having laid the foundationfor genuine Marxist psychology.

P1: OYK0521849993rfa CB895-Sawchuk 0 521 84999 3 December 12, 2005 17:48

References

Abel, E. (1984). Terminal degrees: The job crisis in higher education. New York: Praeger.Abramowitz, M., and David, P. A. (1996). Technological change and the rise of

intangible investments: The U.S. economys growth part in the twentieth cen-tury. In Employment and growth in the knowledge-based economy (pp. 3560). Paris:Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Adler, P. S. (1990). Marx, machines and skill. Technology and Culture, 31(4), 780812.Adler, P. S. (1993). The learning bureaucracy: New united motors manufacturing,

Inc. In B. M. Staw and L. L. Cummings (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior,Vol. 15 (pp. 111194). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Adler, P. S. (1996). The dynamic relationship between tacit and codified knowledge:Comments on Nonakas managing innovation as a knowledge creation process.In G. Pogorel and J. Allouche (Eds.), International handbook of technology management(pp. 110124). Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Adler, P. S., and Borys, B. (1996). Two types of bureaucracy: Enabling and coercive,Administrative Science Quarterly, 41(1), 6189.

Adler, P. S., Goldoftas, B., and Levine, D. I. (1997). Ergonomics, employee involve-ment, and the Toyota production system: A case study of NUMMIs 1993 modelintroduction. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 50(3), 416437.

Adler, P. S., Barbara Goldoftas, and Levine, D. I. (1998). Stability and change atNUMMI. In R. Boyer, E. Charron, U. Jurgens, and S. Tolliday (Eds.), Betweenimitation and innovation: The transfer and hybridization of productive models in the inter-national automobile industry (pp. 128160). New York: Oxford University Press.

Adler, P. S., Goldoftas, B., and Levine, D. I. (1999). Flexibility versus efficiency? Acase study of model changeovers in the Toyota production system. OrganizationScience, 10(1), 4368.

Adler, P. S. (2001, MarchApril). Market, hierarchy, and trust: The knowledge econ-omy and the future of capitalism. Organization Science, 214234.

Adler, P. S. (2003). Practice and process: The socialization of software development.Unpublished manuscript, University of Southern California.

Afonso, A. J. (2002). Polticas contemporaneas e avaliacao educacional. InA. J. Afonso, and L. C. Lima (Eds.), Reformas da educacao publica: democratizacao,modernizacao, neoliberalismo (pp. 111127). Porto, Portugal: Afrontamento.

269


270 References

Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (2005). AHRQ Home. http://www.ahcpr.gov

American Association of University Professors. (1999).Graduate students today: Work-ing for academic renewal; A kit for organizing on the issues of part-time and non-tenure trackfaculty; Faculty rights; AAUP guidelines to protect nontenured faculty rights (pamphlets).AAUP: 1012 14th Street NW, Suite 500, Washington DC, 200053465.

American Association of University Professors. (2001). Uncertain times: The annualreport on the economic status of the profession. Academe (AprilMay) 2598.

American Federation of Teachers. (1994). Part-time faculty issues. Item #607.Washington, DC.

American Federation of Teachers. (1996). Statement on part-time faculty employment.Item # 640. Program and Policy Council Task Force on Part-Time Employment(L. Stollar, M. Hittleman, and K. Schermerhorn) AFT: 555 New Jersey Avenue,NW, Washington, DC 20001.

American Federation of Teachers/National Education Association. (1998). Shapingthe profession that shapes the future. Speeches from the AFT/NEA Conferenceon Teacher Quality, (September 2527) Washington, DC.

American Federation of Teachers. (1998). The vanishing professor. Item #587,( July) AFT Higher Education Department, AFT: 555 New Jersey Avenue, NW,Washington, DC 20001.

Anderson, K. (1999). Marx on suicide in the context of his other writings on alien-ation and gender. In E. Plaut and K. Anderson (Eds.), Marx on suicide (pp. 328).Evanston, IL: Northwestern.

Appadurai, A. (1986). Introduction: Commodities and the politics of value. InA. Appadurai (Ed.), The social life of things: Commodities in cultural perspective(pp. 363). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Arce, A. (2002). A pedagogia na era das revolucoes; Uma analise do pensamento dePestalozzi e Froebel. Sao Paulo, Brazil: Editora Autores Associados.

Aronowitz, S. (1997). Academic unionism and the future of higher education. In C.Nelson (Ed.), Will teach for food: Academic labor in crisis (pp. 181214). Minneapolis,MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Aronowitz, S. (2000). The knowledge factory: Dismantling the corporate university andcreating true higher learning. Boston: Beacon.

Asmolov, A. G. (2001). Psychology of personality; Principles of general-psychological analysis.Moscow: Smysl.

Asmolov, A. G. (2002). Beyond consciousness; Methodological problems of nonclassical psy-chology. Moscow: Smysl.

Attewell, P. (1987). The deskilling controversy. Work and occupations, 14(3), 323346.Babson, S. (Ed.). (1995). Lean work: Empowerment and exploitation in the global auto

industry. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press.Bach, J. (1994) The immaturity of CMM. American Programmer , 7(9), available online

at: http://www.satisfice.com/articles/cmm.htm.Bach, J. (1995). Enough about process: What we need are heroes. IEEE Software,

12(2), 9698.Bandura, A. (1997). Self-efficacy: The exercise of control. New York: W. H. Freeman.Barker, J. (1993). Tightening the iron cage: Concertive control in the self-managing

organization. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, 408437.


References 271

Barker, K. (1998). Toiling for piece-rates and accumulating deficits: Contingentwork in higher education. In K. Barker and K. Christensen (Eds.), Contingent work:American employment relations in transition (pp. 195220). Ithaca, NY: IRL/CornellUniversity Press.

Barley, S. R. (1996). Technicians in the workplace: Ethnographic evidence for bring-ing work into organization studies. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41(3), 404441.

Barley, S. R., and Kunda, G. (2001). Bringing work back in. Organization Science,12(1), 7594.

Barton, P. E. (2000). What jobs require: Literacy, education and training, 19402006.Princeton, NJ: Educational Testing Service.

Beamish, R. (1992). Marx, method, and the division of labor. Champaign: University ofIllinois Press.

Beck, C. (1994). Postmodernism, pedagogy, and philosophy of education. In AndreyThompson (ed.) Philosophy of education 1993 (pp. 113). Urbana, IL: Philosophyof Education Society.

Becker, A. L. (1995). Beyond translation. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Beirne, M., Ramsay, H., and Panteli, A. (1998). Developments in computing work:

Control and contradiction in the software labour process. In P. Thompson andC. Warhusrt (Eds.), Workplaces of the future (pp. 142162). London, MacmillanBusiness.

Bell, D. (1973). The coming of post-industrial society. New York: Basic Books.Berg, I. (1970). Education and jobs: The great training robbery. London: Penguin.Bernstein, B. (1990). Class, codes and control, vol 4: The structuring of pedagogic discourse.

London: Routledge.Bernstein, B. (1996). Pedagogy, symbolic control and identity. London: Taylor and

Francis.Berstein, R. J. (1990). Rortys liberal utopia, Social Research, 57(1), 3072.Berstein, R. J. (1997). One step forward, two steps backward: Richard Rorty on liberal

democracy and philosophy, Political Theory, 15(4), 538563.Berstein, R. J. (1998). Beyond objectivism and relativism: Science, hermeneutics, and praxis.

Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.Bertelsen, O., and Bodker, S. (Eds.). (2000). Information technology in human

activity. Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, 12, 314.Bhaskar, R. (1986). Scientific realism and human emancipation. London; New York:

Verso.Bhaskar, R. (1989). Reclaiming reality. New York: London: Verso.Bhaskar, R. (1991). Philosophy and the idea of freedom. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.Blackler, F. (1993). Knowledge and the theory of organizations: Organizations as

activity systems and the reframing of management, Journal of Management Studies,30(6), 863884.

Block, L. F., and Press, C. E. (1986). Building market strength through DRGs. Chicago:Pluribus Press.

Blonsky, P. (1928). The subject of psychology and psychopathology from a geneticstandpoint. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 35, 356373.

Bohman, J. (1999). Practical reason and cultural constraint: Agency in Bourdieustheory of practice. In R. Shusterman (Ed.), Bourdieu: A critical reader (pp. 129152).Malden, MA: Blackwell.


272 References

Bottomore, T. (1963). Karl Marx: Early writings. London: Watts.Bottomore, T. (Ed.). (1983). A dictionary of marxist thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press.Boud, D., and Garrick., J. (Eds.). (1999). Understanding learning at work. London:

Routledge.Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste. Cambridge,

MA: Harvard University Press.Bourdieu, P. (1991). Language and symbolic power. London: Polity.Bourdieu, P. (1993). La misere du monde. Paris: Seuil.Bourdieu, P. (1998). Practical Reason, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Bourdieu, P., and Passeron, J. C. (1977 [1970]). Reproduction in education, society and

culture. London: Sage.Bowles, S., and Gintis, H. (1976). Schooling in Capitalist America. New York: Basic

Books.Braverman, H. (1974) Labour and monopoly capital: The degradation of work in the twen-

tieth century. New York: Monthly Review PressBrice-Heath, D. (1983). Ways with words: Language, life and work in communities and

classrooms. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Brown, J. F. (1936). Psychology and social order. New York: McGraw-Hill.Brown, J. F. (1938). Freud vs. Marx: Real and pseudo problems distinguished.

Psychiatry, 1(2), 249255.Brown, M. (1986). The production of society. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.Browne, A. (1937). Psychology and marxism. In D. Lewis (Ed.), The mind in chains

(pp. 167184). London: Fredereick Muller.Burawoy, M. (1979). Manufacturing consent. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Burawoy, M. (1996). A classic in its time. Contemporary Sociology, 25(3), 296299.Calhoun, C., LiPuma, E., and Postone, M. (Eds.). (1993). Bourdieu: Critical perspectives.

Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.Callinicos, A. (1989). Against postmodernism. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.Callinicos, A. (1991). The revenge of history. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.Certeau, M. (1984). The practice of everyday life. Berkeley: University of California

Press.Chaiklin, S. (Ed.). (2001). The theory and practice of cultural-historical psychology. arhus,

Denmark: arhus Unversity Press.Chaiklin, S., Hedegaard, M., and Jensen, U. J. (Eds.). (1999). Activity theory and

social practice: Cultural historical approaches. arhus, Denmark: arhus UniversityPress.

Charlesworth, S. J. (2000). A phenomenology of working class experience. Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press.

Chase, B. (1998). New unionism in higher education. Speech to National Center forCollective Bargaining in Higher Education, Baruch College, New York, NY.

Cheney, G. (2002). Values at work: Employee participation and market pressure at Mon-dragon. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.

Clark, B. (1999). Effects of process maturity on development effort. Unpublished paper,available at http://sunset.usc.edu/bkclark/Research.

Cohen, G. A. (1978). Karl Marxs theory of history: A defense. Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press.


References 273

Cohen, G. A. (1988). Human nature and social change in the Marxist conceptionof history, The Journal of Philosophy, 85(4), 171191.

Cohen, J. (1982). Review of G. A. Cohen, Karl Marxs theory of history. The Journalof Philosophy, 79(5), 253273.

Cole, P. (1907). Herbart and Froebel; An attempt at synthesis. New York: TeachersCollege/Columbia University.

Collins, J. (1993). Determination and contradiction: An appreciation and critiqueof the work of Pierre Bourdieu on language and education. In C. Calhoun (Ed.),Bourdieu: Critical perspectives (pp. 116138). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Conn, R. (2002). Developing software engineers at the C-130J software factory, IEEESoftware (September/October), 2529.

Conradi, R., and Fuggetta, A. (2002). Improving software process improvement,IEEE Software (JulyAugust), 9299.

Courtney, S. (1992). Why adults learn: Towards a theory of participation in adult education.New York: Routledge.

Covaleski, M. A., Dirsmith, M. W., Heian, J. B., and Samuel, S. (1998). The calculatedand the avowed: Techniques of discipline and struggles over identity in Big Sixpublic accounting firms, Administrative Science Quarterly, 43(2), 293327.

Critchley, S. (1998). Derrida: Ironista privado o liberal publico? In: Mouffe, C. (org.)Desconstruccion y pragmatismo, Buenos Aires: Paidos.

Crocca, W. T. (1992). Review of Japans Software Factories: A Challenge to U.S.Management. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37(4): 670674.

Crosby, P. B. (1979). Quality is free. New York: McGraw-Hill.Cuban, L. (1993). How Teachers Taught (2nd ed.). New York: Teachers College Press.Cusumano, M. A. (1991). Japans software factories: A challenge to U.S. management. New

York: Oxford University Press.Davydov, V. V. (1988). Problems of developmental teaching. Soviet Education 30(8),

1597.Davydov, V. V. (1991). The content and unsolved problems of activity theory. Inter-

disciplinary Newsletter for Activity Theory, 7/8, 3035.Davydov, V. V. (1993). The perspectives of activity theory. Interdisciplinary Newsletter

for Activity Theory 13/14, 5053.Davydov, V. V. (1996). Theory of developmental teaching. Moscow: Intor.Davydov, V. V. (1998). The last speeches. Riga: Experiment.Davydov, V. V. (1999). A new approach to the interpretation of activity structure and

content. In S. Chaiklin, M. Hedegaard, and U. J. Jensen (Eds.), Activity theory andsocial practice (pp. 3950). Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.

De Geer, H. (1982). Job studies and industrial relations: Ideas about efficiency and relationsbetween the parties of the labour market in Sweden, 19201950. Stockholm: Almqvist &Wiksell International.

DeMarco, T., and Lister, T. (1987). Peopleware: Productive projects and teams. New York:Dorset.

DeNora, T., and Mehan, H. (1993). Genius: A social construction. In J. Kitsuse andT. Sarbin (Eds.), Constructing the social . Los Angeles: Sage.

Dickens, C. (1844). Hard times. New York: W.W. Norton.Dodge, S. (2001). Students, faculty heckle city colleges board. Sun Times (May 4)

Chicago, 22.


274 References

Dreier, O. (1993). Re-searching psychotherapeutic practice. In S. Chaiklin and J.Lave (Eds.), Understanding practice (pp. 105124). New York: Cambridge UniversityPress.

Dreier, O. (1997). Subjectivity and social practice. Aarhus: Institut for Filosofi, AarhusUniversitet.

Dreier, O. (1999). Personal trajectories of participation across contexts of socialpractice. Outlines 1, 532.

Dreyfus, H., and Rabinow, P. (1999). Can there be a science of existential structureand social meaning? In R. Shusterman (Ed.), Bourdieu: A critical reader (pp. 8493).Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Duarte, N. (1993). The individuality for itself: Contribution to a historic-social theory to theformation of the individual. Campinas, Brazil: Autores Associados.

Duarte, N. (1996). School education and theory of the everyday life and the Vygotsky school.Campinas, Brazil: Autores Associados.

Duarte, N. (2000a). Vygotsky and learning to learn: Critique of neo-liberal and post-modernistappropriations of Lev Vygotskys theory. Campinas, Brazil: Autores Associados.

Duarte, N. (2000b). Human anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape; TheDialectics in Vygotskian and Marxian theory and the question on objective knowl-edge in schooling. Revista educacao e sociedade, 71, 79115. (Available in Portuguese:http://www.scielo.br)

Duarte, N. (Ed.). (2000c). About constructivism: Contributions to a critical analisis.Campinas, Brazil: Autores Associados.

Duarte, N. (2002a). Vigotski e o aprender a aprender: crticas a`s apropriacoes neoliberais epos-modernas da teoria vigotskiana (2nd edition). Campinas, Brazil: Autores Associ-ados.

Duarte, N. (2002b). Who is Vygotsky? Epistemological issues and implications fordebates. 5th ISCRAT Conference The International Society for Cultural Research andActivity Theory (June 1822), Free University Amsterdam, Holland.

Duarte, N. (2003a). Tacit knowledge and school knowledge in teachers education why Donald Schon didnt understand Luria. Revista Educacao e Sociedade, 24(83),601625. (Available in Portuguese: http://www.scielo.br)

Duarte, N. (2003b). Knowledge Society or Society of Illusions? Four critical dialecticalessays in philosophy of education. Campinas, Brazil: Autores Associados.

Duarte, N. (2003c). A teoria da atividade como uma abordagem para a pesquisa emeducacao [Activity Theory as an Approach to Educational Research]. Perspectiva,21(2), 279302.

Duayer, M. (2001). Marx, verdade e discurso. Perspectiva. Florianopolis, 19(1)(JanuaryJune), 1539.

Duayer, M. (2003). Ontologia na ciencia economica: realismo ou ceticismo instrumental?UFF: Niteroi. Unpublished manuscript.

Duayer, M., and Moraes, M. C. M. (1997a). A etica pragmatica do neoconser-vadorismo: Richard Rorty. In L. M. Huhne (Org.), Etica, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil:Uape.

Duayer, M., and Moraes, M. C. M. (1997b). Neopragmatismo: A historia comocontingencia absoluta. Tempo, Revista do Departamento de Historia, UFF, 2(4)(December), 2748.

Dubson, M. (2001). Ghosts in the classroom: Stories of college adjunct faculty and the pricewe all pay. Boston: Camels Back Books.


References 275

Eagleton, T. (1991). Ideology. New York: Verso.Eagleton, T. (1999). Utopia and its opposites. In L. Panish and C. Leys (Eds.),

Necessary and unnecessary Utopias, Socialist Register . London: Merlin Press.Eagleton, T. (2003). After theory. London: Penguin Books.Eckert, P. (1989). Jocks and Burnouts Social Categories and Identity in High School. New

York: Teachers College Press.Elhammoumi, M. (2000). Lev Vygotsky: The Feuerbach of marxist psychology. Unpub-

lished manuscript.Elhammoumi, M. (2001a). Lost or merely domesticated? The boom in socio-

historico-cultural theory emphasizes some concepts, overlooks others. In S.Chaiklin (Ed.), The theory and practice of cultural-historical psychology (pp. 200217).arhus, Denmark: arhus University Press.

Elhammoumi, M. (2001b). The reception of Lev Vygotsky in South America: Afertile terrain for a materialist psychology. In M. Golder (Ed.), Vygotsky: A radi-cal psychologist (pp. 5166). Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ateneo Vigotskiano de laArgentina.

Elhammoumi, M. (2002). To create psychologys own capital. Journal for the Theoryof Social Behaviour , 32(1), 89104.

Elhammoumi, M. (2004). Is back to Vygotsky enough? The legacy of socio-historico-cultural psychology. Historical materialism: Research in critical marxist theory.12(3), 3251.

Elias, N. (2000). The civilizing process. Malden, MA: Blackwell.Elkonin, D. B. (1998). Psicologia do jogo. Sao Paulo: Martins Fontes.Elkonin, D. B. (2000). Toward the problem of stages in the mental development of children.

Available online at: www.marxist.orgEngels, F. (1890/1978). Letter to Joseph Bloch. In H. Selsam and H. Martel (Eds.),

Reade in Marxist Philosphy (pp. 204206). New York: International Publishers.Engels, F. (1978). Socialism: Utopian and scientific. In R. C. Tucker (Ed.), The Marx

Engels reader (2nd ed.; pp. 683717). New York: Norton.Engestrom, Y. (1987). Learning by expanding: An activity-theoretical approach to develop-

mental research. Helsinki, Finland: Orienta-Konsultit.Engestrom, Y. (1990). Learning, working and imagining: Twelve studies in activity theory.

Helsinki, Finland: Orienta-Konsultit.Engestrom, Y. (1996). Interobjectivity, ideality, and dialectics. Mind, Culture, and

Activity, 3, 259265.Engestrom, Y. (1999a). Activity theory and individual and social transformation. In

Y. Engestrom, R. Miettinen, and R.-L. Punamaki (Eds.), Perspectives on activity theory(pp. 1938). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Engestrom, Y (1999b). Innovative learning in work teams: Analyzing cycles of knowl-edge creation in practice. In Y. Engestrom, R. Miettinen, and R.-L., Punamaki(Eds.), Perspectives on activity theory (pp. 377404). Cambridge, UK: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Engestrom, Y. (2000). From individual action to collective activity and back: Develop-mental work research as an interventionist methodology. In P. Luff, J. Hindmarshand C. Heath (Eds.), Workplace studies: Recovering work practice and informing systemdesign (pp. 150166). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Engestrom, Y. (2001). Expansive learning at work: Toward an activity theoreticalreconceptualization. Journal of Education and Work, 14(1), 133156.


276 References

Engestrom, Y., Miettinen, R. and Punamaki, R.-L. (Eds.). (1999). Perspectives on activitytheory. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Engestrom, Y., Toiviainen, H., Pasanen, A., and Haavisto, V. (2004). Collaborativeconcept formation at work. Paper presented at the Academy of Management Meeting,New Orleans, August 611.

Engestrom, Y., Virkkunen, J., Helle, M., Pihlaja, J., and Poikela, R. (1996). Changelaboratory as a tool for transforming work. Lifelong Learning in Europe, 1(2), 1017.

Evangelista, O., and Shiroma, E. O. (2003). Um Fantasma ronda o professor: a mist-ica da Competencia. In M. C. M. Moraes (org.), Iluminismo a`s avessas: Producaode Conhecimento e politicas de Formacao docente (pp. 8198). Rio de Janeiro:DP&A.

Ezzamel, M., and Willmott, H. (1998). Accounting for teamwork: A critical studyof group-based systems of organizational control. Administrative Science Quarterly,43(2), 358396.

Fenichel, O. (1934/1967). Psychoanalysis as the nucleus of a future dialectical ma-terialistic psychology. American Imago, 24, 290311.

Ferrie`re, A. (1927). The activity school. New York: The John Day Company.Fichtner, B. (1999). Activity theory as methodology: The epistemological revolution

of the computer and the problem of its societal appropriation. In M. Hedegaardand J. Lompscher (Eds.), Learning activity and development (pp. 7192). arhus,Denmark: arhus University Press.

Flores, A. (1938). Psychology and marxism: A bibliography. Dialectics, 4, 2124.Foot, K. A. (2002). Pursuing an evolving object: Object formation and identification

in a conflict monitoring network. Mind, Culture and Activity, 9 (2), 132149.Form, W. (1987). On the degradation of skills. Annual Review of Sociology, 13, 2947.Fowler, B. (1997). Pierre Bourdieu and cultural theory. London: Sage.Foucault, M. (1975/1977). Discipline and punish. New York: Vintage.Fraser, S. (1991). Labor will rule: Sidney Hillman and the rise of American labor. New York:

Free Press.Freedman, B. (1939). Psycho-social repression and social-rationalization. American

Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 9(1), 109122.Freedman, B. (1940). Amplifications of marxist psychoanalysis. American Journal of

Orthopsychiatry, 10(2), 351354.Freidson, E. (2001). Professionalism: The third logic. Cambridge, UK: Polity.Freire, P. (1969). Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York: Continuum.Freire, P (1970). Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York: Herder and Herder.Freire, P. (1992). Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York: Continuum Publishing.Friedman, A. L., and Cornford, D. S. (1989). Computer systems development: History,

organization and implementation. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.Froebel, F. (1887). The education of man. New York: D. Appleton.Froebel, F. (1895). The mottoes and commentaries of Friedrich Froebels mother play. New

York: D. Appleton.Froebel, F. (1917). Pedagogics of the kindergarten. New York: D. Appleton.Fujimura, J. (1996). Crafting science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Fukuyama, F. (1992). The end of history and the last man. New York: Free Press.Gappa, J. M., and David W. Leslie (1993). The invisible faculty: Improving the status of

part-timers in higher education. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.


References

Abel, E. (1984). Terminal degrees: The job crisis in higher education. New York: Praeger.Abramowitz, M., and David, P. A. (1996). Technological change and the rise of

intangible investments: The U.S. economys growth part in the twentieth cen-tury. In Employment and growth in the knowledge-based economy (pp. 3560). Paris:Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Adler, P. S. (1990). Marx, machines and skill. Technology and Culture, 31(4), 780812.Adler, P. S. (1993). The learning bureaucracy: New united motors manufacturing,

Inc. In B. M. Staw and L. L. Cummings (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior,Vol. 15 (pp. 111194). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Adler, P. S. (1996). The dynamic relationship between tacit and codified knowledge:Comments on Nonakas managing innovation as a knowledge creation process.In G. Pogorel and J. Allouche (Eds.), International handbook of technology management(pp. 110124). Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Adler, P. S., and Borys, B. (1996). Two types of bureaucracy: Enabling and coercive,Administrative Science Quarterly, 41(1), 6189.

Adler, P. S., Goldoftas, B., and Levine, D. I. (1997). Ergonomics, employee involve-ment, and the Toyota production system: A case study of NUMMIs 1993 modelintroduction. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 50(3), 416437.

Adler, P. S., Barbara Goldoftas, and Levine, D. I. (1998). Stability and change atNUMMI. In R. Boyer, E. Charron, U. Jurgens, and S. Tolliday (Eds.), Betweenimitation and innovation: The transfer and hybridization of productive models in the inter-national automobile industry (pp. 128160). New York: Oxford University Press.

Adler, P. S., Goldoftas, B., and Levine, D. I. (1999). Flexibility versus efficiency? Acase study of model changeovers in the Toyota production system. OrganizationScience, 10(1), 4368.

Adler, P. S. (2001, MarchApril). Market, hierarchy, and trust: The knowledge econ-omy and the future of capitalism. Organization Science, 214234.

Adler, P. S. (2003). Practice and process: The socialization of software development.Unpublished manuscript, University of Southern California.

Afonso, A. J. (2002). Polticas contemporaneas e avaliacao educacional. InA. J. Afonso, and L. C. Lima (Eds.), Reformas da educacao publica: democratizacao,modernizacao, neoliberalismo (pp. 111127). Porto, Portugal: Afrontamento.

269


270 References

Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (2005). AHRQ Home. http://www.ahcpr.gov

American Association of University Professors. (1999).Graduate students today: Work-ing for academic renewal; A kit for organizing on the issues of part-time and non-tenure trackfaculty; Faculty rights; AAUP guidelines to protect nontenured faculty rights (pamphlets).AAUP: 1012 14th Street NW, Suite 500, Washington DC, 200053465.

American Association of University Professors. (2001). Uncertain times: The annualreport on the economic status of the profession. Academe (AprilMay) 2598.

American Federation of Teachers. (1994). Part-time faculty issues. Item #607.Washington, DC.

American Federation of Teachers. (1996). Statement on part-time faculty employment.Item # 640. Program and Policy Council Task Force on Part-Time Employment(L. Stollar, M. Hittleman, and K. Schermerhorn) AFT: 555 New Jersey Avenue,NW, Washington, DC 20001.

American Federation of Teachers/National Education Association. (1998). Shapingthe profession that shapes the future. Speeches from the AFT/NEA Conferenceon Teacher Quality, (September 2527) Washington, DC.

American Federation of Teachers. (1998). The vanishing professor. Item #587,( July) AFT Higher Education Department, AFT: 555 New Jersey Avenue, NW,Washington, DC 20001.

Anderson, K. (1999). Marx on suicide in the context of his other writings on alien-ation and gender. In E. Plaut and K. Anderson (Eds.), Marx on suicide (pp. 328).Evanston, IL: Northwestern.

Appadurai, A. (1986). Introduction: Commodities and the politics of value. InA. Appadurai (Ed.), The social life of things: Commodities in cultural perspective(pp. 363). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Arce, A. (2002). A pedagogia na era das revolucoes; Uma analise do pensamento dePestalozzi e Froebel. Sao Paulo, Brazil: Editora Autores Associados.

Aronowitz, S. (1997). Academic unionism and the future of higher education. In C.Nelson (Ed.), Will teach for food: Academic labor in crisis (pp. 181214). Minneapolis,MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Aronowitz, S. (2000). The knowledge factory: Dismantling the corporate university andcreating true higher learning. Boston: Beacon.

Asmolov, A. G. (2001). Psychology of personality; Principles of general-psychological analysis.Moscow: Smysl.

Asmolov, A. G. (2002). Beyond consciousness; Methodological problems of nonclassical psy-chology. Moscow: Smysl.

Attewell, P. (1987). The deskilling controversy. Work and occupations, 14(3), 323346.Babson, S. (Ed.). (1995). Lean work: Empowerment and exploitation in the global auto

industry. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press.Bach, J. (1994) The immaturity of CMM. American Programmer , 7(9), available online

at: http://www.satisfice.com/articles/cmm.htm.Bach, J. (1995). Enough about process: What we need are heroes. IEEE Software,

12(2), 9698.Bandura, A. (1997). Self-efficacy: The exercise of control. New York: W. H. Freeman.Barker, J. (1993). Tightening the iron cage: Concertive control in the self-managing

organization. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, 408437.


References 271

Barker, K. (1998). Toiling for piece-rates and accumulating deficits: Contingentwork in higher education. In K. Barker and K. Christensen (Eds.), Contingent work:American employment relations in transition (pp. 195220). Ithaca, NY: IRL/CornellUniversity Press.

Barley, S. R. (1996). Technicians in the workplace: Ethnographic evidence for bring-ing work into organization studies. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41(3), 404441.

Barley, S. R., and Kunda, G. (2001). Bringing work back in. Organization Science,12(1), 7594.

Barton, P. E. (2000). What jobs require: Literacy, education and training, 19402006.Princeton, NJ: Educational Testing Service.

Beamish, R. (1992). Marx, method, and the division of labor. Champaign: University ofIllinois Press.

Beck, C. (1994). Postmodernism, pedagogy, and philosophy of education. In AndreyThompson (ed.) Philosophy of education 1993 (pp. 113). Urbana, IL: Philosophyof Education Society.

Becker, A. L. (1995). Beyond translation. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.Beirne, M., Ramsay, H., and Panteli, A. (1998). Developments in computing work:

Control and contradiction in the software labour process. In P. Thompson andC. Warhusrt (Eds.), Workplaces of the future (pp. 142162). London, MacmillanBusiness.

Bell, D. (1973). The coming of post-industrial society. New York: Basic Books.Berg, I. (1970). Education and jobs: The great training robbery. London: Penguin.Bernstein, B. (1990). Class, codes and control, vol 4: The structuring of pedagogic discourse.

London: Routledge.Bernstein, B. (1996). Pedagogy, symbolic control and identity. London: Taylor and

Francis.Berstein, R. J. (1990). Rortys liberal utopia, Social Research, 57(1), 3072.Berstein, R. J. (1997). One step forward, two steps backward: Richard Rorty on liberal

democracy and philosophy, Political Theory, 15(4), 538563.Berstein, R. J. (1998). Beyond objectivism and relativism: Science, hermeneutics, and praxis.

Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.Bertelsen, O., and Bodker, S. (Eds.). (2000). Information technology in human

activity. Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, 12, 314.Bhaskar, R. (1986). Scientific realism and human emancipation. London; New York:

Verso.Bhaskar, R. (1989). Reclaiming reality. New York: London: Verso.Bhaskar, R. (1991). Philosophy and the idea of freedom. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.Blackler, F. (1993). Knowledge and the theory of organizations: Organizations as

activity systems and the reframing of management, Journal of Management Studies,30(6), 863884.

Block, L. F., and Press, C. E. (1986). Building market strength through DRGs. Chicago:Pluribus Press.

Blonsky, P. (1928). The subject of psychology and psychopathology from a geneticstandpoint. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 35, 356373.

Bohman, J. (1999). Practical reason and cultural constraint: Agency in Bourdieustheory of practice. In R. Shusterman (Ed.), Bourdieu: A critical reader (pp. 129152).Malden, MA: Blackwell.


272 References

Bottomore, T. (1963). Karl Marx: Early writings. London: Watts.Bottomore, T. (Ed.). (1983). A dictionary of marxist thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press.Boud, D., and Garrick., J. (Eds.). (1999). Understanding learning at work. London:

Routledge.Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste. Cambridge,

MA: Harvard University Press.Bourdieu, P. (1991). Language and symbolic power. London: Polity.Bourdieu, P. (1993). La misere du monde. Paris: Seuil.Bourdieu, P. (1998). Practical Reason, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Bourdieu, P., and Passeron, J. C. (1977 [1970]). Reproduction in education, society and

culture. London: Sage.Bowles, S., and Gintis, H. (1976). Schooling in Capitalist America. New York: Basic

Books.Braverman, H. (1974) Labour and monopoly capital: The degradation of work in the twen-

tieth century. New York: Monthly Review PressBrice-Heath, D. (1983). Ways with words: Language, life and work in communities and

classrooms. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Brown, J. F. (1936). Psychology and social order. New York: McGraw-Hill.Brown, J. F. (1938). Freud vs. Marx: Real and pseudo problems distinguished.

Psychiatry, 1(2), 249255.Brown, M. (1986). The production of society. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield.Browne, A. (1937). Psychology and marxism. In D. Lewis (Ed.), The mind in chains

(pp. 167184). London: Fredereick Muller.Burawoy, M. (1979). Manufacturing consent. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Burawoy, M. (1996). A classic in its time. Contemporary Sociology, 25(3), 296299.Calhoun, C., LiPuma, E., and Postone, M. (Eds.). (1993). Bourdieu: Critical perspectives.

Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.Callinicos, A. (1989). Against postmodernism. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.Callinicos, A. (1991). The revenge of history. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.Certeau, M. (1984). The practice of everyday life. Berkeley: University of California

Press.Chaiklin, S. (Ed.). (2001). The theory and practice of cultural-historical psychology. arhus,

Denmark: arhus Unversity Press.Chaiklin, S., Hedegaard, M., and Jensen, U. J. (Eds.). (1999). Activity theory and

social practice: Cultural historical approaches. arhus, Denmark: arhus UniversityPress.

Charlesworth, S. J. (2000). A phenomenology of working class experience. Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press.

Chase, B. (1998). New unionism in higher education. Speech to National Center forCollective Bargaining in Higher Education, Baruch College, New York, NY.

Cheney, G. (2002). Values at work: Employee participation and market pressure at Mon-dragon. Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.

Clark, B. (1999). Effects of process maturity on development effort. Unpublished paper,available at http://sunset.usc.edu/bkclark/Research.

Cohen, G. A. (1978). Karl Marxs theory of history: A defense. Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press.


References 273

Cohen, G. A. (1988). Human nature and social change in the Marxist conceptionof history, The Journal of Philosophy, 85(4), 171191.

Cohen, J. (1982). Review of G. A. Cohen, Karl Marxs theory of history. The Journalof Philosophy, 79(5), 253273.

Cole, P. (1907). Herbart and Froebel; An attempt at synthesis. New York: TeachersCollege/Columbia University.

Collins, J. (1993). Determination and contradiction: An appreciation and critiqueof the work of Pierre Bourdieu on language and education. In C. Calhoun (Ed.),Bourdieu: Critical perspectives (pp. 116138). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Conn, R. (2002). Developing software engineers at the C-130J software factory, IEEESoftware (September/October), 2529.

Conradi, R., and Fuggetta, A. (2002). Improving software process improvement,IEEE Software (JulyAugust), 9299.

Courtney, S. (1992). Why adults learn: Towards a theory of participation in adult education.New York: Routledge.

Covaleski, M. A., Dirsmith, M. W., Heian, J. B., and Samuel, S. (1998). The calculatedand the avowed: Techniques of discipline and struggles over identity in Big Sixpublic accounting firms, Administrative Science Quarterly, 43(2), 293327.

Critchley, S. (1998). Derrida: Ironista privado o liberal publico? In: Mouffe, C. (org.)Desconstruccion y pragmatismo, Buenos Aires: Paidos.

Crocca, W. T. (1992). Review of Japans Software Factories: A Challenge to U.S.Management. Administrative Science Quarterly, 37(4): 670674.

Crosby, P. B. (1979). Quality is free. New York: McGraw-Hill.Cuban, L. (1993). How Teachers Taught (2nd ed.). New York: Teachers College Press.Cusumano, M. A. (1991). Japans software factories: A challenge to U.S. management. New

York: Oxford University Press.Davydov, V. V. (1988). Problems of developmental teaching. Soviet Education 30(8),

1597.Davydov, V. V. (1991). The content and unsolved problems of activity theory. Inter-

disciplinary Newsletter for Activity Theory, 7/8, 3035.Davydov, V. V. (1993). The perspectives of activity theory. Interdisciplinary Newsletter

for Activity Theory 13/14, 5053.Davydov, V. V. (1996). Theory of developmental teaching. Moscow: Intor.Davydov, V. V. (1998). The last speeches. Riga: Experiment.Davydov, V. V. (1999). A new approach to the interpretation of activity structure and

content. In S. Chaiklin, M. Hedegaard, and U. J. Jensen (Eds.), Activity theory andsocial practice (pp. 3950). Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.

De Geer, H. (1982). Job studies and industrial relations: Ideas about efficiency and relationsbetween the parties of the labour market in Sweden, 19201950. Stockholm: Almqvist &Wiksell International.

DeMarco, T., and Lister, T. (1987). Peopleware: Productive projects and teams. New York:Dorset.

DeNora, T., and Mehan, H. (1993). Genius: A social construction. In J. Kitsuse andT. Sarbin (Eds.), Constructing the social . Los Angeles: Sage.

Dickens, C. (1844). Hard times. New York: W.W. Norton.Dodge, S. (2001). Students, faculty heckle city colleges board. Sun Times (May 4)

Chicago, 22.


274 References

Dreier, O. (1993). Re-searching psychotherapeutic practice. In S. Chaiklin and J.Lave (Eds.), Understanding practice (pp. 105124). New York: Cambridge UniversityPress.

Dreier, O. (1997). Subjectivity and social practice. Aarhus: Institut for Filosofi, AarhusUniversitet.

Dreier, O. (1999). Personal trajectories of participation across contexts of socialpractice. Outlines 1, 532.

Dreyfus, H., and Rabinow, P. (1999). Can there be a science of existential structureand social meaning? In R. Shusterman (Ed.), Bourdieu: A critical reader (pp. 8493).Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Duarte, N. (1993). The individuality for itself: Contribution to a historic-social theory to theformation of the individual. Campinas, Brazil: Autores Associados.

Duarte, N. (1996). School education and theory of the everyday life and the Vygotsky school.Campinas, Brazil: Autores Associados.

Duarte, N. (2000a). Vygotsky and learning to learn: Critique of neo-liberal and post-modernistappropriations of Lev Vygotskys theory. Campinas, Brazil: Autores Associados.

Duarte, N. (2000b). Human anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape; TheDialectics in Vygotskian and Marxian theory and the question on objective knowl-edge in schooling. Revista educacao e sociedade, 71, 79115. (Available in Portuguese:http://www.scielo.br)

Duarte, N. (Ed.). (2000c). About constructivism: Contributions to a critical analisis.Campinas, Brazil: Autores Associados.

Duarte, N. (2002a). Vigotski e o aprender a aprender: crticas a`s apropriacoes neoliberais epos-modernas da teoria vigotskiana (2nd edition). Campinas, Brazil: Autores Associ-ados.

Duarte, N. (2002b). Who is Vygotsky? Epistemological issues and implications fordebates. 5th ISCRAT Conference The International Society for Cultural Research andActivity Theory (June 1822), Free University Amsterdam, Holland.

Duarte, N. (2003a). Tacit knowledge and school knowledge in teachers education why Donald Schon didnt understand Luria. Revista Educacao e Sociedade, 24(83),601625. (Available in Portuguese: http://www.scielo.br)

Duarte, N. (2003b). Knowledge Society or Society of Illusions? Four critical dialecticalessays in philosophy of education. Campinas, Brazil: Autores Associados.

Duarte, N. (2003c). A teoria da atividade como uma abordagem para a pesquisa emeducacao [Activity Theory as an Approach to Educational Research]. Perspectiva,21(2), 279302.

Duayer, M. (2001). Marx, verdade e discurso. Perspectiva. Florianopolis, 19(1)(JanuaryJune), 1539.

Duayer, M. (2003). Ontologia na ciencia economica: realismo ou ceticismo instrumental?UFF: Niteroi. Unpublished manuscript.

Duayer, M., and Moraes, M. C. M. (1997a). A etica pragmatica do neoconser-vadorismo: Richard Rorty. In L. M. Huhne (Org.), Etica, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil:Uape.

Duayer, M., and Moraes, M. C. M. (1997b). Neopragmatismo: A historia comocontingencia absoluta. Tempo, Revista do Departamento de Historia, UFF, 2(4)(December), 2748.

Dubson, M. (2001). Ghosts in the classroom: Stories of college adjunct faculty and the pricewe all pay. Boston: Camels Back Books.


References 275

Eagleton, T. (1991). Ideology. New York: Verso.Eagleton, T. (1999). Utopia and its opposites. In L. Panish and C. Leys (Eds.),

Necessary and unnecessary Utopias, Socialist Register . London: Merlin Press.Eagleton, T. (2003). After theory. London: Penguin Books.Eckert, P. (1989). Jocks and Burnouts Social Categories and Identity in High School. New

York: Teachers College Press.Elhammoumi, M. (2000). Lev Vygotsky: The Feuerbach of marxist psychology. Unpub-

lished manuscript.Elhammoumi, M. (2001a). Lost or merely domesticated? The boom in socio-

historico-cultural theory emphasizes some concepts, overlooks others. In S.Chaiklin (Ed.), The theory and practice of cultural-historical psychology (pp. 200217).arhus, Denmark: arhus University Press.

Elhammoumi, M. (2001b). The reception of Lev Vygotsky in South America: Afertile terrain for a materialist psychology. In M. Golder (Ed.), Vygotsky: A radi-cal psychologist (pp. 5166). Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ateneo Vigotskiano de laArgentina.

Elhammoumi, M. (2002). To create psychologys own capital. Journal for the Theoryof Social Behaviour , 32(1), 89104.

Elhammoumi, M. (2004). Is back to Vygotsky enough? The legacy of socio-historico-cultural psychology. Historical materialism: Research in critical marxist theory.12(3), 3251.

Elias, N. (2000). The civilizing process. Malden, MA: Blackwell.Elkonin, D. B. (1998). Psicologia do jogo. Sao Paulo: Martins Fontes.Elkonin, D. B. (2000). Toward the problem of stages in the mental development of children.

Available online at: www.marxist.orgEngels, F. (1890/1978). Letter to Joseph Bloch. In H. Selsam and H. Martel (Eds.),

Reade in Marxist Philosphy (pp. 204206). New York: International Publishers.Engels, F. (1978). Socialism: Utopian and scientific. In R. C. Tucker (Ed.), The Marx

Engels reader (2nd ed.; pp. 683717). New York: Norton.Engestrom, Y. (1987). Learning by expanding: An activity-theoretical approach to develop-

mental research. Helsinki, Finland: Orienta-Konsultit.Engestrom, Y. (1990). Learning, working and imagining: Twelve studies in activity theory.

Helsinki, Finland: Orienta-Konsultit.Engestrom, Y. (1996). Interobjectivity, ideality, and dialectics. Mind, Culture, and

Activity, 3, 259265.Engestrom, Y. (1999a). Activity theory and individual and social transformation. In

Y. Engestrom, R. Miettinen, and R.-L. Punamaki (Eds.), Perspectives on activity theory(pp. 1938). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Engestrom, Y (1999b). Innovative learning in work teams: Analyzing cycles of knowl-edge creation in practice. In Y. Engestrom, R. Miettinen, and R.-L., Punamaki(Eds.), Perspectives on activity theory (pp. 377404). Cambridge, UK: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Engestrom, Y. (2000). From individual action to collective activity and back: Develop-mental work research as an interventionist methodology. In P. Luff, J. Hindmarshand C. Heath (Eds.), Workplace studies: Recovering work practice and informing systemdesign (pp. 150166). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Engestrom, Y. (2001). Expansive learning at work: Toward an activity theoreticalreconceptualization. Journal of Education and Work, 14(1), 133156.


276 References

Engestrom, Y., Miettinen, R. and Punamaki, R.-L. (Eds.). (1999). Perspectives on activitytheory. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Engestrom, Y., Toiviainen, H., Pasanen, A., and Haavisto, V. (2004). Collaborativeconcept formation at work. Paper presented at the Academy of Management Meeting,New Orleans, August 611.

Engestrom, Y., Virkkunen, J., Helle, M., Pihlaja, J., and Poikela, R. (1996). Changelaboratory as a tool for transforming work. Lifelong Learning in Europe, 1(2), 1017.

Evangelista, O., and Shiroma, E. O. (2003). Um Fantasma ronda o professor: a mist-ica da Competencia. In M. C. M. Moraes (org.), Iluminismo a`s avessas: Producaode Conhecimento e politicas de Formacao docente (pp. 8198). Rio de Janeiro:DP&A.

Ezzamel, M., and Willmott, H. (1998). Accounting for teamwork: A critical studyof group-based systems of organizational control. Administrative Science Quarterly,43(2), 358396.

Fenichel, O. (1934/1967). Psychoanalysis as the nucleus of a future dialectical ma-terialistic psychology. American Imago, 24, 290311.

Ferrie`re, A. (1927). The activity school. New York: The John Day Company.Fichtner, B. (1999). Activity theory as methodology: The epistemological revolution

of the computer and the problem of its societal appropriation. In M. Hedegaardand J. Lompscher (Eds.), Learning activity and development (pp. 7192). arhus,Denmark: arhus University Press.

Flores, A. (1938). Psychology and marxism: A bibliography. Dialectics, 4, 2124.Foot, K. A. (2002). Pursuing an evolving object: Object formation and identification

in a conflict monitoring network. Mind, Culture and Activity, 9 (2), 132149.Form, W. (1987). On the degradation of skills. Annual Review of Sociology, 13, 2947.Fowler, B. (1997). Pierre Bourdieu and cultural theory. London: Sage.Foucault, M. (1975/1977). Discipline and punish. New York: Vintage.Fraser, S. (1991). Labor will rule: Sidney Hillman and the rise of American labor. New York:

Free Press.Freedman, B. (1939). Psycho-social repression and social-rationalization. American

Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 9(1), 109122.Freedman, B. (1940). Amplifications of marxist psychoanalysis. American Journal of

Orthopsychiatry, 10(2), 351354.Freidson, E. (2001). Professionalism: The third logic. Cambridge, UK: Polity.Freire, P. (1969). Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York: Continuum.Freire, P (1970). Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York: Herder and Herder.Freire, P. (1992). Pedagogy of the oppressed. New York: Continuum Publishing.Friedman, A. L., and Cornford, D. S. (1989). Computer systems development: History,

organization and implementation. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.Froebel, F. (1887). The education of man. New York: D. Appleton.Froebel, F. (1895). The mottoes and commentaries of Friedrich Froebels mother play. New

York: D. Appleton.Froebel, F. (1917). Pedagogics of the kindergarten. New York: D. Appleton.Fujimura, J. (1996). Crafting science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Fukuyama, F. (1992). The end of history and the last man. New York: Free Press.Gappa, J. M., and David W. Leslie (1993). The invisible faculty: Improving the status of

part-timers in higher education. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.


References 277

Geist, P., and Hardesty, M. (1992). Negotiating the crisis: DRG and the transformation ofhospitals. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Geras, N. (1995). Language, truth and justice. New Left Review, 209 (January/February), 110135.

Gibbs, G. G. (1994). Softwares chronic crisis. Scientific American (September),8692.

Gibson, C. D., and Earley, P. C. (n.d.). Work-team performance motivated by collectivethought: The structure and function of group efficacy. Unpublished manuscript, Uni-versity of Southern California.

Gielen, U. P., and Jeshmaridian, S. S. (1999). Lev S. Vygotsky: The man and the era.International Journal of Group Tensions, 28(3/4), 273301.

Giest, H. (2001). Education and media. Paedagogica Pannonia, 3, 746.Goldin, C., and Katz, L. F. (1998). The origins of technology-skill complementarity.

Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(3), 693732.Goldin, C., and Katz, L. F. (1999). The returns to skill in the United States across the

twentieth century. (Working Paper #7126). Washington, DC: National Bureau ofEconomic Research.

Gouldner, A. W. (1957). Cosmopolitans and locals: Toward an analysis of latent socialroles, Administrative Science Quarterly, 2(3), 281306.

Graeber, D. (2001). Toward an anthropological theory of value: The false coin of our dreams.New York: Palgrave.

Graham, L. R. (1972). Science and philosophy in the Soviet Union. New York: Knopf.Gramsci, A. (1978). Selections from the prison notebooks (5th edition). New York: Inter-

national Publishers.Gramsci, A. (1994). Socialism and culture. In R. Bellamy (Ed.), Antonio Gramsci:

Pre-prison writings (pp. 812). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Greenbaum, J. M. (1979). In the name of efficiency. Philadelphia: Temple University

Press.Greenbaum, J. M. (1998). The times they are a changing: Dividing and recombin-

ing labour through computer systems. In P. Thompson and C. Warhusrt (Eds.),Workplaces of the future (pp. 124141). London: Macmillan Business.

Griss, M. L. (1993). Software reuse: From library to factory. IBM Systems Journal ,32(4), 548566.

Grubb, N. and Associates. (1999). Honored but invisible: An inside look at teaching incommunity colleges. New York: Routledge.

Grugulis, I., Willmott, H., and Knights, D. (2001). Special issue on the Labor ProcessDebate, International Studies of Management and Organization, 30(4) (entire issue).

Haack, S. (1997). Evidencia e investigacion, hacia la reconstruccion en epistemologia,Madrid: Editorial Tecnos.

Hall, S. (1973). A reading of Marxs 1857 introduction to the grundrisse. (WorkingPaper #1). Birmingham, U.K.: University of Birmingham, Center for Contempo-rary Culture Studies.

Handel, M. (2000). Trends in direct measures of job skill requirements. (Working Paper#301). Blithewood, NY: Jerome Levy Economics Institute.

Harter, D. E., Krishnan, M. S., and Slaughter, S. A. (2000). Effects of process maturityon quality, cycle time, and effort in software development. Management Science, 46(4),451466.


278 References

Hatcher, R. (2000). Social class and school: Relationships to knowledge. In M. Cole(Ed.), Education, equal

is there a marxist psychology? by mohamed elhammoumi

Documents