is transparency a force for peace?
TRANSCRIPT
Is Transparency a Force for Peace?∗
Alexandre Debs† and Jessica Chen Weiss‡
April 2, 2012
Abstract
We argue that democratic transparency is a force for conflict. By making it eas-
ier for domestic audiences to evaluate government performance during international
crises, transparency exacerbates domestic reputational concerns and incentives to
escalate. Statements by the political opposition inform the public about the util-
ity and appropriateness of escalation, enabling citizens to discern the government’s
competence. Four case studies illustrate the role of opposition statements in re-
vealing the political circumstances rather than the government’s resolve, thereby
shaping domestic incentives to use force.
Keywords: transparency, interstate crisis, audience cost, democratic peace
∗We thank Seok-ju Cho, Justin Fox, David Lake, Nuno Monteiro, and participants at StanfordUniversity, the University of California, Berkeley, and the University of California, San Diego for excellentcomments, and Anna Fritzsche, Debbie Gim, Andrew Henderson, Andrew Macklis, Helena Malchione,Jalal Osman, Jaya Wen, and Jared Webber for excellent research assistance. Alexandre Debs thanksCISAC (Stanford) and BCEP (University of California at Berkeley) for their hospitality in the 2011-2012academic year. Jessica Weiss thanks the Ohio State University and Mershon Center for their hospitalityin the 2011-2012 academic year. All remaining errors are our own.†Dept. of Political Science, Yale U. email: [email protected].‡Dept. of Political Science, Yale U. email: [email protected].
1
1 Introduction
Is transparency a force for peace? International relations scholars have reached a con-
sensus in the affirmative. Since states have incentives to misrepresent their resolve,
information problems may cause bargaining breakdown and trigger war (Fearon, 1995).
Transparency is said to reduce information problems and facilitate the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes (Schultz, 1998, 2001), potentially explaining why democracies rarely
if ever fight each other (Russett, 1993). This consensus rests on an overly optimistic
representation of domestic contestation and opposition statements as fully lifting infor-
mational barriers to peace, while downplaying the effect of electoral competition on the
government’s incentives for war.
The bargaining literature on democratic transparency makes two unrealistic assump-
tions: that a country’s resolve is fully attributable to the government’s innate compe-
tence, mettle, or willingness to use force, and that the domestic opposition is fully
informed about the country’s resolve. First, we argue that a country’s resolve, defined
as a willingness to bear the costs of fighting, is partly determined by external factors, call
them “circumstances,” which affect the costs and benefits of military action. Whereas re-
solve is usually equated with a government’s type, we highlight the importance of outside
factors, including allied support for the use of force, the international legitimacy of mili-
tary action, intelligence estimates of the military’s ability to achieve tactical objectives,
the likelihood of “quagmire” or broader regional conflict, as well as the humanitarian
and geostrategic consequences of inaction. A government’s innate preferences are only
one component of a country’s resolve.
Second, we argue that the opposition has expertise about the circumstances but
may not have key access to information about the government’s willingness to incur
the costs of war. Although the opposition has an informational advantage over the
electorate and the foreign government, it does not manage the military and may not be
aware of operational plans. A partially informed opposition cannot reveal the country’s
resolve. Rather, their comments help the public understand the costs and benefits of
2
military action,1 thereby shaping the domestic incentives and “optics” surrounding the
government’s decision.
By arguing that opposition statements reveal information about circumstances rather
than the government’s resolve, we conclude that public competition for office is less con-
ducive to peace than conventionally understood. When public audiences cannot discern
the circumstances or must rely on official interpretations, the international outcome does
not fully reveal the government’s competence. Backing down or standing firm means
less when the policy costs or benefits are unknown. When circumstances are known,
domestic audiences are better able to evaluate whether the government’s behavior on
the international scene was the result of competence or simply good fortune. Like-
wise, audiences may be less critical of concessions, such as the withdrawal of troops or
demobilization of forces, if opposition leaders agree that the circumstances warrant it.
Transparency thus prevents the government from hiding behind the circumstances,
exacerbating domestic reputational concerns that increase the government’s willingness
to use force. Although the revelation of unfavorable circumstances gives the government
political cover to compromise, this knowledge also creates incentives for the govern-
ment to escalate and demonstrate its competence. Even when the opposition indicates
that escalation is too costly under the circumstances, warranting compromise, a leader
concerned about her reputation for resolve may be tempted to demonstrate her ability
to manage conflict at relatively low cost. By contrast, the revelation of favorable cir-
cumstances makes it difficult for even a less resolved government to compromise, lest
it convey weakness before domestic audiences. Thus, leaders become more reluctant to
sue for peace when the circumstances are known, making conflict more likely.
We structure the argument as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature.
Section 3 presents the theory. Section 4 illustrates the logic of our argument with
qualitative evidence. Section 5 concludes. Formal results are in the appendix.
1On the role of elite cues in guiding public opinion, see, e.g., Almond (1950); Lippmann (1955);
Erskine (1963); Sobel (1983); Larson (2000); Holsti (2004); Canes-Wrone (2006); Page and Bouton
(2006); Berinsky (2007); Groeling and Baum (2008).
3
2 Literature Review
Democratic transparency was once seen as a diplomatic liability. On his first visit to
China, Nixon told Zhou Enlai to use a Chinese interpreter because U.S. officials “have
a problem keeping secrets” (Mann, 1999, 41). The literature has since reversed course,
viewing transparency as essential to credible communication. Anticipating domestic
sanctions for publicly escalating and then conceding, accountable leaders can lock in
a tough bargaining position and coerce adversaries into making concessions (Fearon,
1994). Choosing to generate such “audience costs” signals resolve, especially when a fully
informed and unfettered political opposition can call the government’s bluff (Schultz,
1998, 2001). Therefore, “democracy facilitates peaceful conflict resolution by overcoming
informational asymmetries that can cause bargaining to break down” (Schultz, 1999,
233), offering a potential explanation for the democratic peace.2
Yet audience costs remain controversial. Scholars have debated the willingness of
domestic audiences to punish leaders who get caught bluffing (Schultz, 1999; Ashworth
and Ramsay, 2010; Snyder and Borghard, 2011). Some argue that bluffing reveals incom-
petence and therefore warrants punishment (Smith, 1998; Guisinger and Smith, 2002;
Sartori, 2002), but this does not explain “why voters would ascribe lower competence
to those who make a threat and then fail to intervene than those who refrain from mak-
ing the threat in the first place.” (Schultz, 1999, 237). Others argue that democracies
rarely issue explicit threats (Trachtenberg (2011), but see Slantchev (2012)), win more
often through military coercion (Downes and Sechser, 2011), and are constrained by the
“policy costs” of using force more than by past rhetoric (Snyder and Borghard, 2011).
In fairness, leaders need not make “threats” to engage domestic audiences and may do
so through troop mobilization or public protests (Weiss, N.d.). But one pillar in the
literature–that democratic transparency makes conflict less likely–remains unshaken.
We argue that the consensus on transparency rests on a restrictive view of elite
2For experimental evidence on audience costs, see Tomz (2007); Trager and Vavreck (2011); Leven-
dusky and Horowitz (forthcoming).
4
discourse on foreign policy. The opposition does not simply confirm or discredit displays
of resolve. Instead, it informs the electorate about the circumstances surrounding a
conflict and comments on the appropriate course of action. As such, elite statements
may convince a domestic audience that using force is warranted, in turn rationalizing
the decision to punish a leader who fails to follow through on a tough stance. Thus,
the conceptual distinction between “audience costs” (the cost of backing down after
public escalation) and “policy costs” (the cost of implementing a policy that is out of
sync with the electorate’s preferences) is narrower than previously argued. Moreover,
domestic audiences need not value the country’s reputation more highly in order to
sanction a leader for accepting a peaceful offer, as Slantchev (2006, 2011) suggests was
an “unstated assumption” of prior models. Their choice sets simply differ: a leader
decides between accepting a peaceful offer or waging war, while citizens decide whether
to re-elect the leader. A leader may accept a peaceful offer despite the electoral cost if
she judges that the cost of conflict is too high. Citizens may nevertheless replace her if
they infer that she is incompetent.
Reassessing the nature of transparency yields more pessimistic conclusions about
democratic crisis behavior. In the theory of audience costs, democracy is a force for
peace because opposition statements reveal information about a country’s resolve, al-
leviating the foreign country’s risk-return trade-off. Says Schultz (2001, 17), “what is
different about democratic systems is that their preferences are more transparent.”3
Yet this approach ignores the effect of elite discourse on the domestic audience, which in
turn influences the government’s preferences for war and peace. A growing literature has
studied the dangers of transparency, yet it assumes that transparency reveals political
actions (Canes-Wrone, Herron and Shotts, 2001; Stasavage, 2004, 2007; Prat, 2005; Fox,
2007; Fox and Stephenson, 2011; Fox and Van Weelden, 2011).4 In our framework, trans-
3By contrast, we may observe opposition members endorsing the government in an electoral dicta-
torship yet assign no meaning to such statements if we believe they were obtained under coercion.4Likewise, standard models of audience costs assume that they are either exogenous parameters
(Schultz, 1998, 2001; Baliga and Sjostrom, forthcoming), which may be avoided if threats are made in
private (Kurizaki, 2007; Ramirez, 2011), or an exogenous function of the bargaining outcome, relative to
5
parency does not reveal political actions; the electorate can always observe whether the
government decides to go to war or accept a peaceful offer. Instead, transparency reveals
the circumstances surrounding an action, enabling the electorate to evaluate the govern-
ment’s competence. By giving foreign policy choices greater meaning and consequence
for the fate of leaders, transparency exacerbates the government’s domestic reputational
concerns, making it tougher for the government to compromise and increasing the risk
of war.5
Although we focus on the effect of transparency on crisis behavior, future work
should reassess the conditions under which meaningful transparency obtains. The lit-
erature has reached a consensus that democratic transparency relies on the potentially
conflicting goals of an informed opposition: the national interest and their electoral
prospects (Ramsay, 2004).6 While potentially biased by partisan or office-seeking incen-
tives, politicians may still provide credible information if they condition their statements
on circumstances. For example, typically dovish politicians do not always oppose the
use of force.7 Several leading U.S. and British politicians who supported the war in
Afghanistan vehemently opposed the invasion of Iraq, citing the absence of compelling
evidence and multilateral support. Before the war in Afghanistan, Liberal Democrat
leader Charles Kennedy pledged his support, stating: “The evidence to hand is indeed
persuasive. Persuasive as to culpability and persuasive as to breathtaking criminality”
(Russell, 2001). Yet Kennedy refused to support the Iraq war, saying: “We do not
believe there is a case for war which has been established under these procedures in the
absence of a second [U.N.] resolution” (Kallenbac and Sparrow, 2003). In the United
a public claim (Tarar and Leventoglu, 2009, 2010, 2011). None endogenizes audience costs as a function
of transparency.5In some sense, the paper generalizes the conclusions of Debs and Goemans (2010) to a setting where
the leader has reputational concerns (for other leader-based explanations of conflict, see Jackson and
Morelli (2007); Wolford (2007, forthcoming); Baliga, Lucca and Sjostrom (2011)).6Other factors include a free media (Slantchev, 2006) or international institutions (Thompson, 2006;
Chapman, 2007; Fang, 2008).7Likewise, typically hawkish politicians do not always support the use of war, as we illustrate below
in the case of the U.S. intervention in Haiti, which Republicans opposed.
6
States, the late Democratic senator Ted Kennedy supported the war in Afghanistan but
was one of two dozen senators who voted against the resolution authorizing war in Iraq.
Nevertheless, it is not clear that conflicting goals are necessary or sufficient for informa-
tion revelation.8 Politicians may ignore their own assessment of a crisis and either rally
around the flag or hew to the party line.9 Characterizing the general conditions under
which transparency arises deserves further consideration.
3 Formal Model
3.1 Set-Up
This is a game with two countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F ). There are three players
in the home country: the government (G), the opposition (O), and the electorate (E).
For simplicity, and following the literature, F is a unitary actor.
The two countries bargain over the division of a ‘pie’ of size 1. Let F offer a share
x to H, keeping 1 − x for itself. The home government may accept (a = A) or reject
(a = R) the offer, triggering war. War is a costly lottery, i.e. it costs cH for players
in country H, cF for F , and it is won by H with probability p, with the victorious
country gaining control of the full pie.10 For simplicity, and following the literature, cF
is common knowledge. We assume that cH is either low (c) or high (c) and depends on
two factors: the government’s “type” (t), either competent (tc) or incompetent (ti), and
“circumstances” (ω), either favorable (ωf ) or unfavorable (ωu). Let the probability that
the cost of war is low, γ(t, ω), be greater under a competent government and favorable
circumstances, i.e.
γ(tc, ω) ≥ γ(ti, ω)∀ω (1)
8See Propositions 4, 5.9Statements are meaningful only if they are expected to be (technically, there may always exist a
‘babbling equilibrium’).10For simplicity, politicians and citizens bear the same cost of war. For models relaxing this assump-
tion, see Jackson and Morelli (2007); Debs and Goemans (2010).
7
γ(t, ωf ) ≥ γ(t, ωu) ∀t (2)
The electorate and foreign country are uninformed about the type of the government
and the circumstances. Their prior belief is that the government is competent with
probability µ0 and circumstances are favorable with probability q. The opposition has
expertise about the political circumstances and the opportunity to reveal this informa-
tion publicly. Technically, nature sends them a private message m ∈{m1,m2
}and they
send a public signal s ∈ {s1, s2}. We assume that the government is partially responsible
for cH , and circumstances are “important” in determining cH , and that the opposition is
partially informed about cH . Technically, this means that both (1) and (2) hold strictly;
that a competent type in unfavorable circumstances is more likely to face a high-cost war
than an incompetent type in favorable circumstances (E[c|tc, ωu] > E[c|tci, ωf ], where
E[c|t, ω] = [γ(t, ω)c+ (1− γ(t, ω))c] is the expected cost of war for a leader of type t in
circumstances ω);11 and that the message from Nature correctly reveals circumstances
(m = m1 = ωf if ω = ωf and m = m2 = ωu if ω = ωu). Let µ(s, x, a) be the electorate’s
posterior beliefs that the government is competent after signal s, offer x and action a.12
Politicians in the home country (G and O) care about the outcome on the interna-
tional scene and the private rent from holding office, putting weight αi ∈ (0, 1] on the
former (i ∈ {G,O}) and 1−αi on the latter. The electorate cares about the outcome on
the international scene and the type of the politician elected, putting weight αE ∈ (0, 1]
on the former and 1− αE on the latter. Following the literature, the electorate prefers
the “competent” type and re-elects the government with probability ρ (µ(s, x, a)), where
ρ (.) is an increasing function. Finally F , a unitary actor, only cares about the outcome
on the international scene.
11On relaxing this assumption, see footnote 23 and proposition 6.12For simplicity, cH is not observed before the election decision. Our results hold as long as cH does
not fully reveal the type of the government.
8
3.1.1 Timing and Solution Concept
The game proceeds as follows:
1. Nature sends a signal to O
2. O sends a public signal
3. F offers a peaceful division of the pie
4. G accepts or rejects F ’s offer
5. E decides whether to re-elect G
6. Payoffs are accrued
We solve for a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of this dynamic game of incomplete infor-
mation. PBEs require that strategies are optimal given the players’ beliefs and that
beliefs are obtained using Bayes’ rule whenever possible. To further restrict strategies
off the equilibrium path, we impose Criterion D1 (Cho and Kreps, 1987). We assume
that O and F play pure strategies. A pure strategy for O is a function from its in-
formation set (here{ωf , ωu
}) into the signal space
{s1, s2
}. We say that democracy
is meaningfully transparent if O plays a separating equilibrium, revealing its signal,
and after any history in the continuation game, public beliefs are that O’s message
was truthful. We compare this equilibrium to a pooling equilibrium, where O’s strat-
egy is independent of its information.13 A pure strategy for F is a mapping from
the signal space{s1, s2
}into the interval [0, 1]. A strategy for G is a mapping from
the type space,{tc, ti
}, the set of circumstances
{ωf , ωu
}, the signal space
{s1, s2
},
and the interval offers [0, 1] into a distribution over acceptance and rejection decisions
{A,R}. We assume that G plays a cut-off strategy, accepting an offer x if and only
if x ≥x(t, ω, s∗ (ω)). We call x(t, ω, s∗ (ω)) the government’s “minimum demands,”
13A third possibility is that O plays a separating equilibrium and there is no restriction on off-the-
equilibrium-path beliefs in the continuation game. This would imply putting positive probability on an
event that was deemed impossible after O’s signal. We discuss this possibility in comparing our results
with those of audience costs theory (Propositions 4 and 5).
9
i.e. the minimum terms acceptable along the equilibrium path in a pure strategy
PBE. We assume that if x(t, ω, s∗ (ω)) is interior, G is indifferent about accepting the
offer, i.e. UG(t, ω, s∗ (ω) , x(t, ω, s∗ (ω)), A) = UG(t, ω, s∗ (ω) , x(t, ω, s∗ (ω)), R), where
UG(t, ω, s, x, a) is G’s expected payoff as a function of the parameters of the model and
the players’ actions.14
3.2 Solution
Consider G’s decision to accept or reject an offer x. We have:
UG(t, ω, s, x,A) = αGx+ (1− αG)ρ (µ(s, x,A)) (3)
UG(t, ω, s, x,R) = αG(p− E[c|t, ω]) + (1− αG)ρ (µ(s, x,R)) (4)
Then we can order the government’s minimum demands: the greater the expected cost of
fighting, the less willing the government to fight and the smaller its minimum demands.
Thus, minimum demands increase with competence and with favorable circumstances
(Claim 1). Since incompetent types are keener to avoid war, the decision to accept
peace sends a signal of incompetence to the electorate. Even when the circumstances are
unknown, obfuscating the government’s signal, the electorate knows that incompetent
types are more likely to settle and competent types are more likely to reject. As a result,
peaceful offers must compensate the government for the domestic cost of appearing eager
to compromise.
Next we note that the electoral cost of peace increases with transparency. Figure 1
illustrates the government’s minimum demands, should they be interior.
14Cut-off strategies help in obtaining a unique (interior) equilibria and facilitate comparison with
existing models. However, they may produce perfect Bayesian equilibria which are not sequential equi-
libria.
10
0 1
Share of the pie offered to country H
No Meaningful Transparency
x(ti,ωu,snmt*(ωu)) x(tc,ωu,snmt*(ωu)) x(ti,ωf,snmt*(ωf)) x(tc,ωf,snmt*(ωf))
0 1
Share of the pie offered to country H
Meaningful Transparency
x(ti,ωu,smt*(ωu)) x(tc,ωu,smt*(ωu))
0 1
Share of the pie offered to country H
x(ti,ωf,smt*(ωf)) x(tc,ωf,smt*(ωf))
Unfavorable Circumstances
Favorable Circumstances
Figure 1: Interior Minimum Demands in the Baseline Model
If democracy is not meaningfully transparent, i.e. circumstances are not revealed,
then the electorate’s inference problem is difficult. The electorate does not know if it
should attribute the reluctance to wage war to the leader’s incompetence or to unfa-
vorable circumstances. If democracy is meaningfully transparent, i.e. circumstances
are revealed, then the electorate’s inference problem is easier. If the circumstances are
known, the electorate can infer the government’s competence from its actions. For exam-
ple, an incompetent government that accepts its minimum offer reveals its incompetence,
creating incentives to mimic the competent type by rejecting the offer and demanding
more.15
15If interior, the minimum demands of all governments weakly increase, and strictly unless the govern-
ment is competent under favorable circumstances. In this case, the electorate knows that the competent
type under favorable circumstances is the most willing to reject peaceful offers. Thus, whether or not
there is transparency, rejecting an offer that all other types would accept signals that the government is
competent, whereas accepting reverts back to the prior.
11
Figure 2 illustrates another example where only the minimum demands of the com-
petent government under unfavorable circumstances are interior.16
Share of the pie offered to country H
No Meaningful Transparency
x(tc,ωu,snmt*(ωu)) x(ti,ωf,snmt*(ωf))=1
1 Share of the pie offered to country H
Meaningful Transparency
0=x(ti,ωu,smt*(ωu)) x(tc,ωu,smt*(ωu))
0 Share of the pie offered to country H
Unfavorable Circumstances
Favorable Circumstances
p+cF
0=x(ti,ωu,snmt*(ωu))
x(tc,ωf,snmt*(ωf))=1
x(ti,ωf,snmt*(ωf))=1
x(tc,ωf,snmt*(ωf))=1
Figure 2: Bargaining Range in the Baseline Model, an Illustration
Without meaningful transparency, this government faces the same reelection prob-
ability whether he accepts or rejects his minimum demand, since the electorate simply
infers that circumstances were unfavorable if the offer is accepted and favorable oth-
erwise.17 Thus a bargaining range exists and peace may obtain under no meaningful
transparency. With meaningful transparency, however, the circumstances are known,
16If the government is incompetent and circumstances are unfavorable, the direct cost of war is so high
that he accepts any offer. If circumstances are favorable, the direct cost is so low that any government
rejects any offer (given electoral concerns).17The government’s minimum demand is x(tc, ωu, snmt∗ (ωu)) = p− E [c|tc, ωu].
12
and by accepting its minimum demands the government forgoes the opportunity to sig-
nal its competence.18 As a result, meaningful transparency, by exacerbating a leader’s
reputational concerns, may eliminate the bargaining range and make war inevitable.
More generally:
Proposition 1 With a partially responsible government, where circumstances are im-
portant, and a partially informed opposition, meaningful transparency is a force for war.
Proof. See the Appendix.
3.3 Discussion
We now discuss the implications for audience cost theory, revisiting three of its premises:
first, public acts of escalation generate a credible threat of domestic punishment; second,
transparency is a force for peace; third, regular and public competition for office gener-
ates transparency. The literature has focused on the first but has not, in our opinion,
sufficiently questioned the other two.
First, our approach addresses current critiques of audience costs. In our model, it
is unnecessary to assume that a threat is made: the fear of domestic sanctions affects
international bargaining even if the government does not talk. It is also unnecessary to
assume that the electorate cares about a mismatch between words and deeds: voters
sanction the government if they are convinced that circumstances were favorable, thus
attributing failure on the international scene to government incompetence. Moreover,
the electorate need not care more about the country’s reputation than the government
does. These actors face different choices: the government chooses between war and peace,
and the electorate chooses between the incumbent and the challenger. A government
may accept a peaceful offer, even if it reveals its incompetence, if a war would prove too
costly. The electorate may oust a government that revealed incompetence, no matter
how important the country’s reputation.19
18The government’s minimum demand is x(tc, ωu, smt∗ (ωu)) = p−E [c|tc, ωu] + 1−αGαG
[ρ (1)− ρ (µ0)].19Sufficient conditions for the existence of offers which would be accepted even if they lead to the
government’s demise are p > E [c|tc, ω] and ρ (.) being increasing (so that x(tc, ω, smt∗ (ω)) > 0; see (8)).
13
Second, the conditions under which transparency is a force for peace are more fragile
than conventionally understood. The previous section showed that if we adopt more
realistic assumptions about the opposition’s information and the impact of external
circumstances, transparency is a force for war. We now argue that the problem with the
conventional wisdom runs deeper. In the theory of audience costs, war occurs due to the
foreign country’s risk-return trade-off. Assuming that the government is fully responsible
for the cost of war and the opposition is fully informed, i.e. (1) holds strictly, and (2)
holds with equality, transparency can be a force for peace according to the standard
logic (Fearon, 1995).20 If t is not revealed, F runs a risk-return trade-off: it may deem
that the concessions needed to appease the competent type are too generous, instead
offering terms acceptable only to the incompetent type. If t is revealed, F can compute
the most generous terms it can extract from G without risking war, and peace prevails.
In short:
Proposition 2 With a fully responsible government and a fully informed opposition,
meaningful transparency is a force for peace. Proof. See the Appendix.
This logic is compelling, but it is fragile. The canonical model rests upon the as-
sumption that transparency fully reveals the government’s resolve, enabling the foreign
government to calculate its optimal offer. Assume instead that the opposition is only
partially informed about the type of the government (and consider the case where the
government only cares about the national interest, αG = 1). War occurs if the foreign
offer is insufficient to meet the government’s minimum demand, i.e. the foreign coun-
try makes a mistake in its risk-return trade-off, offering terms that are only acceptable
to the incompetent government when the government is actually competent. Figure 3
illustrates the effect of the opposition’s signal on foreign beliefs about the government’s
type.
20The model of war with rational unitary actors is equivalent to the case where αG = 1. Under
meaningful transparency, µ(s, x,A) = µ(s, x,R) ∀(s, x), so that F ’s risk-return trade-off is unaffected by
αG.
14
0 1
Beliefs that government is competent
F’s op7mal offer: x* =p-‐E[c|ti] x* =p-‐E[c|tc]
μ
Outcome: War is Possible Peace Prevails
μ0
Effect of Transparency on the likelihood of war:
No Effect Decreases Increases No Effect
μ0
Figure 3: Effect of Transparency with a Fully Responsible Government, Partially In-formed Opposition
If the opposition’s signal is insufficiently informative, then its revelation does not
affect the foreign country’s risk-return trade-off and the probability of war remains un-
changed. Otherwise, the opposition’s signal may increase or decrease the likelihood of
war. If the foreign government’s prior is that the government is likely incompetent,
transparency has no effect unless the opposition signals that the government is com-
petent, convincing the foreign country to make the generous offer. In this case, the
probability of an offer generous enough to satisfy both types increases and the likeli-
hood of war decreases. By the same logic, if the foreign government’s prior is that the
government is likely competent, transparency has no effect unless the opposition signals
that the government is incompetent, convincing the foreign country to make the less
generous offer. In this case, war becomes more likely, as it reduces the probability that
the foreign offer is generous enough to satisfy the competent type. Thus, transparency
does not necessarily reduce the likelihood of war if the opposition’s signal only partially
15
reveals the government’s type. In sum:
Proposition 3 With a fully responsible government and partially informed opposition,
meaningful transparency does not necessarily reduce the likelihood of war. Proof. See
the Appendix.
Yet if transparency fully reveals the government’s type, why does meaningful trans-
parency obtain? According to conventional wisdom, the opposition is truthful because
it balances two potentially conflicting objectives: their electoral prospects and national
welfare (or αO ∈ (0, 1); Ramsay 2004). For example, it would be rational for the oppo-
sition to reveal the government’s competence if doing so improves national welfare. Yet
if transparency reveals the government’s type, the country receives its reservation value
for war. Thus, there is no drawback for the opposition in claiming that the government
is incompetent, because doing so will not hurt the national interest, but there is a strict
electoral benefit.21 In short:
Proposition 4 With a fully responsible government and a fully informed opposition,
meaningful transparency cannot obtain in equilibrium if the opposition balances its elec-
toral prospects and national welfare. Proof. See the Appendix.
Characterizing the general conditions under which meaningful transparency obtains
is beyond the scope of this paper.22 Yet we believe this question deserves more attention
than it currently receives.
21In Ramsay (2004), the type space of the government is richer than the message space of the opposition
(the former is continuous, the latter is binary), so that the opposition’s message does not fully reveal the
type of the government, and governments can extract rents. In our set-up, we may construct separating
Perfect-Bayesian equilibria which do not satisfy meaningful transparency. Yet the assumption that the
opposition weighs its electoral prospects and the national welfare (αO ∈ (0, 1)) is neither necessary nor
sufficient for their existence (Proposition 5).22We provide an example in Figure 2 and Proposition 1. There, F claims the entire pie; under
unfavorable circumstances, the incompetent government accepts any offer and the competent type cannot
be appeased; under favorable circumstances, neither type can be appeased. Thus, the foreign offer is
independent of the opposition’s signal, which may rationally be truthful if it cares only about the national
interest.
16
Summing up, we conclude that the literature has been overly charitable toward the
effect of transparency and audience costs on peace. Conventionally, war arises from
uncertainty over the government’s resolve to fight, producing a risk-return tradeoff as
the foreign government calculates its offer. Actions that publicly engage the domestic
audience, including opposition statements that are overheard by foreign observers, are
said to reveal the government’s resolve and help locate a bargain preferable to fighting.
Yet this view of democratic transparency omits critical features of strategic competi-
tion between the government and opposition. As in international bargaining, domestic
politics are plagued by information problems. Uncertainty about the government’s type
creates incentives for incumbents to signal resolve or competence to the electorate as
well as foreign audiences. Thus, opposition signaling not only fails to ameliorate the
foreign government’s risk-return tradeoff; it also adds a domestic reputational cost to
accepting peace.
In reaching this conclusion, we made three assumptions. First, the opposition does
not have full information about the government’s resolve. Second, contrary to existing
models, resolve is partly a function of external “circumstances.”23 Third, consistent
with the existing literature, the electorate values “competence.”24 We believe these
23In the intermediate situation, where circumstances affect the cost of war but not significantly, i.e.
(2) holds strictly but E [c|tc, ωu] < E[c|ti, ωf
], predictions are intermediate. The minimum demands
of type ti in circumstances ωu strictly increase under meaningful transparency, but those of type tc in
circumstances ωu strictly decrease: the latter’s reputation for accepting a peaceful offer is even worse
under no meaningful transparency, since the electorate cannot rule out the possibility that circumstances
are favorable and the government is incompetent (Proposition 6).24This does not mean that the electorate is war-mongering. “competent” leaders are desirable since
they manage wars more effectively but also because they obtain better peaceful terms. In other words,
an electorate may prefer a competent type even if it wishes to avoid a costly war, since the threat of war
sustain better peaceful terms. Yet this conventional wisdom ignores the fact that competent leaders may
drag their country into a costly, otherwise avoidable war. To use a different vocabulary, say that leaders
who face a low cost of war are hawkish, and let the electorate prefer dovish leaders in unfavorable
circumstances, when war should perhaps be avoided. Then meaningful transparency has competing
effects: if it reveals unfavorable circumstances, it creates incentives for appearing dovish. The net effect
is in general indeterminate, but remains if the electorate perceives the benefit of hawkish (or ‘resolved’)
17
assumptions are empirically plausible but warrant further investigation in their own
right. We now illustrate the logic of our argument with qualitative evidence.
4 Empirical Evidence
We highlight the role of opposition statements and external circumstances in four crises
from the ICB dataset (Table 1). Crises are split evenly in terms of the opposition’s
reputation on foreign issues (dovish vs. hawkish), its actual stance in the crisis, and the
crisis outcome.
Table 1: Opposition Statements and Crisis Outcomes
Crisis Incumbent Opposition Position Outcome
India-Pakistan, 2001-2 BJP Congress Hawkish Victory
US-Iran, 2006-7 Republican Democrat Dovish Compromise
Israel-Lebanon, 1993 Labor Likud Hawkish Compromise
US-Haiti, 1994 Democrat Republican Dovish Victory
Although the first two crisis outcomes correspond to the conventional prediction (op-
position support, peaceful victory; opposition dissent, peaceful compromise), the content
of the opposition’s signal did not simply confirm or undermine government signals of
resolve. The opposition’s main role was to emphasize the circumstances surrounding a
crisis, framing the public debate about the costs and benefits of using force and enhanc-
ing the electorate’s ability to evaluate the government’s handling of a crisis.
In the 2001 India-Pakistan crisis, the Indian opposition endorsed a forceful reac-
tion to the attacks on the Indian Parliament, claiming the support of the international
community in fighting terrorism. India prevailed in the crisis through U.S. and British
pressure, whose support the opposition had anticipated. In the 2006-07 US-Iran crisis,
leaders to outweigh those of dovish leaders (see Proposition 7). Note also that the preference for dovish
leaders may simply expand an already-existing bargaining range (since war is inefficient), leaving the
probability of conflict unchanged.
18
Democratic opposition leaders objected that the circumstances did not warrant military
action against Iran, questioning the evidence of a nuclear weapons program, citing par-
allels to faulty intelligence on Iraq, and pointing to the lack of military resources and
allied support. President Bush wished to signal resolve, but eventually de-escalated the
crisis, after a new National Intelligence Estimate stated that Iran had halted its nuclear
weapons program in 2003.
The other two cases illustrate that opposition statements exacerbate reputational
concerns, creating incentives for the government to demonstrate resolve and enabling the
government to earn domestic plaudits for standing tough. The outcomes also contravene
the canonical prediction (opposition support, battlefield compromise; opposition dissent,
battlefield victory). In the 1993 Israel-Lebanon crisis, Likud claimed that circumstances
were ripe for war, that terrorist attacks warranted a forceful response, and inaction
would be due to Rabin’s incompetence. In the 1994 US-Haiti case, Republicans claimed
that circumstances did not warrant war, and that Haiti’s strategic value was too low
to justify any cost in fighting. By defying his naysayers and initiating a successful
campaign, Clinton demonstrated his competence as commander in chief.
4.1 India-Pakistan Crisis: India Parliament Attack, 2001
On December 13, 2001, armed gunmen attacked the Indian Parliament, killing 14. After
Indian police indicated that the attackers had ties to two Pakistan-based organizations,
Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba, Prime Minister Vajpayee ordered a general
mobilization for war, Operation Parakram, and demanded that Pakistan take respon-
sibility. In January, under pressure from the United States, Pakistan banned the two
organizations and pledged to stop cross-border terrorism. As Kapur (2007, 135-6) writes:
“According to top officials, India did not attack during Operation Parakram because the
deployment had been a success; it had prevented further terrorism on the scale of the
Parliament attack and had secured a Pakistani pledge to prevent any future infiltration,
thereby obviating the need for an Indian offensive.” For a few months, peace prevailed
19
on terms favorable to India.25
The parliamentary debates surrounding the mobilization of Operation Parakram on
December 18 illustrate several important features of democratic transparency: first, the
importance of external circumstances in affecting the government’s resolve to use force,
particularly the existence of an international consensus against terrorism; second, the
role of opposition politicians from the Congress Party as partially-informed political
experts whose statements helped reveal the nature of the international circumstances
affecting the likelihood that the government would use force; and third, the foreign
recognition of these external circumstances as bolstering Indian resolve, which led to
peaceful concessions by Pakistan and the resolution of the crisis.
Opposition leaders drew attention to the international circumstances which favored
Indian retaliation as well as the opposition’s partial information about the situation.
Even as Congress leader Manmohan Singh confirmed that the opposition was “one with
the nation in its solemn resolve that we shall not make any compromises with these
terrorist gangs,” Singh also argued that the U.S. war on terror created an important
opportunity for India, noting that “what is applicable in dealing with the terrorists in
Afghanistan must be applicable to these terrorists also who have perpetrated such a
ghastly act on the Indian territory.” (Singh, 2001). Opposition leaders also referenced
their ignorance of operational details, pledging their support for “any well-considered
step the government may contemplate or take to counter terrorism” (Dugger, 2001) and
calling upon the government “to take the Opposition into confidence.” (Singh, 2001). In
response, the BJP spokesman agreed to take the Opposition into confidence. The follow-
ing day, in a televised speech to Parliament, PM Vajpayee stated: “We are also forging
an international consensus as has been suggested by members of parliament. And, the
consensus is with us on this question.” Vajpayee also adopted the same language as
opposition leaders in criticizing the U.S. and Britain for urging India to “observe re-
straint.” (n.d., 2001c) Members of the opposition Samajwadi Party and Congress Party
25Disrupted in May 2002 by an attack on an Indian army base in Kaluchak, Jammu, which is coded
as a new crisis by the ICB.
20
had demanded, “Should we take permission from foreign powers to protect our citizens
and our borders?” and “Why did we dance to the tunes of George Bush and Tony
Blair?” (n.d., 2001b).
India’s rhetoric and massive war mobilization convinced the United States to pres-
sure Pakistan for concessions. As India and Pakistan continued to mobilize for war amid
border clashes, the U.S. State Department listed the two groups as terrorist organiza-
tions. Following a telephone call by President Bush to Pakistani President Musharraf
asking for “additional strong and decisive measures to eliminate the extremists who seek
to harm India, undermine Pakistan, and provoke war,” Musharraf publicly promised to
crack down on the organizations and arrested several hundred militants (Nayak and
Krepon, 2006, 50). It is, of course, impossible to separate the coercive effect of India’s
military mobilization from the additional credibility lent by the domestic debate sur-
rounding the appropriateness and desirability of Indian retaliation. Former Indian Army
Vice Chief of Staff V.K. Sood noted: “This was India’s finest hour: Pakistan and the US
were coerced–for the first and last time–by India’s military mobilization.” (Sood and
Sawhney, 2003, 87, 94)
Yet the evidence also suggests that favorable international circumstances –namely,
the international recognition that India would be justified in pursuing its attackers–
helped convince the U.S. that India would indeed use force, necessitating additional
U.S. pressure on Pakistan to defuse the crisis. As Chari, Cheema and Cohen (2007, 167)
write: “The embassy’s position on the crisis was clear from the start. [Ambassador]
Blackwill and his team saw the Indian buildup as a direct and understandable response
to the terrorist attack in Srinagar and on the Indian parliament. Although it was
important to bring an end to the buildup and the heightened risk of war, the Indians
did have, in the words of one U.S. official, ‘moral parity’ with the United States when
it came to the war on terrorism.”
The advantage to India was understood, if not appreciated, by Pakistani observers.
One Pakistani newspaper, The Nation, accused India of “play[ing] on the theme of
21
terrorism to earn world sympathy” (n.d., 2001a). Jang, another newspaper, decried
Tony Blair’s statements in India as “voicing Vajpayee’s views equating the Kashmir
freedom struggle with terrorism... it seems that [Blair] has tried to please India by
saying, ‘we condemn all those who finance or provide support to terrorists.”’ (n.d.,
2002).
4.2 U.S.-Iran Nuclear Crisis, 2006-07
In January 2006, Iran informed the IAEA that it would resume its nuclear research
and development activities. During the ensuing crisis, the United States obtained bi-
partisan and international support for sanctions, but the “military option” remained
controversial. It was not until December 2007, when a new U.S. National Intelligence
Estimate stated that Iran had suspended work on its nuclear weapons program in 2003,
that the Bush administration, while continuing to press for sanctions, de-escalated the
crisis, backing off on the implied threat of force. Although dovish opposition statements
corresponded to the international outcome predicted by the canonical model–peaceful
compromise rather than victory– the primary role played by the Democratic opposition
was to argue that circumstances were unfavorable for war and press for the appropriate
response, rather than to reveal information about the administration’s resolve.
In 2006, following reports that the Bush administration was considering air strikes
against Iran, House and Senate Democrats introduced nonbinding resolutions calling on
the President not to initiate military action without Congressional authorization. After
a Republican-authored House report faulted U.S. intelligence agencies for insufficient
effort to investigate Iran’s nuclear weapons program, ranking Democrat Harman said
the report “took a number of analytical shortcuts that present the Iran threat as more
dire.” (Linzer, 2006). From January to December 2007, the crisis intensified. The White
House dispatched a second aircraft carrier group to the Gulf and increased Patriot missile
defenses in Kuwait and Qatar, described by Defense Secretary Gates as an effort to gain
leverage over Iran rather than as a prelude to military action (Katzman, 2007). Leading
Democrats emphasized that the circumstances did not warrant the use of force, citing
22
the lack of military resources and support from allies and within Congress. Senator
Rockefeller, Chairman of the Intelligence Committee, questioned the administration’s
intelligence, saying: “To be quite honest, I’m a little concerned that it’s Iraq again...
This whole concept of moving against Iran is bizarre....I don’t think that policy makers
in this administration particularly understand Iran.” (Mazzetti, 2007).
Although Democrats had regained control of Congress, their dovish statements–
including further attempts to prevent the government from using force without Congres-
sional approval or use funds to attack Iran–were ineffectual. They neither undermined
the administration’s resolve nor suggested to outside observers that the implied threat
of force was a bluff. In February, the administration stated that it had evidence that
Iran was training and supplying insurgents in Iraq, and Vice President Cheney said that
military action had not been ruled out. Despite repeated denials that the Bush adminis-
tration was planning to attack Iran, the increased possibility prompted explicit concern
from foreign officials, including French President Sarkozy, Russian President Putin, as
well as IAEA head ElBaradei, who worried that his reports on Iran’s activities might
“give additional argument to new crazies who say, ‘Let’s go and bomb Iran.”’ (Cooper,
2007).
The NIE findings were publicly released on December 3. Democrats seized on the
opportunity. “The key judgments show that the Intelligence Community has learned its
lessons from the Iraq debacle,” Rockefeller said. “This demonstrates a new willingness
to question assumptions internally, and a level of independence from political leadership
that was lacking in the recent past.”’ (n.d., 2007b). Harman said that “good policy
based on this assessment is to sheath the sabers.” (Harman, 2007). Even Representative
Engel, a Democrat who had opposed attempts to limit the administration’s ability to
use force, called the NIE “troubling,” saying: “It makes one harken back to the flawed
Iraq intelligence.” (n.d., 2007b)
Democrats accused Bush of misrepresenting the circumstances in pressing for war.
Representative McDermott said that the NIE shows that the Democrats “told the Amer-
23
ican people the truth.” (n.d., 2007b). Senator Biden pointed out that as late as October,
Bush had said a nuclear-armed Iran could trigger “World War III,” (n.d., 2007a) well
after he should have received preliminary briefings. Biden added: “After all we’ve been
through, for this president to knowingly disregard or once again misrepresent intelligence
about the issue of war and peace, I find it outrageous.” (n.d., 2007a).
Bush understood that the NIE undermined the military option, but remained stead-
fast in claiming resolve. Though he declared the report “a great discovery”(n.d., 2007c),
Bush stated that “our policy remains the same... all options are on the table.” (Sciolino,
2007). In fact, the NIE report altered the diplomatic context. “The war option is off
the table,” said a French official. And while China might have allowed a new round
of sanctions, the NIE report gave “the Chinese an opportunity to get off the hook,” a
senior administration official acknowledged (Myers and Cooper, 2007).
4.3 Israel-Lebanon Crisis: Operation Accountability, 1993
On July 25, 1993, Israel launched Operation Accountability, a weeklong air, artillery and
naval counter-response to Hezbollah rocket attacks from southern Lebanon. Hawkish
opposition leaders highlighted the appropriateness of a more forceful response, imbuing
their commentary with the presumption of expertise–knowledge not of the government’s
resolve, but of the military’s ability to prevail, the costs of delay, and the tactical ap-
propriateness of major operations rather than limited artillery strikes. These opposition
statements highlighted the favorable circumstances for using force and appeared to have
a galvanizing effect on the Labor government of Yitzhak Rabin, whose decision to take
military action in Lebanon was at least partly intended to shore up his security cre-
dentials and deflect attention from his willingness to compromise with Syria and the
PLO. The operation was successful on the battlefield, forcing a wave of refugees to flee
southern Lebanon, but also drew international condemnation and pressure to agree to
a ceasefire with Hezbollah, ending the crisis.
Following the Hezbollah attack on Israeli forces in Southern Lebanon, leaders from
24
both Likud and Tsomet, the largest opposition parties, demanded the government re-
spond more forcefully. Likud spokesman Yossi Olmert stressed the need to strike deep
into Lebanon, saying “We have to strike at the head of the snake, at its main bases in
Beirut and the Bekaa valley, and not at its tail in southern Lebanon.” (Beeston, 1993b).
Tsomet member Moshe Peled criticized the government for its weak response, saying
that “lobbying artillery shells was not an appropriate reaction.” (Izenberg and Rotem,
1993). Two days before the government launched the operation, Likud politician Ariel
Sharon stated on Israeli radio the need to act soon, stating that “unless the army took
decisive action now, it might later be forced to invade Lebanon in even larger numbers.”
(Beeston, 1993a). Although the opposition was privy to much of the information that
the government had, the opposition did not directly participate in making policy or di-
recting the use of force. The government made two presentations to the Knesset (Maoz,
2008, 228), but as Maoz notes, “None of the key decisions during this period–such as the
escalation of warfare due to kidnapping and assassination raids or the two large-scale
military operations in 1993 and 1996–was thoroughly debated in the Knesset.”
Hawkish statements by the domestic opposition appeared to push the government to
take tougher action against Hezbollah in south Lebanon, hoping to provide political cover
for their efforts to negotiate with Syria and the Palestinians. In the lead-up to Operation
Accountability, the Rabin government had come under fire from the Israeli right for being
willing to compromise with Syria on the Golan Heights and showing flexibility toward the
Palestinians. According to a private opinion poll that Rabin initiated in May 1993, more
than half of respondents viewed Rabin’s handling of negotiations with the Palestinians
as too “soft.” As Auerbach and Greenbaum (2000, 49) write: “In view of the data
that suggested people’s distrust in Rabin’s ability to maintain security and effectively
conduct negotiations, he could either halt the fast movement toward agreement with
the PLO, or he could take a dramatic decision in order to recover his credibility as a
tough and trustworthy leader. Rabin opted for the second alternative.” In the same
vein, Maoz (2008, 213,255) suggests that “A show of force was seen as a way to ward off
domestic criticism of government policy. [...] Suspecting that he would have to reveal
25
to the public a sharp policy turnaround in terms of its relations with the PLO or with
Syria, Rabin decided to demonstrate resolve, directing the IDF to launch Operation
Accountability.”
According to Auerbach and Greenbaum (2000, 49), the operation was a success in
terms of restoring Rabin’s credibility in the public mindset. Asked whether the oper-
ation was successful, 81% said yes; asked whether one could “trust Rabin’s judgment
concerning security and political issues” in light of Operation Accountability and other
policies over the past year, 64% responded positively. Although Rabin would be assassi-
nated before the next election, the domestic boost in credibility strengthened his ability
to pursue negotiations with Syria and the PLO.
4.4 U.S. Intervention in Haiti, 1994
In 1994, the Clinton administration sent troops to Haiti under U.N. auspices to oust
the military junta and restore the democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aris-
tide. Although the Republican opposition expressed serious reservations about the wis-
dom of military intervention in the months prior to the mid-September invasion, these
statements did not undermine Clinton’s resolve. In May, the House narrowly passed a
nonbinding amendment to the fiscal defense authorization bill opposing military inter-
vention. “There is no emergency in Haiti requiring the dispatch of American troops,”
said Senate minority leader Dole, who sponsored a resolution expressing the view that
U.N. approval is insufficient to authorize the use of U.S. troops (n.d., 1994). “It is time
to call a halt to this reckless rush to invade Haiti,” said Senator Lugar (Price, 1994). In
early August, Senate Republicans sponsored a measure requiring Congressional approval
for an invasion.
While active in voicing dissent, Republicans were disengaged from the planning pro-
cess. According to Girard (2004, 63):
Because of a two-week summer recess lasting until 12 September 1994,
Congress remained largely silent as the Haiti crisis reached its climax. Since
26
Clinton was himself enjoying a 13-day vacation in Martha’s Vineyard, Congress
deluded itself into thinking that Haiti was not a pressing issue. Then, ten
days before the invasion, the administration advocated an invasion with re-
newed stridency....The first troops were thus scheduled to land on Sunday
night, one day before congressmen could express formal opposition.
Only after the invasion on September 19 did the Senate Armed Services Committee
hold a hearing on Haiti. Gingrich, the Republican whip, declared: “We are drifting
steadily into a quicksand of misery. It is an enormous miscalculation by the Clinton
administration.” (Walker, 1994). The New York Times quoted “a typical Republican
view” from Representative Roukema, who said: “The withdrawal of U.S. forces should
be complete and immediate. Restoring Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the presidency of Haiti
is not worth the life of one member of our armed forces” (Greenhouse, 1994).
George Stephanopoulos, an adviser to President Clinton, suggested that the reluc-
tance of Congressional Republicans to intervene militarily gave the President a political
opportunity to demonstrate his leadership in foreign affairs:
Although the invasion was not politically motivated, and full of political
risk, it could be a political plus. Clinton was constantly being called ’spine-
less’ and ‘wishy-washy’-Doonesbury was depicting him as a talking waffle.
Paradoxically, the more the Republicans screamed, the more they helped
the president. Taking a lonely stand on a tough issue like Haiti was the best
way for Clinton to demonstrate presidential character.26
Following through with the military operation helped Clinton shake off the image
of indecision created by his past efforts to deal with the Haiti situation. The previous
October, the USS Harlan County turned around shortly after arriving at Port-au-Prince.
Although it had sailed to Haiti to provide humanitarian assistance as part of the newly
26Stephanopoulos, George. 1999. All Too Human: A Political Education (NY: Little Brown), p. 308,
cited in Girard (2004, 72).
27
established Joint Task Force Haiti Assistance Group, it was met by Haitian gunboats
and anti-American demonstrations chanting “Remember Somalia!”. Unable to “guaran-
tee the safety of the vessel and its personnel,” the U.S. government ordered the ship to
return to Guantanamo Bay, in a retreat that “shocked many Americans as well as the in-
ternational community, who perceived that the ship departed under threats...Numerous
plans officers believe that the incident backed the United States into a corner and forced
the eventual U.S. invasion of Haiti to ‘save face.”’ (Kretchik, 1997, 39-41,83).
The outcome of the Haiti case defies both the prediction of the audience cost model
and its mechanisms. By signaling that the circumstances were unfavorable, the opposi-
tion enabled Clinton to burnish his credentials without undermining the signal of resolve
that led the Haitian junta to capitulate. Republican statements that the costs of in-
tervention were not worthwhile did not dissuade Clinton from authorizing the invasion,
and public support for the invasion rose ten points after its bloodless success (Brecher
and Wilkenfeld, 2000).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the effect of transparency on interstate conflict. We present
a model of domestic competition for office in which statements by the domestic opposi-
tion reveal information about the wisdom of using force abroad, providing informational
cues that enable the electorate to discern the government’s foreign policy competence.
By introducing the less restrictive assumption that opposition elites are partially rather
than fully informed, we find that transparency creates domestic incentives for conflict
in addition to revealing information about a state’s resolve.
A clear implication of our paper is that audience costs theory has been given too
much credit as a possible explanation for the democratic peace.27 Interestingly, semi-
27For alternative strategic explanations of the democratic peace, see Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999);
Jackson and Morelli (2007); Fearon (2008); Debs and Goemans (2010); Baliga, Lucca and Sjostrom
(2011).
28
nal contributions warned against this risk. Fearon (1994, 582,586) assessed the claim
that democratic leaders face greater audience costs as a “plausible working hypothe-
sis,” which “could conceivably help explain” the democratic peace.28 Likewise, Schultz
(1998, 840) stated that the model’s relevance to the democratic peace is “more sugges-
tive than conclusive.” Schultz (2001, 11) asserts: “This book is not primarily about the
democratic peace.”
Certainly, one should be cautious about the ability of any theory to offer a complete
explanation of the democratic peace with a single feature, when the differences between
dictatorships and democracies are so rich.29 Yet it still possible to evaluate, logically,
the effect of greater transparency on the likelihood of conflict, abstracting away from
other competing forces. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we conclude that greater
transparency is a force for war, not peace.
Our framework opens interesting avenues for future research, including the general
conditions under which transparency arises as well as a more comparative theory of
domestic sources of conflict across regime types. When there is no regular and pub-
lic competition for office, citizen protests may be an effective, and perhaps the only,
mechanism of information relevation (Weiss, N.d.). Contrasting the conditions and de-
gree to which dictatorships and democracies face reputational concerns, depending on
the available mechanisms of information revelation, is an important question for future
research.
28Fearon recently proposed an explicit theory for the democratic peace which does not rely on the
audience cost argument (Fearon, 2008).29Fearon (1994) believes there are two features of democracy which have opposite effects on the degree
of audience costs: democratic leaders can be replaced more easily than their democratic counterparts, but
the consequences of losing office are milder. Schultz (1998, 840) and Schultz (2001, 11) are concerned
about the theory being monadic and the inconclusive and overdetermined nature of the democratic
peace. For possible solutions to the concerns raised by Fearon (1994) and Schultz (1998, 840), see Debs
and Goemans (2010). For another answer to the concern by Schultz (1998, 840), see Levy and Razin
(2004). For an argument that the difference dictatorships and democracies may be small relative to the
differences between non-democratic regime types, see Weeks (2008).
29
6 Appendix
Claim 1 Let (t, ω) and (t′, ω′) be such that E [c|t, ω] > E [c|t′, ω′] and s∗ (ω) = s∗ (ω′).
Then either x(t, ω, s∗ (ω)) = x(t′, ω′, s∗ (ω′)) ∈ {0, 1} or x(t, ω, s∗ (ω)) < x(t′, ω′, s∗ (ω′)).
Proof. If x(t, ω, s∗ (ω)) is interior,
x(t, ω, s∗ (ω)) = p− E [c|t, ω] +1− αGαG
[ρ (µ (s, x(t, ω, s∗ (ω)), R))− ρ (µ (s, x(t, ω, s∗ (ω)), A))]
(5)
< p− E[c|t′, ω′
]+
1− αGαG
[ρ (µ (s, x(t, ω, s∗ (ω)), R))− ρ (µ (s, x(t, ω, s∗ (ω)), A))]
(6)
or (t′, ω′) strictly prefers to reject x(t, ω, s∗ (ω)) after signal s∗ (ω) = s∗ (ω′), i.e. x(t, ω, s∗ (ω)) <
x(t′, ω′, s∗ (ω′)). By the same logic, if x(t, ω′, s∗ (ω′)) is interior, then x(t, ω, s∗ (ω)) <
x(t′, ω′, s∗ (ω′)); x(t, ω, s∗ (ω)) = 1 implies x(t, ω′, s∗ (ω′)) = 1 and x(t, ω′, s∗ (ω′)) = 0
implies x(t, ω, s∗ (ω)) = 0.
Proof. (Proof of proposition 1). Write smt∗ (ω) and snmt∗ (ω) for O’s strategy when,
respectively, democracy is meaningfully transparent and when it is not (let smt∗(mj)
= sj
, prob(snmt∗
(mj)
= s1)
= q ∈ (0, 1) ∀j ∈ {1, 2}). If minimum demands are interior,
they are unique and equal to the following values:
(i) Under meaningful transparency:
x(ti, ω, smt∗ (ω)) = p− E[c|ti, ω
]+
1− αGαG
[ρ (1)− ρ (0)] (7)
x(tc, ω, smt∗ (ω)) = p− E [c|tc, ω] +1− αGαG
[ρ (1)− ρ (µ0)] (8)
(ii) Without meaningful transparency:
x(ti, ωu, snmt∗ (ωu)) = p− E[c|ti, ωu
]+
1− αGαG
[ρ
(µ0
µ0 + (1− µ0) q
)− ρ (0)
](9)
30
x(tc, ωu, snmt∗ (ωu)) = p− E [c|tc, ωu] (10)
x(ti, ωf , snmt∗(ωf)
) = p− E[c|ti, ωf
]+
1− αGαG
[ρ (1)− ρ
(µ0 (1− q)1− qµ0
)](11)
x(tc, ωf , snmt∗(ωf)
) = p− E[c|tc, ωf
]+
1− αGαG
[ρ (1)− ρ (µ0)] (12)
(iii) if x(t, ω, smt∗ (ω)) and x(t, ω, snmt∗ (ω)) are interior, then x(t, ω, smt∗ (ω)) ≥
x(t, ω, snmt∗ (ω)) ∀ (t, ω), with the inequality being strict for some (t, ω).
(iv) Meaningful transparency may eliminate the bargaining range, i.e. for some (t, ω)
we may have
x(t, ω, smt∗ (ω)) > p+ cF > x(t, ω, snmt∗ (ω)) (13)
(v) The following completes the description of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium where
meaningful transparency obtains. Assume that αO = 1 and the following conditions hold:
E[c|ti, ωu
]> p+
1− αGαG
[ρ (1)− ρ (0)] (14)
E [c|tc, ωu] < min
{p+
1− αGαG
[ρ (µ0)− ρ (0)] ,−cF +1− αGαG
[ρ (1)− ρ (µ0)]
}(15)
E[c|ti, ωf
]< p+
1− αGαG
[ρ (µ0)− ρ (0)]− 1 (16)
Consider the strategies: O sends s∗(mj)
= sj, j ∈ {1, 2}; F offers x∗(sj)
= 0 ∀j ∈
{1, 2}; if ω = ωf and s = s1, G rejects any x ∈ [0, 1]; if ω = ωf and s = s2, G
rejects x if and only if x ∈[0, p− E
[c|t, ωf
]+ 1−αG
αG[ρ (1)− ρ (µ0)]
); if ω = ωu, t = ti,
G accepts any x ∈ [0, 1] ∀s; if ω = ωu, t = tc, s = s1, G rejects x if and only if
31
x ∈[0, p− E [c|tc, ωu] + 1−αG
αG[ρ (µ0)− ρ (0)]
); if ω = ωu, t = tc, s = s2, G rejects x
if and only if x ∈[0, p− E [c|tc, ωu] + 1−αG
αG[ρ (1)− ρ (µ0)]
); E re-elects the incumbent
with probability ρ (µ(s, x, a)), where µ(s1, x, A) = 0, µ(s1, x,R) = µ0, µ(s2, x, A) = 0 if
x < p− E [c|tc, ωu] + 1−αGαG
[ρ (1)− ρ (µ0)], µ(s2, x, A) = µ0 otherwise, µ(s2, x,R) = 1.
They form an equilibrium where meaningful transparency obtains and the probability
of war is weakly greater than under no meaningful transparency, with the difference being
strict if either E [c|tc, ωu] ≥ p or µ0 ≥ p−E[c|tc,ωu]p+cF
.
Consider (i). By claim 1 and Bayes’ rule, we have that if minimum demands are
interior, they satisfy (7) and x(tc, ω, smt∗ (ω)) satisfies
x(tc, ω, smt∗ (ω)) = p−E [c|tc, ω]+1− αGαG
[ρ(µ(smt∗ (ω) , x(tc, ω, smt∗ (ω)), R
))− ρ (µ0)
](17)
µ(smt∗ (ω) , x(tc, ω, smt∗ (ω)), R
)is not pinned down by Bayes’ rule. If αG = 1, it need
not be, since x(tc, ω, smt∗ (ω)) = p− E [c|tc, ω] and (8) is satisfied. If αG < 1, Criterion
D1 implies µ(smt∗ (ω) , x(tc, ω, smt∗ (ω)), R
)= 1.
Consider (ii). Using claim 1 and Bayes’ rule we obtain (9), (10), and (11). Applying
Criterion D1 and the logic of the proof of (i), we obtain (12).
Consider (iii). This is straightforward. Clearly, the inequality holds strictly ∀ (t, ω) 6=(tc, ωf
)and weakly for (t, ω) =
(tc, ωf
).
Consider (iv). This is straightforward given (iii) and (v).
Consider (v). Beliefs are obtained using Bayes’ rule along the equilibrium path, and
completed off the equilibrium path to ensure sequential rationality.
Now consider F ’s strategy. After signal s1, F is indifferent between any offer x ≤
p + cF (all are rejected along the equilibrium path) and may offer x∗(s1)
= 0. After
signal s2, F has a unique optimal offer, x∗(s2)
= 0.
Now consider O’s strategy. After message m1, O’s payoff is µ0[p− E
[c|tc, ωf
]]+
(1− µ0)[p− E
[c|tc, ωi
]]for any signal, and there is no profitable deviation from sending
s = s1. After message m2, O’s payoff is µ0 [p− E [c|tc, ωu]] for any signal, and there is
no profitable deviation from sending s = s2.
32
Then we note that in this equilibrium, meaningful transparency obtains and the
probability of war is q + (1− q)µ0. Consider the equilibrium outcome under no mean-
ingful transparency. Using (15) and E [c|tc, ωu] > E[c|ti, ωf
], we have
p+ cF < p− E[c|ti, ωf
]+
1− αGαG
[ρ (1)− ρ
(µ0 (1− q)1− qµ0
)]
and there is no bargaining range with any t if ω = ωf . If E [c|tc, ωu] ≥ p, F has a unique
optimal offer, x = 0, generating a probability of war equal to q. If E [c|tc, ωu] < p, F
runs a risk-return trade-off, choosing between x = 0 and x = p−E [c|tc, ωu]. It chooses
the latter if and only if µ0 ≥ p−E[c|tc,ωu]p+cF
. If it chooses x = 0, the probability of war is
q + (1− q)µ0; otherwise it is q.
Proof. (Proof of proposition 2). Since circumstances do not affect the cost of war, drop
ω in the expected cost of war E [c|t, ω] above and use instead E [c|t]. The proposition
builds on the following results:
(i) Under meaningful transparency (where s∗(mj)
= sj, j ∈ {1, 2}) the following is
the unique equilibrium ∀αG ∈ [0, 1]: F offers x∗(sj)
= max{p− E
[c|s∗−1 (
sj)], 0}
;
G accepts x after signal s if and only if x ≥ p − E [c|t]; E re-elects the incumbent with
probability ρ (1) if s = s1 and ρ (0) if s = s2.
(ii) Meaningful transparency weakly reduces the probability of war and may strictly
do so.
(i) is straightforward. Under meaningful transparency, the probability of war is
zero. To show that this may be strictly lower than the probability of war without
meaningful transparency (where prob(s∗(mj)
= s1)
= q ∈ (0, 1) ∀j ∈ {1, 2}), assume
that p > E[c|ti]
and αG = 1, in which case there is a unique equilibrium: After any
signal s, F offers x∗ = p − E [c|tc] if µ0 ≥E[c|ti]−E[c|tc]E[c|ti]+cF , x∗ = p − E
[c|ti]
otherwise;
G accepts if and only if x ≥ p − E [c|t]; E re-elects the incumbent with probability
ρ (µ (s, x, a)), where µ (s, x, a) is given by Bayes’ rule and equilibrium strategies whenever
possible. Thus, war happens with probability µ0 > 0 if µ0 <E[c|ti]−E[c|tc]E[c|ti]+cF .
Proof. (Proof of Proposition 3). Assume that (1) holds strictly, (2) holds with equality,
prob(m = m1|t = tc
)= prob
(m = m2|t = ti
)= θ > 1/2, p > E
[c|ti]
and αG = 1.
33
Write µ1 (s) for the posterior beliefs that t = tc after O sends signal s.
(i) In any equilibrium, F offers
x∗ (s) =
p− E [c|tc] if µ1 (s) ≥ E[c|ti]−E[c|tc]
E[c|ti]+cF
p− E[c|ti]
if µ1 (s) <E[c|ti]−E[c|tc]E[c|ti]+cF
G accepts x if and only if x ≥ p − E [c|t]; E re-elects the incumbent with probability
ρ (µ (s, x, a)), where µ (s, x, a) is obtained using Bayes’ rule and equilibrium strategies
along the equilibrium path.
(ii) Meaningful transparency strictly increases the probability of war if
E[c|ti]− E [c|tc]
E [c|ti] + cF∈(
µ0(1− θ)µ0(1− θ) + (1− µ0)θ
, µ0
]
strictly reduces the probability of war if
E[c|ti]− E [c|tc]
E [c|ti] + cF∈(µ0,
µ0θ
µ0θ + (1− µ0)(1− θ)
]
and does not affect the probability of war otherwise.
(i) is straightforward. Thus, without meaningful transparency, the probability of
war is 0 ifE[c|ti]−E[c|tc]E[c|ti]+cF ≤ µ0 and µ0 otherwise. With meaningful transparency, it is 0 if
E[c|ti]−E[c|tc]E[c|ti]+cF ≤ µ0(1−θ)
µ0(1−θ)+(1−µ0)θ , µ0 (1− θ) ifE[c|ti]−E[c|tc]E[c|ti]+cF ∈
(µ0(1−θ)
µ0(1−θ)+(1−µ0)θ ,µ0θ
µ0θ+(1−µ0)(1−θ)
],
and µ0 otherwise. (ii) follows.
Proof. (Proof of Proposition 4). Under meaningful transparency, µ(s1, x, a
)= 1,
µ(s2, x, a
)= 0 ∀ (x, a) and strategies for F , G and E are in Proposition 2.
Note first that if p > E [c|tc], x∗(s1)
= p − E [c|tc] > x∗(s2), while if p ≤ E [c|tc],
x∗(s1)
= x∗(s2)
= 0.
Thus, O sends signal s1 after m = m1 (t = tc) if and only if
αOmax {p− E [c|tc] , 0}+(1− αO) (1− ρ (1)) ≥ αOmax {p− E [c|tc] , 0}+(1− αO) (1− ρ (0))
34
which does not hold, since αO ∈ (0, 1).30
Proposition 5 We solve for a pure strategy perfect-Bayesian equilibrium, i.e. where F ,
G, and O play pure strategies, though G need not play cut-off strategies. Assume that
p− E [c|t] > 0 ∀t and 1− p− cF > 0. We show:
(i) If
cF > −E[c|tc] +1− αGαG
(ρ (1)− ρ (0)) (18)
then in any pure strategy separating perfect-Bayesian equilibrium, peace prevails and
x∗ (s∗ (t)) = x(t, s∗ (t)) ≡ inf {x|UG (t, s∗ (t) , x, A) ≥ UG (t, s∗ (t) , x,R)}, where UG (t, s, x, a)
is the expected utility of a government of type t after signal s when offered x and taking
action a;
(ii) A pure strategy separating perfect-Bayesian equilibrium where peace prevails ex-
ists only if it is incentive compatible for the opposition to reveal its information, which
requires either
(ii.1)
x∗(s2)< p− E [c|tc] +
1− αGαG
(ρ(µ(s2, x∗
(s2), R))− ρ (0)
)(19)
αOx∗ (s1) ≤ αOx∗ (s2)+ (1− αO) (ρ (1)− ρ (0)) (20)
αOx∗ (s1) ≥ αO (p− E [c|tc]) + (1− αO)
(ρ (1)− ρ
(µ(s2, x∗
(s2), R)))
(21)
or (ii.2) (19) does not hold (20) holds with equality.
(iii) αO ∈ (0, 1) is not necessary for the existence of a pure strategy, separating
Perfect-Bayesian equilibrium.
(iv) αO ∈ (0, 1) is not sufficient for the existence of a pure strategy, separating
Perfect-Bayesian equilibrium.
30In addition, we can show that if p > E [c|tc], meaningful transparency cannot obtain in equilibrium
∀αO ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover, if p ≤ E [c|tc], meaningful transparency obtains in equilibrium if and only if
αO = 1 (in which case F does not face a risk-return trade-off against unitary states (αG = 1), since all
accept any offer).
35
Proof. Consider (i). We first show that in any pure strategy, separating Perfect-
Bayesian equilibrium, ∀t
x(t, s∗ (t)) ≤ p− E [c|t] +1− αGαG
(ρ (1)− ρ (0)) (22)
Indeed, UG (t, s∗ (t) , x, A) < UG (t, s∗ (t) , x,R) implies
αGx+ (1− αG) ρ (µ (s, x,A)) < αG [p− E [c|t]] + (1− αG) ρ (µ (s, x,R))
⇔ x < p− E [c|t] +1− αGαG
[ρ (µ (s, x,R))− ρ (µ (s, x,A))]
≤ p− E [c|t] +1− αGαG
[ρ (1)− ρ (0)]
and (22) follows. Together with (18), it implies that x(t, s∗ (t)) < p+ cF ∀t.
Since G plays a pure strategy, F ’s optimal strategy is well defined if and only if
UG (t, s∗ (t) , x(t, s∗ (t)), A) ≥ UG (t, s∗ (t) , x(t, s∗ (t)), R), in which case F offers x∗ (s∗ (t)) =
x(t, s∗ (t)). (i) follows.
Consider (ii). To obtain (ii.1) and (ii.2), note first that G of type ti would accept
x∗(s1)
after signal s1, since E[c|ti]> E [c|tc]. Thus, O sends signal s = s2 after
m = m2 (t = ti) if and only if (20) holds.
Next assume that G of type tc would reject x∗(s2)
after signal s2, i.e. (19) holds.
Then O sends signal s = s1 after m = m1 (t = tc) if and only if (21) holds, giving case
(ii.1).
Now assume that G of type tc would accept x∗(s2)
after signal s2, i.e. (19) does not
hold. Then O sends signal s = s1 after m = m1 (t = tc) if and only if
αOx∗ (s1)+ (1− αO) (1− ρ (1)) ≥ αOx∗
(s2)
+ (1− αO) (1− ρ (0))
so that (20) holds with equality, completing case (ii.2).
To show (iii), assume that (18) holds. Consider the following: O sends signal
s∗(mj)
= sj, j ∈ {1, 2}; F offers x∗(s1)
= p − E[c|tc], x∗(s2)
= p − E[c|ti] +
1−αGαG
(ρ (1)− ρ (0)); G accepts x if and only if x ≥ x(t, s), where x(t, s1) = p − E [c|t],
36
x(t, s2) = p − E [c|t] + 1−αGαG
(ρ (1)− ρ (0)); E re-elects the incumbent with probability
ρ (µ (s, x, a)), where µ(s1, x, a
)= 1, µ
(s2, x, A
)= 0, µ
(s2, x,R
)= 1.
They form a separating Perfect-Bayesian equilibrium if
αOE [c|tc] ≥ αO[E[c|ti]− 1− αG
αG(ρ (1)− ρ (0))
]− (1− αO) (ρ (1)− ρ (0)) (23)
conditions which may hold even if αO ∈ {0, 1}.
Indeed, by (18) peace prevails. Moreover, (19) and (21) hold, and (20) reduces to
(23). Clearly (23) holds for αO = 0 and may hold for αO = 1.
To show (iv), assume that (18) holds. There is no pure strategy, separating Perfect-
Bayesian equilibrium as long as αO < αG and (23) fails, conditions which may be
satisfied even if αO ∈ (0, 1).
Indeed, (18) ensures that peace prevails and x∗ (s∗ (t)) = x(t, s∗ (t)). If (23) fails,
then (20) and (21) are incompatible, using (22). Thus, we must have (19) failing and
(20) holding with equality. Yet if αO < αG, then if (20) holds with equality, (19) must
hold, using (22).
Proposition 6 Assume that (2) holds strictly but E [c|tc, ωu] < E[c|ti, ωf
]. Minimum
demands, if they are interior, are as follows. They are given by (7), (8) under meaningful
transparency. Without meaningful transparency, they are given by (9), (12), and
x(ti, ωf , snmt∗(ωf)
) = p− E[c|ti, ωf
]+
1− αGαG
[ρ (1)− ρ (0)]
x(tc, ωu, snmt∗ (ωu)) = p− E [c|tc, ωu] +1− αGαG
[ρ (1)− ρ
(µ0 (1− q)1− qµ0
)]
Thus, x(t, ω, snmt∗ (ω)) ≤ x(t, ω, smt∗ (ω)) holds weakly for (t, ω) ∈{(ti, ωf
),(tc, ωf
)},
strictly for (t, ω) =(ti, ωu
)and fails for (t, ω) = (tc, ωu). Proof. Straightforward.
37
Proposition 7 Assume that the re-election probability is a function of beliefs about t
and ω, ρ(µt, µω
), which satisfies the following properties: ρ
(µt, µω
)is strictly increasing
in µt ∀µω ≥ µω, strictly decreasing in µt ∀µω < µω for some µω ∈ [0, 1]; ρ(µt, µω
)is
strictly increasing in µω ∀µt ≥ µt, strictly decreasing in µω ∀µt < µt, for some µt ∈ [0, 1].
Then the government’s minimum demands, if they are interior, are unique and equal to
the following values:
(i) Under meaningful transparency:
x(ti, ωu, smt∗ (ω)) = p− E[c|ti, ωu
]+
1− αGαG
[ρ (1, 0)− ρ (0, 0)]
x(tc, ωu, smt∗ (ω)) = p− E [c|tc, ωu] +1− αGαG
[ρ (1, 0)− ρ (µ0, 0)]
x(ti, ωf , smt∗ (ω)) = p− E[c|ti, ωf
]+
1− αGαG
[ρ (1, 1)− ρ (0, 1)]
x(tc, ωf , smt∗ (ω)) = p− E[c|tc, ωf
]+
1− αGαG
[ρ (1, 1)− ρ (µ0, 1)]
(ii) Without meaningful transparency:
x(ti, ωu, snmt∗ (ωu)) = p−E[c|ti, ωu
]+
1− αGαG
[ρ
(µ0
µ0 + (1− µ0) q,
q
µ0 + (1− µ0) q
)− ρ (0, 0)
]
x(tc, ωu, snmt∗ (ωu)) = p− E [c|tc, ωu] +1− αGαG
[ρ (µ0, 1)− ρ (µ0, 0)]
x(ti, ωf , snmt∗(ωf)
) = p− E[c|ti, ωf
]+
1− αGαG
[ρ (1, 1)− ρ
(µ0 (1− q)1− qµ0
,q (1− µ0)1− qµ0
)]
x(tc, ωf , snmt∗(ωf)
) = p− E[c|tc, ωf
]+
1− αGαG
[ρ (1, 1)− ρ (µ0, q)]
38
(iii) x(ti, ωu, smt∗ (ω)) S x(ti, ωu, snmt∗ (ω)) if and only if ρ (1, 0) S ρ(
µ0µ0+(1−µ0)q ,
qµ0+(1−µ0)q
);
x(tc, ωu, smt∗ (ω)) S x(tc, ωu, snmt∗ (ω)) if and only if ρ (1, 0) S ρ (µ0, 1);
x(ti, ωf , smt∗ (ω)) S x(ti, ωf , snmt∗ (ω)) if and only if ρ (0, 1) T ρ(µ0(1−q)1−qµ0 ,
q(1−µ0)1−qµ0
);
x(tc, ωf , smt∗ (ω)) > x(tc, ωf , snmt∗ (ω)) if and only if µ0 < µt.
Proof. First, note that claim 1 applies, replacing ρ (µ (s, x(t, ω, s∗ (ω)), a)) with the
equivalent ρ(µt (s, x(t, ω, s∗ (ω)), a) , µω (s, x(t, ω, s∗ (ω)), a)
). (i) and (ii) obtain using
Bayes’ rule, equilibrium strategies, and Criterion D1. (iii) follows.
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