isfed research

International Society for Fair Elections and

Democracy (ISFED)

Analysis of the Draft Law on Local Self-Governance, International

Experience and Recommendations

January 2014

Tbilisi

International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) 2

Author: Nino Samvelidze

Responsible for Publishing: Nino Lomjaria

Research was carried out with the financial support of National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The views

expressed in the Research belong to the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy and do not

reflect views of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).


Content

I. Introduction ........................................................................................ Error! Bookmark not defined.

II. Increasing the Number of Self-Governing Divisions and Their Staffing ........................................ 5

III. Direct Election of Executive Branch of the Self-Government and No Confidence Vote ............... 9

IV. Financial Independence and Disposal of Property .........................................................................13

V. Staff Reductions .................................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.

VI. Regional Self-Government ................................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.

VII. Public Councils and District Councils ...........................................................................................22

VIII. Legal and Field Supervision of Self-Governments .......................................................................25

IX. Conclusion .......................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.


I. Introduction

The new law of self-governance has become the focus of not only political but broad public

discussions as well. Over the years municipal authorities have been facing a number of problems,

including the lack of financial resources, dependence on central authorities as key challenges, which

made it hard to determine local needs and generate financial resources needed to meet these needs for

an effective and timely delivery of services at the municipal level.

Effective local self-government is one of the key preconditions for a democratic development

of a country since it is directly related to participatory democracy and the development of civil

society. Problems in self-government called for fundamental changes in the system.

To this end, the government of Georgia initiated in the parliament a draft law of local self-

governance elaborated by the Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure. Much criticism

has been voiced about novelties envisaged by the draft, mostly about possible risks of introducing

these novelties for the country. The statement of Catholicos Patriarch of All Georgia Ilia II triggered a

particular turmoil. According to the statement, certain novelties offered by the new law could have

posed the risk of separatism. Some of these novelties were removed from the initial draft or modified

following discussions and deliberations, causing the difference of opinion about effectiveness of the

reform itself.

According to the authors of the new law, self-governance reform and the novelties offered by

it serve the purpose of democratization and decentralization of the system of public administration

and formation of an effective system of local self-governance, which also envisages increase of their

powers and financial independence.1 The most important initiative proposed in the draft law is the

office of Gamgebeli elected directly for each self-governing community and the office of Mayor

elected directly for each self-governing city. The draft law also increases budget of municipal

authorities and transfers certain category of property available on self-governing territory into the

ownership of local self-governments. It envisages certain changes in competencies and powers of self-

1 Explanatory note of the draft law of Georgia on self-government


governments and in mechanisms of supervision.2 The reform also entails various other changes. 40

million laris will be allocated from the budget for implementation of the proposed changes. The

allocated amount will be increased from 120 to 200 million laris by 2017. 3

ISFED shares its position and recommendations about changes proposed by the draft law. Our

recommendations are based on international practice, including compliance of the proposed changes

with the European Charter of Local Self-Government. With respect to applicable international

practice, we focused more on the experience of central European countries in self-government

reforms as they gradually transformed social and soviet system into the system of democratic self-

government and their experience is close to the Georgian reality.

II. Increasing the Number of Self-Governing Divisions and Their Staffing

Proposed Changes

Notably, the initial draft envisaged formation of 18 self-governing cities. Cities with

population of at least 15,000 would be granted the status of a self-governing city. 4 According to these

criteria, 13 new self-governing cities would be added to five self-governing cities that already exist.

However, after deliberations criteria for the status of a self-governing city were modified and now

only seven self-governing cities will be added to the existing five. 5 These seven cities will be granted

the status of a self-governing city solely on the basis of the fact that they serve as regional centers.

Following the changes in the criteria, eight cities with population of at least 15,000 will no longer get

the status of a self-governing cities per initial criteria.6

2 Explanatory note

3 Self-Government Reform A New Challenge for Georgia by Georgian Times, December 5, 2013, see

http://www.geotimes.ge/index.php/?m=home&newsid=52479 4 Initial draft, Article 3

5 Telavi, Gori, Mtskheta, Akhaltsikhe, Ambrolauri, Ozurgeti and Zugdidi. However, notably the population of Mtskheta and

Amrbolauri is less than the number envisaged by the initial draft 6 Samtredia, Khashuri, Senaki, Zestaponi, Marneuli, Kobuleti, Tskaltubo and Kaspi


The reform will increase the number of municipalities by separating self-governing cities from

municipalities. 7 Pursuant to the new law settlements and agglomeration of settlements will form self-

governing divisions - self-governing cities and self-governing communities. Consequently, self-

governing cities and self-governing communities are referred to in the draft law as municipalities.

Agglomeration of historically developed settlements and/or settlements with homogenous social,

economic and natural-geographic characteristics will also be given the status of a self-governing

community.8

Executive authority of self-governing divisions will be vested in Gamgebeli (for communities)

and Mayor (for cities) elected directly for the term of three years (for the term of four years starting

from 2017). Sakrebulo will serve as a representative agency, elected in a secret ballot voting, through

direct, universal and equal elections.9 Further, the new law proposes premature termination of the

authority of Gamgebelis/Mayors through motion of no-confidence discussed in details below.

Comments:

Changes in local self-governance introduced in 2004-2005 established the level of self-

governments at the level of districts that existed during Soviet times, subsequently creating 69

municipalities. Local geographic, infrastructural or cultural characteristics had no proper role in

municipal division. Consequently, individual municipalities often contained different interests and

needs, which resulted in ineffectiveness of local self-government and poor reflection of interests of

local population in self-government policies. A number of livelihood problems persist in villages and

cities nowadays that remain unresolved due to the lack of decision-making mandate and financial

independence. Municipal authorities are unable to plan infrastructural or urban development

independently as the process of decision-making entails consultations with central authorities and

undergoing of applicable procedures, delaying the process.

The proposed draft increases the number of self-governing cities and plans for optimization of

municipalities. Effective implementation of proposed changes will essentially increase the quality of 7 Explanatory note

8 Draft law, Article 3

9 Article 20


self-governance and will make it possible to resolve local problems in a timely manner as self-

governments themselves will be able to make independent decisions about priority projects and most

importantly, they will be able to mobilize adequate financial resources for funding these projects. In

this respect, the key challenge is setting boundaries of new municipalities in a timely manner.

Article 150 of the draft law explains that the Commission for Regional Development of

Georgia will elaborate criteria for territorial optimization of municipalities within the period of one

months after promulgation of the law; based on the criteria, it will elaborate and submit to the

government of Georgia proposals about municipal division within the period of three months after

promulgation of the law. The government of Georgia in its turn will initiate proposal before the

parliament within the period of 15 days.10 In view of this timeframe, implementation of proposed

changes will take 3-4 months. Considering that the government should provide new municipalities

with corresponding infrastructure, it is hard to imagine that the process will be finished prior to 2014

municipal elections. Further, principles of the European Charter should also be take into account,

stipulating that boundaries of local self-governments should be determined based on prior public

consultations11 which also takes time. Therefore, the governmental commission should utilize the

period for elaboration of criteria as effectively as possible and comply with the requirement by

holding meetings with public and taking comments of stakeholders into consideration.

International Experience

In the Post-Soviet space Poland is one of the best examples of optimization of local self-

governments and boosting of their powers. Up until 1990 Poland had one level of local self-

government gmina, central municipal structure of the government. Following the reform

implemented in 1990, gmina acquired more autonomy on resources and in the process of decision-

making. 12 However, the major turning point was in 1998 when the new reform divided local self-

10

Article 150 11

European Charter of Local Self-Government, see http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBV0002625/geldigheidsdatum_21-12-2013 12

Local Self-Government in Poland by Andrey Kovalchik. Decentralization: Experiments and Reforms by Tams M. Horvth,

Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2000, pp. 217-254


government into three different levels: 2413 municipalities13 (gmina), 379 districts (powiaty) and 16

regions (wojewdztwo).14 These changes significantly increased public trust in local self-government

and improved service delivery procedures. Notably, the reform statistically increased womens

involvement in politics and increased their number in municipal decision-making authorities.15

Reforms affected diversification of political representation and the quality of democracy and

effectiveness for each level of self-government. Changes introduced with the reform reinforced the

role of civil society and their participation. The reform empowered municipalities and helped them

grow into a key pillar of civil society.16 Significant strides were made in the development of

broadcasting and print media; number of non-governmental organizations increased (from 277 in

1989 to 1078 in 1991, 1332 in 1992 and 5,900 in 199717); so did the number of people actively

involved in initiatives of local organizations; as well as the amount of funds allocated by the

municipality for local organizations. Further, in 1993-1997 number of organizations funded from

local municipalities doubled. 18 Optimization of units of self-government and their empowerment

with resources significantly increased civic engagement.

The local self-government reform in Poland in 1990 was revolutionary in nature, while rest of

the changes implemented gradually was part of the reform as a whole. The reform completely

changed the practice of service delivery at the local level; municipal authorities no longer depended

on central authorities and were able to meet local needs in a more effective and timely manner.19 We

must also highlight some of the challenges faced by Poland in the process of reforming the local self-

government system: decentralization was most opposed by the Ministry of Finance that managed

finances before at the local level. The reform was also opposed by politicians whose influence would

be essentially decreased in the process of local decision-making, and labor unions whose role would

weaken following the reform as they served as the only means of dialogue with the central 13

Size of municipality is now 20 000 instead of 40 000 constituents 14

Administrative division of Poland, see http://ksng.gugik.gov.pl/pliki/podzial_administracyjny_polski_2011-eng.pdf 15

Decentralization and Women's Status in Regional Polish Institutions by Meg Rincker, Women and Politics magazine, 2009,

pp. 46-69 16

Local Self-Government Reform in Poland by Zherzi Regulski, Local self-government and public service reform, Open

Society Institute, Budapest, 2003 , pp.189-192 17

Regulski, p.194 18

Regulski, p.190 19

Kovalchik, pp. 52-56


authorities. 20 Overcoming these challenges took some time but eventually, consensus was achieved

through rigorous consultations with the involvement of all stakeholders.

Recommendations:

Determining boundaries of self-government units and granting them the status in a timely

manner is the biggest challenge. We recommend that relevant government commission

submit to the government its proposals about municipal division in effective time-frame;

boundaries of municipalities should be determined and the status should be granted a month

before scheduling of the municipal elections;

The process of municipal division should be based on active public consultations at the local

level. Appropriate mechanisms of communication should be introduced to ensure public

involvement periodic meetings with public, stakeholders and keeping all stakeholders

informed about outcomes of these meetings on a systematic basis;

The work of the commission elaborating the criteria must be public and transparent; it should

cooperate with members of civil society with appropriate competencies and the ability to

generate mechanisms and ideas to facilitate not only timely implementation of the changes but

will also ensure quality of implementation;

The government in cooperation with the NGO sector and media should work to promote and

raise public awareness about the issue in the shortest timeframe possible.

III. Direct Election of Executive Branch of the Self-Government and No Confidence

Vote

Proposed Changes

20

Regulovsk, p. 23


One of the most important changes proposed by the reform is direct election of executive

branch of municipalities (Gamgebeli/Mayor). According to the new law, executive power is vested in

Gamgebelis/Mayors while Gamgeobas/Office of the Mayor is an institution that supports realization

of powers of Gamgebeli/Mayor. Mayor/Gamgebeli is the highest official of municipality responsible

and accountable before Sakrebulo and constituents.21

Further, the draft law introduces motion of no confidence against Gamgebeli/Mayor, initiated

by more than half of enlisted members of Sakrebulo as well as based on a written petition of at least

20% of registered constituents of the municipality. Written petition will be reviewed by Sakrebulo

within no later than ten days after submission. Gamgebeli/Mayor is defeated through the motion of

no confidence if the motion is supported by two thirds of enlisted members of Sakrebulo.

Mayor/Gamgebeli may file against the no confidence vote in court. If this is the case, s/he gets to

maintain his/her powers and repeat elections will not be scheduled until after the trial.22

Comments

Under the applicable legislation, with the exception of Tbilisi, Mayors in four self-governing

cities and Gamgebelis in districts of Georgia are appointed by Sakrebulo Chairperson with consent of

Sakrebulo. These officials are appointed rather than elected by local constituents and in most of the

cases candidates have been nominated based on their political affiliation, which has drawn a certain

boundary line between the local population and Gamgebelis over the years.

ISFED welcomes direct election of Gamgebelis/Mayors as a way to increase their role of an

executive branch and their responsibility and before local constituents as well as the responsibility to

be accountable. Direct election of executive authorities also boosts quality of democracy and public

trust in elected officials. Direct elections will create closer ties between constituents and elected

officials (Mayors/Gamgebelis), reducing their dependence on central authorities and the ruling

political force, and ensuring their stable functioning.

21

Draft law, Articles 45 and 46 22

Article 48


As to the motion of no confidence, we believe that it diminishes the importance of direct

elections of Mayor/Gamgebeli. Consider an example of parliament defeating the government through

the motion of no confidence. The key difference is that the government has been approved by the

parliament itself, as opposed to directly elected by constituents. There is no such relationship

between Sakrebulo and Mayor/Gamgebeli as the letter is delegated with the mandate by constituents.

Motion of no confidence is different from impeachment as the latter involves commission of a crime

or violation of the Constitution. Subsequently, defeating Mayor/Gamgebeli through motion of no

confidence violates the principle of direct elections and key objective of the decentralization reform

to increase citizen engagement in local self-governance. Furthermore, there is a risk of abusing the

mechanism for political influence; additionally, the latest changes do not envisage grounds for

appealing the no confidence vote in court.


Procedures and mechanisms of motion of no confidence against Mayors differs across the

countries, and there are three different ways of initiating the motion: voter signatures (followed by

referendum), decision of court about the petition of a council and referendum. The research has

illustrated that in European countries where Mayor is elected directly by constituents, representative

authorities have the right to raise motion of no confidence against Mayor/Gamgebeli without

referendum or courts decision.

2002 reform in Poland introduced direct election of Mayors increasing democratic nature of

the institute, status of the office and simplifying the process of decision-making. As noted above,

municipality (gmina) is the lowest level of self-government where executive power is vested in

Mayors. 23 Considering the number of municipalities in Poland (2478) and the fact that it is the lowest

level in self-government and is the closest to the local population, it is safe to conclude that it best

reflects the principles of participatory democracy considering that Mayors are responsible before each

constituent of gmina. Transformation of local self-governance and the system of municipal elections

has not been easy for Poland as it was criticized by many forces as robust self-government was not in

23

Law of Poland on local self-government, see http://www.urban.org/pdf/pol_locgovfin.pdf


their best interests.24 However, introducing direct elections of Mayor significantly boosted public

confidence in municipal government and increased the responsibility to be accountable.

Municipal council in Poland has no right to recall Mayor; however, it is possible to recall

mayor through local referendum. In order to organize such a referendum it is necessary that at least

10% of eligible voters sign the petition. The local referendum in order to be valid requires a minimal

turn-out at the level of more than 2/3 of the last regular elections.25 12 Mayors have been recalled

through referendum since 2010. The mechanism is logically related to the principle of direct election

as it envisages recalling of Mayor by local constituents who have delegated him/her with the mandate

in the first place, and not any other subject that may be motivated by other reasons.

There are two levels of self-government in Hungary municipalities and counties. There are

19 counties and 3175 municipalities in the country. Council of representatives serves as a self-

governing body of a municipality, led by Mayor directly elected by constituents. Counties have

Assemblies directly elected by constituents, led by President elected by the Assembly itself.26

Municipality councils are authorized to apply to court for recall of Mayor elected by constituents in

direct elections. If the court finds that Mayor pursued illegal activities or s/he is avoiding the

obligation to make his/her own finances public, s/he will be recalled.27 Another interesting example is

Germany and its federal states or Lander where councils are authorized to motion no confidence vote;

however, decisions are made through referendum in which certain minimum votes are required.28 In

Germany motion of no confidence against Mayor is viewed as a political instrument.29

24

Regulski, p. 48 25

Global Network of Cities, local self-government in Poland, see http://www.cities-

localgovernments.org/gold/Upload/country_profile/Poland.pdf 26

Self-government in Hungary 2012, Assembly of European Reagions, see

http://www.aer.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/MainIssues/Interinstitutional_Relations/HUNGARY_2012.pdf 27

Local self-government act of Hungary, Article 70. Local Government in Europe: The Fourth Level in the EU Multi-Layered System of Governance by Carlo Panara, Michael R. Varney Local Self-Government in Europe: Fourth Level of EU

Governance, 2013, p. 399 28

According to Landers the percentage rate is within the range of 25-50% 29

The direct election and recall of the mayors in Germany: From representative democracy-based to direct democracy-based local leadership by Hellmut Wollmann, University of Oslo, 2013, see http://www.uio.no/english/research/interfaculty-

research-areas/democracy/news-and-events/events/conferences/2013/Programme/wollmann-direct-eleciton-of-mayors-

draft.25.12.pdf


Introduction of directly elected office of Mayor means substituting representative democracy

with direct democracy, key objective of municipal reform for many European countries.

Consequently, recall of Mayor by Council/Sakrebulo, without popular support conflicts with the

principle of direct elections, as noted by many scholars, creating democracy deficit.30

Recommendations:

The mechanism of no-confidence vote against Mayors/Gamgebelis should be removed from

the draft law.

IV. Financial Independence and Disposing of Property

Proposed Changes

Local self-government reform introduces certain budgetary changes. One of the obstacles of

effective functioning of self-government is their lack of financial independence. The new law

increases financial resources of municipal authorities at the expanse of various tax shares and

transfers. The draft introduces local taxes to fill municipal budget together with a share of income tax.

Proportion and mechanisms for distributing income tax between state and municipal budgets as well

as percentage of the whole fund of the equalization transfer to be allocated for municipalities will be

determined by September 2015.31

Municipal budgets in addition to special and targeted transfers will also receive capital transfers as

part of their outside receipts. The capital transfer is carried out from one budget to another budget

for the purpose of implementation of a targeted capital project, which is related to the increase of the

30

Ibid 31

Article 153


transfer recipient's non-financial assets.32 The basis for the issuance of capital transfers is the

municipalitys initiative.

Owning a property and having the right to dispose it is important for proper realization of self-

governance. Management and disposal of property owned by a self-governing unit falls under its

exclusive authorities, also envisaged by the European Charger on Self-Government. The draft law

stipulates that property on the territory of a municipality owned by the Ministry of Economy,

impounded or are considered to be the property of former collective farms will be transferred into the

ownership of the municipality by 2017.33 Transferring the property into the ownership of

municipalities and the income generated from the property will boost financial independence of

municipalities, enabling them to use the resources to better exercise their powers as municipalities

will now have the right to owning and disposing34 their own property. However, it is difficult to

estimate whether municipalities will be able to generate significant revenue from their newly

acquired property.

Comments

There has been the lack of attempts to grow the volume of municipal budgets in Georgia

before the Rose Revolution. Following the Rose Revolution funding for municipal budgets

significantly increased but the amount of funds that municipal authorities were able to make

independent decisions about (i.e. spend independently) was greatly reduced. Further, in some cases

central authorities determined purpose of various funds available for local self-governments.

Subsequently, municipal budgets were not allocated according to local needs which had a direct

impact on effectiveness of municipal governance. One of the criteria for determining effectiveness of

municipal government is its ability to distribute its own financial resources according to local needs

and priorities.

32

Explanatory note 33

Article 107 34

According to the draft law, disposal of property also entails privatization, transfer with the right of use and transfer into the

ownership of state free of charge


We welcome that the draft law proposes changes (capital transfers, elaboration of procedures

and mechanisms for distributing equalization transfer, tax shares and provision of additional

property) that will play important role in increasing financial capabilities and independence of self-

governing units. However, it is early to estimate the extent to which proposed changes will affect

municipal budgets and whether they are sufficient for meeting the objective local self-governments

meeting local needs and delivering services that are needed.


Notably, local revenues in municipal budgets in a number of European countries account for

30-35% of the budget while in countries like France, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, they account

for 75% of the budget.35 Local receipts in municipal budgets are directly related to the ability of a self-

government to generate necessary finances on its own. Therefore, in countries with high amounts of

local receipts in municipal budgets functioning of self-government is much more effective.

Consequently, leverage and mechanisms of fiscal decentralization should be considered in proportion

to local needs.

An illustrative example of fiscal decentralization is Slovakia where one of the objectives of

fiscal decentralization reform was to increase the share of local receipts and tax shares in municipal

budgets.36 Today municipal revenues in Slovakia are made up of tax shares (70,3% of income tax

remains in local budget), levies, commissions from service and administrative procedures, profit tax,

grants, transfers and loans. There is a special formula for tax shares based on functions of self-

government and its mandate.37 Consequently, mechanisms of fiscal decentralization should be taken

into account as much as possible in the process of decentralization.

Municipalities of Poland (gmina) are financially empowered and they are the richest level of

self-government. They have their own diverse receipts and are the only level of government in

35

CoE Local Finance Benchmarking Tool, Centre of Expertise for Local Government Reform, Strasbourg, 2009, see

https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=2318521&SecMode=1

&DocId=2029286&Usage=2 36

Strategy of Slovakias fiscal decentralization reform, see https://www.finance.gov.sk/en/Components/CategoryDocuments/s_LoadDocument.aspx?categoryId=135&documentId=193 37

Global network of cities, local self-governments, Slovakia, see http://www.cities-

localgovernments.org/gold/Upload/country_profile/Slovakia.pdf


addition to the central government that has the power to levy taxes.38 The most important local tax is

property tax that accounts for more than half of the municipal budget.39 However, considering that

property tax has always been in the hands of self-government and it does not generate significant

volumes of income, we must think about alternative sources of income or increase share of other

taxes in municipal budgets.

Recommendations:

We welcome the increase of self-government budget but we believe that the extent to which

proposed changes (new tax formulas, modification of shares of capital transfers, equalization

transfers) will increase municipal budgets in general and whether they are sufficient to meet

local needs should be researched, as well as whether separation of budgets of villages and

towns from city budgets will ensure their financial independence.

We believe that concrete formula for calculating share of individual taxes in local and state

budgets, as well as the principle of distribution of equalization transfers should be determined

in a timely manner to allow the analysis discussed in the previous recommendation in a

reasonable timeframe;

It is important to determine and ensure the transfer of property into the ownership of local

self-governments in a timely manner, in order for them to be able to effectively discharge

their legal powers. The process should be conducted with the involvement of all stakeholders.

V. Staff Reductions

Proposed Changes

38

Global network of cities, local self-governments, see http://www.cities-

localgovernments.org/gold/Upload/country_profile/POLAND.PDF 39

Charges in Local Government Services and Budgets in Poland by Piotr Bury, 2008, see

http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/NISPAcee/UNPAN018974.pdf


The draft low proposes staff reductions in municipal governments. Number of municipal

employees is determined according to the following criteria: 30 employees plus one employee for

every 500 constituents. Number of part-time municipal employees should not exceed 10% of the

number of employees in Gamgeoba and Sakrebulo office. In self-governing units where 10% of full-

time employees is less than five, number of part-time employees can be increased up to five.40 In this

light, it was estimated that the number of public servants in the regions would be reduced from

13,000 to 8,600;41 however, following the reform (beyond 2017), the number of employees will be

increased again and equal to their initial number. Further, on January 24, 2014, representatives of the

parliament publicly stated that the office of trustees will not be affected by staff reductions. Currently

the number of trustees in various villages of Georgia amounts to one thousand and consequently,

1000 workplaces will be left intact following municipal elections.42 Further, notably the new low

proposes that expenditures for compensating Sakrebulo and Gamgeoba public servants should not

exceed 25% of budgetary expanses of a self-governing unit concerned.

Comments

It is ambiguous as to what the reason for reducing the number of public servants is and

increasing it in 2017. If proposed changes have to do with administrative cuts, it is peculiar that

number of public servants is increased back to their original number in 2017. Further, the purpose of

funds saved by administrative cuts is unclear. There is a risk that proposed changes will trigger a

protest in local population as employment is often one of the issues of concern at the local level. It is

also important that employees are not dismissed on political grounds, which should be controlled

properly.


40

Article 155 41

Explanatory note 42

Guardian.ge, Court to deliver final verdict about termination of authority of elected Mayors and Gamgebelis, January 24, 2014, see http://guardian.ge/48-archeuli-merebisa-da-gamgeblebisathvis-uflebamosilebis-shecherebis-saboloo-msajuli-

sasamarthlo-iqneba.html


In majority of central European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland) municipal

reform focused on capacity building of public servants and consequently, on determining

qualification criteria. Rules and procedures to be met by candidates in order to be hired in public

service was determined. Furthermore, as a result of municipal reform municipal jobs became more

attractive.43 For instance, one of the priorities of local self-government reform in Poland was to

maintain qualified staff and to further increase the level of their qualification. The government

elaborated a concept for ensuring stage by stage capacity building for municipal employees. Number

of municipal employees with higher education grew gradually. Compared to 1990, number of

municipal employees with higher education in 1998 reached 70%. Capacity building for public

servants became a key objective for local self-governments in Poland. Further, employees underwent

various trainings, increasing the level of their qualification and their capacity in order to meet their

new functions introduced with the reform.44 During the reform, similar to other countries it was the

focus of Poland to improve the level of qualification of local self-government employees as opposed to

reducing their number.

Recommendations:

The government should explain the purpose of staff reductions to public, and if it has to do

with administrative cuts, it should specify priorities that the savings will be allocated for;

Criteria that will guide the process of staff reduction should be expressly defined. For

instance, tests can be developed for priority areas to verify qualification and experience of

employees. Results will serve as the basis for staff reductions. Further, the government

should elaborate mechanisms for capacity building, as qualified personnel is one of the key

preconditions for effective self-government.

43

Public Service Administration Reform in Central Europe by Miroslav Beblav, decentralization and public administration

reform in Central and Eastern Europe, Open Society Institute, Budapest, pp. 55-72. 44

Regulski, p. 167


VI. Regional Self-Government

Changes Proposed

The initial draft introduced regional unions of municipalities for the purpose of ensuring that

interests of member municipalities are reflected in the process of planning and implementing the

development of territories concerned. Boards would serve as a collegial bodies of these unions,

manned by members of Sakerbulo of municipalities within unions (one member of Sakrebulo for

every 10 000 registered voters in each municipality).45 Powers of the board entailed adoption of the

development strategy, election of chairperson and deputy chairperson and recognition of authority of

members and its premature termination.46 However, the most important power of the board was to

initiate a motion to recall the state representative Governor. According to the initial draft,

Governors were accountable not only before the government but also before these boards,

According to the final formulation in the draft law, advisory boards will be set up instead,

manned by Gamgebelis elected directly by constituents of self-governing units on corresponding

territories, Sakrebulo chairperson and their deputies (three representative from each municipality).47

Functions of the board are reduced compared to their original functions as proposed by the initial

draft and entail reviewing of projects proposed by Governor and their budgets, reviewing strategies

for social and economic development of the region and elaborating subsequent recommendations for

submission to Governor. They will no longer have the powers envisaged by the initial draft, including

the power to recall Governor, i.e. the boards functions will be advisory in nature.

Comments

Changes proposed in the initial draft about powers of the regional level of self-government

triggered variety of opinions. Part of political parties and civil society representatives stated that

setting up of regional unions of municipalities is closely linked to formation of autonomous unit and

is suggestive of federalism and therefore, the issue should be examined within the context of

45

Initial draft, Article 169 46


Article 145


territorial arrangement of the country and changes in the Constitution. Further, Catholicos Patriarch

of All Georgia stated that the draft would result in dissolution of the country, 48 which triggered broad

discussions. We believe that delegating functions of self-government to regional government in no

way indicates federalism considering that the system is practiced by many unitary states in Europe

and are associated with effectiveness of regional government.49 Furthermore, we believe that

Governor accountable before the regional board as proposed by the initial draft would be free from

political influence of the government and therefore, able to fulfill his/her functions more effectively.

Furthermore, initial draft of the project provided more effective means for checks and balances at the

regional level as the board would be manned by representatives of self-government from various

political forces.

Initiators of the draft law, in consideration of the position of Patriarchy and several opposition

parties as well as civil society representatives decided to make certain changes and abolish elements of

self-government at regional level. According to the final draft, it is the aim of the advisory board to

represent interest of municipality and ensure that these interests are reflected in planning and

realizing of development of the territory concerned. However, benefits of introducing advisory

boards are unclear considering that their functions are purely advisory in nature. It is less likely that a

board with three members will be able to ensure that opinions of minorities and other members of

Sakrebulo (and not only those of Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson) are taken into account.

Further, it is not clear as to what the reasons are for forming a separate agency and spending

resources to have a board that will have no meaningful role in decision-making. Governor

himself/herself can pay a visit to and consult with representatives of other municipalities within the

region. We believe that the board with the competencies that it has will not be able to solve problems

and therefore, will have no meaningful impact.


48

Civil.ge Patriarch: New Self-Government Law to Result in Disintegration of the Country, De ember 5, 2013, See http://www.civil.ge/geo/article.php?id=27635 49

Further discussed in the part about international experience


There are strong regional units of self-government in some of the unitary countries of Europe

(France, Poland, Greece, Czech Republic, and Croatia). For instance, following a reform in Czech

Republic in 1997, 13 regional self-governments were set up whose representative agencies regional

councils are elected for the term of four years. Regional council is the supreme decision-making

body within the scope of its authority. Council members are elected directly by constituents in a

proportional system by means of a secret ballot. Number of council members depends on the number

of constituents in each region. Executive agency or the board is elected by the council, while board

members elect regional president accountable only before the board and the council.50

Example of Croatia is also interesting. Croatia is a small state but its government is quite

decentralized. There is an administrative unit (county) at the regional level, a self-governing agency

governed by a prefect elected by the regional council. Each region has its own budget adopted by the

regional council. Prefect is accountable before the council within the scope of its authority but it also

oversees activities of the council.51

Regions (wojewdztwo) in Poland are the highest administrative unit of local self-government

in which powers are distributed among self-government and central authorities. Regional council

serves as a self-government agency in the region, elected in direct universal elections for the period of

four years. The council in its turn elects an executive body office of marshal and its chairperson

marshal of the region.52 Council of the region decides about matters of development strategy and

budget of the region. Central government is represented by means of a regional office headed by

Governor of the region appointed by Prime Minister. S/he supervises the work of self-government

and undertakes functions of a coordinator.53 Direct election of regional councils is indicative of the

degree of democracy and legitimization of local authorities. Further, considering the scope of its

50

Global network of cities, local self-governments, Czech Republic, see http://www.cities-

localgovernments.org/gold/Upload/country_profile/Czech_Republic.pdf 51

Global network of cities, local self-governments, Croatia, see http://www.cities-

localgovernments.org/gold/Upload/country_profile/Croatia.pdf 52

Public Investment across Levels of Government: The Case of Wielkopolska, Poland by Marcin Dabrowski and

Dorothe Allain-Dupr, OECD Secretariat, December 2012, see http://www.oecd.org/gov/regional-

policy/wielkopolskie_edited.pdf 53

Financing of local self-government in Poland by Pyotr Bur and PAvel Svianevich. Financing of local self-governments in

Central Europe by Zelko Sevich, 2008, pp. 319-321


mandate54, it is safe to conclude that direct election of regional councils ensures that its activities and

strategies are responsive to local needs and improves effectiveness of its work. This way, it empowers

self-government and poses no threat to territorial integrity and sovereignty of a country.

Recommendations:

Ensure better understanding of regional governance and its needs within the context of

self-government reform and determine the scope of authority and competencies of

regional councils. Discussions about powers of a regional council should remain on the

agenda since it is directly related to practicing of decentralization values in the country;

In order for the regional government and the office of Governor to be effective in the

future, a mechanism of checks and balances must exist, which the initial draft endorsed.

The institute of Governor, its functions and the scope of the authority should be revised in

frames of the constitutional reform.

VII. Public Boards and District Boards

Proposed Changes

The initial draft established public boards at rural level to participate in the process of

elaboration of strategic development of villages and their budgets, selection, planning and monitoring

of implementation of projects.55 Thus, it would serve as mechanism for participation in addressing

issues of local importance. The supreme body of the board was general assembly led by a chairperson

elected by the assembly.56 Establishment of public boards was postponed for now in the parliament

and it was stated that the government will revisit the issue probably before 2015.

54

Polish law on local self-government, see

http://www.urban.org/pdf/pol_locgovfin.pdf 55


Initial draft, Article 95


Further, the initial draft created district boards in Tbilisi for identifying needs of local

population and defend their interests. District boards were authorized to prepare and approve project

proposals, raise the issue of liability of Governor, convene extraordinary meeting of Sakrebulo and

discharge other delegated powers.57 However, similar to public councils, setting up of district councils

was also removed from the draft law.

Comments

We believe that public councils in rural areas is a mechanism to achieve most important goal

of self-government active citizen participation. Public councils would increase opportunities for

local population to get more actively involved in selection and implementation of priority projects.

Even though the initial draft did not provide explicitly powers of these councils, i.e. whether they

would have a decisive role in reviewing and selecting projects, and left room to improving other

technical issues, 58 it provided a mechanism for direct participation of local population in the process

of resolving issues of local importance.

We believe that public councils will make it easier to determine local needs and will promote

adequate decision-making. Active participation of local population in approval of projects will

increase transparency of the process, degree of legitimization of changes and help mobilize

knowledge in concrete spheres as a necessary precondition for changes to be successful.

As to setting up of district councils in Tbilisi, we believe that it would have empowered local

self-government mechanisms in the city. Even though Tbilisi has quite large and politically most

active population, local self-government mechanisms are poorly developed and mastered, preventing

population from having their own priorities reflected in Gamgeoba agenda. Therefore, in

consideration of functions of district councils, we believe that they would have increased local self-

government mechanisms in the city.

57


The draft law explained that initiative group with at least ten members (registered voters) had the right to motion for setting

up of a public council; however, it did not specify the number of groups that could petition to Gamgebeli for setting up the

council



Slovenia has mechanisms similar to the ones proposed by the initial draft; in particular, local

self-government law in Slovenia allows having lower levels of self-government in municipalities or

public councils, which entails delegation of certain competencies to these councils and their

engagement in administration of matters that they are directly concerned with. Such mechanism also

exists in the city: there are seventeen unions in Ljubljana that function as legal entities of public law.

It was introduced following the referendum in 2000 in which the idea was supported by constituents.

Members of councils are elected by constituents registered in certain settlements. Competencies of

councils include participation in solving problems and elaboration of applicable

recommendations/opinions. The council receives petitions from citizens that it refers to competent

agencies for consideration.59

Recommendations:

The idea should not be abandoned but further deliberated as public councils are a

mechanism for ensuring direct participation of citizens in the process of decision making.

Councils should be formed and developed on a stage by stage basis. It is particularly

important to provide clear definition of the scope of their competencies and their role in

decision-making process. This way, it will ensure that future projects are responsive to

interests and priorities of local population. A separate draft law should be elaborated about

public and district councils based on close consultations with the population and civil

society organizations. Further, a transitional provision can be formulated stipulating that

the government commits itself to presenting the draft law to the parliament by the end of

next year;

Large-scale campaigns raising public awareness about functions, purpose and mandate of

these councils must be conducted to ensure that the initiative is successfully translated into

practice.

59

The System of Local Self-Government in Slovenia by Stane Vlaj, see

http://en.iju.hr/ccpa/ccpa/downloads_files/02%20Vlaj.pdf


VIII. Legal Supervision and Field Supervision of Self-Governments

Proposed Changes

Final draft of the law delegates the government of Georgia with the function to supervise self-

governments. A supervising body has the right to evaluate normative acts issued by municipalities

within the scope of their authority and take appropriate measures in compliance with applicable

procedures.60 Administrative and legal acts issued by a municipal agency in frames of the power

delegated to it falls under Field supervision exercised by relevant Ministry that establishes advisory

instructions, requests access to information, inspects and issues instructions, suspends or repeals

administrative-legal acts and substitutes a self-governing agency.61


There are different models of supervision in Europe. For instance, central supervision in

Latvia, Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania is exercised by ministries that specialize in

corresponding areas, with leading roles played by the Ministry of Internal affairs in Hungary and

Czech Republic and the Ministry of Regional Development in Romania and Latvia in legal and field

supervision.62 Finland practices a different system characterized with strong decentralization. For

instance, local self-government in Finland is completely independent from the central government

and has autonomy. Municipalities have the right to conduct their administrative and financial matters

independently. The central government engages in supervision only in exceptional cases as prescribed

by applicable law. In particular, regional office of the state is authorized to resort to its function of

supervision only when there has been a complaint lodged against the municipality over alleged illegal

actions. Such complaint can be lodged by an individual but it does not serve as grounds for filing in

60

If supervising agency finds that the normative act in question violates principles of constitution or citizens rights and liberties, it can file in court 61

Article128 62

Institutional Models of Local Leadership: Comparative Analysis by Agnieszka Pavlovska and Katarzyna Razik, see

http://www.dsp.unito.it/download/summer_paper_radzik.pdf


court. Regional office of the state can issue instructions only, saying that the municipality should

meet its obligations prescribed by law. It may also order a fine against the municipality but the

central authorities have no right to terminate the mandate or dismiss the elected body or individual at

the local level. Supervision of functioning and public service delivery by municipalities falls under

the purview of parliamentary ombudsman in Finland; however, ombudsmans powers are limited to

issuing a recommendation, a reproof or motioning for a criminal punishment if s/he is able to prove

that an agency or an individual concerned has violated law.63

In Czech Republic the system of local self-government entails independent, delegated and

state-delegated competencies. Control and monitoring of own competences of regions and

municipalities are entrusted to the Ministry of Interior. Municipalities fulfilment of delegated

functions is controlled by the regional administration, while sectored ministries and other central

agencies control delegated functions of regions. However, there are certain mechanisms in Czech

Republic that ensure open communication and exchange of information between the central

authorities and self-governments, including regular meetings and consultations between

representatives of central authorities and representatives of self-governments from all levels. Further,

meetings between sector specialists from local and central authorities are held on a systematic basis.

Notably, there is a union of municipalities and cities in Czech Republic defending interests of local

self-government and manned by representatives of municipalities. Key objective of the union is to

defend interests and rights of self-government and lobby their goals at the central level. Further,

there are hundreds of unions at lower level with the aim of setting goals within the exclusive powers

of local self-government and lobbying their interests.64

Practice of suspension or repeal of legal acts varies according to countries, so does the type of

courts that determine lawfulness of acts. For instance, in Spain, Portugal, France and Hungary

compliance of normative acts with applicable law are determined by court, while in Germany and

Poland supervisory agency examines lawfulness of acts and issues resolutions about their suspension

63

Finlands parliamentary ombudsman, see http://icoaf.org/docs/Finland/parliamentary_ombudsman_finland.pdf 64

Global network of cities, local self-governments, Czech Republic, see http://www.cities-

localgovernments.org/gold/Upload/country_profile/Czech_Republic.pdf


or repeal while local self-governments have the right to file in court against resolutions of a

supervisory agency.65

Recommendation

The Ministry of Justice should play greater role in the process of legal supervision. Within the

scope of its competencies the Ministry of Justice will be better able to elaborate legal findings

and prepare recommendations considering that it has the practice and can tackle the task more

easily;

IX. Conclusion

The idea of effective implementation of local self-government is the most important value

based on the principles of democratic governance. It allows citizens to participate in planning and

administration of matters of local importance, while local authorities with high degree of

legitimization and a strong mandate serves as a guarantor of proper development of mechanisms for

participatory democracy at the local level. We believe that self-government is the main pillar of

democratic development of a country allowing citizens to exercise their rights as guaranteed by the

Constitution of Georgia and the European Charter of Self-Government ratified by Georgia, which

entails active participation in the process of decision-making in view of local needs and priorities.

Meaningful local self-government means that self-government authorities are acting in view of

interests of local population, are independent of the central authorities and have economic

independence and a broad scope of competencies empowered by applicable legal base.

On March 1, 2013, the Government of Georgia adopted the Main Principles of the Strategy on

Decentralization and Self- Government Development of the Government of Georgia for 2013-2014

stipulating that the key principle of the reform is to facilitate vibrant citizenship and civic

65

Competencies of local self-governments in Europe, CoE, see https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1377639#P282_55171


participation in governance.66 However, we believe that changes proposed by the latest draft of the

law do very little to realize this objective. We welcome the fact that offices of Gamgebeli and Mayors

will now be elected offices, which greatly promotes the practice of participatory democracy and

increases responsibility of elected official before constituents; however, it is insufficient to increase

citizen participation in local self-governments. One of the mechanisms that would allow realization

of the objective was formation of public councils to promote vibrant citizenship and allow citizens to

play active role in the process of decision-making and priority setting at the local level. Even though

corresponding proposal in the initial draft was in need of improvement to better define competencies

of public councils, it was improvable. Setting up of public boards has been completely removed from

the final draft and we believe that the law will falls short of objectives of the strategy adopted by the

government itself considering that these mechanisms were to facilitate direct citizen participation in

the work of self-government. Further, by introducing the option of no confidence vote it violates the

principle of direct elections considering that direct elections are related to the higher degree of

citizen participation while dismissal of Mayor/Gamgebeli by Sakrebulo diminishes the principle of

direct and participatory democracy in importance. Therefore, discussions should continue to

implement the reform initiated by the government on a stage by stage basis.

Notably, according to the strategy adopted by the government, key strands of the local self-

government reform included 1. Formation of public self-government for each settlement; 2.

Territorial optimization and empowerment of municipal self-governments; 3. Introducing elements

of self-government in regional authorities; 4. Creating effective mechanisms of state supervision; 5.

Providing legal, technical and resources support to the process of reforming.67 Mechanisms envisaged

by the final draft are inadequate for full realization of these objectives. The only objectives realized

are direct election of Mayors and Gamgebelis and increasing the number of self-governing cities.

It is essential to evaluate whether final draft of the law is fully in line with the objectives of

the reform. Further, legislative base should be elaborated in consultation with civil sector on a

systematic basis and their comments must be taken into consideration. It is also important to conduct

66

Main Principles of Decentralization and Self-Government Development of the Government of Georgia, see

http://droa.ge/uploads/files_5_1.pdf 67

Local self-government advisory board, project titled It is Time of Self-Government, see http://droa.ge/?menuid=6&lang=1


a campaign for raising public awareness about self-government principles and its goals/objectives.

Further, technical support works should be accelerated and the timeframe for elaborating changes to

be introduced prior to the elections should be reasonably reduced.