Communist and Post-Communist Studies 44 (2011) 369–379

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Communist and Post-Communist Studies

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Swords into plowshares: The organizational transformation of rebelgroups into political parties

John Ishiyama*, Anna BattaDepartment of Political Science, University of North Texas, 1155 Union Circle #305340, Denton, TX 76203-5017, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o

Article history:Available online 8 November 2011

Keywords:Rebel partiesPolitical partiesParty organizationCommunistNepal

* Corresponding author.

0967-067X/$ – see front matter � 2011 The Regentdoi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2011.10.004

a b s t r a c t

How do the features of a rebel group and the external political environment interact toaffect the internal dynamics within a rebel group after it transforms into a political party?In this paper we combine literature on organizational change in parties in new democ-racies with the emerging literature on rebel group-to-party transformation, to developa framework by which to understand these dynamics. Using the Communist Party of Nepal(Maoist) as a case study, we find that the legacies of the conflict, the organizationallegacies of the rebel group, and the post civil war incentives for electoral gain, createpolitical cleavages within parties that generate considerable organizational centripetalpressures, pressures that will need to be accommodated in new party organizationalstructures.

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There has been growing recent attention in the scholarly literature on how rebel groups have transformed themselves intopolitical parties (Reilly and Nordlund, 2008; de Zeeuw, 2007; Manning, 2007). This attention has emerged, in part, because ofthe realization that the creation of durable peace settlements requires the active involvement and cooperative engagement ofthese political groups. The transformation of rebel groups into political parties provides channels for both interest articulationand political process engagement for former rebels, thus contributing to a sustainable peace, stability, and democracy(Ishiyama and Batta, 2010; Curtis and de Zeeuw, 2009; Manning, 2007). However, most studies that have examined theevolution of former rebel groups into political parties have focused onwhether former rebel groups decide to adapt to, evade,or exit the post war political arena (Manning, 2007; de Zeeuw, 2007; Deonandan et al., 2007; Söderberg-Kovacs, 2007).Others (Allison, 2010, 2006) have examined the factors that explain the electoral success of former rebel groups that turn intopolitical parties. Generally absent from the literature is an examination of the intra-party struggles that inevitably result aftera rebel group “officially” renounces violence and “successfully” transforms into a political party. The struggles over identityand structure continue after the transformation into a political party and will continue to affect the organizational devel-opment of these parties that evolved from former rebel organizations. In turn, the organizational types of parties that emergefrom former rebel groups will affect how they organize voters, articulate interests, recruit new candidates, and integrate theirfollowers into the democratic process – in other words, the crucial functions performed by political parties in deepening andexpanding democracy.

However much of the literature on political parties in new democracies and countries in transition has generally ignoredthe development of parties in post-conflict societies. Although it has long been thought that political parties are crucial in thedevelopment of political democracy and political stability, the literature on political parties is mostly silent about party

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J. Ishiyama, A. Batta / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 44 (2011) 369–379370

development after the end of civil wars. Indeed, such cases have been considered “outliers” and “exceptional”, and hencetheories of party development are not seen as particularly relevant. For example, Peter Mair (1984:128) points out that evenwith the case of the Irish system (a case where the civil war ended many decades earlier) comparative political research hastended to overlook the Irish parties because the case “does not fit” the patterns of development elsewhere (in part because ofthe legacy of the civil war which “froze” partisan alignments for many decades after the civil war). In a similar way, mostcomparative studies of new parties in new democracies (Basedau and Stroh, 2008; Gryzmala-Busse, 2002; Ishiyama, 1999,1997, 1995) explicitly omit the examination of parties emerging after the end of a civil war as being too different to beexamined in light of existing literature on parties.

However, as Allison (2010: 106) notes, in many ways these rebel groups confront a situation similar to those facing a newpolitical party – they need to devise a political platform, raise funds to campaign, create a full time organization and deviseprocedures to select leaders and candidates. However, political parties with roots as rebel groups are not “new” organizations.Some have long histories dating back several decades to political parties, unions, student organizations, and peasant groups inthe pre-civil war period. Further each rebel organization has its own internal organizational legacy – somewere merely loosecoalitions of disparate groups, held together by a common enmity vis a vis the government, whereas others were tightly knitorganizations, complete with their own “bush bureaucracies”. Most all, however, have to confront the demand of redesigningorganizational structures that were conducive to conducting an irregular war, but not to compete and win elections.

How do the internal features of the rebel group and the external political environment interact to affect the internaldynamics within a rebel group after it transforms into a political party (i.e. after it accepts the conditions of the settlement andcompetes for election)? In this paper we synthesize literature on organizational change in parties in new democracies withthe emerging literature on rebel group-to-party transformation, to develop a framework by which to understand thesedynamics. This framework is then applied to the case of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) as an illustrative case study.

Rebel group-to-party transformation

Although there is some literature on the transformation of rebel groups into political parties, the focus of such literaturehas been onwhether rebel groups “successfully” transition into a party, rather than on the internal politics and organizationaltransformation of these parties once they begin to engage in political competition. This is somewhat surprising in that, assome scholars have pointed out, organizational transformation is the most important transformation for successful adap-tation to new political circumstances. As de Zeeuw (2007) notes, a key challenge facing a rebel group’s transformation intoa political party is the necessary transformation of internal power configurations and the accompanying organizationalrestructuring. The organizational demands are very different when the purpose is military operations as compared tocampaigning for elections. Indeed,

Rebel movements are generally hierarchically organized with a clear top-down chain of command that has proven tobe most effective for military operations. In political parties, by contrast, executive power is normally less concen-trated andmuchmore democratically diffused throughout the organization, though there are any variations. Moreover,the nature of decision-making within political parties is generally more participatory, bottom-up, and consensual,reflecting the character of popularly representative institutions (de Zeeuw, 2007:14).

However, not all parties engage in decentralization and intra-party democracy as an inevitable part of the transitionprocess. Indeed, whether or not a party decentralizes and internally democratizes is dependent on the competitive envi-ronment it faces. As Ishiyama (1995, 1997) points out, if a centralized organization continues to be electorally successful(because it has organizational advantages over competitors, as was the case for many “unreformed” Communist SuccessorParties in post communist politics) then there really is no incentive for intra organizational change. Thus, party organizationalchange is a product of the interaction of internal organizational characteristics of the party and the competitive environmentthe party faces.

Studies of parties in post conflict societies show that some rebel groups-turned-political parties have different organi-zational features. Some have greater internal party democracy and are less centralized, while others have less intra-partydemocracy and are more centralized (Manning, 2007). Generally the organizational features of transformed armed groupsare seen as an adjustment to the structural factors in the party’s environment (such as the post-conflict competitive envi-ronment or the incentives generated by the electoral system). However, just as important are the internal party interactionswhich help shape the organization. For instance, who wins the struggle between the militant wing and civilian wings of therebel group-turned-party will have an important impact on the way the party organizes. de Zeeuw (2007) argues that if theleader and main party candidates took an active part in the violence, then power in the party will be more centralized, sincethey are likely to maintain the organizational features of the rebel group (with centralization of power characteristic ofmilitary organizations).

Despite recent interest in the process of transforming a rebel group into a political party, most literature on rebel group-to-party transformation does not generally incorporate the rich existing literature on party organizational development in newdemocracies. For instance, there is a substantial literature on the transformation of the communist successor parties ofCentral and Eastern Europe. These organizations, like rebel groups, were confronted with a sudden shift in the politicalenvironment (van Biezen, 2003; Grzymala-Busse, 2002; Ishiyama, 1997, 1995). This literature emphasizes the interaction

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between “internal” organizational legacies (i.e. organizational features prior to the transition) and the external politicalenvironment (e.g. incentives generated by political institutions and the features of the competitive space).

Like rebel groups after the end of a civil conflict, the communist parties faced very different political conditions after thecollapse of communism. Some organizations developed along certain lines, fully transforming themselves into competitive,western style, social democratic parties (e.g. the Hungarian Socialist Party, HSP). Others retained organizational features,and political identities, left over from the communist past (e.g. the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, CPBM, in theCzech Republic, and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, CPRF). Further, power was centralized at differentlevels, with the HSP and CPRF more diffuse, and the CPBM more centralized. This was largely dependent on the resolution ofthe political struggle within the successor parties, between what Ishiyama (1995) referred to as the struggle between“standpatters” (those who clung to the communist ideology) “liberals” (or those who sought limited reform, andacknowledge the necessity of electoral competition, but not an abandonment of communist ideals) and “reformists” (thosewho embraced social democracy and competitive elections). Whoever won the internal struggles established the partyorganization.

What affected whether one intra-party group won over another? Several authors (Ishiyama, 1999, 1997, 1995; Gryzmala-Busse 2002) have focused on this organizational question, which provide insights as to how rebel organizations mightdevelop. First, there is what Ishiyama (2001) labels the “externalist” perspective, which holds that the resolution of theinternal competition results from the demands of the political environment. The more competition the successor party faced,and the poorer it did electorally, the more the imperative was to change, which advantaged the “reformists” over the otherfactions (Ishiyama, 1995; Waller, 1995). Further, institutional factors such as the electoral system (Ishiyama, 1997), presi-dentialism (Ishiyama and Kennedy, 2001), and federalism are emphasized as important factors shaping the competitiveenvironment.

Scholars have also contended that the past organizational features of parties impact the ability to adapt to new politicalcircumstances. In other words, what explains the outcome of the internal struggle is not simply the party’s adaptation toa new environment, but rather the organizational legacies of the past. For Gryzmala-Busse (2002) some of the communistsuccessor parties adapted better than others because they inherited organizational skills developed during the communistperiod (such as managerial and bureaucratic skills). Different rebel organizations also have different organizational legacies(Ishiyama and Batta, 2010; Manning, 2007; de Zeeuw, 2007). Some were highly organized and centralized “bush bureau-cracies” (such as the EPLF in Eritrea), whereas otherswere relatively loose coalitions of different groups (such as the FMLN in ElSalvador). Different organizational legacies are likely to affect the organizational development of rebel groups-turned-parties.

These themes are echoed in some of the rebel group-to-party transformation literatureManning (2007, 2004) for instance,notes the importance of whether the leadership is capable of dealing with the new challenges of a political party and theorganization’s capacity to adjust to a peacetimemobilization strategy. The first relates to the transformation of the leadershipfrom primarily military leaders, to civilian leaders able to campaign for office. This involves the resolution of the internalstruggle between those in the organizationwho favor transformation into a political organization, and thosewhowant to staytrue to the values of the rebel organization (Manning, 2004). The second relates to whether “war-time packages of collectiveincentives remain both available and effective in the electoral arena”(Manning, 2007: 255). In short, rebel groups face twoorganizational challenges “those that imply adjustments in inter-elite relations, and those that require changes in the wayparties seek to attract a mass following” (their “collective incentive strategies”) (Manning, 2004: 55).

Söderberg-Kovacs (2007) examines whether parties make a successful transition to being a political party, concentratingexclusively on former rebel groups that transformed into opposition parties (thus excluding those that transformed intogoverning parties). Like Manning, she argues that an internal factor impacts on whether the transition is “successful” – thegroup’s degree of internal cohesion during the peace process. However it is also dependent on two “external factors” – therebel group’s level of popular support at the time of the transition and, the degree of legitimacy the international communityis willing to grant the rebels.

Jeroen de Zeeuw’s (2007) work on rebel group transformations into political parties highlights the internal struggle withinthe rebel group as it transforms into a political party. He differentiates between: 1) successful transformations (where thereformist perspective has won), 2) partial transformations (where an internal stalemate exists), and 3) façade transformations(where effectively the conservatives have won the internal struggle). The “successful” transformation from rebel group topolitical party is indicated by the complete disarmament and demobilization of its fighters, the renunciation of violence,a demonstrated commitment to implement the peace accords, and an acceptance of elections as the only legitimate means topolitical power. Successful transformations from this perspective include the NRM/A in Uganda, the EPRDF in Ethiopia, theFSLN in Nicaragua, RENAMO in Mozambique, and the FMLN in El Salvador. A partial transformation occurs when rebel leadersrecognize that their movement has to change in order to participate in political life, but they do not completely cease thearmed struggle, resulting in a hybrid military political organization. The IRA is an example of this model, as are Hamas,Hezbollah, Fatah in Palestine, the CNDD-FDD in Burundi, and the SPLM/A in Sudan. In a façade transformation, the groupspeaks the rhetoric of rebel-to-party transformation as a pretext for continuing to receive money and support, erectinga “façade” political front to mask their military activities. Examples include Colombia’s ELN and FARC, Afghanistan’s Hizb iIslami, and the LTTE in Sri Lanka.

What Manning, Sodeberg-Kovacs, and de Zeeuw share in common is a focus on what explains the “successful” trans-formation from a rebel group to a political party (successful in terms of the engagement in elections and the renunciation ofviolence). But what explains how the organization evolves after the successful transformation of rebel groups to parties?

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Theory

Based on the above, we can sketch together a theory that might explain the course of the internal struggle betweendifferent groups within a rebel group-turned-party after a successful transformation has occurred. Generally, as manyscholars have argued, parties are made up of different kinds of participants, who are motivated by different goals andaspirations (Panebianco, 1988; Schlesinger, 1984). Joseph Schlesinger, for instance, argues there are two fundamentallydifferent kinds of participants in a party’s activities – those who are motivated to join and participate in the activities ofa party in pursuit of ideational benefits (benefit seekers) and those who seek administrative or career benefits (office seekers).Further, parties provide organizational resources to participants, which include two different kinds of capital – ideational andadministrative (Hale, 2007). Ideational capital is the identity and values that attract voters to particular party symbols, such assympathy for the party’s platform and proposed policies or psychological benefits. Administrative capital is more material –this includes the offices and power that can be doled out to ambitious politicians. As Panebianco (1988) notes, as partiesdevelop over time they move from “systems of solidarity” to a “system of interest.” A system of solidarity is based on theconcept of a “community” of equals in which the participants’ ideological ends coincide (and where ideational capitaldominates). A system of interest, on the other hand, is where the party becomes a collection of individuals with differentambitions, goals and aspirations, and the party becomes an organizational means to manage these differences.

A similar transformation should also occur within a rebel group transformed into a political party. Indeed, as the rebelgroup enters into electoral competition, and especially if it wins seats in office, this is likely activate the office seeking impulsewithin the party, both by transforming existing leaders into ambitious politicians, and attracting outside individuals to theparty who see it as a potential vehicle for their own political ambitions. However, the differences between the benefit seekersand the office seekers is also likely more acute than in other parties that have not fought a civil war. Since the risks ofparticipating in a conflict are so high for potential participants, and the immediate benefits are so low, then it is likely that thelargest proportion of rebel group members are those who are attracted for “ideational” rather than “administrative capital”reasons. Offering the social incentive of fighting for a good cause instead of loot is likely to generate highly committed andideologically committed members (Weinstein, 2007). These individuals are unlikely to view favorably the compromise ofideals and values for the sake of electoral gain.

Party organizational development is a product of these fundamental internal struggles, even after the “successful”transformation from rebel group-to-party. These struggles include struggles over identity, and struggles over the concen-tration of power. How these struggles are resolved will affect how the party is ultimately organized.

The first struggle over identity, refers to the “purpose” of the party and the extent to which a party is based largely onprogram or on personality. This relates to longstanding distinction betweenparties that seek election to implement a program(programmatic parties) versus those that fashion a program to win election (electoral parties). The former generally ischaracterized by high levels of party discipline and the dominance of the professional party organization (as opposed to theelected representatives of the party) to enforce the party program. On the other hand for electoral parties, the incentive forleaders is to be as flexible as possible – hence programs are meant to flexible (and appealing) in order to gain access to power.

The second struggle is over the centralization of power “theway inwhich power is distributed amongst the different levelsof leadership” (Duverger, 1963:52). As Janda (1980: 180) notes centralization of power refers to “the location and distributionof effective decision-making authority within the party” which are the national party organs, particularly the leadership”(Janda, 1980:108). An extremely important aspect of centralization is who has the power to select the representatives of theparty or its parliamentary candidates (Lane and Ersson, 1991). Do nominations occur at a local level or does the power tonominate reside at a higher level within the party?

What affects the intra-party struggle for identity and power? As noted above, there are both internal and external factorsthat can affect the organizational development during the rebel group-to-party transformation. Internal factors relate toorganizational legacies. To what extent were the organizational characteristics of the rebel group an asset (or not) in assistingthe rebel group-turned-party in being electorally successful? Further, what were the organizational legacies of the rebelgroup? Although we have suggested above that the struggle between “benefit seekers” and “office seekers” is likely to bemore acute in rebel groups-turned-political parties than in political parties elsewhere, this likely depends on the “selectiveincentive” strategies of the prior rebel group (Weinstein, 2007; Manning, 2004).

For instance, Lichbach (1995) identifies four broad solutions to the collective action problem for rebel organizations,including Market, Contract, Community, and Hierarchy. The first three are related to the idea that organizations produce“capital” to provide incentives for individuals to follow the organization. Market solutions include the provision of materialbenefits (or lowering the costs of following). Groups that are endowed with access to material resources are more likely topromote organizational coherence via material selective incentives (and keeping to the agreement made by the organization)than are less well materially endowed groups. Collier and Hoeffler (2001; 1998; see also Collier, 2000) have argued that accessto lootable resources (such as gemstones or drugs) can provide a rebel organization with income flows that help finance theselective incentives needed to recruit rebel soldiers (Weinstein, 2005). Community solutions (akin to ideational capital)presuppose the existence of preexisting ethnic or ideological associations. These connections may be informal, such asregional affinities. They also can be formal, such as political parties that promote groupness and identity (Sambanis, 2001;Taylor, 1988). We might expect, then, that rebel groups that relied on community solutions are much more likely to havean acute internal conflict once the group transforms into a party, then those that emphasize market or contract solutions.

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In identifying the “external” dimensions that impact upon the transformation process of rebel groups into political parties,Manning (2004) has identified several factors that affect the “structure of incentives” (borrowing from a term used bySchlesinger) facing political parties. These include the recent historical context, the institutional framework that affects thestructure of competition, and international involvement, in the peace process.

There are several historical/contextual factors identified in the rebel groups-to-political parties literature that can affectthe organizational development of rebel groups-turned-political parties. First, a legacy of prolongedmilitary conflict will tendto lead to a greater centralization of power within an organization (de Zeeuw, 2007). Thus wewould expect that the legacy ofthe previous conflict, in terms of longevity and intensity will likely increase the tendency in the successor organization tomaintain this tradition of centralization.

Certainly another factor that would impact the process of transformation of a rebel group into a political party is whetherthe rebel group was victorious (and became the governing party) or whether the rebel group became one of the oppositionparties (Allison, 2010, 2006). Rebel groups that emerge as the governing party after victory, with all the spoils of access to thestate have far less incentive to change to new political circumstances then those that evolved in organizations that have tocompete to gain access to power.

In addition to the legacies of the previous conflict, there are institutional/competitive factors that affect the propensity toorganize along certain lines as opposed to others. One of the most often cited relates to the competitive environment facinga party. Janda et al. (1995), Harmel and Janda (1994), have argued that party change (including organizational change) occursas the result of parties reacting to changes in the political environment. From this perspective, parties are assumed to beconservative organizations that are unlikely to change unless forced (Harmel and Janda, 1994). Thus, party change is viewedas a rational and purposeful move by the party in response to specific stimuli.

For Janda, one of the most important influences on internal party struggles is when the party performs poorly in elections(1990). Janda et al. (1995) tested the hypothesis that parties will change only if they do poorly in elections. The authorsdefined five different kinds of elections as perceived by the party’s activists: calamitous, disappointing, tolerable, gratifyingand triumphal (Janda et al., 1995). Generally, positive results (tolerable, gratifying or triumphal) do not cause change inparties. Rather they found that generally calamitous or disappointing elections were associated with the greatest degree ofparty identity, indicating that parties only try to change their identities when voters reject the policy face they had presentedin the previous election.

Institutional factors can also affect party organizational development in some direct and indirect ways. Electoral systemscan promote the politics of personality, particularly single member district plurality systems in which candidates and notparties compete for election Certainly presidentialism can also promote the politics of personality and lessen the importanceof party program others point to the impact of presidential systems on the internal dynamics of political parties (Ishiyama andKennedy, 2001). Federalism can also tend towards decentralized parties, given that the structure of opportunities providesopenings for political influence at local levels, and party organizations reflect this (Janda, 1980).

The transformation of the CPN(M)

As an illustration, we apply the above framework to the case of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M), whichfought a long civil war from 1996 to 2006, and is generally considered a “successful” example of a rebel group-to-partytransformation (de Zeeuw, 2007).

The Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) was founded in Calcutta, India, on April 29, 1949. By the 1950s the communistmovement fragmented over conflicts in personality and program, largely over the issue of whether Nepal was ready forproletarian revolution, and later whether the Marxist Leninist or Maoist strategy was most appropriate for Nepal (Nickson,1992). The CPN was formed to struggle against the autocratic Rana regime and pressed for reform of the feudal agriculturalsystem. The CPN played an important role in 1951 uprising that overthrew the Rana regime. However the new governmentbanned the CPN in 1952. From that point on the communist movement fractured into several different (and contentious)underground parties.

The CPN(M) was formed out of one fraction of a kaleidoscope of leftist parties at the beginning of the 1990s, many ofwhom, while sharing a broadly Maoist ideology, differed over ideological questions such as who the ‘principal enemy’ was,and whether the time was ripe for launching a ‘People’s War’. Out of the morass of Maoist groups one group, the CommunistParty of Nepal-United Marxist Leninists (CPN-UML), originally based in the east of the country, became one of the mainparliamentary parties, emerging as the main parliamentary opposition after the 1990 reforms and the establishment ofa constitutional monarchy in Nepal. The party abandoned revolution and began openly cooperating with the Nepali Congress(NC), another opposition party based among the urban elites. Without abandoning their fundamentally Marxist outlook, theCPN (UML) had moved away from the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and towards promoting a democratic/parliamentary road to communism. By 1994–1995 they were able to form a minority government.

Other groups kept to the revolutionary line and operated more or less underground. In the 1990s the “Maoist” communistmovement was highly fragmented with at least eight separate political organizations calling themselves Maoist. They weredivided by philosophical and tactical differences regarding the establishment of communism in Nepal, particularly overwhether the country was ready for revolution. In November 1990 some of these groups formed the Communist Party of Nepal(Unity Centre) or CPN-UC, which was a merger of the Communist Party of Nepal (Mashal), Communist Party of Nepal (Fourth

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Convention), Proletarian Workers Organization and the Communist Party of Nepal (Janamukhi). They were joined later byother leftist intellectuals, such as Dr. Babarum Bhattarai and Shital Kumar.

In 1991 the CPN-UC held its first convention and adopted the line of “protracted armed struggle on the route to a newdemocratic revolution”. In 1992, an economic crisis triggered by the policies of the Nepali Congress led government promptedwidespread strikes and violence. A “Joint People’s Agitation Committee” was set up together with other smaller communistparties,1 and called for a general strike or April 6, 1992, Riots and violence broke out through Kathmandu with police firing ondemonstrators, killing an estimated 14 people.

In 1994 a group led by Bhattarai and Pushpa Kamal Dahal (alias Prachanda) broke away from CPN-UC, dissatisfied by theleadership’s response to the repression of the party, and formed a parallel CPN-UC. In 1996 that group took the nameCommunist Party of Nepal (Maoist).

Disillusioned with the limited changes brought about by the reforms of the early 1990s, despite the inclusion of the CPN-UML in the leadership of the state (which had transformed Nepal from a quasi-autocratic towards a constitutional monarchyandmulti-party system) the CPN (M) decided that rebellionwas the onlyway to end a traditional elite dominated system theyperceived as unresponsive to the needs of the peasantry (Weinstein, 2007: 301; Millard, 2002: 298). On February 13, 1996 theCPN(M) launched an insurgency, the “People’s War”, against the Nepalese state (Ogura, 2008: 7). The CPN(M) rebels initiallydeclared an all out struggle against the state to establish a “peasant-led revolutionary communist regime” (Skar, 2007:361).However, after five years of rebellion in 2001, and in search of allies and supporters, the Maoists restated their politicalobjectives, pressing for the election of a Constituent Assembly (CA), which “would be charged with rewriting the constitutionand thus transforming the constitutional monarchy into a federal republic” (Ogura, 2008: 7).

In the beginning, they focused their military activities on the poor rural regions of Western Nepal. Over time, the CPN(M)expanded their operations to the rest of the country (Singh, 2007). By 2001, the CPN(M) and its military wing the People’sLiberation Army (PLA) claimed 80% of the territory of the country to be under their control (Ogura, 2008: 7).

After the June 1, 2001 Palace Massacre, in which King Birendra and several members of his family were killed, and thesubsequent ascendance of his unpopular brother Gyanendra to the throne, the government parties were unable to come to anagreement with the new King on how to deal with the CPN(M) rebellion. Subsequently, King Gyanendra staged a palace coup,in 2005 sacked the elected government and began a period of “royalist military dictatorship” (Skar, 2007:359). Subsequently,the CPN(M) formed an alliance with seven major political parties of Nepal (the Seven Party Alliance or SPA) including theCPN(UML) and the Nepali Congress Party aligned in a common front opposed to the monarchy (Ogura, 2008: 7; Baral,2006:178). A series of massive organizations were organized across the entire country, culminating in a massive demon-stration in April 2006 that lasted 19 days, finally forced the king to step down on April 24, 2006 (Economist Intelligence Unitor EIU, 2007: 8). Subsequently, the parliament, in its first session since the palace coup in 2002, stripped the king of his powers(EIU, 2007: 10). After the defeat of their “common enemy” the SPA and the Maoists agreed to open peace negotiations and tohold Constituent Assembly (CA) elections (Nayak, 2008; 468). A Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was reached inNovember 2006, ending the civil war (Ogura, 2008: 7).

In April 2007, the CPN(M) participated in the 22-member interim government, receiving five ministerial portfolios (EIU,2007:7–9).2 However, the CPN(M) demanded that as a precondition for their continued participation in the provisionalgovernment that there be the immediate abolition of themonarchy with a declaration of a republic and the adoption of a fullyproportional electoral system (which was vehemently opposed by the Nepali Congress Party). After nearly 5 months ofpolitical impasse, on December 23 2007 the SPA agreed to declare a federal republic after the constituent assembly electionsand to adopt a parallel mixed electoral system here 60% of the elected seats would be allocated by the proportional system,and the remaining 40% by first-past-the-post single member constituencies (FPTP). Further negotiations increased thenumber of seats for the proportional representation system were to 335 (601) and the members nominated by the primeminister were increased to 26 from 17. The seats for first-past-the-post elections remained at 240, making the total number601 seats instead of the earlier 497 (Asian Development Bank or ADB, 2007).

Elections were held in April 2008. Surprisingly, the CPN(M) did very well, winning the most seats in the new ConstituentAssembly–220 out of 575 contested seats (the remaining 26 members were to be chosen by the government formed after theelection). Perhaps most surprisingly (given the party’s insistence on a fully proportional system) the CPN(M) won 120 seatsthrough the single member constituencies and 100 through proportional representation lists. Indeed, the CPN(M) was one ofonly three parties to field candidates in each one of the 240 single member constituencies (the other two being the NPC andCPN(UML)). The Constituent Assembly subsequently declared a federal republic, stripped Gyanendra of all powers, andarranged for the parliamentary election of a nominal head of state. Three mainstream parties, including the CPN(UML) andthe NPC, supported the NPC’s Ram Baran Yadav for the presidency. Hewas elected as the first President of Nepal, receiving 308out of 590 votes and defeating CPN(M) candidate Ram Raja Prasad Singh, who received 282 votes (Nepalnews, 21 July 2008;Xinhua – China Daily, 7 July 2008).

Subsequently the CPN(M) announced they would still be willing to ascend the Prime Ministership and form thegovernment, after agreeing to three points:

1 These included Communist Party of Nepal (Masal), the Nepal Communist Party and the Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist Leninist-Maoist).2 The CPN/M were awarded the ministries of Physical Planning and Works, Information and Communication, Forest and Soil Conservation, Local

Development, and Women, Children and Social Welfare.

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1. Maoists would have at least two years without being voted out of government,2. The alliance of NC-CPN(UML)-MPRF (Madhesi People’s Rights Forum – an autonomist organization for the Madhesi region

in Nepal) was dissolved, and3. Maoists would be allowed to get a “minimum program” voted through.

In the subsequent vote for Prime Minister, held in the CA in August 2008, Prachanda was the CPN(M) candidate and wasbacked by the CPN(M), the CPN (UML), the MPRF and 17 other parties. The NC presented Sher Bahadur Deuba its candidate,but Prachandawonwith 464 votes against 113 votes for Deuba. The CPN(M), the CPN (UML) and theMPRF then divided the 14cabinet portfolios between themselves and some smaller coalition partners with CPN(M) holding nine portfolios, the CPN(UML) six, and theMPRF four (Nepalnews, 16 August 2008). However within a year, Prachanda resigned from the post of PrimeMinister on 4 May 2009 after his move to sack the Nepalese Chief of the Army Staff, Rookmangud Katawal, was opposed byPresident Ram Baran Yadav (BBC News. 4 May 2009).

Post conflict organizational features of the CPN(M)

In some sense, the transformation into a political party can be thought of as a re-transformation of the CPN(M) intoa political party. However, although the CPN(M) had been founded with political goals in mind, it was fully designed, from thebeginning, to launch an armed insurrection, there “from the moment of its inception the CPN(M) was formed with thepurpose of mounting violent rebellion”(Klapdor, 2009: 35).

In many ways, however, the CPN(M) has made significant changes in its move from a primarily military organization intoa political party. On the one hand, the CPN(M) adopted a new political strategy in 2006 as a result of success in the battlefield,but also the realization that the military option would not gain access to power, based on peaceful means and alternativemeans to power (such as via a constituent assembly and elections). This shift was strengthened following the engagement ofthe party in the peace process in 2006, and was especially apparent with the disarmament of the PLA and the dissolution ofthe “bush” bureaucracy that the party had established (i.e. parallel alternative government and judicial structures) (Ogura,2008: 41–42). Thus in some basic ways the CPN(M) has made the transformation into a political party.

In internal organizational terms, the CPN(M) is organized along traditional Marxist Leninist organizational lines, with anemphasis on “democratic centralism”. It remains a highly centralized party, with considerable organizational capacities. First,in terms of centralization, candidate recruitment and selection are entirely under the control of the central party authorities.The PR portion of the candidate list is a “closed-list” determined by the party’s nominations committee (subject to mandatedquotas for women and lower castemembers andminority groups). Further as with other parties (notably the Nepali Congress)the party committee determines nominees for the individual districts as opposed to more local party organizations. Candi-dates are not required to be residents of the districts they represent for the SMD seats, providing fairly wide latitude for thecentral party authorities to determine who is run for election where. Thus the candidate recruitment and nominationprocedure is centralized at the highest level in the CPN(M).

Second, in terms of organizational capacity, the CPN(M) has long had a tradition of being hierarchically structured andcentralized (as with most overtly Marxist Leninist parties). At the top of the organization was the Standing Committee (theparty executive) then the Politburo, the Central Committee, the divisional commands, the regional and sub-regional bureaus,and district, area and cell committees. The most important political decisions within the CPN(M) were taken by the StandingCommittee, the top leaders of the CPN(M). The Politburowas also responsible for creating the political strategies of the group.

Further, the party inherited considerable organizational capacity as a result of its conduct of the People’s War. During thecivil war, in areas under rebel control the CPN created parallel state structures called “People’s Governments” (PGs) thatprovided security and social services as well as levying taxes (Raj, 2004: 92–93; Sharma, 2004: 46). The CPN(M) alsoestablished similar parallel power structures at the district, regional, and national levels. At each region there were “People’sHouses of Representatives” that were “to enable autonomous governance by local people” (Ogura, 2008: 19). This, coupledwith the pervasive sense in the countryside that the Kathmandu elite refused to deliver services to rural areas, resulted in thegeneration of considerable political capital for the CPN(M).

In December 2006, during a Central Committee meeting in Bhaktapur, the CPN(M) leadership restructured the organi-zation in preparation of a shift from a war time to a peacetime structure, with the goal of creating party organs the mirroredthe state structure (Ogura, 2008: 41–42). First they formed an 11-member Central Secretariat that became its highestdecision-making body (replacing the standing committee).3 With the establishment of the interim government in 2007Chairman Prachanda issued a statement dismantling the parallel People’s Governments, and People’s Courts. In August 2007,the CPN(M) fundamentally altered the national power structure of the party, by dissolving the Regional Bureaus, which had

3 Members of this Secretariat included Chairman Prachanda, Baburam Bhattarai, Ram Bahadur Thapa Magar, Krishna Bahadur Mahara, Dev Gurung,Mohan Vaidhya, Chandra Prasad Gajurel, Ananta, Post Bahadur Bogati, and Netra Bikram Chand.

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coordinated communication between the central leadership and cadres, replacing them with 11 new State Committees,reflecting their desire to restructure the state along new federal lines.4 As the highest level party authority after Chairmanhimself, five Central Bureaus led by top party leaders also were formed. These included a Central Military Bureau (ChairmanPrachanda), a Central Organization Bureau (Ram Bahadur Thapa Magar), a Central Front Bureau (Baburam Bhattarai), anInternational Bureau and a Central Publicity(Chandra Prasad Gajurel), Publication and Training Bureau (Mohan Vaidhya).Nonetheless despite this restructuring, the party remains hierarchically organized and centrally controlled.

Despite this reorganization, there were continued problems associated with the evolving identity of the party afterparticipating in competitive elections and the internal coherence of the party. Although there had long been ideological andpersonal “fault lines” within the CPN(M) these had been largely subsumed by the armed struggle from 1996 to 2006.However, as the civil war wound down, these fault lines became more prominent.

These internal fault lines divide the political leadership as well as dividing the central party authorities and local partyorgans. At the level of the party center, there are at least three identifiable factions within the party leadership that haverather fundamental disagreements as to how the party should proceed regarding the new constitution (scheduled to bepromulgated in 2011) and the degree of engagement with other political parties in Nepal. Each of these factions are associatedwith different elements of the party, and particularly the different groups that were the constituent parts of the CPN(M)whenit was founded in the 1990s.

The most radical group is associated with one of the Vice Chairs of the Party (and chief ideologist) Mohan Vaidya (aliasKiran) who had been the former Secretary General of Communist Party (Mashal) prior to its merger with the CPN(M). Vaidyahas argued that although, for the time being, the CPN(M) should embrace “republicanism” it should also ultimately preparefor the “People’s Revolt” (Nepalnews 25 August, 2010).

He generally rejects the idea of permanent cooperation with the “comprador-bourgeoisie” parties such as the CPN (UML)and the NC. During the period of negotiations leading up to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, he had advocated onlyindependent bilateral negotiations with the King’s government and not cooperating with the mainstream parties in a unitedfront (Khadka, 2005). Although during the civil war he was aligned with the party chair Prachanda, more recently a growinggap has emerged between the two leaders, particularly over the future revolutionary struggle. Vaidya appears to have thesupport of several top leaders, most of whom were elected from the single member districts in the Constituent Assemblyelection, as well as local party cadres.

The second group, the moderates, are associated with Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, an economist with a Ph.D. from an IndianUniversity. He reputedly has close ties with Indian Communist parties, opening him up to accusations by his opponents in theradical ranks that he is a tool of India. He had served in parliament in the early 1990s with the CPN(UC) but broke with theparty and joined the radicals around Prachanda. In early 2005, Bhattarai was reportedly demoted within the Maoist ranks asa result of an internal party dispute about the prominence of Chairman Prachanda. The substance of Bhattarai’s complaintswere that Prachanda was building a cult of personality around himself in the CPN(M) (Ogura, 2008: 20). He, along with hiswife Hishila Yami, (the leader of the Party’s women’s organization) and other associates were expelled for advocating policiesof accommodation with the other opposition parties (which in 2005 was counter to the CPN(M) party line). He and hisassociates were later reinstated that year when the party line changed after the royal coup.

Generally Bhattarai has touted a “moderate” line arguing for cooperation with the “comprador bourgeois” parties and thedeepening of the democratic republic. Although he acknowledges that the ultimate goal is the establishment of a “Peoples’Republic” this is to be put off until other pressing economic issues are to be addressed (Nepalnews 25 August, 2010). Bhattarai’supporters include many intellectuals in the party, several who were elected to the Constituent Assembly off of the Party liston the Closed Proportional Representation (PR) part of the ballot.

Generally Prachanda has navigated between the radicals and the moderates, but traditionally had, more often than not,been aligned with the radical wing. However, after the entry of the CPN(M) into government, his approach notably changed.He agreed with the Bhattarai moderate line of forming a united front with the other opposition parties after February 2005royal coup. He has also become more ambiguous about the timing of the institution of the People’s Republic. Recently, he hasbecome quite critical of the fractured nature of party politics in Nepal and the parliamentary system in Nepal in general(favoring a strong presidential system), sparking increasing suspicions about his own personal political ambitions.

This internal struggle appeared most recently in the August 2010 CPN(M) Central Committee meeting where both Vaidyaand Bhattarai, presented separate political reports that were at odds with the political report presented by the Chairman.Vaidya called for preparations for a new people’s revolt and the immediate institution of a People’s Republic. The Bhattaraireport apparently emphasized the need to continue to cooperate with the “bourgeois” parties and to seek a “unity govern-ment” that would deepen democratic republicanism and consolidate the gains the party has thus far achieved (Nepalnews 25August 2010). Prachanda, however, called for continued political engagement, but advocated transforming Nepal froma parliamentary into a presidential system. The group supporting Vaidya’s document blamed Prachanda’s group for betrayingthe spirit of people’s war and beingmore interested in holding power. Chairman Prachandawas also blamed for sidelining the

4 The names of the State Committees are: the Seti-Mahakari State Committee, the Tharuwan State Committee, the Bheri-Karnali State Committee, theMagarat State Committee, the Tamuwan State Committee, the Tambashaling State Committee, the Newa State Committee, the Madhes State Committee, theKirat State Committee, the Limbuwan State Committee and the Kochila State Committee. The CPN(M) separated the Limbuwan State Committee and theKochila State Committee from the former region of the Kirat Autonomous Republic.

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revolutionary leaders from important positions of the party and filing them up with those who support his policy positions(Nepalnews, 12 August, 2010). Although at the meeting Prachandra’s position appeared closer to Bhattarai’s, there remainspersonal tension between the two, given the widespread suspicion that Bhattarai may challenge Prachanda to become leaderand Prime Minister himself.

Another emerging cleavage within the CPN(M) is the growing division between the party leadership and the regional anddistrict party organizations. Generally, the local organizations tend to be more radical than the Party Center. There are severalreasons for this, but perhaps most because the local organizations tend to be dominated by younger and more ideologicallycommitted cadres. Indeed, since its beginnings the CPN(M) was very selective in terms of recruiting younger cadres to staffthe local party organizations (Weinstein, 2007). Membership recruitment for the CPN(M) was highly “selective” (Klapdor,2009), based on the candidates’ “dedication to the cause of the revolution”. Further, members were offered few materialbenefits for joining the CPN(M). Cadres were not paid a salary but given instead a monthly allowance of less than two dollarsfor items such as toothpaste and soap” (Weinstein, 2007: 302). Maoists tended to recruit from groups that had few otherprospect of success in Nepalese society, such as marginalized dalits (untouchables) ethnic minorities, youth, and women(Pettigrew, 2002: 307). Indeed 40% of local cadres in CPN(M) were women (Skar, 2007:370). Thus, the local ranks of theCPN(M) tended to be largely staffed by committed ideologues.

As long as the armed struggle and the Peoples’ Revolt were underway, the differences between the older generationleadership and the local cadres remained subsumed. However, in August 2010, shortly before the CPN(M) CentralCommitteeMeeting, these differences became quite visible when the leaders of the impoverished Kailali district openlyrebelled from the CPN(M) and declared their own Communist Party called the “Nepal Janashramik Party” claiming thatthey were compelled to take the decision as the CPN(M) “betrayed the trust of thousands of party activists whosacrificed their lives for the sake of the party”. They also accused the CPN(M) leadership of having diverted from itsmain goal “to liberate the masses”. They demanded that the allowances and other benefits being given to landlords andcapitalist classes immediately stopped and contended that the needs of former PLA fighters had been largely ignored bythe party leadership (Nepalnews 3 August, 2010).

Thus, although the transition to a political party has, to some extent, been completed, the transition has activatedsignificant organizational pressures within the CPN(M). Whether these pressures lead to dissolution and collapse of the partyor the party finds a way to accommodate very different groups within the organization remains to be seen.

Thus far, the party remains intact, and there is little in the way of substantial programmatic or organizational change (theParty still speaks of the inevitability of communism, and the impending creation of a “People’s Democracy”). There are manyinternal and external reasons why rather little change has occurred. Certainly the inherited organizational features of theparty borrowed from the war time period have helped to mobilize support for the party during the election. Indeed, the factthat the CPN(M) did so well in the single member district elections during the Constituent Assembly elections in 2008undoubtedly had a great deal to do with the high degree of local organization the CPN(M) as compared to its competitors,which were largely based in the urban areas. Further the organizational coherence of the party leading up to the elections wasbeneficial in mobilizing voter support.

In addition, external factors have not thus far compelled the CPN(M) organization to change very much. In part, consistentwith Janda et al. (1995), the CPN(M) has really not been challenged to change. First, it is facedwith a competitive environmentin which its competitors largely lack legitimacy in the eyes of voters. First, the actions of Gyanendra (who never possessedmuch in terms of popular support) coupled with the fierce resistance of the CPN(M) to the monarch, lent considerablelegitimacy to the party (Gupta, 2008: 4–5). Further there remains considerable disillusionment with the mainstream politicalparties, theNCand the CPN(UML) especially among the poorer rural population,which sees theNC as the party of the elites andthe CPN (UML) the party of merchants and the urbanmiddle classes. Public opinion polls after the end of the civil war showedconsiderable distrust of themainstreamparties, and considerable popular support for the CPN(M) (Sharma and Sen, 2006: 25).

Although for now the party remains unified and organizationally unchanged, future developments are likely to exacerbatethe internal pressures for organizational change. One is the persistence of the SMD component of the electoral system, whichis likely given that the NC strongly supports it and the CPN(M) has clearly benefitted from it. However, this will have twoeffects over time. On the one hand, the system emphasizes personality over program, and the CPN(M) was a party organizedoriginally along program and ideology. It is likely to increase the “politics of personality” within the party and exacerbatefurther divisions within the party. Further, as scholars of post communist parties have noted (see Ishiyama, 1997) the exis-tence of both a single member district component and a PR list component (as in Hungary and Russia), created within theparty leaderships a mandate divide, or in other words, ideological and programmatic differences between representatives ofthe districts and those elected off the list. Second, if Prachanda’s own proposal to move away from parliamentarism toa presidential system was adopted, this would further emphasize personality over program, and subsequently the furtherideological dilution of the CPN(M). Finally, if the proposed federal provisions are adopted in the 2011 constitution, this willlikely weaken the connection centralization of the party and enhance the power of the local party organizations.

Conclusion

The above paper has illustrated how the transformation of rebel groups into political parties creates internal organiza-tional pressures to change. In the case of the CPN(M) the transition to a competitive political party did lead to major

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reorganizational changes, but the party remained largely a highly centralized and organized structure, which enabled it to doquite well in the Constituent Assembly election of 2008. Further, since its competitors were quite weak and largely distrustedby the electorate, the CPN(M) did not face the kind of external challenges that would compel further organizational change(see Janda et al., 1995).

However, as the CPN(M) transitions into a competitive political party, this has unleashed a fissure between those in theparty who wish to continue to have access to political power (such as the Bhattarai faction and increasingly those around theparty chair Prachanda) by accommodating with other political actors, and those who wish to stay true to the party’s revo-lutionary ideology (the Vaidya group). A further fissure exists between the party leadership (which increasingly sees thebenefit of political engagement in the democratic process) and the more revolutionary local organizations. It is noteworthythat Ishiyama (1997) and Thames (2005) observed a similar struggle between the national party leadership of the CommunistParty of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and the local cadres of the CPRF. In the case of the CPN(M), the outcome of this strugglewill ultimately not only determine the organizational features the party, but whether it will be a party promoting peace anddemocracy or one that returns to the field to renew the People’s War.

This process will certainly be shaped by a number of political factors, of which include the institutional features of theNepalese political system that result from the 2011 constitution. Whether the Single Member District ortion of the electoralsystem is maintained, whether a presidential system is instituted, or if the promised federalism is also adopted, all will havea profound effect on shaping the internal struggles within the CPN(M).

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