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International Relations
This paper articulates one of the key challenges between Political Islam and
traditional International Relations, that is, the dichotomy between the state and
umma construct. The relationship between umma and state is a lens through which
we analyse the way in which the International Relations (IR) discipline struggles to
account for alternative theories. First the paper places Political Islam or Islamism, the
pursuit of politics on the basis of Islamic norms, in the context of ideologies. In doing
so we distinguish between Islamism or Political Islam the ideology, and Islam the
faith. With regards to IR we will explore how ideology is perceived in the dominant,
neorealist structure of IR as a tool of the state, and then compare this to the more
important status afforded to ideas in constructivist theory. The paper then moves to
define one of the key features of Political Islam, the umma  social construct, and
summarises the points of contention between it and the state. Political Islam will be
shown to be lacking in its conception of state-to-state interaction, its focus primarily
on the domestic sphere. Following this the paper does not ask of Political Islam what
it can do to accommodate the state in IR theory but rather, what can IR do to
accommodate the umma. In doing so, we critique the IR disciplines inability to
satisfactorily deal with alternative theories.
Distinguishing between Islam the religion and Islam the ideology
 Attaching a cultural label like 'Islam' to a state can be convenient in setting the
 
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What a label cannot do is tell us how that state is governed. At least that is what
Fred Halliday states in his work, The Middle East in International Relations.1 What
Halliday goes onto assert is that “ideology is a factor in foreign policy, but as an
instrument of state, as much as it is an independent limit on what the state does”.2 If
we examine this further with regards to Islam as an ideology; to what extent does an
Islamic ideology demand certain actions of the state, on the international scene?
We define ideology as standpoints that constitute “sets of belief about how the
past shapes the present, its triumphs and, never far away, its treacheries, how the
world works, and, equally important, about how it should  work”.3 This is contrasted to
Munsons definition of Islamic ideology as “a blue print for political action”.4 Munsons
„blue print for politics is devoid of the holistic appraisal of the world apparent in the
first, traditional view of ideology, a criticism that can also be put to „newer ideologies
like Feminism or ecological based ideologies. Are such ideologies which define
themselves around a singular issue be it the environment, womens rights or the
shari’a comparable to the „classical ideologies total conceptions of society? In the
case of the shari’a this could potentially be the case as, depending on ones
interpretation, shari’a does have something to say about every aspect of ones life.
Regardless of the status afforded to shari’a, or not, „Islam will be shown to be unable
to represent a univocal stand point as “the symbolism and the language is inherently
flexible and even ambiguous, one Muslims image can be anothers “counter -
image”.”5 However, since there is no dominant interpretation of Islams ideological
 
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stand point, everything, so to speak, is there to play for.
If, according to the definition offered by Eickelman and Piscatori, the political
is the setting of boundaries, a contest between actors who “seek to draw lines
between public and private, government and civil society, obligatory and forbidden,
moral and immoral”6, and ideology serves as the „blueprint for such political action,
then ideology has huge bearing on how one governs; governance being the explicit
emphasis of this definition of the political.
The return, “by state and social movements alike, to the espousal of a more
traditional set of values, associated with religion”7, is linked perhaps to a more
general ideological trend whereby people no longer identify with broad social
movements like they may have done in the past. It is argued that one of the reasons
for this is the pervasive hegemony of neo-Liberal ideology, which has led to a
situation where the „politics of identity has replaced the „politics of ideology, as the
latter is no longer an area for contestation.
However, there is a conception of ideology, albeit a Marxist one, that sees an
ideologys primary  purpose as giving one a sense of identity. This identity is a false
one in Marxs criticism of the capitalist ideology, “[papering] over the real conflicts in
society, making what is artificial and coerced appear natural and free”.8 Nonetheless,
the idea that the main purpose of ideology is as an identity broker does not mean it
falls outside of the more traditional view of it having a total conception of how society
should work. Indeed, a total conception of society will include categorising of peoples
into one group or another, there-by conferring some kind of identity onto these
 
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groups even if it is as basic as „us and „them.
Ideology however, can only be responsible for so much. Identity is dependent
on far more than just ideology. To illustrate, how many non-Jewish Zionists or non-
Muslim Islamists exist in the world? Or even simpler, how many Feminists are of the
male gender? This theory is articulated as „intersectionality by Crenshaw. She writes
about different „axes of analysis when talking about identity. In her example she
discusses two axes, that of race, and gender. She claims that academia fails to
account for Black women, who lose out both in feminist debates where they are
counted as „Black, and in anti-racist policies where they are considered women.9 
Similarly, there is a weakness in claiming that an ideological commitment can define
an individual. Being an „Islamist does not preclude being a parent, student, male,
female or any other of the multitude of identities we all hold, all at the same time. So,
rather than the sole purpose of ideologies, we would say that it is definitely a
component of an ideology to confer identity to the groups who subscribe to it, but
there is more than ideology at work when talking about identity.
Even so, a peculiar trait of the Islamic ideology is its ability to incorporate so
many of these axes of identity. It is seen to have such a strong draw because it can
appeal to almost every societal class you can think of, at the same time, without
contradiction.10 However, this statement is only true amongst Muslims, and has
notable exceptions (like homosexuals, for example), but adds to the reasons why
Islam is seen to be in resurgence in modern times. So if Islam can confer to
someone an identity, is it therefore an ideology as well?
 
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Religion and ideology are common in some respects. Both, for example,
speak from a position of dominance; both are “politico-tutorial”11 and have an
element of universalism about them. In the case of religion, it is only „our way, not
the alternatives that lead to salvation. In the case of neo-Liberal ideology, it
represents an “unalterable framework for social and political life”.12  The fact that
religion and ideology might operate in the same ontological space does not mean
they are capable of coexisting in that space. In fact, the very term „ideology was
coined as an oppositional notion to religion. Its originator, Antoine Destult de Tracy,
wanted in 18th  century revolutionary France to “set the human understanding of
ideas on a scientific footing”13, as opposed to the metaphysical source of knowledge
offered by the church. Schwarzmantel is even more critical of the trend of religions
resurgence in the place of ideologies. To him, religious ideologies “[emphasise]
religion as a divisive factor which functions as a basis of cultural identification and
undermines the wider unity offered by secular ideologies of politics”.14 But as
intersectionality theory shows us, an ideology cannot serve to provide societal unity
by virtue of the identity it affords someone.15 
The aforementioned „secular ideologies are however, tolerant and accepting,
at least in the case of the hegemonic form of Liberalism. Religious ideology on the
other hand, especially Islamism, is not. This is not meant to be an inflammatory
statement, but can easily be substantiated by looking at the  jiziya, exemption tax,
which is explicitly divisive of society. This is a tax on non-Muslims living under
 
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Muslim governance who pay to be exempt from military service. Indeed under the
Ottoman system a non Muslim could not serve in the military and so the tax was not
an option but obligation.16 Though in actuality jiziya is a policy not an ideology, it is a
policy which helps order society and so one can assume, given our understanding of
ideologys role in constituting society, that the jiziya is at least partly derived from this
(Islamic) ideological standpoint.
The previous arguments hinge on an interpretation of the shari’a which is all
encompassing, allowing for the „total conception of society that is definitive of an
ideology. Such a view is but one interpretation amongst many. Another popular
notion would see Islam relegated out of the ideological and therefore political scene
altogether, much in concordance with neo-Liberalisms take on religion. This
interpretation of the shari’a  sees Islams guidance as spir itual in nature, separate
from the temporal affairs of man. As Ziya Goklap, the so called “Grand Master of
Turkism”17 believed, much of the „Islamic rulings on the structure of society were
derived from Arab culture and further, „true Islam, “was a religion that demanded of
its followers „faith, and it did not confine its followers to any form of social
organization”.18 Indeed, “personal piety is one thing and ideological commitment to
the goal of a strictly Islamic state is another”.19 The fact that Islamic ideologues have
to stress so much that there is no distinction between religion and politics is perhaps
due to the fact this is not how the majority of Muslims view their religion.20 
 
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Political Islam vs. Realism: An Ideological Competition?
In international relations “realism, by most accounts the dominant paradigm in
international relations theory”21, views ideology as a tool to be wielded by the actors,
states, in an anarchical world. Realism, and there are varied nuanced versions of the
theory, presupposes the pursuit of power, material and social, is the primary
motivator for state behaviour. Ethics, morality or ideologies are products of power
and these material interests, not the other way around. So unlike our previous
conception of ideology, the idea that it informs ones view on how the world works
and how it should work, in the realist interpretation ideology does not necessarily
constitute an individuals appraisal of the world but is a tool used to influence
individuals towards the aims of states. Influence extends outwards from the state
and ideology does not or should not influence it or impinge on its capacity to act in
international relations. Such a scenario need not be as amoral as is often implied by
the literature on realism. It can be said that patriotism, the suspension of self for the
benefit of a collective, is one of the most altruistic gestures an individual can make.
When a collective is so roused and inspired to action, then self interest for the benefit
of that collective is equally the most moral action a state can take to protect its
population and help them prosper.22 
The central debates in International Relations have traditionally been between
the realist perspective and liberalist, teleological viewpoints.23 Constructivism is
relatively new to the fray and claims not to contend with what these more traditional
 
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scholars say or do, but tries to shine a light on what they ignore, in this case “the
content and sources of state interests and the social fabric of world politics”.24 
Constructivism informs the methodology of this paper as unlike the neorealist
interpretation of Arab and Muslim politics, ideology is in this region, and perhaps the
world over, more than just a tool used for self benefit.
Here we channel Barnetts arguments in his book Dialogues in Arab Politics:
Negotiations in Regional Orders, where he also places an emphasis on
constructivism to highlight the shortcomings of neorealist analysis of the Middle East.
Regional order in the Arab world, according to Barnett, is achieved not only by “a
stable correlation of military forces, but also because of stable expectations and
shared norms”.25 His emphasis on shared norms and expectations is what sets him
apart from neorealist thinkers and is where his emphasis on Constructivism lies, as
these norms are not set in stone but are liable to be constructed and reconstructed
by the various actors involved in the politics of the region. Given his concessions to
realist theory Barnett could be described as a „weak or „soft constructivist, but
anything less would represent an underdeveloped theory as realism, whatever its
shortcomings, still explains a great deal in the Middle East, where states ostensibly
seek security under anarchy; towards the end of the 20th century “the Middle East
remained the worlds largest non-OECD arms market, its total annual defence
expenditure around $60 billion, compared with... $37 bn for Central and South
 America. At 7 percent of GDP, defence expenditure was the highest for any region of
the world”.26 
In international relations actors do not want their choices constrained by
 
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ideologies which are here seen merely as “useful adjuncts to political power and are
nurtured for that purpose”.27 This of course resides in the realist world view,
assuming the nature of the game is self interest. However, the quintessential
constructivist Alexander Wendt claims that “[i]f self interest is not sustained by
practice, it will die out”.28 Certainly Islams view of human nature is sufficiently
different to bring about this change of practice; “[m]an is taken as he is... Islam takes
into account human nature, his capacities, his virtues, evils, strengths, and
weaknesses... It does not portray man as inferior, nor does it denigrate his role on
earth”.29 To claim self interest is a practice that could die out is a contentious
statement to say the least, but if self interest is a practice, then is it reasonable to
assume that there is a theory behind this practice of self interest? If so that theory
would have to be realism, which either through tragedy of the system (Neorealism)
or evil of the agent (classical realism) emphasises self interest.30 
But why, then, does this one particular theory, one among many, hold such a
lofty, universalistic appeal in international relations? It is peculiar that a universal
theory such as Neorealism, supposedly detached from history, seems to be, at least
in part, a product of its time; who can claim that the vision of a bipolar world as “the
best of all possible worlds”31 is not an assertion heavily influenced by the time of its
conception in the 1970s, and the Cold War. In the words of Nicholas Onuf, the
emphasis on the realist paradigm means “international relations [forms] a bounded
 
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and distinctive social reality”.32  In fact, Onuf criticises the very notion that realism
constitutes a paradigm theory as the base assumptions are something you have to
be told (anarchy) not something you can prove, as in the natural sciences.33 This
being true, which is not a claim easily substantiated, we would posit that as well as
being a theory of international relations, realism is also an ideology that one
subscribes to in order to gain agency and a distinct world view. In this way political
Islam as a possible counter ideology represents a threat to this „establ ished order of
things.
Having defined the term Political Islam as an ideology, and what is meant by
an ideology in international relations, the paper moves to analyse a possible method
of social organisation derived from that Islamist ideology, the umma.
Umma vs. State
Driven by their ideological world view of how the world should be, some Political
Islamists take issue with the structure of the international system, especially the
centrality of the state. For them, Islam sees little that divides persons except faith. In
this world view political association to a state which divides the unity of believing
Muslims is problematic. Their solution: the umma,  typical of Medieval Islam, where
by one is affiliated to a political construct based on their faith. This section outlines
the major differences between these two constructs, and how IR might fail to
accommodate an Islamic body politic.
 
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The European state developed through individualism, law and justice. The
Islamic concept of body politic, which we refer to as the umma, is based on justice,
group and leadership.34 This distinction is made by Ayubi, and though highlighting
some of differences between the state and the umma,  he fails to grasp fully the
different terrain the two constructs rest upon. For the purposes of his argument the
umma  represents an Islamic equivalent to the state. He proceeds to use the
differences he indentifies between state and umma to explain the differing formation
and behaviour of the two. In fact, the umma is not an equivalent to the state but an
alternative to it, as we will now explore.
Often used as justification for the particularity of the umma chapter 2, verse
143 of the Quran states, “Thus have we made you an umma justly balanced, that
you might be witnesses over the nations, and the Messenger a witness over
yourselves”.35 In this verse the word umma, community, is used in the same
sentence as nas, peoples or nations, signalling a distinction between the two. The
umma does not represent, like the state, a defined territory within which an authority
can govern. We can note that Western notions of rule are centred very much on
„government, tied to sovereignty and ruling over a specific  and defined   territory as
formulated by Webers notion of the state. Islamic jurisprudence however, makes
little distinction over territory and is instead focused more on rule over individuals,
regardless of where they live. When governance of Islamic lands was relatively
centralised by way of the Ottoman Empire, direct rule was not implemented over the
entire territory but over the people; “law was still... personal rather than territorial”.36 
 
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In the less lucrative, geographically remote or strategically unimportant regions in
was sufficient “to give recognition to local families of lords, provided they collected
and transmitted revenue and did not threaten the routes by which trade and armies
passed”.37 
In this way we designate an umma  as a community of believers who are
bound by the laws of that community irrespective of territorial boundaries. In such a
way Christians and Jews who partook of alcoholic drinks in Muslim territory, an
otherwise punishable act for Muslims, as long as this was not done in public, were
committing no offence as they were instead bound by the rules of their own
communities.38 Conversely the state, as derived from the Peace of Westphalia,
defines itself on the notion of territorial sovereignty39 and in this very fundamental
way differs from the umma which has no such notion.
If we presume the units that constitute political Islams concept of the
international sphere are ummas  not nation-states, then is it necessary for political
Islam to develop a more substantive theory of international relations, or find a place
to „fit within the current discipline? This is the question that drives this paper, for as
much as the state can be described as a Western or European construct, so too is
the discipline of IR. IR, using as its unit of analysis the nation-state, demands that
political Islam define itself in similar terms to be accepted by the discipline. Put
crudely, political Islam must „play the game, at least a little, to  be considered a
„legitimate theory.
 
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It follows that we will attempt to challenge commonly held beliefs about IR in
light of its specific historical development. Specifically, the centrality of sovereignty
and territoriality inherent in the discipline will be subjected to this procedure, labelled
genealogy by French poststructuralist Michel Foucault.
Political Islam’s inadequate rendering of the international sphere 
The distinction between ideology and political theory in regards to realism may be
semantic, but lends to our discussion as we have conceptualised Islam throughout
this paper as more ideology than theory, and so defining realism in the same terms
makes comparison between the two easier. Such conceptualisation may however be
in vain as it can be observed that political Islam is very much concerned with the
domestic.40  Its vision of the international sphere is in fact quite underdeveloped as
the state defines itself on what it is  and thusly looks very much into itself, not its
place in the international structure or system. For example, Sayyid Qutbs definition
of the Islamic state sees that “in the final resort it is concerned with the observance
of the religious law, with the care of society in every respect, with the establishment
of justice and equality in society and with the allotment of wealth according to the
principles which are accepted by Islam”.41 This definition deals explicitly with the
states relationship with its citizens but not its relationship with other states. The
Islamic conception of an international structure sees the world crudely demarcated
into „domains, most commonly that of war and peace, dar al-harb and dar al-Islam
 
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treaty, dar al-ahd . Fazlur Rahman unwittingly highlights this problem in his rather
vague description of international relations in his article, Implementation of the
Islamic Concept of State in the Pakistani Milieu.42  In it, Rahman refers simply to an
overarching peaceful intent citing a Quranic verse, “Enter ye all into peace, O,
mankind”.43 Beyond Quranic injunctions to honour treaties, even with enemies, there
is little offered regarding an Islamic theory or structure to international relations.
Whereas constructivism has “succeeded in broadening the theoretical
contours of [international relations]”44, allowing ideology and the realm of ideas to
play more of a role in how one constructs and implements a world view, we have
shown that political Islam fails to keep up in this regard. Constructivism helps to blur
the lines between different disciplines, Sociology and International Relations in
particular, helping also to penetrate the barriers between „domestic and „international
levels of analysis. Political Islams rudimentary conception of the international
sphere could thus capitalise on a constructivist approach to international relations,
helping it „construct a more comprehensive world view from its existing
religiopolitical foundations.
The Westphalian Narrative in International Relations
Presuming IR to begin with states as the „who and war as the „how (acknowledging
this as a realist presumption) it is not unreasonable to believe in the anarchic system.
This assertion is one that Nicholas Onuf makes to highlight that this most central of
IRs presumptions, is not falsifiable. We have to be told about the anarchic system, it
 
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cannot be proved. He elucidates, “[w]hile it was claimed that anarchy is the
distinctive condition to which the discipline responds, it is by no means clear that the
Western state system is the only concrete instance of international relations
available for study”.45 
The emphasis on anarchy, sovereignty and territoriality stems from the
„beginnings of international society and the Peace of Westphalia. It is claimed by
Kayaoglu that the emphasis on Wesphalia as the formation of modern international
society gives an undue bias to European norms and values. “This bias maintains that
Westphalia created an international society, consolidating a normative divergence
between European international relations and the rest of the international system.”46 
From this divergence IR has stipulated that to be considered part of international
society is to be part of this European normative heritage.
In a study of post colonial African states Herbst shows that the African
continent boasted varying political organisations in pre-colonial times. These are
simplified into two notions of pre colonial African rule; 1. Rule over people, not
territory. In this instance land was plentiful and population the constraining resource.
2. A notion of rule in which sovereignty was shared. It was common for land to be
owned by one organisation, and people another, hence “such were the limits of
territorial authority that the central government was often not concerned with what
outlying areas did as long as tribute was paid”.47 This is reminiscent of the Ottoman
example given earlier, where the Empire exercised direct control only in strategically
important or lucrative areas, satisfied with tribute from the other, more remote or
 
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unimportant regions.48 What Herbst describes as the paradox of African states
independence is that they joined the international community simply as a result of
decolonisation; “It was immediately assumed  that the new states would take on
features that had previously characterized sovereignty, most notably unquestioned
physical control over a defined territory”.49 Ironically in the African case, as too with
the Middle East, even those who defined themselves in opposition to Europe and the
West adopted the Western political organisation, the state, to rule. The only way
Herbsts African states would be accepted in the international community was to
adopt the Westphalian narrative, which coincidentally, or not, treats “the West as a
perennial source of political and religious tolerance in international society”.50 
To conclude as Fred Halliday does that “[t]here is no such thing as the
'international relations of Islam'”51 is perceived as inadequate to the IR discipline; as
was the case with post colonial African states, we can surmise that political Islam
„must develop an increased conception of the international sphere because if it does
not, it cannot join the international community. To further explain this position we
look to Mutalib and his analysis of the Malaysian state. He claims, “[a]s in other types
of political systems, those who do not subscribe to the ideological or philosophical
basis of the state (in the case, the non-Muslims) are not to be given leadership
positions in government”.52 While he is explicitly describing the domestic situation in
Malaysia we can extrapolate his argument to the international level; those that do not
subscribe to the ideological or philosophical basis of the international system (the
Westphalian narrative) will not be accepted as part of that system.
 
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The most striking points of contention between political Islam and the state
are sovereignty and legitimacy. When we analyse political Islam on the international
level, comparing it to the Westphalian narrative, the main point of contention remains
the issue of sovereignty. Unlike discussions on the domestic level, we do not mean
who or what institution can reign sovereign in a territory. Rather, how does a
construct like the umma, with dubious territorial boundaries and supposed
 jurisdiction over its subjects even in other, non-Muslim territories, interact with these
territories? Such supposition will not be attempted in this paper, we will instead
continue our exploration of the limits of IR theory and other possible effects such a
bounded political reality has on political Islam, and the challenges political Islam puts
to traditional IR theory.
Challenges to the Discipline
It is said that while Foucault proved that “an IR freed from the totalizing discourse of
Western, capitalist modernity remains impossible, this does not mean that we should
abandon the task of excavating the “genealogical fragments” of those pre-Liberal
voices “silenced” by the onward March of Western Reason”.53 If political Islam
represents such a „pre-Liberal voice then it does not necessarily need to be
excavated, or perhaps should not be excavated, as another of Foucaults
contributions to IR was a critique of universalism. Political Islam represents not just
another  pre-Liberal voice but, possibly, an all encompassing conception of the world
on a par with that offered by IR theory (and the dominant strands within it, neo-
realism or neo-liberalism).
 
18
Certainly those architects of contemporary political Islam, Qutb, Mawdudi and
Khomeini, all envisioned total and comprehensive change; “They saw no possibility
of coexistence between Islam and other political and social systems”.54  If political
Islam is to be articulated in such a confrontational way, perhaps there is cause to
leave it semi articulated, an incomplete ideology that cannot challenge the status quo.
Here we draw on Onuf and his constructivist stance that society, including
international society, is one which we create for ourselves. Unlike Realisms
assertions about the nature of man and other such universalistic claims, Onufs
constructivism acknowledges that the system which IR currently serves is one
created   by man, perhaps for the benefit of the majority, perhaps the minority,
dependant of course on ones point of view. On the centrality of the state he
comments, “a number of such violently erected centers of peace [states] emerge,
each a threat to the others, all vying ceaselessly and indecisively for influence. In the
logic of the Leviathan, these centers are locally peaceful because questions of
influence have been forcibly settled”.55 While his centres of peace are locally
peaceful, it is implied that the struggle between different or competing centres results
in conflict and violence.
There is, plausibly, substantial benefit to IRs limited scope in that by forcing
recognition of states and only states, albeit in the image of a European construct,
there is less of a reason for different centres of peace to come into conflict. In this
way, the local has transcended national boundaries so that we can consider entire
continents (North America and Europe) as „local centres of peace, in Onufs
 
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language. Of course this was the same claim made of the Westphalian narrative
before the chaos of two world wars.
The stronger argument would be to claim that the “total, comprehensive, and
revolutionary” 56  change demanded by political Islam could potentially create
considerable conflict as the progress made in transcending the local would be
bounded by those who maintain the current, Westphalian order and those who would
adopt a new, Islamic order.
Such an argument echoes the inter-war religious thinker, Reinhold Niebuhr.
Credited for developing what is described as Christian Realism, Niebuhr was critical
of the international careers of states, seeing them as primarily egoistic and self-
important. However, and somewhat begrudgingly, he alludes to the fact that the
British Empire might have be achieving the best that any nation can, in that the
international aims of the Empire are simultaneously congruous with her domestic
aims; that her self interest is in the best interest of other nations. His stance is
qualified by the fact that “[i]t is questionable whether her [the British Empire]
achievement is great enough to make the attainment of international justice, without
conflict, possible”.57  First published in 1932, it is clear now that the attainment of
international justice was indeed unattainable by the British Empire. It may be
possible however that the dominant forces of IR, chiefly realism and the primacy of
the market, are now the modern „equivalent  of the British Empire. While these
dominant IR paradigms might well be to the benefit of some states more than others,
much in the same way the British Empire primarily benefited the British Isles, they
 
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could represent the best chance at international justice without the application of
violence.
The point remains that the state is a European construct and it does conflict
with some non-European peoples, in this case, Muslims. If political Islam cannot or
need not develop a more substantial concept of the international sphere then it is up
to IR theorists and Islamic scholars to find a method by which the umma and the
state could do more than co-exist but co-operate in such a way that an umma might
conceivably join an organisation such as the European Union or any other
organisation that operates with states as units for admission. Dar-al-ahd   is still a
stones through away from dar-al-harb  and therein lays the problem with political
Islams conception of the international sphere. 
It must also be mentioned that this is only a „problem for those (non-Muslims)
found on the „wrong end of an Islamic world order. As far as din-wa-dawla  (faiths
inseparability from the state) ideologues are concerned Islam is a religion for all
peoples of the globe and the preferred order for international society. As such, being
compatible with the state is meaningless as in this hypothetical world order the state
would no longer exist.
Conclusion
 As Onuf attempts to demonstrate, we are able to accept the politics of Realism
without subscribing to the otherwise inherent universalism within the theory. This is
achieved by acknowledging the origins of international society and charting the
 
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 possible to „construct an alternative system that could give credence to concepts like
the umma  or dar-al-Islam. However, such an alternative system might very well
come into conflict with the incumbent realist order and as such, it would be better to
find a way for these two systems to move beyond their zero-sum relationship and
exist together.
Thinking that goes beyond the boundaries stipulated by „political modernity
will begin to acknowledge alternative forms of international relations. The concept of
political modernity is a bounded, European reality which other, non-European
cultures, must adopt and adapt to in order to achieve legitimacy in international
society.58 Alternative forms of international relations could stem from any number of
other cultural heritages such as Arab, African or Chinese traditions. Only when
modernity is un-hinged from the normative dominance of Western states, inherent in
a system created by those same states, can a truly multicultural and „international
society develop. As it stands these „pre-Liberal voices of other cultures are seen as
antithetical to reason and modernity. The universality of the current system needs to
be challenged so that the same „pre-liberal voices can be seen as co-contributors
rather than down right competitors. Senturk summarises thusly, “there should be
room for the advocates of different ideas, because none represents the truth in its
totality despite the sincerity of the claims of their advocates”.59 
In the case of Islam, as the international system is challenged so too can
Muslim scholars attempt to unpack religious ideas into a more complete conception
of „Islamic international relations. Muslims face, in addition to the boundaries of
58  Though we have taken this as our starting point, it is by no means set in stone that we
 
22
political theory, the boundaries represented by the faith of Islam. Between the two,
Muslims find little room to manoeuvre when conceiving a form of governance. Either
a Muslim can challenge the extent of Islams „reach in public life, as Ali Al-Raziq
famously attempted in Islam wa usal al hukum60 or he can challenge the norms that
underpin political modernity, or both. In challenging the norms of modernity,
genealogy, the tool used by constructivists to detach IR from universalism, could not
possibly be used to the same effect with political Islam. Genealogical treatment of
Islam creates an acute problem in that it threatens to remove the divine will that is
the universalist foundation of political Islam. Postmodernist tools like this “[threaten]
to deconstruct religious messages into mere fairy tales”.61 Such is the dilemma when
trying to integrate or account for a religious based order in the secular discipline of IR.
60   Al-Raziq, A: Islam Wa Usal Al Hukum (Beirut: Dar Maktab al-Hayat, 1966),
61 Turner, B: Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism (London: Routledge, 1994), pg. 78
 
23
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