Palgrave Studies in Political Psychology series

The Palgrave Studies in Political Psychology book series profiles a range of innovativecontributions that investigate the leading political issues and perspectives of ourtime. The academic field of political psychology has been developing for almost50 years and is now a well-established subfield of enquiry in the North Americanacademy. In the context of new global forces of political challenge and change aswell as rapidly evolving political practices and political identities, Palgrave Studiesin Political Psychology builds upon the North American foundations through pro-filing studies from Europe and the broader global context. From a theoreticalperspective, the series incorporates constructionist, historical, (post)structuralist,and postcolonial analyses. Methodologically, the series is open to a range ofapproaches to political psychology. Psychoanalytic approaches, critical socialpsychology, critical discourse analysis, Social Identity Theory, rhetorical analysis,social representations, and a range of quantitative and qualitative methodolo-gies exemplify the range of approaches to the empirical world welcomed inthe series. The series integrates approaches to political psychology that addressmatters of urgency and concern from a global perspective, including theo-ries and perspectives on world politics and a range of international issues: therise of social protest movements for democratic change, notably in the globalSouth and the Middle East; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its broader impli-cations; patterns of global migration and associated challenges of integrationand religious accommodation; the formation and deformation of political, eco-nomic, and strategic transnational entities such as the European Union; conflictsand violence resulting from local and regional nationalisms; emerging politicalmovements of the new left and the new right; ethnic violence; legacies of warand colonization; and class conflict.

Series editorsTereza Capelos is Senior Lecturer at the University of Surrey, UK, Vice-President ofthe International Society of Political Psychology, Co-Chair of the ECPR PoliticalPsychology Standing Group, and Director of the International Society of PoliticalPsychology Summer Academy (ISPP-SA).

Henk Dekker is Professor of Political Socialization and Integration at the Grad-uate School of Social and Behavioural Sciences, Associate Professor of PoliticalScience at the Institute of Political Science, and Vice-Dean of the Faculty of Socialand Behavioural Sciences of Leiden University. He is a recipient of the Nevitt San-ford Award from the International Society of Political Psychology.

Catarina Kinnvall is Professor at the Department of Political Science, Lund Uni-versity, Sweden and former Vice-President of the International Society of PoliticalPsychology (ISPP).

Paul Nesbitt-Larking is Professor of Political Science at Huron University Col-lege, Canada and Visiting Professor, School of Health and Human Sciences,University of Huddersfield, UK. He is currently President-elect of the InternationalSociety of Political Psychology.

Titles include:

Nicolas Demertzis (editor)EMOTIONS IN POLITICSThe Affect Dimension in Political Tension

Lisa StrömbomISRAELI IDENTITY, THICK RECOGNITION AND CONFLICTTRANSFORMATION

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Israeli Identity, ThickRecognition and ConflictTransformationLisa StrömbomLecturer, Department of Politics, Lund University, Sweden

© Lisa Strömbom 2013

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Contents

List of Figures vi

Acknowledgments vii

List of Abbreviations ix

Part I Introduction

1 Introduction 3

Part II Theory

2 Thick Recognition and Conflict Transformation 23

3 Identities in Conflict 41

Part III New History

4 Boundaries and Recognition in Israeli Master Narratives 69

5 Boundaries and Recognition in Israeli Counter Narratives 85

6 The Challenge 99

7 The Confrontation 126

Part IV Conclusion

8 Thick Recognition – Past and Present 147

Notes 160

References 164

Index 181

v

Figures

6.1 A model of narrative transformation over time, inspiredby Archer’s model of morphogenetic cycles (Archer, 1996[1988]:304) and adapted to the purposes of my discussion 100

8.1 Facilitating and inhibiting circumstances and theirtrajectories into conflictual relations 148

vi

Acknowledgments

Many colleagues have played important roles in the writing of this book.My gratitude goes to Karin Aggestam, Anette Ahrnens, Jens Bartelsson,Fabio Cristiano, Martin Hall, Maria Hedlund, Sara Kalm, CatarinaKinnvall, Åsa Knaggård, Helena Lindholm-Schultz, Dalia Mukhtar-Landgren, Bo Petersson, Sarah Scuzzarello, Anna Sundell, Ted Svensson,Maria Småberg and Ylva Stubbergaard. They all at various times agreedto read my texts and provided me with good advice as well as construc-tive criticism. I also direct my gratitude to the anonymous reviewerswho came up with constructive and very helpful criticism after readingdrafts of the manuscript. Thanks also to the editors of the series Politi-cal Psychology, who supported me and believed in the idea of this textbecoming a book.

I am also very thankful to a number of Israeli academics: DanielBar-Tal, Ruth Firer, Eyal Naveh, Rafi Nets-Zehngut and Avraham Sela.During 2009, they generously shared some of their time with mein order to discuss the topic of this book. Sharing their insightsand experiences made the book much richer, and I was providedwith the opportunity to “reality-check” many of the ideas devel-oped here.

Financial support for the writing of this book was generouslygranted by the Swedish research council, through the project MECW(the Middle East in the Contemporary World) and the specificproject “Exploring Peace Gaps”. Some of the ideas that I advancehere were expanded upon in two journal articles: “Thick Recog-nition. Advancing Theory on Identity Change in Intractable Con-flicts” has appeared online ahead of print in the European Journal ofInternational Relations, in July 2012 (http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/early/2012/07/18/1354066112439217). The other, “Identity Shifts andConflict Transformation – Probing the Israeli History Debates”, appearedin Mediterranean Politics, volume 18, issue 1, 2013.

On a more personal note, I turn to some individuals who have beencrucial to my general sense of well-being throughout life. My mother,Christina and father, Tommy, have always provided invaluable emo-tional support. In addition, they have given me a genuine sense

vii

viii Acknowledgments

that I can succeed in doing anything that I really put my heart andmind into.

Finally, Nils-Erik: you mean more to me than words can ever express,both because we share a special emotional connection and because youhave given me the most valuable gift one could ever hope for – ourchildren, Axel and Klara. I am so happy to share them with you, and toknow that I will continue to do so to the end of our days.

Abbreviations

ACPR Ariel Center for Policy ResearchDOP Declaration of PrinciplesIDF Israel Defense ForcesNIF New Israel FundIZL Institute for Zionist StrategiesNGO Non-Governmental OrganizationPSI Professors for a Strong IsraelTAU Tel Aviv UniversityUN United NationsUNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

ix

Part I

Introduction

1Introduction

Israeli identity, history and thick recognition

Memories of 1948

The Israeli debates over interpretations of the 1948 war, often called thedebates over New History,1 are the main object of analysis in this study.These debates focused on how to interpret the Israeli War of Indepen-dence in 1948, or as the Palestinians call it, “al-Naqba” (meaning “thecatastrophe”). The debates touched on fundamentals of Israeli iden-tity as well as the genesis of the State of Israel. They were immenselyimportant, as understandings of conflict and feelings of identity in thepresent are largely shaped by interpretations of events in the past.

The introduction of New History in the Israeli public sphere led towidespread controversy. After vigorous debates, in academia as well as inthe public domain, new textbooks inspired by New History were intro-duced in Israeli schools. Following the broadcast of a widely viewedtelevision documentary dealing with Israeli history during and after thewar of 1948, the tone of the debates became more ferocious. In thelate 1990s, influential politicians in the Knesset, together with othervocal actors, participated in the promotion of ideas that contributedto political decisions inhibiting further institutionalization of New His-tory. The initial success of New History was thus reversed as the politicalestablishment as well as a large part of the Israeli public opposed thepublic dissemination of the ideas inherent in the material.

The debates on the war of 1948 touched on fundamentals concerningIsraeli national identity, which is at the heart of the Israeli–Palestinianconflict. Those debates, which initially concerned history, later on cameto the forefront as media and politicians became involved in intensearguments with potent political content:

3

4 Introduction

The angry reaction by many Israeli intellectuals and the rejection ofthe new historians’ narrative by wide sections of the Israeli public,especially among veterans of the 1948 war, indicated that these revi-sions had touched a raw nerve in the Israeli consciousness. In fact, theongoing heated debate was not just an academic controversy. It was acultural struggle over identities and self-perceptions, with deep polit-ical overtones. One keen observer noted that the sharp oppositionand deep concerns these researchers have aroused [. . .] resulted froma perception that they endanger the boundaries of the current [Israeli]identity and are seen as a threat to Israelis’ self-image.

(Bar-On, 2006:155)

This study emphasizes the transformative potential inherent in thedebates over Israeli New History, and argues that they were closelyrelated to identities and relationships in conflict. As New History firstexperienced success and showed signs of taking root in official insti-tutions, and then waned and was removed from institutions, it servesas an interesting case where circumstances that inhibit, as well asfacilitate, the introduction of changed understandings of history inconflict settings can be explored.

Aim and outline of the book

This book emphasizes the potential for conflict transformation throughreformulations of history. Identities in intractable conflicts (Azar, 1991)are its main focus.2 One common feature of these conflicts is thatthey tend to be protracted and violent, with deep-rooted animosityand prejudice between the groups involved. They are also known forbeing highly resistant to traditional negotiation and mediation efforts(Rouhana and Bar-Tal, 1998:761–762).

The over-arching aim of this study is to develop an understanding ofthe recognition concept so that it can assist in furthering our knowledgeof the peaceful transformation of intractable conflicts. I develop theconcept of thick recognition, which pinpoints the transformative poten-tial of changed historical accounts in conflictual relations. I inquireinto a case of seemingly static conflict, and propose that the deadlockmight be broken, if notions of thick recognition could be introduced.The main argument is that recognition of crucial identity elements –such as widely shared understandings of history – might increase thepotential for relationship transformation in intractable conflicts. TheIsraeli case highlights the central element of understandings of historyin intractable conflicts. It also provides deeper knowledge regarding the

Introduction 5

intrasocietal processes involved when novel understandings of historyand identity are introduced in conflict-ridden societies.

This chapter constitutes Part I of the study, in which introductoryinformation regarding the subject, the book’s over-arching aim andmethodological issues are presented. It also introduces the reader to thestate of the art when it comes to research on Israeli history and identitiesrelated to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

Part II consists of Chapters 2 and 3. There I carve out the theoreti-cal notions that will later be used in the empirical analysis. Chapter 2introduces the main fields of recognition and conflict transformation.The reader is introduced to two dimensions of the recognition concept:thick and thin recognition. Thick recognition is the main theoreticaladvancement here, and refers to understandings of the other’s funda-mental features of identity. This in turn is related to the concept ofconflict transformation. Here the processual qualities of that conceptis underlined, contributing to an understanding of conflicts as undergo-ing constant transformation, even though at times they might appear asstatic. Thick recognition is theoretically linked to the process of conflicttransformation. This is a necessary step as the analysis in the third partof the book probes the Israeli history debates in terms of thick recogni-tion and relates them to processes of conflict transformation during themost formative years of the Oslo peace process.

Chapter 3 advances ideas regarding identity change in intractableconflicts. It further develops the concept of thick recognition, andconnects transformed understandings of identity to processes of con-flict transformation. Here the notion of core constructs is presented;this allows for an understanding of identity construction, which inturn highlights the malleability of collective identity construction, aswell as the common tendency for identities involved in conflict situa-tions to go through psychological processes which makes them appearvery static. The thick recognition concept is introduced as a key tothe introduction of more diversified identities, which could ease rela-tions between former enemies. As core constructs tend to be stabilizedin the social interactions brought about by intractable conflicts, it isclear that it might be difficult to alter relationships between the adver-saries. However, it is shown that when narratives of thick recognition areintroduced – under certain circumstances – those stabilized boundariesmight be altered. The chapter ends with a discussion on the relationshipbetween understandings of history, identity and conflict. Here, I buildan argument showing why it is crucial to link changes in historicalunderstandings to the transformation of conflicts.

6 Introduction

Part III consists of the empirical analyses in Chapters 4 to 7. Chapter 4is the first to address the empirical case. It introduces the Israelicommemorative narratives at the center of the debates over NewHistory. Here the traditional Israeli understandings of the war of 1948are analyzed according to the previously carved out elements inher-ent in thick recognition. Their respective views on identity, differenceand boundaries are thus scrutinized. The master narratives of Zionismand conflict are also introduced and assessed in terms of recognition.The chapter concludes that the Israeli master commemorative narra-tives seem to draw clear boundaries between Israelis and Palestiniansin their descriptions of the history of both nations. There is hencelittle to no room for recognition of Palestinians in either the mas-ter commemorative narratives or the master narratives of Zionism andconflict which are assessed in this chapter.

Chapter 5 conducts an analysis similar to that in Chapter 4. Herethe focus is on constructions of identity in the counter commemorativenarratives, as well as in the counter narratives of Zionism and conflict.It thus introduces the reader to the actors promoting New History, aswell as the content inherent in their historical understandings. It isshown that the counter commemorative narratives of New Historybrought thick recognition into the narrative constellation of Israeli soci-ety, forming a forceful challenge to the identities and understandingsof conflict inherent in traditional Israeli understandings of history. Thechapter clearly shows that elements of thin as well as thick recognitionwere partly inherent in the counter narratives of Zionism and conflictwhich flourished during the same time period.

Chapters 6 and 7 analyze the debates over New History. They intro-duce the reader to the fierce debates regarding historical interpretationthat went on in Israel during much of the 1990s. It was played outbetween different memory agents who tried to promote their views ofhistory in academic as well as in more public forums such as educationaltext books, and visual as well as written media. The chapters assess theinterplay between gatekeepers and challengers in their struggles to influ-ence Israeli collective memory. It is made evident that a vital part of theinterplay between different memory agents concerned influence overinstitutions communicating history to the public, such as media andeducation.

Chapter 6 covers the first debate cycle, in which New History wasintroduced and started to take root. The analysis addresses circum-stances facilitating as well as inhibiting the introduction of narrativesof New History into Israeli society in terms of recognition openings and

Introduction 7

recognition closures. During this debate cycle a recognition opening is dis-cerned. Chapter 7 is concerned with the second debate cycle, in whichNew History experienced decline. It is obvious that in the fight againstNew History, academics, journalists and politicians tried to portray thesometimes post-positivist, post-nationalist and most of all boundary-provoking message inherent in New History as a threat to the unity ofthe Israeli nation, and sometimes also as a lethal threat to the existenceof the state. The gatekeepers thus experienced success in their effortswith the result that the counter narratives of New History were erasedfrom Israeli official memory institutions. This is interpreted in terms ofrecognition closures.

In Part IV (Chapter 8), I present the conclusions that can be drawnfrom the study. The study’s theoretical advancement, together withits empirical analysis, has left three major imprints. (1) A processualapproach has helped to fine-tune the understanding of how narrativesof thick as well as thin recognition interplay with the development ofconflict. (2) The analysis has accentuated the role and importance ofactors within conflicted societies as they have the potential to questiongoverning assumptions of identities and relationships in conflict. Theseactors, in our case historians, politicians and civil servants working ineducation policy, for example, hence have the potential to influenceidentities in conflict through the introduction of narratives of thickrecognition. (3) The analysis also contributes to a deeper understandingregarding the processes of recognition openings or recognition closuresin intractable conflicts. Taken together this enhances understandings ofhow conflicts can transform toward and away from peaceful outcomes.Lastly, the book discusses current developments in Israeli society, andpoints to forceful recognition closures when it comes to nationalism,historiography and conflict.

Why recognition?

The concept of recognition has recently attracted renewed attentionamong international theorists who have developed the concept inshared concerns about the pivotal role of misrecognition as a gen-erator of conflicts. The notion of recognition has a long philosoph-ical tradition. The main source for philosophical inquiries into theconcept is most often Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1978), which hasserved as inspiration to later political theorists who have expanded onthe concept. The most influential of these are Axel Honneth (1995)and Charles Taylor (1994), who have both contributed contemporaryinsights on the recognition concept based on Hegel’s philosophy, in

8 Introduction

turn sparking theoretical development in several fields of inquiry. Thisresearch has subsequently been employed in the fields of internationalas well as conflict theory. However, in my view there are two signif-icant lacunae within this literature when applied to the internationaldomain, considered in this study. Firstly, contemporary developmentson the topic of recognition seem to work with quite a narrow definitionof the concept, mainly connecting it to interstate dynamics (Strömbom,2012). Fabry (2010) and Reus-Smit (2011) address recognition mainlyin relation to international systems of states. In the same vein, Lebow(2010) and Lindemann (2010) have a strong focus on recognition asthe main cause of interstate war. Recent works by Honneth (2011),Onuf (2011) and Wolf (2011) are also preoccupied with mutual recog-nition between states (Bartelson, 2013:1–2). This usage of the conceptbrings limitations, as recognition then only relates to state entities withapparently preconceived identities. Hence profound identity dynamics,particular to each collective – be it states or other entities caught upin the problematique of misrecognition – are overlooked. The inherentlogic of many intrastate conflicts – often characterized by vicious circlesof misrecognition – is thus disregarded. The conceptual developmentin this study contributes to an advancement of the concept of recogni-tion, so that it becomes applicable in the analysis of all kinds of conflictsdriven by misrecognition – and not solely in interstate conflicts, as hasoften been the case in international theory.

Secondly, the above accounts point to the fact that contemporarythought on recognition in the field of international relations theorymainly has focused on misrecognition as a cause of conflict – instead ofprobing ideas regarding how processes of recognition can also be under-stood as a way toward conflict resolution (Strömbom, 2012). Researcherspreoccupied with the concept of recognition often agree that recogni-tion – meaning that others acknowledge and recognize our existence – isa crucial feature of identity construction (Ringmar, 2012:6). The lack ofrecognition – misrecognition – is then in turn seen as a potential sourceof conflict (Markell, 2007:110). It is therefore imperative to investigateif and how misrecognition can be reversed. In this regard, my studybuilds on earlier work on identity aspects of recognition, such as thatof Honneth (1995), Wendt (2003), Möller (2007) and Allan and Keller(2006).

The concept of thick recognition – the main conceptual advance-ment here – moves the recognition concept away from its interstateconnotations and deepens our understandings of how identities andrelationships among parties to intrastate conflicts can be transformedinto more peaceful ones. In recent literature on conflict transformation

Introduction 9

(Buckley-Zistel, 2008, Dayton and Kriesberg, 2010), as well as within theliterature dealing with reconciliation (Auerbach, 2009, Rosoux, 2009)and just peace (Aggestam, 2012, Allan and Keller, 2006) there have beenefforts to think beyond (mis-)recognition as merely a cause of conflict.Here, researchers have focused on how to transform destructive relationsinto ones that allow for differences and promote shared responsibilityfor injustices in the past. I build my argument partly on insights devel-oped by these researchers, guided by the idea that the ultimate challengeis to increase understanding of how recognition processes can be spurredin order to promote peace (cf. Aggestam, 2012:94).

Foundations

A processual ontology

This study is guided by a focus on process, whether it comes to theoriesregarding conflicts, narratives or identities. A “process” here means“a causally or functionally linked set of occurrences or events which pro-duces ‘a change in the complexion of reality’. Furthermore, to say thata set of events constitute a particular process means that these eventsoccur in an identifiable time-series” (Jackson and Nexon, 1999:302).The theorists who have developed a processual perspective on the studyof society share the view that Western philosophy has always hada bias in favor of things and substances (Albert et al., 2001:3, Elias,1978:111–112, Emirbayer, 1997:288, Jackson and Nexon, 1999:301–302,Rescher, 1996:29).

Processes are understood as having priority over product, as processesare seen as the source from which “things” are derived (Stripple,2005:17). As my aspiration is to construct an analysis that accommo-dates the study of both structural factors as well as those concerningagency, the processual ontology is well suited as “relational scholarsreject the notion that one can posit discrete, pre-given units such asthe individual or society as the ultimate starting points of sociologicalanalysis” (Emirbayer, 1997:287). The processual understanding of realityis crucial for this study, as it enables a view of conflicts, identities andnarratives as undergoing constant change, allowing for the visualizationof transformation in social settings, which, like intractable conflicts, onthe surface might appear as static.

Power beyond the agency-structure divide?

The Israeli debates over competing historical narratives can beunderstood as a struggle over the right to define identity and differ-ence in that society. At the heart of that process lies a struggle in which

10 Introduction

different subjects strive to create the authority needed in order to for-mulate or reformulate narratives of identity. The power of formulatingidentity hence takes center stage. Thus, I partly follow Dyrberg (1997)who has elaborated on Foucault’s power analysis. “[T]he most effectiveway to understand power,” he argues, “is to approach it in terms ofprocesses of identification” (1997:13). Dyrberg does not refrain fromconceptualizing power in a more traditional manner, and addressesquestions such as “who has the power” and “in what manner that poweris manifested”. However, he states, those questions are on a lower-orderlevel, in relation to his main concern, which is the higher-order level ofpower.

The power that lies in the becoming of identity, or writing thingsinto existence through narratives, would be a higher order of power.3

That perspective sees power as productive and concerns the power thatrests in language, stories and other texts informing us about the worldaround us. Power is thus intrinsic to society and the agents that workin it. Power should be conceived of as a matter of relationships, ratherthan as absolute or isolated (Clegg, 1989:207, Simmel, 1994:203–206).Power must thus be thought of not as static, but as always circulating.It is never localized here or there, or in a specific someone’s hands: it istruly processual (Foucault, 1980:98).

The lower order form of power is also important, albeit having com-pletely different properties. In this book, the lower orders of powerinvolve the memory agents in the Israeli debates over history, whodraw on narratives such as those on nationalism, or on developmentor on different ideals when it comes to boundaries between groups.Their actions bring about the visualization of new power constellations,hence making room for the becoming of new identities. The abilityto influence societal understandings (through narrative descriptions ofreality) is thus viewed as a key component of power as well as a crucialingredient in political change (Hay, 2002:167). Through the subsequentdiscussions on memory agents and their potential to influence officialmemory institutions,4 the lower order of power is linked to the higherorder. The empirical analysis hence addresses the relationship betweenthe contenders in the debates and develops a conceptualization of theirinteraction in terms of power, as their interplay is understood as havingrepercussions on the broader narrative constellations of societies.

On epistemology

A processual ontology does not sit well with an epistemological foun-dation in objectivism, with its basic commitment to an observable

Introduction 11

permanent reality. In the previous sections, I discussed the importanceof societal context and narratives in conceptions of reality as well asof knowledge. This indicates an epistemological perspective with rootsin social constructivism (cf. Berger and Luckman, 1966). This viewasserts that understandings of the surrounding environment are depen-dent on the perspective and social experiences of the observer. Howand what people come to know is thus inescapably context-dependent.A constructivist framework implies that interpretative approaches aredesigned that pay attention to social processes, rather than searchingfor general laws about reality (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 1994).

We all, researchers and practitioners alike, evaluate problems from aparticular perspective (Asplund, 1970). Thus, the view put forward hereunderlines the fact that knowledge is situated (Haraway, 1996). The con-cept of situated knowledge was elaborated by researchers trying to finda middle ground between the opposing positions of foundationalismand relativism. It enables us not to make claims of finding Truth, butrather to search for reasonable positions through dialogue, conversa-tion, critical thinking and practical reason through which knowledgeclaims, theories, concepts and empirical results can be critically exam-ined, always keeping in mind that the knowledge generated is basedon a specific position or location (Bäckstrand, 2001:45). Knowledge isthus more a question of conversation and social practice, rather than anattempt to accurately mirror social conditions (Rorty, 1979:171).

Why narrative analysis?

This book shares many of the assumptions underlying the diverse,yet unified narrative paradigm. As such it is social constructivist andsees social reality as fluid and multifaceted. The research methodsused in narrative inquiry are mainly qualitative, where narratives areunderstood as an ordering principle of understandings of our reality.(Spector-Mersel, 2010:206, 209).

There are at least three good reasons for an emphasis on narra-tive within the framework of this study: Firstly, the study focuseson constructions of identity and their relations to apprehensionsof reality, which is often elaborated in narrative theories regardingidentity and action (Patterson and Monroe, 1998, Ringmar, 1996,Somers and Gibson, 1994). Secondly, there is also a strong focus onunderstandings of history and how they relate to processes of identi-fication in present day societies. There have been elaborate accountsin which narratives are seen as mediators between understandingsof history and politics in the present. Narrative is hence a suitable

12 Introduction

approach since it provides a historicized view of the present, as stories inwhich people situate themselves always present beginnings and endings(cf. Jenkins, 1995, Papadakis, 2003, 2008a, Ricœur, 1984, White, 1973,Zerubavel, 1995). Thirdly, an over-arching ambition of this study is toincrease understandings of how actions can be conceptualized whendifferent historical understandings are presented within a conflictualenvironment. Here, narrative theory also offer crucial insights, as manywithin the tradition have paid attention to the role of narrators, hereconceived of as memory agents, and their crucial function when itcomes to advancing different stories about reality (cf. Patterson andMonroe, 1998, Ringmar, 1996, Somers, 1994, Whitebrook, 2001).

Memory agents, institutions and narratives

National identities and official memory institutions

The people experiencing feelings of togetherness in regard to a nationalcollective always relate to national narratives as they are formulatedby elites, media and other public forums. Narratives of history areforwarded in official memory institutions and, as mentioned, they arealways dependent on the public who gives them legitimacy by accept-ing them and passing them on to the future or rejecting them, thusrevealing that they are found to be illegitimate.5

In the literature on collective memory and its relations to identityformation, states are often mentioned as fostering societal cohesionby communicating official views of history to the public. The use ofhistory curricula to foster national sentiment, for example, is a well-known practice in all modern countries (Al-Haj, 2005, Nash et al., 1998),and might be especially salient in societies involved in deep-seatedconflicts (Bar-Tal, 1988). In many societies, especially those sufferingfrom long-standing conflict, official history emphasizes the sufferingof the nation and also helps to legitimize its future goals (Papadakis,2008b:128). Hence, certain views of history, preferred by the politicalelite, are mediated to the public through different channels. Differingterminologies are used when describing this official memory commu-nication to the public. Mehlinger and Apple talk about textbooks usedin history education as a modern version of village storytellers, sincethey convey to children and adolescents what adults believe they shouldknow about their own society and others (Apple, 1993, Mehlinger,1985). Podeh (2000), and Al-Haj (2005), in turn refer to channels com-municating history to the public as memory agents. I find the latterterminology misleading as those channels have no will of their own,

Introduction 13

but are dependent on decisions taken by political actors. In this study,channels communicating official memory, or state memory (Tulvisteand Wertsch, 1995:312), are instead understood as official memory institu-tions. They are dependent on political elites and their political decisions,according to which they communicate certain views of history to thepublic.

Not only schools are understood as official memory institutions butalso history curricula, commemorative rituals sponsored by the state andeducation about conflict and conflict history undertaken in the military.This study limits itself to the study of memory institutions visible in thedebate material, which mainly concerned education.6 In the empiricaldiscussions the institutionalization of counter narratives is discussed,indicating a change in official memory institutions. As official insti-tutions have long been permeated by master narratives, changes ininstitutions are not accomplished overnight. Change is often gradual,and might be reversed through interaction between memory agents.

When commemorative narratives become inscribed into officialmemory institutions that constantly communicate the narratives ofcommemoration to the public, they tend to be quite forceful when itcomes to identification. Counter narratives can always be observed inthe margins of narrative constellations, forming challenges to currentmaster narratives. As master narratives have a history of being domi-nant and thus strongly institutionalized and embedded in the minds ofthe members of that community, they are quite difficult to alter. In soci-eties involved in intractable conflict, of which Israel is a prime example,master narratives have proved to be extremely resistant to change. Thishas to do not only with the fact that they have become heavily institu-tionalized into official memory institutions, but also the fact that duringthis process they have been strongly intertwined with security concerns.

Introducing memory agents

The agent is understood as central in the construction and forwardingof narratives and counter narratives. The persons promoting counternarratives as well as master narratives are understood as memory agents,and as such they propagate different versions of reality and hence con-tribute to understandings of conflict. This study sees actors as crucialwhen it comes to transforming relationships in intractable conflicts overtime. Here action is understood in terms of narration, and narrators ofhistory are in this context understood as memory agents, who havesimilarities with what Mitchell in conflict settings calls change agents(2006:29). They might have an impact on identity formation as they

14 Introduction

have the possibility to present the public with different identifications.However, they do not have the power to themselves affect either col-lective or individual understandings of history and identity. It is keythat they succeed in communicating their narratives into official mem-ory institutions, which in turn are very influential in communicatingmemories to the public. Once communicated through official memoryinstitutions they reach the public who in turn might respond in variousways to new narratives and possible novel identifications. Depending onsocietal context, and on individually held narratives they might respondeither by synthesizing “new” identities or by holding on ever harderto previously held ones (Bloom, 1990:39). The debates over historycan thus be understood as a struggle for the right to formulate thehistory of the nation, and inscribe that into official memory institu-tions, which during certain circumstances might have vast implicationsfor the identifications of the present and thus for the understandings ofconflict.

How then are memory agents identified? Possibly all individuals orgroups telling stories about memories are memory agents. However, inorder to confine the study and delimit it to relevant processes, the mem-ory agents of concern here are those who in the official debate and/orthe realm of media, politics or law have left some kind of imprint on theprocess. One might have partaken in a public debate regarding the warof 1948, or published an academic or journalistic piece on the topic orbeen part of a political or legal forum, where education policy has beendecided. I focus on actors’ observable presence and the possible imprintthat they left in the debates over New History. In order to identify therelevant agents, I have looked at different measures taken (Friedrich,1963:57) in the course of the debates. The act of taking such a mea-sure is understood as an act of the memory agent. In this way actionshave implications on institutions, as they actively in one way or anotheraccept or disagree with their content (Lundquist, 2007:129).

Memory agents propagating narratives of commemoration do so indifferent forums. One important channel where images of nationalityare communicated to the public is, of course, the mass media. Whenmass media express views on history and identity on editorial pageswhere specific views held by the newspaper publisher are printed, itis understood as broadcasting views held by certain memory agents.Moreover, mass media have another important function: an arena wheredifferent views meet and are presented to the public. When understoodin this way, mass media are not channels for the state or for a certainpublisher, but rather assume the role of a public marketplace (Nygren,

Introduction 15

2001, Petersson, 2006:43, Weibull, 2000) where different memory agentscan communicate their views. In the realm of mass media, different nar-ratives of the nation’s history are displayed, and thus it might be possibleto discern which narratives are more dominant at a given moment intime. Memory agents can thus tell their stories of commemoration andcommunicate them directly to the public in different arenas such asmass media, or try to affect decision-makers so that their views of his-tory are included in official memory institutions. Memory agents hencehave two major ways to communicate. One is in different public market-places such as the media, through which they might possibly influencethe public. The other channel has to do with influencing institutions,which indirectly might influence the public in the long term. In theempirical analysis of the debates, the memory agents are scrutinizedand the conception of them will be more complex, as the concepts ofchallengers and gatekeepers are introduced.

Gatekeepers and challengers

When making a distinction between historians who promote continuitywith regard to master narratives, and others who favor commemorativenarratives that indicate a desire for social change, I will use the notionof challengers when discussing promoters of counter narratives, as theyper se always challenge ruling understandings in society; defenders ofmaster narratives will henceforth be called gatekeepers, as, whatever thecontent of their ideas, they always strive to keep master narratives intact,and hence constantly protect them from intrusion by other narratives.

Gatekeepers hence advocate master commemorative narratives ofsociety. They tend to be negative toward social change, as they wantto preserve the master commemorative narratives of the nation andthe conflict, and are reluctant to change their habitual views of selfand other. Challengers promote counter narratives that break with tra-ditional views because they are optimistic about social change andpromote complex views of both the self and the other, forming a deci-sive break from the former stable boundaries between the unambiguousself and other (Heradstveit, 1979:130–132).

Narratives and counter narratives

One important issue in this study is how understandings of grouphistory in societies involved in intractable conflicts relate to thephenomenon of identity transformation. As sentiments connected tocollective identifications of a group are often woven into the historicalconsciousness of that group, the official historiography of that society

16 Introduction

is understood as a commemorative narrative with power to influenceidentification in that society. When that history concerns the specificnarratives of conflict, then it is even more obviously linked to col-lective identifications as well as society’s understandings of conflict.Even though narratives are multifaceted and always in flux, as they arecomposed by many competing ideas, some narratives dominate overothers at certain times. These are the master commemorative narratives.As they become inscribed into official memory institutions communi-cating history and memory to the national collective, they also tend tobecome dominant in the process of collective identity construction.

When discussing the construction of commemorative narratives asa process depending on contextual factors, questions are posed, notonly about the construction of master commemorative narratives, butalso about those that exist in their shadow – the silences and counternarratives in society. There are always stories not being told because fordifferent reasons they are incoherent with regards to the master nar-ratives and thus are marginalized. Counter narratives always exist inrelation to master narratives, but the two are not dichotomously related(Andrews, 2004:2). They can often be read under the surface of mas-ter narratives and are always in tension with dominant stories, neitherfully in opposition nor untouched. Counter narratives expose the powerof master narratives; their inherent power is also evident as they pointto the construction of the dominant story by suggesting other ways inwhich it could be told (Andrews, 2004:3).

Narrative change is a result of an essentially communicative act(Kearney, 2002:5), as the way meanings are interpreted in a society atlarge is an intersubjective process between narrators and their audience(cf. Buzan et al., 1998:31). Thus the memory agents promoting thecounter narratives make different moves in which they attempt to for-ward their stories. The result of their interaction is dependent on thepublic, who by different means choose to accept some narratives anddiscard others. Thus, the narrators alone do not have the power todecide which narrative is to become dominant in society. The inhabi-tants of that society are a constant part of the process because they haveto accept the narratives in order for them to become master narratives(cf. Buzan et al., 1998:28–31).

Previous research on Israeli identities in conflict

When it comes to the understanding of Israeli society, many writershave contributed important insights into its complexities. Light has

Introduction 17

been shed on processes of identity construction and various under-standings of the complex web of ideas constituting the different strandsof Zionism7 permeating that society have been proposed. In the pastdecade, important contributions have been made in describing thedevelopment of nationalism within Israeli society (cf. Kimmerling,1985, Nimni, 2003, Ram, 1998, 2003, Segev, 2001, Silberstein, 1999,Weissbrod, 1997). Research on Israeli nationalism has also been linkedto the complex conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. Severalresearchers have pointed to the connection between the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and identity construction, emphasizing the fact thatreconstituted identities in the long run might have an effect on rela-tionships in conflict (Aggestam, 1999, Bar-Tal, 2000b, Ben-Josef Hirsch,2007, Blomeley, 2005, Kelman, 2001, Levy, 1999).

Research on Israeli collective memory is thriving. There has beenscholarly research on rites connected to the establishment of thenation (cf. Zerubavel, 1995), the changing memory of the Holocaust(cf. Feldman, 2008, Tossavainen, 2006), and commemorations ofsoldiers fallen in Israel’s wars (cf. Ben-Amos, 2002, Lomsky-Feder, 2004).Recently researchers have also focused on collective forgetting, or amne-sia, in the Israeli context (cf. Ram, 2009). Several studies (Ben-JosefHirsch, 2007, Feldt, 2005, Ghazi-Bouillon, 2009, Levy, 1999, cf. Nimni,2003, Rotberg, 2006, Shapira and Penslar, 2003, Silberstein, 1991, 1999)have contributed to the understanding of the debate focused on inthis study. The most recent and comprehensive study on the topic waswritten by Ghazi-Bouillon (2009); it introduces the Israeli debates overhistory and connects them to an understanding of the development ofthe Middle East peace process. Here, conclusions regarding the impact ofthe debates on the peace process are mainly based on the opinions of itsinterlocutors (Ghazi-Bouillon, 2009:11). The study does not address thepolitical character of the debates as they are linked neither to conflicttheory nor to theoretical conceptions of social change. In 2011, Israelisocial psychologist Rafi Nets-Zehngut published a seminal study on thetopic of Israeli memories of 1948 (Nets-Zehngut, 2011). His disserta-tion delves into Israeli collective memory in a broader sense, since hegoes through representations of memory in five different societal insti-tutions. However, since his topic is social psychology, that study takeslittle interest in interlinkages to political and societal processes, makingit differ quite significantly from the accounts presented here.

This study draws partly on empirical insights generated by the studiesabove, whereas the theoretical framework is mainly drawn from else-where. The case at hand is approached from a synthesis of theoretical

18 Introduction

strands regarding identities, narratives and conflicts. Merging thesetheoretical traditions is rare in the Israeli case. It uses the Israeli debatesover history in order to generate theory regarding the transformationof intractable conflicts. Throughout the study, historical understand-ings are linked to identities and relationships in intractable conflictsand circumstances under which transformation of relationships in thelatter are more likely. It mainly highlights the role of inside actors inendogenous processes, something quite rare in theories of conflict reso-lution and conflict management, which often have a strong emphasison the actions of third parties. This study hence does not focus ondialogue between groups in conflict, but rather on dialogue within oneof the groups in conflict. By contrast, an open dialogue within thecollectives involved in conflict might be a first step in order to improvethe impaired dialogue between the groups involved in conflict.

In this study, the Israeli debates over New History are in focus,together with an emphasis on commemorative narratives (Zerubavel,1995). The analysis of Israeli commemorative narratives is based onboth primary sources, such as official speeches, educational texts andtexts used during commemorative rituals. The analysis is also based ona rich secondary literature that has scrutinized Israeli commemorativenarratives in general and debates over the interpretation of the war of1948 in particular. The debates over history as such will also be scru-tinized in order to identify how different narratives have been playedout. The content of the debates is in turn connected to other relatednarratives, as the aspiration is to link the social interactions regardingthe debates to the broader narrative constellation of Israeli society.

The debate material is mostly easily accessible as it has appeared bothin books, many of which were written in English, and in English editionsof Israeli broadsheets such as Ha’aretz and Yediot Aharonot. The debatealso partly took part in academic journals such as History and Memoryand Israel Studies. Even if some of the material is harder to access, bynow there exists quite an extensive secondary literature regarding thedebates, to which I can turn in order to find translated extracts fromsources that have not been translated into English from Hebrew. Thismight of course be problematic, as I have had to rely on translated mate-rial and sometimes on interpretations thereof. This was one of the mainreasons for conducting informant interviews, which I discuss furtherbelow.

When it comes to broader societal developments, I have relied primar-ily on the rich secondary literature concerning the ideational climate inIsrael during the time studied, regarding international influences as well

Introduction 19

as the impact of the peace process on the Israeli nation. Here there existsan extensive secondary literature dealing with Israeli developmentsspecifically as well as contributions regarding the international spreadof narratives related to peace processes in particular and collectiveidentities in general.

In addition to the material already mentioned, I have conducteda number of semi-structured interviews (Patton, 1980:36, Stenelo,1984:29) with people who have substantial knowledge of the IsraeliNew History debates and their surrounding context. The intervieweeshave been seen as informants, meaning that I have used our discus-sions to gain further knowledge and more facets of my research subject,rather than analyzing the specific points of view of each person thatI talked to. I also discussed my understanding of the wider course ofthe debates, in order to obtain validation of my interpretations, espe-cially when it comes to translated material. In this way, my knowledgehas been enriched, facilitating a multi-faceted understanding of the caseat hand.

Some might wonder why a person chooses to conduct a study ofonly one out of two parties to an intractable conflict. The cliché thatit takes two to tango is of course valid also for the Israeli–Palestiniancase. To achieve successful conflict transformation, both the Palestinianpublic and the Israeli have to change views about the opponent as wellas about themselves. In order to develop theory, there is, however, valuein studying the actions taken that might instigate conflict transforma-tion within one of the groups involved in intractable conflict, as thatmight be a way to instigate a transformation process. However, in thefuture development of events, it is of course crucial that the other partyto a conflict also partakes in the transformation process and offers thickrecognition to its counter-part in the conflict.

Part II

Theory

2Thick Recognition and ConflictTransformation

On recognition

Introduction

This chapter introduces the concept of thick recognition, which capturesthe transformative potential of changed understandings of identity insettings of intractable conflict. In the elaboration of the concept ofthick recognition, I point to a deep level of conflict analysis, whichis well suited for addressing aspects of identity. This approach under-lines the importance of endogenous processes among actors withinconflict-ridden societies. Thus, possible intrasocietal bases for conflictualchange are located. In order to expand knowledge of the transformativepotential of changed historical understandings in societies involved inintractable conflict, I also introduce the notion of conflict transforma-tion which furthers the processual approach employed here. An intro-duction to the fields of recognition and conflict transformation is crucialto the understanding of the rationale of this study. The perspectives alsooffer valuable insights into hardships and possibilities when it comes tothe possibility of changed identities and relations in intractable conflictscharacterized by stubborn enemy images and non-recognition such as inIsrael/Palestine, Sri Lanka and Cyprus.

Introducing recognition

When aspiring to achieve more positive relations in settings ofintractable conflict, approaches devoted to profound aspects of identityand how they relate to other themes in a society’s narrative constel-lation are necessary. One such approach underlines the concept ofrecognition. According to that approach, recognition is key to the estab-lishment of long-term peaceful relations, both in societies involved in

23

24 Theory

overt conflict, as well as in multicultural societies in general (Honneth,1995, Taylor, 1994 [1992]). Honneth and Taylor have developed theirviews of recognition independently from each other. However, theirviews share characteristics as they both base their argument on Hegel’searly writings (Honneth, 1995:92, Taylor, 1994 [1992]:36). Their sharedemphasis on recognition as essential for humans is based on the notionthat identities are shaped and become meaningful only in relation withothers (Taylor, 1994 [1992]:32). Honneth uses Mead’s writings on socialpsychology to clarify and make this argument more concrete.

G. H. Mead (1934) suggested that people cannot see themselves with-out relating to how others see them. Hence the emergence of identityinvolves not only views of self but also how others see that self. Thus,the constitution of identity is an interactive, social process (Jenkins,1996:19–20). Honneth argues that

The reproduction of social life is governed by the imperative ofmutual recognition, because one can develop a practical relation-to-self only when one has learned to view oneself, from the normativeperspective of one’s partners in interaction, as their social addressee.

(1995:92)

Struggles for recognition in Honneth’s view can be understood as afriction between the “me” (the internalized view of how others seethe self) and the “I” (every person’s untapped potential for identity-formation)1 (Markell, 2007:110). As this is a potential source of conflict,it is thus imperative to try to accommodate one’s own view of the selfand the way others see the self, in order to build more peaceful relations.

Some have criticized scholars developing the concept of recognitionon the ground that it should bring about justice through the distributionof equal justice between previously unequal subjects (cf. Markell, 2003,2007). The view of recognition in this study avoids that critique, asdemands for recognition here are not understood as means to obtainjustice. Rather, struggles for recognition are understood as intersub-jective human negotiations and struggles over identity that need tobe addressed if processes of creating, as well as transforming, soci-etal relations in general and in intractable conflict, in particular, areto be fully understood. In this study, the ideal of distributing equaljustice to parties is less relevant because recognition concerns socialpsychological processes and feelings of being respected in one’s differ-ence, which can contribute to conflict transformation. Taylor’s emphasison “equal worth” is therefore left behind. Many authors, such as Billig

Thick Recognition and Conflict Transformation 25

(1995), Reicher and Hopkins (2001), Volkan (1994) and Bar-Tal (2000a),emphasize that narrative change must be accompanied by broaderstructural changes in order to have wide-ranging repercussions on theorganization of conflicted societies. As much as I agree with them onthis point, this study departs from the point of narrative change anddiscusses circumstances under which that might be possible. Thereforebroad structural change must be considered in a comprehensive conflictanalysis, whereas it falls out of the confines of this particular study.

Another common critique regarding the literature on recognitionis that it should presuppose that boundaries are sources of conflicts(cf. Abizadeh, 2005, Markell, 2003, 2007). This is not the view suggestedhere. Identities are always relational and bounded. However, differencedoes not presuppose antagonistic relationships, nor must it presupposeother communities in the present (Abizadeh, 2005:45). Difference mighthence be a positive source of identification; it can also, for example, beother time periods or phenomena that are non-human, for example,those emanating from an eco-system. Thus, boundaries between groupscan be a source of conflict, and in that case it is fruitful to look intodifferent kinds of recognition. When boundaries are not a source ofconflict, recognition as a perspective has less to offer.

Honneth addresses social conflicts, and the imperative to encouragerecognition in and between groups, in order to lessen the degree ofconflict. The concept of recognition is relevant when it comes to thediscussion of transformation of intractable conflicts (cf. Jamal, 2000:38).The concept, when applied to the environment of intractable conflict,is indispensable in an analysis of factors that might contribute to moretranquil relationships in conflict. Mainly inspired by Honneth’s workon recognition, as well as recent scholars’ application of it (Allan andKeller, 2006, Barker, 2001, Bush and Folger, 2005, Jamal, 2000, Lebow,2008, Möller, 2007, Ringmar, 1996, Wallensteen, 2002, Wendt, 2003),I develop the concept and bring it into the discussion of transformingidentities within intractable conflicts.

The recognition concept and its origins

Honneth distinguishes between three types of recognition: love, rightsand self-esteem (1995:93). With love, he refers to the recognition thatcomes from intimate family relations such as mothers and fathersinteracting and affirming self-esteem with their children during earlychildhood (1995:98). It thus refers to acts of recognition within a closecollective. When it comes to the distinction of rights, recognition isthought of as an intersubjective matter of achieving legal recognition,

26 Theory

implying that a person is guaranteed legal status and recognized as ajuridical subject with guaranteed liberty as well as political and socialrights (1995:115). The third and last dimension is self-esteem, and refersto social esteem granted by others (1995:121). Self-esteem is directedat particular qualities that characterize persons in their difference. Herea more profound type of recognition is suggested. It goes beyond thesuperficiality of legal rights and points to recognition and thus accep-tance of individual differences (1995:122). These three dimensions ofrecognition are, in Honneth’s view, necessary for the feeling of self tobe undistorted (Möller, 2007:57). In the later development of thin andthick recognition, this study is concerned with the dimensions of rightsand self-esteem.

When it comes to identities in intractable conflict, a number ofresearchers suggest that the process of recognition should be consideredas a necessary element when it comes to moving the conflict out of thestate of intractability (cf. Jamal, 2000). In Israeli and Palestinian rela-tions, a shift toward more genuine recognition between parties wouldmake the conflict more of a more technical matter of sharing resourcesand territory rather than one characterized by enemy images, mistrustand delegitimation. That in turn would indeed increase possibilities forcreative solutions to conflicts caught in deadlock. Absence of recogni-tion, in the sense that it gives rise to feelings of misrecognition, canbe a source of social conflict (Möller, 2007:59). This is due to a disso-nance between one’s view of self and of others. Thus, lack of recognitionmight lead to different forms of conflict because such a situation can beunderstood as a threat to the destiny set out in the national narrative.Deprivation of recognition of one’s identity is painful and creates humil-iation, and in order to attain a conclusive establishment of a certainidentity it must be recognized (Ringmar, 1996:81). Legal elements, suchas ensuring legal rights to groups in conflict; as well as identity recog-nizing maneuvers, recognizing identities in national narratives, are bothnecessary in order to transform conflicts (Banerjee, 1997:37, Möller,2007:74). Some authors stress legal, procedural values, whereas othersunderline the importance of recognizing identity elements, and somefurthermore emphasize both aspects. I follow Allan and Keller (2006),Wendt (2003) and Möller (2007), who suggest a division of the conceptinto two parts, thin versus thick recognition.

To my knowledge, Allan and Keller offer the most elaborate accountof this dichotomy, and attribute it to Walzer (1994) and his context of“thick” and “thin” morality (Allan and Keller, 2006:197). Walzer him-self in turn borrowed the concept from Clifford Geertz (1973), who

Thick Recognition and Conflict Transformation 27

elaborated on the idea of “thickness”. Geertz’s concept of thickness andhis use of the term “thick description” were in turn adapted from GilbertRyle’s writings (1971). Ryle had tried to understand the deeper meaningof behaviors by aiming to identify the context in which they occurred.Huysmans also elaborated on thickness in his development of the thicksignifier approach (1998), where he discussed the concept of thick-ness and alluded to Geertz’ discussions on the importance of the widercultural context in which narratives or discourses are embedded in orderto fully understand them (1998:250). The distinction between thickand thin is also visible in the citizenship literature, and elaborated byauthors such as Tilly (1996) and Soysal (1994). In Tilly’s understanding,“thin citizenship” is mainly connected to state activities, whereas “thickcitizenship” is seen as efforts to build community through joint actionsby the state and civil society (1996:8). Soysal discusses the issue of post-national citizenship and argues that thin conceptions of community arenow being replaced by more inclusive ideas of human rights, which canbe extended beyond former national communities (1994:196).

Thick versus thin recognition

Thin recognition corresponds quite well with Honneth’s conception ofrights. It regards being acknowledged as an independent subject withina community of law (Möller, 2007:60, Wendt, 2003:511). When recog-nized in this way, one attains the juridical status of an independent,sovereign entity, and thus one is the legitimate locus of needs, rights andagency – one is a subject rather than an object. Thin recognition rests onthe procedure of accepting the other as a human being. This definitionof recognition is indeed thin, as the thickness of the agent is not recog-nized as such; it is rather left in the background, unacknowledged (Allanand Keller, 2006:197). The conception of the subject in acts of thinrecognition is universal in the way that the subject’s particularity is onlyacknowledged as a unit of difference; thus everyone with this status isthe same, “a universal person” (Wendt, 2003:211). Wallensteen’s (2002)use of the recognition concept in the area of conflict studies comesquite close to the notion of thin recognition, as he focuses exclusivelyon de jure recognition, where parties in conflict previously have notrecognized each other as legitimate negotiation partners (2002:51, 67,167). The mutual recognition between Israelis and Palestinians duringthe Oslo process is reflective of thin recognition. Here the opponentwas given the legitimacy of participating in peace talks; however, noth-ing was said about the other’s historical demands and identities, whichcould then be completely disregarded during the negotiation process,

28 Theory

thin recognition notwithstanding. Wallensteen’s perspective echoes thegeneral view of conflict research, where mutual recognition on legalgrounds is often understood as a starting point when initiating peaceprocesses. This is indeed an important element in all situations assess-ing conflict dynamics in efforts to move conflict into a more peacefuldirection.

Thick recognition resembles Honneth’s notion of self-esteem andmainly concerns being appreciated and respected by significant actors.It involves respect for the features that make a subject unique (Möller,2007:60, Wendt, 2003:511). This conception of difference is particularrather than universal, as the subjectivity of the other is underscored(Wendt, 2003:512). Bush and Folger define recognition as “the evocationin individuals of acknowledgement, understanding, or empathy for thesituation and the views of the other” (Bush and Folger, 2005:23). Thickrecognition thus includes the understanding of the other’s fundamen-tal features of identity.2 If understanding of those fundamental traits ofthe other is reached, empathy toward the feelings and experience of theother group might be achieved. The key here is the emphasis on empa-thy. The goal is not to reach consensus on one identity or one grandstory, but rather an acceptance of the other’s identity and history, andthrough that process one’s own identity becomes accommodated (Allanand Keller, 2006:199). Thus, thick recognition can be seen as an indis-pensable element in the process of building long-term peaceful relations(Allan and Keller, 2006:195). Through the process of thick recognition,parties might adjust their positions to work better alongside each other,in the process of transforming previously antagonistic identities:

The discovery that accommodation of the other’s identity need notdestroy the core of the group’s own identity makes these changespossible, and this kind of learning usually takes place during thenegotiation process. To find a common ground between identities, itis essential to genuinely understand the core identity of the other.Thick recognition implies full acceptance of the humanity of theother – including the contradictory elements of human experienceand their societal dimensions.

(Allan and Keller, 2006:200)

In addition, it is important to note that thin and thick recognitionshare one vital feature: renouncement.3 As both thin and thick recog-nition involve alterations in the images of self and other, they requirerenouncement of elements that have been almost sacred in the core

Thick Recognition and Conflict Transformation 29

construct. Thus some symbols, positions and advantages must be sacri-ficed, consciously or unconsciously, in order to grant recognition to theother. When it comes to thin recognition, the fact that one has longrelied on the belief that “there is no partner for negotiation”, it mightbe painful to go through the alteration of views implied in the processof recognizing the other as a legitimate negotiation partner. With regardto thick recognition, the process of renouncement is even more psycho-logically demanding. Fundamental identity aspects are then discardedand important symbols of the self might have to be sacrificed along theway. Both parties must be willing to pay the cost necessary in order torecognize the other. Thus, both thin and thick recognition imply con-cessions. This insight further contributes to understandings of why itis so difficult to change profound identity elements in intractable con-flicts. Each side must give up important symbols, elements of prestige,positions and principles that have been a vital part of the ongoingconflict (Allan and Keller, 2006:203). Even though the two forms ofrecognition both involve the process of renouncement, they differsignificantly when it comes to the aspects of the other that are to berecognized.

How do we practically go about differentiating between thin andthick recognition then? There is no ultimate division-line between theconcepts, but when separating them in practice there are some obvi-ous differences. Thin recognition concerns important acts when a partyor collective is accepted as a recognition partner or included in peaceprocess, for example. Then there is a distinct, however often quite asuperficial, acceptance of the other as part of a cooperation or nego-tiation effort, implying that their claims might be seen as legitimate,even if not accommodated or agreed upon. This can create ground forfuture cooperation, but unless developing into thicker forms, it mightnot lay the ground for peaceful coexistence. Thick recognition is moreprofound, and implies that important identity features of a collectiveare recognized. Examples of this can be past experiences of victimhoodor persecution. Acts when one party recognizes atrocities that have beencommitted against others and gives moral legitimacy to their historicalinterpretations can be seen as promoting narratives of thick recognition.One such example would be when Willy Brandt attended a memorialservice – kneeling in front of the monument at the Warsaw Ghettoin 1970. Thus an actor, representing a group guilty of war crimes orgenocide in the past, gives legitimacy to the other parties’ feelings ofsuffering and victimization, in this case implying that the actor takesmoral responsibility for those acts. Therefore, both forms of recognition

30 Theory

concern the legitimacy of the other, whereas one, thin, is more super-ficial and considers universal traits of the other. Thick recognition isrecognition on a more profound level and regards the particularities ofthe other’s identity.

The issues mentioned above constitute an area of interest that is alsocentral within the literature on reconciliation, which has been increas-ingly elaborated as a concept within the field of conflict theory in recentyears. It mainly focuses on peace-building strategies aiming for morepeaceful relations in conflictual settings. The literature on reconcilia-tion shares this study’s concern with understandings of history as crucialon the way to building more peaceful relationships (Rosoux, 2009:543).Many efforts for truth and reconciliation, trying to find one version ofhistory over which all parties can agree, as in South Africa for example,have experienced difficulties in obtaining justice due to the fact that ithas been difficult to once and for all objectively identify perpetratorsand victims of conflicts (Rosoux, 2009:549). There have also been prob-lems with double victimization as a result of reconciliation processes.This has been the case in Rwanda, for example, where bearing witnessof atrocities one has been subjected to has put women, in particular, ina very vulnerable position. This shows the difficulties in creating strate-gies for reconciliation, as some parties always tend to feel neglected orto experience renewed trauma when having to face violence and crimesof the past. This study hence shares the effort to address the past in itsconcern with understandings of history with the literature on recon-ciliation. However, this study is more process-oriented and has a moreanalytical approach, as its main goal is to advance theory rather thanto create peace-building strategies. This study also attends to attemptsfrom inside actors within one party to conflict, and does not focus ondirect interaction between the conflicting parties, which is often the aimin the literature on reconciliation.

Likewise, this study’s focus on thick recognition and relationshiptransformation intersects with the concept of peace education, whichis a comprehensive term encompassing many research traditions thatproduce material functioning as policy advice for practitioners (Feldt,2008:201, Salomon, 2002). In many ways it builds on the idealistic peacetradition of Johan Galtung, combined with strands of progressive educa-tion, democratization, multi-culturalism and NGO (non-governmentalorganization) projects concerning peaceful coexistence and acknowl-edging the story of the other (Feldt, 2008:202). As mentioned above,this study is not prescriptive and therefore does not offer clear-cut policyrecommendations, nor does it propose what kind of history ought to be

Thick Recognition and Conflict Transformation 31

taught in order to foster peace. The contribution that it might add to thefield of peace education is the multi-narrative approach. The suggestionis that the allowance and advocacy of a multiplicity of historical narra-tives can serve as a fertile ground for seeds of peace to be sown; however,that must coincide with other facilitating circumstances in order to besuccessful.

The above sections have introduced the concept of thick recognition,which will be further developed in Chapter 3. When I later on move tothe empirical analysis, the process of thick recognition will be related toelements of thin recognition inherent in the Israeli–Palestinian peaceprocess, and the dynamic interplay between thick and thin recogni-tion often observed during peace processes will be further probed.In the following, our attention is shifted to the relationship betweenrecognition and processes of conflict transformation.

Conflict transformation

The social construction of conflict

The approach to conflict in this study has been inspired by conflictanalysts who have participated in the development of an emerg-ing literature on how social categories, such as friends and enemies,are created within conflicts since the 1990s (cf. Buckley-Zistel, 2008,Campbell, 1992, 1998, Jabri, 1996, Ramsbotham, 2010, Shapiro, 1997,Slocum-Bradley, 2008, Suganami, 1996).

The most important insights emerging from conflict analyses focusingon the socially constructed understandings within conflict are thatunderstandings of parties in conflict are not “misperceptions”, but partof the narratives that contribute to the constitution of collective iden-tities (Buckley-Zistel, 2008:4). In this view, identities are understoodas constituted alongside difference, and the boundary separating selfand other is understood as a potential source of conflict (Jabri, 1996).However, some of the studies that underline the constructed natureof conflicts tend to have a solely descriptive focus. It is importantto develop that understanding and connect it to relevant theories ofconflictual change so that processes of transformation within socialconflicts can be grasped.

In order to bring change into the locus of the study, the literatureon conflict transformation is employed. In contrast, the theoreticaltradition called conflict management mainly seeks to contain conflict,without necessarily addressing its underlying causes (Miall et al.,1999:29). The conflict resolution approach instead seeks ends to conflicts

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through the act of attending to basic needs of the conflicting par-ties, such as security and identity (Aggestam, 1999:22–25, Miall et al.,1999:29). Contrary to those two approaches, conflict transformationembraces the notion that holds that conflicts are non-linear, cyclicalprocesses. Conflicts are hence understood as part and parcel of the socialconstruction of societies (Lederach, 1996:8–9). Therefore they cannot beended once and for all, but our understanding of their transformationcan be increased. Conflict transformation is emphasized by researchersseeking to encourage broader social change through the transformation4

of antagonistic relationships between the conflicting parties. Conflictsare then situated in social relations between the collective identities ofthe parties to conflict (Buckley-Zistel, 2008:22). Conflicts are hence seenas undergoing constant change, and, in their development over time,periods of both peaceful and violent transformation can be observed.(Kriesberg, 2007:294–295). Conflicts are moreover understood as resid-ing within the very structures of society, meaning that asymmetriesand structural parameters must be addressed if constructive conflicttransformation is to be achieved.

Conflict transformation – a processual approach

Within the conflict transformation paradigm, it is not so much thespecific war or battle that is of interest, but rather the more generalexperience of conflict altogether (Wallensteen, 1991:129). Conflict inthis perspective is conceived of as a holistic phenomenon, and thegoal is not so much to solve problems (Väyrynen, 1991:1–2) as it isto describe and increase the understanding of the inherently dialec-tic nature of conflict (Lederach, 1996:17). The conflict transformationparadigm can be described as being mainly concerned with relationalaspects of conflict, and the main goal for practitioners and researchers isthus to identify and/or respond to opportunities for empowerment andrecognition.

Within this tradition, many writers emphasize the importance ofchange in attitudes toward both the adversary and one’s own group as anecessary step in the process leading toward transformation of conflict(cf. Buckley-Zistel, 2008, Diamond & MacDonald, 1996, 1997, Kriesberg,1993, Lederach, 1996, Miall et al., 1999, Mitchell, 2002, Northrup,1989, Sahadevan, 1997, Saunders, 2003). The conflict transformationapproach ascribes importance to all levels of society (Lederach, 1996:17),from elites to grassroots, as well as third parties to conflicts, argu-ing that agents representing all those arenas need to be involved inorder to achieve the goal of reducing conflict. This approach seeks

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to encourage broad social change through transforming antagonisticrelationships between parties in conflict (Buckley-Zistel, 2008:21). Thiscan concern malevolent relationships such as those between partiesin Israel–Palestine, but also the transformation of asymmetrical soci-etal structures, such as the unequal power-relations between the stateof Israel and the Palestinian authority where the latter often has beentreated as a state actor even though lacking institutional as well asterritorial autonomy and resources.

One might argue that the conflict transformation approach attendsmore to the sources of complex conflicts than to their material symp-toms (Jamal, 2000:37). As conflicts are viewed as the socially constructedphenomena, we are presented with opportunities for transformation indirections that can reshape understandings and social relationships andlead to mutually beneficial outcomes for involved parties (Lederach,1996:19). In this case, the antagonists in conflict are able to changetheir impaired relationship into one that allows for mutual acceptance(Buckley-Zistel, 2008:22).

Within the conflict transformation paradigm, the fact that conflictsare seldom completely eradicated is highlighted. The focus is insteadon how conflict might transform into more or less violent realities(Galtung, 1995:53, Kriesberg, 2001:375, Väyrynen, 1991:4). Mitchell(2002) discusses whether to analytically emphasize conflict transforma-tion as an inherent processual value or to view the outcome of thetransformation process as the main goal. As conflicts are understoodas undergoing constant change, a focus on process rather than outcomeis hence most suitable here. The approach suggested is to further theunderstanding of parts of the process of transformation, leading to moreor less destructive relations. Then direct attention is paid to the processof building more peaceful relationships.

The conflict transformation approach has been used in the searchfor an adequate language to describe efforts to create peace, and wasoriginally developed by researchers such as Adam Curle (1991), LouisKriesberg (1989), Raimo Väyrynen (1991) and Kumar Rupesinghe (1994,1995). Those researchers and others all underline the processual char-acter of conflicts, and contribute to the understanding of conflicts asundergoing constant transformation, even though they at times mightappear as static. Researchers such as Johan Galtung tend to place strongemphasis on structures in processes of conflict transformation, whereasother writers within the tradition, such as Kriesberg (1989, 2003),Lederach (1996), Mitchell (2002), Buckley-Zistel (2008) and others, puta stronger emphasis on process, emphasizing the dynamic interplay

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between actors and structures in conflictual change. When conflicts areconceived of in this way, new opportunities for transformation emerge,as conflicts then can be un-, re-, or de-constructed, implying that theycan become transformed. Throughout such processes, it can be envi-sioned that parties to conflict are able to change their relationship intoone which allows for mutual acceptance (Buckley-Zistel, 2008:22). Thisstudy is located within that area, as I develop the concept of thick recog-nition, which is regarded as one way to change relationships in conflict,which is seen as part of the process of conflict transformation.

I hence seek to investigate collective identities involved in conflict,and how those contribute to sustaining conflicts. In order to locateconstituencies for change, theoretical perspectives allowing for reformu-lation of identities, which in turn might bring about relationship changewithin conflict, must be incorporated. Guided by researchers within theconflict transformation paradigm, as well as those focusing specificallyon the area of recognition (Allan and Keller, 2006, Banerjee, 1997, Bushand Folger, 2005, Jamal, 2000, Möller, 2007, Wendt, 2003), this studyin turn develops the concept of thick recognition.5 In carving out thatconcept, this book seeks to deepen our understanding of facilitating andinhibiting circumstances when it comes to introducing changed under-standings of history in societies tormented by intractable conflicts.Those facilitating circumstances are here understood as leading to recog-nition openings, and inhibiting circumstances in turn cause recognitionclosures. Recognition openings as well as recognition closures are inturn seen as feeding into different processes of conflict transformation(Kriesberg, 2007:156, 187). A recognition opening is observed when nar-ratives of recognition are disseminated in society and start to take rootin different forums available to the public. A recognition closure mightoccur when narratives of recognition for different reasons cannot becommunicated. Then the public, regardless of their own context andbackground would not even be exposed to narratives of recognitionand authorities might even try to work against and delegitimize suchnarratives.

I have now covered important dimensions of theories regardingconflict transformation. I now turn to the issue of identity change whichis one part of the broader process of conflict transformation.

Changing identities in intractable conflicts?

Introducing narratives of thick recognition among collectives involvedin intractable conflicts is difficult, and calls for a discussion onparticularities regarding identification. Whereas the meta-theoretical

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point of departure for this book is that identities are manifold andprone to change, a clarification has to be made regarding identities inintractable conflicts; they tend to be somewhat more resistant to change.This section presents the underpinnings of that argument, investigatingfurther the specific psychological features of identities in conflict-ladensocial systems.

Individuals and collectives involved in intractable conflicts tend todevelop patterns of identity and behavior in order to be able to copewith conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000b, Rouhana and Bar-Tal, 1998). This indi-cates that a social system is built around the conflict, which both reflectsand perpetuates the dynamics and effects of relationships in conflict(Diamond, 1997:353). Those patterns run deep and tend to operate likepowerful default settings, pulling people back to familiar territory whenexperiencing something new. If and when exposed to new identities,attitudes and “facts” regarding the conflict, parties might, given facilitat-ing circumstances, re-examine basic beliefs and assumptions regardingthe dynamics of conflict. However, due to the fact that intractableconflicts tend to produce quite rigid identities within those conflict-habituated systems, this kind of development tends to be slow and filledwith hardships.

People sharing identities in groups often to share targets of exter-nalization, often understood as common enemies. This reinforces ashared view of a world split into either perceived enemies or allies(Northrup, 1989, Ross, 2000:1013, Volkan, 1994:78). Groups withinconflicts tend to develop their own relatively internally consistent iden-tity logics, which makes it possible to cope with events during theevolution of conflict. Problems of communication often present them-selves when groups of differing logics try to solve conflicts. An examplehereof is the simple fact that Israelis perceive the formative events of1948 as a historical victory, the start of independence and resurrectionof the Jewish community, whereas Palestinians conceive of the sameevent as al-Naqba, a catastrophe of expulsion and national humiliationwhich to some meant the beginning of the end of Palestinian nationalself-determination.

Identity construction and relationships between different commu-nities is hence a crucial dynamic in intractable conflicts and plays amajor role in the conduct and development of conflictual relationships.Identity is thus a central component in intractable conflicts as it isassociated with a mutual vulnerability that leads each side to fear that byrecognizing the other’s national identity, it is denying its own (Kelman,1991:153–159).6

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Narrowing the scope – inside actors and conflict transformation

The study is now moving toward an understanding of historical debatesas carrying with them a potential for conflict transformation. In thefollowing, the literature on change within conflict transformation isaddressed, so that an understanding of the potential of historical debatesto bring about change in conflict settings can be located within thetheoretical framework of the study.

The body of work on conflict transformation is rich in its descriptionsof processual change as well as in its emphasis on all layers of society,from grassroots to elites, when it comes to necessary agents involved inthe endeavor of changing conflict. Some lacunae are discernible how-ever. Even though numerous works within the tradition point to theimportance of grassroots levels in the conflict transformation process,endogenous processes taking place at the local level, such as dialoguesover critical issues within the parties to conflict, are seldom addressed(Saunders, 2003:92). It is an undisputed fact that one of the most diffi-cult tasks when dealing with intractable conflicts is to achieve changein the conflicting parties’ understandings of their own identity as wellas the identities of other parties to the conflict (Azar, 1991). This mightbe understood as a part of actor transformation (Miall et al., 1999:157,Väyrynen, 1991:4) or changes in the conflict component of identity(Jamal, 2000:37, Kriesberg, 2003:317). This can involve intra-societaldisputes, and might result in changed views on collective identity.This activity often occurs in societal debates, and might not even beovertly conflict-related, as it often takes place out of view (Miall et al.,1999:157). Some researchers underline the need for such processes, butthe issue is often ignored with reference to the fact that “intractableconflicts involving threatened identities are not likely to be readilychanged from within” (Northrup, 1989:76).

Instead of focusing on endogenous processes at the intra-societallevel, researchers tend to focus on third party facilitation, such asmediation (Bush and Folger, 1994, 2005, Kriesberg, 2001), action-learning (Garcia, 2006), training (Diamond, 1997), sustained dia-logue (Saunders, 2003, Schwartz, 1989) or problem-solving workshops(Kelman, 1979, 1991), in order to create empathy and understandingbetween groups. Those are all commendable efforts. However, relativelylittle has been written on the role of inside actors (Francis, 2002:27), incontrast to the multitude of studies mainly scrutinizing elite and thirdparty behavior. This study aims to do just that. It looks at the interplaybetween inside actors such as academics, state officials, media producers

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and textbook writers and the possibility of their influencing the courseof identity politics. This shows that these actors might play a crucialrole in the development of conflict as they have the opportunity tocontribute to the creation of recognition openings as well as recognitionclosures in a society.

In order for change to occur when it comes to intractable conflicts, itis crucial that conflicting parties revise their identities in the direction ofmore sympathetic, or even empathetic, feelings toward the other party(Kriesberg, 2007:190–191, Slocum-Bradley, 2008:20). Achieving changein identities of the parties in conflict would indicate the possibility ofprofound social change and address factors underlying violent conflict,thus preventing its recurrence and intensification; such a process tendsto take place over a long time span (Garcia, 2006:46). When it comes totransformation of relations within intractable conflicts, there is no sub-stitute for the presence of inside actors as it is indeed difficult to proceedwith the transformation as long as the individuals involved hold hostilefeelings toward each other (Spies, 2006:51). This implies that the keyto success is having conflicting parties involved in the transformationprocess through participation in negotiations and renegotiations overidentity.

In settings of intractable conflict, change is highly dependent onstructural factors. However, the possibility of achieving change is alsohighly influenced on how actors involved understand the conflict andits parties.7 Many factors thus contribute to the constitution and trans-formation of intractable conflicts. Those conflicts often harbor violencebetween social groups defined according to the characteristics of eth-nicity, nation, religion, race or other terms, always containing notionsof one’s own collective as well as of other parties to conflict (Slocum-Bradley, 2008:1). In order to understand prerequisites for change inconflict, deepened understandings of processes of identity constructionin relation to conflict are thus needed. If changes in identity bring aboutmore positive views of the other within intractable conflicts, the poten-tial of non-violent relations might increase, especially if the changeconcerns core constructs of collectives involved, which as mentionedabove have strong links to the relationships within conflict (Northrup,1989:78). Identity changes within conflicts “have the potential andresponsibility to influence relationships, sub-systems, systems, policies,institutions and transformative processes” (Spies, 2006:51). This mightwork in both positive and negative ways; thus the degree of destruc-tiveness might be heightened if core constructs come to include morehostile feelings toward the antagonist in conflict, whereas more peaceful

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relations might be experienced if understandings of the other and keyfeatures of those identities are increased. This type of change maylead to more positive relations in conflict, rather than only suggestingperipheral, short-term settlements (Kriesberg, 2007:187–188, Northrup,1989:78). Since identities are multifaceted and prone to change, thereare opportunities for change – especially when placed in a situationwhere alternative understandings of reality are presented (Mitchell,2006:28).

Assessing change – transforming identities in intractable conflicts

Persons within conflict settings always hold a set of understandingsabout themselves and other parties to the conflict, which are relatedto and affect relationships in the conflict (Mitchell, 2005:8). Thoseconceptions are central in shaping the core constructs of the collectivesinvolved in conflict. They are also difficult to alter, and some criticseven consider the thought of achieving this kind of change “wildlyoptimistic” (Mitchell, 2002:9). However, even though difficult to assess,if achieved, changes in the identities of the conflict’s parties havegreat potential when it comes to paving the way for transformationof relationships in conflict. The main argument here is thus that ifcounter narratives of history can be introduced that harbor ideas of thickrecognition, understandings of identity might change. If the context ofconflict alters so that more antagonistic narratives are introduced, rela-tionships in conflict might in contrast transform into more destructiveones. The recognition of profound identity features of the counterpart,such as if Israelis recognized al-Naqba or if Palestinians would seriouslyacknowledge the atrocities of the Holocaust, hence harbors the potentialof undermining destructive identity dynamics and paving the way formore peaceful and constructive relationships.

Our focus here is thus a relational take on conflict transformation.When transformation is assessed in this manner, it is assumed to bebrought about partly by a change or refinement in the consciousnessand character of the identifications of collectives involved in conflict.That can in turn spur transformation in relationships between theconflicting parties, which under favorable circumstances can possiblyinfluence conflict behavior as well as the social system in which itis embedded. The transformation of conflict is then seen as a resultof transformation of identities, rather than stemming from directagreements devised as solutions for social problems (Bush and Folger,1994:24, Mitchell, 2002:11). When discussing the possibility of theintroduction of new narratives of conflict, it is immensely importantto relate the analysis to what Miall et al. (1999) called context of conflict.

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Since conflict narratives are always influenced by other narratives touch-ing on societal values like democracy, human rights, conflict manage-ment, it is pivotal to consider the contextual setting, or because it hasa fundamental potential to affect actors within conflict. Interactionswithin conflict hence cannot be properly understood unless consid-ered in relation to contemporary narratives that affect understandingsof conflict.

An intractable conflict is by definition extremely resistant to attemptsto resolution. The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is unfortunately anexcellent example of that. Despite at least six wars of varying intensityand two Intifadas, together with third party involvement and pressure,the parties seem to be further from a solution than ever. One viablepath when yearning for relationship transformation in intractable con-flicts is scrutinizing if or when alternative understandings of history arepresented and subsequently accepted in society. Identity transformationspurred by narratives of thick recognition is understood as a transforma-tion of core constructs, which may result in major repercussions for theconflict as a whole (this notion is further elaborated in the next chapter)(Northrup, 1989:78).

Interestingly enough, at one of the brightest time-periods, in the early1990s when hopes for peace were raised among Israelis and Palestinians,historical interpretations tightly interwoven with the identities of bothparties were questioned and partly renegotiated.

Changes in identities are understood as having possible influenceon relationships between parties in conflict, paving the way towardtractability. The general assumption here thus regards changed under-standings of history as containing ideas of thick recognition andcircumstances under which they might lead to changed relationshipsbetween groups in conflict. Thus, it is assumed that transformation ofcore constructs in the Israeli case eventually might bring relationshiptransformation. Relevant contemporary narratives in this case, such asthe ongoing peace process and economic as well as ideological liberal-ization, must also be considered as they are viewed as the context ofconflict, meaning that they are meaningful narratives in the local andregional environment that surrounds and has a potential to influencethe course of conflict. Those narratives can be disparate, but are alwaysinterrelated as they are part of the same narrative constellation.

Moving forward

This chapter has introduced this book’s usage of the notions of thickrecognition and conflict transformation. Thick recognition has been

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presented as an indispensable part of the process of constructive conflicttransformation. The next chapter ventures deeper into how narrativesof thick recognition, through their potential boundary-destabilizingcharacter, might challenge common understandings of identity inintractable conflicts. It will thus be shown how attempts to change theunderstandings of history of a national collective involved in intractableconflict might result in a change in the core constructs of that nationalcollective.

3Identities in Conflict

This chapter goes deeper into processes of identity construction andpoints to the transformative potential of narratives of thick recogni-tion when it comes to trajectories of conflicts. The notion of coreconstructs is introduced as a way to understand why identities, eventhough they are understood as inherently fluid and changeable, stilltend to be stabilized in setting of intractable conflicts. With this servingas a backdrop, the chapter carves out dimensions which are distinctivefor narratives of thick recognition, which are: (1) self-transformation;(2) other-transformation; and (3) boundary-transformation. Here thedimensions are elaborated in terms of theory, but they can and will lateron be used as analytical devices when assessing if and to what degreedifferent narratives contain elements of thick recognition. In the ana-lytical chapters, it will be evident that they are helpful analytical toolswhen it comes to assessing constructions of identity in understandingsof history. The chapter ends by connecting notions of recognition andidentity change to narratives of history – commemorative narratives.

Identities – narrated, relational and fluid

The overarching approach to understanding identity construction andsocietal and conflictual development in this book takes its vantage pointin narratives. The narrative take provides a tool through which the inter-relationship between ideas, experiences and action can be grasped, andoffers an understanding of how identities become created and recreatedover time (Robertson, 2003:90). As this study takes interest in debatesover history and their linkages to relationships in contemporary soci-eties, there has been a need to find theoretical entry points that canconnect the realms of history, temporality and identity. When it comes

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to conceptualizing the ways in which narratives of the present are con-nected to narratives of the past, the insights of Paul Ricoeur are useful.One of the most central aspects of narrative, he argues, is that it allowsus to construct narrative identities, both at the level of collective historyand at the level of individual life (Ricœur, 1984:241). Identities, individ-ual as well as collective, are hence created through narratives (Ricœur,1984:247). In this way, narratives can be understood as guardians, orkeepers, of time (Wood, 1991:9). Different experiences that might beshattered and contradictory are placed into narratives with beginnings,midpoints and endings. Hence, heterogeneous experiences and conflict-ing views are ordered in the telling of one seemingly coherent narrative.Narrative thus functions as a connective device between the realms oftemporality, identity and history. For example, it is clear that Israelimaster narratives of history are quite coherently ordered and seeminglyhomogenous, even though the Israeli society has for a long time beentorn by intrasocietal cleavages as well as conflictual external relations.

Based on the above reasoning, this book employs a narrative per-spective when approaching the subject of identity (cf. Andrews, 2007,Czarniawska, 2004, Dienstag, 1997, Patterson and Monroe, 1998,Polkinghorne, 1988, Ricœur, 1984, Scuzzarello, 2010, Somers andGibson, 1994, White, 1973, Whitebrook, 2001). The concept of narra-tive refers to story or stories, pointing to the ways in which humansconstruct disparate facts that they encounter in their everyday livesand cognitively weave them together in order to make sense of real-ity. Narrative is hence viewed as having influence on the way in whichreality is perceived and how people relate to the world around them(Patterson and Monroe, 1998:315, Somers and Gibson, 1994:61). Identi-ties are always in transition as they come into being through combinedprocesses of being and becoming, belonging and longing to belong(Andrews, 2007:9, Yuval-Davis, 2006:201). The concept of narrative ishence central for understanding the process of identity construction.

Narrative and the construction of society

All the narratives of a society can be understood as its narrative constella-tion, following Somers’s approach (1994). The narrative constellation isan ever-changing processual whole composed of relational parts, andcontains a myriad of different concepts organized around narrativethemes, which are all interrelated. That constellation, even though con-taining many possible ways to make sense of reality, always relates topower because it contributes to the upholding of definitions of con-cepts. Within a narrative constellation, different stories are told, stories

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about history and memory, stories about conflict and stories about rela-tions to others. The narrative constellation can, in a way, be understoodas a broad repertoire that offers possible identities to the national col-lective in question, whose members in turn choose which identities toadopt and/or reject depending on individual properties as well as soci-etal context. The dominant narratives in a narrative constellation areunderstood as its master narratives. On the margins of narrative constella-tions reside narratives that challenge their conventional wisdom. Theseare called counter-narratives, which “disturb those ideological maneuversthrough which ‘imagined communities’ are given essentialist identities”(Bhabha, 1990:300). The resulting conflict between competing narra-tives, in contrast increases the porosity of community boundaries andintensifies the ambivalence of collectives as cultural and political forms(Bhabha, 1990, Özkirimli, 2000:197, Rattansi, 1994). Counter-narrativeshence challenge the conventional wisdom of societies (Andrews, 2004,Zerubavel, 1995).

Fluid identities

If it is believed that collective identities are constructed, and not some-thing that comes with birth, it is necessary to come to terms with howthey are constructed and then spread amongst a collective of people. Theargumentation in this book obviously rests on the ontological assump-tion that narrative and identity are intimately connected (Andrews,2007, Czarniawska, 2004, Dienstag, 1997, Patterson and Monroe, 1998,Ricœur, 1984, Ringmar, 1996, Somers, 1994, Whitebrook, 2001). Peoplemake sense of who they are as both individuals and parts of collectivesthrough narratives.

[W]hat an individual or a community choose to tell about themselvesis intricately tied to how they construct their political identities.

(Andrews, 2007:11)

Narratives hence provide a rich basis through which identities can beexplored.

Collective identities are not phenomena that can be studied objec-tively. Rather, they are of an elusive character, and they depend ona complex series of social processes (Jenkins, 1996:19–21, Preston,1997:49). As identities are fluid constructs, they harbor inherent poten-tial for change. This implies that even in the most intractable ofconflicts there are possibilities for identities and relationships to change,even though, on the surface, it may seem like an almost impossible

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development. For example, the Good Friday Agreement in NorthernIreland has helped accommodate a process of constructive conflict trans-formation where identities have become less conflict-prone, in a settingwhich was often perceived as intractable. This does not imply that theconflict will always be on a constructive path, but it surely indicatespossibilities of relationship and identity change in this type of set-ting. National identity is just one of many differing identities to whichpeople of the modern era claim to belong (Featherstone, 1995, Scholte,1996). One thing that is certain regarding the importance of differentidentities to different people is that many individuals living in vio-lent environments, characterized by repeated threats, tend to identifystrongly with the group that experiences that same threat and vio-lence (Bar-Tal, 2000b, Volkan, 1997). What needs to be emphasized, asalready mentioned, is that collective identities are never static. Circum-stances may sometimes make identities appear to be unchanging, but bynature, they are not. Collective identities are always created alongside ahistorical context of varying relationships, events and power relations.The fact that each individual perceives that he/she owns many differentidentities also demonstrates the volatile nature of collective identityover time.

Relational identities

Literature on deep-seated conflict contains many references to psycho-logical theory. Before embarking on any further discussion of featuresof the relationship between identity and conflict, some elaboration onpsychological theory related to identity is needed. In order to delve intopsychological aspects related to conflict settings, the impact of the spe-cific context of the people involved in conflict must be considered, aswell as individual psychological processes (Ross, 2000:1016).

Researchers involved with social psychology have often developedtheories regarding identity. The very concept of group in social psy-chology was originally defined in relation to the nation (Reicher andHopkins, 2001:5). Many conflict scholars inclined to study psycho-logical aspects of conflicts borrow thoughts from Social Identity The-ory when accounting for identity construction and possibilities foridentity change in intractable conflicts (cf. Bar-Tal, 2000b, Northrup,1989, Rouhana and Bar-Tal, 1998, Sahadevan, 1997). Several researchersrecently engaged in theorizing national identity and dynamics ofin- and out-groups (cf. Bar-Tal, 2000b, Billig, 1995, Kinnvall, 2004, 2006,Reicher and Hopkins, 2001) also use perspectives inspired by SocialIdentity Theory (Tajfel, 1974, 1981). This theory is appealing, in part,

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because it tries to grasp the dynamics of large-scale collectives. Focusis on the fact that individuals often ascribe positive characteristics totheir own group in comparison to other groups. This is explained bythe fact that the in-group provides individuals with self-esteem, whichmotivates them to raise the status of the own group in relation to othergroups (Billig and Tajfel, 1973, Hogg and Abrams, 1988). This theorywas later expanded into Self Categorization Theory (Turner, 1991, 1999,Turner et al., 1987), which highlights the cognitive process of self-categorization through which people define themselves in terms ofa shared social category, for example, Christians, Swedes or politicalscientists.

However, this perspective contains pitfalls, as pointed out by severalresearchers (cf. Billig, 1995, Kinnvall, 2004, 2006). One central pointof criticism is directed toward the universalism of Social IdentityTheory as well as Self Categorization Theory. This might lead toneglecting the facts that different contexts might bring with themdifferent categorizations and identifications (Billig, 1995:66, Kinnvall,2004:750, 2006:48–49), and that different individuals behave differentlyin relation to their own collectives as well as their surrounding societalcontext. One way of addressing this critique is to embrace the notionthat all individuals come to perceive their sense of identity in a similarfashion. The process of identity construction is thus understood as quiteuniversal in character, whereas the products thereof might come in manydifferent guises due to individual and contextual differences (Kinnvall,2006:39, Penrose, 1995:391–417). Identities are thus perceived as con-tinuously dynamic and processual. This argument is also instructivewhen it comes to individuals and their purported relationship with andautonomy in relation to master narratives. Individual understandingsof identity, individual as well as collective ones, reflect and relate tomaster narratives of the society in which we live and claim belongingto. Thus we depart from our individual characteristics, story and dis-position. However, as we are “animals of context, subjects of time andplace”, we cannot have ultimate agency over this process. This makes uspartly, but indeed not fully, bound by the context of narratives in thesociety and collectives we inhabit (Hammack, 2011).

One might also point to the fact that the focus on individual catego-rization neglects the ways in which categories such as national identitybecome inhabited (Billig, 1995:67). National identity is in this view notjust a marker of identity but has also over time grown to become astrong master narrative. The way peace accords often are constructed –for example, the Dayton accords – is reflective of the strength of the

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master narratives of nationhood. The two-state solution with regard toIsrael–Palestine is also such an example. The above-mentioned illustra-tions point to how the nation is often used as a forceful internationaldivision principle, and that it is often assumed that peace is equal to ter-ritorial and administrative separation between groups claiming differingnational affiliations. It is powerful in the ordering of both internationaland national relations, and in that way works as a compelling story ofidentification, having an influence on individual identification sinceit affects the way people perceive their reality. As this study aims torelate psychological aspects of identity and intractable conflict to pastand contemporary narratives of conflict, the individual is thus relatedto society at large.

A number of researchers addressing the problems inherent in SocialIdentity and Self Categorization Theory are those dealing with psycho-analytically informed identity theory. Here, identity is treated as bothindividual and social, linking individuals to large social groupings aswell as emphasizing that conflict is experienced at deep emotional lev-els. These perspectives highlight the specifics of the individual and herrelations to actors around her, with a special focus on groups involvedin protracted conflicts (Volkan, 1997) as well as on the importance ofimages of the self in relation to others (Kristeva, 1991). The under-standing of processes of identification guiding this study is in line withthat research, inspired by critical scholars who, in a social constructivistvein, point to the constructed nature of identity. Many of these, such asConnolly (1991), Campbell (1992) and Weldes et al. (1999b), underscorethe boundedness of processes of identification and the interrelationshipbetween identity and difference. They thus share important character-istics with the psychoanalytical theory of Erikson (1970 [1950]), theobject relations theory as developed by G.H. Mead (1934) and SocialIdentity Theory, especially emphasized by authors such as Jenkins (1996[1988]), in that they all rely heavily on the assumption that identityis inherently relational. Conflict scholars such as Jabri (1996, 2006),Buckley-Zistel (2008), Slocum-Bradley (2008) and Ramsbotham (2010)also adhere to that tradition and hence emphasize the relational char-acter of identities. Their writings have largely influenced the view ofidentity and conflict advanced here.

Erikson stated that social identity only becomes meaningful inrelation to others, and therefore his focus has been on the social partof identification (1968:41). In some respects the individual and col-lective are hence understood as having shared characteristics, becauseidentification works in relation to both planes simultaneously (Bloom,

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1990:36, Sibley, 1995:45–46). Each is entangled with the other, andboth processes are intrinsically social (Jenkins, 1996:19). If there is achange in society that the collective perceives as threatening, eachindividual who claims membership in that group might feel threatened(Bloom, 1990:39). Individually this might result in anxiety and feel-ings of insecurity, whereas the group can respond to the threat eitherby resynthesizing a new identity or by bolstering the old one (Bloom,1990:39–40).

This section has explored the insights into psychoanalytical and socialpsychological perspectives necessary to understand identity transforma-tion within the setting of intractable conflict. I take with me theoriesregarding the creation of in- and out-groups as well as the nature ofthe relationships between them. These insights are pivotal for the studyat hand, and we have to further consider how contextual factors affectindividuals and groups to avoid falling into the trap of context-free uni-versalism, which is quite unsuitable for a study discussing prerequisitesfor change. In the following, I unpack understandings of how identitiesare constructed in settings of intractable conflict.

Intractable conflict – stabilized identities

Core constructs

When discussing identity in relation to the development of intractableconflict it is useful to employ the concept of core construct (Northrup,1989:64, Sahadevan, 1997:64). This concept was developed by Kelly(1955), who in his theory of personality elaborated on identity construc-tion. The theory is based on the assumption that present interpretationsof reality are subject to revision through a process called construing. Thisprocess involves all aspects of human experience, including emotions,values and behaviors. Kelly’s writings contain ideas which later appearedunder the broad umbrella of social constructivism (Shotter, 2007:68).In this view, identity is seen as fluid and processual:

Concepts have long been known as units of logic and are treated as ifthey existed independently of any particular person’s psychologicalprocesses. But when we use the notion of construct we have nothingof this sort in mind; we are talking about a psychological process in aliving person. Such a construct has, for us, no existence independentof the person whose thinking it characterizes.

(Kelly:87, in Shotter)

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A person’s conception of identity is thus, according to Kelly, com-posed of units of meaning called personal constructs. Core constructsare superordinate to most other constructs. As such they are centralto the whole system of constructs of the person. Core constructs aredefined as those that govern people’s maintenance processes – that is,those by which they maintain their sense of identity and existence(1955:482). The way personal and core constructs make individuals copewith a conflictual environment shows similarities with the concept ofshared beliefs (Bar-Tal, 1988, 2000b, Rouhana and Bar-Tal, 1998). Thedifference is that Bar-Tal and Rouhana’s perspective stipulates a series ofshared beliefs that is pertinent to all societies in conflict settings. Whena core construct is invalidated, the individual tends to feel insecure.In the application of Kelly’s concept of core constructs to the the-ory of intractable conflict, Northrup lends thoughts from Tajfel’s SocialIdentity Theory, which poignantly stresses that personal and socialidentities may be differentially salient under particular circumstances(1989:66). Moreover, social identity may in some contexts functionalmost as an exclusion of personal identity (Bruner and Perlmutter,1957, Dion, 1975, Dion and Earn, 1975, Sherif, 1966). This is particu-larly the case when it comes to intergroup conflicts and discrimination(Northrup, 1989:66). Thus, if a person perceives that his or her collectiveis under constant threat, that person tends to be highly aware of thatgroup membership at all times.

Northrup’s use of Kelly’s theory of constructs indicates a problemwith aggregation, which is common to many studies that focus onthe construction of collective identity. This regards the fact that indi-vidual identity construction would function in the same way on thecollective level. Individual identification is dependent on relations toan outer world, and group identifications are meaningless without indi-vidual identifications. Even though not fully similar processes, bothlevels are hence always entangled with each other, due to the factthat all identifications are irrevocably social and relational (Jenkins,1996:19–21). Collective identities are expressed in narratives of thatcollective and are lived in the experiences of the group members.However – as collective identities are experienced by individuals asparts of larger collectives that in turn can feel attached to differentidentifications – the processes of identity construction, also on grouplevel, is dependent on processes of identification on an individual level.The problem of aggregation notwithstanding, the relationality of indi-vidual as well as collective identification is a quite similar process, andboth can be expressed in narratives of identity on both collective and

Identities in Conflict 49

individual levels. Collectives such as national groups and state actorscan hence be analyzed “as if” they were human agents. Hence, even ifthey can reflect context-bound identity, they should never be reducedto such (Kinnvall, 2006:42). In this study, group identity labels suchas Israeli and Palestinian are always used based on an awareness thatthey are complex and heterogeneous categories which share certain ref-erence points because of what is perceived as common historical andcontemporary experiences (Kinnvall, 2006:43).

If a specific social identity has great salience for an individual’s senseof self and order in the world, it is thus likely to be a core construct.When core constructs are invalidated by incoming information, theindividual experiences threat. This means that if a person feels a strongaffiliation with a particular national identification and experiences thatthat identity is subject to a threat, very strong reactions might be pro-voked. The sometimes very forceful repercussions from some Israelis tothe perceived threat composed by New History and post-Zionism mayin that light be interpreted in terms of a reaction to what is perceived asan almost existential threat to a crucial part of one’s identity.

The theory of core constructs shares many features with the theoryof ontological security, introduced by Anthony Giddens (1991) andduring recent years often used by political scientists to discuss actors’reactions when presented with new “facts” regarding their realities(cf. Delehanty and Steele, 2009, Kinnvall, 2004, McSweeney, 1999,Mitzen, 2006, Steele, 2005). Ontological security is understood as theindividual need to experience oneself as a whole, continuous person intime, as being rather than constantly changing, in order to experiencea sense of agency (following Giddens, 1991, Mitzen, 2006). The theoryof ontological security is sometimes criticized for being essentialist, dueto Giddens’s emphasis on the individual need to feel as one coherentagent in space and time (Featherstone, 1995:101, Kinnvall, 2004:746).In my view, the concept of core constructs is more flexible, as it is moresensitive to the fact that individuals of differing identifications tend tohave varying core constructs. Thus, this theory better relates to the factthat identities are malleable, and it also enables the understanding ofchanged identities, even in cases where the introduction of “new” iden-tities seems less than likely. Threats to any part of a social identity that isa core construct tend to result in a protective response. If a social identityis understood as a core construct for a group of individuals, the pro-cess of protection and mobilization can occur as a group phenomenon.As humans experience different attachments to different social identi-ties, core constructs vary between individuals. Identity is thus viewed

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as continuously dynamic because the sense of self, whether personal orgroup, is not static (Northrup, 1989:67). Identities, even though appear-ing rather stable within settings of intractable conflict, are thus always,due to their processual nature, prone to change.

A radical change in the understandings of the history of a nationalcollective, portraying its past actions as compromising, might thus beunderstood as a situation in which the core constructs of those whoidentify strongly with the national collective are perceived as threat-ened. The identity of the collective is then challenged by a new story,including traits of the other, for example, the commitment of illegiti-mate acts such as war crimes, into one’s own collective. This certainlychallenges the often positive image of the in-group, and might result inthe fact that the individuals involved perceive threat. This can be seen asthought-provoking in the way that changing the history of the nationalcollective, which always is constituted alongside difference, in the Israelidebate was only occasionally directly related to the present conflict withthe Palestinians. However, as the historical narratives are so intimatelyconnected to the collective’s present sense of national identity, I arguethat they can be understood as directly linked to the ongoing conflict,even though the debate concentrated very much on the past.

Thus, core constructs in intractable conflicts tend to be difficult toalter. As this study is concerned with prerequisites for change in coreconstructs, the following sections introduce some of their importantelements. As core constructs are relational, they harbor dimensions ofthe self, as well as contain references to groups to whom the self relates.In intractable conflicts, the most important other is often the antago-nist in conflict, which during conflict is the out-group of most concernto the in-group. Thus, core constructs contain images of the self and theother, as well as references to the relationship between the two.

Core constructs vary between individuals and contexts. In a conflictconcerning religion or ethnicity, aspects regarding religion and ethnicitymight be those seen as core constructs of many of those involved in theconflict. In the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which is mainly a conflictbetween two groups claiming the same national territory, it is reason-able to argue that national identity is a core construct to many of theindividuals living with the conflict.

National identity contains many elements, the most tangible onesbeing spatiality, temporality and relationality. When elements of coreconstructs concerning the self are discussed, the bounded relation-ship between the self and the other is central. However, as thisbook focuses on how historical debates might affect relationships inintractable conflict, the temporal dimension as well as that concerning

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relationships are emphasized, as identity is firmly connected to under-standings of history in this specific study.

The following sections cover the dynamics of core constructs inintractable conflicts that are especially acute; they address factors of self-images and their preoccupation with insecurity, images of the other andrelations to difference, and finally how the relationship between self andother is constituted through the construction of boundaries between theentities.

Intractable conflicts and the insecure self

When discussing identities in relation to intractable conflicts, viewsof the self are a central aspect. Many researchers emphasize that self-images contribute to the dynamics of conflicts,1 and if self-imageschange, conflicts might change accordingly (Kaplowitz, 1990:48). Thus,the way groups involved in conflict see themselves influences conflictinteraction both directly and indirectly.

The process of identification has often been understood as revolv-ing around security, or even understood as being an identity-securingsystem (Bloom, 1990:47, Erikson, 1959:122–157, Habermas, 1975:3–4).Societies involved in intractable conflicts are preoccupied with securityconcerns. Thus, specific inquiry into the relationship between identityand security in situations of intractable conflicts is needed. When cer-tain aspects of identity are seen as a core construct to a person, it isimportant for his/her sense of security (Northrup, 1989:68). Some of theresearchers who stress the constructed nature of understandings of secu-rity also emphasize the theoretical links between identity and security(cf. Albert et al., 2001, Campbell, 1992, Huysmans, 1998, Kinnvall, 2004,Krause and Williams, 1997, McSweeney, 1999, Weldes et al., 1999a),which is crucial for the understanding of this study.

When I turn to security, I thus bring with me the notion that under-standings of security are socially constructed. To say that security issocially constructed is not at all the same as saying that security threatsdo not exist. Of course, I acknowledge that nuclear weapons exist, andthat if used they might injure and kill vast numbers of people. However,when nuclear weapons are taken into the interaction between states,and thus pulled into the socially constructed relations between actorsall over the globe, their meaning might differ enormously according totheir location within the system and how they are interpreted in termsof threat. Thus, nuclear weapons of Third World states are often per-ceived as threatening by analysts in the West, whereas Western nuclearweapons are not. This is not a fact of life, but something interpreted

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in accordance with the perceived character of the international system(Weldes et al., 1999b:10).

Societies involved in intractable conflict have a strong focus on secu-rity matters. All communities tend to focus on different aspects ofsecurity, but for societies involved in intractable conflict, where the sit-uation is characterized by continuous and prolonged threats to life, thestate and the well-being of community members, the security orienta-tion is particularly salient (Bar-Tal, 2000b:87, Klare and Thomas, 1991,Smoke, 1984). When discussing shared beliefs in societies in conflict, awhole repertoire of beliefs regarding the self is often suggested (Bar-Tal,2000b, Bar-Tal and Teichman, 2005, Rouhana and Bar-Tal, 1998). Thosebeliefs concern perceptions of being under siege, patriotic beliefs, beliefsabout unity, victimization and, most importantly, beliefs about security,or maybe more accurately, beliefs regarding the insecure self. The theoryof shared beliefs offers important insights into psychological features ofconflict-ridden societies. Bar-Tal et al. suggest a variety of beliefs as per-tinent to societies in intractable conflicts. In my view, their commondenominator is the insecure state of the in-group and how its strugglefor nationality is motivated by security concerns in a variety of ways.The theme of security is hence latent in the beliefs of patriotism, unity,siege and victimization.

Insecurity and feelings of danger are important elements in allidentity-establishing processes (cf. Campbell, 1992, Neumann, 1999,Stern, 2001, Weldes et al., 1999b). However, as mentioned above, theytend to be more obvious and explicit in societies involved in long-term, deep-seated conflicts. This is due to the fact that those societieshave long been involved in violent situations through which differentsecurity practices have been inscribed in the narratives of the groupsinvolved. Insecurity is hence inherently linked to the self. The approachsuggested here is moreover that it is insufficient only to discuss the selfwhen aiming to understand processes of identity construction. To fullycomprehend that process, thoughts regarding the relationality of theself must be included; that is, how it relates to other entities andimplications of that process.

Intractable conflicts and difference

A starting point in the discussion regarding identity is its constantrelationship to other identities. Any identity, whether of individuals,local communities, nations or states, is always “established in relationto a series of differences that have become socially recognized” (Connolly,1991:64). The stories of the collective center on its uniting features, its

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history and future goals, the territory and symbols of the nation, andaround difference, meaning what the collective is not (Preston, 1997:73).This entails that it is important to study identities on the premise thatthey always are created in relation to others (Campbell, 1992:9, Tilly,2002:61, Weldes et al., 1999b:11). The relationship between identity anddifference is based on the notion that people to some extent alwayscarry difference, or the stranger, inside them (Kristeva, 1991:19–20).Identity and difference are always entangled, and their relationship canbe understood as being at the very locus of conflict (Buckley-Zistel,2008:31, Jabri, 1996:131). The discussion of identity and its relationsto difference contributes valuable insight on the emergence and end-ing of conflicts, and therefore merits close attention (Buckley-Zistel,2008:32). It has been argued that the clearest link between identity andconflict is the act of locating “the evil” in the actions of the other, who isthen understood as inferior and villainous, especially in relation to the“good” character of the self. This process entails identifying one’s owngroup as a victim and identifying the other with stable traits havingnegative connotations, such as hypocrisy, intolerance, negligence, arro-gance, greediness, extremism and so forth (Moghaddam, 2006, Slocum-Bradley, 2008:12). This is often evident when studying descriptions ofthe self as constructed by collectives in conflicts. Then the insecure selftends to be contrasted against the mirror-image of the enemy, which isdescribed in almost inhumane terms and as a threat to the own col-lective. This preoccupation is frequently visible in foreign as well asdomestic policy, in education as well as in speeches by political lead-ers. For example, different threats are often enhanced. In Israel, thesemay range from threat of annihilation, terrorist attacks and war (Bar-Tal,2000b:95). These threats are mainly assumed to be brought about by theaggressive and threatening character of an almost inhuman enemy.

In order to further the discussion on identity and difference, thoughtson how the concepts relate to insecurity must be brought in. Weldeset al. (1999b:12) emphasize the notion that difference per se is not to beunderstood as a prerequisite for insecurity. Still, through various culturalprocesses, difference can be transformed into otherness and when thatoccurs, a source of insecurity becomes established. Otherness is thenunderstood as standing in a double relationship to notions of identity;it both threatens and constitutes it (Weldes et al., 1999b:11). Differ-ence should never be understood as external to identity construction;it is rather to be thought of as part and parcel of the very process ofestablishing identity.2

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One often sees a relationship between how political elites speak oftheir national missions and goals and devalue pictures of the oppo-nent’s legitimacy (Kaplowitz, 1990:57). What is interesting here is thateven though political actors speak of self-images, the notion of theother is always present, as the process of constructing a self-imagealways includes the process of distinguishing the self from the other(Vertzberger, 1993:125). This process is continuous through the exclu-sionary procedures of separating in-groups from out-groups, and enforc-ing simplified beliefs about the opponent in conflict. The next sectionintroduces ideas regarding boundaries between self and other, whichis a necessary component when aiming to understand possibilities oftransforming the relationship between self and other in intractableconflict.

Intractable conflicts and the stabilization of boundaries

The relational aspect of identity production entails finding boundariesdemarcating groups from one another when we study collective identi-ties. One of the most typical characteristics of identity construction ingeneral, and of the construction of national identity in particular, is thatit is inherently boundary-producing (Calhoun, 1995:197, Neumann,1999:4). Identity is put at a distance from difference in the process oferecting boundaries that distinctly separate the in-group from the out-group. National identities are created through the sharing of narrativesconcerning we–they boundaries – narratives about how those bound-aries arose and what they separate (Tilly, 2002:61). National identitiesare thus always relational and collective, which tells us that

the constitution of identity is achieved though the inscription ofboundaries that serve to demarcate “an inside” from “an outside”,a “self” from an “other”, a “domestic” from a “foreign”.

(Campbell, 1992:9)

The boundary work is evident in concrete, physical boundaries such asborder controls, fences and so on, as well as in psychological bordering,demarcating us from them in both time and space. People maintain rela-tions with each other on each side of the boundary, whereas relationsacross the boundary are also maintained. On both sides of the boundary,narratives are created and upheld – narratives about the relations withinthe collectives as well as between the groups on each side of the bound-ary (Tilly, 2005:7). This implies that the collective is defined through itsrelationship to other groups. It becomes visible through its boundaries,

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and the boundary itself is a social construction, continuously changingthrough time (Barth, 1969). The processes of boundary production areespecially visible in societies involved in intractable conflicts. Here theencounters with difference are manifest, and one does not need to bevery familiar with psychological thinking in order to see the boundarywork taking place among the groups involved:

Under stressful conditions [. . .] physical borders serve a double duty:they provide practical, physical protection, and they are “psycholo-gized” to represent a symbolic thick skin that protects large groupsfrom the feeling of being contaminated.

(Volkan, 1997:105)

Those boundaries often appear stable to observers, because in soci-eties involved in intractable conflicts, understandings of identities oftenbecome static, appearing to be not prone to change at all. However, theconstructed nature of identity, the differences and boundaries separat-ing them, implies that identities are never static, but are understood asnegotiable and context-dependent (Hylland-Eriksen, 1993:42).

One way of describing the psychological processes resulting in seem-ingly stable boundaries is to use the term stabilization.3 This is a processof crystallizing or hardening the construction of the self and the other,putting “secure” distance between the self and the threatening other inconflict (Northrup, 1989:70). New information that could contribute tothe view of the other as “like-self” is thus understood as a threat. There-fore information where the other is constructed in terms of the self isoften aggressively distorted or maybe not even perceived, as it falls outof the range of constructs that the individual holds about her world(Northrup, 1989:70). Unwanted thoughts about the self are projectedonto the other party, and constructed as “not-self”. Those feelings arekept at a distance by placing them on the other side of the seeminglystable boundary – as traits of the other. Stabilization involves increasingefforts at securing the boundaries of the self. In that process, psycho-logical defenses are built, and self and other tend to become mutuallyexclusive categories over time (Northrup, 1989:71).

Some researchers have argued that it is important not to overem-phasize boundaries when relationships between groups are studied(cf. Hylland-Eriksen, 1992:31, Lindholm-Schulz, 1999:13). Focusing onboundaries might function as a self-fulfilling prophecy and might thencontribute to enforcing boundaries instead of overcoming them. How-ever, when the nature of boundaries is in focus, emphasizing that

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permeable boundaries between groups might be a viable way to trans-form intractable conflicts, I find the critique redundant. Boundariesalways exist; they are in fact intrinsic to identity construction. Herethose boundaries are studied in an attempt to suggest how they couldbe reconstructed in order to allow for coexistence or even new construc-tions of identities crossing previous boundaries. I argue that that activitycan hardly be understood as boundary enforcing.

These past sections described how core constructs relate to identity,difference and boundaries in the context of intractable conflict. As coreconstructs tend to be stabilized in the social interactions brought aboutby intractable conflicts, it is clear that it might be difficult to alter rela-tionships between the adversaries in conflict. However, the conceptof thick recognition offers an understanding of how – under certaincircumstances – those stabilized boundaries might be altered.

Thick recognition – unsettling boundaries

The recognition concept is central to the conflict transformationparadigm, especially when assessing possibilities to transform identitiesin conflict. Jamal’s (2000) discussion highlights the importance of nar-rative in conflict settings, as identities and narratives regarding identityare crucial in a society’s understanding of its own relation to conflict. Heintroduces some crucial aspects of the recognition concept. In this study,two of his dimensions are particularly useful. (1) Self-transformation isseen as vital because recognition of the other that does not carry with itsome modification in one’s self-identity may be meaningless in reality(Jamal, 2000:38). Self-transformation in practice has to do with chang-ing the image of the self, for example, going from a view of the self asvictimized, to a view where the self also is seen as a perpetrator in cer-tain historical contexts. (2) Taking responsibility is another such crucialaspect, which means taking juridical, ethical and moral responsibilityfor the negative effects inflicted on the other party in the past. A pro-cess of recognition that shies away from sharing responsibility for pastinjustices is indeed an impaired process.

As the dimension of taking responsibility is closely connected toaspects of the self, it will be discussed under the heading of self-transformation. As previously mentioned, renouncement is understoodas a vital part in the recognition process and will thus be incorporatedas an element of self-transformation. Jamal’s discussion is interesting inmany respects. However, for the issue of conflict transformation andthe revision of history, I complement the two mentioned aspects so

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that the relational emphasis of this study is carried through. The pro-cess of self-transformation is supplemented with the process of other-transformation. That is thus a second aspect that must be added to fullyunderstand the identity aspects of conflict transformation related torecognition. If relationships are to be altered, views of both the self andthe other must be transformed in order for relations to be transformed.Therefore the process of self-transformation, including the processes ofrenouncement and taking responsibility, together with the process ofother-transformation, will be the main focus for analysis when examiningthe process of debating Israeli commemorative narratives. In addition,transformations of self and other are understood as closely knit to theboundary production between the two. Thus, processes of self- andother-transformation are understood as bringing about changes in theperceived stability of boundaries inherent in core constructs in set-tings of intractable conflicts. Therefore, a concluding section will followthe sections on self- and other-transformation on the boundary trans-formation that can be the outcome of the process. The three elementsinherent in processes of thick recognition correspond well with thecentral dimensions of identity, difference and boundaries, and in thefollowing the linkage between core constructs and thick recognition isemphasized.

Self-transformation

As mentioned above, the process of thick recognition is dependenton transformations in views of the self. In the process of self-transformation, past assumptions and decisions as well as routines takenfor granted are questioned. A self-critical process is hence involvedwhen past views of reality are evaluated (Buckley-Zistel, 2008:44). Thisis often a complicated process, where the image of the self inherentboth in the core constructs of a national collective and in the mas-ter commemorative narratives of society is described anew. If the newnarratives contain dramatically different characteristics of the self com-pared to those described in the master narratives, it might be difficultfor them to resonate with the public, as the core construct is challenged,which might lead to a feeling of threat. Apparently, the agents who pro-mote the counter commemorative narratives do not perceive them asthreatening, as in some way or another they ascribe weight to othercomponents of the core construct. The challenge for them is thus toinform their audience that this self-transformation need not be danger-ous, but rather that it holds potential for a more peaceful and securefuture, which indeed is a challenging task.

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The process of self-transformation contributes to the illumination ofthe in-group in a more “objective” light, especially concerning actsrelated to the conflict, and needs to be self-critical. Such change can alsoreduce the monopolization of feelings of victimhood, meaning that thesuffering of all groups in conflict can be recognized (Bar-Tal, 2000a:358).In the process of taking responsibility inherent in self-transformation,the element of renouncement is vital because certain positive concep-tions of the self must be abandoned when one recognizes the sufferingsand victimhood of the other. This type of recognition which containselements of renouncement and self-transformation is sometimes alsowitnessed in processes of reconciliation. There both elite as well as grass-roots leaders often publicly announce a changed view of the past whereone admits to previous wrong-doings and crimes in order to move onand build more peaceful relations. This has, for example, been the casein the reconciliation work in Rwanda, where different actors have aimedto build a more peaceful society after the genocide that took placein 1994.

Other-transformation

Self-transformation must be linked to the parallel process of other-transformation, central to the understanding of thick recognition.When it comes to transforming images of the other through thick recog-nition, the key aspect of the process is recognizing what the otherperceives as key elements of identity. If the other has a feeling of beingvictimized by the doings of the counterpart in conflict, that feelingof victimization must be recognized, so that the other’s feeling of notbeing recognized can be reversed. When the victimizers show awarenessof their victims’ grief, the grief becomes validated, which might leadto the growth of more positive relations between former rival groups(Volkan, 1994:172). Here it is again important to emphasize that theaim is to accept and recognize difference, rather than to achieve forcedunification and joint narratives. The incorporation of the others’ nar-rative, together with accommodation of one’s own, might result innarratives that can coexist, even though built on differing experiencesand points of view. Thus the process toward more peaceful relationsincorporates difference, rather than reifying the practice of exclusion ofthe other (Buckley-Zistel, 2008:39, Jabri, 1996:151). This entails accep-tance and understanding of the views and deeply felt feelings of theother. In Sweden this has, for example, been done through official apolo-gies to former soldiers from the Baltic countries, who were extraditedfrom Sweden to the Soviet Union after the Second World War. In 1994,

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Sweden officially invited the 44 soldiers who were still alive. On theoccasion the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed regret onbehalf of the Swedish Government and agreed with all external criti-cism that had been directed toward the Swedish actions during whathas been commonly called “the extradition of the Balts”.

Memory agents promoting self- and/or other-transformation appar-ently have a more complex view of the opponent than those promotingthe master commemorative narratives. Their self-assigned task is thusto promote the complex view of the other that significantly breaks withcommon views. These memory agents do not sense that a more complexview of the other disturbs their world-view, or else they would not havepromoted the counter narratives in the first place. Their task is to per-suade their audience that this is the case, showing them that the presentas well as the past other owns human qualities, such as making errors aswell as doing the right things.

Implications of thick recognition – boundary transformation

Thick recognition through the reconstruction of commemorative narra-tives means to remember the past differently. Hence, new narratives arelet in and the old ones are adjusted in order to allow for their coexis-tence, and thus society can be allowed to “re-member” the membersof community and participants in conflict. If the counter narrativesthat imply shifted boundaries between groups are successful in soci-ety, transformation of relations in conflict can hence be the outcome.Social life might be reorganized as a consequence, as the members ofthe community and the participants in conflict may be assembled ina different way (Buckley-Zistel, 2008:50). This reconstruction of iden-tity through changes in narratives “bears the potential to assemble notonly our thoughts and perceptions in a different way, but also war-torncommunities per se” (Buckley-Zistel, 2008:50). New potentials arise, andformerly stable boundaries between identity and difference can becomemore permeable, opening up possibilities for more peaceful relations inthe future.

The perception of self undergoes transformation; it moves from aunitary understanding of the self as flawless to a more complex con-ception of self as capable of doing both good and bad. In times whenone’s own collective committed bad deeds, there is thus room for takingresponsibility, and where the others’ claims for justice are recognized,renouncement of parts of one’s own narrative is a justified sacrifice.Difference is then not necessarily understood as a threat, but ratheras a pluralistic other with flaws as well as good qualities. Here former

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perpetrators are understood as victims and vice versa, which can bea very demanding psychological process (Bar-Tal, 2000a:358). This isindeed a difficult process, as it challenges beliefs in the core constructsof individuals in conflict, which are hard to alter as people often tend toact protectively when that occurs.

However, if the memory agents are successful in their story telling,and succeed in communicating their counter narratives to the relevantaudience, the identity of the other becomes subject to thick recogni-tion. If this nuanced view of the other gains acceptance in society, itsmembers could revisualize the dividing lines in their community, andthus the former stable boundaries between the communities in conflictcould become more permeable, opening up a potential for other divi-sions and accordingly for reconstructed relationships between groups.In this manner, thick recognition might be a source that brings aboutchanges in the make-up of the core constructs in collectives involvedin conflict. This fundamentally affects relations in the conflict setting,which might turn former violent relations into more peaceful ones.

Recognition openings and closures

Moments when audiences are presented with counter narratives mightevoke strong reactions among the inhabitants of a society. This is indeednot unique for the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Aside from Israeli soci-ety, there are also examples of other societies involved in intractableconflicts, where changes in narratives of historiography and identityprovoked intense debates. Those cases include, for example, Ireland,Cyprus, India and Sri Lanka (cf. Banerjee, 1997, Boyce and O’Day, 1996,McBride, 2001, Papadakis, 2003, 2008a, Ryan, 1996, Strathern, 2004).

Some might meet “new” identities with suspicion and antipathy,whereas others welcome the possibilities brought about by the newformulations of identity. The reactions to novel narratives are sometimesunified, but more often differing factions in society react in differentways depending on their own identifications, hopes and fears. Masternarratives are not held in subjective and isolated minds; they becomedominant only because they are shared and intersubjective (cf. Buzanet al., 1998:31). The process of establishing identities and narratives insociety is an intersubjective process resting among its subjects (Arendt,1958). Thus, one view of history cannot be dominant if it is held byelites alone. In order for counter narratives to become master narratives,the public hence must accept them.

Reconstruction of identity is an ongoing process. However, whennew narratives arise, overtly challenging societies’ master narratives,

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possibilities for transformation unfold. Those moments often occur dur-ing peace processes when the ongoing conflict is momentarily on holdand new narratives of peace come to the fore (Buckley-Zistel, 2008:58).This might be described as “the odd time in-between” (Arendt, 1968:14),where dominant traditions are broken and a gap appears in which actionand change might occur. This notion corresponds quite well with whatRingmar names formative moments. He argues that formative momentsare times

when old identities break down and new identities are created in theirplace; times when new stories are told, submitted to audiences, andnew demands for recognition presented.

(1996:83)

During those times, the birth of new narratives as individuals andgroups tell new stories about themselves is often witnessed.

As the general conception of identities is that they are malleableand thus might be altered, the introduction of new identities throughcounter narratives might under certain circumstances lead to recogni-tion openings in society. The memory agents might identify stronglywith the peace movement, the international community of intellectu-als, or other identities that do not rely on a strong identification alignedwith the master narratives of national identity. The crucial questionis if and how the memory agents promoting counter commemorativenarratives could succeed in communicating those narratives to the pub-lic, so that they would not be understood as threatening. A formativemoment may arise and the question is whether the narratives canresonate with the audience. When that happens, it can be thoughtof as bringing recognition openings. This might result, in part, fromcircumstances facilitating the introduction of counter narratives andcould hence contribute to synthesizing a new identification (Bloom,1990:40).

Here the element of renouncement is central because the transforma-tion of the image of the collective self involves painful concessions. Onemight have to give up dreams (Allan and Keller, 2006:203) as well as pre-senting oneself as morally inferior to the other at times. Thus, the imageof the self gains traits usually ascribed to the other, which might be avery painful process. This corresponds with Northrup’s notion regard-ing when the other in a conflict becomes “like-self” (Northrup, 1989).One hence has to take responsibility for the fact that the other at timeswas victimized. This implies a confrontation with the locus of master

62 Theory

narratives, touching on traumas as well as amnesias. Thus, “new” imagesof the self, breaking with the insecure self-images of the master narra-tives, are presented and one has to confront the other’s picture of theself, inasmuch as the other’s narrative is given recognition. As men-tioned earlier, this opens up the possibility of viewing both the self andthe other in more pluralistic terms, making a transformation of coreconstructs possible:

The way we have seen ourselves, thought of ourselves, and repre-sented ourselves is challenged through excavating our past in thelight of the “enemy” [. . ..] Once conscious we might consider ourprejudices and prejudgments as inappropriate and unsuitable anddiscard some of our assumptions or positions, habits or routines.In doing so, in discarding features that were intrinsic to our identity,we change.

(Buckley-Zistel, 2008:44)4

The reactions of the audience to the counter narratives depend greatlyon broader developments in society. Even though counter narrativesmight diametrically oppose the master narratives, they might corre-spond with other ideals in society and thus resonate with narrativesfamiliar to the audience. This is context-dependent and will be discussedat length in the empirical analysis.

Other circumstances can inhibit the introduction of narratives ofthick recognition, which in turn might lead to recognition closures. Thecounter narratives thus evoke strong feelings of insecurity and threattoward the core construct, leading to their being discarded altogether(Bloom, 1990:40).5 The counter narratives hence provoke individualswho might act in concert with fellow members of the collective in orderto “secure” the master narratives. This maneuver fortifies the masternarratives so that the core construct of the collective remains intact.The fact that core constructs in intractable conflicts are difficult to alterassists the understanding of the strong reactions that might be evokedwhen self-images in core constructs are challenged by narratives break-ing with the general knowledge of the self and the other promotedin the master narratives. Here, the act of renouncement is consideredtoo painful or outright illegitimate, and the “new” identification isdiscarded altogether.

Reactions to counter narratives of thick recognition might hence dif-fer. They can produce boundary transformation as a result of recognitionopenings, or the upholding of the status quo due to recognition closures.

Identities in Conflict 63

The dynamic of identification thus makes us understand conditions foraction in a collective sharing the same core construct (Bloom, 1990:53).

Locating thick recognition in narratives about the past

History, identity and collective memory

This section introduces an understanding of the relationship betweenhistory and identity. Hence, it presents the logic of why it is crucial tostudy understandings of history in order to further thoughts on its linksto identity construction and conflict transformation in the present.

Understandings of the past help people interpret the present. Theyalso tell them who they are (Lebow, 2006:3). Shared memories thus pro-vide communities with more or less well-defined identities. Also indi-vidual memories are shaped though intersubjective processes and tendto reflect and often reinforce dominant narratives in society (Lebow,2006:4). Memories hence provide a linkage between understandings ofpast and present. Collective memory is understood as being createdthrough communication in a society, and hence heavily reflects dom-inant narratives in that society. Collective memory helps individualsfind meanings in their everyday lives and struggles. As such, collectivememory in its institutionalized and ritualized forms helps constitutethe core of communities (Lebow, 2006:8). The link between collectivememory and identity construction has been debated. Bell points outthis problematic relationship and reminds us that what is genericallycalled collective memory is not truly mnemonic, neither does it have tobe anchored in common experience (2003:65). Henceforth, when I referto collective memory, I mean socially constructed understandings aboutthe past, which are vital for the formation of a sense of collectiveness.However, the memory does not have to be anchored in lived experiencein order to be important for the construction of collective identity.

The master commemorative narratives of a collective are understoodas its broader view of history, which is socially constructed and providesgroup members with a general notion of their shared past. The countercommemorative narratives, in turn, are those narratives regarding thenation’s history, and reside on the margins of the collective memory.They are seldom related publicly and are often rejected by both thelarger public and/or official institutions (Zerubavel, 1995:6–7).

As a group’s memory cannot be collectively “remembered”, it mustbe narrated (Anderson, 1983:204). The master commemorative narra-tives often revolve around the origins of a group, and focuses on eventsthat mark the group’s emergence as an independent social entity (Nora,

64 Theory

1989:16–17, Zerubavel, 1995:7). In order to form a coherent sense ofthe collective’s identity in the past, memories that do not fit into mas-ter commemorative narratives are modified in order to fit or becomesubject for collective amnesia (Anderson, 1983:205, Douglas, 2007,Greenberg, 2005:95, Ram, 2009, Zerubavel, 1995:8). Commemorativenarratives thus have dynamics of both remembering and forgetting(Edkins, 2003:15). This is visible in the commemorations of traumaticevents in many different societies. One example where both collectiveamnesia and memory are visible is the emotion-laden ceremonies whenthe dramatic events of 9/11 in the USA are commemorated. Then theheroism of New York firefighters and the loss of family members inthe destroyed Twin Towers are accentuated, whereas the memory of9/11 cannot also include memories of innocent civilians who have beenkilled in the US-led War on Terrorism which was triggered by the tragicevents of that day. In that way collective amnesia and memory worksimultaneously in the commemoration of certain traumatic episodes inhistory. By focusing on certain aspects of the past, others that are under-stood as either irrelevant or disruptive to the narrative or its ideologicalmessage tend to be ignored.

The national group is thus always connected to a past as well as afuture – or destiny. Even though only certain events in the past are com-memorated, they are not understood as isolated events, but integratedinto a narrative whole, describing the national group as a continuouscommunity throughout time. If commemoration and identity are seenas central features of nationalism, narratives might be understood asbinding the two together by placing the perceived homogeneity of thenation in the past, present and future (Papadakis, 2003:253, Ricœur,1984:241, Zerubavel, 1995, Chapter 1). Knowledge about the past ishence a crucial ingredient in the construction of national identity.Conceptions of history are therefore crucial in the process of shapingideas and emotions underlying actions of individuals in national groups(Wertsch, 1997:6). The official histories of nation-states provide citizenswith a sense of group identity and legitimate a people in their owneyes (Tulviste and Wertsch, 1995). Thus narratives about the past influ-ence identities of both individuals and collectives. In this way, historyplays a crucial role in providing “texts of identity” (Shotter and Gergen,1989).

As all national groups tend to have a strong temporal emphasis intheir construction of collective identity, with a specific focus on pastactions, I now move over to a discussion on how views of the inse-cure self, conceptions of difference and the boundaries in between are

Identities in Conflict 65

inscribed in the master commemorative narratives of national groupsinvolved in intractable conflict (Cairns and Roe, 2003:5).

Inscribing stabilized boundaries in history

Many of today’s conflicts revolve around stories of the past, where thetraditions and territorial claims of forebears are relived, and in whosename present and future wars are legitimated (Jabri, 1996:134). Thisimplies that the images of the self, which as mentioned above are per sehistory-laden, of communities in conflict become even more preoccu-pied with their past. Myths of common ancestry are often enhanced(Jabri, 1996:135) in national groups entangled in intractable conflict, aswell as stories of trauma (Volkan, 1997:36–50) and redemption (Bar-Tal,2000b).

When studying commemorative narratives of groups involved inintractable conflicts, they too tend to be security-oriented, as theyrevolve around the group’s historical traumas and glories, trying to findways through which future traumas can be avoided. Aggressive, strongand security-oriented behavior might spring from collective memoriesof trauma in the past and reflect a group’s unconscious definition ofits shared identity by the transgenerational transmission of an injuredself, infused with the memory of the trauma of the group’s ancestors(Volkan, 1997:48). In this way, the commemorative narratives describ-ing the insecurity of the self in the past also play a legitimating role.In the face of historical injustices and humiliation, one’s own aggres-sions in the present might be justified in order to avoid humiliation andvictimization in the near future.

Master commemorative narratives in intractable conflicts often tellus a tale of difference as enemy, threatening the self (Buckley-Zistel,2008:33). As difference tends to be understood as a threat in intractableconflicts, narratives enhancing “lessons” from the past where the otheris described as aggressive and threatening are often told. Just as the inse-cure self is inscribed in the commemorative narratives of collectivesinvolved in intractable conflicts, so is thus the image of difference asthreat. When historical images of the self as employing aggressive strate-gies to defend its state of insecurity are introduced, narratives of theother as strong and sometimes dehumanized are often present, havingas its only goal to destroy the insecure collective self.

Often the stories in intractable conflicts are mutually exclusive whenit comes to the explanations of the roots of conflict, the meaning ofhistorical developments and the role played by in- and out-groups dur-ing the different stages of conflict (Rouhana and Bar-Tal, 1998:763). One

66 Theory

effective way of putting distance between the in- and out-group is torender the other’s narrative illegitimate. In this way the others’ narra-tives, feelings, understandings and anticipations for the future are keptat arms’ length. This is clear in the Israeli story of ha-Atsmaut (indepen-dence) and the Palestinian story of al-Naqba (catastrophe). Both portraythe events of the war of 1948, leading to the creation of the state ofIsrael, in mutually exclusive terms.

Changing historical understandings of the self and the other throughthe act of thick recognition is thus understood as possibly eroding theapparent stability of borders – paving the way for relationship trans-formation within the setting of intractable conflict. The dynamics ofthis process and its hardships are discussed at length in the empiricalchapters.

Moving on

This chapter has shown that recognition openings – in the way of fullyrecognizing the identity and experience of the other – might ease con-flict and open paths to relationship transformation. It has suggested thatthe stable boundaries of collective identities in conflicted societies mightbe unsettled, if they come under the pressure from narratives of thickrecognition. Conflictual relations are understood as dependent on thebounded relationship of identity and difference in the construction ofcore constructs of the groups involved. Moreover, narratives are under-stood as carrying notions of those boundaries in both past and presentin their descriptions of reality. After having wrapped up the theoreticalpart of the analysis, I now move on to applications of the notions intro-duced here. The next part, New History, first introduces the reader to theIsraeli commemorative narratives and explores how they can be inter-preted in terms of recognition. Then I move on to analyze the debates inwhich memory agents were involved in an intense battle over historicalunderstandings, which also was closely linked to the development andcontext of conflict.

Part III

New History

4Boundaries and Recognition inIsraeli Master Narratives

The New Historians questioned the legitimacy of the mastercommemorative narratives that had been told and retold by the Israelistate through different official memory institutions communicating theshared memory of the Jewish collective to its citizens. The mastercommemorative narratives had previously been inscribed into Israeliofficial memory institutions such as school curricula, history books usedin education, state supported holidays commemorating past glories andsorrows, and also communicated through speeches by officials to themembers of the Israeli community.

This chapter pays attention to Israeli master commemorative narratives.In order to relate further discussions on New History to the over-archingnarrative constellation of Israeli society, the same type of analysis iscarried out (however, in less detail) with regard to the development ofIsraeli master narratives of Zionism and conflict. The analysis focuses onhow views of the self and the other were described in narratives centralto Israeli self-understandings, as well as how they drew boundariesaround relevant and irrelevant collectives respectively. In this chapter,I introduce the Israeli master commemorative narratives about the warsurrounding the creation of the Israeli state and analyze the extent towhich they can be interpreted in terms of recognition.

The master commemorative narratives

Introduction

The master commemorative narratives of Zionism often divide Jewishhistory into three periods: antiquity, exile and return (Weingrod,1997:235, Zerubavel, 1995:15–16). Antiquity is understood as the periodof a heroic past in the land of Israel, ending up in Exodus when the Jews

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70 New History

were scattered into exile throughout the world. The last period, return,concerns the “ingathering of exiles” in mandated Palestine and thesubsequent establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. In much ofZionist commemoration, the focus has been on heroism during theantique era, trying to form identities that break with the picture ofthe “weak” Jew of exile, subjected to pogroms ending up with thehumanitarian disaster of the Holocaust (Weingrod, 1997:237, Zerubavel,1995:75–76). Previously, little used symbols from the antique era, suchas the sacrifice and devotion of the Masada myth1, have been used tocreate a picture of the rising Sabra Jew 2 of the new State, overcom-ing historical persecution in exile through difficult sacrifices. Thus, pastglories from antiquity as well as traumas from persecution in exile,in general, and from the Holocaust, in particular, have shaped theIsraeli commemorative narratives (Tossavainen, 2006:2008). The threeeras of antiquity, exile and return have thus become connected in themaster commemorative narratives and provide a sense of continuityfrom the biblical past, through persecution in the Diaspora (Ackerman,1997:4, Tossavainen, 2006:243) to the fortified, militarized identity ofthe present when the Jewish collective has been resurrected in the bib-lical land of Israel (Weiss, 1997:98). Several researchers argue that oneof the main challenges when Zionism was created was to connect thepresent struggles over land and nationality with remote Jewish historyin the land of Israel (Aronoff, 1993:48, Weiss, 1997). Thus the mastercommemorative narratives can be understood as a story linking Jewishexistence in the biblical lands to the present so as to create continuitybetween the ancient past and the legitimacy of a nation-state for theJewish people in the present state of Israel (Weiss, 1997:98).

The master commemorative narratives have had a strong focus on thehistory of the Jewish collective, portraying that collective in often verypositive terms.3 Stories emphasizing its unique situation of constantinsecurity and siege have come to dominate over the stories describing itas a people like all others. This has become especially visible in the treat-ment of the historical experience of the Holocaust within Israeli mastercommemorative narratives:

The Holocaust was presented as the ultimate expression of the truthof the world’s hatred towards the Jews. Hence, it likewise stressed theisolationist theme. The interpretation of the Holocaust clearly dom-inated the narrative, even during periods when universalism gainedmomentum.

(Yadgar, 2002:65)

Boundaries and Recognition in Master Narratives 71

The unique experience of the Holocaust and accordingly the uniquevictimhood of the Jewish people have been an important pole aroundwhich other themes of the national narratives are centered. The victim-hood created by the Holocaust calls for sacrifices in order to create a safespace free from persecution. The Israeli soldiers personifying that sac-rifice have thus become important symbols for the resurrected Jewishpeople in the present and negation of further exile in the future. Theheroism of young Israeli soldiers is described in an oft-cited poem:

In work garb and heavy shodThey climbIn stillnessWearing yet the dress of battle, the grimeOf arching day and Fire-filled nightUnwashed, weary unto death, not knowingRestBut wearing youth like drops in their hairSilently the two approachAnd standAre they of the quick or of the dead?Through wondering tears, the people stare“who are you, the silent two?”And they reply: “we are the silver platterUpon which the Jewish state was served to You”.

(Alterman, 1947)

This poem is read during official ceremonies on Remembrance Day,when the heroism of Israeli soldiers is commemorated. It symbolizesthe sacrifices of Israeli soldiers and their families, whose lives were the“silver platter” on which the state was built (Feldt, 2005:190–191, Weiss,1997:94).

The trauma of the Holocaust has thus been inscribed in the mastercommemorative narratives of Israel, and sacrifices for the state arelegitimated through the main goal of avoiding another exile. Thenation-building project has thus revolved around a massive focus onthe trauma of the Holocaust, and also on antique myths of resurrec-tion following historic persecution, such as the Masada myth (Bar-Tal,2000b:57, Zerubavel, 1995).

When reviewing the literature on dominant themes in the Israeli nar-ratives regarding the foundation of the state in 1948, three themes seemespecially dominant. (1) The idea of “the few against the many”, of the

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Israeli David defeating an Arab Goliath, breeding a picture of the Jewishcollective as invincible as well as innocent (cf. Almog, 2000:233, Sela,2005:211). This connects to the idea that the Jewish people in Palestinefaced the same conditions in Israel around 1948 as they did in Europeon the eve of the Holocaust (Friling, 2003:26). This has enhanced thepicture of Israel as vulnerable and in constant need of strong defen-sive measures. (2) The notion of “a voluntary flight of the Palestiniansfrom Palestine”, placing the blame for the Palestinian “refugee problem”solely on the Palestinian elite and public (cf. Aggestam, 2004:134–135,Bar-On, 2006, Silberstein, 1999:156–157). (3) Arab unwillingness tonegotiate for peace after the war of 1948. The understanding has beenthat Israel approached the Arab governments to reach a peace agree-ment. However, the Arabs turned down the proposal and sought revengein order to wipe out the shame of their defeat (cf. Sela, 2005:212,Silberstein, 1999:97, Tessler, 2006:178–180).

Those three themes taken together present a picture of the founda-tion of the State of Israel as a righteous struggle by a defensive andweak Jewish collective against a strong enemy, on lands that were largelyunpopulated due to voluntary exile. The continuation of the conflict hasaccordingly been explained as a result of Arab reluctance to negotiatefor peace. The continuous militancy of the Jewish state was formulatedaccording to the principle of “no alternative” (“ein breira”), meaningthat in order to survive in the face of Arab aggression and unwillingnessto reach a peace agreement, Israel had no alternative than to becomehighly militarized so as to avoid the tragedy of another exile. Anotherimportant principle was “purity of arms” (“tahar haneshak”), whichwas the official doctrine of the Israeli Defense Forces, meaning thatviolence was only to be used when, and to the extent, necessary for self-defense (Lustick, 1995:523, 1996:211, Sela, 2005:212, Shapira and Abel,2008:95, Shlaim, 1999:173). Thus, the historical weakness of the Jewishcollective and moral legitimacy of the Jewish cause in the face of Arabaggression, together with the view of “the whole world is against us”,served as a strong legitimating argument in the master commemorativenarratives. With this constant emphasis on historical insecurity as atheme leaving marks on the state of the present, Israeli society hasbecome highly militarized (Kimmerling, 2001:214). With this followsthe belief that Israel’s only option is military, as social–political optionsare not sufficient to assure national security (Idalovichi, 2004:624).The solution to Israel’s historically motivated security predicament hasthus been to construct a highly militarized Jewish state (Aggestam,1999:57).

Boundaries and Recognition in Master Narratives 73

The Zionist master commemorative narratives have become inscribedinto various official memory institutions. Israel’s education policy sincethe establishment of State Education Law in 1953 has been true to thetraditional Zionist commemorative narratives. This law established thatIsraeli curricula should teach “the values of Jewish culture”, “love for thehomeland” and “loyalty to the Jewish state”. This law was immenselyimportant to the Israeli system, so important that David Ben-Gurionreferred to it as one of the country’s two “supreme laws”, the other beingthe right of return (Hazony, 2000b:1). Except from educational pol-icy, the commemorative narratives were also institutionalized throughvarious state supported holidays, during which Israeli citizens have a dayoff from work to celebrate important historical events. Israeli society hasbecome immersed in collective rites of commemoration that have beenmade part of the national calendar (Weiss, 1997:92). In this way, themaster commemorative narratives are upheld not only by the storiestold amongst the members of the collective but also by the commu-nication of the master commemorative narratives through importantofficial channels, beginning in kindergarten (Bar-Tal and Teichman,2005, Firer, Jerusalem, May 2009). In order to discuss how the masternarratives incorporate elements of thick recognition, I now turn to howthe dimensions of self, other and boundaries are described in the mastercommemorative narratives.

Views of self – insecurity and moral righteousness

Israeli history has in its traditional form pointed to the specifics ofthe Jewish collective, emphasizing stories of common traumas andglories. The perception of threats against the Israeli state since itsinception as well as toward the Jewish community in the Diasporahas traveled hand in hand with historiography as an academic disci-pline and the transmission of the official historiography to the Israelipublic.

The theme of historical insecurity stems partly from the intractableconflict with the Arab states and the Palestinian people. Added to this,one of the most prominent features of the Jewish collective memory iscontinuous threat, with the Holocaust being a crucial experience, leav-ing its marks on all considerations of security (Bar-Tal, 2000b:98). Thethreat from the Arab collective, whether from Arab states or from thePalestinian entity, is often described as a continuation of the devastat-ing anti-Semitism that ruined the Jewish community in Europe. Thusthe current conflict is understood through the lens of a persecuted past,undeniably enhancing the theme of insecurity.

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The institutionalized commemorative narratives enhancing persecu-tion have led to the understanding that the national collective has tobe militarily protected in order to survive. This collective is mainly notthe one comprising all the inhabitants of the state, with its Christianand Muslim minorities, but rather the Jewish collective, as it is the onethat have been subjected to anti-Semitism and later on to Arab aggres-sion. This shows that it is mainly the interests and history of the Jewishcollective that have been emphasized in Zionist historiography, whereasother inhabitants of the state, mainly Christian and Muslim Arabs, havebeen left out of the history as well as indirectly outside of the securityconcerns. It hence stands clear that the master commemorative narra-tives of Israel are ethnocentric and concern the collective of Jews, anddo not incorporate the Muslim or Christian minorities of the state.

The perception of being subjected to various threats has indeedbeen highlighted in the Israeli master commemorative narratives. Thenational holidays in Israel are both the Jewish religious holidays empha-sizing the history of the Jews during biblical times, in large partcommemorating the persecution of Jews in biblical times, and “new hol-idays”, created after the inception of the state. The perception of threathas also been transmitted from leaders to the public through variousspeeches over the years, and similar views have been expressed in news-paper editorials. In a Holocaust Memorial Ceremony in 1987, the thenMinister of Defense Yitzhak Rabin proclaimed:

In every generation they rise up to destroy us, and we must rememberthat this could happen to us in the future. We must therefore, as astate, be prepared.

(Ha’aretz [Hebrew], April 27, 1987, quoted in Bar-Tal, 2001:5)

Shalom Rosenfeld, the then editor of the daily newspaper Ma’ariv, wrotein 1980:

The hatred of Israel has always been the all powerful cement whichconnected the different nations and states, which in other areas notonly did not share similar interests but were often contradictoryand at odds with each other . . .. Let the historical philosophers andanthropologists search for the explanation of this remarkable phe-nomenon which has swept away the masses, coming from differenttraditions and cultures to a common ritual of hatred towards a nationand state whose name they can hardly pronounce . . . what preoccu-pies us primarily is the spiritual, political and security expressions

Boundaries and Recognition in Master Narratives 75

which this international brotherly hatred has toward the existenceof the State of Israel and the security of the masses of Jews in theDiaspora.

(quoted in Bar-Tal, 2000b:111)

Various studies (cf. Adar and Adler, 1965, Bar-Tal, 1988, Bar-Tal andTeichman, 2005, Firer, 1980, 2004, Podeh, 2000) show that the themeof victimization of the Jewish people throughout history has beenprominent in education. It has been especially dominant in history text-books. Often the hatred of Jews is described as permanent, although itsexpressions shift from nation to nation, and from one time to other.

The Israeli wars with the Arab states as well as their Palestinian coun-terpart have been described as legitimate defensive struggles in orderto grant a well-deserved land to the victimized Jewish people. Strugglesagainst various counterparts have thus been described against the back-drop of persecution in the past, which has contributed to putting theIsraeli struggle for land and safety in a morally justified light.

When it comes to views of self within the master commemorativenarratives, victimhood is hence the main theme (Blomeley, 2005:127).The historical victimhood of exile and the Holocaust is to be avoidedby all means4 (cf. Fierke, 2006:127, Tossavainen, 2006:217). In the mas-ter commemorative narratives, the collective self is described as quitehomogenous in that its victimization and moral propriety are high-lighted in a variety of ways. The victimhood inflicted on the Jewishpeople through exile, climaxing with the Holocaust, has thus beencemented into historical consciousness. Violent events conducted bythe collective self have hence been interpreted in that light, often ren-dering legitimacy to acts committed by the collective, at the same timedelegitimizing the opponent, as the actions of that group have oftenbeen understood as a continuation of persecution and anti-Semitism inthe Diaspora.

When considering the views of self as described in the mastercommemorative narratives, it is clear that the most vital theme withregard to the self is insecurity. The insecurity of Jews in exile hasbeen extended to embrace the Jews of the state of Israel (Tossavainen,2006:211). In order to achieve security for the Jewish nation, all mea-sures have been taken, including military ones, in order to avoidanother exile. The collective self is thus described as insecure as wellas unambiguously morally righteous when described in the mastercommemorative narratives.

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Views of the other – invisible, backward and aggressive

When it comes to descriptions of the other in the master commemora-tive narratives of Israeli society, the picture is more disparate. Onecontroversy regards what to call the occupied territories, which by manyJewish Israelis are called Judea and Samaria, which are their biblicalHebrew names and thus also connotes to historically legitimate Israeliterritory. Maybe even more controversial is the naming of the popu-lation of the Christian and Muslim communities living inside Israel.Since 1967, the most common term to describe the inhabitants of theWest Bank and Gaza are Palestinians, which is a term used by Israelisand Palestinians alike. However, Israeli Jews have often preferred to callthe “Arab” population inside Israel “Israeli Arabs”, as a way to distin-guish them from and mark distance to the population on the occupiedterritories and the wider Palestinian diaspora. However, the term “IsraeliArabs” has been highly controversial and unpopular among this com-munity in Israel, who often accentuate their national belonging and tiesto the occupied territories as well as colonial past, by referring to them-selves as Palestinians. This “simple” controversy of naming is indicativeof the ambivalent status and conflictual relationship between Israelisand Palestinians in the Israeli “mainland” as well as in the occupiedterritories.

It is obvious that the populations of the Arab states as well as thePalestinian collective have served as crucial others in the construc-tion of commemorative narratives. When reviewing the literature onviews of Arabs and/or Palestinians in Israeli historical accounts, twomajor trends seem to be discernible. The first trend concerns descrip-tions of Arab populations before the creation of the state. Theseaccounts often paint a picture of backward, underdeveloped and cul-turally inferior individuals compared to the Jewish collective. Thisview is complemented with the theme regarding Arab unwillingnessto negotiate for peace. The Arab population has thus also been under-stood as aggressors with little to no interest in reaching a peaceagreement.

The other trend is the invisibility of Arabs and Palestinians in JewishIsraeli history, especially in accounts of the times before 1948.

More than the Arab was described as negative or positive – he waspushed into a forlorn corner, and sometimes was practically pushedout of consciousness.

(Ben-Porat, 2006:56)

Boundaries and Recognition in Master Narratives 77

The Palestinian experience can thus be partly described as subject tocollective amnesia. While the Jewish sufferings, struggles and heroismhave continuously been described, mourned and celebrated, the experi-ences of the Palestinian Arab population have played a marginal role inthe eyes of the public, especially before 1948.

[They were] not hated, not loved, not taken into consideration – partof the landscape.

(Shapira: Visions in Conflict 68–70, in Ben-Porat, 56)

After 1948, the description of Arabs as being primitive has persistedalongside the theme of them being seen as blood-thirsty killers, riot-ers and gangs forming an aggressive continuation of the anti-Semitismperpetrated during the Holocaust (Bar-Tal, 2000b:146, Bar-Tal andTeichman, 2005:165–166).5 The Palestinians also became more visiblein the Israeli Jewish narratives, as they were described as active coun-terparts in the 1948 war and in the hostile relationships that followedthat war, and this has continued into the present. When discussing thedescription of the other in Israeli historical narratives, most researchersagree that negative stereotyping has diminished somewhat with time,albeit still remaining in many instances. For example, a history schoolbook from 1990 that was in use during the 1990s describes differencesbetween Arab and Jewish workers in these terms:

The Arab workers are more obedient, humble, licking the [Jewish]farmer’s boots and ready to serve him in the field and at home, whilethe Jewish workers see themselves as free people, equal to the farmer,who have to fulfill their work duties but refuse to listen to scoldingor curses.

(Shahar, 1990, quoted in Firer, 2004:75)

Here, Arabs are indeed described as inferior and underdeveloped, com-pared to sophisticated Jews with European values. When describing bat-tles between Jewish and Palestinian guerilla groups before the inceptionof the state, the Israeli groups are often described as “organizations” and“special squads”, whereas their Palestinian counterparts are described interms such as “terror-groups” and “gangs” (Firer, 2004:76–77), which isquite revealing for the understanding of the two collectives as being atdifferent stages of development. In this regard, some researchers suchas Baruch Kimmerling (1983) and Gershon Shafir (1989) have con-nected the Israeli state-building project as well as its attitudes toward the

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Palestinian minority to an Orientalist view (Said, 1979), which was oftenseen as an important ingredient in colonialism (Bareli, 2003, Penslar,2003).

The citizens of the Arab countries have been described as an ongoingthreat since the times before the inception of the Israeli state andthroughout the state’s history. With regard to the Palestinian collec-tive, which might be the most important other today, the picture isdifferent. When it comes to the years leading up to the 1948 war,the national resistance of Palestinian Arabs to Zionist aspirations fornational territory was largely ignored. This goes hand in hand with thefact that the Palestinian collective was understood as leaving their landbefore the realization of the United Nations (UN) partition plan. Thus,the Palestinians were understood as abandoning their land followingorders from the Palestinian elite, and when Jews came to inhabit theland, villages and houses were already deserted. This created an under-standing of the Jewish people establishing their state according to theidea of “a land without people for a people without land” (Whitelam,1996:58),6 which also ties into the colonialist theme previously men-tioned. One factor connected to this was that Palestinian guerilla warfarefollowing the war of 1948 was not perceived as having any connectionto the fact that the Palestinian community had lost land, villages andhouses during the war, on whose wreckage Israeli kibbutzim were estab-lished later on (Sela, 2005:207). Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begincommented on the situation of the Palestinians and their claims to theland in 1969, on the specific topic of Palestinian claims to the lands ofkibbutz Ein Hahoresh:

My friend, take care. When you recognize the concept of “Palestine,”you demolish your right to live in Ein Hahoresh. If this is Palestineand not the land of Israel, then you are conquerors and not tillersof the land. You are invaders. If this is Palestine, then it belongs to apeople who lived here before you came.

(Yediot Aharonot, October 17, 1969)

The view of the other has hence been either invisible or marginal,and in the cases where the other has been visible, the descriptionshave often included negative images of either backward primitivenessor aggressiveness and hostility (Campos, 2007:53).

The Palestinian collective has thus in many ways functioned asthe threatening difference toward which the insecure, victimized Israelinational identity has been contrasted. The other is hence describedin unambiguously negative terms. Before the creation of the state, the

Boundaries and Recognition in Master Narratives 79

Palestinian collective was mostly described as invisible, and in the caseswhen they were visible they were mostly understood as backward andprimitive. After the creation of the state of Israel, it was continuouslydescribed as aggressive, threatening and completely unwilling to reachany form of peace agreement. The other has thus been kept at distance,constituting a major security threat to the Israeli national community.The fact that the other has been described along those lines has createda strong moral argument for the legitimization of violent politics ofexclusion.

Stabilized boundaries

The master commemorative narratives obviously draw stark distinctionsbetween self and other. The Israeli Jewish self is described as utterlyinsecure, contrasted to the threatening aggressiveness of the Palestiniancollective. Thus, boundaries between groups are described as stable, withmostly positive traits on one side and negative on the other. Ethnicboundaries are seldom crossed in the master commemorative narrativesof the Israeli war of 1948.

The Jewish collective is described as morally superior, whereas thePalestinian counterpart is inferior culturally and morally. The Jewsare also understood as victims of historical consequences, whereas theother, when visible, is mostly described as an aggressor. Thus, the twoentities are kept apart, and the Jewish collective is seen as needing toengage in hard work in order to secure the collective from the doingsof its counterpart. In this description, the boundaries between groupsinvolved in conflict are understood as stable. The constituent themes regard-ing descriptions of the collective self and its counterpart in the Warof 1948 have been inscribed in official memory institutions and havehence continued to leave imprints on understandings of the conflictever since. Narratives of the past as described in the media, televisiondocumentaries, educational textbooks, as well as official rhetoric andstate-sponsored commemorative rituals and ceremonies, have come todominate most understandings of conflict, contributing to making theconflict intractable.

I now move on to discuss the Israeli narratives of Zionism and conflict,in which the commemorative master narratives have been carried onthrough time.

Master narratives of Zionism and conflict

As previously stated, commemorative narratives and their societalimpact must be related to the over-arching narrative constellation in

80 New History

order to make further sense in a societal context. Throughout time theyare carried on into various narratives that relate to identity construc-tion. Thus, it is key to discuss how narratives important for identityconstruction carry on notions of boundaries from the past into thepresent. In Israel, the narrative themes that most closely relate tothe commemorative narratives of 1948, and have carried them onthroughout time, are narratives of Zionism and conflict. They have beenintimately related to the construction of Israeli national identities andelaborate on relations between the Israeli and Palestinian collectives.In the later debate analyses, it will also become evident that they weretemporally as well as thematically related to the debates over NewHistory. However, as they have elaborated somewhat differently on thenotion of recognition, it is more convenient to discuss them alongsideeach other.

Narratives of Zionism

The goal of Israeli nationalism – the ideology known as Zionism – isto create and support a safe haven in the shape of a nation-state forthe Jewish people of the world in the state of Israel (see, e.g., Nimni,2003:70). Zionism originated in Eastern Europe in the last quarter ofthe nineteenth century. The Jewish state, known as the state of Israel,was declared in May 1948. That state was built according to the guidingprinciples of Zionism. Theodor Herzl’s7 project was secular in charac-ter, borrowing ideas and inspiration from the modern nationalisms ofEurope.

Scholars of Zionism (cf. Avineri, 1981) often argue that Zionism inits early versions, before 1948, was more about the creation of “astate like other states”, than with the religious content of Judaism(Dowty, 1998:5). As the state was taking shape, further considera-tions had to be taken into account regarding what was to become ofits other governing principles and institutions. As societies for vari-ous reasons prioritize some ideas over others, different historical andcontextual factors result in the rendering of superiority to one idealregarding boundary drawing over others, which has grave implicationsfor identification.

When the project of building the Israeli state began, the nineteenthcentury vision of the modern nation-state was used as its formativemodel (Avineri, 1981:13, Gellner, 1994, Ram, 1998:213). The centralcomponent of Zionism thus strongly accentuates the boundaries of theIsraeli Jewish national collective, in its focus both on religion (Judaism)and on secular nationalism. It also has vital elements of classic liberalism

Boundaries and Recognition in Master Narratives 81

(Kimmerling, 1985:262).8 The liberal influences led to the introductionof ideas built on universalistic dimensions in the Zionist ideology, aswell as the determination of the international orientation and culturalmodel adopted by Israeli society (Kimmerling, 1985:265). The liberalcomponents play an important role as counterweights to the heavilyparticularistic character of the elements emphasizing nationalistic char-acteristics and religious affiliation. Zionist politics tried to strengthenuniversalistic tendencies, mainly through the state-centered politicsintroduced by David Ben-Gurion, aiming to create a civic culture or“mamlachtiut” in Israeli politics (Shafir and Peled, 1998:257). This wasmeant to work as a unifying force for the people of immensely varyingbackgrounds immigrating to Israel, and in this way all collectives withinthe state were to be included, as the state engaged in a boundary drawingpractice that was not based on ethnic affiliation. These good intentionsnotwithstanding, many scholars agree on the meager results of mam-lachtiut politics, in the sense of bringing about more equality whenit comes to the socially as well as ethnically stratified Israeli citizens.The actual outcome may have served as unifying for the Jews of Israelsince they came from different parts of the world, whereas an impor-tant minority, the “Israeli Arabs” or Palestinians residing in Israel, inreality were left out of the mamlachtiut efforts (Dowty, 1998:84, Shafirand Peled, 1998:257). The boundaries around the whole “Israeli” collec-tive were hence understood as quite artificial in the minds of the Israelipublic (Shafir and Peled, 1998:258), as the most dominant forms ofZionism have emphasized ethnic bonds and separation between ethniccollectives.

After the 1967 war, Neo-Zionism emerged, when the West Bankand Gaza were occupied by Israel. The people who belong to theNeo-Zionist movement are mainly settlers and their nationalist sup-porters throughout the country (Ram, 2003:27). Neo-Zionism has clearmessianic components that were less accentuated when Zionist ideologywas created but have grown more articulate through time (Aggestam,2004:130–131, Weissbrod, 1997:49). This movement is especially infavor of populating the occupied territories for religious reasons. TheGush Emunim (“The Bloc of the Faithful”), pleading for a “GreaterIsrael” in both the current Israeli lands and the West Bank and Gaza,in their aggressive struggles for new settlements and their refusal to givein to peace proposals to return any land, contribute greatly to politicsbuilt on ethnic considerations. The peace process during the 1990s wasalarming to the Neo-Zionists as many of their ideological goals wouldbe impossible if it was carried through.

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I thus conclude that master narratives of Zionism, as well as their moreextreme forms, Neo-Zionism, uphold and fortify the understanding ofthe boundaries between identity and difference as stable. There are nosigns of recognition, in either thin or thick terms, of the Palestiniancollective.

Master narratives of conflict

During the first decades following the establishment of the Israeli statein 1948, the narratives regarding Israel’s ongoing conflict with the Arabstates converged with the master commemorative narratives describingthe war of 1948 (Tessler, 2006:177). Israel was defined as a defensivenation, struggling against expansionist Arab neighbors in a morallyjust conflict. Until 1967, that picture dominated in Israeli society. Afterthe 1967 war, when Israel won what was seen as a miraculous victoryover the surrounding Arab world, the picture slowly started to change.As Israel then conquered the West Bank of Jordan, the Gaza strip andthe whole of the Sinai Peninsula, a consciousness of the existenceof a Palestinian population within the occupied territories started toemerge. As the occupation continued, master narratives regarding theconflict became challenged from many directions. Despite the criticism,they lived on and were communicated in official memory institutionssuch as educational material, war ceremonies and the military. In theIsraeli master narratives of conflict, which were dominant up until the1980s, and then slowly started to be replaced during the peace process,the Palestinian counterpart was either invisible or described in nega-tive terms. Hence, neither thin nor thick recognition of the Palestiniancollective was present.

Summing up: Absence of recognition and stable boundaries

The Israeli master commemorative narratives draw clear boundariesbetween Israelis and Palestinians in their descriptions of the historyof both nations. It is evident that the opponent in conflict is blamedfor past injustices, portraying the Israeli Jewish collective as a righteousvictim throughout history. Moral legitimacy in the past is thus ascribedto the Israeli national collective. The picture of the other in conflict isconstantly immoral and illegitimate in a number of ways. The otheris understood as aggressive and offensive, in light of the fact that theIsraeli nation was weak and defenseless. The opponent’s alleged suffer-ing is delegitimized on the grounds that the Israeli nation was weak and

Boundaries and Recognition in Master Narratives 83

inferior in numbers at the time, and the Palestinian refugees fled as aresponse to orders from their own elite. The moral justness of the Israelicollective is described categorically, and this historical description justi-fies defensive measures on the part of the Israeli Jews representing pastvictims in the present.

When it comes to the master narratives of Zionism and conflict, thestable boundaries inherent in the master commemorative narrativeshave carried on into the present. Hence, they also underline the ethniccharacter of the Israeli national collective, rather than its civic or civilforms. Thus, the Jewish collective of Israel has been the ethnos aroundwhich master national narratives and narratives of conflict have mainlyrevolved. Other collectives, such as Palestinians in the occupied territo-ries, and Palestinian Arabs living in Israel, both Muslims and Christians,have been marginalized. The tendency to marginalize minorities wasclear in the master narratives of Zionism, and was further enhanced inthe exclusionary forms of Neo-Zionism, which grew stronger from the1980s onwards. It is thus clear that the moral boundaries inherent in themaster commemorative narratives, portraying the Israeli Jewish collec-tive as just in the past, clearly relate to the boundaries of the presentmoral community as presented by the Neo-Zionists, as well as otherpromoters of the master narratives of Zionism.

The boundaries between self and other are hence understood as sta-ble, which is seen as necessary to secure the existence of the stateof Israel. It has also been clear that parts of the collective that iden-tify with or sympathize with the other in conflict are verbally movedto the other side of the stable boundary. The collective thus remainsunambiguous and morally just, as unwanted elements of the self areidentified with the other. This paints a picture of the future in whichone’s own collective is self-sufficient, and in which critics from boththe inside and outside are disqualified because they are part of amorally unjust collective aligned with the enemy. When connectedlike this, it is clear that the master narratives draw a trajectory fromthe past to the present and into the future, where the stability ofboundaries between self and other is understood as permanent andnecessary. If this view is dominant, it clearly facilitates an understand-ing of why peace efforts, changes in the national ideology, as wellas new formulations of history describing the opponent in conflictas a victim and the collective self as a perpetrator, might be under-stood as threatening. In order to survive in the face of Arab aggression,boundary destabilizing maneuvers thus have to be averted through all

84 New History

possible means. There is hence little to no room for recognition ofPalestinians in any of the master narratives discussed above. However,that changed somewhat during the 1980s and 1990s, as will be shownbelow.

After those concluding notes regarding boundaries and recognitionwithin different Israeli master narratives, I move on to analyze thecounter narratives according to the same conceptual framework.

5Boundaries and Recognition inIsraeli Counter Narratives

When previously closed state archives were opened to the public inthe early 1980s, historians of a new generation used the “new” datato formulate a different historical account of the Jewish collective ofIsrael, voicing a substantial critique against the message inherent inthe master commemorative narratives. The later works regarding historyand the subsequent debates touched on different eras in Israeli history,both pre- and post-state building. The largest controversy concernedthe creation of the state around 1948, and that controversy is the onefocused on in this study.

This chapter carries out a similar analysis to the previous one,although paying attention to the counter narratives of commemoration,Zionism and conflict. Throughout the discussion, I am able to discern towhat extent the different narratives incorporate notions of recognition,and also how they describe boundaries between the collectives involvedin conflict. The analyses in this chapter and the previous one serve asimportant backdrops to the debate analyses in Chapters 6 and 7. Here,the most obvious dividing lines between master and counter narrativesin recognition and boundaries are identified; these are the location ofmost importance when it comes to the contents of the debates overNew History.

The setting

In the early 1980s, previously classified documents concerning theArab–Israeli war of 1948 were opened to the public. In the follow-ing years, historians started to work with that material, resulting insome radical changes in the conceptualizations of the Jewish nation’sWar of Independence. Subsequently, a number of previously unknown

85

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documents were published, such as volumes of official documentsconcerning the war, personal diaries, among which David Ben-Gurion’swar diary might be the most notable, as well as the papers of the rulingparty. The new material boosted interest in academic study of the war,and those studies began to be published in late 1980s and early 1990s.

Around 1987, a series of critical historical accounts questioning theIsraeli commemorative narratives were published.1 The first author todo this was Simcha Flapan, a left-wing veteran of the Mapam-party,2

who in his book The Birth of Israel: Myth and Reality (1987), questionedthe very foundations of earlier interpretations of the war. Flapan’s book,taken less seriously due to his radical views on Israeli politics, stirredsome controversy but did not attract widespread attention within Israelisociety. Following its publication, a number of other works were pub-lished, inspired by his world views and fuelled by the newly releasedarchival material, which came to receive extensive attention. One ofthe most controversial of those books was Benny Morris’s The Birth ofthe Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949 (1987), which became widelydebated. Morris’s analysis shattered the understandings of the Jewishcollective during the war as being inferior in numbers, as well as describ-ing them as committing mass expulsions, even though not accordingto any major strategic plan, of Palestinian inhabitants of what was tobecome Israeli land. Two other scholars who followed this trend wereAvi Shlaim and Ilan Pappé. Shlaim’s book, Collusion Across the Jordan(1988), also shatters the idea of voluntary flight of the Palestinians,and describes a flight forced by Israeli expulsions, due to secret planswith the leadership of Jordan, so that the two states would be able toshare the East and West Banks of the Jordan River. Pappé’s first bookon the topic also covered the 1948 war and is called The Making ofthe Arab-Israeli Conflict: 1947–1951 (1992). Pappé also set out to addressthe “myths” constructed within the master commemorative narratives,and he accordingly addressed the topic of forceful expulsions conductedby the Israeli Defense Forces on the former Palestinian inhabitants ofthe state, in line with Morris and Shlaim making the Israeli Jewishcollective responsible for the creation of the situation of the Palestinianrefugees. Those were the works serving as inspiration for further schol-ars, questioning what had become known as historical truths in Israelisociety.

In the following, I investigate in which ways Israeli national identityis described in the counter commemorative narratives; is it viewed inthe same way as before, or is the description altered so that it can moreeasily exist alongside other identities?

Boundaries and Recognition in Counter Narratives 87

Views of self – from victim to perpetrator

In the writings and arguments within the various works of Israeli NewHistory, several aspects of the views of self, as described in the mastercommemorative narratives, are questioned. Considering the fact thatthe self-image of weakness and inferiority, as well as of innocenceregarding the creation of the refugee status of the Palestinian people,are challenged; the moral standards of the Israeli collective in factare questioned. Several researchers addressed the alleged “David versusGoliath-myth”, and undermined the view of the Jewish collective as aweak, defensive David, fighting a strong, vindictive and aggressive Arabworld portrayed as Goliath (Silberstein, 1999:99). The military strengthof the Israeli army at the time is estimated by the New Historiansto be much greater than claimed earlier. The army is also said to beequipped with more and better weapons, which previously had beendenied (Morris, 1990:33).3

The role of the Israeli forces as being not only defensive combatantsbut also expelling large numbers of Palestinians, as well as committingwar crimes such as massacres (Pappé, 2003:115), formed a decisive breakwith the self-image described in the master commemorative narratives.This questioned the morality of the Jewish collective, who according toMorris and Shlaim were far more strategic in their takeover of land andthe related expulsion of Palestinians. In Shlaim’s case this addressed thesecret Jewish negotiations with the leadership of Transjordan regardingcontrol over the Palestinian lands (Shlaim, 1988). In the version of thewar presented by Morris, the Jewish collective expelled Palestinians whowere militarily inferior as well as less than willing to give up their landsand villages (1987). Thus the leading New Historians, Morris, Shlaimand Pappé, all agreed that the Palestinian refugee problem mainlyresulted from expulsions enforced by the Jewish forces. Morris claimsthat there was no master plan for the expulsions, whereas Shlaim andPappé both affirm that there was a Plan D (“plan dalet”) in whicha strategy for expelling the Palestinians from the lands was workedout beforehand. Also other historians, later active in the making ofcounter narratives regarding the 1948 war, such as Tom Segev (1986)and Baruch Kimmerling (2001:39), submit evidence for the existence ofa grand expulsion strategy within the framework of Plan D (Blomeley,2005:130). Pappé asserts: “Plan D was a master plan for the expulsionof as many Palestinians as possible” (1999:94), whereas Morris arguesthat the flight of the Palestinians was “essentially a product of the war”(2001:38).

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Not only were the Palestinians expelled in the war of 1948, accord-ing to Morris. The Israeli leadership after the expulsions worked hard toprevent the expelled Palestinian Arabs from returning to their homesand villages (this is extensively discussed in the chapter “Blocking areturn” in The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1987:155–196).According to Morris, some destruction of Arab villages and houses wascaused during abandonment as well as a result of warfare. However,most of the demolition was claimed to be a result of vandalism, lootingand deliberate demolition by the Israel Defense Force (IDF) units andmembers of neighboring villages during days, weeks and months imme-diately following the expulsions. Morris claims that very soon after theexpulsions, plans to make the Palestinian exile permanent were begin-ning to crystallize within the Israeli elite. A “transfer committee” wasworking on how to make the “miracle of Palestinian exodus” everlasting(Morris, 1987:160). According to the transcripts from the Israeli govern-ment’s first official discussion of the refugee issue, the then Minister ofForeign Affairs, Moshe Sharett, said this on the issue:

[the refugees] are not coming back, and this is our policy that theydon’t come back. Then this should affect on how we negotiate andhow we present it to the outside world. We do not need to encouragepeople to return. They need to get used to the idea that this is a lostcause, and that this change is a change that does not reverse.

(quoted in Ben-Josef Hirsch, 2007:243)

This was supposed to be done through the wrecking of villages andhousing, as well as the destruction of crops and preventing crops frombeing harvested, so that the refugees literally would have nothing toreturn to. This was later followed by the policy of establishing newsettlements on abandoned villages, which little by little became partof the establishment of the new state.

Here, sustaining themes in the master narratives are shattered andthe status of the self as morally just is questioned. The myths of Davidversus Goliath as well as the establishment of “A land without peoplefor a people without land” are overthrown. The morality of one’s owncollective is scrutinized and the result is that one’s own collective hasbeen strong, offensive and quite ruthless in its actions toward the adver-sary in conflict. The constant historical insecurity of the self as describedin the master commemorative narratives is thus questioned. In contrastto the view of self as pure, innocent and morally just in the mastercommemorative narratives, the counter narratives present a picture in

Boundaries and Recognition in Counter Narratives 89

which the Israeli state was “born in sin” (Morris, 1990:8). In the countercommemorative narratives, the collective self is understood as morallycomplex and not thoroughly righteous, in the sense that it is capableof both good and bad deeds. The self might still be understood as inse-cure and victimized during the period of exile, but in the case of the1948 war, the counter narratives described the Israeli Jewish collectiveas much stronger and thus less insecure than previously indicated.

Views of the other – from perpetrators to victimsof expulsion

In the counter commemorative narratives, the Palestinian collective isdescribed as being in a vulnerable position at the time of creation ofthe new State, lacking institutional as well as military strength, beingoutnumbered and later expelled by the Jewish collective. They werealso seen as deceived by the Jordanian elite who, according to Shlaim’saccount, negotiated with the Israelis to rid the East Bank of Jordan ofPalestinians in order to get hold of its lands (1988). The most significantalteration in the New Historians’ view of the other was the visibility ofthe Palestinian experience of 1948. Al-Naqba (“the catastrophe”), whichwas a fundamental experience for the Palestinian collective and for thecreation of Palestinian nationalism and had previously been neglectedin the Israeli description of the war of 1948, was thus introduced intoIsraeli historical consciousness. One might argue that the Palestinianexperience of al-Naqba had become the subject for collective amnesia inthe Israeli master commemorative narratives.

The basic assumption here is that the major shift within the counternarratives of New History is the making visible of a formative Palestinianhistorical experience. Several researchers participating in the makingof the counter narratives of New History (cf. Kimmerling and Migdal,1993: 279) highlight the importance of the Palestinian experience in thecreation of Israeli history and experience. The counter narratives of NewHistory hence describe the Palestinian other as a victim of Israeli aggres-sion and expansionism. The view is thus changed from an aggressive orinvisible role to victimization. Even though not all Palestinian accountsof al-Naqba are recognized, the counter narratives of New History comeclose to thick recognition as the victimization of the Palestinian expe-rience is acknowledged, thus legitimizing the grief and suffering of thecollective during and in the aftermath of al-Naqba. This also implies afocus on the sometimes immoral acts committed by the collective selfduring and after those events.

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Here the Palestinian collective is understood as vulnerable, victim-ized and defenseless, sharply differing from the source of insecurity thatthey are described as being in the master commemorative narratives.Thus, the other Arab states in these narratives might have threatenedthe Israeli Jewish collective, whereas the Palestinian entity was a victimof historical circumstances. This is of course also vital when it comesto further discussion on how the counter narratives relate to identifi-cation. The other is thus not described as exclusively threatening, butalso as victimized, which makes the conception of other in the counternarratives more morally complex.

The experience of al-Naqba is recognized by all the New Histori-ans, but to different degrees. The majority of researchers within theparadigm of New History make a moral standpoint in that they pointto the immorality of the Jewish collective when it comes to the expul-sions. Benny Morris, perhaps the most outspoken and public of theNew Historians, later announced, however, that he stood by his viewof history, but claimed that the acts of “ethnic cleansing” commit-ted by the Jewish collective were justified and that the deeds vis-à-visthe Palestinian people also were justified, given the historical context(Pappé, 2003). In a much noticed interview with journalist Ari Shavit inHa’aretz, Morris made it clear that his moral judgments of the materialsignificantly differed:

There is no justification for acts of rape. There is no justification foracts of massacre. Those are war crimes. But in certain conditions,expulsion is not a war crime. I don’t think that the expulsions of1948 were war crimes. You can’t make an omelet without breakingeggs. You have to dirty your hands [. . ..] A society that aims to killyou forces you to destroy it. When the choice is between destroyingor being destroyed, it’s better to destroy.

(Morris in Shavit, 2004)

New Historians hence do not always condemn the expulsions ofPalestinians on moral grounds. Rather their historical understandingscan be used in many different ethical arguments. In Morris’s case, theparticularistic mission of a nation-state for the vulnerable Jewish peoplejustifies acts like ethnic cleansing and expulsions.

Toward permeable boundaries

In the counter commemorative narratives, the opponents in conflictare described in different terms than before. There is no denial of the

Boundaries and Recognition in Counter Narratives 91

victimhood created by the Holocaust. Other qualities of the self areemphasized, however. Thus, the self, apart from being a victim, isdescribed as a perpetrator in another historical context. In this way theself is described in a more complex manner in the narratives of NewHistory. When it comes to views of the other, that collective is alsodescribed as more versatile. Not all Arabs are described in the same fash-ion, but are rather understood as pluralistic, as some are seen as immoralwhereas some, like the Palestinians during the expulsions of the 1948war, are described as vulnerable victims of Jewish expulsions and elitenegotiators of Israel and Transjordan, negotiating behind their back.Views of the Palestinian collective are thus shifted, as the Palestinians nolonger solely are understood as perpetrators. In this account, they are thevictims of the war of 1948. As the narratives describe Israeli attempts toblock the return of Palestinian refugees as well as war crimes committedby the Israeli party, the whole discussion regarding Arab reluctance tonegotiate for peace appears in another light. The truthfulness of the factthat the Arab and/or Palestinian party has been unwilling to reach peaceagreements is questioned, as well as becoming a more understandableposition given the atrocities carried out by the Israeli party during andafter the war.

Boundaries between groups are thus described as permeable as thecontrasts between them are blurred. The self comes to resemble for-mer images of the other as it is understood as a perpetrator, whereasthe other starts to resemble the self, as its victimhood is made visi-ble. The boundary between identity and difference thus becomes morepermeable, as morality and victimhood are ascribed to both groups,even though under different historical circumstances. The countercommemorative narratives display a destabilization of the self/othersplit, affiliated with thick recognition. If and when identity and dif-ference in the past are described anew, identifications in the presentmight be affected. Changed understandings of boundaries in the pastthus also suggest the possibility of changing understandings of bound-aries between groups in the present. If this is so, the transformation ofself, other and boundaries between them might be understood as influ-encing the core constructs of groups involved in intractable conflict.The alteration is made possible by the fact that the narratives of NewHistory contain elements of thick recognition. Views of self and otherare hence transformed when compared to the master narratives, implying thatthe particularity of Palestinian identity and history are recognized. The cen-tral identity element of al-Naqba is recognized, meaning that the Israelicollective assumes responsibility as active participators in the expul-sion and uprooting of Palestinians. This means that important elements

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in the master narratives are renounced as the victimization of the selfduring the 1948 war is questioned.

I now briefly leave the counter commemorative narratives, as I turnto an investigation of how their notions of boundaries are – or are not –mirrored in counter narratives of Zionism and conflict.

Post-Zionism and the peace movement

Post-Zionism

There are today many variants of Zionism, reaching from secularistsocialist accounts to far-right messianic factions, and the directionof the ideology is constantly debated, both in academic circles andin political forums (see, e.g., Nimni, 2003:9–12 passim, Silberstein,1999:15–45 passim). However, from the early 1990s and onwards, themaster narratives of Zionism were challenged by the ideas of post-Zionism,4 which not infrequently has been connected to ideas of NewHistory. The post-Zionists argue that

Historians, together with authors, poets, painters, sculptors, journal-ists, teachers, and other intellectuals, artists and persons of letters –at a later stage including also social scientists – took active and evenleading parts in the composition and propagation of the [Israeli]national narrative. Far from being a remote academic arbiter, Israeliacademia was part and parcel of the national endeavour.

(Ram, 2003:30)

The writings of the post-Zionists coincide with those of the NewHistorians on the point that both describe a reality in which boundariesbetween groups are understood as permeable rather than stable. In thenarratives of both post-Zionism and the counter narratives of New His-tory, it is not the history and perceived realities of one group that isdescribed. Rather, emphasis is put on the multiple truths and interpre-tations of reality and a multiplicity of narratives instead of the grandnarrative of one group, as has been the case with traditional Zionism(Silberstein, 1999:96–97). As stated by Nimni:

The controversial claim at the heart of post-Zionist arguments is thatIsrael should develop a type of civic identity and an institutionalframework oriented to the universal values of liberal democracy.No ethnicity must be ontologically or institutionally privileged overany other.

(Nimni, 2003:2)

Boundaries and Recognition in Counter Narratives 93

During the initial years of the peace process, narratives of post-Zionismgrew stronger in Israeli society.5 Thus, when it comes to nationalism,permeable boundary drawing practices gained momentum. This openedup for the possibility of understandings of the self as well as of the otheras more complex, rendering the understandings of boundaries betweenself and other in the past, as well as in the present, permeable. Thismight also indicate that the description of the core construct of Israelinational identity is altered; it might be able to coexist with other ethnicidentities without experiencing feelings of threat.

Post-Zionism is mainly based on universalistic principles and aspirestoward coexistence and the downplaying of ethnic fault-lines. It doesnot emphasize particularistic identity traits of any group, neither Jewishnor Palestinian, and in that way it is difficult to analyze in terms of thickrecognition. However, when it comes to boundary drawing, its ideal ismost definitely that of permeable boundaries and liberal democracy, asit is inherently critical toward societal division along ethnic lines. Thusit supports the boundary drawing principles inherent in the thick recog-nition of New History, even though it has quite a different, and moreforward-looking nature.

Counter narratives of conflict

In the 1980s, several events lead to the emergence of a critical narra-tive with regard to conflict, where the traditional image of Israel as ahistorical victim sacrificing soldiers in a morally just conflict accord-ing to principles such as “no alternative” and “purity of arms” wasquestioned. The first such event was the war starting in Lebanon in1982 (Bar-On, 1996:141, Sela, 2005:212). The elite rhetoric regardingthe invasion of Lebanon was couched in terms of national defense,and the war was supposedly conducted with no expansionist agenda.However, as Israeli soldiers started to report from the battlefield, andclaimed that their orders were to drive as far into Lebanon as the fuel intheir vehicles could take them, doubts were raised within Israel regard-ing the credibility of the elite when it came to the motives behind theinvasion (Bar-On, 1996:140). As the war in Lebanon continued, andespecially at the time of and after the massacres in Sabra and Shatila in1982,6 a public soul-searching started, questioning the master narrativesof conflict. The role of the military was probed, and the moral righ-teousness of military power in unnecessary conditions was challenged(Sela, 2005:212). In 1987, the Palestinian popular uprising known asthe Intifada began. It was spurred by an incident in which Palestiniancivilians were killed by an Israeli vehicle. The Israelis declared that theevent was an accident, whereas the Palestinian side declared that it was

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a cold-blooded murder perpetrated by an Israeli as an act of intentionalaggression (Aggestam, 1999:106, Bar-On, 1996:219). What started as aspontaneous reaction to an isolated event in Gaza soon spread to theWest Bank, resulting in an increased visibility of the Palestinians in theoccupied territories inside Israel. The spontaneous Israeli reaction was tosuffocate the popular uprising by force, and discussions began in Israelregarding how to solve the problems of the occupied territories.

Already during the 1970s, the first comprehensive Israeli peacemovement “Shalom Achshav” (“Peace Now”) was born. It grew strongerover the years, and by the time of the invasion of Lebanon and later onthe Intifada, it had become a considerable force within Israeli society.Even though the state together with the Israeli Defense Forces still for-mulated the master narratives of conflict, to which the majority of thepublic subscribed (Bar-On, 1996), the peace movement and the ideasformulated by its proponents expanded and grew into a significantcounter narrative over the years. At the time immediately following themassacres in Sabra and Shatila, Peace Now, together with the kibbutzmovement, the Labor party and other leftist parties organized a peacedemonstration in which more than 250,000 participants gathered toprotest against the moral righteousness of the actions of the Israeli army.During the Intifada the counter narratives of conflict grew strongerand the rhetoric of peace, questioning the truthfulness of the masternarratives of conflict, grew increasingly stronger.

During the time of the Intifada, the counter narratives of peace startedto include the notion of ending occupation (“Dai Lakibush”), whichincluded the concept of “two states for two peoples” (Bar-On, 1996:223).Beginning with the birth of Peace Now, the counter narratives ofconflict unfolded within a plethora of protest groups triggered by theconsciousness initially brought about by the Intifada. Thus, many com-mentators agree that the Intifada had immense impact on the peaceprocess between Israelis and Palestinians. The notion of suppression ofunarmed civilians did not resonate well with notions within the tradi-tional narratives of conflict (Bar-On, 1996:269, Yudkin, 1995:216), suchas “no alternative” and “purity of arms”. The Intifada thus fuelled polar-ization in Israeli society with regard to the nature of relations with thePalestinian community as well as the future of occupation. The counternarratives of conflict is represented in ideologies of movements such as“Yesh Gvul” (there is a limit/border), which is composed of individualswho refuse to do their military service on occupied lands, “Women inBlack”, a politically and ideologically diverse women’s movement, whoevery week during the Intifada dressed in black and stood in silence at

Boundaries and Recognition in Counter Narratives 95

road crossings, with signs in their hands saying “End the occupation!”both in Hebrew and in English. Thus, the counter narratives sprunginto the Israeli peace movement, whose slogan “End the occupation”was also picked up by the Israeli left peace camp, which later on was tonegotiate a peace agreement with the Palestine Liberation Organization(PLO) in the early 1990s. The Oslo accords were based on the principleof land in exchange for peace and aimed at returning occupied land inreturn for security guarantees from the Palestinian counterpart. Thus itis fair to say that the balance between counter and master narratives ofconflict was tilted during the 1990s, as the counter narratives becamefavored by the Rabin-led government who started negotiations withthe Palestinians based on the principle of giving away occupied landin exchange for peace and recognition.

The counter narratives of conflict are hence mainly preoccupied withthe consequences of 1967. Thus, the major aim is to reverse the occupa-tion and return to the status quo before 1967. Hence the Palestinianexperience of al-Naqba is completely invisible in the narratives. Thecounter narratives of conflict thus resemble the counter commemorativenarratives of the 1948 war in the way that they make the Palestiniancounterpart visible as well as questioning the morality of the Israelicollective. Thus, the existence of legitimate Palestinian claims to occu-pied lands was recognized in the counter narratives of conflict. However,profound identity aspects of the Palestinian collective, foremost thehistorical consciousness of al-Naqba, were not recognized. Anotherpoint is that the two-state solution carries the idea of ethnic division inits very core. Even though it may promote negotiations aiming towarda just solution to the conflict and the return of occupied areas, it stillsupports ethnic division lines, since the Israeli state should consist of amajority of Jewish Israelis and the Palestinian state should be populatedby a majority of Arab Christians and Muslims. The boundary drawingprinciples inherent in the two-state solution thus really enhances eth-nic principles since it shies away from the idea of coexistence of bothcommunities in the same land.

In such terms, the counter narratives of conflict might be understoodas bringing thin recognition of the Palestinian national collective intoIsraeli consciousness. Policies promoting two states for two peoples aswell as principles such as land for peace have indeed permeated thecounter narratives of conflict. Thick recognition, however, has largelybeen absent from the Israeli counter narratives of conflict. Thus thepeace process, mostly promoted by politicians and civilians who sharethe understandings of the counter narratives of conflict, can be said to

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strengthen recognition within Israeli society, although mostly in a thinrather than thick fashion. The counter narratives of conflict are not uni-vocal. The other is described as “good” enough to be a partner for peace,which indicates that difference is not solely understood as a threat tothe existence of Israeli identity. The collective self is also understood asmore versatile, as moral righteousness is questioned both when it comesto the occupation of territories in 1967 and the invasion and subsequentwar in Lebanon beginning in 1982. This might indicate a shift in theunderstanding of Israeli national identity. However, the narratives donot go as far as suggesting coexistence on the same land, which showsthat they still carry an idea of ethnic division in their core.

Summing up: recognition and permeable boundaries

According to the New Historians, the Palestinians were weak victimsof the war of 1948. They were expelled, humiliated and transferredinto involuntary exile, which until this day is an unresolved problem.This challenges the notion of Jewish uniqueness as it indirectly showedsimilarities between Palestinian victimization and characteristics usu-ally ascribed to Jews in the Diaspora who have often been describedas weak, defenseless victims fighting to overcome exile. The discus-sion of Jewish history as either unique or comparable is a vital themethat differentiates the counter versus master commemorative narratives(Levy, 1999:55). The recognition of the Palestinian tragedy revealed thatthey too were victims of historical circumstances beyond their influence(Blomeley, 2005:137). This can be understood as a destabilization of theself/other split inherent in core constructs in intractable conflicts. Nimniunderlines this process by stating:

Recognizing and bringing to light the tragedy of the Palestinian“nakba” through the work of the New Historians brought to thesurface of Israeli understanding the many similarities between thePalestinian and Jewish tragedies.

(Nimni, 2003:6)

The Israeli debates over history that took place mainly during the 1990scan hence be understood as

the struggle over the plurality of representations of history in Israel.In actuality, what is involved here is a contest for recognition of

Boundaries and Recognition in Counter Narratives 97

a multiplicity of differing Jewish experiences, replacing the hithertohomogenous narrative, binding for one and all.

(Diner, 1995:151 [my emphasis])

Even though different New Historians present differing accounts ofthe expulsion of Palestinians, as well as different views on whetherthe expulsions were parts of an Israeli master plan for expulsion ofunwanted individuals or not, they all in different ways recognizeal-Naqba. That involves renouncing deeply held views of Israel’s pastas well as recognition of deeply held identity aspects of the Palestiniancounterpart. Thus, the accounts presented by the New Historians can beunderstood as conveying a new counter narrative, which ideationallybrought thick recognition of the Palestinian collective and historicalexperience onto the Israeli public arena. In many ways, the countercommemorative narratives of New History brought thick recognitioninto the narrative constellation of Israeli society, thus forming a forcefulchallenge to the core construct of Israeli national identity.

Post-Zionism presented Israeli society with different views of self andother than those presented within the master narratives of Zionism.Here, both self and other are understood as more versatile and capableof doing both morally good and bad deeds. This leads to the fact thatboundaries between groups shift from stable – as understood in themaster narratives – to permeable. Post-Zionism emphasizes universalisticideals, enhancing similarities between groups, rather than ethnic dif-ferences. Universal values such as human rights are also highlighted.Thus, the group boundaries emphasized here are more civic bound-aries, addressing all the inhabitants of Israeli lands. Thus, the boundarieswithin the post-Zionist narratives are in line with the moral boundaryprinciples inherent in the Israeli counter commemorative narratives.The construction of Israeli national identity is thus altered in post-Zionism, as it emphasizes a plurality of views and identities, down-playing the importance of national identification. As post-Zionism hasfocused attention on discrimination and inequality in Israeli society,the Palestinian situation has become visible. Even though the fun-damental experience of al-Naqba has not been consistently addressedby post-Zionism, fundamental claims of asymmetry and human rightsviolations of the Palestinian party have been recognized. According tothe analytical dimensions in the concept of thick recognition, it canthus be concluded that post-Zionism in many respects offers thick recog-nition to Palestinian identity and experience, even though voiced indifferent terms.7 Post-Zionism is inherently forward-looking in nature as

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it sprung from a concern with Israeli nationalism and its future devel-opment. Rather than focusing on the past, it has thus aimed to createinclusionary visions for a just future. Thus, post-Zionism and IsraeliNew History are understood as intimately related as they share moralboundaries.

In the counter narratives of conflict, views of self and other are alteredwhen related to the master narratives of conflict, as they are understoodto be versatile groups, capable of morally just and unjust deeds. How-ever, as the counter narratives of conflict have focused so much onthe experience of Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands following thewar of 1967, the fundamental Palestinian identity aspect of al-Naqbais overlooked. The peace movement, mostly representing the counternarratives of conflict, thus focuses very much on the consequences of1967, resulting in historical unawareness of the consequences of thewar of 1948. Thus, as the counter narratives of conflict recognize thePalestinians as legitimate negotiation partners, as well as opening up forthe possibility of the creation of a Palestinian state, it is evident that itcontains vital elements of thin recognition. When it comes to the future,the counter narratives of conflict have some trust in the Palestiniancounterpart and offer it thin recognition; however, there is a clear visionof the future as containing relations between the parties, albeit after aseparation in the form of two nation-states. Thus the ethnic boundariesof the master narratives carry on into the counter narratives of con-flict, which envision a peaceful future while incorporating a separationbetween the two ethnic groups.

This chapter has presented empirical understandings and theoreticaldimensions that will be central in the upcoming analysis of debates overNew History. The Israeli counter narratives of commemoration containideas of thick recognition. Different forms of recognition have also beenexpressed in counter narratives of Zionism and conflict. Together theyhence came to formulate a clear challenge vis-à-vis the master narrativeswhen it comes to boundary drawing. That challenge is the focus of thetwo following chapters.

6The Challenge

Outlining the analysis

In order to study the interaction between narratives, and capturetransformations following it, an analytical framework that can graspnarrative transformations has been developed. When searching for anappropriate operative scheme, I was inspired by Archer’s morphogenesisapproach, as it was developed in Culture and Agency (1996 [1988]). Themodel is based on a processual understanding of reality and proposesan analytical distinction between structure and agency. The model hasbeen adapted to incorporate a conceptualization of narrative.

The initial narrative constellation (T1) involves starting conditions,which can be understood as aggregated outcomes of past actions. Thisis in turn followed by social interaction between agents (T2 and T3).This social interaction is partly conditioned by the narrative constella-tion, but never determined by it. The social interaction between actorsin turn leads to narrative elaboration (T4). This is the analytical end stateof a morphogenetic cycle and constitutes the beginning of another cycleof continuous change (Archer, 1995:90–91). This means that the inter-play between actors and structures can be studied sequentially by meansof alternating phases of agents’ creativity and structural determination(Sztompka, 1993:201).

Changes in the images of self and other within parties entangledin intractable conflict should be viewed as an ongoing process, ratherthan as end states in the analysis. The model allows for an analysis ofthe interplay of narratives, deepening the understanding of narrativeelaboration over time. The analyses of the Israeli debates on history inthis chapter and in Chapter 7 will be conducted in accordance withFigure 6.1. The main focus of the analysis is shifts and twists in the

99

100 New History

Analytic dimension

Time

Narrative constellation

T1Social interaction (between memory agents)

T2 T3

Narrative elaboration(societal level) T4

(societal level)

Figure 6.1 A model of narrative transformation over time, inspired by Archer’smodel of morphogenetic cycles (Archer, 1996 [1988]:304) and adapted to thepurposes of my discussion

Israeli intrasocietal debates regarding New History. However, as theseare understood as interconnected to broader processes of conflict trans-formation, I will also relate to contextual factors concerning relationsbetween Israelis and Palestinians during this time period. By this inter-linkage we gain a deeper understanding for relational factors servingas inhibiting and facilitating circumstances when it comes to chang-ing understandings of identity and history. As such, the main focus onintrasocietal debate is complemented by a perspective which allows foran elaboration on links to intersocietal relations.

Narrative constellation: The initiation of New History

Since the very inception of the Zionist movement, an anti-narrative ofZionism has existed (Segev, 2001:46, Shapira, 1999:23). Leftist or laborZionism is inherently nationalist and aspires for national communitythrough labor and military struggle. However, a more radical factionpromoting resistance to the nationalist content of Zionism resided fromthe start in the outer margins of the Israeli left. Before the end ofthe 1980s, those ideas were peripheral in Israeli politics and culture;however, the advent of the New Historians changed all that (Shapira,1999:26).

When it comes to narratives of conflict, those were being muchdebated at the time when New History was introduced, which might

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have contributed to the way in which it was received. Harsh criti-cism was voiced against the occupation, and as Palestinian violenceincreased, the Israeli countermeasures grew more repressive (Weissbrod,1997:50). The first Intifada triggered reactions in Israel as well as in theinternational community, and demands for withdrawal from the terri-tories were heard. Thus, the Intifada made the Israeli public consciousof the negative sides of occupation. Linkages between withdrawal anduniversal human rights principles were often drawn in the rhetoric ofanti-occupation (Weissbrod, 1997:51–52), downplaying the apparentlystable boundaries inherent in ethnic identification. Following PrimeMinister Begin’s speech on the invasion of Lebanon in 1982, in whichhe referred to the war as a “War of Choice” (which would be quite theopposite of the previously mentioned principle of “No Alternative”),the national consensus around the valued notion of No Alternativestarted to crumble, allowing for critical re-examinations of the country’shistory (Shlaim, 1999:290). The current political polarization in Israelisociety, together with the increased confidence created by the Madridand Oslo processes subsequently, created an atmosphere allowing forself-evaluation and criticism (Ben-Josef Hirsch, 2007:246).

The peace process, which started with secret negotiations during thelate 1980s and culminated in the signing of the Declaration of Principlesin 1993, also contained notions of understanding and incorporation ofpreviously neglected narratives, some of which were voiced in IsraeliNew History. Thin recognition of the existence of the Palestinians onthe occupied territories was brought by the Oslo process, as well as afocus on the rights and identities of minorities within Israel, mainly the“Israeli Arabs” or Palestinians residing in Israel (Weissbrod, 1997:59).The peace process in general made Israelis more positive towardreassessing their historical understandings than ever before (Shapira,1995:33). Thus, more relaxed intersocietal relations between Israelis andPalestinians together with intrasocietal demands for withdrawal can beseen as interlinked to the introduction of new historical understand-ings. This also implies that empirical linkages between narratives ofthick and thin recognition can be discerned. At the same time, ideologi-cal discussions regarding Zionism and its socio-economic foundationswere on the rise. Narratives of Zionism were hence also in flux atthe time of introduction of New History, which can be related to itsinitial success. One trend around this time was the liberalization ofIsrael in economic terms. Earlier on, Israeli politics mainly led by theLabor Party had been strongly influenced by socialism, and hence toa large extent society experienced public control over many societal

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functions. At this time, economic liberalization and privatization pro-gressed remarkably, preparing the ground for foreign investments andadvancement of the free market (Ben-Porat, 2006:152). With this “glob-alization” of the market, the Americanization of Israeli culture wasremarkable.1 Some even argued that the globalization of the economyserved as a rationale for peace, so that increased economic interdepen-dence within the Middle East and globally would decrease the degreeof violence in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (Ben-Porat, 2006:167). Thistendency was clear in Shimon Peres’s blueprint for the future called “TheNew Middle East” which was presented shortly before the Oslo agree-ments. The links between peace and a globalized economy are clear inPeres’s formulations:

Peace between Israel, the Arab states, and the Palestinians will elim-inate an important source of tension, if not the most dangerous.Instead of visions of blood and tears there will rise visions of happi-ness and beauty, life and peace. We are at a historic crossroads. Do wechoose the path of the tongues of fire, billowing smoke, and rivers ofblood, or of blooming deserts, restored wastelands, progress, growth,justice and freedom? The higher the standard of living rises, the lowerthe level of violence will fall.

(1993:46)

Here the counter narratives of Zionism, in their more socio-economicaspects, were clearly related to narratives of conflict. Other impor-tant tendencies at this time were the pluralization of cultures andlifestyles (Ram, 2000:235, Silberstein, 1999:95). The collectivism oftraditional Zionism came under question, as many belonging to theyounger generation began to pursue what they saw as the Western “goodlife” (Silberstein, 1999:95). Israel’s cultural scene also experienced swiftchanges. With the arrival of satellite TV during the 1990s, the televisedmedia were no longer controlled by the state, leading to an influx ofnon-Israeli media, broadcasting non-Israeli perspectives of events. Somecommentators assert that Israel went through a “privatization revolu-tion” during this time, and that revolution allegedly also had an impacton collective memory, which went through its own phase of privatiza-tion (Gutwein, 2010:36). This trend pointed toward individualization ofHolocaust memory, commemorating “every person and every name”,instead of the whole collective of victims. For some, this offered ways tomemorialize the Holocaust without marginalizing Israeli minorities whodid not claim membership in the historical experience of the Holocaust.

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According to some, this individualized memory held a promise of beingless xenophobic and less self-righteous than the nationalized, collec-tive memory of the Holocaust inherent in the master commemorativenarratives of Zionism (Gutwein, 2010:37–39). Those trends can be seenas antagonists to the boundaries inherent in traditional Zionism andmaster narratives of conflict, since they might have the power to erodeethnic collectivities from below.

Israeli society experienced a whole range of cultural and ideological“earthquakes” as general notions of national politics, economy, conflictand culture were questioned from conservative as well as politicallymore radical factions (Segev, 2001:133). The rapid changes led anincreasing number of Israelis to view Zionism as outdated. In turn,this led Zionist leaders to adopt a highly defensive posture (Gutwein,2010:39–40, Silberstein, 1999:94). Taken together, these trends led toa decline of Zionist ideology, as the rapidly changing cultural, eco-nomic and social landscapes together with altered political conditionsled a growing number of Israelis to regard Zionism as obsolete in thenew, globalized and pluralized Israel (Idalovichi, 2004:622, Silberstein,1999:95). Thus, the master narratives of Zionism were challenged astraditional narratives of the national were under attack from variousdirections.

One can thus conclude that Israel experienced a change in the generalpolitical climate during the 1980s and 1990s, which was a factor favor-ing new interpretations of traditional narratives (Shlaim, 1999:290).Narratives of Zionism and conflict were clearly challenged from variousdirections by counter narratives enhancing differing boundary-drawingprinciples on many levels. Many commentators agree on the fact thatthe initiation of the historiographical debates indicated a certain matu-rity of Israeli society (Bar-Tal, Jerusalem, May 2009, Naveh, Tel-Aviv, May2009, Sela, Jerusalem, May 2009). Since the creation of the Israeli state in1948, its leading politicians had been preoccupied with nation-buildingand state creation through various policies, during which time question-ing of the nature of that state was almost unthinkable. (Ben Josef-Hirsch(2007) and Uri Ram (2009), indeed, talk about the Israeli history revi-sion in terms of breaking a taboo.) When the archive laws were changedin the 1980s, several circumstances, among which Israel’s maturationas a state can be mentioned, combined with the opening of previouslyclosed archives, resulted in the actual questioning of the moral rationalebehind the foundation of the state of Israel (Diner, 1995:148).

It is obvious that many different narratives were in flux at the timewhen Israeli New History was introduced. The master narratives of

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Zionism and conflict were alive and well, albeit being challenged fromvarious directions as indicated above. Counter narratives promotingrecognition and permeable boundaries between groups were to be foundin the different spheres of economics, culture, conflict and national-ism, as well as in politics. In all those different domains, new claimsfor identity were raised. Thus, “old” identities were broken down to acertain extent and new ones were created, as new stories were beingtold and submitted to audiences, presenting new demands for recog-nition. According to Ringmar’s discussion, the narrative constellationpresent in Israel at the time of the introduction of New History canthus be defined as a formative moment (1996:83). Different narrativespresenting the public with thin as well as thick recognition, describ-ing communal boundaries as permeable rather than solid, facilitated aninterpretation of Israeli history in different ways than before. Follow-ing the theoretical discussions in previous chapters, this in turn makesa recognition shift possible, if and when the counter narratives of NewHistory penetrate further into Israeli public consciousness and memoryinstitutions. In this section, I have established that the narrative constel-lation at the time of the introduction of Israeli New History providedcircumstances that could have contributed to the fact that it also ini-tially became quite successful when introduced to a larger public. Thiscan be related to both intersocietal factors such as critique against occu-pation and the War in Lebanon and more positive relations with therise of the first mass peace movement in Israel. Intrasocietal dimensionsof course also played an important part. Maturity of the Israeli society,together with influx of globalized culture, contributed to an atmospherewhich allowed for more internal criticism than before in many differentareas. The narratives of New History must thus not be understood inisolation but rather as standing in an intimate relationship with othernarratives in Israel at that time, which also contained notions of recog-nition and permeable boundaries. In the following section, I continueto look at the debate that followed the publication of the works of theIsraeli New Historians, as I venture into the social interaction betweenmemory agents that took place in the Israeli debates over New History.

Social interaction: Challenge and delegitimation

The very first accounts of the new version of historiography were foundwithin academia. The first wave of New Historians to question “tradi-tional” Israeli historiography did so on positivist grounds. Following theopening of previously closed Israeli archives in the early 1980s, a new

The Challenge 105

generation of researchers, most notably Avi Shlaim and Benny Morris,published works that challenged traditional views of the events duringthe war of 1948 (cf. Morris, 1987, Shlaim, 1988). The first historical con-troversy thus considered the “correct” description of the Arab–Israeli warfollowing the Israeli declaration of independence in 1948. Thus theycriticized master narratives of history, but tried to present their audi-ence with new “facts”, which were claimed to be void of subjectivismand ideological content. The New Historians, as mentioned in the pre-vious chapter, shattered traditional myths of the war and offered newaccounts of the events, claiming that they were closer to the “historicaltruth”. Morris commented on his own research process:

From the new documents of that period it became clear that much ofwhat had been told to the people – to children at school and adults innewspapers – in the memoirs and historical writings – was in the bestinstances distortion and in many other instances simply the ignoringof facts and plain lies.

(quoted in Silberstein, 1999:92)

Tom Segev in the same vein claimed that his book:

shattered a firmly established self-image and exposed as mere mythsa large number of long accepted truisms

(Segev, 1986:viii)

Those critical accounts started intense debates within academia onhistoriographical method and its implications. Still, however, thisfirst wave of New Historians remained epistemologically conserva-tive, as they adhered to positivist and empiricist views of history(Naor, 2001:140, Pappé, 2003:106).

The second generation of New Historians based their critique on amore post-positivist account. They did not aspire to present the “cor-rect” version of history, but rather questioned the objectivist claims oftraditional historiography and insisted that a pluralistic view of history,and history viewed as socially constructed, would better serve the inter-ests of society and also incorporate groups that had formerly beenexcluded from the official history production. Another trend visible inthe second generation of historical critique was the description of theZionist project as part of colonialism.

The most notable scholar within the second wave was Ilan Pappé.He advocated a multi-perspectival view of history and denied that

106 New History

objectivity is a matter of the correspondence of interpretation to factor events (Silberstein, 1999:107). Another scholar who applied thismodel was Baruch Kimmerling, who in his book Zionism and Ter-ritory: The Socio-Territorial Dimension of Zionist Politics compared thecolonizing process of the Jews in Palestine with the colonial typeof immigration and settlement in the Americas, Africa and Australia(1983:8). Other scholars such as Gershon Shafir followed in his footstepsand contributed colonialist interpretations of Israeli history (cf. Shafir,1989). The narratives presented in the second wave of New Historydid not differ much in substance from those presented by the pos-itivist New Historians. Both focused on narratives enhancing novelperspectives, recognizing collectives that had previously been excludedfrom the master commemorative narratives, even though they haddifferent theoretical and meta-theoretical outlooks. Ilan Pappé’s work,even though he insists on a postmodernist and deconstructivist view,is characterized by a quite traditional political-diplomatic narrative(Howe, 2000:243). Even though the New Historians thus claimed tohave differing meta-theoretical outlooks, the defenders of the mastercommemorative narratives still attacked all the New Historians alike fortheir supposed postmodernism (Almog, 2000:243).

Shabtai Teveth was a vocal critic of the New Historians’ work, andaccused the New Historians of contaminating their historiographywith ideological and political messages (Silberstein, 1999:101). Accord-ing to his view, historiography should be independent of politicalconcerns, and it is possible as well as desirable to separate politicalinterests from scholarly analysis, interpretation and writing. Accordingto Teveth’s reading, the New Historians contributed a “farrago of dis-tortions, omissions, tendentious readings, and outright falsifications”(1989:33). Teveth also stated that the common denominator for the NewHistorians is their inclination to side with the Palestinians and delegit-imize Zionism (1989:24). These criticisms were to recur frequently in thecourse of the debates.

After going on in confined historiographical forums, the controversiesover the new scholarship spread throughout academia during 1994–1995. On 10 July 1994, more than 500 people gathered in a lecturehall at Tel Aviv University to listen to historians and sociologists debat-ing each other’s work. The event was the climax of several months ofhistoriographical controversy in the Israeli media (Lustick, 1996:196).The debate was also carried into respected academic journals like Historyand Memory and Israel Studies at about that time. The debates also flowedinto the public sphere, taking place in the largest daily broadsheets, like

The Challenge 107

Ha’aretz, Yediot Aharonot and Davar. The debate thus spilled over intothe public realm (Blomeley, 2005:127). The two largest universities inIsrael, Tel Aviv University and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, orga-nized conferences on the work of the New Historians and on analysesof the debate they had provoked. These conferences were open to thepublic and received major public attendance and attention. The mediapaid attention to the New Historians as well as their critics as they wereinterviewed in several Israeli radio and TV talk shows.

The debate was hence increasingly spread to the public, and wasconsidered by Israeli politicians. Members of the Knesset (MKs), suchas Amnon Rubinstein and Yael Dayan, sat at public roundtables withrepresentatives of the New Historians and their critics as well as withPalestinians and other scholars. On both occasions the MKs expressedconcern that the theses of the New Historians, especially regarding thePalestinian refugee problem and its causes, had the potential to causeharm to the future of Israel (Ben-Josef Hirsch, 2007:246). This says some-thing about the sensitivity of the issue of New History, as MKs Dayanand Rubinstein, both considered dovish leftists in the Israeli politicalcontext, felt provoked and disturbed by the works of the New Historians.

The media coverage that the New Historians received includedreactions from columnists, biographers, journalists, public figures,politicians and many ordinary citizens (Ben-Josef Hirsch, 2007:242).The springboard to the public debate was, of course, the academicdebates regarding historiography, which in turn rapidly transformedinto debates regarding the preferred nature of Israeli society. Whatstarted as an academic dispute over the historiography of the Jewishsettlement in mandated Palestine thus soon turned into a heatedpublic debate over national identity (Levy, 1999:59–60). In 1994, YisraelLanders wrote one of the first public attacks on New History:

What has previously been known in limited academic circles shouldnow be revealed to the community at large: There has arisen a schol-arly school among Israeli social scientists that challenges the Zionistworld view, the Zionist settlement of the land of Israel, and the rightof the state of Israel to exist.

(quoted in Silberstein, 1999:114)

The following debate focused a lot on morality. The legitimacy of thestate of Israel was seldom directly addressed by the New Historians’writings; however, the nature of the state and its focus on Judaism wasconstantly discussed. Despite this, writers in the public debate, such

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as Landers, tried to depict the New Historians as delegitimizers of theIsraeli state, because they point out that in some respects it “was bornin original sin” (Blomeley, 2005:33, Morris, 1990:8). Interestingly, thisin turn was coupled with other assumptions, as the New Historianswere said to be self-destructive and driven by a biological urge for self-destruction (Silberstein, 1999:114). One who especially emphasized thiswas Aharon Megged, whose argument linked the New Historians’ nar-ratives to anti-Semitic views, aspiring to the destruction of the state(Megged quoted in Silberstein, 1999:115). In this way, the New Histori-ans were linked to sworn enemies of the State of Israel, such as militantPalestinians and anti-Semites. Megged claimed that the New Histori-ans had a “suicidal impulse” and that they were part of a new wavethat increasingly distracted and weakened the immune system of Israelisociety. He also charged the New Historians with providing ammuni-tion to Israel’s enemies, and, through the delegitimization of the Zionistproject, endangering the very existence of the Jewish state because itwas born in sin:

A few hundred of our “society’s best”, men of the pen and of thespirit – academics, authors, and journalists, and to these one mustadd artists and photographers and actors as well – have been workingdeterminedly and without respite to preach and prove that our causeis not just: Not only that it has been unjust since the Six Day War andthe “occupation”, which is supposed to be unjust by its very nature;and not only since the founding of the state in 1948, a birth whichwas itself “conceived in sin” [. . .]

(Megged: 1999)

Here, critics within the Israeli collective are clearly delegitimized andidentified with the other side in the conflict; this allowed the Israelicollective to retain its own perceived unity and placed unwantedelements of the self with the immoral other.

The uniqueness of the Jewish collective experience was an importanttheme in the master commemorative narratives, a theme highlightedby the collective memory of the Holocaust. The New Historians hencecontested the theme of uniqueness, which had been prevalent in IsraeliJewish collective memory. The narratives of the New Historians in turnconveyed a Palestinian historical experience that was also permeated byloss and victimhood. This is clear proof that the New Historians showedlittle sympathy for the view that the humanitarian disaster of the Holo-caust would have legitimated violence against the local population of

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Palestine in order to serve the moral cause of the creation of a Jewishhomeland. The fact that Israeli national history is so intermingled withnarratives of legitimation resulted in the new interpretations of historyculminating in a debate on the legitimacy and identity of the Israelistate, as well as the national collective, reaching far beyond the profes-sional boundaries of historiography (Diner, 1995:149). Anita Shapira isan Israeli historian and a moderate critic of the New Historians’ works.She asserted that due to the massive trauma inflicted upon EuropeanJewry during the Holocaust, the huge waves of Zionist immigrationinto Palestine as a response must be viewed with a culturally relativistapproach (Blomeley, 2005:134). In her argument:

not every colonization movement is to be dismissed out of hand, andnot every national liberation movement, by definition, sacred.

(1995:69)

This reasoning clearly indicates that some historical traumas are viewedas more relevant than others and might lend legitimacy to future violentbattles for independence. Here, it is clear that historical references areconnected to narratives of legitimacy in the master narratives of com-memoration. On the other hand, Shapira also clearly indicates that theIsraeli–Palestinian conflict affects the ramifications of Israeli historicalconsciousness

If the peace process is carried forward to a successful conclusion, andIsrael is welcomed as a fully recognized polity among the states ofthe Middle East, then the perspective of the past will be reinforced,whose rudiments are already evident, though only intermittentlyin the writings of Avi Shlaim and Benny Morris: the perspective ofrealism. When reality comes more closely to approximate the moralideals, moralism will become redundant. We will see this thick andtwisted conflict more accurately and more humanely. And the powerof discourse may succeed where the power of arms has failed.

(1999:36)

This indicates that even critics of the New Historians’ perspective pointto a link between changed relations on the intersocietal plane andmore acceptance of new historical ideas in an intrasocietal setting.The debate later moved on to broader layers of society, no longersolely taking place on the pages of daily newspapers. For example, anorganization named “Ha-Tikva” (“hope”, and also the title of Israel’s

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national anthem) was founded, in order to save Israel from the alleged“onslaught of Post-Zionism” (Weissbrod, 1997:58). Another such groupwas “Women in Green”, an activist movement working for the visionof a Greater Israel, thus part of the Neo-Zionist movement, who alsoworked against the view of history portrayed in the narratives of theNew Historians (Ghazi-Bouillon, 2009:133). Prominent promoters of thepeace camp also felt obliged to announce that the quest for peace hadnothing to do with the end of the Jewish state. They defended theexistence of the Jewish state on the basis of the long persecution ofthe Jewish people, ending up in the Holocaust, claiming that this wasethically justifiable, even if the history of Israel’s early years was dif-ferent and somewhat more complicated than they had believed earlier(Weissbrod, 1997:58). This is indicative of the tension between differ-ent boundary drawing practices within Zionism. As mentioned in theprevious chapter, the peace movement was to some extent driven byuniversalistic values favoring permeable borders between ethnic groups.The particularistic claim of justification due to the Holocaust enhancingstable ethnic boundaries is hence quite contradictory to other valueswithin the movement.

It is obvious that the narratives of New History stirred intense feelingsamong its critics: academics, public commentators and the public. In thenext section, which looks at the third and last step of the first narrativecycle, the results of the social interaction, called the narrative elabo-ration, is addressed. I assess the balance between counter and masternarratives that succeeded the social interaction covered above.

Narrative elaboration: Toward thick recognition

Now “a cultural civil war” raged within Israeli society (Wurmser, 1999).This resulted in a gradual change within Israeli media, as well aseducation policies. In the early 1980s, a TV series had been pro-duced called “The Pillar of Fire”. This documentary series covered theperiod before the establishment of the state of Israel and in manydetails converged with the master commemorative narratives of Israel.In order to celebrate Israel’s 50th anniversary in 1998, the “Tekumma”series was produced. The name Tekumma also alludes to the mastercommemorative narratives, and picks up the thread where “Pillar ofFire” ended. Tekumma was a 22-part documentary, broadcast by theIsrael Broadcasting Authority, showing Israel’s history since the creationof the state, then 50 years ago. The New Historians were grudgingly pos-itive about the new series, because it not only showed stories from the

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perspective of the master commemorative narratives, but also actuallyincluded critical voices and eyewitnesses from the Palestinian experi-ences from the war of 1948. However, some criticism was voiced, dueto the fact that the series was said to be framed within traditionalZionism, an example of this being its name, coined within the tradi-tional Zionist narrative, meaning the resurrection of the Jewish peoplein the redeemed land of Palestine (cf. Pappé, 1998:99).

In many respects, the series echoed the arguments and narratives ofthe New Historians. In its coverage of the 1948 war, it showed notonly the Israeli side, but also incorporated the Palestinian sufferings,showing “the expulsion, dispossession and killing of Arabs” (New YorkTimes, 4 October 1998). Ronit Weiss-Berkowitz, the writer-director ofone episode portraying Palestinians who engaged in terrorism to fightfor the return of their land, stated that she wanted to portray:

the creation of the ideology behind terrorism . . . We Israelis think thatwe have a monopoly on blood, tears and pain, but of course this isnot true. We know our side in this story. I wanted to present the otherside, loudly.

(quoted in Schnell, 1998:1)

The then Communications Minister Limor Livnat harshly criticized theseries, claiming that it was a propaganda film for Israel’s enemies. Shealso claimed that she stopped allowing her son to watch it. She askedrhetorically:

Why do we have to sit on the defendant’s bench in a series run bypublic broadcasting in Israel?

The Israeli media paid great attention to the series, and the daily Ha’aretzconducted a public opinion poll asking if Israeli society was ripe for acritical assessment of history. Many were surprised by the results of thepoll, as 70 per cent of the respondents said “yes”. The series also hadhigh ratings, which was unexpected. In the poll, the public, regardlessof gender, religion or political affiliation, responded that “Even if I don’tagree with this or that item, this series is worth seeing” (Schnell, 1998:2).Heavy criticism was directed at the series, mainly from the center andleft in the Israeli political spectrum. This critique held that not enoughemphasis was given to the achievement of what would be described asthe pioneering years of Zionism (Schnell, 1998:1). Most of the materialin the series, in spite of strong criticism, was based on eyewitnesses and

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evidence from people in the field. Yigal Eilam, one of the senior advisorsin the making of Tekumma, claimed that this decision was made inorder to affirm the authenticity of the TV series, even though its crit-ics argued that interviews with historians and prominent persons wouldbe more authoritative historical sources. The makers of the series deliber-ately tried to represent Israeli history in all its complexity in order to letthe viewers make their own interpretations. This resulted in the strategyof assigning different directors with diverging outlooks to each episode,guaranteeing that there would not be a concerted control of the series,thus assuring that it would not portray a uniform approach to Israelihistory (Eilam quoted in Schnell, 1998:2–3). It is thus clear that Israelimedia started to broadcast views of history, reaching a large majority ofthe public, which were partly inspired by the narratives of New History.Hence, parts of the public marketplace, as constituted by the media,were changed in favor of the narratives of New History. Through thebroadcasting of Tekumma, the media hence offered more diversifiedviews to the Israeli public than previously on commemorative narrativesof the nation.

An important official memory institution, communicating commemo-rative narratives to Israel’s younger public, is the education system. Dueto the influence of the New Historians in Israeli universities, changesin the school curriculum were discussed in the early 1990s. One of themost influential figures in the Education Ministry’s Education Commit-tees was Israel Bartal (Hazony, 2000b:2). Already in the 1970s, Bartal andothers tried to break free from ideology and embarked on a systematiccritique of the principles of Zionist historiography. When that projectended, he stated, “there were virtually none of its teachings that theydid not reject”. In the early 1980s, committees were assigned to mod-ify goals and content of the history curriculum (Al-Haj, 2005:54). TodayBartal claims that the “Zionist narrative has disappeared from the aca-demic world”, which in his view is part of the explanation behind thechanges in Israeli textbooks during the 1990s. In 1991, committees werecommissioned to review and revise curricula on Israeli history, Jewishhistory, literature, Jewish studies, civics and archeology. The curriculafrom the 1970s were deemed outdated by the committees (Hazony,2000b:2).

Bartal was the one responsible for the revision of the school historycurriculum. In 1998, he claimed that

There is no longer one accepted historic truth [. . .] The old historybooks, which in earlier years presented the Zionist narrative as an

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undisputed historical fact, do not fit in with the [present] historicaland political discourse after the myths have been smashed.

(quoted in Hazony, 2000b:3)

In a magazine for Israeli schoolteachers, Bartal also asserted that

The victory of Zionism in Palestine was the catastrophe of the localArab population. We have to teach this, and to show that nationalistmovements are, by their nature, the saviors of one people and thedestroyers of another.

(quoted in Hazony, 2000b:7)

Moshe Zimmerman, another important figure in the curriculum process,announced in 1994 that the old curriculum would be revised:

We’ve incorporated subjects that were not studied until now, such asthe history of the third world [. . .] learning about the [Jewish] peopleand the state [of Israel] appears in the program, but certainly not as asubject of primary importance.

(quoted in Hazony, 2000b:3)

The Zimmerman curriculum was released in 1995 (Hazony, 2000b:5).It included Jewish history as a component of world history ratherthan an independent subject, and was indicative of the move fromagenda-driven univocal commemorative narratives to a view that incor-porates critical accounts and challenges to traditional national realms ofmemory (Yogev, 2010:10).

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the first generation of Israelihistory scholars portrayed the War of Independence as the Jewish Daviddefeating the Arab Goliath. This view was expressed in many worksof history, perhaps most notably in Leon Uris’s best-selling novel Exo-dus (1958). That narrative had been codified into different textbooksfor Israeli schools, such as the Book of the Haganah – a history ofIsrael’s pre-state army edited by the former Minister of Education andetched into the consciousness of Israeli schoolchildren. Such narra-tives played an important role in shaping Israeli policy toward thePalestinians (Mahler, 1997:2). The changes in the curriculum now ledto the introduction of a number of new history books – of whichthree have become the most controversial: A World of Changes editedby Danny Yacobi (1999), Passage to the Past by Kezia Tabibyan (1999)and The Twentieth Century, on the Threshold of Tomorrow (1999) by Eyal

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Naveh (Bronner, 1999, Firer, 2004). In these books, the role of Zionismwas downplayed, and other narratives describing the history of thestate of Israel were incorporated together with the traditional Zionistones. It is clear that there are quite substantial differences between thenew schoolbooks and the traditional ones. A textbook named The Sil-ver Platter2 from 1984 presented the history of the 1948 war in thoseterms:

The numerical standoff between the two sides in the conflict washorrifyingly unbalanced. The Jewish community numbered 650,000.The Arab states together came to 40 million. The chances of successwere doubtful and the Jewish community had to draft every possiblefighter for the defense of the community.

(quoted in Bronner, 1999:2)

In Eyal Naveh’s book the power balance between the collectives isinstead described like this:

on nearly every front and in nearly every battle, the Jewish side hadthe advantage over the Arabs in terms of planning, organization,operation of equipment and also in the number of trained fighterswho participated in the battle.

(quoted in Bronner, 1999:2)

The middle school textbook A World of Changes, produced by theMinistry of Education, and edited by Danny Yacobi, might be themost radical of the three. It thoroughly discusses the creation of thePalestinian refugee problem and mentions localities in which Jewishcombat forces conducted expulsions (Bronner, 1999). Kezia Tabibyan,author of the ninth-grade textbook Passage to the Past, which includeda description of the 1948 massacre of Deir Yasin, an event thathad never been described in a ninth-grade textbook before, com-ments:

If I want to educate the citizens of Israel after 2000 they must knowthat there is another point of view about things like our War of Inde-pendence [. . .] They must deal with Deir Yasin. They must know thatthere was another people who had their life here.

(quoted in Bronner, 1999)

Another book, written by Lifshitz, comments on the massacre:

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However, it is one of the black marks on the conscience of the Jewishnation and proves that in a nation’s war for independence thereare dark areas in which horrible things were done that, under nocircumstances, can be understood or justified.

(quoted in Firer, 2004:47)

Another textbook inspired by the New Historians also mentions themassacres and expulsions and claims that

The flight by the majority of the Arab population was encouraged bythe Israeli authorities.

(Lifshitz quoted in Firer, 2004:47)

Here is thus an example of the theme of “original sin” that is alsoto be found in Morris’s work. It is evident that the myth shat-tering and arguments of de-justification of the New Historians alsocan be found in Israeli school textbooks following the Zimmermancurriculum. Thus the narratives of the New Historians started toinfluence history as it was taught to Israeli schoolchildren. This canbe understood as an important institutional change, as history astaught in schools presumably has a strong impact on the collec-tive identifications of the future population. Daily newspapers werealso influenced by New History, which was evident when journal-ist Rozental in Ha’aretz in 1993 wrote about the Palestinian victimsof the 1948 war in terms of refugees (Firer, 2004:35). However, EliePodeh, who conducted one of the most comprehensive studies ofthe change in history textbooks, claimed that even though theywere far more unbiased than traditional accounts, they still to a cer-tain degree presented stereotypical and delegitimizing views of Arabs(2002:149–150).

The critics scorned the books following the new curriculum andcriticized them on the grounds that they were representative of uni-versal history, which was understood as undesirable, as they thus werecompletely neutral toward the Zionist case (Hazony, 2000b:5). AharonMegged commented on the New History curriculum: “Why not justtranslate the Palestinian books for our children and be done with it?”He also claims that the new textbooks are

an act of moral suicide that deprives our children of everything thatmakes people proud of Israel.

(quoted in Bronner, 1999)

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When studying the narrative elaboration following the social interac-tion, some change in official memory institutions can be discerned,pointing toward a shift compared to the initial narrative constellation.As some institutional change took place with the introduction of thecounter commemorative narratives into vital official memory institu-tions such as important education forums as well as into the publicarena of media broadcasts, I suggest that this change should be under-stood in terms of a recognition shift. It took approximately ten yearsfrom the first publication by the New Historians until they reachedhistory and civics textbooks. That much time was needed as the newand controversial ideas had to go through certain public acceptance,confirmation from the Ministry of Education and a process of writingand publishing textbooks (Firer, 2004:36). The shift in recognition tookplace as the counter commemorative narratives of New History grewstronger and through their placement in important memory institutionswith the potential power to affect identifications of Israeli youth overtime. This institutional change could in the fullness of time contributeto a shift in recognition in the identifications of the public. It can thusbe concluded that the first cycle brought a recognition shift to Israelisociety regarding the understanding of commemorative narratives. Theshift was brought into some vital official memory institutions crucial inthe communication of commemorative narratives to the public.

On the topic of conflict transformation, some commentators assertthat ideas of thick recognition inherent in the counter narratives of NewHistory spilled over into the peace process and affected negotiations inthe late 1990s and early 2000s. This might have been most visible in theIsraeli discussions on the Palestinian refugee problem, which directlyconcerned recognition of the Palestinian Naqba.

The early Oslo process dealt only indirectly with the return of thePalestinian refugees. Israelis were reluctant to address the issue duringthe early years of Oslo, whereas the Palestinians continued to pushfor the refugee question. During the late 1990s, we witnessed consid-erable changes in backchannel communication as well as in elite-levelnegotiations (Strömbom, 2013). The back-channel meetings discussedthe refugee question in different ways. For example, IPCRI – the jointPalestinian–Israeli public policy think tank – had a project on promotingcultures of peace, which discussed the consequences of the 1948 war andthe refugee problem as an issue in need of creating a joint vision (Baskinand Al-Qaq, 1999). Another backchannel forum addressing the issue wasthe Refugees Working Group lead by Professor Herbert Kelman, who inan interview claimed that even though displaying divergent points of

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view, the group at several times and in considerable detail discussed thehistorical narratives of the two sides (Ben-Josef Hirsch, 2007:249, Alpheret al., 1999).

In the official negotiations the content of New History became visiblearound 2000. In Stockholm, negotiators discussed the refugee questionat length. The negotiators then emphasized the importance of trying tobridge the gap between the two versions of the origins of the refugeeproblem (Ben-Josef Hirsch, 2007:250). During the Camp David talks theparties for the first time ever negotiated over numbers of refugees thatwould be granted return. The next round of talks was held at Taba, inearly 2001. When studying the documents from the negotiations it isclear that Israeli negotiators broke new ground.

In the last round of the formal Israeli-Palestinian peace talks at Taba,Egypt (January 2001), Israeli negotiators went where no Israeli offi-cials have gone before: they negotiated over numbers related tothe return of some Palestinian refugees into Israel, and consideredacknowledging the Palestinian tragedy and Israel’s share of respon-sibility for the exodus of approximately 700,000 Palestinians duringthe 1948 war.

(Ben-Josef Hirsch, 2007:241)

No agreement was reached at the Taba negotiations, but several com-mentators assert that the parties were closer to an agreement than ever,partly due to the intense discussions over the refugees (Ben-Josef Hirsch,2007:250, Pundak, 2001).

At least two sources support the fact that the parties were extremelyclose to agreeing on the issue (Strömbom, 2013). Miguel Moratinos, theEU envoy to the negotiations stated:

the Israeli side offered to present a mutual narrative on the tragedy ofthe Palestinian refugees. The Palestinians side discussed the suggestednarrative and considerable progress was achieved although there wasno agreement.

(Eldar quoted in Ben-Josef Hirsch, 2007:251)

Also the so-called Clinton plan, in which the former US presidentsketched the ramifications of a future agreement, reflected this fact.In this it was stated that Clinton:

118 New History

believe[s] that Israel is prepared to acknowledge the moral and mate-rial suffering caused to the Palestinian people as a result of the 1948War and the need to assist the international community in addressingthe problem.

(Clinton, 2003: 253)

The changes in the representation of the refugee problem in Israeli pub-lic consciousness can partly be understood as a result of the influenceof the counter commemorative narratives (Ben-Josef Hirsch, 2007:52).This indicates that the counter narratives of New History made parts ofthe Israeli negotiating team accept that Israel had an active role in thecreation of the refugee problem. It can hence be assumed that the nego-tiators were less constrained by the master commemorative narratives ofthe 1948 war, allowing them to incorporate the counter commemorativenarratives, with their account of the role of Israel in expelling therefugees, into the negotiations over a compromise solution (Ben-JosefHirsch, 2007:252). Different participants in the negotiations conveyedthat part of the historical work made by New Historians was read inpreparation for the negotiations. During the negotiations, head nego-tiators Yossi Beilin and Nabil Shaath cited the work of the Israeli NewHistorians in their opening remarks. Gidi Grinstein, another participant,commented on the impact of the work of the New Historians:

It did not change grounds but for some, including me, it gave thedocumentary evidence for views that we had for long. Anyone whothinks seriously about 1948 does not think that 700,000 people justleft everything voluntarily; it just doesn’t make any sense. The NewHistorians gave the historical validation and recorded evidence thatsupport this thinking.

(Grinstein quoted in Ben-Josef Hirsch, 2007:251)

Daniel Levy, an advisor to Yossi Beilin and member of the Israeli nego-tiating team, described the importance of communicating the counternarratives of New History to the Israeli public, in order to make themwilling to accept the sacrifices that peace demands:

A different approach of the Israelis on their history is important forthe Palestinians as a way to promote acceptance for the practicalsolution. Mainly since the solution is not likely to include an actualreturn into Israel. It is also relatively important vis-à-vis the IsraeliPublic . . . If we ask the Israeli tax payer to pay for X years X amount

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of money (to cover Israeli compensations for the refugees), the pub-lic must be convinced that paying those compensations is justified.With the old narrative – that the Arabs fled out of free will – it will behard to convince the Israelis that the Palestinians deserve anything.

(interview with Levy quoted in Ben-Josef Hirsch, 2007:251)

Thus, some Israeli negotiators understood the importance of thick recog-nition of the Palestinian party, both in order to ease relations in theconflict and make them less violent, and in order to show the Israelipublic that Palestinian demands for return and/or compensation werejust. However, not all Israeli politicians reasoned like Levy. Many politi-cians and parts of the public who wanted to negotiate for peace feltthat recognition of the Palestinian sufferings caused by occupation since1967 was legitimate. However, when it comes to recognition of the harmcaused by the war in 1948, the discussion is very different. Yael Dayan(MK) comments on the topic of 1948 versus 1967:

the question is how far back you want Israel to go. On the one hand,you are saying it is irreversible. Israel is there. On the other hand,I agree with you absolutely that settlements in the territories after1967 [are] not only illegitimate, not only unjust, [and have] to beremoved or undone. Is this what your Nakba is today? Is Kdumim[an Israeli settlement in the West Bank] your Nakba today? Or thecompensation or acceptance of a certain number of people back topre-1967 borders?

Dayan further focused her argument:

In 1948, when people came as refugees, they did not have thecapacity to be sensitive to other refugees.

(Dayan et al., 1998:6)

I thus conclude that some, even if certainly not all, of the contentof the New Historians’ works trickled down to the peace negotiatorsand contributed to the fact that the refugee status of the Palestiniansbecame a subject for negotiations in 2001. Hence, the initial recogni-tion shift for a brief period influenced the peace process and indirectlyled to discussions over the Palestinian refugee problem, which was pre-viously unheard of in Israeli master narratives of Zionism, conflict andcommemoration. This clearly underlines the close linkages between

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intersocietal processes of relationship change and intrasocietal elabo-ration on historical understandings. Not only did the initial success ofNew History coincide in time with the most hopeful years of the Osloprocess. In fact they can be understood as having clear empirical link-ages as the narratives of the New Historians were visible in backchanneltalks, problem-solving workshops and negotiations.

Memory agents and official memory institutions

The challengers – delegitimized yet successful

As shown in the analysis, various actors were involved in the first debatecycle. Different categories of actors served as challengers in the Israelidebates over history. Examples of those are primarily the New Histori-ans themselves, such as Morris, Pappé, Shlaim, Segev, Shafir and others.Secondary interpreters of the narratives of New History who tried toinscribe them into important official memory institutions were alsoobserved. Those actors were mainly historians writing textbooks for edu-cational purposes, and television producers involved in the making ofthe Tekumma series. Politicians also played an important part as theychallenged the master commemorative narratives in the public realm,especially regarding education. Here, ministers like Yossi Sarid and civilservants such as Israel Bartal and Moshe Zimmerman played impor-tant parts as their opinions regarding important policy issues clearlyinfluenced history schoolbooks as well as the composition of the newcurriculum. The counter narratives even trickled into the peace process,where head negotiators such as Yossi Beilin and Daniel Levy served asimportant challengers, through their participation in discussions overthe Palestinian refugees in 2000 and 2001.

When it comes to gatekeepers criticizing and working against thecounter narratives of New History, several individuals and collectiveswere involved. In this first debate cycle, academics faithful to the mastercommemorative narratives of Zionism were the main actors address-ing the arguments of New History in academic and public forums.They were joined by politicians who expressed concerns that the NewHistorians’ world views would harm the legitimacy of the state.

Discussing agency in the case of the New Historians could indicatethat they intentionally tried to transform conflict. However, that wasnot necessarily the case. Some actors, such as Ilan Pappé and SimchaFlapan, had an explicit agenda when it came to the Israeli–Palestinianconflict. Flapan stated:

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It is the purpose of this book to debunk these myths, not as an aca-demic exercise but as a contribution to a better understanding ofthe Palestinian problem and to a more constructive approach to itssolution.

(1987:10)

Ilan Pappé has also been consistent in his agenda when it comes totakings stands with regard to the conflict. In a book written in 2004 hestated:

My bias is apparent despite the desire of my peers that I stick tofact and the “truth” when reconstructing past realities. I review anysuch construction as vain and presumptuous. This book is writtenby one who admits compassion for the colonized not the colonizer;who sympathizes with the occupied not the occupiers; and sides withthe workers not the bosses. He feels for women in distress, and haslittle admiration for men in command. He cannot remain indiffer-ent towards mistreated children, or refrain from condemning theirelders. In short, mine is a subjective approach, often but not alwaysstanding for the defeated over the victorious.

(Pappé, 2004:12)

Others, such as Benny Morris, initially claimed to solely be interested inpresenting history, detached from ideology and politics (Shlaim, 1990).Benny Morris insists that he’s a Zionist, and that his work has no polit-ical purpose whatsoever (Ben-Josef Hirsch, 2007:246, referring to theaforementioned interview with the journalist Ari Shavit). Morris claimedin the Tikkun article that

[. . .] the moment the historian looks over his shoulder, begins to cal-culate how others might utilize his work, and allows this to influencehis findings and conclusions, he is well on his way down that slipperyslope leading to official history and propaganda.

On the other hand, Morris also publicly confessed that his and others’writings of history might have indirect consequences for politics. Thepossibility that a critical revision of the Israeli historical narratives wouldfoster reconciliation and peace with the Palestinians was alluded to inhis scholarship from its beginning. He stated:

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the New History is one of the signs of the maturing Israel [. . .]It may also in some obscure way serve the purpose of peace andreconciliation between the warring tribes of that land.

(Morris, 1990:102)

The New Historians hence had no uniform agenda for change (Blomeley,2005:138), even though their work for a period of time created ashift in the narrative constellation of Israeli society. Thus one mightargue that the political agenda of the New Historians was mainlycreated by its antagonists (Blomeley, 2005:136, Caplan, 2010:232). Eventhough Israeli New Historians cannot be ascribed any kind of inten-tional collective agency, the public reactions and interpretations oftheir historiography points toward the fact that, intentionally or not,for a time they had the power to reformulate Israeli national identity(Diner, 1995:148). They described identity and difference in the formu-lation of Israeli national identity as separated by permeable boundaries.They thus portrayed Israeli national identity as one important constructamong others, which makes it more susceptible to change.

Shabtai Teveth and other gatekeepers ascribed agency to the NewHistorians as they are called “a club whose members bear collectiveresponsibility for each other’s work” (Shlaim, 1990). Teveth also accusedthe New Historians of being politically motivated, pro-Palestinian, andaimed at delegitimizing Zionism and the state of Israel. He statedthat Shlaim’s aim when publishing Collusion Across the Jordan was toprovide

fresh sources of political sympathy for the Arabs, and fresh sources ofantipathy to the Jews.

(quoted in Morris 1990: 25)

Benny Morris and his colleagues, according to Teveth, had set out toundermine if not thoroughly demolish earlier Israeli assumptions ofhistory (Moris 1990: 24). Efraim Karsh also clearly argued in favor ofcollective agency and joint intentions in the case of the New Historians.According to him the New Historians constitute a group with clear char-acteristics, an ideological common ground and shared political goals(Naor, 2001:141).

Peace might be a possible side effect of the writings of New History,according to Morris. Regardless of the manner in which the proponentsof New History viewed the intention behind their work, proponents andopponents alike often made the association between New History and

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post-Zionism. This might explain the occasionally forceful reactions andthe wide media attention to the works of New History. These reactionsdid not focus merely on historical data and research, but on the politicalstruggle over Israeli national identity (Ben-Josef Hirsch, 2007:246).

However, the challengers’ message of deconstructing myths and pre-senting alternative truths has been widely described as one version ofhistory, even though the New Historians themselves insist on a diver-sity of views. Thus, even though their narratives were multivocal, themessage inherent in them is often described as quite consistent inthe secondary literature and has also often been perceived as such bythe public. The Israeli New Historians can hence be understood as mem-ory agents when it comes to history and recognition, which given thetheoretical understandings developed here could in turn lead to conflicttransformation. During this first debate cycle, the gatekeepers took fewpractical actions to get rid of New History. They mainly tried to delegit-imize the New Historians’ works, linking them to the worst connotationsin the master narratives, that is those of anti-Semitism, and the morallyunjust Arab and Palestinian enemy.

Recognition openings – toward institutionalization

Official memory institutions have the power to affect conflict as theycan support or help bring changes in the understandings of self andother, which is a vital part of the environment which feeds into thedynamics of an intractable conflict. When official memory institutionscome to embrace views of thick recognition, and those views are com-municated to the public, they can be part of the processes of self- andother-transformation, which are central features in the transformationof intractable conflict.

This chapter mainly concerned the initial public discussions of com-memoration narratives. Commemorative narratives are communicatedthrough official channels to citizens and also, of course, through theprivate realm – discussed in families and among friends. All of thosecommemorative narratives are prevalent in the narrative constellationof society. However, not all of those narratives are inscribed into theofficial memory institutions. It is clear that up until the 1980s theinstitutionalized narratives of commemoration mainly related to masternarratives of Zionism and conflict. The debates regarding New Historythrough the interaction among different actors, over time startedto affect official memory institutions. Thus, counter commemorativenarratives started to become inscribed into Israeli memory institutionsduring this debate cycle. As mentioned above, they also made their way

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into the peace process, showing the way in which narratives of thickrecognition can influence processes of conflict transformation.

This indicated changed power relations in the higher order of power,as the counter commemorative narratives gain an important func-tion when transferred to institutions. They then become more forcefulcompetitors to the master commemorative narratives because they arecommunicated directly to the public through official memory institu-tions. Two dimensions of narratives can hence be discerned here: all areparts of the overarching narrative constellation, and only some are insti-tutionalized. If the aim is that the whole of the narrative constellationover time will experience a recognition shift, it is indeed crucial thatcounter commemorative narratives are inscribed into official memoryinstitutions.

Facilitating circumstances for thick recognition

This last section considers circumstances that could lead to introduc-tion of narratives of thick recognition in Israeli society. One way tounderstand these phenomena is that other narratives that were impor-tant during the same time-span can support and render legitimacy tothe ideas. This discussion concerns the macro level of society, andaddresses its broader narrative constellation. As shown previously, thecounter narratives of Zionism and conflict indicate permeable bound-aries between national groups and, as they were gaining acceptance, thechance was greater that the narratives of New History would resonatewith the broader public. In the initial narrative constellation of cycleone, different counter narratives of nationalism and conflict presentingideas of recognition to the Israeli public, were gaining acceptance. WhenIsraeli New History was introduced in society, the public had there-fore already partly been exposed to the theme of recognition throughcounter narratives of Zionism and conflict, which were central at thistime. Thus, there was a greater chance that the counter narratives ofNew History would resonate with the public, as the Israeli narrativeconstellation in general experienced a shift toward more recognition.During the end of cycle one, both thin and thick recognition weregaining strength, implying that a shift toward thick recognition in theIsraeli narrative constellation may have been closer than ever before.The peace process and the counter narratives of conflict with their inher-ent thin recognition can be seen as a good start toward relationshiptransformation, which in turn was spurred by the thick recognitioninherent in the narratives of Israeli New History, and strengthened

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by the ideological impulses of post-Zionism. Again, it can be pointedout that more peaceful relations between the parties to conflict canbe seen as serving as an important contextual backdrop to the initialsuccess of the New Historians’ narratives. More positive intersocietalrelations can thus be understood as a facilitating circumstance for theintroduction of narratives of thick recognition. If the official memoryinstitutions had remained relatively intact, there is great likelihood thatthick recognition over time would have gained more acceptance amongthe public. This tentative hypothesis concerns the macro level andpoints to structural factors that are important for creating acceptanceof thick recognition by the public.

The micro level concerns how individuals perceive narratives ofthick recognition, that is, how to understand that some individu-als found the counter narratives of New History acceptable whereasothers fiercely opposed them. A key factor when addressing individ-uals’ proneness to accept alterations in narratives of identity is thephenomenon of core constructs. The macro level of the narrative con-stellation influences actors’ willingness to accept thick recognition, asit communicates security aspects that can influence individual percep-tions of threat. If the narrative constellation goes through a shift towardmore recognition, parts of the public might be more willing to acceptpermeable boundaries as their perceptions of threat are lowered. Differ-ent human beings perceive their identities and relevant and irrelevantthreats to those depending on the narrative constellation as well asindividual predispositions. When a narrative constellation in which nar-ratives emphasizing permeable boundaries between groups are gainingstrength, individuals might become less security oriented as a result.This in turn could lead to a higher acceptance when core constructsare challenged, which in its turn could result in transformation of coreconstructs.

In this section, I have discussed recognition openings, and have cov-ered important facilitating circumstances, contributing to the introduc-tion of narratives of thick recognition in Israeli society. Here, I mainlyaddressed circumstances facilitating the introduction of narratives ofthick recognition in the Israeli context. The next chapter turns tothe second debate cycle, during which narratives of thick recognitioneventually waned.

7The Confrontation

This chapter addresses the second debate cycle, during which thechallengers met increasing resistance as the gatekeepers tried to regainpower over official memory institutions. The outline of the chapteraligns with the previous one. Hence the cycle is broken down into initialnarrative constellation, followed by social interaction between memoryagents, ending up in narrative elaboration. In the final sections, theinterplay between memory agents and official memory institutions isdiscussed, moving over to an elaboration on circumstances that mayhave inhibited further success of the narratives of New History. Againfocus is on Israeli intrasocietal relations and debates, however, linkedto the interplay with intersocietal processes of relationship and conflicttransformation.

Narrative constellation: Ambiguous tendencies

The previous chapter established that there was a shift in the narrativeconstellation in Israeli society taking place during cycle one. Not onlydid the narratives of New History become more publicly noticed, theyalso began to be inscribed into official memory institutions throughchanges in education on different levels. They also underwent changedrepresentation in the media. As mentioned above, the institutional-ization of commemorative narratives continued during the late 1990sand early 2000s. However, this does not by any means imply that thenarratives of New History were uncontroversial. As the previous sectionsuggested, the tone in the debates over history was quite aggressive fromthe outset and the New Historians had enemies who tried to do delegit-imize them in many different ways. In the late 1990s, the narratives ofNew History were increasingly assaulted by powerful neo-Zionist actors

126

The Confrontation 127

who played on insecurities brought about by increased violence levelsand the stagnated peace process.

This time period also brought about swift changes domestically aswell as globally. When trying to understand the context surroundingthe decline of New History, it is important to keep in mind the localpolitical circumstances possibly bringing about new formations in thenarrative constellation. Narratives of conflict were altered, partly due toan increase in violence levels and fear of physical threats. During the1990s, there was a gradual deterioration in the peace rhetoric, partly dueto an increase in violence and loss of trust in a partner for peace. In 1994,Baruch Goldstein, an Israeli Jewish extremist, killed 29 Palestinians in aHebron mosque, and radical fractions of Hamas and Islamic Jihad subse-quently carried out several suicide bombings in Israeli towns. A majorityof the population still supported the peace process, but growing violencestarted to affect the public (Shamir and Shikaki, 2002). The spectacu-lar violence peaked in 1995 when Jewish Israeli Yigal Amir assassinatedPrime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, which was indicative of the intrasocietalrifts in Israeli society and called for introspection. The increased vio-lence, turmoil and loss of trust in the results of the peace process andits leaders, partly resulted in hard-liners Benyamin Netanyahu of theLikud-party winning the general election in 1996 (Lindholm-Schulz,2004). At the end of the 1990s, Israel witnessed rapid internal as wellas global changes. It is obvious that the ensuing political efforts to getrid of Israeli New History and ban it from official memory institutionswere quite successful during the later parts of the 1990s and onwards.

As the Israeli Likud-party came to power, the peace process experi-enced difficulties. Israel did not put a halt to settlements in the WestBank as stated in the Declaration of Principles, and Palestinian frus-tration and violence increased. A number of simultaneous intersocietalprocesses touched on the narratives of New History. Palestinian violenceincreased, resulting in many Israelis losing confidence in the future ofthe peace process. The Palestinians on their part felt betrayed sincethe peace process appeared to many to be merely a charade of bro-ken promises. Asymmetrical relations persisted and an aid-dependentand weak Palestinian Authority was created. Among Jewish Israelis,this development brought about negative thoughts about the conflict-ing party, as prejudice against the Palestinians as being aggressive andunwilling to negotiate for peace could be understood as verified whenviolence against civilians increased. This development was at its peak in2000 at the outbreak of the second Intifada, as well as a breakdown inthe peace negotiations at Taba in early 2001.

128 New History

The late 1990s saw some efforts at peace by Israeli Labor leader EhudBarak, but after his failure to reach an agreement with the Palestiniansat Camp David in 2000 and Taba in 2001, many regarded the peace pro-cess as terminated. New actors were brought into politics due to newpolitical conditions as the Likud party again won the general elections.The actors in political power during the second Intifada were closelyaffiliated with the idea of Neo-Zionism. As for narratives of Zionism,this period hence saw increased support for Neo-Zionist ideas, whichwas especially evident at the time of the election of the well-knownhard-liner Ariel Sharon in 2001. The second Intifada coincided in timewith the attack on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001. TheIsraeli right could then use the threat of global terrorism as fuel intheir political rhetoric against Palestinian violence during the secondIntifada.

It is hence clear that even though New History experienced substan-tial initial success, the turbulent time period in the end of the 1990sresulted in the upheaval of master narratives of Zionism and conflict.New actors hence came to power who would try to use their influence toremove New History from official memory institutions. Their power toinfluence historical interpretation grew as intersocietal relations becameincreasingly destructive from the beginning of 2000 onwards.

Social interaction: Gatekeeping interventions

We now know that the counter commemorative narratives of New His-tory slowly started to affect official memory institutions in the late1990s. The counter commemorative narratives were hence increasinglycommunicated to the Israeli public, and created strong feelings amongits opponents. This coincided with distrust among the conflict’s par-ties and increased violence toward Israeli civilians. At this point severalgroups were formed in Israel, all aiming at the removal of New Historyfrom the Israeli official scene. “Hatikva” and “Women in Green” wereloosely formed interest groups. At this time a group formed by Israeli his-tory professors also worked against introducing New History into Israelischool books. This loosely formed organization was called “Professorsfor a Strong Israel” (PSI) and worked hard at discrediting the his-tory book written by Eyal Naveh (Ghazi-Bouillon, 2009, Nets-Zehngut,New York City, November 2009).

At this time, more official centers such as the Shalem Center and theAriel Center for Policy Research (ACPR) were also formed.1 The thenPrime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu raged over Israeli universities and

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their alleged pro-Palestinian tendencies, and pledged to support the cre-ation of alternative institutions (Mahler, 1997:9). The Shalem Centeris a right-wing think tank run by Yoram Hazony. It was established inJerusalem in 1994 and focuses on influencing society through culturalideas (Ghazi-Bouillon, 2009:126). Since 1997, the center has publishedthe quarterly journal Azure, which deals with scholarship and opinionon issues of concern to the Jewish public in Israel and abroad. TheShalem Center was intimately connected with the then Prime Minis-ter Benyamin Netanyahu’s political establishment. Netanyahu had closerelations with Hazony, and several of the coworkers in his administra-tion had been involved in the Center’s activities prior to their govern-mental appointments (Gutwein, 2003:36). The ACPR is an organizationof intellectuals aiming at policy research in order to promote Israelisecurity, which was understood as endangered by the Oslo process. TheACPR website states that

the peace which will force Israel to its pre-1967 borders, i.e. losingthose territorial assets critically needed for the very existence of theJewish state, will not be but a recipe for war.

(2005)

The ACPR connected the security concerns of the Israeli state to theuniversal security claims of all nation-states. Their mutual concern hasbeen to engage in the war on terror, adopting a neo-conservative agenda.The think tank deals with domestic issues, such as the Oslo process,the danger of the New Historians and insecurities brought by post-Zionism, which in their rhetoric often are linked to anti-Semitism. Theyhave also addressed global issues such as the war on terror, drawingon Samuel Huntington’s work The Clash of Civilizations (1996 [1988])(Ghazi-Bouillon, 2009:139). The ACPR has also issued various publi-cations that defend Zionism and depict post-Zionism as well as NewHistory as a “risk” for the Israeli nation (cf. Sharan, 2003a). State-ments in which post-Zionists and New Historians are claimed to beanti-Semites are also voiced in some of the publications from ACPR(cf. Sharan, 2003b:51).

In 1997, Ephraim Karsh wrote a book called Fabricating Israeli History –The New Historians. There, he accused the New Historians of badmethodology and of being “partisans seeking to provide academicrespectability to long-standing misconceptions and prejudices relatingto the Arab-Israeli conflict” (Karsh, 1997:195). The New Historians wereaccused of being unprofessional and unscientific, and the book makes

130 New History

an effort to prove their methodological shortcomings (Naor, 2001:142).Another frequent critique regarded the coupling of history with ideol-ogy. This is something that Karsh also pointed out, when he accused theNew Historians, on ideological ground, of intending to propagate lies.He highlighted that by using a reference to Orwell’s 1984:

In this Orwellian world, where war is peace and ignorance is strength,not only are falsifiers not censured by their milieu – they areapplauded.

(Karsh, 1997:xix)

The tone in the academic debates was hence quite sharp; an example ofthis is Lustick’s review of Karsh’s book Fabricating Israeli history: the “NewHistorians”. He states that readers

[. . .] are sure to be stunned by the malevolence of his writing andconfused by the erratic, sloppy nature of his analysis. Errors, incon-sistencies and overinterpretation there may be in some of the Israelihistories, but nothing in them can match the howlers, contradictionsand distortions contained in this volume.

(Lustick, 1997:156)

Karsh made an assault on the historical revisionists, claiming that they:“violate[s] every tenet of bona fide research”, and that their work com-prises a “new Israeli distoriography”, constructing a “fictitious historicaledifice”. The work is also shrouded in a “cloud of innuendo”, reflecting“perverted thinking” as well as “utter hypocrisy”. Strong adjectives suchas “absurd”, “crude”, “mind-boggling”, “patently false” and “sinister”are generously spread throughout his book. This vocabulary is indeedused, even though Karsh claims that his book offers a “sober attempt toset the record straight and to make the case for fair play in the studyof the Arab-Israel conflict in general, and Israeli history in particular”(1997:205). In a later publication, Karsh tried to produce evidence forthe fact that Morris engaged in many types of distortion: he misrepre-sented documents, resorted to partial quotes, withheld evidence, madefalse assertions and rewrote original documents (1999). Karsh concludeshis article by asserting that

Regrettably, Morris’s distortions in the article under consideration areneither a fluke nor an exception. As I have sought to demonstrateelsewhere, they typify the New Historians’ whole approach. Lacking

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evidence, they invent an Israeli history in the image of their ownchoosing.

Yoram Hazony, as already mentioned, partly through articles publishedin Azure, was one of the most vocal critics of New History and madean effort to delegitimize their arguments, claiming that anyone tryingto combine Judaism with universal values is an enemy of the Jewishstate. In Hazony’s argument, even those who formulate criticism againstnationalism are portrayed as enemies of Jewish sovereignty (Shapira andPenslar, 2003:68). Hazony wrote about the history debates in his 2000book The Jewish State: the Struggle for Israel’s Soul. There he refers toauthor David Grossman, who discussed the new views of history andof Zionism in terms of redeployment and withdrawal of entire regionsof the Israeli soul. Hazony comments:

The redeployment of which David Grossman speaks is the destruc-tion of the Jewish state in the mind of the Jewish people. It is thereturn to exile. It is a retreat into the void.

(2000a:72–73)

The book also highlighted direct or indirect links between the debateover the War of 1948 and the collective memory of the Holocaust. Histo-rians who see Palestinians as victims of Zionism and link the Holocaustto the birth of the state of Israel are claimed to diminish the importanceof the Holocaust, regarding it to be mainly a legitimating ground for theexistence of the Israeli State, and hence contribute to the denial of theHolocaust (2000a:9). In this way, Hazony directed his criticism towardTom Segev, who indirectly compared the suffering and victimization ofPalestinian refugees with the victimization and suffering of the Holo-caust in his book The Seventh Million (1993 [1991]). People who mentionthe notion of Palestinian refugees were hence also indirectly accused ofHolocaust denial. In Israel, there has been a strong taboo against hint-ing at any kind of comparison between the Shoah (Holocaust) and theNaqba (Prato, 2006:559). Tom Segev’s book ignored that taboo, whichin turn stirred very intense reactions.

Various collective actors such as the ACPR, the Shalem Center,“HaTikva”, “Women in Green”, “Professors’ association for political-social strength”, together with individual authors, academics and right-wing politicians in the late 1990s, intensely promoted ideas aimingat the removal of New History from Israeli official memory institu-tions. Thus, intense efforts coming from various official locations were

132 New History

launched, aiming at the removal of the counter commemorative narra-tives of New History from Israeli public consciousness. In the debate andactions that followed, it was clear that the attacks were made on all theinstitutionalizations of New History, meaning the Tekumma series, theNew History schoolbooks, as well as individual academics.

The New Historians were hesitant, yet optimistic about the contentof Tekumma, whereas parts of the establishment were outraged by it.Limor Livnat, then Education Minister in the Israeli Likud government,stated that the series, instead of showing Israel’s history:

with a sense of pride and confidence in the historical justice that wasdone to the Jewish people, depicts the Palestinian side sympatheti-cally, systematically distorts the great Zionist deed and causes severeand probably irreparable damage to our image.

(New York Times, 4 October 1998)

She also expressed great apprehension that the show propagated posi-tions for the Palestinians, while “pushing aside all our myths”. ArielSharon, the then cabinet minister, protested in a letter to the educationminister, that

The film distorts the history of the rebirth of the Jewish people inits own national homeland and undermines any moral basis for theestablishment of the State of Israel and its continued existence.

(New York Times, 4 October 1998)

The simultaneous changes in the curriculum led to fierce debate withinthe Israeli establishment. In a 2000 article in New Republic, YoramHazony criticized the new curriculum and A World of Changes. Heclaimed that they taught “universalism” in such a way that Zionismwas lost. He also insisted that Zionist history should be taught from aJewish perspective. He claims not to dismiss the Palestinian perspective.However, he perceives that it is natural for parents:

to want their children to understand their own values and perspec-tives better than those of a stranger.

(2000b)

Here, Hazony emphasizes the value of stable moral boundaries betweenethnic groups. He does not deny the existence of another, perhapsrighteous, Palestinian narrative, but clearly indicates that it should be

The Confrontation 133

kept far away from the minds of Israeli students and pupils. “Womenin Green” published an advertisement in Israeli daily newspaperscondemning Eyal Naveh’s book. The advertisement was signed bywell-known political figures from the Likud, the National Union Party,the National Religious Party, and other neo-Zionist organizations. Theadvertisement read:

Oppose it! Do not buy it! Do not study from it and do not teachfrom it. The book is written in a post-Zionist spirit that will weakenthe pupil’s sense of the rightfulness of the Zionist way and of theestablishment of the state of Israel, to the point of undermining ourrights to our country . . . This book rewrites our history, distorts andfalsifies facts, and trains pupils to identify with the Arab side andeven to understand Arab terrorism as a supposedly legitimate politicalstruggle. Do not allow your children, the citizens of the future, toserve as hostages in the hands of the New Historians. Do not buyEyal Naveh’s book!

(Ha’aretz, 10 September 1999)

The Shalem Center also made an effort to protest against the newcurriculum. They launched a media campaign targeted at all of thenew textbooks on history. Many school principals were sent copies ofthe articles in order to persuade them against choosing the new text-books for their pupils. However, many teachers were upset with thecampaign and went on to sign a public declaration in support of thenew books, as they claimed that the boycott was against the principlesof free speech inherent in modern democracies (Yogev, 2010:2). As aresult of the protests against the books, the Knesset appointed an edu-cation committee to evaluate Naveh’s textbook in November 2000. Thecommittee was composed of members of various political affiliations.They unanimously voted in favor of the withdrawal of the book untila number of alleged distortions had been corrected. This was done inspite of Yossi Sarid’s2 firm statement in 1999, in which he expressed hiscomplete support for the book. He had also warned that he would rejectany attempt to revise its contents (Naveh, 2006:246). The Shalem Cen-ter also published a research report dealing with A World of Changes. Thecenter thus took the debate regarding history and moved it to a societallevel, relating it to the preservation of the Zionist national identity ofIsrael (Ghazi-Bouillon, 2009:135).

Also PSI raged against the New History curriculum as well as againstthe new history books:

134 New History

The new literature curriculum, together with that for history, isindicative of the systematic politicization of the educational systemunder Minister-Commissar Yossi Sarid.

(http://www.professors.org.il/, statement tothe press, 2 March 2000)

In 2000, Teddy Katz, an Israeli student, wrote his Master’s thesis TheExodus of the Arabs from Villages at the Foot of the Southern Mount Carmel,about the alleged Tantura massacre. The thesis came to public attentionwhen Israeli journalist Amir Gilat, who published an article on the topicin the daily Ma’ariv, picked up its theme. The author of the controversialthesis was arrested and put on trial. He was accused of having fabricatedsources and tainting the names of the Israeli soldiers in the interviews,as according to the author they had taken part in the killings. The trialdealt with alleged falsifications and distortions. Experts were appointedto evaluate the correctness of the claims presented in the thesis. Theexperts claimed to have found several cases of negligence, falsification,fabrication, ignorance and disregard in Katz’s thesis (Gelber, 2003:122).Katz, in turn, argued that this should be an academic debate amongscholars, rather than being fought in the realm of law (Ghazi-Bouillon,2009:112). Ilan Pappé, who has some methodological criticism againstKatz’s thesis, believed that Katz presented a rather fair picture of whattook place in Tantura. He claims to have evidence supporting the occur-rence of an ethnic cleansing there, and that the Israeli establishment,most notably the IDF, does all that is in its power to keep the story ofTantura from being told to the public (Pappé, 2001:22–25 passim).

Narrative elaboration: Backlash

I have now gone through the social interaction that took place duringthe second cycle in the debates over history. It is clear that thecontenders in the debate tried fiercely to make their views resonatein Israeli society. The New Historians and their followers such as text-book authors, college students, TV producers and others made efforts tointroduce New History into different segments of Israeli society. Theirefforts were successful to a certain extent, as the counter narratives ofNew History initially became inscribed into some vital official memoryinstitutions, communicating collective memory to members of Israelisociety.

During the second debate cycle, several interest groups with varyingdegrees of organization were formed in Israeli society. Their common

The Confrontation 135

aim was to criticize Israeli New History and to prevent those narrativesfrom being inscribed into Israeli official memory institutions.

Debates regarding school history books raged for a period of time,ending up in the banning of several of the new books and the shreddingof all the copies of A World of Changes. The Knesset Education Commit-tee unanimously rejected the book. Limor Livnat, the Education Min-ister, claimed that this was a step in her “crusade to return post-Zionistthought to its rightful place” (Livnat, 2001). It was removed from the listof texts approved by the Ministry of Education on the recommendationof the Knesset Education Committee (Naveh, 2006:244). The ban wasmotivated by the argument that the book was unfaithful to the tra-ditional Zionist narrative, overlooked central events in Zionist historyand did not adequately reinforce the national-Zionist ethos for students(Al-Haj, 2005:55). Livnat defended the ban in the Israeli daily Ma’ariv(7 March 2001):

No nation studies its history from the point of view of its enemyor the point of view of the United Nations. The state of Israel is aJewish and democratic state and this should direct the perspective ofits educational system.

Also members of the PSI joined in the heavy criticism of the new historybooks. Ron Breiman, then chairman of the organization, stated thatIsrael had a heavy bias amongst its academics, which made it nearlyimpossible for right-wing academics to make their voices heard. There-fore, Breiman stated, it was necessary to get support from the politicalestablishment, as the left-wing academics within the humanities wouldnever let those voices in (Ghazi-Bouillon, 2009:136).

In the early 2000s, Israeli right-wing politicians were very troubledwith the state of mind of Israeli youth, who were claimed to demonstratecomplete ignorance toward their heritage (Naveh, 2006:244). Apart frombanning textbooks expressing the views of New History, a new subjectcalled “Heritage”, was introduced in the curriculum during the schoolyear of 2001–2002 (Naveh, 2006:245). It was also clear that the ministersin the government had different views on education policy than theirpredecessors, as they banned books that had been recommended anddefended by former Education Minister Yossi Sarid.

Israeli society turned against Teddy Katz. Even though his thesis wasinitially awarded a high mark (97), the University revision committeeordered a suspension of his thesis, giving him six months to submit therevised version. The master’s thesis thus generated plenty of controversy,

136 New History

together with a lawsuit. The content of Katz’s thesis was thus not onlya subject for academic debate but was brought into the realm of law(Ghazi-Bouillon, 2009:113). The trial was never concluded, as Katz hada nervous breakdown and later admitted that he did not have enoughmaterial to support his conclusions (Aggestam, 2004:137).

Tekumma, the Israeli documentary TV series presenting alternativeviews of the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, was also under heavyattack. Livnat, who referred to the series as “post-Zionist”, demandedthat it should be taken off the air (Silberstein, 1999:1). The series wasbanned from schools, but had until then created major debate withinsociety.

As a result of the social interaction in the second debate cycle, theinitial partial acceptance of the ideas in the counter narratives of theNew History declined. During this cycle a backlash is evident, in whichthe balance between the former master narratives and the counternarratives of New History almost returned to the previous status quo.This period of recognition closures took place against the backdrop of astagnating peace process and increasingly destructive intersocietal rela-tions between Israelis and Palestinians in general. Influential politiciansand interest groups supported the master narratives of commemoration,which again resulted in teaching at universities and schools along-side the master commemorative narratives of Zionism. The culturalscene was also affected because influential politicians made an effortto criticize and delegitimize cultural products created outside of theframe of the master commemorative narratives of Zionism. After thebreakdown of negotiations at Taba in 2001, coinciding with the out-break of the second Intifada, the peace process went into seeminglytotal stalemate. Willingness to negotiate was low and levels of violenceescalated.

The reflection that can be made regarding this development is thatthe heaviest critique and efforts to stop the content of New Historywere made at the institutional level, rather than at the level of academicpublication. Publication of historical revisionism within academia canthus be viewed as one thing, as those works are less likely to reach thegeneral public, whereas the inclusion of that perspective in school booksis something entirely different as all countries, especially new ones, typ-ically view schools as a place not just to learn but to foster patriotic spirit(Bronner, 1999).

One conclusion that can be drawn from this discussion is thatacademic debate tends to be understood as a minor threat to collec-tive identity, compared to public debates and the inscription of those

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ideas into official memory institutions. During this period the Israelidebates over New History waned. Temporally, this coincided with thecollapse of the peace process and the beginning of the second Intifada.As the arguments of New History had been coupled with the themeof delegitimation of the existence of the Israeli state, it was also easyto renounce those arguments in the light of direct physical threats tothe Israeli public. The promoters of the master commemorative narra-tives easily found resonance for their arguments in the current politicalsituation, as master narratives of Zionism and conflict were gainingground and intersocietal relations between Israelis and Palestiniansdeteriorated. It thus becomes quite clear that the counter narrativesformed a serious challenge that was picked up by the gatekeepers.Those in turn had different functions. Some formed mostly an aca-demic critique, and fought their battles within the academic sphere.Some, on the other hand, worked intensely in order to rid officialmemory institutions of narratives of New History. Some only pointedtoward the possible threats from New History, whereas others actedon the alleged threats and worked to remove them from the publicdebate. In this case, challengers and gatekeepers alike tried to definethe most suitable historical facts and to institutionalize them. Dur-ing the time span of debate cycle two, the gatekeepers of the mastercommemorative narratives turned out to be most successful in theirendeavor, leading to the deinstitutionalization of New History fromIsraeli society.

The New Historians allegedly faced professional consequences ofintroducing the counter narratives. Benny Morris claimed that Israeliuniversities ostracized him, and that after many years of job search hemanaged to get a position only in one of the less prestigious universi-ties in Israel. Ilan Pappé was scorned by the Israeli establishment, wheremany refused to publish his works, and also actively stopped him fromcommunicating his views in public. For example, he tried to organize aconference together with his colleague Asad Ghanem on the topic of thememory of the 1948 war, but was stopped by authorities at the Univer-sity of Haifa. He wrote an article on the topic called Why Haifa UniversityCancelled My Conference (http/::www.hnn.us/articles.1482.html). Afterthat incident, he referred to himself as “the most hated Israeli inIsrael” and had to find an academic position in the UK, as it washard for him to find work in Israel (Blomeley, 2005). Also Eyal Navehconfesses to have suffered professional consequences after writing hiscontroversial history textbook. He now claims that he can present hismulti-narrative approach in academic forums, but if he wants to keep

138 New History

his job as a writer of educational texts in the Israeli school system, hemust remain true to the master narratives in those texts (Naveh, 2009).Baruch Kimmerling commented on the professional treatment of theNew Historians:

in the past four or five years, an almost coordinated campaign onthe scale of the McCarthyistic witch-hunts has been waged againstacademics in Israel who do not accept the basic ideological premisesof a mobilized research or who are critical of some of the paradigm ofthe elder generations.

(quoted in Mahler, 1997:9)

As a result of this, many New Historians have been unable to publishtheir work in Israel, and for many of them the only option forpublication is now in the international press.

In contrast to this development there are still traces of the countercommemorative narratives of New History in Israeli society, but due tothe political context, the ideas have not yet been further institutional-ized, and the debate regarding history today does not permit the sameextent of criticism.

Another change that points to the influence of the New Historians’views on the public is visible in the work of Israeli researchers DanielBar-Tal and Rafi Nets, which was carried out during 2008. Througha number of questions in a poll carried out by the Israeli opinionpoll institute Dialog, they investigated the collective memory amonga representative sample of 500 Israeli Jews. Some, but not all, of theirquestions relate to the main themes discussed in the Israeli debatesover New History. The question most obviously connected to this studyregards the main reasons for the departure of Palestinian refugees dur-ing the War of Independence. Here, 40.8 per cent answered that theyleft due to fear and calls of leaders to leave, 39.2 per cent answeredthat they left due to fear, calls from leaders, and expulsion by theJews, whereas 8 per cent answered that they left solely due to expul-sion by the Jews. The final 12 per cent answered that they did notknow. With regard to the narratives it is clear that nearly 41 percent remained true to the master narratives, whereas roughly 39 percent believed in the version presented by the master narratives, butwere partly influenced by the counter narratives as they saw Jewishexpulsions as part of the reason behind the departure. Eight per centbelieved the counter narratives to be correct as they believed that theJews were the only ones responsible behind the Palestinian exodus (for

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an English summary of the findings of their study, see Press RoomAt Teachers College 2009). Given the results of the survey, one canreflect upon the impact of the New Historians on the collective mem-ory of the Israeli public. It is clear that some of the explanations of theNew Historians are accepted fully or partly by a large part of the pub-lic, and to a certain extent might have seeped through to the Israelipublic.

In 2002, the Israeli NGO Zochrot was founded. Based in Tel Aviv,its aim is to promote awareness of al-naqba (Bronstein, 2005:220). Itsslogan is “To commemorate, witness, acknowledge, and repair” (www.zochrot.org, accessed 15 June 2010). Zochrot organizes tours of Israelitowns, which include taking displaced Palestinians back to the areasthey fled or were expelled from in 1948 and afterwards. A key aimis to “Hebrew-ise the Nakba” by creating a space for it in the pub-lic domain of Israeli Jews. Zochrot acts in many ways to advance thisgoal. The group erects street signs giving the Palestinian history ofthe street or area they are in. It is also known for the organization oftours for Jews and Arabs to Palestinian villages destroyed in 1948. Dur-ing these tours, signs are posted that commemorate the different sitesin the destroyed villages. Refugees and their families provide knowl-edge of village history, and an attempt is made to expose as muchof the ruined villages as possible. Through these stories participantscan get an idea of what the village actually looked like, and what itwas like to live in it. The event is also seen as important in estab-lishing the historical/collective memory of the land (Musih, 2010).Zochrot has created a website in Hebrew, devoted to the Palestinianvillages that were destroyed or resettled as a result of the War of1948. Even though Zochrot is a small organization, their activities bearwitness to the fact that there still exist groups aiming to communi-cate counter narratives of Israeli history, and trying to contribute toa raised awareness of the Palestinian formative identity experience ofal-Naqba.

This section has covered the narrative elaboration that resulted fromthe social interaction in the second narrative cycle of the debates. Themain conclusion is that the counter narratives of New History disap-peared from the Israeli official scene from the early 2000s and onwards,coinciding with the eruption of the second Intifada. Thus, the moststaunch recognition closures took place when intersocietal relationsbetween Israelis and Palestinians went through one of its darkest andmost destructive phases. However, Israeli New History lives on, albeitonce again in the margins of Israeli society.

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Memory agents and official memory institutions

Gatekeeping

After a while, when New History started to become inscribed into officialIsraeli memory institutions, other actors opposing the counter narra-tives became involved in the debates. Influential politicians, mainlyfrom the right, mobilized to rid the Israeli society of New History.The delegitimation taking place in the first debate cycle continued andseemingly increased, together with direct efforts to clear institutionsfrom ideas of New History. Various organizations were also formed,sometimes in cooperation with leading Likud politicians like BenyaminNetanyahu. The organizations often aimed at New History, but alsooften linked that to the dangers of the Oslo Process and the threat ofannihilation of the state. During this period, strong politicians from theright also played a vital part as their gatekeeping activities effectivelyremoved New History from the vital official memory institution of edu-cation. The peace process has also stagnated ever since, partly due tocertain of the above agents’ ability to delegitimize anyone who tries tobase politics on the idea of permeable boundaries between Israelis andPalestinians.

Some memory agents promoted and communicated new views ofhistory directly to the public and to secondary actors. Others hadthe power to in different ways import those ideas into official mem-ory institutions. Those institutions in turn continue to communicatethese narratives until altered. The activities aimed at official mem-ory institutions are understood as gatekeeping. It has also been clearthat the politicians in charge of education politics tried to influencememory institutions in order to make them reflect their views on his-tory. In this way, memory agents on different levels tried to influencememory institutions through challenging and gatekeeping, which canbe understood as lower order forms of power. Through their actions,the narrative constellation is affected, which over time might lead tochanged identifications. This analysis hence enables an understandingof how the lower order affects the higher order of power. Memoryagents may thus, through their actions, be successful in influencingidentifications in society.

Recognition closures – toward deinstitutionalization

When examining the debates and the social interaction surroundingthem, it is clear that the counter narratives were treated differently

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depending on their degree of institutionalization. As long as the counternarratives existed mostly in academic and public forums for discussion,their opponents fiercely opposed them, but conducted no practicalattempts to stop the ideas. However, after some years during whichthe counter narratives of New History had experienced initial success,and were imported into official memory institutions, the social inter-action became qualitatively different. Now different gatekeepers workedtogether to uproot the counter narratives of New History, and eventuallyturned out to be quite successful in that endeavor. As the debate tookplace within academia, the battle was thus very much one of words, andit proved difficult to silence the “New Historians” within the academy.When dispersed to the public scene through media, and later on also toeducation policy, the challengers’ attempts at gatekeeping, where theyfiercely guarded the boundaries of the master narratives, were howeverquite successful. It is hence obvious that political efforts were mostlyaimed at stopping the message of New History in the field of educa-tion, which is a realm where ideas of thick recognition really couldhave made a difference in the long term. Some of the most controversialschoolbooks were removed, and Teddy Katz became a notorious exam-ple of what happens to students questioning the master commemorativenarratives of Israel, and the television series Tekumma was taken off theair and banned from school curricula. Individual challengers who hadpromoted narratives of New History, such as Ilan Pappé, Benny Morris,Avi Shlaim and Eyal Naveh, all suffered professional problems due totheir views on Israeli history. The result of all this was that the counterpublic display of New History were removed from official memory insti-tutions and once again reside on the margins of the Israeli narrativeconstellation.

Inhibiting circumstances for thick recognition

It is obvious that the ensuing political efforts to get rid of IsraeliNew History and ban it from official memory institutions were quitesuccessful during the second cycle of debates. One factor contributingto this development is of course the actuality that the peace process wasstagnating at that time, resulting in the counter narratives of conflictlosing strength. The meager results of the peace process also resulted inincreased violence against Israeli civilians, contributing to the fact thatthe public was losing faith in prospects for peace. Violent spectacularevents at the time also contributed to heightened tensions. In September

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2000, a 12-year-old Palestinian boy and his father were caught in cross-fire, ending up in the boy being shot to death by Israeli soldiers. Aroundthe same time in Gaza, two Israeli soldiers were brutally killed by a lynchmob in central Ramallah. Pictures of the innocent dead boy togetherwith his grieving father and the two dead Israeli soldiers together withcheering Palestinians were broadcast throughout the world. The aggres-sive rhetoric of promoters of the master commemorative narratives thustied into the general development of the conflict, since ideas of recog-nition at that time were waning as polarization and violence grew.Memory agents in the government such as Ariel Sharon and LimorLivnat took measures to hinder further institutionalization of New His-tory in official memory institutions. As violence continued to increase,ending up in the outburst of the second Intifada in 2000 – the Israelinarrative constellation as a whole clearly did not favor counter narra-tives containing ideas of neither thin nor thick recognition. Intersocietalrelations were deteriorating to previously unseen destructive levels,which eventually lead to the erection of the barrier between Israel andthe West Bank and further to the withdrawal from Gaza. The wors-ened relations and increased separation resulted in even less interactionbetween societies at the time when thick as well as thin recognitionof Palestinian experiences and identities waned and almost disappearedfrom Israeli public consciousness.

Moving over to the micro level of analysis, I take up the questionof why counter commemorative narratives containing ideas of thickrecognition can cause such feelings of threat in a society involvedin intractable conflict. As the self has been portrayed as vulnerableand in need of heavy security measures in the past, identity hasbeen augmented with security concerns. The insecure state of the col-lective self has thus been constantly emphasized in order to justifyaggressive struggles in the past and present, and attempts to changethose narratives might entail massive feelings of threat. In this case,the other is described as vulnerable and a victim of aggressions inthe counter commemorative narratives, which clearly destabilizes theformer boundaries between identity and difference.

One example of the boundary destabilizing character of the counternarratives of New History regards the large number of Israeli kib-butzim that were established on the ruins of Arab villages. The mastercommemorative narratives rarely mentioned the causal relationshipbetween the success of the Israeli state in 1948 and the devastatingcollapse of the Palestinian collective that followed (Massad, 2000:53).This link was highlighted in the counter commemorative narratives,

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which emphasize, among other things, another side of the story of thenewly founded villages and kibbutzim. Tom Segev gives us a vivid exam-ple when he describes the history and creation of Kibbutz Lohamei HaGetaot (Ghetto Fighters’ House). That kibbutz houses the Ghetto Fight-ers’ Museum and was built by survivors from the Warsaw ghetto aftertheir arrival in Israel. The kibbutz was built on top of the destroyedPalestinian village of al-Sumayriyya, whose inhabitants according toSegev had been deported during the 1948 war (1993 [1991]:156). Segevwrites that there is “no settlement in Israel that better illustrates thelink between the Holocaust and the Palestinian tragedy” (Segev, 1993[1991]:451).

As the boundaries are destabilized through the introduction of thecounter commemorative narratives, the other might be perceived ascoming closer to the insecure self, which might be understood asextremely threatening given the fact that in the master narratives thatcollective has been described as vindictive, unreliable and aggressive.This can be understood as a result of the fact that the core constructof national identity is perceived as being challenged, and those chal-lenges tend to bring about feelings of threat. This perceived instabilityof boundaries can thus result in actions of defending core constructs,employing far-reaching measures to make sure that the core construct ofIsraeli national identity remains in line with the master commemorativenarratives.

It is obvious that in the fight against New History, academics, jour-nalists and politicians tried to portray the sometimes post-positivist,post-nationalist and most of all boundary-provoking message inher-ent in New History as a threat to the unity of the Israeli nation, andsometimes also as a lethal threat to the existence of the state. In theirrhetoric, they thus enhanced the need of stable boundaries betweennational groups, underscoring the insecurity of the Israeli nationalcollective and its legitimate fight for land against a strong and aggres-sive counterpart in conflict. The New Historians themselves, in thearguments of their opponents, are actually described as enemies ofthe Israeli state. In this way, they are connected to alleged lethal ene-mies of the Jewish national cause, such as anti-Semites and Palestiniannationalists. The gatekeepers, opposing New History, thus played onsentiments of insecurity, victimization and justification in order to dele-gitimize its arguments. During the second cycle of debates, the success oftheir efforts was experienced, temporally coinciding with increased vio-lence levels, as the counter narratives of New History were erased fromIsraeli official memory institutions. The counter narratives, however,

144 New History

still exist in the margins of the Israeli narrative constellation, and havealso apparently had some vital influence on the proceedings of the peaceprocess (Ben-Josef Hirsch, 2007) as well as the collective memory of theIsraeli public (as indicated in the study carried out by Nets-Zehngut in2011).

Part IV

Conclusion

8Thick Recognition – Past andPresent

New History, thick recognition and relationshiptransformation

Through the investigation into understandings of identity constructionin conflictual settings and the development of the concept of thickrecognition, this book has addressed the linkage between the trans-formation of intractable conflicts and understandings of history. Theanalysis unpacked the Israeli history debates and divided them intotwo cycles of narrative constellations, social interactions and narrativeelaborations. It was clear that the twists and turns of the debates hadclear connections to the general domestic political climate at the time,as well as to the relationship between the conflict’s two main parties.Thus, links between changes in historical understandings and construc-tions of identity as well as relationship and conflict transformationhave been probed. The research served to increase our understanding ofprocesses of identity change in intractable conflicts as commemorativenarratives were linked to important narratives of identity and conflictin the present. Hence, the importance of the construction and recon-struction of historical understandings in intractable conflicts has beenhighlighted.

The over-arching aim of this book was to provide understanding ofhow different and shifting accounts of history inform relationshipsbetween parties in intractable conflicts. It developed the concept ofthick recognition and moved it into the setting of intractable conflicts,in order to provide further insight into possibilities of transformingthem. I have suggested that commemorative narratives can be analyzedalong the lines of the way they describe views of the self, the otherand their separating boundary. This enables comparative analyses of the

147

148 Conclusion

extent to which different narratives contain narratives of thick recogni-tion. Once that is established, it is possible to analyze elaborations onrecognition and how these tie into processes of conflict transformation.The theoretical chapters developed the concepts of memory agents andofficial memory institutions, which are understood as crucial in thatprocess. Memory agents have the ability to influence memory insti-tutions through their actions; this visualizes how the interplay in thelower order of power has influence on formulations of identity on thehigher order.

The empirical analysis showed that the Israeli debates over historycan be related to processes of conflict transformation; it also pointedto circumstances that facilitated and inhibited the introduction of NewHistory in Israeli society. The study scrutinized Israeli commemorativenarratives regarding the 1948 War and investigated the dynamics ofthe debates over history, which regarded core aspects of Israeli nationalidentity as well as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Below, the results ema-nating from the Israeli case study are related to the concepts of conflicttransformation, thick recognition and identities in conflict. Facilitatingas well as inhibiting circumstances for the transformation of relation-ships in intractable conflicts are also discussed. The empirical analysiscontributed three significant findings, which feed back into theories ofconflict transformation:

(1) The processual approach helped to fine-tune the understandingof how narratives of thick as well as thin recognition interplay withthe development of conflict. As identities and conflicts are understoodas processual and non-linear, more positive and peaceful relations cannever (unfortunately) be seen as end states, but processes that can takemore positive or negative directions. The findings are illustrated inFigure 8.1. The figure illustrates how inhibiting circumstances can leadto recognition closures, which in turn leads to (often destructive) con-flict transformation. Facilitating circumstances instead tend to lead to

Inhibitingcircumstances

Facilitatingcircumstances

Recognitionclosures

Conflicttransformation

Narrativeconstellation

Recognitionopenings

Conflicttransformation

Figure 8.1 Facilitating and inhibiting circumstances and their trajectories intoconflictual relations

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recognition openings which also affect (and often leads to construc-tive) conflict transformation. Different types of transformation then inturn feeds into the broader societal contexts and results in new narrativeconstellations.

Through the concluding analyses, a deeper understanding of theprocess of debating history in societies tormented by intractable con-flicts has been gained. As conflict transformation has been understoodin terms of process, combined with the sequential analysis, new insightshave been developed.

(2) An analysis of the interaction between actors within conflictedsocieties is crucial as they have the potential to question governingassumptions of identities and relationships in conflict. These actors, inour case for example historians, politicians and civil servants workingwith education policy, hence have the potential to influence identitiesin conflict through the introduction of narratives of thick recognition.The analysis made it clear that war-challenging narratives of thick recog-nition can be expressed by state officials, which in turn shows thateven in the seemingly most intractable of conflicts, there might be con-stituencies for change, even among the political elite who in turn areoften responsible for the fate of high-level peace initiatives. Membersof the political establishment in Israel tried to exert influence over offi-cial institutions, such as education and state-sponsored media. Thus,they influenced whether or not narratives of thick recognition wouldbe disseminated to the public. When it comes to spreading the narra-tives of thick recognition to a broader audience, it is thus undisputedthat influential politicians can contribute to the creation of recognitionopenings and/or closures, depending on how restrictive they are whenit comes to manifestations of identity politics. It is equally evident thatstate officials and their policies are greatly influenced by the ideationalcontext in their respective societies. Thus, we can never study identitypolitics and politics of recognition solely from a top-down perspective.This calls for further examination of the interplay between identity poli-tics as conducted by the political elite and demands or resistance againstthick recognition on the societal level.

(3) This study also contributed to a deeper understanding regardingthe processes of recognition openings or recognition closures in intractableconflicts. Recognition openings are achieved when counter narrativesof recognition take root and subsequently become inscribed into officialmemory institutions. This is brought about by the act of challengingmentioned above, which in turn spurs change in the narrative con-stellation that may bring transformed conflictual relations. When other

150 Conclusion

narratives containing thick as well as thin recognition were winningground, narratives of New History carrying notions of thick recognitionalso started to take root. The narrative constellation at that time canbe understood as a facilitating circumstance for narratives of recognition,as it might have contributed to readiness to accept novel narratives ofrecognition among the public.

An important conclusion from that discussion is that narrativesof thin and thick recognition seemed to assist each other in theprocess of conflict transformation. There was hence an opening dur-ing which members of the community felt free to formulate criticismof the contemporary system. One might understand the circumstancessurrounding a recognition opening as a moment in time when differ-ent actors in the political environment are able to voice their criticism(Hirschman, 1970). Thus, during times of the ideational liberalizationlinked to post-Zionism, which incorporated notions of thick recogni-tion, and a peace process that forwarded narratives of thin recognition,the counter commemorative narratives of thick recognition were ini-tially successful. The memory agents were aided by the wider narrativeconstellation, which enabled them to voice criticism against traditionalhistoriography. An examination of the wider narrative constellation ofsocieties has proved to be crucial when aiming to increase understand-ings of whether challengers come to be successful in their promotionof narratives of thick recognition. The period of recognition openingsalso saw embryonic signs of thick recognition in the peace process,when Israeli negotiators at Taba for the first time brought the issue ofPalestinian refugees to the negotiation table. Hence, the works of NewHistory for a brief time contributed to changed interactions betweenparties to conflict.

Recognition closures can be understood as a result of the gatekeepers’struggles to maintain continuity in the social system. Through acts ofgatekeeping they delegitimized and worked to remove New History fromofficial memory institutions. In the case studied here, the gatekeeperswere successful in their attempts and successfully removed many of thenarratives of thick recognition from institutions. The analysis showedthat several circumstances worked inhibitingly when it came to fur-ther spread of the narratives of thick recognition. The narratives ofNew History were described as a threat to the core construct of Israelinational identity by the gatekeepers. They aimed at recognition closuresthrough delegitimation and later on managed to remove the counternarratives from the official sphere, and seemed to be most success-ful in that endeavor during times of increased violence and threats to

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physical security. The stagnated peace process and advances of narra-tives of neo-Zionism, neither of which carried notions of recognition,assisted the gatekeepers in their quest to restore the power of the mastercommemorative narratives. Apparently then, large parts of the public aswell as the elite turned to the stable boundaries inherent in the mas-ter narratives of Zionism and conflict, which closely correspond withthe master narratives of commemoration. At the time of the recogni-tion closures around 2000 studied here, there was hence little room tovoice criticism, as the challengers were excluded from dialogue as wellas from political influence. The period of recognition openings also sawembryonic signs of thick recognition in the peace process, when Israelinegotiators at Taba for the first time brought the issue of Palestinianrefugees to the negotiation table. Hence, the works of New Historyfor a brief time contributed to changed interactions between parties toconflict.

The recognition closures hindered the New Historians from voicingtheir views publicly. One option for the critics was then to exit(Hirschman, 1970) the situation, as in the case with Ilan Pappé, whofound work in the UK. The other alternative was loyalty (Hirschman,1970), meaning to stay within the system and conform to its formaland informal rules.

The analysis also pointed to the links between domestic politicaland societal processes – intrasocietal relations, and the developmentbetween the conflict’s two main parties – its intersocietal dynamics.This shows that the narrative constellation not only concerns domes-tic issues but that the conflictual development and changes in relationsbetween parties is also an important dynamic to asses when discussingintrasocietal discussions. Clearly, the subsequent societal interactionand narrative elaboration thus touch on inter- as well as intrasocietalaspects. Thus, even though this study’s main focus was on intrasocietalrelations and dialogue, its results show that relationships between par-ties are crucial for what can and cannot be discussed domestically at acertain instant in time.

The analysis shows that Israel for a long time now has experiencedquite compelling recognition closures. However, the counter narrativesstill exist in the margins of Israeli society. Given facilitating circum-stances and agents willing to promote ideas of thick recognition, theymight hence again take root. If narratives of thick recognition pro-moting understandings of the national collective, as demarcated bypermeable boundaries instead of stable ones, could be accepted by thepublic, they could again voice their understandings of national history,

152 Conclusion

which in turn could lead to changes in the makeup of Israeli nationalidentity, resulting in less antagonistic feelings toward the adversaryin this conflict. Then relationships between adversaries could againbe influenced by permeable boundaries, spurring the process of morepeaceful conflict relations.

The discussion above indicates that the understanding of transforma-tion of core constructs developed here can in a way serve as a basisfor generalization when it comes to other intractable conflicts. The pro-cesses discussed are to a large extent universal, whereas the outcomesof those processes depend on contextual factors. Thus, other soci-eties involved in intractable conflicts and experiencing societal debateover recognition can be analyzed through the conceptual frameworkdeveloped here. The next section discusses the analysis developed andconducted here and its implications for further conflict research.

Moving the research agenda forward

In what ways can the knowledge emanating from this study contributeto the development of conflict theory? It has suggested alternative waysforward in the analysis of intractable conflicts. A good deal of interestingresearch has previously been conducted in the intersection between the-ories of intractable conflict, identity and history. However, in this study’selaboration on a theoretical framework that through a processual per-spective incorporates the identity dynamics of those conflicts into therealm of conflict transformation, new insights have been developed.

The processual perspective and the focus on inhibiting as well as facil-itating circumstances have helped fine-tune the understanding of therelationship between narratives of recognition and processes of con-flict transformation. As narratives of recognition often are intertwinedand seem to correspond with the development of peace processes, wehave seen that successive phases of thin recognition can be followedby or accompanied with thicker forms of recognition. Thus this analy-sis has envisioned and deepened understandings of the process when conflictstransform towards and away from peaceful outcomes.

The findings point toward the importance of considering interactionamong actors within societies in conflict, which can be non-state aswell as state actors, and their interactions in conflict-ridden societies.As identity aspects are part and parcel of the development of intractableconflicts, it is indeed futile to study those conflicts without taking theiridentity dynamics into consideration. Due to the fact that all con-flicts – even the seemingly most intractable ones – go through constant

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transformation, there are always opportunities for change. However,when scrutinizing constituencies for change, it is imperative to lookbeyond third party actors and interactions, which have been the mosttraditional loci of interest in conflict research. In order to address pro-found identity aspects of intractable conflicts, I argue that there are morefruitful ways forward than the orthodox focus on elite negotiationsand/or third-party interventions.

Even though the notion of recognition in both thick and thin formshas been much elaborated within the field of political theory, it hasbeen surprisingly missing in research within conflict theory. One strandof conflict research ventures into thoughts on de jure recognition innegotiation settings, but little if any research has been conducted onthe topic of profound identity aspects. If we are to investigate possibili-ties of transforming intractable conflicts with strong identity elements,thick recognition must be taken into consideration and be related to theprocess of relationship transformation. The results from this study high-light the transformative potential of thick recognition in those settings.If the aim is to transform war-torn societies into more peaceful ones, wecannot afford to ignore their identity dynamics. In any such analysis, itis crucial to consider aspects of recognition and how the public, as wellas elites, relate to issues of thick recognition. If notions of thick recog-nition are introduced in conflicted societies, leading to the recognitionof crucial identity aspects of the other, the conflict might move onto amore peaceful path.

Even though this study has had a theoretical focus on thick recog-nition, thin recognition obviously has an important role to play, as itmight serve to facilitate or inhibit the introduction of narratives of thickrecognition. Hence, this study’s development of the concept of thickrecognition serves as an important complement to universalistic (andoften state-centric) analyses of thin recognition in the field of moreorthodox conflict theory as well as in international relations theory.However, it cannot substitute for earlier accounts, as there seems to be avital interplay between the two in practice.

Analytically, the method suggested here directs attention to narrativesof thick recognition, which can be expressed by a variety of actors indifferent areas. The study of thick recognition might hence lead in mul-tiple directions, due to the fact that the researcher looks for acts of thickrecognition within conflict settings, rather than a priori focusing on aspecific level of analysis. In this way the researcher is not predisposedto look at a specific actor or level of analysis, but rather he or she canembark on a broad search for narratives of thick recognition and their

154 Conclusion

social interaction. That search provides opportunities for thorough-going analyses penetrating into profound identity aspects – which arenecessary if we are to visualize the transformation of intractable conflictsinto more peaceful forms.

The international community of researchers as well as practition-ers concerned with conflict transformation should thus pay attentionto endogenous processes and interactions among inside actors of thiskind. They should constantly underline the urgency of, as well asintellectually encourage, a multiplicity of narratives regarding iden-tity in societies involved in intractable conflicts. Societal discussionsregarding recognition contribute to the fact that boundaries of nationalidentities come under constant pressure. In the end, that might affectthe boundaries of national collectives involved in conflict. Thus, ideasof thick recognition inherent in all forms of narratives should bepromoted. This means that researchers and practitioners alike shouldpay attention to official memory institutions as well as memory agentswith the potential power to influence them. Indeed, if peace processescontinue and there is no change in official memory institutions, theremight be little support among the public for peace efforts, as theboundaries between the collective self and the opponent in conflictare continuously perceived as stable. This only brings about momentarychanges in relations, as thick recognition must be allowed to permeatesociety in order for the intractable state of conflict to be transformedinto a tractable one, where destructive relations are replaced by morepeaceable ones. It is thus key to pay attention to counter narratives con-taining thick recognition in conflict-ridden societies, as over time theymight form the most important domestic challenge to core constructsof groups involved in conflict.

Visiting the present: Israeli society in the midst ofrecognition closures

Israeli society goes through constant change. The debates covered inthis study were very lively, and many have followed since. During the1990s, narratives within many different areas came to challenge con-ventional wisdom in Israeli society. A lively peace movement supportedthe Oslo process, and the societal debates within the media and otherareas were indeed vigorous. The Oslo peace agreement is today hardlyseen as viable and new constructive ideas for a solution to the conflictseem distant. The peace that was formulated in Oslo has thus left manydisappointed and frustrated, as it “has empowered few, frustrated many

Thick Recognition – Past and Present 155

and brought remarkably little peace [. . .]” (Bröning, 2011:1). The recog-nition closures that took place around the eve of the new millenniumhave had grave consequences. The conflict dynamics, which were tur-bulent and went through significant changes during the 1990s, havealtered the intrasocietal dynamics in an unfortunate way, implying thatcritics have little or no opportunity to make themselves heard in thesocietal setting. Intractability seems to be more entrenched than ever atthe moment, and prospects for peace are dim. There are worrying signsin at least three areas, indicating that it will take some time before Israelisociety is presented with new recognition openings.

The first area is academia. The climate for critical academics isbecoming harder, with new claims from the right-wing establishmentdemanding the banning of books expressing views that break with mas-ter narratives of Zionism (Kashti, 2010a). One significant feature of theinteraction in the debates studied here was attempts to delegitimizechallengers of Israeli master narratives. Since then, many academicsas well as other pro-peace activists have struggled to communicateviews that break with Israeli master narratives. In 2006, Sari Nuseibeh,president of Al-Quds University in East Jerusalem, claimed:

If we are to look at Israeli society, it is within the academiccommunity that we’ve had the most progressive pro-peace views andviews that have come out in favor of seeing us as equals.

(quoted in Haaretz, 17 June 2006)

However, in the increasingly polarized political environment criticshave more frequently become faced with delegitimation. At this verymoment, vocal civil society actors such as IZL (the Institute for ZionistStrategies) and Im Tirtzu (another Israeli pro-Zionist group) are workinghard on campaigns to delegitimize anyone who promotes what they seeas anti-Zionist views (Kashti, 2010b). Accusations have been directedtoward teachers in Ben Gurion University of the Negev as well as TelAviv University who are accused of teaching anti-Zionist views (Kashti,2010c). The silence of the Israeli public can hence partly be seen as a nat-ural outcome of the forceful delegitimization campaigns directed towardanybody who tries to express criticism vis-à-vis the policies of the Israeligovernment.

A second area that shows troublesome signs of decline is the tradi-tionally so vibrant Israeli civil society. After the war in Gaza at theend of January 2009, international as well as domestic criticism wasraised against what was seen as disproportionate Israeli use of violence.

156 Conclusion

In order to get a clearer picture of what happened during the war, theUN established the “The United Nations Fact Finding Mission on theGaza Conflict” team, under the leadership of then president of UNHCR,Richard Goldstone. It published the so-called “Goldstone Report” inSeptember 2009, which accused both the Israeli Defense Forces andPalestinian militants of war crimes and possible crimes against human-ity (www.un.org, 2010). The Israeli reactions to the report were verystrong. Israeli Information Minister Yuli Edelstein gave a speech onthe topic of the Goldstone Report stating that the results are simplyexpressions of anti-Semitism (Keinon, 2010). Again high-ranking Israeliofficials countered criticism of actions carried out by the Israeli govern-ment with delegitimation in the strongest sense. The writers of the UNreport were accused of anti-Semitism, even though Richard Goldstonehimself is part of the South African Jewish community.

Naomi Chazan, former member of the Knesset, and a columnist atthe Jerusalem Post, encountered heavy criticism after the GoldstoneReport. Chazan presently heads the New Israel Fund (NIF), which isa US-based organization that funds activist Israeli civil society NGOs,some of which provided material for the Goldstone Report. Followingthe publication of the report, the Israeli political establishment turnedagainst Chazan, and she was additionally fired from her position atthe Jerusalem Post (Lis, 2010). Interior Minister Eli Yishai claimed thatshe, together with the NIF, were backing civil society organizationsthat “aim to destroy Israel” (Susser, 2010). In the same vein, MosheYa’alon, Minister of Strategic Affairs, referred to Israeli human rightsorganizations as “enemies from within” (Susser , 2010). Prime Minis-ter Benyamin Netanyahu further claimed that “Goldstoneism” was oneof three existential threats to Israel, the other two being Iran and aPalestinian state without adequate security arrangements (Jerusalem Post,2009, Susser, 2010).

Following the Goldstone Report and the Chazan affair, the currentLaw Committee, headed by Yisrael Beiteinu’s1 David Rotem, has set upa subcommittee to examine the sources of funding of NGOs active inIsrael (Ronen, 2010). Some of the committee members aim to ban fund-ing by foreign countries, which is seen as interfering in Israel’s internalaffairs. Kadima Party’s2 Otniel Schneller wants to go a step further,proposing the establishment of a parliamentary inquiry commissionto probe the conduct of the INF and its grantees. Schneller said he isagainst the absurdity of Israeli civil society “paying organizations likePhysicians for Human Rights to slander us”, and wants to stop the NIFfrom supporting what he sees as anti-Zionist groups (Ha’aretz, 2010).

Thick Recognition – Past and Present 157

Through forceful delegitimation strategies, gatekeepers have silencedIsraeli civil society actors. In that context, there is little if any roomfor critics to voice their concerns. In February 2010, a group of leadingIsraeli academics, writers, actors, directors and political activists includ-ing novelists A. B. Yehoshua and Amos Oz, placed a full-page ad inHaaretz. It expressed “disgust at the campaign of incitement and hatred”being waged against Chazan and the NIF (Susser, 2010). Notwithstand-ing the support of Chazan, the delegitimation of critics of Israeli policiesis troublesome as the linking of criticism with existential threats to secu-rity, and especially to anti-Semitism, might quiet the fiercest critic. Eventhe Israeli public, which historically have been involved in vigorous dis-pute with its elite, have become increasingly quiet. That developmentmight result in depriving Israeli society of intrasocietal dialogue, whichis a crucial component in any democracy.

Thirdly – and of crucial importance – the prospects for peacefulconflict transformation in such a closed societal setting are indeed glum.In the wake of the war in Lebanon in 1982, hundreds of thousands ofIsraelis demonstrated in the streets against what was seen as dispropor-tionate use of violence and “a war of choice” rather than “a war of noalternative”. During and after the Gaza war, the previously fierce Israelicivil society, as well as its peace movement, remained silent. Even inthe aftermath of the war, after the publication of the Goldstone Report,only very radical groups together with a small number of pro-peaceacademics openly criticized Israeli actions during the war.

This development is unfortunate, although not entirely surprising.One can conclude that the debate climate in Israel today shows meagerprospects for recognition openings, as internal as well as external crit-ics are dismissed and often linked to anti-Semitism. Even Jewish groupsin the Diaspora, which have historically expressed strong support forIsraeli actions and policies, have expressed concern with the presentclimate in the domestic Israeli debate. The newly founded Americanpro-Israel, pro-peace lobby J-street has been delegitimized in the Israelipublic debate. On 10 July 2010, the Jerusalem Post ran an article inwhich columnist Isi Leibler rhetorically asked himself if J-street, beingsuch a critic of current Israeli policies, really should be incorporatedunder what he described as “the Jewish tent” (2010). Again, a groupexpressing pro-peace views and criticism of Israeli policies has becomedefined as outside of the Jewish collective, appearing to be siding with“the enemy”.

The campaigns against pro-peace and human rights groups havebecome intensified during the last couple of years. Several Israeli as

158 Conclusion

well as Palestinian pro-peace organizations claim that their activitiesare delegitimized on a regular basis as authorities on both sides try toimpinge upon their work. In Israel, there are presently vast problemsfor peace NGOs to carry out peace activities because of what manyNGOs experience as a “calculated onslaught” on human rights orga-nizations (Aggestam and Strömbom, 2013). This is done through thecutting of funding, but also through strong delegitimation campaignsin the media and elsewhere. The onslaught comes mainly from orga-nizations, such as the NGO Monitor, Israel academia monitor and ImTirtzu, which are partly backed by the government and many right-wing Knesset members. They constitute a new phenomenon in Israel –civil society organizations whose main activity is to monitor and tryto assert control over other organizations (Ziv, 2012). These monitor-ing organizations have sought to prohibit the dissemination of ideasof universal jurisdiction, such as human rights. The peace NGOs havedifficulties in communicating their ideas toward the political elites, asboth Israeli and Palestinian authorities discredit their work. As a resultof this it is also difficult to get the message of peace and recognitionthrough to the broader public in both societies. Hence, peace activists onboth the Israeli and the Palestinian side presently work under precariousconditions (Aggestam and Strömbom, 2013).

The signs are indeed worrying. The current Israeli isolation, in whichcritics from within as well as from without are constantly dismissed, isharmful to future peace efforts. In order for the conflict to move onto amore peaceful track, this isolation must be broken. It is imperative thatthe Israeli establishment stops the delegitimization of critics and insteadengages in dialogue with the international community and respondsto its criticism in order to find viable ways toward a more peacefulfuture.

This study has highlighted the important role of academic as well asintra-societal debates in conflicted societies. When internal as wellas external critics against Israeli politics are delegitimized and linkedto anti-Semitism, it is crucial for commentators to destabilize that linkand show that policy has nothing to do with ethnic or national affil-iation, but is what actors make of it. It has been shown here thatintrasocietal criticism can have a destabilizing effect on master nar-ratives that encourage ethnic entrenchment. It has also been arguedthat contentious voices might create space for debates that can con-tain seeds spurring processes of peaceful conflict transformation. Thisstudy has shown that important social criticism against the exclusionary

Thick Recognition – Past and Present 159

principles through which conflicts are constituted can spring from pro-fessionals in the academic sphere, who are often influenced by debatesthat transgress national boundaries. Those social critics serve a pivotalfunction in conflict-ridden societies, as their voicing of criticism con-tributes to the existence of a plethora of counter narratives that overtime might challenge master narratives and assist in the transformationof conflictual relationships.

Notes

1 Introduction

1. Benny Morris wrote an article in the Jewish bimonthly publication Tikkun in1987, where he described his and his colleagues’ work and characterized theirwritings as “new historiography”. That description prevailed and has sincebecome the most common way to collectively describe these historians (NewHistorians) and their works (New History).

2. This type of conflict has also been called “deep-rooted” (Burton, 1987),“enduring rivalry” (Goertz and Diehl, 1993) or “intractable social conflict”(Kriesberg, 1993).

3. Dyrberg offers an insightful analysis and discussion on the form of powerthat lies in the becoming of identity. However, throughout his book he some-times suggests a more structuralistic perspective, where identities are achieved(1997:88, 95). I distance myself from this view, as I believe that the con-struction of identities is not a process of achieving, but of becoming, whichinvolves subconscious as well as conscious considerations by the subjectsat hand.

4. The specific properties that characterize memory agents and official memoryinstitutions are thoroughly discussed in Chapter 3.

5. Through the education system the national imagination is often banalized,and becomes part of everyday rituals and symbols that appear neutral andhence remain unquestioned (cf. Billig, 1995).

6. For a comprehensive study of Israeli memory institutions, from education andthe social system to the military, see Nets (2011).

7. Theodor Herzl, who wrote his manifesto Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State) in1896, is often seen as the inventor of Zionism. His program aimed at creating“a state like other states”, and can be interpreted as a reaction against theformer particularism of Jewish life.

2 Thick Recognition and Conflict Transformation

1. The distinction between “me” and “I” used by Honneth is borrowed fromMead’s theory of symbolic interactionism (1934).

2. Tamir’s discussion (1995) on “thick multiculturalism” partly resembles the dis-cussion on thick recognition here, as they both emphasize constant dialogueand negotiations over differences that do not indicate a priori solutions andtend to result in untidy compromises (Tamir, 1995:172).

3. Allan and Keller (2006:201) talk about renouncement as a separate categoryalongside thick and thin recognition. I argue, however, that renouncementis part and parcel of the process of both forms of recognition, and will thusincorporate it as a necessary element in the recognition process.

160

Notes 161

4. The processual view of transformation presented here should not be mistakenfor the view of transformation as introduced by Holsti (2004:16), wheretransformation is understood as functional change of institutions over time.

5. Their different views of recognition were in turn originally inspired by polit-ical theorists Taylor (1994 [1992]) and Honneth (1995), who have doneextensive work on recognition within the area of construction of politicalcommunity and social conflicts respectively.

6. Here, Kelman’s thoughts on psychological aspects of conflicts are quiteconsistent with contemporary psychoanalytic theory (Ross, 2000:1016).

7. Kriesberg lists four major components that contribute to the development ofrelations within conflict. Those are identity, grievances, goals and methods(Kriesberg, 2007:156). Given our focus on identities and relationships here,identities and grievances are in focus, whereas goals and methods are moreperipheral. However, goals and methods might also be affected if relationsbetween adversaries become less violent.

3 Identities in Conflict

1. Classical works in psychology, such as those of Erikson (1970 [1950]), pointedout that self-images have a strong linkage to conflict behavior. Erikson alsoearly on pointed to the close linkage between identity and security.

2. For an elaboration on this specific discussion, see Campbell (1992:82).3. Northrup uses the term rigidification to characterize this phenomenon.4. Buckley-Zistel has an illuminating discussion on conflict transformation and

social change – along the same lines as the discussion on self- and other-transformation suggested here. She employs a hermeneutic perspective, whichmight be difficult to match with a discussion on narrative. However, she sug-gests the questioning and re-evaluation of past horizons, and thus discards theambition of a fusing of horizons in line with Gadamer’s (1975) conceptualiza-tion. In her view difference is accepted and she does not suggest unification,but rather coexistence and acceptance of horizons (Buckley-Zistel, 2008:45).Thus, I believe that her argument runs along the same lines as this study.

5. In his discussion on the malleability of identities and the acceptance orrejection of new identities proposed, Bloom relies heavily on Erikson’s work(1968, 1970 [1950]), which emphasizes feelings of security as essential for theidentification process.

4 Boundaries and Recognition in Israeli Master Narratives

1. The Masada myth revolves around the Jews who had fled to the Roman fort ofMasada in the Judean desert in 73 AD. In order to deny success to the Romans,the Jewish men killed all the women and children, finally committing collec-tive suicide by leaping off the Masada cliff. The myth of Masada has come tosymbolize Jewish strength and willingness to sacrifice during the antique era.

2. The Sabra is the cactus fruit also known as prickly pear; extremely rough andthorny on the outside, but sweet and delicate on the inside. Jews born in Israelare often referred to as Sabras. The Sabra is also often used to describe Israelinational character (cf. Almog, 2000).

162 Notes

3. Strong nation-building projects and their usage of instrumental, state-sponsored historiography in times of creation of new states, is by no meansunique to Israel (cf. Kimmerling, 2008, Sela, 2005:205).

4. The idea of rejecting the notion of exile and preventing it from happen-ing again, is often referred to as “negation of exile”, or shlilot ha-golah(cf. Zerubavel, 1995:17).

5. Bar-Tal, and Bar-Tal and Teichman build their arguments on results of com-prehensive studies where textbook material have been analyzed, such as Firer’s(1980, 2004), Podeh’s (2000), and others’.

6. This well-known Zionist slogan is often attributed to British Jewish authorand Zionist activist Israel Zangwill (Blomeley, 2005:133). In 1901, Zangwillwrote: “Palestine is a country without a people; the Jews are a people without acountry” in New Liberal Review. The message in this quotation indeed capturesthe spirit of the Zionist slogan above, even though it is formulated somewhatdifferently.

7. Theodor Herzl, who wrote his manifesto Der Judenstaat (“The Jewish State”)in 1896, is often seen as the inventor of Zionism. His program aimed at cre-ating “a state like other states”, and can be interpreted as a reaction againstthe former particularism of Jewish life. Herzl’s early work has, however, beenheavily criticized from some directions, condemning his non-religious back-ground and mission. The spiritual thinker Ahad Ha’am has been one of themajor critics of Herzl’s works (cf. Dowty, 1998:5).

8. Kimmerling also emphasizes socialism as a core component of Zionism.As much as I agree with him on this point, this factor will be less empha-sized here, as it plays a less important role in relation to the subject of thisstudy.

5 Boundaries and Recognition in Israeli Counter Narratives

1. A recent study by Nets-Zehngut (2010) shows that academic studies reflect-ing the counter commemorative narratives also existed before the writings ofthe New Historians. However, these were mostly written by Jewish authorsoutside of Israel and relied mainly on sparse interview material from an eliteperspective as Israeli state archival material from the War of 1948 was stillclassified, and did not reach the public debate.

2. A left-wing Marxist party, which ceased to exist in 1997.3. The article by Morris referred to here was originally published in the American

bimonthly Jewish journal Tikkun in 1989.4. Post-Zionism has different connotations. One has to do with a temporal

dimension, where Zionism is seen to have evolved into a post-Zionist stateof affairs, with less socialism and collectivism, developing into a “more nor-mal” liberal democracy. The other regards is more of an ethical stance, whereZionism is seen as ideologically flawed, and in need of critical revision inorder to catch up with other societies governed by liberal democratic practices(Nimni, 2003:3). The second type promotes civic rather than ethnic identitymarkers. The strand of post-Zionism that has been mostly connected to NewHistory is the ethical kind.

5. The evolution of post-Zionism is further presented in Chapters 6 and 7.

Notes 163

6. During this massacre, carried out by Phalangists in the Palestinian refugeescamps of Sabra and Shatila in South Lebanon, the Israeli army were chargedwith knowing all about the plans, but allowing the massacre to continue andthus failing to take action to prevent it.

7. Palestinian scholars such as Nur Masalha (1991:91) and Rashid Khalidi(quoted in Mahler, 1997:12) have criticized the New Historians on thegrounds that they only pay attention to previous Israeli research. They claimthat they ignore earlier works by non-Zionist scholars, giving the impressionthat these narratives are the outcome of isolated debates among Israelis, hav-ing little to do with Palestinian sources. However, the Palestinian historiansmainly validated the empirical claims of Israeli New History, indicating thatthe counter narratives recognize the Palestinian experience of al-Naqba. TheIsraeli New Historians might not embrace all different interpretations of theexodus from Palestine; however, it seems as if their main stories are quitesimilar.

6 The Challenge

1. For an elaborate discussion on the Americanization of Israel, see Segev (2001).2. Clearly alluding to the well-known poem referred to in Chapter 4.

7 The Confrontation

1. “Women in Green”, “Ha-Tikva”, as well as other movements such as ACPRand the Shalem Center, turned against many of the counter narratives. Hencethey sometimes directed actions aimed at the New Historians, but they alsotargeted the anti-occupation movement, front figures in the peace process andthe more general ideas of post-Zionism.

2. Sarid was then Education Minister and represented the left-of-center Meretz-party.

8 Thick Recognition – Past and Present

1. A right-wing nationalistic party, founded and led by Avidgor Liberman from1999 to present.

2. A liberal-centrist party, led by Tzipi Livni from 2008 to present.

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Index

Note: Locators in bold type indicate figures or illustrations

Abel, E., 72Abizadeh, A., 25Abrams, D., 45academic critique, 137Ackerman, W., 70ACPR (Ariel Center for Policy

Research), 128–9, 131Adar, L., 75Adler, C., 75Aggestam, K., 9, 17, 32, 72, 81, 94,

136, 158aggregation, 48Albert, M., 9, 51Al-Haj, M., 12, 112, 135Allan, P., 8, 9, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 34,

61, 160Almog, O., 72, 106, 161al-Naqba (the catastrophe), 3,

35, 38, 66, 89–91, 95, 116, 131,139

Alpher, J., 117Al Qaq, Z., 116al-Sumayriyya, 143Alvesson, M., 11Americanization of Israeli

culture, 102Amir, Y., 127Anderson, B. R., 63, 64Andrews, M., 16, 42, 43anti-occupation rhetoric, 101anti-Semitism, 73–5, 77, 108, 123,

129, 143Apple, M., 12Arab aggression, 72, 74Arab-Israeli war of 1948

academic studies, 86Deir Yasin, 114differing narratives, 35, 66, 142and founding of the state of Israel,

70–1, 80, 103, 108

historical controversy, 105and the Holocaust, 131interpretation debate, 3–4Israeli memories, 17Israeli perceptions, 35, 72, 77–80,

119opening up of previously classified

documents concerning, 85; seealso archives

Palestinian experience, 89, 91, 111,115–18, 143

Pappé’s book, 86The Silver Platter’s presentation, 114

Arab states, 73, 75–6, 82, 90,102, 114

Archer, M. S., 99, 100Archer’s model of morphogenetic

cycles, 99–100archives, 85, 103–4Arendt, H., 60, 61Aronoff, M. J., 70Asplund, J., 11asymmetry, 32–3, 127atrocities, 29–30, 38, 91Auerbach, Y., 9Avineri, S., 80Azar, E. E., 4, 36Azure (journal), 129, 131

Bäckstrand, K., 11Balts, Swedish extradition of, 58–9Banerjee, S., 26, 34, 60banning of books, 135, 155Barak, E., 128Bareli, A., 78Barker, R., 25Bar-On, M., 4, 72, 93, 94Bar-Tal, D., 4, 12, 17, 25, 35, 44, 48,

52, 53, 58, 60, 65, 71, 73, 74, 75,77, 103, 138, 162

181

182 Index

Bartal, I., 112–13, 120Bartelson, J., 8Barth, F., 55Baskin, G., 116Begin, M., 78, 101Beilin, Y., 118, 120Bell, D., 63Ben-Amos, A., 17Ben-Gurion, D., 73, 81, 86Ben Gurion University, 155Ben-Josef Hirsch, M., 17, 88, 101, 107,

117, 118, 119, 121, 123, 144Ben-Porat, G., 76, 77, 102Berger, P., 11Bhabha, H. K., 43Billig, M., 24–5, 44, 45, 160The Birth of Israel: Myth and Reality

(Flapan), 86The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee

Problem, 1947–1949 (Morris), 86Blomeley, K., 17, 75, 87, 96, 107, 108,

109, 122, 137, 162Bloom, W., 14, 46, 47, 51, 61, 62, 63,

161Book of the Haganah, 113boundaries

identity and the stabilization of,54–6

as source of conflict, 25boundary transformation, 41, 57,

59–60, 62Boyce, D. G., 60Brandt, W., 29Breiman, R., 135Bröning, M., 155Bronner, E., 114, 115, 136Bronstein, E., 139Bruner, J., 48Buckley-Zistel, S., 9, 31, 32, 33, 34, 46,

53, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 65, 161Burton, J. W., 160Bush, B., 25, 28, 34, 36, 38, 94Buzan, B., 16, 60

Cairns, E., 65Calhoun, C., 54Campbell, D., 31, 46, 51, 52, 53, 54,

161Camp David talks, 117, 128

Campos, M., 78Caplan, N., 122change agents, 13Chazan, N., 156–7Christian and Muslim communities,

naming controversy, 76citizenship literature, thick and thin

distinctions in, 27The Clash of Civilizations

(Huntington), 129Clegg, S., 10Clinton plan, 117–18collective amnesia, 64, 77, 89collective identification, 15–16, 38,

48, 115collective identity, 19, 31–2, 34, 36,

43–4, 48, 54, 63–4, 136collective memory, 12, 17, 63–5, 73,

102–3, 108, 131, 138–9, 144Collusion Across the Jordan (Shlaim),

86, 122colonial description of Zionism, trend

in second wave of historicalcritique, 105–6

colonialism, Kimmerling’s applicationof the model, 106

colonialist themes, 78, 105commemorative narratives, master vs

counter, 63–4conflict

counter narratives of, 93–6Israeli master narrative, 82

conflict transformation, 116changing identities in intractable

conflicts, 34–5influence of narratives of thick

recognition, 124inside actors and, 36–8processual approach, 32–4social construction of conflict, 31–2transforming identities in

intractable conflicts, 38–9conflict transformation literature,

lacunae, 36conflict transformation paradigm,

centrality of recognition concept,56

Connolly, W. E., 46, 52

Index 183

counter narratives of conflict, 94–6,125, 141

counter narratives of Zionism, 92,102, 124

Culture and Agency (Archer), 99Curle, A., 33Cyprus, 60Czarniawska, B., 42, 43

Davar, 107Dayan, Y., 107, 119Dayton, B., 9Dayton accords, 45deinstitutionalization, of New History,

140–4Deir Yasin, 114de jure recognition, 27delegitimation, 26, 104, 137, 140,

157–8Delehanty, W. K., 49Dialog (opinion poll institute), 138Diamond, L., 32, 35, 36Diaspora, 70, 73, 75Diehl, P. F., 160Dienstag, J. F., 42, 43Diner, D., 97, 103, 109, 122Dion, K., 48discrimination, and group

membership awareness, 48Douglas, M., 64Dowty, A., 80, 81, 162Dyrberg, T. B., 10, 160

Earn, B., 48economic liberalization, of Israel,

101–2Edelstein, Y., 156Edkins, J., 64education policy, Israel’s, 73education system, Israel’s, 112Eilam, Y., 112ein breira (no alternative), 72

see also no alternativeElias, N., 9Emirbayer, M., 9empathy, thick recognition

and, 28equal worth, 24Erikson, E. H., 46, 51, 161, 161

ethnic boundaries, and the Holocaust,110

ethnic cleansing, 90, 134ethnic division, 95–6exile, 69–72, 75, 89, 131Exodus, 69Exodus (Uris), 113The Exodus of the Arabs from Villages at

the Foot of the Southern MountCarmel (Katz), 134

expulsions, of Palestiniansmoral perspective, 90New Historians’ presentation, 87–8,

90, 118Palestinians’ perception, 35

Fabricating Israeli History – The NewHistorians (Karsh), 129–30

Fabry, M., 8facilitating and inhibiting

circumstances and theirtrajectories into conflictualrelations, 148

facilitating circumstances, 31, 34–5,100, 124–5

Featherstone, M., 44, 49Feldman, J., 17Feldt, J., 17, 30, 71Fierke, K. M., 75Firer, R., 73, 75, 77, 114, 115, 116, 162Flapan, S., 86, 120fluid identities, 43–4Folger, J., 25, 28, 34, 36, 38Foucault, M., 10Francis, D., 36Friedrich, C. J., 14Friling, T., 72

Gadamer, H.-G., 161Galtung, J., 30, 33Garcia, E., 36, 37gatekeepers, 15, 120, 122–3, 137,

141, 143Gaza, 155–7Geertz, C., 26, 27Gelber, Y., 134Gellner, E., 80genocide, 29, 58Gergen, K., 64

184 Index

Ghanem, A., 137Ghazi-Bouillon, A., 17, 110, 128, 129,

133, 134, 135, 136Gibson, G., 11, 42Giddens, A., 49Gilat, A., 134globalization, as a rationale for peace,

102, 104Goertz, G., 160Goldstein, B., 127Goldstone, R., 156Goldstone Report, 156, 157Good Friday Agreement, 44Greater Israel, 81, 110Greenberg, J., 64Grinstein, G., 118Grossman, D., 131Gush Emunim, 81Gutwein, D., 102, 103, 129

Ha’aretz, 18, 74, 90, 107, 111, 115,133, 156

ha-Atsmaut, 66Habermas, J., 51Hamas, 127Hammack, P., 45Haraway, D., 11HaTikva (interest group), 109–10,

128, 131Hay, C., 10Hazony, Y., 73, 112, 113, 115, 129,

131, 132Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 107Hegel, G. W. F., 7, 24Heradstveit, D., 15heritage education, 135Hirschman, A., 150, 151historiography, Teveth’s view, 106history

and identity, 63–5inscribing stabilized boundaries in,

65–6History and Memory, 18, 106history textbooks, 113–15Hogg, M. A., 45Holocaust, 17, 38, 70–1, 75, 77, 91,

102–3, 108–10, 131, 143Holocaust denial, 131Holsti, K. J., 161

Honneth, A., 7, 8, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28,160, 161

Hopkins, N., 25, 44Howe, S., 106human rights, 27, 39, 101human rights organizations,

campaigns against, 157–8Huntington, S., 129Huysmans, J., 27, 51Hylland-Eriksen, T., 55

Idalovichi, I., 72, 103identity

collective, see collective identityfluid, 43–4history and, 63–5as interactive process, 24intractable conflict and, see

intractable conflict and identityand narrative, 56relational, 44–6relational character, 46see also national identity

identity constructionKelly’s elaboration, 47narrative perspective, 41–2

identity formation, impact ofnarrative on, 13–14

identity theory, psychoanalyticallyinformed, 46

identity transformation, 15, 39, 41–7Im Tirtzu (Israeli pro-Zionist group),

155, 158India, 60inhibiting circumstances, 34, 141, 148insecurity, 47, 51–3, 62, 65, 73, 75, 90,

127, 129, 143insecurity and moral righteousness, in

the Israeli master narrative, 73–5internal criticism, 104Intifadas, 39, 93–4, 101, 127–8, 136–7,

139, 142intractable conflict and identity

and difference, 52–4and the stabilization of boundaries,

54–6changing identity, 34–5core constructs, 47–51the insecure self, 51–2

Index 185

Kelly’s theory, 47–51recognition and, 26transforming identity, 38–9

invisibility of Arabs, 76, 79, 89Ireland, 60Islamic Jihad, 127Israel academia monitor, 158Israeli Arabs, 76, 81, 101Israeli civil society

decline of, 155post-Gaza war silence, 157

Israeli counter narrativecontext, 85–6David vs Goliath-myth, 87expulsion strategy, 87–8peace, 94permeable boundaries, see

permeable boundariesremoving from official narrative,

128, 131–2views of self, 87–9views of the other, 89–90vulnerability of the Palestinian

collective, 89see also New Historians; New History

Israeli Defense Forcesforceful expulsions conducted by, 86official doctrine, 72

Israeli demonstrations, against the warin Lebanon, 157

Israeli identities in conflict, previousresearch, 16–17

Israeli master narrativecolonialist themes, 77–8critical historical accounts

questioning, 86criticisms, 105dominant themes, 71–2eras, 69–70heroism, 70–1inscription into official memory

institutions, 69, 73insecurity and moral righteousness,

73–5a land without people for a people

without land, 78, 88legitimacy, 69negative stereotyping in, 77renouncement of elements, 92

stabilized boundaries, 79victimhood, 70–1views of self, 73–5views of the other, 76–9

Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 3, 17, 29,39, 50, 60, 90–1, 102, 109, 120

as example of intractable conflict,39

and national identity, 50Israel Studies, 18, 106IZL (Institute for Zionist Strategies),

155

Jabri, V., 31, 46, 53, 58, 65Jackson, P. T., 9Jamal, A., 25, 26, 33, 34, 36, 56Jenkins, K., 12Jenkins, R., 24, 43, 46, 47, 48The Jewish State: the Struggle for Israel’s

Soul (Hazony), 131Judaism, 80, 107, 131justice, recognition and, 24

Kaplowitz, N., 51, 54Karsh, E., 122, 129, 130Kashti, O., 155Katz, T., 134–6, 141Kearney, R., 16Keinon, H., 156Keller, A., 8, 9, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 34,

61, 160Kelly, G., 47, 48Kelman, H. C., 17, 35, 36, 116,

161kibbutzim, 78, 94, 142–3Kimmerling, B., 17, 72, 77, 81, 87, 89,

106, 138, 162Kinnvall, C., 44, 45, 49, 51Klare, M. T., 52Knesset Education Committee, 135Krause, K., 51Kriesberg, L., 9, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38,

160, 161Kristeva, J., 46, 53

Landers, Y., 107–8“a land without people for a people

without land,” 78, 88Lebanon, 93–4, 96, 101, 104

186 Index

Lebow, R. N., 8, 25, 63Lederach, J. P., 32, 33legitimacy, 12, 27, 29–30, 69–70, 75,

107, 109, 120, 124Leibler, I., 157Levy, D., 118–20Lifshitz, Oded, 114Likud, 127–8, 132–3, 140Lindemann, T., 8Livnat, L., 111, 132, 135–6, 142Levy, D., 17, 96, 107, 118, 119, 120Lindemann, T., 8Lindholm-Schulz, H., 55, 127Lis, Y., 156Livnat, L., 111, 132, 135, 136, 142Lomsky-Feder, E., 17Luckman, T., 11Lundquist, L., 14Lustick, I., 72, 106, 130

Ma’ariv, 134–5MacDonald, J., 32Mahler, J., 113, 129, 138, 163The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict:

1947–1951 (Pappé), 86malevolent relationships, 33mamlachtiut, 81Markell, P., 8, 24, 25Masada myth, 70–1Masalha, N., 163massacres, 87, 90, 93–4, 114–15Massad, J. A., 142mass media, 14master commemorative narratives of

society, 15, 57master narratives of Zionism, 69, 82,

92, 103, 119–20, 123, 128, 136–7see also Israeli master narrative;

ZionismMcbride, I., 60Mcsweeney, B., 49, 51Mead, G. H., 24, 46, 160Megged, A., 108, 115Mehlinger, H., 12memory agents, 10, 12–16, 59–61,

104, 120, 123, 140, 142concept analysis, 13–15

Miall, H., 31, 32, 36, 39Migdal, J. E., 89

misrecognition, as potential source ofconflict, 8

Mitchell, C., 13, 32, 33, 38Mitzen, J., 49Moghaddam, F., 53Möller, U., 8, 25, 26, 27, 28, 34Monroe, K. R., 11, 12, 42, 43moral legitimacy, of the Jewish cause,

29, 75moral righteousness

and insecurity, 73–5of the Israeli army, 93–4, 96

Moratinos, M., 117morphogenetic cycles, Archer’s model,

100Morris, B., 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 105, 108,

109, 115, 120, 121, 122, 130, 137,141, 160, 162

Musih, N., 139mutual acceptance, 33–4mutual recognition, 8, 24, 27–8

naming controversies, 76Naor, A., 105, 122, 130narrative

concept analysis, 42and the construction of society,

42–3identity and, 56

narrative change, 16, 25narrative constellation, ambiguous

tendencies, 126–8narrative elaboration, backlash, 134–9narrative transformation model, 100narratives, and counter narratives,

15–16Nash, G., 12national identity

and dynamics of in- and out-groups,44–5

elements, 50historical narrative and, 50Israeli, 3, 78, 93, 96, 122–3, 143and knowledge about the past, 64as master narrative, 45and official memory institutions,

12–13recognition and denial, 35shared narratives and, 54

Index 187

National Religious Party, 133National Union Party, 133nationalism, 10, 17, 64, 93, 104,

124, 131Naveh, E., 103, 114, 128, 133, 135,

137, 138, 141neo-Zionism, 81–2, 110, 128, 133Netanyahu, B., 127–9, 140, 156Nets, R., 138Nets-Zehngut, R., 17, 128, 144, 162Neumann, I., 52, 54new curriculum

Hazony’s criticisms, 132protests against the, 133

New Historiansanti-Semitic accusations, 108impact on the collective memory of

the Israeli public, 139Karsh’s criticisms, 129–30professional consequences, 137–8,

141; see also Israeli counternarrative

New Historydebates over Israeli, 3–4deinstitutionalization, 140–4importance of communicating the

counter narratives of to theIsraeli public, 118–19

introduction of, 3, 101, 104Landers’ attack, 107narrative elaboration, 110–20public debate, 106–8removal from Israeli official memory

institutions, 128, 131–2see also Israeli counter narrative

New Israel Fund (NIF), 156Nexon, D. H., 9NGO Monitor, 158Nimni, E., 17, 80, 92, 96, 1629/11, see September 11th terrorist

attacks1984 (Orwell), 1301948, Arab-Israeli war of, see

Arab-Israeli war of 1948no alternative principle (ein brera),

72, 93–4, 101Nora, P., 63–4Northrup, T. A., 32, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39,

44, 47, 48, 50, 51, 55, 61, 161

Nygren, G., 14–15nuclear weapons, 51

occupation, 82, 94–6, 101, 104, 108,119

occupied territoriesbiblical Hebrew names, 76naming controversy, 76neo-Zionist perspective, 81recognition of the Palestinian

collective, 82, 101visibility of Palestinians, 94

O’Day, A., 60official memory institutions, 10,

14–15, 16, 69, 79, 82, 116, 120,123–5, 126–8, 131, 134–5, 137,140–1, 143

national identities and, 12–13ontological security, Giddens’

theory, 49Onuf, N., 8Orientalism, 78Oslo accords, 95Oslo process

and the ACPR, 129dangers of, 129, 140and initial success of New History,

120and return of Palestinian refugees,

116–17thin recognition and, 27, 101see also peace process

other-transformation, 41, 57–9, 123otherness, 53Oz, A., 157Özkirimli, U., 43

Palestine Liberation Organization(PLO), 95

Palestinian Authority, 127Palestinian exodus

collective memory of Israeli Jewsstudy, 138

counter narrative, 138Palestinian refugee problem

inclusion in peace negotiations, 119Morris’s analysis, 86, 88New Historians’ view, 86–8, 118and the Oslo process, 116–17

188 Index

Palestinian refugee problem –continued

school textbook discussion, 114understanding changes in the

representation of in Israelipublic consciousness, 118

“voluntary flight” notion, 72Palestinians

IDF’s expulsion, 86in the Israeli master narrative, 76–9see also expulsions

Palestinian villages, tours, 139Papadakis, Y., 12, 60, 64Pappé, I., 86, 87, 90, 105, 106, 111,

120, 121, 134, 137, 141, 151Passage to the Past (Tabibyan), 113–14Patterson, M., 11, 12, 42, 43Patton, M., 19peace accords, 45peace education, 30–1peace movements, 61, 94–5, 104, 110Peace Now, 94peace process

impact of the Intifada, 94and the rights and identities of

minorities, 101Shapira’s view, 109and the strengthening of

recognition, 95–6see also Oslo process

Peled, Y., 81Penrose, J., 45Penslar, D. J., 17, 78, 131Peres, S., 102Perlmutter, H., 48permeable boundaries, 56, 90–2, 93,

104, 110, 122, 124–5, 140Petersson, B., 15Phenomenology of Spirit (Hegel), 7“The Pillar of Fire” (documentary),

110Podeh, E., 12, 75, 115, 162pogroms, 70Polkinghorne, D. E., 42post-Zionism, 49, 92–3, 125, 129postmodernism, 106power analysis, Foucault’s, 10power relations, 44, 124Prato, B., 131

pre-1967 borders, 119, 129Preston, P., 43, 53privatization revolution, 102pro-peace groups, campaigns against,

157–8processes, concept analysis, 9PSI (Professors for a Strong Israel), 128,

131, 133, 135psychological theory, in literature on

deep-seated conflict, 44public debate, 14, 107, 137Pundak, R., 117purity of arms, 72, 93–4

Rabin, Y., 127Ram, U., 17, 64, 80, 81, 92, 102, 103Ramsbotham, O., 31, 46Rattansi, A., 43realism, 109reality, processual understanding, 9recognition

Bush and Folger’s definition, 28centrality to conflict transformation

paradigm, 56concept and origins, 25, 27Honneth’s dimensions, 25–6and justice, 24literature review, 8, 23–5openings and closures, 34, 37, 60–3,

123, 136thick vs thin, 27–31see also thick recognition

reconciliation, 9, 30, 58, 122literature review, 30

refugee question, see Palestinianrefugee problem

Refugees Working Group, 116Reicher, S., 25, 44Rescher, N., 9relational identities, 44–6renouncement, 28–9, 56–9, 61–2research agenda, moving forward,

152–4responsibility, taking, 56–9, 61, 91,

117return

of Palestinian refugees, 88, 91, 111,116–19

Zionist narrative, 69–70, 73

Index 189

Reus-Smit, C., 8Ricoeur, P., 12, 42, 43, 64rights, thin recognition and, 27Ringmar, E., 8, 11, 12, 25, 26, 43, 61,

104Robertson, A., 41Roe, M., 65Ronen, G., 156Rorty, R., 11Rosoux, V., 9, 30Ross, M. H., 35, 44Rotberg, R. I., 17Rotem, D., 156Rouhana, N., 4, 35, 44, 48, 52, 65Rozental, Rubik, 115Rubinstein, A., 107Rubinstein, D., 107Rupesinghe, K., 33Rwanda, 30, 58Ryan, S., 60Ryle, G., 27

Sabra and Shatila, 93–4Sabra Jew, 70Sahadevan, P., 32, 44, 47Said, E. W., 78Salomon, G., 30Saunders, H., 32, 36Schnell, I., 111, 112Schneller, O., 156Scholte, J. A., 44school books, 132, 135–6school curriculum, 12–13, 69, 73,

112–15, 120, 132–5, 141Schwartz, R., 36second Intifada, 127–8, 136–7, 139,

142Scuzzarello, S., 42Segev, T., 17, 87, 100, 103, 105, 120,

131, 143, 163Sela, A., 72, 78, 93, 103, 162Self Categorization Theory, 45self-esteem, 25–6, 28, 45self-image, 4, 51, 54, 62, 87, 105self-transformation, 41, 56–8September 11th terrorist attacks, 64,

128settlements, 119, 127The Seventh Million (Segev), 131

Shaath, N., 118Shafir, G., 77, 81, 106, 120Shalem Center, 128–9, 131, 133Shalom Achshav (Peace Now), 94Shamir, J., 127Shapira, A., 17, 72, 77, 100, 101,

109, 131Shapiro, M., 31Sharan, S., 129Sharett, M., 88Sharon, A., 128, 132, 142Shavit, A., 90, 121Sherif, M., 48Shikaki, K., 127Shlaim, A., 72, 86, 87, 89, 101, 103,

105, 109, 120, 121, 122, 141Shoah, 131

see also HolocaustShotter, J., 47, 64Sibley, D., 47Silberstein, L. J., 17, 72, 87, 92, 102,

103, 105, 106, 107, 108, 136silver platter, 71Simmel, G., 10The Silver Platter, 114Sinai Peninsula, 82Situated knowledge, 11Six Day War, 108Sköldberg, K., 11Slocum-Bradley, N., 31, 37, 46, 53Smoke, R., 52social identity, 46, 48–9Social Identity Theory, 44–6, 48social interaction, gatekeeping

interventions, 128–34social interaction between memory

agents, challenge anddelegitimation, 104

socialism, 101society, narrative and the construction

of, 42–3Somers, M., 11, 12, 42, 43Soysal, Y., 27Spector-Mersel, G., 11Spies, C., 37Sri Lanka, 60state archives, 85, 103–4Steele, B. J., 49Stenelo, L. -G., 19

190 Index

Stern, M., 52Strathern, A., 60Stripple, J., 9Strömbom, L., 8, 116, 117, 158Suganami, H., 31suicide bombings, 127Susser, L., 156, 157Sweden, extradition of the Balts, 58–9Sztompka, P., 99

Taba negotiations, 117, 127–8, 136,151

Tabibyan, K., 113tahar haneshak (purity of arms), 72

see also purity of armsTajfel, H., 44, 45, 48taking responsibility, 56–9, 61, 91, 117Tamir, Y., 44, 45, 48Tantura massacre, 134Taylor, C., 7, 24, 161Teichman, Y., 52, 73, 75, 77, 162“Tekumma” (documentary), 111–12,

120, 132, 136, 141Tel Aviv University, 106–7, 155terrorism, 53, 64, 111Tessler, M., 72, 82Teveth, S., 106, 122textbooks, 12, 113–15, 120, 132–3,

135–6thick recognition

boundary transformation and,59–60

concept analysis, 8–9dimensions for narratives of, 41facilitating circumstances for, 124–5inhibiting circumstances for, 141,

144locating in narratives about the

past, 63–6other-transformation and, 58–9and perceptions of threat, 125and positive intersocietal relations,

125self-transformation and, 57–8

thicknessGeertz’s concept, 27Huysmans’ elaboration, 27

Thomas, D. C., 52Tilly, C., 27, 53, 54

Tossavainen, M., 17, 70, 75Transjordan, 87, 91Tulviste, P., 13, 64Turner, J., 45The Twentieth Century, on the Threshold

of Tomorrow (Naveh), 113, 133two-state solution, 46, 94–5

UN (United Nations), 156unequal power-relations, 33universal person, 27Uri, L., 113

Väyrynen, R., 32, 33, 36Vertzberger, Y., 54victimhood, 29, 58, 75, 91, 108victimization, 29–30, 52, 58, 65, 75,

89, 92, 131, 143violence, 30, 44, 72, 102, 127, 136,

142, 155Volkan, V., 25, 35, 44, 46, 55, 58, 65

Wallensteen, P., 25, 27, 28, 32Walzer, M., 26war crimes, 29, 50, 87, 90–1war diary, Ben-Gurion’s, 86war on terror, 64, 129Warsaw ghetto, 29, 143Weibull, L., 15Weingrod, A., 69, 70Weiss, M., 70, 71, 73, 111Weiss-Berkowitz, R., 111Weissbrod, L., 17, 81, 101, 110Weldes, J., 46, 51, 52, 53Wendt, A., 8, 25, 26, 27, 28, 34Wertsch, J., 13, 64West Bank, 76, 81White, H., 12, 42Whitebrook, M., 12, 42, 43Whitelam, K. W., 78Why Haifa University Cancelled My

Conference (Pappé), 137Williams, M. C., 51witch-hunt, 138Wolf, R., 8Women in Black, 94–5Women in Green, 110, 128, 131, 133Wood, D., 42

Index 191

A World of Changes (Yacobi), 113–14,132–3, 135

Wurmser, M., 110

Ya’alon, M., 156Yacobi, D., 113Yadgar, Y., 70Yediot Aharonot, 18, 107Yehoshua, A. B., 157Yesh Gvul, 94Yishai, E., 156Yogev, E., 113, 133Yudkin, L., 94Yuval-Davis, N., 42

Zerubavel, Y., 12, 17, 18, 43, 63, 64,69, 70, 71, 162

Zimmerman, M., 113, 120Zimmerman curriculum, 113, 115Zionism

anti-narrative, 100Bartal on, 113boundary drawing practices, 110decline in, 103downplaying in new history books,

114

flux in narratives of, 101framing of “Tekumma”

documentary within, 111historical periods, 69Israeli master narrative, 69, 80–2,

92, 103, 119, 123, 128, 136–7;see also Israeli master narrative

New Historians’ inclination todelegitimize, 106

Palestinians as victims of, 131questioning of the collectivism of

traditional, 102resisting nationalist content

of, 100and the second Intifada, 128in “Tekumma” documentary series,

111trend for colonial description in

second wave of historicalcritique, 105–6

variants of, 92see also neo-Zionism; post-Zionism

Zionism and Territory (Kimmerling),106

Ziv, H., 158Zochrot, 139