Since the eruption of the second intifa-da in September 2000, Israel has open-ly pursued a policy of targeted killing.

The Israelis have identified, located, andthen killed alleged Palestinian terrorists withhelicopter gunships, fighter aircraft, tanks,car bombs, booby traps, and bullets.Approximately eighty Palestinian militantsand about fifty innocent bystanders havebeen killed through fall 2002, promptinginternational condemnation, domestic soul-searching, and bloody retaliation.1 Given itscontroversial nature and obvious costs, it isworth considering whether this policy isdefensible. Why has Israel embarked on apolicy of targeted killing? Has the policybeen effective in reducing Palestinianattacks on Israeli civilians? Is targeted killingpermitted by Israeli and international law?Can it be justified in moral terms?

For Israel, it is necessary to know whetherits policy is pragmatically and ethically jus-tified. If it is, it makes sense for Israel to con-tinue this approach. If there are seriousshortcomings, they need to be highlightedso that the policy can be modified or dis-carded. For countries other than Israel, andespecially the United States, assessing theworth of targeted killings is hardly less sig-nificant. Ever since September 11, much ofthe world, with the United States in the lead,has sought ways to counter terrorism. If theIsraelis have a successful approach, it makes

sense to emulate it. If Israeli policy is funda-mentally flawed, however, better to under-stand that now, especially when voicesdemanding that terrorists be hunted downand killed have grown so loud. Either way,learning from the Israeli experience is cen-tral to those seeking to combat the threatfrom terrorism.

If it can be directed against military, albeitirregular, combatants as opposed to politicaladversaries as determined by a formal, openprocess, targeted killing is acceptable underthe international law governing warfare.Targeted killing has not appreciably dimin-ished the costs of terrorist attacks and mayhave, in the short term, even increased them.But if those targeted cannot or will not beapprehended by the Palestinian Authority(PA) or the Israeli armed forces, the policy isthe only way to mete out justice to perpetra-tors of violence against Israeli civilians. Overthe long term, the policy may reduce thecapacity of terrorist networks to carry outattacks. So long as Israel’s adversaries targetcivilians as a prime goal of their operations,

111

DEBATE

Israel’s Policy of Targeted KillingSteven R. David*

* This paper is adapted from Steven R. David, “FatalChoices: Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing,” MideastSecurity and Policy Studies, no. 51 (Ramat, Israel: TheBegin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan Uni-versity, 2002).1 Karin Laub, “‘Targeted Killings’ Claim Civilians,”Associated Press, September 27, 2002; available atwww.acj.org/Daily%20News/Sep_02/Index.htm#1.

Repinted from Ethics & International Affairs 17, no. 1.© 2003 by Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs.

the Israeli government will have little choicebut to continue this practice.

THE NORM AGAINST ASSASSINATION

Targeted killing is the intentional slaying ofa specific individual or group of individualsundertaken with explicit governmentalapproval. Whether targeted killing consti-tutes assassination is a critical issue not onlybecause of the pejorative connotation ofassassination, but because both internation-al treaty and customary law outlaw assassi-nation. The 1937 Convention for thePrevention and Repression of Terrorism, theUN Charter, and the 1973 New York Con-vention on the Prevention and Punishmentof Crimes Against Internationally ProtectedPersons, Including Diplomatic Agents, areprominent examples of efforts undertakento codify the illegality of assassination.

Philosophical and political norms againstassassination have been even more influen-tial than written law. The notion that assas-sination is not an accepted practice ofstatecraft became prominent with the writ-ings of Hugo Grotius and Emmerich de Vat-tel in the seventeenth and eighteenthcenturies. The prohibition against assassina-tion was strengthened in the mid-1970s fol-lowing congressional investigations intoactivities by American intelligence agencies.The Church and Pike congressional com-mittees were outraged by CIA efforts toassassinate several world leaders, includingPatrice Lumumba of the Congo and Cuba’sFidel Castro. The committees’ findings ledPresident Gerald Ford to issue an executiveorder in 1976 prohibiting assassination orthe conspiracy to commit assassination byemployees of the U.S. government, whichwas broadened by President Jimmy Carterin 1978 to include those acting on its behalf.

This executive order has been reaffirmed by each succeeding American president.Although pertaining only to the UnitedStates, given America’s leading role in theworld, the executive order contributed tothe general agreement that assassination isunacceptable.2

There is a consensus that assassinationviolates international law, but the Israelipolicy of targeted killing can be distin-guished from assassination. There is no universally accepted legal definition ofassassination, but there is general agreementthat it involves the killing of a specific indi-vidual who is politically prominent and whois targeted because of that prominence.Assassination also customarily involves theuse of treacherous means to carry out thekilling. And targeted killing of an individualby the state has more often been understoodas assassination when the countries involvedare at peace.3

The question of whether Israel is at war orengaged in armed conflict is not easilyanswered. As the head of the internationallaw branch of the Israeli army’s legal divisionremarked, “International law actually onlyrecognizes two situations: peace or war. Butlife isn’t as simple. Israel is not at war sincewar is between two armies or two states andthe Palestinians have neither. But since Israelis in armed conflict with Palestinians, you areallowed to target combatants.”4 If it is accept-

112 Steven R. David

2 See, e.g., Ward Thomas, The Ethics of Destruction:Norms and Force in International Relations (Ithaca,N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 49; and TimWeiner, “Rethinking the Ban on Political Assassina-tions,” New York Times, August 30, 1998, sec. 4, p. 3.3 See Michael N. Schmitt, “State-Sponsored Assassina-tion in International and Domestic Law,” Yale Journalof International Law 17, no. 2 (1992), pp. 632–42; andThomas, The Ethics of Destruction.4 Tim Weiner,“Making Rules in the World Between Warand Peace,” New York Times, August 19, 2001, pp. A1, A4.

ed that Israel is in fact engaged in armed con-flict with terrorists, then its policy of target-ed killing becomes legally defensible. Lawprofessor John Norton Moore explains, “Ifone is lawfully engaged in armed hostility, itis not ‘assassination’ to target individualswho are combatants.” American militarylawyer Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., agrees: “Con-trary to popular belief, neither internationallaw nor U.S. domestic law prohibits thekilling of those directing armed forces in war.Nations have the right under internationallaw to use force against terrorists.”5

All states are afforded the general right ofself-defense as affirmed in Article 51 of theUN Charter. This right is consistent withIsrael’s obligations under the 1993 OsloAccords and international law concerningthe obligations of occupying powers. Whena state is negotiating with a political body inan occupied territory, in this case the PA,that will not or cannot stop those whothreaten its security, international law allowsit to take steps necessary to protect itself.6

Just as a soldier can legally fire on an oppos-ing army in wartime before it attacks, soIsrael is legally justified in preemptivelykilling terrorists, even if they are not in theact or have not previously attacked Israel.War—or armed conflict—is a legal licenseto kill whether it is targeted killing or moretraditional combat.

Israel is not alone in claiming the right totarget individuals. The United States hasalso adopted this view. Despite the executiveorder banning assassination, the Bushadministration has reserved the right to killthose it believes are terrorists. Strikes areauthorized by a collection of classified pres-idential findings, legal opinions, and policydirectives, some of which predate the Sep-tember 11, 2001, attacks. At least two senioroperatives of al-Qaeda have been deliberate-

ly and admittedly killed by the United Statesin its ongoing war against terrorism.7

The legal question also rests on whetherIsrael is using treacherous means when itkills suspected terrorists. Since assassinationis defined as “murder by treacherousmeans,” how one is killed is as important aswho is killed. Politically, the question ofwhat constitutes treachery can be decisive indetermining whether a killing is justifiable.The United States had little trouble defend-ing its efforts to kill Muammar al-Qaddafi in1986 or Osama bin Laden in 1998 usingbombs and cruise missiles. Precisely becausethey were military operations and not car-ried out under false pretenses, the banagainst assassination did not apply. Similar-ly, if the United States makes war on Iraq andkills Saddam Hussein in a bombing raid, itwould not be considered assassination.

In some of their killings, the Israelis haveused deception, disguising themselves aswomen or Arabs to facilitate getting to theirtargets. Not all the killings have been justifi-able, but the point here is to outline a policythat would pass legal muster. What distin-guishes many of the killings in the secondintifada from those in the past is their openand military nature. Although it has some-times involved greater collateral damage, theuse of helicopter gunships or F-16s to kill sus-

israel’s policy of targeted killing 113

5 Harry Levins, “Military Experts Debate Moral Rami-fications of Killing Leaders,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch,August 3, 2001, p. A10.6 The failure of the PA to stop suicide bombings againstIsrael is well documented. See Human Rights Watch,Erased in a Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks againstIsraeli Citizens (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002).7 “Fleischer Backs Hussein’s Slaying: ‘One Bullet’ LessCostly than War, Bush Spokesman Says,” WashingtonPost, October 2, 2002, p. A12; David Johnston and DavidE. Sanger,“Fatal Strike in Yemen Was Based on Rules SetOut by Bush,” New York Times, November 6, 2002, p. A1;and Eric Schmitt,“U.S.Would Use Drones to Attack IraqiTargets,” New York Times, November 6, 2002, p. A14.

pected terrorists has fit the conventionalmodes of warfare more than the shadowy,deceitful world that characterizes assassina-tions. As such, international lawyers may dis-approve of the Israeli actions, but so long asconventional military means are employedto kill those engaged in terrorism, few wouldargue they violate the ban on assassination.8

Finally, for targeted killing to be legal,the targets must be combatants. Under thelaws of war and armed conflict, combatantsare subject to attack, raising the question ofjust what constitutes a combatant. It is truethat the Palestinians, lacking a state, do notfield a regular army with uniformed sol-diers. This does not mean, however, thatterrorists cannot be considered combat-ants. What is critical is whether the objectsof the targeted killings pose an armedthreat to Israeli security. If they do, thenthey are combatants, regardless of whetherthey wear a uniform. Since most of the tar-gets of Israeli strikes have been members ofmilitant organizations that call for thedestruction of Israel through militarystruggle, they present an armed threat andare subject to attack. Moreover, mostexperts on international law argue thateven civilians can be considered combat-ants if they are part of the military chain ofcommand that poses a threat to your coun-try.9 Here again the United States appearsto be supportive of Israeli policy in deed,though not in word. In November 2002, theUnited States used an unmanned Predatoraircraft to launch a missile that killed a senior al-Qaeda operative traveling withfive associates by car in Yemen. In com-menting on the killing, a Pentagon officialremarked, “We’re at war with Al Qaeda. Ifwe find an enemy combatant, then weshould be able to use military forces to takemilitary action against them.”10 This

rationale mirrors the Israeli justificationfor targeted killing.

In sum, in the majority of cases during thesecond intifada, the Israeli policy of targetedkilling has not been tantamount to assassi-nation because Israel is engaged in armedconflict with terrorists, those targeted areoften killed by conventional military means,and the targets of the attacks are mostlycombatants or are part of the military chainof command. In those cases in which the tar-geted killings did not fit these criteria, theymay indeed be considered assassinations.Nevertheless, the thrust of the Israeli prac-tice of targeted killing is consistent with acountry’s right to target specific individualsin the pursuit of self-defense and is thus nota policy of assassination.

Within Israel, targeted killing is not asecret, extralegal policy. There is a body ofcase law within the Israeli courts concerningthe policy, and the general finding has beenthat it can be carried out in a legal way. It istrue that Israel does not allow capital punish-ment for its citizens. It is also true that Israel’sBasic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty,adopted in 1992, guarantees that “There shallbe no violation of the life, body or dignity ofany person as such.” However, the Basic Lawdoes allow these rights to be suspended “by alaw fitting the values of the State of Israel,

114 Steven R. David

8 For general discussions of why conventional attackson individuals during armed conflict do not consti-tute assassination, see Schmitt, “State-SponsoredAssassination in International and Domestic Law”;and Patricia Zengel, “Assassination and the Law ofArmed Conflict,” Mercer Law Review 43 (1991), p. 627.I am grateful to Ward Thomas for alerting me to thesecitations.9 See, e.g., Louis R. Beres, “The Permissibility of State-Sponsored Assassination During Peace and War,” Tem-ple International and Comparative Law Journal 5, no. 2(1991), p. 237.10 James Risen,“CIA is Reported to Kill a Leader of Qaedain Yemen,” New York Times, November 5, 2002, p. A1.

designed for a proper purpose, and to anextent no greater than required or by such alaw enacted with explicit authorization there-in.” Israeli law has allowed for just such a sus-pension. In February 2002 MenachemFinkelstein, the judge advocate general of theIsraeli Defense Forces (IDF), issued threeconditions under which targeted killing cantake place. Before suspected terrorists arekilled the PA must first ignore appeals fortheir arrest, the Israelis must conclude thatthey would be unable to arrest the individu-als themselves, and the killing must be doneto prevent an imminent or future terroristattack—not for revenge or retribution. TheIsraeli High Court has supported these con-ditions in a strongly worded opinion on Jan-uary 29, 2002, that rejected petitions callingfor an end to targeted killing. Provided theseconditions are followed, targeted killing isconsistent with Israeli law.11

Norms are broad guidelines of behaviorthat are largely followed by states and otheractors. There is no established norm againsttargeted killing, but there is one againstassassination. Although there is a substantialdifference between the two concepts, they arerelated in public perceptions. Understandingthe difficulty Israel has had in justifying thepractice of targeted killing stems, in part,from the norm against assassination. Moreimportant, continued Israeli employment oftargeted killing can work to erode that normin people’s minds, with negative conse-quences for Israel and the world community.

The norm against assassination is rela-tively new. Before the seventeenth century,assassination was regarded as a normalmeans for states to conduct their business,similar to diplomacy and war. Statesmen,philosophers, and even the Catholic churchapproved of the practice as a method forstates to pursue their interests while limiting

harm done to innocents. The support ofassassination dropped precipitously, howev-er, in the 1600s. Both in terms of rhetoricand practice, assassination became frownedupon. The norm against assassinationbecame so strong that even as odious a char-acter as Adolf Hitler was not seen as a legit-imate target by the British, who deemed anyeffort to kill him unsportsmanlike.12

What changed? According to WardThomas, norms stem not only from moralconsiderations, but also from the interests ofthe great powers. Moral concerns regardingassassination existed before the seventeenthcentury, but so long as assassination served theinterests of the major states, those concernsdid not constitute a norm against its practice.The rise of the sovereign state and the begin-nings of the mass army in the mid-1600schanged the thinking about the acceptabilityof assassination.By limiting legitimate conflictto clashes of large military forces, the leaders ofthe great powers established rules thatincreased their advantages while sidelining theweaker states that could not muster massarmies. Similarly, the norm against assassina-tion protected leaders of great powers bydepriving the weak of an instrument thatallowed them to threaten those leaders. Solong as there was general agreement that theway to resolve violent conflicts was throughconventional war and that assassination wasunacceptable, the hierarchy of the internation-al system and the interests of the leaders of themajor powers would be preserved.13

israel’s policy of targeted killing 115

11 Amos Harel and Gideon Alon,“IDF Lawyers Set ‘Con-ditions’ for Selective Assassination Policy,” Ha’aretz,February 4, 2002; available at www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=125404; and Muham-mad Baraka v. the Prime Minister and the Minister ofDefense, HCJ 5872/01.12 See Ward Thomas, The Ethics of Destruction, pp. 56, 60.13 Ibid., pp. 60–62.

The reasons for the emergence of thenorm against assassination illustrate someof the costs Israel could be expected to bearif the norm were eroded. Assassination is aweapon of the weak. It benefits those withlimited resources but fanatical devotion to acause. In other words, it plays to Palestinianstrengths. So long as conventional militaryoperations hold sway, Israel is in an unas-sailable position. Its use of multimillion-dollar jet fighters and modern tanksmanned by trained crews makes it thestrongest power in the Middle East. Butwhen the arena switches to the world ofassassination, young men and womenarmed with a couple of hundred dollars ofexplosives and eager to achieve martyrdomare able to inflict grievous harm on Israel.Insofar as Israel erodes the norm againstassassination, it transforms the rules of con-flict in a manner that benefits its most fer-vent adversaries.

It is of course true that norms do notdetermine behavior. Terrorists, almost bydefinition, are not constrained by establishednorms. The long history of plane hijackingsand other attacks against civilians by terror-ists gives testimony to their willingness toviolate established codes of conduct. In con-fronting this problem, states have also had todepart from the usual norms. Terrorists typ-ically do not appear in identifiable uniformsor hold clear swaths of territory, makingconventional responses to their threats allbut impossible. Insofar as Israel and otherstates make war on terrorism, traditionalnorms of combat will have to change.

These changes may not all be to Israel’sand other countries’ benefit. When a majorregional power such as Israel openly pro-claims its right to pursue a policy of target-ed killing, it helps to create a new standardof behavior that may work to its detriment.

Norms may not be determinative, but nei-ther are they irrelevant. Rather than simplydisregarding norms because they interferewith its war on terrorism, Israel needs to actin a way that preserves its right of self-defense without bringing about future harmto itself and the international community.The emergence of new laws and institutionsto deal with war crimes will be an addition-al constraint on Israeli behavior. In fightingterrorism, Israel and other states will have toplay by new rules, but no state, especiallyone that is not a great power, such as Israel,is totally free in acting against the wishes ofthe international community.

THE SECOND INTIFADA

The policy of targeted killing is not entire-ly new. Three major efforts at targetedkilling took place in the 1990s. The firstoperation killed Palestinian Islamic Jihadhead Fathi Shikaki in Malta in October1995. No competent successor emerged toreplace Shikaki, producing disarray inIslamic Jihad.14 In January 1996 YahyaAyyash was killed in Gaza while speakingon a mobile telephone that had beenbooby-trapped by the Israeli domesticintelligence agency, Shin Bet. Ayyash hadbeen one of Hamas’s most skilled and pro-lific bomb makers whose handiworkproved critical to many terrorist attacksagainst Israel. Ayyash’s death, however,also unleashed four suicide bus bombingsin the next two months, killing more thanfifty Israelis. Finally, in an embarrassing,almost comic episode, the Israelis failed tokill Khaled Meshal, the chief of Hamas’s

116 Steven R. David

14 Michael Eisenstadt, “‘Pre-Emptive Targeted Killings’as a Counter-Terror Tool: An Assessment of Israel’sApproach,” Peacewatch, August 28, 2001, p. 1.

political bureau in Amman, in September1997. Two Mossad agents succeeded in poi-soning Meshal, but were captured by Jor-danian authorities before they could leaveJordan. In order to secure the return of thetwo operatives, Israeli prime minister Ben-jamin Netanyahu agreed to provide theantidote for the poison and releasedHamas’s founder, Sheik Ahmed Yassin,from an Israeli prison. As a result of thisepisode, Israel damaged its relations withJordan and infuriated Canada when it wasrevealed that the Mossad agents had usedCanadian passports.15

A wave of targeted killing began inNovember 2000 as a response to the secondPalestinian intifada. Following the failure ofthe Camp David accords in the summer of2000 and Israeli prime minister ArielSharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in lateSeptember, the Palestinians unleashed a vio-lent revolt against Israel. While in the firstintifada the ratio of Palestinians to Israeliskilled was roughly twenty-five to one, well-armed Palestinian groups making use of sui-cide bombers had now reduced thatproportion to three to one.16 Israel respond-ed to these increasingly lethal attacks withmilitary incursions into Palestinian con-trolled areas, increased use of checkpoints tocontrol Palestinian movements, the reoccu-pation of the West Bank, and a dramatic risein the slaying of Palestinian militants.

What was new during the second intifadawas the scale of the effort—never have somany been killed in such a short span oftime. Also new were some of the tactics, par-ticularly the use of helicopters and war-planes. Because of the extent of thecampaign and the obvious use of Israeli mil-itary forces, the Israeli government has beenforced to acknowledge its role in targetedkillings to a much greater extent than previ-

ously, although it still refuses routinely toclaim responsibility for its operations.17

The specific procedures for determiningwho is to be targeted have not been madepublic, but an overall sense of how thesedecisions are made has emerged. Typically,Israeli intelligence agencies, often relying onthe testimony of collaborators, will identifyindividuals who pose a terrorist threat. Theagencies prepare a report detailing the pastactivities of the suspect and assess the poten-tial for him or her to engage in future attacks.This information is evaluated by a group inthe Israeli Defense Forces that includes thecommander of the region and militarylawyers. A recommendation is then made tothe chief of staff. If the recommendation is totarget the individual, the Israeli cabinet isbrought in to approve or disapprove of theaction. Once approval is given, the IDF usu-ally does not seek additional approval tomake the strike. However, if innocent casual-ties could occur as a result of the operation,the IDF will again seek the approval of theminister of defense and the prime ministerbefore launching the attack. The operationsare carried out by specially trained forces,not the regular military. The Israelis claimthat they only target those who are on theirway to a terrorist attack or are actively plan-ning one. During the early months of thesecond intifada, when the Israelis had ongo-ing talks with the PA, they would first handover a list to the PA of the suspected terror-ists for apprehension. If the PA did not arrestthe individuals, and Israel determined that it

israel’s policy of targeted killing 117

15 Barton Gellman, “For Many Israelis, Assassination IsOnly as Bad as Its Execution,” Washington Post, October12, 1997, p. A1.16 James Bennet, “Mideast Balance Sheet,” New YorkTimes, March 12, 2002, p. A1.17 Samantha M. Shapiro, “Announced Assassinations,”New York Times Magazine, December 9, 2001, p. 54.

could not arrest them, they were killed.18

Once talks broke down with the PA in thespring of 2002, it has not been clear if theIsraelis attempted to provide a list for thePalestinians before taking action.

Several high-ranking Palestinians havebeen killed during the second intifada. Theyinclude the head of the Popular Front for theLiberation of Palestine, Abu Ali Mustafa, oneof the leaders of the Tanzim movement, Raedal-Karmi, and a senior official of Hamas,Salah Shahada. Most of those killed, howev-er, were mid-level fighters, importantenough to disrupt a terrorist cell but not soimportant as to provoke retaliation.19 Thetargets of the attack usually knew they werebeing sought. It is not known how many mis-takes Israel has made by targeting the wrongindividual because Israel usually does notacknowledge such mishaps. Given that thedecision to kill individuals is made without atrial, there is little question that innocentpeople are sometimes slain. In addition, evenwhen the right individual is targeted, inno-cent bystanders are often killed in the opera-tions. Nevertheless, most of those killed areacknowledged, or celebrated, as having beenactive anti-Israeli fighters.

IS TARGETED KILLING EFFECTIVE?

There are strong arguments that targetedkilling is an ineffective and possibly harmfulpolicy. During the second intifada, Israelembarked on more targeted killings than atany time in its history. At the same time,record numbers of Israeli civilians havebecome victims of Palestinian attacks. It ispossible that even more Israeli civilianswould have been killed if not for the policyof targeted killing, but given the roughly 600Israelis killed, it is clear that targeted killinghas been unable to stop terrorism.

It is not difficult to understand why tar-geted killing has not been more effective.Organizations promoting terrorism againstIsrael such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and theal-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, a paramilitaryoffshoot of PA chairman Yasir Arafat’s Fatahfaction, are very decentralized. They aremade up of many cells, the destruction ofsome having little or no impact on others.Moreover, the number of young men andwomen who are willing to be suicidebombers appears to be practically limitless.Outfitting these self-described martyrs withprimitive bombs capable of wreaking mur-derous assaults appears to be relatively easy.There is also no doubt that targeted killing,at least in some instances, increases the ter-rorist threat against Israel by producingretaliation. The killings of Ayyash, Karmi,and Shahada all resulted in dramatic escala-tions in attacks against Israelis with revengeexplicitly cited as the motivation. Targetedkilling also hurts Israeli interests by remov-ing current adversaries who may prove to beuseful negotiating partners in the future. Onmany occasions, Israeli leaders have publiclylamented the lack of moderate, pragmaticPalestinian leaders with whom they couldnegotiate. It is a problem that the Israeli pol-icy of targeted killing is partially responsiblefor creating. For example, when Israel killedArafat’s second in command, Abu Jihad, in1988 it eliminated not only an individualbehind several bloody operations, but alsosomeone on the right wing of the Palestin-ian Liberation Organization whom manysaw as a pragmatist capable of makingpeaceful compromises.

118 Steven R. David

18 Harel and Alon, “IDF Lawyers Set ‘Conditions’ forSelective Assassination Policy”; and Shapiro,“AnnouncedAssassinations,” p. 54.19 Shapiro, “Announced Assassinations,” p. 54.

By diverting scarce resources away from thecollection and analysis of intelligence on thethreat posed by adversarial states, Israel runsthe risk of paying less attention to existentialthreats in order to combat pressing but less-than-vital challenges to its security. Followingthe 1972 Munich Olympics, Israel focusedmuch of the attention of its intelligence serv-ices on hunting down the terrorist organiza-tion Black September. This effort may haveled, in part, to diverting Israel’s attention awayfrom the growing threat posed by Egypt andSyria, which led Israel to being caught by sur-prise at the outbreak of the 1973 Yom KippurWar.20 Even where the effect is not so grave,targeted killing can hurt Israel’s ability togather critical intelligence. Locating andkilling key Palestinian terrorists requires time-ly intelligence, much of which can only besupplied by informers. Given that a limitednumber of people will know the whereaboutsof the targets, it will not be difficult to isolatethose who have collaborated with Israel.Increasing reports of informers being killedduring the second intifada may partly be aresult of their identities becoming known as aresult of the targeted killing policy.21 Finally,Israel’s policy has been condemned by Arabcountries, Europe, the United Nations, andeven the United States.Clearly, targeted killingis a policy with serious shortcomings.

UPROOTING TERRORIST NETWORKS

There are nonetheless strong argumentssupporting the effectiveness of targetedkilling. There is little question that Israel’spolicy has hurt the capability of its adver-saries to prosecute attacks. Terrorism isessentially an offensive action, makingcounteroffensive actions such as targetedkilling an especially effective response. It is

exceedingly difficult for Israel to defend ordeter terror attacks from Palestinians. Interms of defense, there are literally tens ofthousands of targets in Israel for Palestin-ian terrorists. Power stations, governmentbureaus, bus depots, airports, skyscrapers,open-air markets, sport stadiums—the listis endless. It is impossible to defend themall, especially against a determined adver-sary that can choose the time and place ofattack. Although some level of deterrenceof terrorism is achievable, dissuadingpotential terrorists is not easy when theyare eager to die for their cause. In such sit-uations, the best response to terrorism is toeliminate the threat before it can belaunched. One of the most successfulmeans of eliminating terrorists before theycan strike is targeted killing.22

Israel has achieved some notable success-es in its policy of targeted killing. In the1950s, terrorist infiltration from Egypt less-ened as a result of the killing of Egyptianintelligence officers in charge of the opera-tion. In the 1960s, Egyptian presidentGamal Abd al-Nasser’s plan to build ballis-tic missiles capable of reaching Israel col-lapsed when his German scientists fled inthe wake of Israeli mail bomb attacks. BlackSeptember was all but destroyed as a func-tioning terrorist organization in the 1970sfollowing the Israeli campaign to avenge theMunich massacre. The 1995 assassination ofIslamic Jihad leader Shikaki undermined

israel’s policy of targeted killing 119

20 Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, Every Spy a Prince: TheComplete History of Israel’s Intelligence Community(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990), p. 194.21 Joel Brinkley,“Israel Promises a Pullback as Death TollKeeps Rising,” New York Times, March 15, 2002, p. A9.22 For a similar view regarding dealing with terrorismin general, see Richard K. Betts,“The Soft Underbelly ofAmerican Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror,”Political Science Quarterly 117 (Spring 2002), p. 33.

the effectiveness of this group for severalyears as successors struggled over policyand power.23

Several other benefits of Israel’s policy oftargeted killing became apparent from itsheightened practice during the secondintifada. First, targeted killings have imped-ed the effectiveness of Palestinian terroristorganizations where leadership, planning,and tactical skills are confined to a few keyindividuals. There is a limited number ofpeople who have the technical ability tomake bombs and plan attacks. If these peo-ple are eliminated, the ability to mountattacks is degraded. There is some evidencethat targeted killings have reduced the per-formance of terrorist operations. Israelisestimate they stop over 80 percent ofattempts, and the incidence of poorlyplanned attacks, such as suicide bomberswho appear with wires sticking out of theirbags or detonations that occur with littleloss of life, indicates that there have beenproblems either with the organization of theoperations or with those available to carrythem out. There are individual leaderswhose charisma and organizational skillskeep a group together. If they are eliminat-ed, they are not easily replaced.24

Targeting killing also keeps potentialbombers and bomb makers on the run.When the Israelis informed the PA whomthey were after, this information was oftenpassed to the targeted individuals so thatthey knew they were being hunted. Somevoluntarily chose to place themselves in cus-tody to avoid being slain. The threat theyposed to Israel was consequently dimin-ished. There are numerous accounts of oth-ers on the hit list taking precautions againstbeing killed, such as sleeping in a differentlocation every night and not letting othersknow their whereabouts.25 Even for those

Palestinians who have not been told they arebeing hunted, the very possibility theymight be targeted is likely to cause a changein behavior. Time and effort undertaken toavoid Israeli dragnets are time and effort notundertaken to plan or carry out operations.

Targeted killing also acts as a deterrent.Deterrence refers to the ability to persuadesomeone not to do something they arecapable of doing by confronting them withunacceptable punishment. It is distinctfrom preventing someone from acting byhindering their ability to do so. Seen in thislight, it appears virtually impossible to deterpeople willing and even eager to lose theirlives. After all, what punishment could beemployed to dissuade suicidal attackers?But behind every suicide bomber are otherswho might not be as ready for martyrdom,some of whom have shown signs that thepolicy is working. Prime Minister Sharonmet with three PA leaders on January 30,2002. When he asked for their negotiatingposition, first on their list was an end to tar-geted killings.26 Islamic Jihad and Hamasagreed to refrain from launching attacks inpre-1967 Israel in December 2001 so long asIsrael refrained from killing its leaders.Although the cease-fire eventually brokedown, their willingness to abide by the

120 Steven R. David

23 See Nachman Ben-Yehuda, Political Assassinations byJews: A Rhetorical Device for Justice (Albany: SUNYPress, 1993), pp. 304, 307, 318; and Eisenstadt,“‘Pre-Emp-tive Targeted Killings’ as a Counter-Terror Tool,” p. 1.24 See Eisenstadt, “‘Pre-Emptive Targeted Killings’ as aCounter-Terror Tool,” p. 2; and Brian Michael Jenkins,Should Our Arsenal Against Terrorism Include Assassina-tion? (Santa Monica: Rand, 1987), p. 4.25 See, e.g., the account of a target in Yael Stein,“Israel’sAssassination Policy: Extra-Judicial Executions,”B’Tselem position paper, trans. Maya Johnston(Jerusalem: B’Tselem, January 2001), p. 6; available at www.btselem.org.26 See William Safire, “Sharon Enters Armistice Talks,”New York Times, February 4, 2002, p. A27.

cease-fire, even temporarily, indicates thedeterrent power of targeted killing.

In sum, the policy of targeted killing hasprevented some attacks against Israel, weak-ened the effectiveness of terrorist organiza-tions, kept potential bomb makers on therun, and deterred terrorist operations. It hasnot prevented all acts of terrorism, nor canit. But as part of a larger array of policies,including blockades, checkpoints, andincursions, it is a successful response to anintolerable threat.

REVENGE, RETRIBUTION, ANDJUSTICE

Despite many problems, a policy of targetedkilling makes sense for Israel for five reasons.First is the question of morality. There iswidespread agreement that targeted killingraises disturbing moral issues. After all,Israel is killing individuals without any trialor due process. Innocent people are some-times killed in these operations. It offendsthe moral sensibilities of many when gov-ernment officials are reduced to the role ofhit men, as if they were part of some crimi-nal organization. The bedrock of Westerndemocracy established by liberal philoso-phers such as John Locke has been limitedgovernment. How can that principle recon-cile itself with a government that deprivespeople of their life without proper judicialproceedings? The moral squeamishness thatthe policy entails is demonstrated by thereluctance of Israel to comment on variouskillings for which it is clearly responsible.

Its qualms notwithstanding, the Israelipolicy of targeted killing, if it is carried outstrictly against combatants in the legal senseoutlined above, can be defended from amoral perspective. Just war tradition fromthe time of Saint Augustine to the present

has emphasized the need for armed conflictto be discriminate and proportionate in thepursuit of legitimate ends for the use offorce to be moral.27 Targeted killing can bedone in a way that meets these criteria. It isdiscriminate in that it upholds noncombat-ant immunity and minimizes collateraldamage. It is proportionate in that onlyenough force is used to accomplish thetask. Targeted killings do not employ largenumbers of troops, bombers, artillery, andother means that can cause far moredestruction than they prevent. And target-ed killing serves a legitimate end by strikingat those who threaten the lives of inno-cents. Since the policy is applied againstthose carrying out or assisting in terroristattacks, targeted killing enables Israel toprotect its civilians by eliminating thosewho would murder them.

Targeted killing also serves Israel’s inter-ests because it affords the Israeli public a cal-ibrated form of revenge. Revenge is seen bymany as a destructive and even evil motiva-tion that should be avoided at all costs. Thisexplains the 2002 decision by the IDF judgeadvocate general that allowed targetedkillings but prohibited those undertaken forvengeance. But revenge is also a naturaldesire by an individual or society for obtain-ing justice when other means are not avail-able. Achieving revenge can bring about asense of fulfillment and justice for peoplewho believe they have been wronged. Failingto achieve revenge can lead to despair, frus-tration, and anger. Politically, this can lead tothe downfall of governments unwilling orunable to avenge attacks on its people. Morefundamentally, withstanding repeated attacks

israel’s policy of targeted killing 121

27 See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A MoralArgument with Historical Illustrations (New York: BasicBooks, 1977).

without responding can lead to a sense ofimpotence and malaise that could weaken asociety’s ability to protect itself. Israel, likeother states, has a moral right to exist. Oneof the greatest immoralities a state can com-mit is to behave in a way that results in itsown destruction. Insofar as vengeanceagainst terrorist acts contributes to Israel’ssecurity by reassuring the public, its practiceis morally justifiable. Revenge becomesproblematic when there are no guidelines forhow to act and against whom. If there is toomuch space for arbitrary retaliation, revengecan indeed get out of hand and become dis-ruptive. That is why states regulate and over-see the exercise of revenge. For domesticinfractions, revenge is realized through therule of law. In the international realm,revenge is pursued through foreign policy,ranging from diplomatic rebukes to war.28

Israel’s use of targeted killing is a form ofcontrolled, state-sanctioned revenge. Sincethe government decides who is to be killedaccording to established criteria, the issue ofarbitrary retaliation is resolved. Because thekillers of Israeli civilians are themselveskilled, the desire for revenge from both fam-ilies of the victims and the society at large ismet. Anger at the government is dissipatedas the perpetrators of terrorism receive aspunishment the same fate as their victims.A July 2001 poll by the Tami Steinmetz Cen-ter for Peace Research at Tel Aviv Universityfound that 70 percent of Israelis supporttargeted killing.29

Retribution is a further justification forthe Israeli policy of targeted killing. Retribu-tion, in its purest sense, has no utilitariancomponent. It is not motivated by vengeance.Even if the victims do not care about theoffense committed or are opposed to pun-ishing the aggressors, punishment neverthe-less must be carried out. Nor is retribution

motivated by deterrence or a need to satisfythe demands of an aggrieved population. Ifit can be shown that deterrence will not beenhanced by retaliation or that the commu-nity has no wish to strike back, retributionstill demands the punishment of the guilty.Retribution is driven by the belief thatoffenders need to be punished because suchpunishment is warranted. This concept ofjust deserts is compellingly put forward bythe theorist Michael Moore, who writes,“Retributivism is the view that punishmentis justified by the moral culpability of thosewho receive it. A retributivist punishesbecause, and only because the offenderdeserves it.”30

Israel’s policy of targeted killing, strippedof its utilitarian justifications, is retribution,plain and simple. Palestinian suicidebombers seek out the most innocent ofIsraeli civilians—old men, women, and chil-dren—and attempt to kill as many of themas they can. Stopping these operationsbefore they can inflict their horrific harm isof obvious importance and provides someof the justification for targeted killings. Butwhat of those who plan the attacks—armthe bombers and send them on their way?How are they to be punished? The PA claimsit is unable to stop the perpetrators, some ofwhom, such as those in the al-Aqsa Brigades,have links to Arafat’s Fatah faction. Who,

122 Steven R. David

28 For an interesting discussion of revenge as it appliesto capital punishment, see Ernest van den Haag andJohn P. Conrad, The Death Penalty: A Debate (NewYork: Plenum, 1983), pp. 247, 250.29 Ephraim Yaar and Tamar Hermann, “70% of IsraeliJews Support Assassination Policy,” Ha’aretz, August 8,2002; available at www.acj.org/august/August_8.htm#11.30 Michael S. Moore, “The Moral Worth of Retribu-tion,” in Jeffrie G. Murphy, ed., Punishment and Reha-bilitation, 3rd ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1994),pp. 94, 97.

then, aside from the Israelis, will provide thejust deserts to these terrorists? Even if thepolicy of targeted killing does not reduceIsraeli casualties, such a policy is justifiedbecause it is only through this approach thatthe terrorists get what they inflict onothers—a violent death.

There is a danger that retribution, likerevenge, can get out of hand. In order to pre-vent this from happening, two limits on ret-ribution need to be imposed. First, thepunishment must fit the crime. Retribu-tivists emphasize that the response to anaction must be proportionate to that action.Since Palestinian terrorists are bent onkilling Israeli civilians, killing them in returnis a fitting reaction. Second, the punishmentmust be focused on those who are commit-ting the offense, with innocents spared. Asthe moral philosopher Judith Lichtenbergwrites, “while the principle of retributionsays that the guilty must be punished, equal-ly important is its demand that only theguilty may be punished. Punishment mustbe tailored to reach those who have donewrong and leave untouched those who havenot.”31 Targeted killing, when done properly,achieves this goal by focusing retaliation onthe actual perpetrators of terrorism. To besure, targeted killing that also producesinnocent casualties weakens the retributiverationale. But given the greater risks of inno-cent Palestinians being killed by other formsof retaliation such as military strikes againsturban areas, targeted killing best fits the ret-ributive model of appropriate punishmentfor the guilty.

Aside from revenge and retribution, tar-geted killing is morally defensible becausealthough it would be preferable to have anegotiated peace, such an outcome has notproved possible so far. It may therefore bethe least bad option Israel can mount

against terrorism.32 As discussed, Israel hasresponded to Palestinian terrorism in sever-al ways, all of which have major drawbacks.Checkpoints humiliate and inconveniencelarge numbers of the Palestinian popula-tion, producing resentment. Israeli raids toarrest militants result in large numbers ofcivilian casualties. For both of theseresponses innocent Palestinians are hurt inthe effort to get at the guilty. Not only is thismorally repugnant, it also plants the seedsfor future terrorism.

Major incursions into Palestinian territo-ry to root out the terrorist infrastructurehave been especially controversial. In thespring of 2002, the Israelis carried out twomassive interventions producing thunder-ous international condemnation. Followingthe Israeli incursion of early March 2002,UN secretary-general Kofi Annan, whoopposes Israel’s policy of targeted killing,sent a letter to Prime Minister Sharon thatwas sharply critical of Israel’s actions. Thetext of the letter nonetheless suggests thatmore discrete, focused actions would bepreferable to the policy of mass intervention:

In the process [of incursions] hundreds ofinnocent non-combatant civilians—men,women, and children—have been injured orkilled and many buildings and homes havebeen damaged and destroyed. . . . Israel is fullyentitled to defend itself against terror. . . . It isincumbent on all parties to take urgent stepsto de-escalate the level of violence. Israelshould contribute to this effort by ensuringthat the IDF uses only weapons and methodsthat minimize the danger to the lives andproperty of Palestinian civilians, in conformi-ty with its humanitarian obligations . . .33

israel’s policy of targeted killing 123

31 Judith Lichtenberg, “The Ethics of Retaliation,” Phi-losophy and Public Policy Quarterly 21 (Fall 2001), p. 5.32 For a similar view, see Eisenstadt, “‘Pre-Emptive Tar-geted Killings’ as a Counter Terror Tool,” p. 3.33 “Kofi Annan’s Blunt Words Criticizing Israeli Tactics,”New York Times, March 19, 2002, p. A12.

Targeted killing is a policy that meets thesecriteria of minimizing the danger to Pales-tinian civilians. Similarly, the New YorkTimes, which had editorialized against tar-geted killings, seemed to endorse a similarpolicy when confronted with Israeli mili-tary incursions. A March 14, 2002, editorialstated,“Israel must cut way back in its use ofmilitary force as Washington urges, anddirect its actions against suspected terror-ists rather than against the broader Pales-tinian civilian population. Its currentmethods are causing great civilian sufferingand unnecessary humiliation. With Pales-tinian police failing to make arrests, Israel isjustified in sending its own forces after spe-cific terrorist suspects.”34 This statementclearly calls for a carefully defined policytargeting terrorists.

The far greater Israeli intervention intothe West Bank following the March 28, 2002,Passover massacre produced even moreinternational opposition. This interventionsaw a massive call-up of Israeli reserves askey Palestinian cities, including Jenin,Nablus, Ramallah, and Bethlehem, wereattacked and reoccupied in an effort todestroy terrorism at its roots. However justi-fied the intentions may have been, the oper-ation produced casualties in the hundredsand widespread destruction of civilianareas. Both sides acknowledged that inno-cents were killed, though they differed great-ly on the numbers. Inevitably, the Israeliaction provoked harsh international criti-cism to the point where only the UnitedStates stood by Israel and even Americansupport was called into question. The Euro-pean Union for the first time threatenedsanctions against Israel. Public opinion pollsrevealed greater support for Palestiniansthan Israelis in such countries as France,Italy, and England. UN special coordinator

for the Middle East Peace Process, TerjeRoed-Larsen, an architect of the OsloAccords, called the destruction wrought bythe Israeli army in the West Bank city ofJenin “horrifying beyond belief.”The Israelisfound themselves defying U.S. presidentBush’s order to withdraw their troops “with-out delay,” while Secretary of State ColinPowell criticized Israeli actions.35 Duringthe second intifada about twenty times asmany Palestinians have been killed as aresult of Israeli incursions as have beenkilled by targeted killing.36

Some argue that Israel can protect itselffrom terrorism by withdrawing from theoccupied territories. In this view, a moreflexible and forthcoming Israeli approach toits negotiations with the Palestinians wouldhalt terrorism without the need to resort totargeted killings. The continued refusal ofIsrael to abide by UN resolutions 242 and 338calling for Israeli withdrawal from landoccupied since 1967, the increasing numberof Israeli settlements since the inception ofthe Oslo Accords in 1993, and the denial ofstatehood to the Palestinians have clearlycontributed to a climate of despair thatdrives some to suicide bombing and otherextreme acts. Why not give the Palestinianswhat they justifiably seek and thus end ter-rorism at its source?

124 Steven R. David

34“Israel’s Unwise Offensive,”New York Times, March 14,2002, p. A30.35 James Bennet, “Israeli Forces Pull Back from Jenin,But Blockade Still Remains,” New York Times, April 19,2002, p. A10; James Bennet, “Powell Ends Trip; Sees NoCease-Fire before a Pullout,” New York Times, April 18,2002, p. A1; and Patrick Tyler, David E. Sanger, Todd S.Purdum, and Eric Schmitt, “With Time Running Out,Bush Shifted Mideast Policy,” New York Times, June 30,2002, p. A12.36 As of December 2002, 1,794 Palestinians and 673Israelis have been killed. The International Policy Insti-tute for Counter-Terrorism, “Fatalities in the Palestin-ian-Israeli Conflict”; available at www.ict.org.il.

This contention is not persuasive forthree reasons. First, the wave of violence—the second intifada—began after the CampDavid meetings of the summer of 2000.Although there has been some controversyas to just what the Israeli-American propos-al was, virtually everyone acknowledges thatit offered unprecedented Israeli concessionson Jerusalem and a withdrawal from most ofthe occupied territories. At the very least, itwarranted a counteroffer from ChairmanArafat, which never came. What emergedfrom the Palestinians instead was a wave ofterrorism, perhaps expected to extort addi-tional concessions. Second, the latest intifa-da was launched when Prime Minister EhudBarak—not Sharon—led Israel. Followingthe failure of Camp David, Barak’s govern-ment, which was committed to a diplomaticsettlement with the Palestinians, continuedto negotiate with the PA at Taba, where addi-tional progress was made. Throughout thisprocess, terrorism mounted, giving scanthope that a diplomatic settlement wouldstem the violence. Finally, most of the sui-cide bombings launched against Israel havebeen carried out by Hamas and IslamicJihad. These organizations have openly pro-claimed their goals to be the destruction ofthe state of Israel. It is difficult to see whatkind of political compromise from Israel,short of national dissolution, would pacifythese groups. It is certainly true that only apolitical settlement with the Palestinianswill end terrorism against Israel. But thenotion that what is required to bring aboutsuch a settlement is a more accommodatingIsraeli position, as opposed to a change inthe Palestinian leadership, is not borne outby the experience of the past two years.

As this review of Israeli policies suggests,it is not enough to oppose Israel’s policy oftargeted killing. Critics of this approach

need to provide an alternative. Aside fromanti-Israeli extremists and pacifists, fewcounsel Israel to simply endure suicidebombing attacks and do nothing. The ques-tion then becomes what for Israel is the cor-rect response to terrorism. For hawks,Israeli incursions into Palestinian areasalong with continued occupation areattractive options, though not so much toreplace targeted killings as to supplementthem. For Israel’s international critics, thereare few suggestions for how Israel shouldcombat terrorism, only condemnation ofwhatever armed response Israel undertakesalong with demands for Israeli political con-cessions. As we have seen, targeted killingmay achieve international approval in retro-spect not so much for what the policy hasachieved, but rather because it is less objec-tionable than the alternatives. Although nota ringing endorsement, targeted killing maysurvive because it is indeed the least badchoice for a state confronted with the threatof terrorism.

I have conceded that there has been noclear benefit from this approach as recordnumbers of Israeli civilians have been killedin terrorist attacks at the same time that tar-geted killings have also reached unprece-dented levels. But the absence of a short- oreven medium-term benefit does not meanthat targeted killings will not, over the longhaul, eventually undermine the infrastruc-ture of terrorism. As noted above, leaders ofPalestinian organizations have acknowl-edged that the slaying of their leaders andoperatives has hurt them and that they areprepared to modify or cease attacks if Israelwould suspend its practice of targetedkillings. Over time, the relentless elimina-tion of the foot soldiers and planners of ter-rorism may well have an impact that is notdiscernible at present. It is far too early to

israel’s policy of targeted killing 125

declare targeted killing an ineffective orfailed policy.

CONCLUSION

There is little doubt that Israel will continueto pursue targeted killing, raising the ques-tion of how this policy can be improved. Isuggest four improvements, all designed tomake certain that the benefits of targetedkilling are not overwhelmed by the very realdangers that such a policy can bring about.First, Israel should be open and unapolo-getic about its pursuit of targeted killings.Targeted killing is a legitimate and moralresponse to terrorist attacks. There is noneed for Israel to evade responsibility forcarrying out this policy, especially whenIsraeli involvement is obvious. Denial orrefusal to comment leaves Jerusalem open tothe charge that it is behaving improperly orhas something to hide. Neither is the caseand Israel should not behave like it is.

Second, Israel needs to make sure that itspursuit of targeted killing does not degener-ate into lawlessness and savagery that makesit undistinguishable from the threat it seeksto counter. The guidelines that Israel hasalready instituted for targeted killing need tobe strengthened and made the subject ofopen debate.Along with following the direc-tive that targeted killing should be carriedout only against combatants on their way tocommitting terrorist acts or who are knownto be behind them, Israel must also do moreto ensure that decisions on actual killings areoverseen by elected officials. As a democra-cy, Israel needs to entrust the monumentaldecisions on whom to kill to those who areresponsible to the Israeli people. In addition,Israel must do more to ensure that innocentcasualties are minimized when targeted

killings are carried out. Operations such asthe one that killed Hamas leader Shahada inGaza along with sixteen bystanders must notbe approved.

Third, Israel must refrain from killingpolitical leaders. Granted, the distinctionbetween political leaders and those whoplan terrorist attacks is at best ambiguous.Nevertheless, for the norm against assassi-nation to survive—a norm that Israel needsas much as any state—a distinction must bedrawn between political leaders and com-batants. Just as the Israeli government hasannounced it will not kill Chairman Arafat,despite its assertion that he is an activebacker of terrorist operations, so too must itavoid the targeting of lesser leaders provid-ed their main activities are political. Thekilling of Palestinian leaders such as Shikakiand Mustafa must stop. Finally, Israel needsto announce publicly that the policy of tar-geted killing is a temporary expedient whileit is engaged in armed conflict with terror-ists. Israel must unambiguously declare thatif a Palestinian leadership makes peace withIsrael and proves itself capable and willing tocurb terrorism, targeted killing will cease.Targeted killing makes sense and is justifi-able only as a weapon of war. Once that waris over, the policy must end.

Targeted killing is an unsavory practicefor an unsavory time. It can never take theplace of a political settlement, which is theonly solution to the terrorism that confrontsIsrael. Until such a settlement is achieved,however, targeted killing stands out as ameasured response to a horrific threat. It isdistinctly attractive because it focuses on theperpetrators of terrorism while largely spar-ing the innocent. For a dangerous region in animperfect world, targeted killing is the worstpossible policy—except for all the others.

126 Steven R. David