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CYCLOPSJOURNALAjournalofContemporaryTheory,TheoryofReligionandExperimentalTheoryISSUE1ISSN2398-2705April,2016LondonCYCLOPSJOURNALisalsoavailableinOpen-Accessformat:http://www.cyclopsjournal.orgEDITORIALBOARD:ConstanzaBizraelli(originallyConstanzaNuñez-Melgar)(FounderandEditor-in-Chief)MarinaJijina-OgdenNicolaMasciandaroEleniIkoniadouCoverDesignandLogobyTinyLittleHammersCyclopsJournalislicensedunderaCreativeCommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives4.0InternationalLicense.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Allmaterialremains© copyrightoftherespectiveauthors.

INDEX5 Editor’sPreface 10 ZenPessimism:OnE.M.CioranandNon-Being BradBaumgartner 28 MarvelousHarmony:OnChristinatheAstonishing NicolaMasciandaro 44 TheCyclopsandOcularOrigination:AStudyinThree Phases. PartI:TheEye-Axis ConstanzaBizraelli 68 MoralorMortalCosmos? OnSubjectiveExistenceinKantandBataille JamesF.Depew 94 ReadingsofNietzscheinDostoevskyandNietzsche:The PhilosophyofTragedybyLevShestov MarinaJijina-Ogden 112 AbouttheContributors

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Editor’sPrefaceNon-ConductivePresencesandTheChannellingofAbstraction Cyclops Journal is based on an initiative that seeks togenerateanextensionofphilosophy into theprovincesof itsownmargins, intowhat isanticipativelyregardedasunthinkablebut isyet to be present in thought, in spite of its apparentincommensurability with the nature of the act of thinking. Thechannelization of abstract thinking into pre-establishedarrangements of directions- like pipe systems bearers of astructural truth informed by rationality- allows a certain fluidityand continuity in our understanding and assimilation of events.However,thereisalwaysaresiduum:the“inassimilable”,composedby elements that are deprived of the lubricant of logicdirectionality,whichwouldallowthemtorelatewithotherlogicallycommensurable elements. These other elements are thereforeimpossible to conduct through the channels of discursiveunderstanding. The residues of conductive abstraction remain anundecipherable dense knot of potential channels, as a virtuallabyrinthcontractedinitsnon-possibilitybutturnedconcreteinitsundeniable presence- the numinous presence of the unthinkable.The unthinkable is1, inscribed in the geometric reduction thatcharacterizestheinfrastructuresofthethinkableandexceedingit. This unsorted mass of the unthinkable stands as a formallabyrinth, logic only in its general idea. Yet, it is a non-accessiblelabyrinth; its channels stand as the phantasmatic residue of thefailed attempts to channelize and, despite their apparent volatilephantasmagoria,theyconcealaheavymassofresidualmatter.Both

1Itremains,itcontinuesbeing.

EDITOR’SPREFACE

6

heavy and subtle, residual volumes of inassimilable matter areinformedbyfragmentedquantaoftheforcesofabstraction. Inassimilable elements are turned by the channelizingintellect and by directional reason into channels that do notconduct:becausetheylackcontinuity;becausetheylackrelationaldirection; yet they are. They bear an incorruptible unity ofpresence, which manifests fragmentarily in regions where theopacityofdirectionalreasondiminishes. Even as it is a non-conductive presence, “labyrinth” isheavier than its conductive twin. Embodying non-conductivity, itcan only be grasped in a pure and abstract present, which itinundates with liquids that do not conduct. The presence of theunthinkable to the mind conceals the possibility of its owntranslation intodiscursivemodels, into thespiritofa fluidsystembased on discursive logic. However, by concealing it, it does notnegate it. Discontinuity in reason does not annihilate the unity ofpresence of what appeared as unthinkable to the forces ofabstraction;onthecontrary,ithighlightsthisunitybyrevealingtheinsufficiencyofreason. Thepresenceof theunthinkable in the formsof thosenon-conductive elements, which are nonetheless still susceptible ofbeing grasped by the forces of abstraction, enables the growth ofcertainawarenessofthenecessitytoactualizethechannelizationoftheforcesofabstraction.Ontheonehand,thenucleusoftheforceofabstractionresidesinacravingfordirection.Ontheotherhand,it is rooted in theneed for a scale: namely, a relational systemofpuredirections,whereitcanexecutetheconcreteinscriptionofitschannels. However, the problem of residuality in abstractionresides in the modality of being of the lubricants that allow theconductionoftheforcesofabstractionthroughthechannelsoftheunderstanding. What is unthinkable is as it is because it resistsconductive continuities that are based on certain measurements-specifically those of conventional logic and directional reason.However,thismightnotbethecaseifotherconductivemodelsare

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applied, such as those of emotion, mystical thinking, musicalthinking, pure energy, archetyposophy or “polymorphous reason”(borrowing this last term from Klossowski). After all, theunthinkable is still present, as an apparition or as a pureemergence, even if it still stands as a one-dimensional non-accessiblelabyrinthtothecontemporarymind.HeterologicalChannelling InTheUseValueofD.A.FdeSade,Bataille(1985)2introducedthe terms “heterogeneous” and “heterology” to describe elementsthatareimpossibletoassimilate,basedonamodelstructureduponthe binary assimilation/excretion. Moving into the categories ofthoughtandabstraction,heterogeneouselementsconstituteobjectsthat do not serve any purpose; they are directionless and are theoutcome of unproductive expenditure. They do not produceposterity and, in this sense, they lack continuity. According toBataille, what is sacred and what is excremental shareheterogeneity.Heterology,ontheotherhand,standsasanabstractscience-atheoreticalrouteoradiversionoftheactofthinkingintotheresiduesoftraditionalchannelization,intotheinassimilable,theunthinkable. In the light of what has been said previously,heterologicalactionmightonlybepossiblebymeansofanexerciseofextensionoftheforcesofabstractionandanactualizationofthemodalitiesandlubricantsoftheirchannelization. Heterology, in its categorical use, recognizes the heavypresenceof theunthinkableandoffersatheoreticalrecognitionofthispresence. CyclopsJournalisinterestedindepartingfromheterologyasamedium to approach the possibility of extending contemporarythought into sacred and abstract non-conductive presences.

2SeeBataille,Georges.(1985)VisionsofExcess:SelectedWritings,1927-1939.Ed.AllanStoekl.Trans.AllanStoekl.Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress.

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CultivationoftheOcularUbiquity Thepresenceoftheunthinkableaboveallseduces,andsetsintoplayotherconductivepossibilitiesgeneratinganabstractorgybetweenfaculties,informedbymutual,pluralandyetunimaginablecopulas and synaesthesias. Our task would consist of cultivatingeyes inside of these processes instead ofmerelywitnessing themfrom externality. The ocular component of thought, namely theideas thatrevolvearoundaconceptionofvisionasevidenceorastheactofcastinglightonobscuredregionsisintunewiththeideabehindthenameoftheJournal:“Cyclops”,meaningroundeyes.Ouraction would consist of cultivating the germ of the ocular in themargins of the thinkable and into the regions of the unthinkable.Thecultivationofvision(inanabstractsense)inthedepthsofeachprocessentailsthegerminationofeyesthatwouldinternallygrowinaccordancewitheachorganism,nurturedbydifferentnutrientsin each case, permeating the opposition between what can beassimilated and what cannot be assimilated. Heterologicalchannellingherebehavesasanarrangementofspinningeyes:eyesset intowork;amachineryofubiquitousvision;a thinking that iseverywhere,with theability togrow insideofeverypresenceandwith every presence. The cultivation of ocular ubiquity throughheterological channelling enables a polymorphous growth of thesameeye in theunfoldingof its potential diversity. Itwelcomes aparasitical and virulent cosmogenesis of vision through theactualizationoftheforcesofabstractionintoeverythingpresent.

ConstanzaBizraelli

London,2016

ZEN PESSIMISM: ON E.M CIORAN AND NON-BEING

Brad Baumgartner

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ShocktotheSystem

Unlikesystematicphilosophers,manyofwhomspendlargeswaths of time grapplingwith the fastidious organization of their

ideas, pessimist philosopher E. M. Cioran gained a reputation for

dismantlingtheso-calledsystematicutilityofphilosophyinfavorof

afragmented,disintegrativeone.1AsEugeneThackersuggestsinan

interview entitled “The Sight of a Mangled Corpse,” paying

considerationtoCiorannecessitatesacorollarycounter-analysisof

philosophyitself.Thus,heindicatesthat

there is something in Cioran’s work that mitigates against

philosophy in the key of philosophy. That is a good definition of

“pessimism” to me—the philosophy of the futility of philosophy.

Cioran takes up this thread from other thinkers to be sure—

Nietzsche,Schopenhauer,Lichtenberg,Leopardi,Pascal,theFrench

moralists. His writing itself works against the presuppositions of

grand, systematic philosophy, composed as it is of fragments,

aphorisms, stray thoughts. It is refreshing to readhiswork today,

especially against the mania for systematicity in philosophy

textbooksortheso-calledspeculativerealisttreatises.(2013,386)

Thacker’sanalysiscontinues,pointingoutthatthereis‘subtractive

rigourtothiskindofpessimism,whatNietzschecalledtherigourof

the “unfinished thought.”Cioranappeals to thesecretvoice inside

allourheadswhenwereadphilosophy,orscience,orpsychology,

or self-help: “Really? You really think we can just figure it all

out?”’(Ibid).

1Cf.CioraninAllGallisDivided:‘Thoughtwhichliberatesitselffromallprejudicedisintegrates, imitating the scattered coherence of the very things it would

apprehend.With“fluid”ideaswespreadourselvesoverreality,weespouseit;wedo not explicate it. Thus we pay dearly for the “system” we have not sought’

(2012a,33).

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Since, as Thacker shows, Cioran is heavily invested in

unveilingphilosophy’s futility2in a subtractivemode that, even in

itsanti-nessstillcloselyresemblesphilosophy, itmaybeuseful to

posit, but in a way that discloses the paradoxical nature of this

pessimism,yetanothertermforwhatspecificallyCioranisdoingin

his writing. But before we do, let us suggest that one way to

theorizeCioranianpessimism,which, at its limit, is really aweird

mysticism that negates its own beyond, might be to highlight it

withinthecontextof its leitmotif—thatof futility—andtopointto

itsessentialpracticalityasatransposalofphilosophicutility.Todothis,weneedtobeginwiththequestionofontology.Ontology,the

branch of metaphysics that concerns itself with the nature of

existence,asksthequestionofhowsomethingcanbesaidtoexist.

Rather than speaking about Cioranian pessimism on the basis of

sometotalizingphilosophicalsystem,3wemightdobettertoseeit

aslayingoutapositionforanegativeontology,or,moreaccurately,

ameontology (an ontology ofwhat is not) that can teach readers

something central and non-exchangeable about existence as it is

commonlyviewedoragreedupon.

WhilemanymayreadCioran’sphilosophicalworkasgloomy

and incomplete, we should note that these are in fact important

featuresinhiswork:theyarethetextualremnantsofarigorous—

albeitsubtractive—processofun-makingoneselfandtheworldvia

apracticalmysticismof intense,pessimisticmindfulnesswhich,as

wewilllatersuggest,paradoxicallyresultsinasortofZen-likeno-

2Onewill note Cioran’s critique of philosophy inTheTroublewithBeingBorn:‘Philosophyistaughtonlyintheagora,inagarden,orathome.Thelecturechair

isthegraveofphilosophy,thedeathofanylivingthought,thedaisisthemindin

morning’(1976,188).3 Cf. ‘A person who has the misfortune to fall victim to the spell of a philosophical system […] can no longer see the world, or people, or historic events, as they are; he sees everything only through the distorting prism of the system by which he is possessed’ (Meditations on the Tarot, 1985, 42-3).

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mind. In opposition to identifying with oneself as oneself, hisaphorisms and fragments position readers in a marginal space

between being and non-being. It is not that Cioranian pessimism

changes thecondition inwhichonecouldbesaid toexist, for that

condition is one of futility, but that it burrows an inhabitable gap

between existing andnon-existing, andpointingus to it, a liminal

modethatclaimsnothronetoatranscendentreality,mightenable

onetothinkinawaythatismoreclearlyandimmanentlypessimal.

FieldNotesfromNowhere

Forapessimist,fragmentarywritingoftenservesasongoing

marginalia on the book of systematicity. Cioran’s philosophical

position, as it views systematic philosophy as a kind of futility

warehouse,iscomposedoffragmentarythoughtsthatbreakupnot

only the language of systematicity but also sever the positivistic

conditionsforamodeofexistingthatdirectsitselfand/orvalidates

the“subject”towhichitrefersonthissideofbeing.‘Aslongasyouliveonthissideoftheterrible,’writesCioran, ‘youwillfindwords

toexpress it;onceyouknowit fromtheinside,youwillno longer

find a single one’ (1976, 53). Yetwhatwould knowing something

“from inside” the other side of being, which is really to say,unknowingsomething,looklike?

Focusingonthemessuchasnothingness,4despair,suffering,

and personal crisis, Cioran’s work presents a series of

meontological dictums that allow readers to come into mindful

awarenessoftheircomplicitywiththehorrorsofexistence.Letus

take, for instance, an aphorism in which Cioran presents this

paradox by way of a philosopher who hopes to gain a kind of

satisfactionfromhisontologicalforays.Cioranwrites,‘“Beingnever

4Cioran’searlywork,forinstance,surviveswithinthetraditionofthe‘nihilismof

the great sophists’ (Petreu, 2005, 234), and, infused with sophistical

idiosyncrasies concerned with the nature of non-being and the language of

negation,holdsacloserelationtotheworkofGorgias.

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disappoints,”declaresaphilosopher.Thenwhatdoes?Certainlynot

nonbeing,bydefinitionincapableofdisappointing.Thisadvantage,

soirritatingtoourphilosopher,musthaveledhimtopromulgateso

flagrant a countertruth’ (2012b,113). According to this inventiveformulation, any perceived positive conditions for existence are

actually ontological misgivings that survive under an ideological

rubricofoptimisticvalidation:beingdoesnotdisappoint.Thekōan-like thrust of this aphorism,however, ismostpowerful inwhat it

does not show. On the other side of the ontological veil of this

positivistic philosopher lies “so flagrant a countertruth” that it

precedes his statement entirely. In fact, it precedes even the

conditions to proffer an ontology. For only in non-being is one

capableofneverbeingdisappointed,ifnotsimplybecausethereis

no is there—no circumstance nor possibility to exist at all. This

notion is perhaps the closest Cioran will come to a “first

philosophy” in the Cartesian sense of the term of knowing

somethinginfullsurenessaftercastingallintodoubt.Utilizinganegativeandequallyskepticallogicthatsubtracts

its way from a whole in order to proffer an imperative for non-

being,Cioranposits anon-philosophical tenet thatprimaciesnon-

beingastheonlytruthtobedesired:‘Ihavenevertakenmyselffor

abeing.Anon-citizen,amarginaltype,anothingwhoexistsonlybytheexcess,bythesuperabundanceofhisnothingness’(1976,176).

Giventhatmeontologytypicallyutilizesdiscourseaboutbothbeing

andnon-being,Cioran’smarginalstatusasachameleon-likefigure

that moves back and forth between being and non-being

simultaneously relays to readerswhatdoesnothappen, that is to

say,negativelyindexeswhathappensnowhere. Pessimism’sconnectiontomysticaldiscoursesofnon-being

is well-noted in one of Cioran’s pessimist predecessors, Arthur

Schopenhauer, who held a personal and philosophic affinity for

Eastern mysticism and was strongly influenced by Hindu and

Buddhist religious thought. Though, as Peter Abelson points out,

‘comparedtohisworldview,whichisverysevere,Buddhismseems

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almostcheerful’(1993,255),SchopenhaueragreedthatBuddhism’s

First Noble Truth, dukkha—a Pali word commonly translated as

“suffering”—wasthebasisofhumanexistence.InTheWorldasWilland Representation (1819), Schopenhauer analyzes several

principles of esoteric origin. His description of the ethics of

willessness,forinstance,isworthquotingatlength:

If[the]veilofMaya,theprincipiumindividuationis,ifliftedfromtheeyes of a man to such an extent that he no longer makes the

egotisticaldistinctionbetweenhimselfandthepersonofothers,but

takesasmuch interest in thesufferingsofother individualsashis

own,andthus isnotonlybenevolentandcharitable in thehighest

degree,butevenreadytosacrificehisownindividualitywhenever

several others can be saved thereby, then it follows automatically

that such a man, recognizing in all beings, his own true and

innermost self,must also regard the endless sufferingsof all that

livesashisown,andthustakeuponhimself thepainof thewhole

world.Nosuffering isany longerstrangeor foreigntohim.All the

miseriesofothers,whichheseesandissoseldomabletoalleviate,

allthemiseriesofwhichhehasindirectknowledge,andeventhose

herecognizesmerelyaspossible,affecthismindjustasdohisown

[…]Whereverhelooks,heseessufferinghumanityandthesuffering

animalworld,andaworldthatpassesaway.(1969,378-9)

ThepurposeofhighlightingthisquotationisnottosubsumeCioran

undertherubricofpersonalliberationthatSchopenhaueroutlines,

but rather to address the fact that Cioran disconnectedly fits into

this paradigm just like the fragmented verses he pens fit into his

implicitcritiqueofsystematicphilosophy.Inotherwords,Cioranis

andisnotthisliberatedperson,doesanddoesnotthesethings.His

own contradictory individuation is evocative of what might

fragmentarilyoccurintheontologicalgapsandaffectivecrevicesof

suchanindividual’slife.5

5‘Once we appeal to our most intimate selves,’ Cioran writes, ‘we become

unconscious of our own gaps… “Self-knowledge”? A contradiction in terms’

(1976,35).

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What, then,oughtthepessimist todoabouttheproblemof

communal suffering, thedoublesuffering,no less, that stemsboth

fromthehorrorofone’sindividuationand,forthosewholackself-

knowledge, from the inability to recognize such horror? The

obviousanswer isthatthepessimistwilldonothing: ‘Whattodo?

Where to go? Do nothing and go nowhere, easy enough’ (Cioran,

1976,13).Butwhatdoesthismean?Howmightthisnegativepraxis

turn back to the theory of knowledge? If we are to take Cioran’s

visionofexistence,auniversewithnowayout,seriously, thenwe

mustdeigntounderstandthecomplexityoftheethicalparadoxthis

negativevisionbringsto light.First,wemust learntodwell inthe

horror of being ourselves. If to exist is truly the ultimate

condemnation,ifourownbirthsseverusfromtheabyssiccanalof

non-being, thenwemust findaway to existnot. Ifwe follow this

through, “beingnegatively” (2012,23), asClariceLispector’sG.H.

oncecalledit,becomesthewaytoliverightly,whichisalsotosay

justly. This is the hidden mystical life of the marginal figure, the

inter-dimensional chameleon that passes betweenbeing andnon-

being because they know by un-knowing, because they owe

themselvesnothingotherthantoknowthattheyknownot.Inthis

sense, we might wish, first, to implore a kind of “pessimist

activism,”6onecompelledbyaninvertedandintrovertedcourage—

not hope—to be emptied out, to stay and break breadwith one’s

nothingness.Thiswouldbeanassortmentofindividualswhoknow

theyaredoomedbuthavelearnedtodwell intheirownhorrorso

that,oneday,theymightbeabletounlearnit,inorderto,asNicola

Masciandaroputs it, ‘think through cosmicpessimism,asopposedtodwellinginit’(2014,188).

Keeping Schopenhauer’s description of the principiumindividuationis and its corollary renunciation inmind,onecanseethat Cioran hovers somewhere in the middle of the two as a

6Cf. ‘No one needs pessimism, though I like to imagine the idea of a pessimist

activism’(Thacker,2012,66).

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marginal figure. On the one hand, in Cioran’s fragmentary work

readers findthe laboriousmusingsofamansodeeply tied toand

cognizant of humanity’s suffering that it brings him to a place of

innermost,evenautomatic,recognitionofpainandsuffering.Inthis

case,Cioran,who,wecouldargue,hasadoptedanidentitypolitics

of non-identification and has to a degree successfully renounced

himselfasaselfandtheworldasworld,hassomewhatpartedwith

theprincipiumindividuationis.Cioranseespersonalandcommunalsuffering everywhere he looks and, as is indicated by the

overarching theme of suffering found in his work, he does, as

Schopenhauer puts it, “take upon himself the pain of the whole

world.”Ontheotherhand,however,hestopsshortofbecomingthe

kind of bodhisattva figure Schopenhauer describes above that

attempts to lead others out of the veil of Maya, or the illusory

causesofhumanity’ssuffering,andintoliberation.Cioranisafailed

mysticandanevenbetterpessimistinthesensethathewouldnot

holdthisattainmenttrueoravailableforanybody,whichisinpart

analogoustoandbolstershiscritiqueofthe“failedmystic”inTearsandSaints,i.e.‘acritiqueof[themystic’s]willtopowerwhichreapsnothing but empty and cruel suffering’ (Zarifopol-Johnston, 1995,

Introductionxiii).Hesacrificeshisindividuality,butnotforanyone,and in that way he exemplifies the latter half of Schopenhauer’s

description which focuses on the hardship of the individual who

cannotfendoffherdesiresviaa“finalresignation”inordertofree

themselves from the “the allurements of hope” and the false

pleasuresof theworld (1969,379).On theonewho is luredback

into such egoism, Schopenhauer continues, ‘At times, in the hard

experience of our own sufferings or in the vividly recognized

sufferingsofothers,knowledgeof thevanityandbitternessof life

comesclosetouswhoarestillenvelopedintheveilofMaya’(Ibid).

Cioranissuretoresisttheallurementsofhope.Yet,inquite

anotherway, he remains courageous in sense that hiswork does

indeed uncover what lies underneath Maya’s veil. Through an

intense mode of unknowing, a kind of practical mysticism of

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pessimistic awareness, he points out the elaborate and illusive

fallacies through which human beings live out their lives. In this

way, then, Cioran hovers in between the two concepts of

willlessnessandegoism,which,inhistypicalcontradictoryfashion,

isnotsurprising.Andyet,thereisanother,athird,viewthatcanbe

taken, that is alignedat thepoint atwhich authorship and reader

receptioncomesintoplay.ForjustbecauseCiorandoesnotintend

his work to be a catalyst to any kind of change whatsoever, that

doesnotnecessarilymeanthatareadermightnotfindany.Infact,

the change that happens is not even one that is related to the

productofchangingtheplightoftheworld,butratherachangein

theprocessofobservingtheworld.

TowardsaZenPessimism

Anotherway to showhowCiorandealswith the subjectof

non-being is to view inexistence as a particular state ofmind.7To

doso,wecananalyzepassagesinhisworkwhichspecificallyrelate

to Buddhism, a religion which prioritizes the concept of

nothingness or, more accurately, emptiness (sunyata), as deeplysignificantonthepathtorealization.Intheremainingspace,anin-

depth study of Buddhism’s wellspring of beliefs and traditions

cannot be undertaken, but we can begin to trace out Cioran’s

curious treatment of Buddhism. Given that he appears at once

criticalandlaudatoryofBuddhistdoctrine,thislivingcontradiction

may bring us closer to understanding how merging Eastern

mysticism with philosophical pessimism presents challenges to

philosophicalauthority,butalsoutilizesthelimitsofphilosophical

thinkinginordertopossiblythinkthroughsuchlimits.Forexample,Cioranwrites,

7 As we will see, this state of mind is a state of no-mind, a self-realized

nothingnessasopposedtomereapathyorpassivenihilism.

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“Meditate but one hour upon the self’s nonexistence and youwill

feelyourselftobeanotherman,”saidapriestoftheJapaneseKusha

secttoaWesternvisitor.

Withouthaving frequentedtheBuddhistmonasteries,howmany

timeshaveInotlingeredovertheworld’sunreality,andhencemy

own? I have not become another man for that, no, but there

certainly has remained with me the feeling that my identity is

entirely illusory, and that by losing it I have lost nothing, except

something,excepteverything.(1976,19)

Drawing onBuddhist custom, Cioran discloses a sort of pessimist

appreciation for living in a stateofnon-attachment.To lose living

under the false illusions of one’s identity is to gain everything byreturning to one’s original state, what Zen masters call Original

Mind. In unorthodox fashion, Cioran’s curious treatment of

Buddhismconstitutesastrangeportmanteaudiscourse,orinverted

spiritualpractice,somethingwemightcallaZenpessimism. Zen, a form of Mahayana Buddhism which began in sixth-

century China and later spread throughout theWest in amodern

contextbyD.T.Suzuki,especiallyprimaciesthisrelation.Insofaras

Cioranisdoingakindofnon-philosophy,8thatis,subtractingfrom

Western systematic thought rather than adding to it, this mode

bears a resemblance to Buddhist philosophy, ‘which takes up

philosophy,’ writesWilliam Barrett, ‘only as a device to save the

philosopher from his conceptual prison; its philosophy is, as it

were, a non-philosophy, a philosophy to undo philosophy’ (1965,

xvi).Zen, then, isnotaphilosophy.Andneither is it ‘mysticismas

the West understands mysticism’ (1965, xvii). Zen writings or

sayingsaimnottophilosophizeandareconveyedthroughstrange

mystical utterances, negations which give way to nonsensical

affirmations.ForthosewhocomeintotheZenstateofmind,these

nonsensical affirmations have pointed to the deeper reality of

8Theusageofthistermthroughouttheessaycanbethoughtofasaphilosophyof

undoingandisnottobeconfusedwiththenon-standardphilosophyofFrançois

Laruelle.

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existence. ‘In the end all language is pointing:weuse language to

point beyond language, beyond concepts to the concrete,’ writes

Barrett (1965, xv). In contrast, Cioran points backwardly beyond

language, reverseengineering it intoanexistentialmantra forego

death: ‘Sarvamanityam: All is transitory (Buddha).A formula oneshouldrepeatateveryhouroftheday,atthe—admirable—riskof

dyingofit’(2012b,19).

If the failed mystic of Tears and Saints, is, for Cioran, thefigure of futility par excellence, then this Zen pessimism, anepigrammatic auto-subtractivism in which futility points to itself

viabeingoneself, becomesessentiallyrecuperative. Thispessimistrecuperationisparadoxical,giventhatCiorangoestogreatlengths

toemphasizeabsolute futility,but it isby this futility thatreaders

may be able to recuperate nothingness. There is something in

futilityworththinkingaboutmorefully,andthatsomething,being

nothing, recuperates—à la futility qua futility. So the question

arises:whyhavethesetextsnotyetbeensuckedintotheblackhole

oftheirownmaking?Itisbecausetheyfirstrequirereaderstopass

throughtheeventhorizoninordertoactualizetheirnothingness.

In other words, Zen pessimism recuperates failure not in

ordertoredeemtheworld,butrathertopointoutmoreandmore

ofitsinfinitefailures.Cioranwrites,

“Allissuffering”—modernized,theBuddhistexpressionruns:“Allis

nightmare.”

Thereby, nirvana, whose mission now is to end a much more

widespreadtorment,isnolongerarecoursereservedtothefewbut

becomesasuniversalasnightmareitself.(Cioran,1976,14)

Whereas Zen Buddhist satori, the nirvanic experience of innerpeace, emphasizes the awakened mind as its source, Cioran

paradoxically insists(viaanoneiric logicofsuffering)thatonlyby

nightmare comes one’s true awakening. To see the world as

nightmare,tohearitplayingasthenocturneofpessimism,isnotto

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know the modern world philosophically, but rather to know it

practically.9 Atpresent,letusemphasizethatCiorandoesnotspecifically

advocateZenBuddhistpractice,butratherusesBuddhistdoctrine

to problematize his readers’ relationship to his non-philosophy’s

underlying tenets. Suzuki states, for example, that ‘contradiction,

negation,orparadoxicalstatementistheinevitableresultoftheZen

wayoflookingatlife’(1965,120).Zenisa“livingfact,”anintuitive

means of apprehending truth, and not something to be penned

down.Ontheonehand,Suzuki’snotionofparadox ishomologoustoCioran’saphoristic languageofparadox.Ontheotherhand,one

findsinCioranapoeticinversionofZen,thatis,anon-philosophy,

but one profusely committed to writing. Consequently, it

exacerbatesZen’slimit-conditionstothepointoffailure.Thatistosay, his appropriation of Buddhist thought is itself a failure. But

failure is ‘alwaysessential,’writesCioran,because it ‘revealsusto

ourselves, permitsus to seeourselves asGod seesus’ (1976, 17).

For a Zen pessimist, the world does not change, only their

perceptionofitdoes.Itfollowsthatthisshiftinperceptionenables

one to attain a level of pessimistic lucidity, a state which neither

withdraws from, nor adds to, the world’s troubles. ‘One can be

proud of what one has done,’ writes Cioran, ‘but one should be

muchprouderofwhatonehasnotdone.Suchpridehasyet tobe

invented’(2012b,81).

Appealstonon-actionraiseanimportantquestionregarding

Cioran’s work and its relationship to ethics. In Buddhism, one

cannotextricatetheepistemologicalfromtheethical,fortheethical

istheapriorimoment.Buddhasteppedontothepaththemoment

he recognized that others suffer and that their suffering is the

sufferingofself.Earlierwepointedoutthat,forCioran,onlyinnon-

beingisonecapableofnotbeingdisappointed.Thisnotionechoes

9AsCioranseesit,‘Inthis“greatdormitory,”asoneTaoisttextcallstheuniverse,

nightmareisthesolemethodoflucidity’(2012a,19).

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21

the very crux of Buddhism’s commitment to compassion.10It is

precisely in thatmoment of realization of non-existence that one

recognizes the absolute commitment to others. Here Cioran

presents readers with an ethical conundrum. He fails to allot an

ethical imperative for compassion and thus fails to assess the

ethical implications of this thought. Hence, his invocation of

Buddhism is indeed a failure, at least an ethical failure. But being

that Cioran’s appeal to non-action serves as a practical vehicle to

auto-negation, returning the practitioner to their rightful

inexistence,thenhisworkdoesprovideafascinatingpivotpointfor

the critical reception of his work to cross back into the realm of

ethics.

TheWayofWorst IfthereisalessonofunlearningtobegleanedfromCioran,it

is to erase the “fiction of being” that people, dishonestly

perpetuating an insidious complicity with their own births,

constantly entrust to themselves. Being’s fiction is that it

masqueradesasnon-fiction,thatitistheonly“reality”that“exists.”

Onemustfirstawakentothenightmareinorderforthenightmare

toprovideone’sawakening.Theawakeningmightbesudden,asin

the Rinzai account of satori, or itmay come over the duration of

time,mirroring the Soto school. Or perhaps one ought ‘to go still

furtherthanBuddha,toraiseoneselfabovenirvana,tolearntodo

without it…, to be stopped by nothing, not even by the notion of

deliverance,regardingitasamereway-station,anembarrassment,

10In Dialogues with Scientists and Sages (1986), Renée Weber remarks thatultimate reality in Buddhism is a state that, similar to Kant’s ‘noumenon,’ is

‘beyond human language and thought.’ ‘It is from this level of wholeness,’ she

continues, ‘that truecompassionderives.Compassion—thecentralethicalvalue

of Buddhism—is therefore no mere emotion but rather a force that lies

embeddedinrealityitself’(129).

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aneclipse…’(1976,207).Suchanawakeningisthereforeakindofsleeping,11a nirvanic reversal of nirvana wherein the pessimist

refuses self and world, but also refuses what is beyond self and

world. No matter how it comes, his work plants the nightmarish

seed of readerly awakening necessary to properly decipher the

fictive nature of being. This way of reading, which is a type of

pessimist sleuthingor truedetection,12sets thestage todismantle

the very stage upon which this fiction takes place, reversing the

hermeneuticcircleintoaself-eatingorOuroboricone.

Ultimately,Cioranoftenavoidsgoingintotherealmofethics.

His is an ethics of no one. But this ethics of no one conceals an

ethicsoftheOther.Itmodelsthekindofhorror-dwellingittakesto

create the conditions of possibility in which other individuals,

perhaps his readers, can enter into the realm of ethics.13For, todwell in horror necessarily means coming to realize, as if out of

nowhere,thatbeingoneselfistherootcauseofhorrorintheworld.

Hence, the critical reception of his work can point to an ethical

encounter, even though he may have found one futile. Put yet

anotherway,thelackofethicsinCiorancanbenegativelyindexed

as a pessimal ethical move on his part, which lays the ground

(pessum“downward,totheground,”fromPIEped-yos)14foraformof pessimo-mystical social anarchism, a world of no ones who

communebytheirnothingness.

His readers thus find themselves complicit in an adroit

Cioranianparadox: that thispracticeofauto-negation,selflessness

11Cf.Cioran:‘Ifwecouldsleeptwenty-fourhoursaday,wewouldsoonreturnto

the primordial slime, the beatitude of that perfect torpor before Genesis—the

dreamofeveryconsciousnesssickofitself’(1976,212).12Onthecoinageanduseofthisnewterminrelationtothestudyofpessimism,

seetherecentreleaseentitledTrueDetection(2014).SchismBooks.13A Nietzscheanmove of this sortwould thus view utter futility as essentially

productive,i.e.inaworldwithabsolutelynohope,thereisnothingthatcanharm

anyoneanylonger.14“Pejorative.”OnlineEtymologyDictionary.[Online][Accessed:30August2015].

BRADBAUMGARTNER

23

viapessimism,mightbearoutinarelinquishmentofsuffering.The

question returns: why read the old curmudgeon Cioran? The

courageofthepessimist isto intuitivelyrecognizethatthereisno

hopeandtoknowthattheonlykindofworldtobedesiredisone

inhabitedbythosewhoexistbytheabundanceoftheirnothingness.

Zen pessimism speculatively opens itself to a readership that can

dwellinthatspaceonandasitsown,areadership,thatistosay,of

no-mind. In no-mind one is said to know without knowing, act

without acting, and do without doing.15Put simply, for the Zen

pessimist to do nothing means to do without doing, by intensely

observing without identifying with oneself as the observer and

recognizing, in that moment, the presence of infinite others

facticallysufferingwithyouandbecauseofyou.Thesearereaders

who, in the commons of nowhere, move in a state of pessimist

mushin(No-Mind),andwho,intheultimateformofcompassionforoneanother,asknothingofeachother.16Topracticeaskingnothing

ofanyoneisalsotosufferthroughthehorrorofoneself,the“livingfact”ofworst.

Zenpessimismshowsthewaytoself-erasurebyshowingus

nothing;it’sonlymaxim,nomaxim.Toillustratethispoint,wecan

take, for example, a short essayentitled “TheOdysseyofRancor,”

whenCioranwritesthat

[O]ur kingdom is that of the “I,” and through the “I” there is no

salvation. To exist is to condescend to sensation, hence to self-

15Cf. theWuXinLun (OnNoMind): ‘It isas ifoneweretoseetotheendof theday, and still see not, because in the end there was nomind to see. It is as if

hearingalldaytotheendofday,stillonehearsnot,becauseintheendtherewas

nomindtohear.Itisasifonefeelsalldaytotheendoftheday,andyetfeelsnot,

becauseintheendtherewasnomindtofeel.Itisasifoneknowsalltotheendof

theday,andstillknowsnot,becauseintheendtherewasnomindtoknow.For

nomindisindeedtruemind.Truemindisindeednomind’(QuotedinSaso,1992,4-5).16Thisparadox,arisingexnihilointhemindoftheZenpessimist,pointstoitself

asadoubleentendre:toasknothingofanyone,thatis,buttheirnothingness.

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affirmation […]Themorewe try towrestourselves fromourego,

thedeeperwesinkintoit.Tryaswewilltoexplodeit,justwhenwe

suppose we have succeeded, there it is, apparently more self-

assured thanever;whateverwedo todestroy itmerelyaugments

itsstrengthandsolidarity,assuchisitsvigoranditsperversitythat

it flourishes still more in affliction than in joy […] No man stirs

withoutallyinghimselftothemultiple,toappearances,tothe“I”.To

actistoforfeittheabsolute.(1998,62-3)

The logicofnon-actionfoundinthispassage isaxiomatic: there is

no one to be; there neverwas anything to do; there is noway in

because there isnowayout. Inotherwords,pessimistnon-action

resurrects the potential for ontological insurrection: to accept the

inexistentcalltobenoone,whatZenreferstoastheselflessself,is

simply to return one to the full awareness of their nothingness.

Pessimismof this sort claimsnomasteryoveranything; it isnon-

masteredthroughitsnirvanicreversalofnirvana,therenunciation

of enlightenment: ‘“Children admit no limits to anything’ they

always want to see beyond, to see what there is afterward. But

there is no afterward.Nirvana is a limit, the limit. It is liberation,

supreme impasse….’ (1976, 175). This pessimistic kōan, a playful

butconcentratedgestureof language,givespause:todesireaway

out isa limit.Ciorandoesnotofferanescape.Rather,heoffersus

nothing.

Cioran’s writings supply readers with the negative of

writing, the dissemination of the extimacy of his soul. In On theHeightsofDespair,Cioranwrites,‘Mysoulischaos,howcanitbeatall?There iseverything inme:searchandyouwill findout...inme

anything is possible, for I am hewho at the suprememoment, in

front of absolute nothingness, will laugh’ (1992, 86). This is the

mantra of the pessimist, the one who, despite the ineffable

magnitudeof suffering in theworld, staysput, tosee itand feel it

withanintensitythatothersdonotyetpossess,sothattheymight

one day laugh, to suffer absolutely but not to balk, for in this

laughterthereisabsolutelynothingoverwhichtosuffer.Speaking

impossibly, from there, which is really nowhere, everything is

BRADBAUMGARTNER

25

possible, impossibly speaking, even nothing. Stay put and let Zen

pessimismfailyouintoinexistence.Worstisnotawayout.Itisthe

Way.

References

Abelson,Peter.(1993)“SchopenhauerandBuddhism”,PhilosophyEastandWest.Vol.43,no.2:255-78.

Barrett,William.(1965)Introduction.ZenBuddhism.ByD.T.Suzuki.GardenCity:Doubleday.

Cioran,E.M.(1975)AShortHistoryofDecay.(Originallypublishedin1949).Trans.RichardHoward.NewYork:TheVikingPress.

Cioran,E.M(1976)TheTroublewithBeingBorn.(Originallypublishedin1973).Trans.RichardHoward.NewYork:ArcadePublishing.

Cioran,E.M.(1992)OntheHeightsofDespair.(Originallypublishedin1934).Trans.IlincaZarifopol-Johnston.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.

Cioran,E.M(1998)HistoryandUtopia.(Originallypublishedin1960).Trans.

RichardHoward.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.

Cioran,E.M.(2012a)AllGallisDivided.(Originallypublishedin1952).Trans.RichardHoward.NewYork:Arcade.

Cioran,E.M.(2012b)AnathemasandAdmirations.(Originallypublishedin1986).Trans.RichardHoward.NewYork:Arcade.

Lispector,Clarice.(2012)ThePassionAccordingtoG.H.(Originallypublishedin1964).Trans.IdraNovey.NewYork:NewDirections.

Masciandaro,Nicola.(2014)“ParadisicalPessimism:OntheCrucifixionDarkness

andtheCosmicMaterialityofSorrow”,QuiParle:CriticalHumanitiesandSocialSciences.Vol.23,no.1:183-212.MeditationsontheTarot:AJourneyintoChristianHermeticism.(1985)Trans.RobertPowell.NewYork:Penguin.

Petreu,Marta.(2005)AnInfamousPast:E.M.CioranandtheRiseofFascisminRomania.Trans.BogdanAldea.Chicago:IvanR.Dee.Saso,MichaelR.(1992)Trans.BuddhistStudiesintheRepublicofChina:1990-1991.Honolulu:UniversityofHawaiiPress.Schopenhauer,Arthur.(1969).TheWorldasWillandRepresentation.(1819)Trans.E.F.J.Payne.NewYork:Dover.

Suzuki,D.T.(1965)ZenBuddhism.Ed.WilliamBarrett.GardenCity:Doubleday.Thacker,Eugene.(2012)“CosmicPessimism.”continent.Vol.2,no.2:66-75.[Online]Availableat:

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http://www.continentcontinent.cc/index.php/continent/article/view/84

[Accessed:20March2014].

Thacker,Eugene.(2013)“TheSightofaMangledCorpse:AnInterviewwith

EugeneThacker.”Scapegoat.No.5:379-386.Weber,Renée.(1986)DialogueswithScientistsandSages:TheSearchforUnity.NewYork:PenguinBooks.

Zarifopol-Johnston,Ilinca.(1995)Introduction.TearsandSaints.ByCioran.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.

[Ulisse Aldovrandi, Monstrorum Historia, 1642]

MARVELOUS HARMONY: ON CHRISTINA THE ASTONISHING

Nicola Masciandaro

The ears of mortals are filled with this sound, but they are unable to hear it.

Cicero, Somnium Scipionis

In Adam’s voice before he fell there was the sound of every harmony and the sweetness of the whole art in music.

Hildegard of Bingen

There we hear without any sound.

Meister Eckhart

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Asifechoinginthespacebetweentheunhearablesoundwhichfillsthe body and the incorporeal hearing that takes place without

sound, Christina Mirabilis (1150-1224) was known to produce

astonishingharmoniesinthefollowingmanner:

[…]etcumipsisaliquando[sedendo] loquereturdeChristo,subito

et inopinate rapiebatur a spiritu, corpusque ejus velut trochus

ludentum puerorum in vertiginem rotabatur, ita quod ex nimia

vehementia vertiginis nulla in corpore ejus membrorum forma

discerniposset.Cumquediutius sic rotata fuisset, acsi vehementia

deficeret,membris omnibus quiescebat; sonabatque proinde inter

guttur et pectus ejus, quaedam harmonia mirabilis, quam nemo

mortalium vel intelligere posset, vel aliquibus artificiis imitari.

Solamflexibilitatemmusicaeettonosilleejuscantushabebat;verba

vero melodiae, ut ita dicam, si tamen verba dici possunt,

incomprehensibiliter concrepabant. Nulla interim de ore ejus vel

naso vox vel anhelitus spiritalis exibat, sed inter solum pectus et

gutturharmoniavocisangelicaeresonabat.

Sometimeswhileshewassittingwiththem[nunsofSt.Catherine’s

near Saint-Trond], she would speak of Christ and suddenly and

unexpectedly she would be ravished in the spirit and her body

wouldrollandwhirlaround likeahoop.Shewhirledaroundwith

such extremeviolence that the individual limbsof herbody could

notbedistinguished.Whenshehadwhirledaroundforalongtime

in this manner, it seemed as if she became weakened by the

violence of her rolling and all her limbs grew quiet. Then a

wondrous harmony sounded between her throat and her breast

whichnomortalmancouldunderstandnorcoulditbeimitatedby

anartificialinstrument.Hersonghadnotonlythepliancyandtones

of music but also the words—if thus I might call them—sounded

togetherincomprehensibly.Thevoiceorspiritualbreath,however,

didnotcomeoutofhermouthornose,butaharmonyoftheangelic

voice resounded only from between the breast and the throat.

(ThomasDeCantimpré,1999.III,35)

NICOLAMASCIANDARO

29

It is beautiful that Christina does this—that is, beautiful more in

lightofthefactthatshedoesitthanduetothenatureofwhatshedoes, however enchanting it sounds. Or better, this harmonic

whirling, whereby the saint’s body spins into being a superlative

toy of its own divine game, opens a third domain of shimmering

depthwherewhatandthatbecomeindistinguishable,wherewhatsheisdoingisthatsheisandthatsheisdoingitiswhatsheis.To

makethissoundlessloopy(andmore),recallthecorrelativenature

of deixis—‘the category within which language refers to its own

takingplace’ (Agamben, 1991, 25)—and its grounding ofmystical

discourse: ‘Where should I write? That is the question the

organizationofeverymystictextstrivestoanswer:thetruthvalue

of the discourse does not depend on the truth value of its

propositions,butonthefactofitsbeingintheveryplaceatwhich

theSpeakerspeaks.’(DeCerteau,2000,199)Thegroundofmusical

hearing is likewisedeictically turned,asGuerinoMazzolaexplains

inTheToposofMusic: ‘Thespecialclassofshifterordeicticsignsisveryimportantinmusic...Theirsignificancetranscendsthelexical

realityandpenetratestheunsayableexistenceofthesystem’suser... In music deixis, such as emotional signification, is the standard

situation.’ (2002, 188 My emphasis) As the twin auto-deictic

dimensions of music and mysticism coincide in the principle of

speaking-through-muteness or signifying-by- unsaying—consider

the human gesture of pointing to something astonishing while

covering one’s mouth—so does Christina’s ecstatic spinning in

placeproducealiterallymouthlessyetstillverbalharmony.1

1Them-resonance across these terms is etymologically significant: ‘the word[mythos] evidences theambivalentnatureof aprimalword.Thecorrespondingverbformythos ismytheomai,meaning,“todiscourse,talk,speak”; itsroot,mu-,means“tosound”.Butanotherverbofthesameroot,myein—ambivalentbecause

ofthesubstitutionofashort“u”—means“toclose”,specificallytoclosetheeyes,

the mouth, and wounds. From this root we have Sanskrit mūkas (with longvowel),meaning“mute,silent”,andLatinmutuswiththesamemeaning.Itrecursin Greek in the wordsmystes, “the consecreated”, andmysterion, “mysterium”,

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I begin, then,with a first response—aresponse thatwould

itselfbefirst.Somethingimportantissimplyinevidence,inmotion

with the spontaneous fact of Christina’s moving, as if with equal

suddennessIhavecaughtmyselflookingatherforlongerthanshe

was even there—an order of reaction to anticipate by echo the

timelesstelosofmysticalunionwhenthesoulrealizes,asitssaysin

TheMirrorofSimpleSouls,‘whereshewasbeforeshewas.’(Porete,1993,218)Fromthisground-zeroimpressionitfollows,intheaura

of our not possessing real knowledge of the nature of her action,

that something is here actually disclosed—if we can keep to the

simplicity of it—about the beautiful essence of doing, about the

intrinsicworthofactionitself.Thiscommentarybegins,then,from

the position that the saint’s resonant spiraling is a standard ofaction, a paradigm of doing, just as her behavior itself is literallyparadigmatic, characterized by ‘the suspension of reference and

normaluse’andis ‘besideitself’(para-deiknymi).(Agamben,2009,24).Christinaastonishesbecausesheactsecstaticallybesideherself

andisbesideherselfwithaction.Anditispreciselythisthatmakes

her, the person,notparadigmatic, not exemplary of her class, butsomething unaccountably more special, a saint (from sacer, setapart). The saint is not a person who shows what to do, but

someonewho demonstrates what action should be. And it is thisthat makes her a most true person, or something that sounds

throughitself(per-sonare).__________

andlaterduringtheChristianera,gavethecharacteristicstamptotheconceptof

mysticism: speechless contemplation with closed eyes, that is, eyes turned

inward’ (Gebser,1985,65).Apophatic language likewiseevokesvia theunsaid:

‘apophatic language . . . displaces the grammatical object, affirms amoment of

immediacy, and affirms a moment of ontological pre-construction—as in the

paradoxicalrefrainthatinmysticalunionthesoulreverts“towhereitwasbefore

itwas”.Themeaningeventistransreferential.Ratherthanpointingtoanobject,

apophatic language attempts to evoke in the reader an event that is—in its

movementbeyondstructuresof selfandother, subjectandobject—structurally

analogoustotheeventofmysticalunion’(Sells,1996,10).

NICOLAMASCIANDARO

31

Wishing tobecomea stethoscopeor speculativeearplaced

uponChristina’sbreast,somethingthatcanhearthehiddenvoiceof

her heart, this commentary will perform a hermeneutics of

auscultation proper to the interface between mystical vision and

thebodyas instrumentof impossible sound.Our task is to see, in

the mirror of this whirling harmony, what Christina hears. More

specifically, rather than treating the saint’s behavior as an occult

phenomenon, religiousmiracle,orhagiographic story, Iwill try to

drawfromitsmovementavisionofintelligentaction,accordingto

thefollowingdefinitionalcriteria:

1)Actionisspecular.Itistheinherentlydelightfulmirroringforthof thehiddennatureandrealityof theagentwhosebeing is

thusamplified.‘Forinallactionwhatisprincipallyintendedbythe

agent, whether he acts by natural necessity or voluntarily, is the

disclosure ormanifestation of his own image.Whence it happens

that every agent, insofar as he is such, takes delight. For, because

everythingthatisdesiresitsownbeingandinactingthebeingofan

agent is in a certain way amplified, delight necessarily follows.’2

Suchistheactivityofthewholeuniverse,whichisnothingbutthe

self-intensifyingspecularinstrumentwherebyRealityorGod,‘Who

was originally unconscious, now becomes oblivious of oblivion

itselfandgetstherealandfinalanswertoHisoriginalFirstWord,

“WhoamI?”,as“IamGod”.’(MeherBaba,1973,139)

2)Actionisintelligentwhenitistruetotheuniversaltaskoflife,which is to free itself from itself,absolutely: ‘Allactionexcept

that which is intelligently designed to attain God-realisation,

createsabindingforconsciousness.Itisnotonlyanexpressionof

2“Naminomniactioneprincipaliterintenditurabagente,sivenecessitatenature

sive volontarie agat, propriam similitudinem explicare. Unde fit quod omne

agens,inquantumhuiusmodi,delectatur;quia,cumomnequodestappetatsuum

esse,ac inagendoagentisessequodammodoamplietur,sequiturdenecessitate

delectatio, quia delectatio rei desiderate semper annexa est.” (Alighieri, 1965,

I.13.2–3)

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accumulatedignorance,buta furtheradditiontothataccumulatedignorance...Alllifeisanefforttoattainfreedomfromself-createdentanglement. It is a desperate struggle to undo what has beendoneunderignorance.’(MeherBaba,1967,I.112-3.) 3) Intelligent action is musical, in the sense of being amovement perfected in the play of a beneficial release of theformless into form. ‘Topenetrate into theessenceofallbeingandsignificance and to release the fragrance of that inner attainmentfortheguidanceandbenefitofothers,byexpressing,intheworldofforms, truth, love,purity andbeauty—this is the solegamewhichhas intrinsic and absolute worth. All other happenings, incidentsand attainments in themselves can have no lasting importance.’(MeherBaba,1967,II.110) Insum, intelligentaction is themusicalrevelationofTruth.For as Cioran observes in Tears and Saints, ‘Only music givesdefiniteanswers.’(1995,80) To effect this, my commentary will compose itself byconsidering the three aspects of its principal idea (specularity,intelligence, musicality) in correlation to the stages of Christina’smovement (speaking, spinning, sounding), understanding that allaspectsareperforcealsopresent ineachstageandthatthewholeevent, liketheanagogicsenseofscripturewhichgivesa“foretasteof paradise”, is mystically fourth—a participation in what standsbeyond the triune count of time. The hidden, unrepresentedmediumofChristina’smovementisherownmysticallistening,ourlistening to which—hearing her hearing—will both explain herastonishing behavior and articulate the nature of true action. Theappropriateness of this method of understanding Christina’smovementisunderscoredbyitslegibilityintermsoftheuniversalprocessionoflovethroughgross,subtle,andmentalspheresintherespectiveformsoflust,longing,andresignation.3First,shefollowsherpleasurebeyonditsinherentinsufficiencyintovehement

3SeeMeherBaba,1967,III.175-80.

NICOLAMASCIANDARO

33

passion and ecstasy. Second, she spins toward union with what

fleshcannotpossess.Third,she isquieted insurrendertothewill

that speaks through her. This, in turn, is the pattern actionmust

follow,thatitwillfollow,whenonelistenstoit.

Speaking

et cum ipsis aliquando [sedendo] loqueretur de Christo, subito

et inopinate rapiebatur a spiritu [Sometimes while she was

sittingwiththem,shewouldspeakofChristandsuddenlyand

unexpectedlyshewouldberavishedinthespirit]

TospeakofChrististoreflectuponthehumanmirrorofGod,upon

the perfection that speculates you infinitely beyond itself, to re-

cognize the God-Man as one’s mirror. It is to voice a universal

cognizance of life as ordered towards its immanent beyond, in

continuitywithactionasprimaryrecognition.AsMeherBabasays,

‘man’s cognizance is life inman, andman’s life ismadecognizantthroughtheactionsofman.’(1973,93originalemphasis)SoClareofAssisitellsonetogazewithinthismirrorcontinually,iugiter—a

word whose compound root (aiu-guei) literally and nearly

ouroborically (life/age/eternity-life) signifies long/eternal life and

whose semantic association with flowing water conveys the

principle of that which is always streaming beyond itself. She

writes, ‘Look upon [intuere] this mirror [speculum] every day, O

queen and spouse of Jesus Christ, and continually [iugiter] study

[speculare]your face in it.’(FrancisandClare:TheCompleteWorks,

1982,204)Thislookingismorethanmeditationuponperfection’s

attributes, for these—indicated by Clare as poverty, humility, and

love—areonlythe“parametersofthismirror”andnot“thatMirror”

itself[ipsumspeculum].(FrancisandClare,1982,204-205.)

To reflect upon Christ means, generically, to see

from/towards the recognition of life that the continuity of action

itself is, to address the livingwork of action, the life one is really

doinginthemidstofallactivity.Tore-cognizeChrististospeculate

the speculum, to study the mirror that becomes manifest in the

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midstofself-reflectionvis-à-visGod,i.e.theunboundedRealitythat

onehasclearlynotrealized.Realityisnegativelyspecular,anopen

secrethiddeninplainlightlikethedarkgroundorsilveringofthe

mirror, which in Turkish is perfectly named sir (secret). It is the

still,true,andunseenspeculumwhereinlifeappearstoitself,what

Ruusbroeccalls‘thesparklingstone[of]Christ...aspotlessmirror

inwhichallthingshavetheirlife.’(1985,60)

The framework of such speculation of the God-Man as

universalmirrorismoregraspable(andless) ifwebracketoffthe

anthropicincarnationalmodelandconsiderinsteadtheideaofthe

ChristorAvatarastheuniversalyetindividuatedliveappearanceof

Godvis-à-visallforms,thespeciesofallspeciesorspiceofthespice

of life.AsMeherBaba says, ‘ThisDivinitypervades the Illusion in

effectandpresentsItselfininnumerablevarietiesofforms—gross,

subtleandmental.’4Accordingly,heoftendescribedhimselfandthe

function of God-realized individuals in specular terms: ‘He who

knows everything displaces nothing. To each one I appear to be

what he thinks I am.’ (1957, 3) 5 ‘The mirror is changeless,

4‘It is very difficult to grasp the entire meaning of the word “Avatar”. For

mankinditiseasyandsimpletodeclarethattheAvatarisGodandthatitmeans

thatGodbecomesman...ItwouldbemoreappropriatetosaythattheAvataris

God and that God becomes man for all mankind and simultaneously God also

becomesasparrowforallsparrowsinCreation,anantforallantsinCreation,a

pigforallpigsincreation,aparticleofdustforalldustsinCreation,aparticleof

airforallairsinCreation,etc.,foreachandeverythingthatisinCreation.When

thefiveSadguruseffectthepresentationoftheDivinityofGodintoIllusion,this

Divinity pervades the Illusion in effect and presents Itself in innumerable

varieties of forms—gross, subtle andmental. Consequently inAvataricperiods

Godmingleswithmankindasmanandwiththeworldofantsasanant,etc.But

themanof theworld cannot perceive this andhence simply says thatGodhas

becomemanandremainssatisfiedwiththisunderstanding inhisownworldof

mankind’(MeherBaba,1973,268-269)

5‘Whatyouseeinthemirrorisyourexactlikeness—itisnotthelikenessofthe

mirror! . . . however I appear to you, it is only your own reflected image. I am

alwaysstillandunchangeable—likethewallorthemirror’(MeherBaba,quoted

inLordMeher,316).

NICOLAMASCIANDARO

35

immovableandalwayssteady.I, too,amlikeamirror.Thechange

youobserveisinyou—notinme.Iamalwayssoconstantandstill

that it cannot be imagined.’ 6 Christ is the appearance of the

universal mirror, the face through which Reality looks back into

you, photographing in a kindof impossible flash the invisible fact

that you are no more of the world than it: ‘They are not of the

world, even as I am not of the world’ (John, 17:16). The bare

phenomenal truth of these words is explained by Michel Henry:

‘Just like Christ, as a man I am not of the world in the radical

phenomenological sense that the appearing out of which my

phenomenological flesh is made, and which constitutes my true

essence, is not the appearing of theworld. This is not due to the

effect of some supposed credo, philosophical or theological; it is

rather because the world has no flesh, because in the “outside-

itself”oftheworldnofleshandnolivingarepossible.’(2003,101)

OrasEckhart(2009,131)says,‘Ioncethought—itwasnotlong

6MeherBaba,quotedinLordMeher,1062.‘TheGodyouareinsearchofisnotup

in thesky.He ishere—onthisplane! IamThat. Iaminyou,sosearch forme

withinyourself. I amnot inanymosque, templeor church.Youmayclaim that

this is impossible—totally impossible. All right, then tell me do your eyes see

yourself?Theyseetheworld,buttheydonotseeyou.Forthatyouhavetousea

mirror. Similarly, through themirrorof love, youhave to see yourself.And the

personwhohasthemirroristhePerfectMasterandnooneelse.OnlyaPerfect

Masterhasthemirroroflove’(MeherBaba,quotedinLordMeher,006).‘Iremain

thesameEternalOneandaminall;thereforeyouallareGod,andyetyoufeelso

helpless.Whyisthis?BecausethereisasortofveilthatveilsyoufromGod.You

yourself are theveil, and it isnotpossible foryou to lift it— thisveilwhich is

yourself. Youreyes,whicharequite small, can seeavastpanoramaandall the

objects contained in it, but they cannot see themselves. To see themselves, a

mirrorisrequired.So,whentheMirrorofmyGracedescends,yourownTrueSelf

isrevealedinaninstant’(LordMeher,4092).‘BeingthetotalmanifestationofGod

inhumanform,Heislikeagaugeagainstwhichmancanmeasurewhatheisand

what he may become. He trues the standard of human values by interpreting

them in terms of divinely human life. He is interested in everything but not

concernedaboutanything’(MeherBaba,1967,III.14-5).

CYCLOPSJOURNAL

36

ago—thatIamamanissomethingothermensharewithme...but

thatIam,thatbelongstonomanbutmyself,nottoaman,nottoan

angel,noteventoGodexceptinsofarasIamonewithHim.’Thefact

of one’s life simply is superessential anddivine, beyond assertion

anddenial.SoMeherBabasays, ‘Philosophers,atheistsandothers

mayaffirmorrefutetheexistenceofGod,butaslongastheydonot

deny their very existence, they continue to testify their belief in

God; for I tell you with divine authority that God is Existence,

eternalandinfinite.Heiseverything.Forman,thereisonlyoneaim

inlife,andthatistorealizehisunitywithGod.’(LordMeher,4055)

One may distract oneself with correlational praise or complaint

about the situation, or lose oneself to a panoply of purposes, but

thereisnorealargumentwithReality—thatwhichfreelyexistson

the order of divine whim and with which there can be no

substantial relation other than individual eternal union. Reality is

itself thatwhichwills it, thegroundlessgroundofeverything that

cannotnotwill it, fromwhosehearinggrowsthemysticdesire ‘to

be everything [tout].’(Bataille, 1988, xxxii) As Julian of Norwich

hears God tell her: ‘I am ground of thy beseeching.’ (1993, 154)

Christinawhirls in the placewhere her ears have touched

the ground, in a body that hears the hidden word whose secret

grows into the very spiral of one’s ears: ‘Now there was a word

spoken to me in private [verbum absconditum], and my ears by

stealthas itwerereceivedtheveinsof itswhisper [venassusurri]’

(Job, 4:12). A hearing through which one begins to touch—a

touching throughwhich one begins to hear . . . themirror of the

Real. Commenting on thiswhisper, John of the Cross explains the

object of such mystical auscultation as the “whistling of love-

stirringbreezes”[elsilbodelosairesamorosos].7Hewrites, ‘justas

two things are felt in the breeze (the touch and the whistling or

sound), so in this communication . . . two things are experienced:

knowledgeandafeelingofdelight...Thedelightofhearingismuch

7SpiritualCanticle14/15.12,inJohnoftheCross,1991,530.

NICOLAMASCIANDARO

37

greater than that of feeling because the sound in the sense of

hearing ismorespiritual.’ (Ibid)Likewise,wemayconceiveof the

saint’s spinning as a kind of spiral organ dance, the corporeal

repercussion of spiritually becoming ear, just as the semazen or

whirlingdervish follows from the contemplative practice of sema,

whichsimplymeans“listening”.

Mysticalauscultationisamatterofbecomingallearsforthe

Reality that must be, that is, right there—it being that through

which anything is perceived at all. So for Bonaventure, the divine

being,initsradicallyimmanentandinconceivablesimplicity,isthe

first thing one always sees and so continually overlooks: ‘How

remarkable, then, is the blindness of the intellectwhich does not

takenoteofthatwhichitseesfirst,andwithoutwhichitcanknow

nothing....Accustomedasitistothedarknessofthingsandtothe

phantasmsofsensibleobjects,whenthemind looksat the lightof

the highest being, it seems to see nothing. And it does not

understand that this darkness itself is the highest illumination of

ourmind.’(2002,115)Tosensethisfirstimageistolistenthrough

overlooking, so that mystical auscultation, to add a twist to the

classicVedanticanalogy, sounds like listening tohow thesnake—

i.e. the rope (ultimate reality) which one cannot without

illuminationnotperceive as a snake (manifolduniverse)—sounds

likearope.

Christina’s spiritual rapture, the spiraling of this “little

Christ”, isaflyingfallingfromandintothemirrorthatherspeech,

in the secret of its hearing, reflects. How does hearingmystically

mediate between her speaking and spinning? What initiates her

sudden rapture? How does this spontaneous transition touch the

nature of true action? The answer to these questions lies in the

inherentnegativeinfinityofthewill,whoseweirdhyper-lonesome

nature—answerable only by the infinite—is to mutate and

accelerateitselfbymeansofitsownprivation.Thisiswhymystical

tradition generally orders affect above intellect, heart over head

(andpracticebeforetheory),asthatwhichalonecanspeculatively

CYCLOPSJOURNAL

38

show the way or lead the mind beyond itself.8What makes it

impossible for Christina to remain speaking is simply the hidden

negativityoroccluded insufficiencyof thepleasureof speculation.

Moreliterally:tospeakofChristmeanstoseeanewthatspeakingof

Christisnotenough—nottomentiontheinevitableintuitionthatto

realizethatTruthonemustat lastsilenceoneself.AsEckhartsays

ofsalvationoreternalbirth,‘Whatdoesitavailmethatthisbirthis

always happening, if it does not happen in me? That it should

happen inme iswhatmatters.’(2009,29)ThegraceofChristina’s

raptureissomethingthatarrivesdesperatelyfromthedarknessof

reflection,whenreflection,duetotheverytruthofitsowndelight,

becomes insufficient—an insufficiency that isnotpredicatedupon

lackbutanunassimilablesurplus,namely,thefactthatwhatoneis

speculatingisalsolookingatyou. ‘TheeyewithwhichIseeGodis

thesameeyewithwhichGodseesme.’(Eckhart,2009,298)Suchis

thebeautifullyblackmirror-pupilofbewilderment that sendsone

intospin,aspertheSufiunderstandingofhayra(bewilderment)in

8‘[T]thePsalmistsays,Tasteandsee.“Taste”refers to theaffectusof love; “See”

refers to the intellect’s cogitation and mediation. Therefore one ought first to

surgeup in themovementof lovebeforeintellectuallypondering . . .For this is

thegeneral rule inmystical theology:oneought tohavepracticebefore theory,

that is,oneoughttobewellpracticedintheheartbeforeonehasknowledgeof

the things said about it’ (HughOfBalma,1997, 71). ‘Noone isdisposed in any

wayto thedivinecontemplationswhich lead toecstasies [excessus]of themind

withoutbeing,likeDaniel,apersonofdesires[virdesideriorum]’(St.Bonaventure,

2002,translationmodified). ‘It isfutiletotrytogleanknowledgeoftruevalues

by exercise of the mind alone. Mind cannot tell you which things are worth

having, it can only tell you how to achieve the ends accepted from non-

intellectualsources.Inmostpersonsthemindacceptsendsfromthepromptings

of wants, but this means denial of the life of the spirit. Only when the mind

accepts its ends and values from the deepest promptings of the heart does it

contributetothelifeofthespirit.Thusmindhastoworkinco-operationwiththe

heart;factualknowledgehastobesubordinatedtointuitiveperceptions;andheart

has to be allowed full freedom in determining the ends of life without any

interference from themind. The mind has a place in practical life, but its role

beginsafterthehearthashaditssay’(MeherBaba,1967,I.140).

NICOLAMASCIANDARO

39

connection with ḥīra (whirlpool)—the perplexity of a swirling

realityinseparablefromone’sownbeing.9Ecstasyisneveramatter

ofescape,butofthefeelingofcomplicitywithsomethingthatistoo

real. So bewilderment—to be rigorously distinguished from

intellectual confusion—is, as IbnArabiexplains, thedead-endexit

whichleadsallthewaytotheAbsolute:‘rationalspeculationleads

to bewilderment [hayra] and theophany leads to bewilderment.

Thereisnothingbutabewilderedone.Thereisnothingexercising

properties but bewilderment. There is nothing but Allah.’ (2005,

64)10Whatseparatesmysticfromphilosopheronthispointisthat

9‘“The[Universal]Orderisperplexity,andperplexityisagitationandmovement,

and movement is life” [al-‘amr ḥīra wa-l-ḥīra qalaq wa ḥaraka wa-l-ḥarakaḥayāt].I read the Arabic wordحیرةhere asḥīranotḥayrafollowing Ibn ‘Arabī’sintention to identify “perplexity” and “whirlpool”.حیرة“perplexity” can be readasḥīranotḥayra, Arabic dictionaries tell us, and “whirlpool” (ḥīra) is oneofthefavourite images of universal life and order in Ibn ‘Arabī’s texts.

Theḥā’ir“perplexed” human being finds himself in constant movement. Hecannotgainafootholdatanypoint,heisnotestablishedanywhere.Thisiswhy

Ibn ‘Arabī says that he is “perplexedinthe multiplication of the One”: this

“multiplication” is not just epistemological, it is ontological as well, and the

perplexedhumanbeingismovinginthewhirlpooloflifeandcosmicOrderandat

thesametimerealisesthatheisatthatmovement.’(Smirnov,22-23).

10Chittick explicates the concept: ‘To find God is to fall into bewilderment

(hayra),notthebewildermentofbeinglostandunabletofindone’sway,butthe

bewilderment of finding and knowing God and of not-finding and not-knowing

Him at the same time. Every existent thing other than God dwells in a never-

never land of affirmation and negation, finding and losing, knowing and not-

knowing.ThedifferencebetweentheFindersandtherestofus is that theyare

fullyawareoftheirownambiguoussituation.Theyknowthesignificanceofthe

sayingof the firstcaliphAbūBakr: “Incapacity toattaincomprehension is itself

comprehension.”’ (1989, 3-4)So forHeidegger,bewildermentcharacterizes the

intellectualexperienceoftruth:‘Thatexperience[‘thefundamentalexperienceof

BeingandTime’]consistsinanever-increasingbutperhapsalso–inafewplaces

– self-clarifying bewilderment in the face of this one event: In the history of

Westernthought,fromitsinception,theBeingofbeingshasindeedbeenthought,

butthetruthofBeingasBeingremainsunthought;notonlyissuchtruthdenied

as a possible experience for thinking, but Western though, as metaphysics,

CYCLOPSJOURNAL

40

theformerrealizesintheactionofherownbeingwhatthelatterat

bestthinkstodo,namely,‘projectunreasonintothingsthemselves,

anddiscoverinourgraspoffacticitytheveritable...intuitionofthe

absolute.’(Meillassoux,2008,82)

The positive insufficiency out of which Christina’s ecstasy

spirals inbewilderment is structurally identical—if I listen rightly

toherhearing—tothatwhichis felt inall limitedformsof love,of

which lust is the most familiar: ‘The unambiguous stamp of

insufficiencywhichlust invariablybears is in itselfasignthat it is

an incomplete and inadequate expression of something deeper,

which is vast and unlimited . . . In this manner the irrepressible

voiceof the infinityofGod’s love indirectlyasserts the imperative

claims of its unexpressed but unimpaired reality.’ (Meher Baba,

1967,III.177)Christina’secstasyflowsalivefromanunreasonable

but no less scientific courage to venture the voidal ground of her

ownwillandexitthecircleofforeseeablepleasure.Sothevectorof

true action is corrective of the self-repetitivewill to gratification,

preciselybyvirtueofbeingtherealorderofpleasureseeking,one

that listens to delight’s essential specularity and touches the

profounder promise of its own failing. Likewise for speculation,

which is also a delightful act. True speculation is that which

ecstatically exit-enters through the factical hole of its own

insufficiency.Fortodosoistheverytuneoflovingintelligence.

tobecontinued

References

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Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress.

expresslythoughunwittinglyconcealstheoccurrenceofthisrefusal.’(Heidegger,

1987,III.189-90)

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41

Agamben,Giorgio.(2009)TheSignatureofAllThings.Trans.LucaD’Isantowith

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Bataille,Georges.(1988)Guilty.Trans.BruceBoone.SanFrancisco:LapisPress.

Bonaventure.(2002)ItinerariummentisinDeum.Trans.ZacharyHayes.Saint

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Cioran,E.M.(1995)TearsandSaints.Trans.IlincaZarifopol-Johnston.Chicago:

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DeCantimpré,Thomas.(1999)LifeofChristinatheAstonishing.Trans.MargotH.

KingandDavidWiljer.Toronto:Peregrina.

DeCerteau,Michel.(2000)“MysticSpeech.”InTheCerteauReader.Ed.Graham

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Chittick,WilliamC.(1989)TheSufiPathofKnowledge:Ibnal-’Arabi’sMetaphysics

ofImagination.Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.

MeisterEckhart.(2009)CompleteMysticalWorks.Trans.MauriceO’C.Walshe.

NewYork:Crossroad.

FrancisandClare:TheCompleteWorks.(1982)Trans.RegisJ.Armstrongand

IgnatiusC.Brady.NewYork:PaulistPress.

Gebser,Jean.(1985)Ever-PresentOrigin.Trans.NoelBarstadwithAlgis

Mickunas.Athens,OH:OhioUniversityPress.

Heidegger,Martin.(1987)Nietzsche.Trans.JoanStambaugh,DavidFarrellKrell,

FankA.Capuzzi.4vols.NewYork:HaperCollins.

Henry,Michel.(2003)IAmtheTruth:TowardaPhilosophyofChristianity.Trans.

SusanEmanuel.Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress.

HughofBalma.(1997)CarthusianSpirituality:TheWritingsofHughofBalmaand

GuigodePonte.Trans.DennisD.Martin.NewYork:PaulistPress.

JohnoftheCross.(1991)CollectedWorks.Trans.KieranKavanaghandOtilio

Rodriguez.Washington,DC:InstituteofCarmeliteStudies.

JulianofNorwich.(1993)Shewings.Ed.GeorgiaRonanCrampton.Kalamazoo,MI:

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Kalchuri,Bhau.LordMeher,[Online]Availableat:http://www.lordmeher.org/

[accessed:7November2014].

Mazzola,Guerino.(2002)TheToposofMusic:GeometricLogicofConcepts,Theory,

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Contingency.Trans.RayBrassier.London:Continuum.

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Porete,Marguerite.(1993)TheMirrorofSimpleSouls.Trans.EllenL.Babinsky.

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THE CYCLOPS AND OCULAR ORIGINATION: A STUDY IN THREE PHASES PART I: THE EYE-AXIS

Constanza Bizraelli

The appearance of the wheels and their work was like unto the color of a beryl [bright gold/yellow]: and they four had one likeness: and their appearance and their work was as it were a wheel in the middle of a

wheel. When they went, they went upon their four sides: and they turned not when they went. As for their rings [rims], they were so high that they were dreadful; and their rings were full of eyes round about them four.

And when the living creatures went, the wheels went by them: and when the living creatures were lifted up from the earth, the wheels were lifted up. Whithersoever the spirit was to go, they went, thither was their spirit to go; and the wheels were lifted up over against them: for the spirit of

the living creature was in the wheels.

Ezekiel 1:15ff (Spoke 4, Cycle 2)

De todas las muertes/ escoge la tuya propia Que será la más breve y ocurrirá en todas partes.

Mario Montalbetti

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44

Introduction TheEnglishword “Cyclop”etymologicallyderives from theunion of two Greek terms: “Κύκλωψ and ὤψops. The former

designates the notion of a wheel, circle or just the figure of

roundness,while the lattermeanseye.The simplest translationofthe termwouldbe: “Roundeye”.However, it ispossible to find in

theetymologicalconstructionoftheword(ifwecombineitwithan

analysisthatfocusesonthearchetypesinplay)theturntowardsa

conception of wheel structured via one of its archetypal

antecedents; Rota1, an ancient term rooted in the Hermetic andCabbalistic traditions. The notion of Rota, approached from ageometric angle only, can be decomposed into two fundamental

symbolisms;ontheonehandthesymbolismofcosmicmotion,that

turnsconcreteonthecyclicpatternsthatstructurethenaturaland

metaphysical worlds of various belief systems and mysticisms

(HermeticismandearlyJudaism,tonameafew),andontheother

1“Rota” or “Taro” is an ancient Kabbalistic formula that has been extensively

interpreted as the expression of the natural absolute, a variant to the

Tetragrammaton,withtheadditionalcomponentsofdynamismandmotion.ItisalsoassociatedwiththeIndianarchetypeoftheMandala.AccordingtoGuillaumePostel (Absconditorum Clavis, 1899), the symbolism of ROTA is intimatelyconnectedwiththeideaofManbecomingGod,itisthereforetheneutralizationof

the binary HOMO-DEUS by means of the archetype of rotation: HOMO-ROTA-

DEUS: ‘[A]ndagain, itmustbetakenintheDEUS-HOMO-ROTAcontext.Assuch,

the Cosmos itself is a rotating sphere consisting of sphereswithin spheres, or,

metaphorically, a wheel.’ (ROTA/RATO : Key to Things Hidden since theFoundationoftheWorld)Onadifferent leveloftheinterpretation,MouniSadhupoints out when analysing the Tarot archetype of the wheel: ‘On the plane of

naturewe have to dowith the pitilessWheel of fortune, otherwise called “the

World’sMill”.ThisWheelgrindseverything,assimilateseverything,andprepares

everything. It raises one thing, and lowers another, as a true ROTA, leaving

nothing immovable, except its AXLEwhich bears the name of: thepossibilityofexistenceofillusion,whichisMATTER.’(1970,192-193).

CONSTANZABIZRAELLI

45

hand the symbolism of wholeness, as Jung pointed out when

analysing theround-shapedarchetypeof theMandala2in termsofthepsychologicalcoagulationofthetotalityoftheself3andaswhat

symbolicallystemsfrom‘thecontemplationintotheabsolutestate

[of consciousness]’(1968, 357). For the purpose of this study, we

willbeinclinedtothinktheGreekroot:“Κύκλ”inadirectionthatis

moreorientedtotheideaofcycle,ratherthantotheformalaspect

of the figureof roundness.A fewexamplesof thepresenceof this

linguisticrootinotherancientGreekwordsmightbe,forinstance:

Κυκλιοδιδασκαλος: that stands for a music teacher of circularchoruses,ordithyrambicpoet,orΚύκλας that stands for “circular,moving in a circle, or recurrent”.Again, ifwe focuson the ideaof

roundnessintermsofmovementratherthanform,andintermsof

temporality rather than spatiality, a new conclusion might be

formed. If we pay attention to the fact that this idea, within the

scheme of the mythological archetype of the Cyclop, becomes

entwinedwithvision(visionintermsofaction),wecouldinferthat

here the sensorial faculty of vision is rendered as a circular

exploratorygesture,whichcomingoutofitself,butatthesametime

carrying its primitive self throughout the action and the

modifications of the agent that this action implies, describes a

curvedtrajectory.

2‘TheSanskritwordmandalameans,“circle”intheordinarysenseoftheword…The“squaringofthecircle”isoneofthemanyarchetypalmotifs,whichformthe

basicpatternsofourdreamsandfantasies.Butitisdistinguishedbythefactthat

itisoneofthemostimportantofthemfromthefunctionalpointofview.Indeed,

it couldevenbecalled thearchetypeofwholeness.Becauseof thissignificance,

the“quaternityoftheOne”istheschemaforallimagesofGod,asdepictedinthe

visionsofEzekiel,Daniel,andEnoch,andastherepresentationofHoruswithhis

foursonsalsoshows.’(Jung,1968,388)3‘Althoughthecentreisrepresentedbyaninnermostpoint,itissurroundedbya

periphery containing everything that belongs to the self- the paired opposites

thatmakeupthetotalpersonality.’(Jung,1968,257)

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Vision is an originating4faculty; it sprouts and grows atsomepoint and develops along the development of its agent. Theocularentailsagerm;itisgroundedontheprimevalstateofbeing-germ.Thegerm-eyesproutsandcomesoutofitselfinordertosee.The Cyclop, cycle-eye, or wheel-eye, according to our reading,would etymologically and archetyposophically 5 describe nothingmorethanthis,thejourneyortrajectoryofvision.Ifvisioniswhatgerminates,within the schemeof theCyclop it does it following acircularpattern.Cyclopherewouldbeframedwithinthepracticeofanactthatistacitlyimpliedintheconstitutionoftheeyeandthatwouldpointtowardsafundamentalconditionofvisioninitsbeingvision. Itwouldhint towards thepresenceof anotherverb,whichapart from executing visionwould predicate a parallel action, thecyclicaction;theactionofturningorspinning. Let’sconsiderthefigureoftheeyeasthatofthesun,whichspinsandgiveslightsimultaneously.Accordingtoakyklip6reading,if theeye (inanabstract sense) iswhatsees, it isalsowhat turnsand what spins. The action of turning is not a secondary actionpredicated upon the basis of seeing, but it is (it belongs) withseeing, since the very beginning. In a similar reading, ArthurBernard Cook, in his book about Zeus, compares the eye of theCyclopswith ‘theshiningorbofthesun’.7(1964, I,313)Followingthelineofthisinterpretation,ananalysisoftheCyclopinthese

4Itisoriginatinginthesensethatitoriginates,thatithasorigin.5Theuseofthistermwillbeexplainedonthefollowingsectionofthispaper.6Fromkyklop:cyclop7AccordingtoCookthearchetypeofthesunasarevolvingwheelfindsitsperfectcorrespondencewiththenotionofeyeandparticularlywiththearchetypeoftheCyclop, bearer of a single round eye: ‘Who orwhatwas the national light-godbefore theadventof theGreekApollon? I amdisposed to think thathewas,orbecame…themonstrousformknowntotheGreeksastheKyklops.(1964,I,302).‘A Greek of the classical period at least might speak of the sun as a revolvingwheelandyetcredittalesofthekyklopesandthecheirogástores,thoughlogicallytheformershouldhaveforcedhimtoidentifythediskwiththeeyeofagiantand

CONSTANZABIZRAELLI

47

termsmight show how the action of seeing travels outside of itsorigin,departingfromthethresholdfoundedatitsemergence,atitsgerm-phase, in order to inevitably return to this point. Thus, theawakeningof visionwouldbebothan initiation in thepracticeofspinning and an embodiment of the orb, of the cycle that informsthe symbolic constitutionof theeye.TheCycle-becomingof visionmightbeframedatthispointasaninherentconditionofpossibilityfor the journey of vision. We will denominate this journey ortrajectoryasthecyclesisofvision. Thetermcyclesis isstructuredupontheunionof theGreek“kyklos” which as we’ve said previously, stands for circular orcyclic,andthesuffix“sis”whichisrelatedtoaction.Itcanbeeithersimpleortransformativeaction.Therefore“cyclesis”couldbereadas “the cyclic action” or as “the action of becoming cyclic”. It isimportanttoconsiderthatthenuptialsoftheideasofrotationandvisionmight indicate that an abstract teleology of vision (if therewas such thing) is rooted on the faculty’s ability to witness andexperience its own source/origin at some point; an operation,which would be impossible without the generation of a scissionbetweentheeyeanditsorigin,andtherefore,theproductionofanultimatedualityintheseer. The wheel-eye that comes out of its origin, abandons theintimacy of its emergence in order to exile itself, describing acurved trajectory bymeans of this exile,whichwill lead it to thesameplacewhere it emerged, to itspointoforigination.Only thisway,wouldtheeyeeverbecapable tosee,witnessandultimatelyknow its own origin. Only this way is the eye able to execute itssingular action upon the source of this same action. Also, as weapply the metaphor of exile to the case of the eye’s journey, asecond archetype will be automatically generated, which is thefigureoftheinevitablereturn.Thiswillappearasaconsequenceof

thelattershouldhavecalleduptheimageofamonster’scirclinghands.’(1964,I,316)

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the formal aspect of the ocular trajectory, which when framedwithinthesymbolicschemeoftheCyclop,presentsitselfasacycle.Finally,thetrajectoryoftheeye,willaswellshowhowintheverywitnessingofthesource,attheendofitskyclipjourney,thepointoforigination would necessarily have to be re-discovered as anotherness; as a former intimate twin that the distance of thejourney has contracted into a distant, inassimilable and incisivelycrueldouble. The figure of circularity speaks cruelty as it stretchestowards the outside of the ocular origin, towards what the eyeopposestoitsownorigin.Becausecrueltyisthebasefigureoftheactions perpetuated upon a strangeness towards what wassupposed to be, of all relations possible, the most intimate. Theintimacyoftheocularoriginisneverexperiencedthroughvisionatthe moment of the emergence of the faculty. The eye emergesunaware of its constituent directionality and requires a secondsubstance to enable the intimacy with itself and to provide theevidenceofitselfforitself.Doublingitself,itcultivatesthegroundsof copula8. The eye needs a second nature to make possible theapprehensionofitself,amirroringnature. Thestretchingofcircularity(cyclesis)towardstheoutsidityof an originating substance, reaches a point of aloofnessatwhichthegermbecomesastrangertoitsownorigin.Onlyatthiscrucialpoint, is mystical illumination (universal love), or individual lovepossible, for it is thepointatwhichthemaximumstretching fromtheorigintakesplace,andwhereanexactgeometricopposition9

8Within the scheme of this analysis, the notion of copula is grounded as theoutcome of the undoing of the initial duplicity (in this case: eye/outside) bymeansof thegeometric figureofopposition.However this isanundoing that isrootedinaplace(topos),andwhichcorrespondenteventshouldnotbeequatedwithapre-originalstate.9 Again, considering that we are thinking within the geometric scheme ofroundness.

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enablesthemobilizationofthesexualdrivesofcopula,sublimatedinthiscaseintheabstractsolventthatconstitutesthefigureoflove.The figure of love as that of cruelty, is a product of the circularoutsidity(expansionofoneself+remotenessfromone’score)ofthegerm thathasbecomeother, and in this sense it is anoutcomeoftheperversionoftheinitialintimacyoftheoriginliquefiedinitselfbefore its cyclesis (before its becoming cycle). Love indicates amovement of attraction towards the source and an anticipatedmergingwiththeorigin,whilecrueltystemsfromtherepulsiontothe source and a drive towards the suspension of cyclesis. Theamorous depth of the origin is present at birth or emergence,however unreachable at this stage to the nascent seer, and thenmediated by outsidity in the figure of death and its warmanticipation,love. Now, leaving the figuresof cruelty, loveandoutsidity asidefor further discussion later, and coming back to the binary exile-return,itisrelevanttopointoutthattheinevitablereturngivenbythe symbolic frameof the Cyclop,might usually (when taken intothe realm of myth) stand upon the narrative and existentialcategories of “fate” or “destiny”. This is a consequence of thecircularstructureofthetrajectoryoftheearlierexile,whichallowsnodiversionsfromtheoriginalrouteoftheexploratorygestureofvision and thus, necessarily returns to the same place where itstarted.Thisstudywillopenaspeculativepathalongthisabstracttrajectory of vision, along its phases of origin/emergence,alienation/ exile/duplicity, into the extended plane of the curvedbecomingof itsexile,and finally into thereturnandwitnessingoftheorigin.

Methodology:Archetyposophy

Throughout this study, the ideas of rotation and visionbriefly introduced in the previous paragraphs will be furtherexposedandexploreddepartingfromthesymbolicconstructionof

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the mythic one-eyed creature Cyclop, which will be used as aplatform for speculative archetyposophical analysis, where thearchetypeinplaywillbeemployedbothasahorizonofspeculationandalimit. InArchetyposophy,themythologem10orarchetype11isusedasafilterthroughwhichthetheoreticaloperatorextractsvividandactualcontentinarelationalandsyntheticmanner.Thearchetypeplaystheroleofasynthesizerofcontentsbetweentheoperatorandthe externalmatters of thought.Here, the symbolic structure of amythologem is framed as a filter prior to the thinking of anyexistentorimaginarycategoryofcontent,workingalmostasaneye.Themythologemplays the roleof a secondeye transposed to theoriginal eye, bearing a particular light that serves to illuminatecertainobscuredareasofthought.Thiswayitunveilsnewcontent,rooted both in the contemporary realities that surround thearchetyposophicalanalysis-gaze,andinthedepthsofthesymbolicinfrastructuresofmythology. Archetypes are, as Karoly Kerenyi points out, groundprinciples, patterns or types within the depths of the plane oforigination.12They constitute the primeval ground necessary fortheemergenceandcontractionofanysubstance,orarrangementofsubstances into their furtherworldlydispositions.Throughout thedevelopment of this study, we will be inclined to think theseprimordialpatternsasiftheyweresomethingsimilartoaccents.

10TermusedbyKarolyKerenyitodenominatethemonadsofmythology,orarchetypes.SeeJungandKerenyi,2002,Introduction.11Eliade,whoalsousestheterm,writes:‘IwasusingthetermwithreferencetoPlatoandSaintAgustine.Igiveitthesenseofexemplarymodel,revealedinmythandre-actualizedthroughritual.’(Eliade[1978]quotedinSpineto,[2008,368])Onthesamesubject,Eliadewrites: ‘Mancouldescapefromanything,exceptforthe archetypal intuitions created at the verymoment in which he has becomeawareofhispositioninthecosmos.’(Eliade[1990]quotedinSpineto,N[2008,369])12Kerenyiwrites:‘Mythologygivesaground,providesafoundation.’(2002,8).

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TheancientGreekterm“ἀρχέτυπος”standsastheunionofthe terms: “ἀρχή” (origin, principle, foundation) and “τύπος”(pattern or type). These ground principles, discursively allocatedwithin narrative coagulations of sense; such as: myths, legends,parablesandfolktales(tonameafewexamples),providegroundstoavastvarietyofbeliefsystemsandmythologies.Theyprobablyconstitute, aswehavementionedbefore, an infrastructure,whichcorrespondentreachextendsthroughtimeandhistoricaleventstothe sensitive and mineral depth of the internal cohesion thatinformscontemporaryculture13. Archetyposophy is the speculativemovement of thought attheverylimitsofthearchetypeandwithinthesymbolicentrailsofitsownplasma.Itworksasaplatformforsynthesisandasfountainof analogies, relations and sophic shortcuts before, after or in-reason.Itisareflectionabouttheground,carriedoutwiththesameground-material that informs it. Archetyposophy, as a speculativeinitiative, departs from an in-groundness of thought, whereabstraction is not alienation from the concrete components ofthinking, but a rooting in the depths of the foundations of thisconcreteness. Let’s consider the event of knowledge as a process soimmediateasvision;let’sconsidertheeventofknowledgeintermsof the execution of a particular gaze. In Archetyposophy, theprocessesofthinkingandknowingworkinasimilarfashiontotheactivity of seeing, in a plane that treasures the nuptials betweenirreducibleintuitionandlogicalstructure.

TheEye-Axis

The eye alone, separated from the idea of the cycle-eye(Cyclop),or theocular in itsorigin,couldbedescribed in itsearly

13Eliadewrites:‘Theconsciousrepetitionofgivenparadigmaticgesturesrevealsanoriginalontology’(1985,5)

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developmentasthatwhichconstellatesasimultaneityofprocessesaround itself; moving processes, streams, accents, elements,texturesandforces,whicharedrawntoitsnascentgermorocularἀρχή,inasimilarfashiontoawhirlwindoreddy. At this early stage, the germ14of the eye allocated at thethresholdofitsownemergence,enduresitsfirsttransmutationintowhatcouldbedesignatedas“place”.Thetopos15ofthenewborneyeisanoutcomeofitsowncravingforcontinuity.Forthegerm,whichrestsatthenewplaceofitsemergence,thefigureoftheaxisiswhatinformsandmaintainsitunspent16initssingularity,openingupthesensesofstability,perspectiveandconsequentlylocation.Motion’sconditionofpossibility isaprimeval fixity thatenables repetition,because repetition is only possible if its object remains the same. Theocular,atthethresholdofitsorigincravesfordynamismand continuity, as a wheel that having indulged in the firstmillimetres of the practice of turning, feels inclined to continueturning.Thepassiveeyedoesnotasktosee.Initsorigin,orinthebecoming solid of its internal cohesion, it only receives-witnessesthenoveltyoftheoutsideasafluidsumofevents.However,atthisprimitivestage,thiswitnessingisnotmediatedbyanything,insteadit is the bare face of the eye’s singularity, informedby the primalaccentof its formation, thatwhich isexposed to the turbulenceofanimmensesomething-somewhereoutside. Inthisearlyexposure,thereisnopossibleassimilationoftheoutsiderwholebytheeye,orofanyofitsparts.Thereisnotsuchthingasapossiblecontractionoftheexternalsubstanceintopartsyet.Thereisonlythesenseofa

14Theterm“germ”isaswellusedbyKerenyitoaddresstheideaoforigin:‘Atthepointwheretheabyss-likeἀρχήofthegermopens,theworlditselfbreaksin.Theworlditselfspeaksintheimagesoforiginationthatstreamoutofit.’(2002,12)15FromtheancientGreekτόπος:place16This is necessary for the germof the eye to remainunspent in its being eye,instead of becoming ontologically disembodied by the dynamic morphologicalfluidityoftheplaneoforigination.

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barewitnessing,afacethatismono-directedtoacentrifugalwhole,incapableof turningback, of undoing its constitution. Face equalsirremediable identity, irremediablevector, impossibleundoingtheconstitutionofself,offace,ofdirectionality.Faceisthecoagulatedimpossibilityofbeingother,orofbeingeverythingonceonehasaface, an eye. A face bears the solidity of cohesion, and thereforedirectionalityandaccent.Afaceisamonadinsofarasitconstitutesa solid unity. In relation to this, Karoly Kerenyiwrites: ‘Amonadmeans an inability to see otherwise, a possession in Frobeniussense.’(2002,27) Perhapsthisiswhyomnipresencesacrificesfacesandheads,its condition of possibility is beheading, sacrificing this way themono-directionalityoffacesandofeyes.Followingthis,wecouldaswell think the figure of the omnipresent saint or mystic as theoperator of a second cyclesis, namely the embodiment of thearchetypeof thesunflower17; featuringagaze thatwascapableofturning from itsownconstitution inorder tobecomeothergazes,other axles, other perspectives. Faces, in general, are incapable ofturningbackfromtheirbeing-that-singular-facethatlooksthatwayor theother.Comingback to theeye, it is clear thatwhat informsthe singularity of the ocular origin is precisely the solidity of itsconstitutionandinternalcohesion;thisiswhatultimatelyenablesittoseeonewayoranother.Theoriginoftheeyeisthesingularityofaspecificperspective.Wewouldliketodenominatetheearlystageofbare-witnessingweweredescribing inthepreviousparagraphsas the eye-axis. Perhaps a Cyclops folktale from Lesbos mightilluminateourpointabouttheselfandtheface:

17Thefigureofthesunflowermightdepict inanarchetypalwayandstickingtotheschemeofroundness,thepossibilityoftheubiquityoftopos.Itwouldpresenta vacant topos, that still framedwithin the scheme of “a place” or “object”, butdeprivedof its innercontent,wouldcruise theoutsidethroughamultiplicityoffaces (and the subsequent copulas between places and each of the unities thatconstitutethepluralityoffacesgivenbythiscyclicubiquity).

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Oncetherewasagoodmanwhosefortunewasinthesun.Hewentouton thehill, and saw three thieveswhohadkilled a goat.Theytoldhimtocookit.Well,astheysay,“athiefamongthieves,andaliaramongliars”;sohenoddedwithoutspeaking,anddidashewasbid. They asked him his name, and he said “APARÓS”- “Mr Self”.When he had cooked the goat, he beat the three thieves soundlywiththespit,andtheyranoffhowling.Peopleaskedthemwhodidit?”“Self!”saidthey,andgotlaughedatfortheirpains.”AnAlbanianversion, recorded at Piana de Greci near Palermo, recognizes twokyklopesandgiveseachofthemtwopairsofeyes.(Cook,1925,II.2,999)

As in the case of many other Cyclop folktales, the story hereinvolves an action of aggression carried out against the beasts.Usually,thisendswiththeblindingofthecyclop’soneeye.PerhapsoneofthemostfamousexamplesofthisisthestoryofPolyphemusin “TheOdyssey”.However, in the case of this specific tale thingsmight have gotten a bitmore exposedwith the association of thehero with the self. As a possible interpretation wemight suggestthatthefigureoftheselfopposesthedynamismofvision,framedasamultiplemovement turnedconcrete in theplural figureof threecyclops. Self, which is one, opposes the three thieves by initiallyfollowingtheircyclesis(ortrajectory),andthenbetrayingit.Whenthewounded cyclops are asked aboutwho did this to them, theyreply “self”. On this peculiar turn in the story there is anincorporation of this initial man, “the-self” into the depths of thethieves’symbolicconstitution.Becausetheysaythis,asif“self”wasaname,buttheyareunderstoodinadifferentway,namelyselfasthat inner condition rooted in their essence. According to thisreading, it wouldn’t be difficult to think the tale in terms of thefigure of a chauffeur being carried in his chariot by three beasts.Theman,whosefortuneisinthesun,needsnomorethepotentialdiversions of the voluptuousness of earthly vision, or thevoluptuousnessofthecontingencyofwandering,sothebeaststhatbearthesepotentialdiversionsareblinded.However,itis

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importanttonotethattheblindingofthebeastsdoesnotentailtheannihilation of the beasts. The self appropriates the plurality anddiversity of its earthly accomplices, but rejects the single-perspectival limitsof thisearthlycyclopeanvision. Interestingly,adifferent interpretation might suggest that the blinding of thebeasts hints towards the sacrifice of the mono-directionality ofvisioncoagulatedinthefigureofone-eyedness.Thissacrificewouldmove in favour of a total vision that was not fixed on a specificperspectiveoraxis,butthatontheotherhandconstitutedavisionthatwasabletoturn,thatwasabletomovefromitssingulartopos,likeasunflower,likethesun.

OutsidityandExile

Now,comingbacktoourdiscussionofthegerm-eye,whichputundertheschemeofaphasewithinaprocess,wedenominatedthe eye-axis, it is important to mention that this phase growspossible bymeans of the first exposure of the eye to the outside,wheretheinitialawarenessofitsunknownexuberancetakesplace.Thefigureoftheeye-axisisthefirstattemptofmediationbetweentheeyeandtheoutside,thefirstbridgethatwoulddresstheearlybare-witnessing described in the first sections of this paper.However,thefundamentalpointhereconsistsonhowthisoutsidestandsinrelationtotheocularorigin.Wewilltrytoapproachandexplorethisinthefollowingparagraphs. As it has been said before,wewill be inclined to think thebinary eye-outside, bymeans of an archetype of exile. Thismighthelptounderstandhowthefigureoftheoutsidecametobeing,ormore precisely: came to place. This figure of exile would set thefoundations for the initial duplicity eye-outside. The term“outsidity”, brieflymentioned before, will stand as the key to theformalaspectof thisevent,andwillaswellconstitutethebasisofourprevioususeoftheterm“centrifugal”.“Centrifuge”,initsliteral

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meaning, defines a force that escapes from a centre. This, in ourcasewill reference theoutsidity of the eye in its axis phase. Theconcept of outsidity is primordially informed by the formula:expansionofoneselfplusremoteness fromone’score.This idea isnecessarily framed within the inner constitution of an agency,which for the case of this analysis will be grounded in thedevelopmentof thenotionof theeye.Now,wewould like toposethatintheeye’sthresholdofemergencethereisalreadyaduplicityeye-outside. The outside is not something that stems from theocular origin as a formal consequence, but it is a presence thataccompanies it and that is tacitly ascribed to its condition ofpossibility. Every ocular origin is simultaneously an eye plus anoutside.Thefigureofexileproposedwouldonlyberealfortheeye;it would constitute a logical gesture that would ground theoriginationofvisioninthatsingulareye. Inordertobecomeverbandtoembodyaction18,thegermofthe eye requires an exterior realm where it can execute itsfunctions. Bare-witnessing this other realm is an experience ofawarenessbutnotnecessarilyoneof recognition. In thisprimevalwitnessing, a bare face confronts the turbulence of anundeterminedoutsiderwhole.Ifthereisanysenseofapprehensioncoming from the eye (in relation to the outside otherness), theremust be a certain awareness of this otherness, aswe pointed outpreviously,andespeciallysinceithasbeenalreadysaidthatthisactof witnessing is not mediated. Then it could be inferred thatsomething in this outsidemust belong in the eye or vice versa. Ifsomething in the turbulent whole that constitutes the outsidebelonged in theeyeorexisted in it aswell, then thiswouldentailthat both eye andoutsideneed to share a commonancestor.Andsincethereisnopossibleancestortotheeye-axis,sinceitisthe

18Theeye-originbecomesverb in theactof seeingbyexecuting theessenceofvisiondiscursivelythroughaction.

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originand thegermof theocular, itwouldbehelpful to think theoutside as something that has been exiled from the eye, since theeye is what ultimately holds the category of origin in thearrangementof thingswearesketching.The figureofexilewouldconsequentlystandasaformalconditionofpossibility;itwouldbelogically concealed in the posing of the binary eye-outside as theoriginalgermoftheeye.Thisideacouldbeexpressedthroughthefollowingmetaphor:

If“eye”isbeing,then“outside”isbeingoutsideofbeing;itisbeingexiledofbeingforthesakeofbeing,servingtheonlypurposeof lettingbeingbe,by letting itbecomeverb;actuallyact,happen,move,bridge.

The eye-axis constitutes the phase where the eye finds its firstnucleartopos,andalsotheeventbywhichitembracesperspective;thisistheoutcomeofananticipatoryembodimentoftheoutsidebymeans of the figure of exile. According to this scheme the outsidewould be framed as something that is not entirely foreign; assomething that can be subject to speculation, and ultimatelyknowledge.Thisallows theeye togobeyondbare-witnessing intoactual immersion, and enables in it the possibility of assimilatingthe foreign extension (outside), which is not so foreign anymore(whichneverwas).Inordertoknow,apprehendandassimilatethisoutsideandnotonlymerelywitnessit,thegermoftheeyeneedstogenerateabridge;itneedstocomeoutofitself.Thefigureofexilesetsthefavourableconditionsforthistotakeplace.TheSynthetic-Eye In theTheogony, Hesiod speaks of three cyclops, ‘Gaia firstboreequaltoherselfstarryOuranos…butthenbeddedbyOuranosshe produced deep-eddying Okeanos ... She further bore theKyklopes with exceeding forceful hearts, Brontes, Steropes and

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Argesmightyofspirit…theywere likegods inallrespectsexceptthe single eye that lay in themiddle of their foreheads. They arenamedKyklopsforthisfeature,becauseonecirculareyelayintheforeheadofeach’(Theogony,135-145).Thinkingarchetyposofically,perhapswecouldsaythatOuranosandGaiatakethecopulaofthenatural archetypes of earth and sky into an interesting schemeofsymbolisminthecontextofouranalysisofvision.Accordingly,itisrelevanttonotethatthefacultyofvision,whentransposedintotherealm of the natural creaturelyworld, is to be found in creaturesthatdwellinexteriorsandingeneralinareasreachedandnurturedbythesun’slight,whilecreaturesthatdwellinthetelluricentrailsoftheearthor inthedepthsoftheseaaregenerallyblindorwithconsiderablelimitationswithregardtotheirvision.Thelightofthesun enables the delineated recognition and recuperation of theoutsideintoforms,figuresandshapesandispossiblythethresholdthat stands in between a monadic-fragmented modality of beingand a continuous non-delineated one. The sun’s threshold is theformalantecedentoftheeye-threshold. Couldthearchetypalcopulaofskyandearth,bealignedwiththe copula of vision and blindness in the context of the symbolicscheme of the Cyclop?Wewill be inclined to think these ideas intermsofapeculiarkindofsynthesis,whichwouldtakeplaceinthefigureoftheCyclopanditsone-eyedness.TheEye-Threshold The ocular threshold stands as a liminal scission; it is theformal event upon which the eye engenders its own duplication;namelytheprimordialdualityeye-outside.Buthowisthispossible?It has been previously said that one of the major conditions ofpossibilityofthenativityoftheeyeisitsinitialdeterminationasanaxis, the axis of a tumultuous and turbulent other, the outside.Following this line we added that the eye-axis also behaves as athresholdthatsetstheconditionsofpossibilityforanapriori

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duplicity. The Eye and the outside are both engendered at thisprimordialevent,mediatedbytheformalfigureofexile,formulatedin the previous paragraphs. In order to become axis, and thusproduce a topos that enables the openness to the world, the eyeneeds to generate an anticipatory embodiment of the outside.Again,thisisachievedbymeansofthefigureofexile.Andsinceatthisearlystageoforigination, it isnotpossibletothinkaboutthisprocessintermsofpartsanddivisibility,theoutsideneedsnotonlytobesomethingthathasbeenexiledfromtheeye,butalsotobeaformalembodimentoftheeyeinitstotality;itneedstobeadoubleof theeye thathasbeenexported intoextension,or thathasbeensacrificed passing from being to place. An unreal anticipatedembodimentofthisextension,executedbytheoriginaleye,createsthepossibilityof intersectionwithit.Theoutsideisproducedasanecessary phantasm, as a shadow that grows along thedevelopmentoftheeye-origin,andenablesittoultimatelycruiseitsownwhirlwind.Expenditure,originandoriginals InthecontextofamoreBatailleanreading,andaccordingtoNickLand,‘Theeyeisnotanorigin,butanexpenditure.’(1992,30)We might argue that being an origin is precisely beingexpenditure.19These two ideasdonot excludeeachother, but arecontained in each other insofar as origin is the threshold ofemergence,andemergenceisthethresholdofexpenditure. AccordingtoBataille’suseoftheterm,totalexpenditurecanbe read in terms of sacrificial consumption; namely, a totalannihilationofthecreatureorobjectatstakeinandforthepresent

19Although there is a first moment in the origination of a substance (origin)where it needs to remain unspent in order to secure its constitution as thatparticularsubstance,thehorizonofpotentialityofasubstance,onceitcrossesthethresholdoforigination,ismarkedbythetransienceoftheorigin;onceitis,itistobespent.

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instant.Bataillean expenditure is a purposeless act that servesnofutureorgoal,anddisintegratesinpureandgrossnowness.

It is necessary to serve the word expenditure for theseunproductive forms, to the exclusion of all the modes ofconsumption, which serve production as a norm. The accent isplacedonloss,whichmustbeasgreataspossibleiftheactivityisto

assureitstruemeaning.(Bataille,1998,70)The use of the term expenditure, abstracted from its economicconnotations, is here framedwithin the realmof simple andpureenergy. Unproductive expenditure serves no purpose; it doesn’tserve the continuity of things as things, but puts its emphasis ontotal loss. Now, it is important to make the following distinctionbeforeproceedingwiththeanalysis;anoriginisnotthesameasanoriginal. The former is a germ, which encapsulates posterity andconceals a promise of development. The germ, in the event oforigination,breaksthroughtheplanethatcontainsandnurturesitssingularity. It can easily afford breaking apart with its nutritiveenvironment because it carries in itself a self-sufficiency thatenablesittoventurebeyond,intotheoutside. Theself-sufficiencyoftheoriginisconstitutedbythesolidityofitsinternalcohesion.Itcouldalsobesaidthattheoriginbearsanintrinsic sense of exteriority embedded in its constitution, whichultimately informs both outsidity and cyclesis. Originals, on theotherhand,arenotnecessarilymeanttooriginateorgrowoutsideof the plane of origination. Perhaps they could be compared toaccents in a fountain of water; accents that are inherent to thestream,thatdwellinthestreamatacerodegreeofelevationfromit.Iforiginssproutfromaground,originalsarein-groundcreatures,creatures thatdwell in in-groundness; they inare inessenceone-dimensionalbeings.20

20Ouruseoftheterm“one-dimensional”willbereferencingMontalbetti’stheoryofboxes,whichwillbeexplainedinthefollowingsectionsofthispaper,nottobe

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Now,comingbacktoourearlierpointonexpenditure,ifwetake the phrase: “Only at the highest of expansion can anythingbegintocontract”,andthenwebringthenotionofexpenditurein,wewillnotethatBatailleanexpenditureinthiscase,worksasboth,expansion and contraction. It is both in one lethal and intimategesture.On theonehand it is theexpansionofagivenorigin intothe posterity of its development, and on the other hand, it is ajourney towards the final contraction of this development intonothingness,bymeansof its totalconsumption.The initialcyclesisof the eye, its original trajectory, is both the unfolding of all theinternalpotentialitiesinherenttotheeye(thosewhichprescribeitsnascent internalcohesion that laterbecomesexternalized throughthe figure of outsidity) and the expenditure of all of thesepotentialities, once they become actual during the cyclesis ortrajectoryoftheeye.Thiswouldultimatelyrevealthetrueessenceof cyclesis as a circular burning. We could, in support of theargumentbyNickLand,and insupportofourearlierpointontheCyclop’s eye resembling the sun, consider the eye-origin and ingeneral,everyoriginorgermasrelatedtothearchetypeofthesun:

Theradiationofthesunisdistinguishedbyitsunilateralcharacter:itlosesitselfwithoutreckoning,withoutcounterpart.(Land,1992,33)

Eye-origins are structured upon their own finiteness, and areaccented in thedirectionalityof theirdeathsentence.Allof this ismurmuredinananticipatedtragicsequel,sincethefirstencounterwiththeoutside,orevensincetheexile,whereasubstanceacquiresthecohesionoftheeyeandthereforestandsatthethresholdofitsirremediablefall,thefallofvision.

confused with Gebser’s use of term in his theory of the archaic, magic andmythical structures of consciousness. (See: Gebser, J (1986) The Ever-PresentOrigin.Athens:OhioUniversityPress.)

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MythandtheMono-DimensionalAbyss Throughout this study we will be inclined to thinkmythology as both a web and a fluid of archetypes, as both acollection of delineated quasi-discrete elements and a non-differentiatedfluidity.Thenotionof“element”or“monad”inmyth,borrowingKerenyi’sterminology,couldbealignedwithourearlierunderstanding of the concept of “original”. The formal creaturesthatwoulddwellintheplaneofmythwouldnotexactlybediscrete(self-sufficient)entity-orientedgerms(asitisinthecaseoforigins)but open accidents that would often merge with one another.Kerenyiwrites:

…Mythologyisthemovementofthismaterial:itissomethingsolidand yet mobile, substantial and yet not static, capable oftransformation.(2002,11)

Mythologyisaflatinfrastructurethatconcealsthepossibilityofthebare confrontation with the evidence of pure sense. It is a depthwhichabyssaltruthisrootedwithinamono-dimensionalintimacy.Thisispreciselythedepthoftheprimordialgroundandthedepthof in-groundness.Mythology is amono-dimensional abyss insofaras it entails a depth that allows no ulterior depth. Its fathomlessqualityresidesinnotbeingaquantitative,butaqualitativeformalprofundity. Ground principles, mythologems or archetypes, have thesame formal depth as vectors. They are not envelopes of contentbutembodimentsofdirectionality.AsMarioMontalbettiwouldsay:they are one-dimensional boxes. They do not promise anythinginternallyorexternally,theyarewhattheypromise,concealingnoulterior content displaced in any direction. They can also bedesignated as accents or originals as they are creatures oforigination. They are accents insofar as they are pure indicators,puredirectionalities.Thequalitativedepthofmythisbasedontheopennessof its accidents (accents).They relate to eachother in a

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continuous and fluid dynamic. The phases of copula in betweenthem, namely theirmergingwith one another, produces a certainblur that enables a wide range of possibilities of formation. Thiswouldbeeasilyallocatedwithintheschemeoffecundity.Preciselythis blurmight stand as the phantasmaticmask of the generativeevent, that turbid absence of focus: the sense of an intimate andnon-nuclearaccent-orientedformlessness.

1-D

Perhaps Mario Montalbetti’s theory of boxes (2012) wouldshow through the realmof linguistics, someof the implicationsofconsidering groundprinciples as constituent elements of amono-dimensional realm. His theory explains in depth the notions ofsignifying, signification and sense through the use of geometricspeculationandfunctionsofusefulness.Hedescribesthreetypesofboxes: three-dimensional, two-dimensional and one-dimensionalboxes.3D(three-dimensional)boxesareessentiallyobjectsthataremeanttocontainanotherobject;theybearthepromiseofcontent.Thereisalsotheconcreteobject;‘elobjetoasecas’21,whichdoesn’tneedtocoincidewiththeobjectof thepromise; it iswhattheboxreally contains.Theobjectof thepromise is concealed logically.Aboxofaspirins,“theboxofSchrödinger”,theboxofWittgensteinin“Philosophical Investigations”, are examples of 3D boxes. On theother hand, 2D (two-dimensional) boxes are those in which theobjectofthepromiseisoutsideofthebox.Photographs,orwords;for instance, theword “apple”, that is promising a real apple, areexamples of 2D boxes. Howeverwords can also be 3D boxes, forinstance, a word that is promising a meaning. The essentialcharacteristic of 2D boxes, according to this theory, is that theyrepresent, and therefore, displace the object of the promise.

21Montalbetti,2012.‘Thetangibleobject’or‘theconcreteobject’:‘therealobject’-opposedtotheidealobjectofthepromise.

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Todarepresentacióndesplazaelobjetodelapromesa.(Ibid)22

Finally,a1D(one-dimensional)boxdoesnotrepresentanything.Itisnotintheplaceofanything, itcannotcontainanythingeither.Itdoesn’tpromiseanythingoutsideorinside,becausegeometricallyitdoesn’t distinguish between inside and outside. As Montalbettishows:

La ilusión de que una linea distingue lados solo es posible siasumimosquelalineayacesobreunespacio2D.(Ibid)23

A1Dboxisinthissensepuredirectionality.Arrowsandvectorsare1Dboxes.Senseisa1Dbox.Ina1Dbox,theobjectofthepromiseandtheboxcoincide.Montalbettiwrites:

Elsentidoesuni-dimensional/uni-direccional.(Ibid)24

AccordingtoMontalbetti’sanalysis,theword“correct”isinformedby the sum of the prefix “co” and an abbreviation of the word“rectitude” resulting in “rect”. Sense is never “correct” because itsrectitude is not established on the basis of its concordance withanotherrectitude.(2012)Inthissense,sense ismono-dimensionalandmono-directional.Itconstitutesitsownplane. One-dimensional boxes, in their formal andpre-ontologicalself-predicative truth, are archaic in the sense that they are basicrealities or foundations. Their archaic quality does not referenceany chronological order, or historical sequence. Sequences do notapplytowhatisarchaicbecausewhatisprimordial,thesubstanceof origination, encompasses substances and events before theexportation of these into discursive sequences. One-dimensional

22‘Everyrepresentationdisplacestheobjectofthepromise’.23‘Theillusionthatalinepossessessidesisonlypossibleifweassumethatthelineislyingona2Dspace.’24‘Senseisone-dimensional/one-directional.’

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boxesandmythologemsareembeddedintheplaneoforigination;theirdegreeofin-groundnessiscero.Theyaregroundmatter.Theyare accented in-ground matter. According to this analysis accentwould be, in the plane of origination, the primitive antecedent ofform,divisibilityandobjectivity.

AfewConsiderationsaboutFunctionandCyclesis

Finallywewouldliketoaddthatfunctionisaswellafigureof cyclesis, like thewheel-eye. Function bends the accentuality oftheoriginal,curlingitarounditself.Itlimitsitsinitiallibertyanditssubsequentopennesstothe frameofacyclic figureandthroughacurved trajectory around itself. This is theway inwhich originalsareexportedintoorigins.Thesolidityofcohesionthatinformstheorigin, its self-sufficiency, is an affirmation of self, and anaffirmationofselfisacopy,arepetition,amirror,oralso,awilltocontinuity.Wheelsarethegeometricwombsofrepetition,doomedto keep turning and actualizing their cycles. Once an accent iscurledarounditselfthroughcyclesis,thenitisabletooriginate.Wenowuse thenotionof “function” in the sameway asweused thenotion of “verb”.Cyclesis is intimately related to verb, origins areintimatelyconnectedtoverbs, insofarastheirnucleus is informedbyaspecificaction.Anactionisonlydescribedassuchtotheextentthat it is repeated.What sees iswhat sees constantly, so then, aneye originates as an outcome of the constancy of the action ofseeing,asanoutcomeof thewheel-act. In themythic figureof theCyclop, the wheel-act of vision finds its own failure; “Cyclop” isinformedbybothvisionandblindness. Inordertoproceedwithacloserinspectionoftheseideas,itwillbenecessarytoenterintothesecondsectionofthisstudy,whichwillbedenominatedasTheEye-Snake.

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References

Bataille,George.(1998)EssentialWritings.Ed.M.Richardson.London:SAGE.Cook,ArthurBernard.(1964-1965)Zeus:AStudyinAncientReligion.NewYork:BiblioandTannen.Cook,ArthurBernard.(1925)Zeus:AStudyinAncientReligion.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.[Online]Availableathttps://archive.org/details/p2zeusstudyinanc02cookuoft[Accessed15October2015]Eliade,Mircea(1985)CosmosandHistory:Themythoftheeternalreturn.NewYork;London:Garland.Hesiod,Theogony.[Online]Trans.Wm.BlakeTyrrell.Availableat:https://www.msu.edu/~tyrrell/theogon.pdf[Accessed6November2015]Jung,CarlGustavandKerényi,Karoly.(2002)TheScienceofMythology:EssaysontheMythoftheDivineChildandtheMysteriesofEleusis.Trans.HullR.F.C.London:Routledge.Jung,CarlGustav.(1968)TheArchetypesandtheCollectiveUnconscious.Trans.R.F.CHull,2ndedn,London:Routledge.Land,Nick.(1992)TheThirstofAnnihilation.London:Routledge.Montalbetti,Mario.(1997)FinDesierto,2ndedn.Lima:HuesoHúmero.Montalbetti,Mario.(2012)Cajas.Lima:FondoEditorialdelaPontificiaUniversidadCatólicadelPeru.ROTA/RATO:KeytoThingsHiddensincetheFoundationoftheWorld.[Online]Availableat:http://cartedatrionfi.tripod.com/RotaTaro.html[Accessed17October2015]Sadhu,Mouni.(1970)TheTarot:Acontemporarycourseofthequintessenceofhermeticoccultism,3rdedn.London:GeorgeAllenandUnwinLTD.Spineto,Natale(2008)“ThenotionofArchetypeinEliade’swritings”,Religion:ajournalofreligionandreligions.Vol.38,no4:366-374.

MORAL OR MORTAL COSMOS? ON SUBJECTIVE EXISTENCE IN KANT AND BATAILLE

James F. Depew

Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more often and steadily reflection is occupied with them: the

starry heavens above me and the moral law within me. Neither of them need I seek and merely suspect as if shrouded in obscurity or rapture

beyond my own horizon; I see them before me and connect them immediately with my existence.

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason

The heavens are in no way refuge for me. There is no refuge on earth or

in heaven.

Georges Bataille, Celestial Bodies

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§Ii.Kant’sExistentialCrisis

The problem of how the subject posits itself, and makesitself into an object of experience, is something of a moment ofcrisisintranscendentalphilosophy.Astranscendentalsubjects,wemustalsobean ‘objectofoutersense forourselves, forotherwisewewouldnotbeabletoperceiveourplaceintheworldandwouldnot intuit ourselves in relation to other things’ (Kant, 2005, 18:619).Theproblemariseswhenwethinkofspace,theformofoutersense,asanaspectofthesubjectitself,sinceinthiscaseitisunclearhowthesubjectcanalsoexistinthatspace.AsKantwrites:‘The“Ithink” expresses theactofdeterminingmyexistence.Existence isalreadygiventhereby,butthemodeinwhichIamtodeterminethisexistence,thatis,howIamtopositinmethemanifoldbelongingtoit,isnottherebygiven’(1998,B158a;cf.B67f.).Kant‘s“Copernicanrevolution”entailsthatcognitionofoneselfisonlypossibleifwhatisouterisrepresentedpriortotheperceptionofobjects.Aproblemariseswhenthisrepresentationofgeneralobjectivityisthoughttooccurwithin the subject,within its inner sensewhich, having theformoftime,1onlypresentsafluxofrepresentations.Thesubject

1Over the course of this study it will become evident that the problem of

temporality as it conditions inner experience is one of the main points of

difficulty for Kant’s theory of position insofar as it conflicts with the spatial

conditionsofouterexperience.Kant’scriticalrefutationof idealism,however, is

based on the premise that inner experience is possible only under the

presupposition of outer experience. Kant notes that “I am” is consciousness of

existenceasdetermined in time,but that ‘[a]ll time-determinationpresupposessomething persistent in perception. This persistent thing, however, cannot be

something inme, sincemy own existence in time can first be determined only

through this persistent thing. Thus the perception of this persistent thing is

possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere

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mustsomehowrepresent itself,whichrequiresperceivingitselfashaving thepermanenceof anobject,butonlyexperiences itself intime,asafluxofrepresentations.AsGarthGreensuggests:

Self-affection and self-cognition require the integration of the

sphere of outer sense (and its noematic correlate of oneself qua

determined object) and the sphere of inner sense (and its noeticcorrelateofoneselfquadeterminingsubject).Onlyaunifiedsphere

of intuition can grant the unity of a single subject, across the

determining-determineddistinction.(2010,317,emphasisadded)

For transcendental philosophy, the consciousness of oneself withrespect to both outer and inner experience must somehow beavailableaprioriifexperienceistobesufficientlygrounded.ii.TheProblemofAbsolutePosition

Inhispre-criticalwork,Kantarguesthattherealpossibilityof all things depends on absolute position. In The Only PossibleArgument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God,

representationofathingoutsideme’(1998,B275).Intheprefacetothesecond

edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant rewords this as follows: ‘But thispermanent[thing]cannotbeanintuitioninme.Forallthedetermininggrounds

ofmyexistencecanbeencounteredinmearerepresentations,andassuchthey

themselvesneedsomethingpermanentdistinct fromthem, in relation towhich

their change, and thus my existence in the time in which they change, can be

determined’ (1998, B xl). Furthermore, ‘[t]he representation of something

persistinginexistenceisnotthesameasapersistingrepresentation;forthatcan

be quite variable and changeable, as all our representations are, even therepresentationofmatter,whilestillbeingrelatedtosomethingpermanent,which

mustthereforebeathingdistinct fromallmyrepresentationsandexternal, the

existence of which is necessarily included in the determination of my own

existence,whichwithitconstitutesonlyasingleexperience,whichcouldnottake

placeevenasinnerifitwerenotsimultaneously(inpart)outer’(1998,Bxli).The

problem that is of concern here, then, is how the “I am” whose existencecorrespondstothedeterminationofthe“Ithink”canpersistoutsideofitsmere

representationininnerexperience.

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Kantarguesthat‘thedifferencebetweenarealthingandamerelypossiblethingneverliesintheconnectionofthatthingwithallthepredicateswhich can be thought in it’ (2003, 2:76).Hemaintainsthat for any subject, ‘nothingmore is posited in an existent thingthanispositedinamerelypossiblething(forthenoneisspeakingof the predicates of that thing). But more is posited through anexistent thing than isposited throughamerelypossible thing, forpositingthroughanexistentthinginvolvestheabsolutepositingofthethingitselfaswell’(Kant,2003,2:75).Whathastobeshownofall possibility in general is that it presupposes something real. Inotherwords,Kantaskswhyaconceptshouldbeacceptedasdatum,arguing thateventhe impossibilityof itscontradictionpositsonlyits logical possibility and not its real possibility. Real possibilityinvolves what Kant calls “absolute positing,” which presupposesactual existence. Kant proceeds with a negative argument: 2

2Kant’sefforttoexplainwhatisnecessaryforthepossibilityofthoughtproceeds

bywayofnegation.Kantwrites:‘Thatofwhichtheoppositeisimpossibleinitself

isabsolutelynecessary.Thisisacertainlycorrectnominaldefinition.ButifIask:uponwhat does the absolute impossibility of thenon-beingof a thingdepend?

then what I am looking for is the real definition; this alone can serve our

purpose…the necessity in the predicates of merely possible concepts may be

called logical necessity. But the necessity, for which I am seeking the ultimate

foundation,namely, thenecessityofexistence, isabsoluterealnecessity.WhatI

find to start with is this: that which I am supposed to regard as absolutelynothingand impossiblemust eliminateeverythingwhich canbe thought. For if

there were still something left to be thought, then it would not be completely

unthinkable or absolutely impossible’ (2003, 2:82). Ultimately, then, all

possibility ‘presupposes something actual in and throughwhich all that can be

thoughtisgiven.Accordingly,thereisacertainreality,thecancellationofwhich

would itselfcancelall internalpossibilitywhatever.Butthat, thecancellationof

which eradicates all possibility, is absolutely necessary. Therefore, somethingexistsabsolutelynecessarily’ (2003,2:83).What thismeans is that, for thepre-

critical Kant, something exists necessarily only insofar as its negation would

amount to the real negation of all (and not just experiential) possibility. Of

course,thischangeswithKant’scriticalturn.

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‘possibilitydisappearsnotonlywhenan internal contradiction,asthelogicalelementofimpossibility,ispresent,butalsowhenthereexists no material element, no datum, to be thought. For thennothing isgivenwhichcanbe thought’ (2003,2:78).Sowhile it istrue that when something is possible the concepts that arecomparedinjudgementdonotcontradicteachother,thisismerelythe formal condition of possibility. There is also the materialconditiontoconsider.AsEckhartFörsterexplains:

Inallcomparison,whatistobecompared–thematerial–mustbe

givenbeforehand.Wherethereisnothingtobecompared,therecanbe no comparison and hence no possibility. For Kant, this means

that nothing can be conceived as possible unless what is real in

every possible notion exists…[A]ll these realities (omnitudo haec

realitas),whichinasensearethematerial forallpossiblenotions,

canexistnecessarilyonlyiftheyareunitedinasingleinfinitebeing.

For if the realitiesweredistributedamong several existing things,

any of them would have its existence limited by privations thatbelong to the thoroughgoing determination of any finite thing.

(2002,78)

Yet in the criticalwork, the project of real comparison (orcomparison of realities) ends in aporia: Kant tells us that infinitebeing is merely the object of a transcendental idea that can onlyregulate the possibility of unification, without ever being able toconstitute a real unity (1998, A682/B710). Now considering thesubjectasa thinkingnatureorsoul (“Imyself”),heshows that itsrealitycannotbeexperiencedexceptintermsofsomelimitationorprivation – its determination is alwaysdirectedby the thought ofthe reality that it limits: the concept of the “highest reality”(omnitudorealitas).Thoughtisthusledbyreasontoformtheideaof an object that, although transcendent, is regarded, if only intheory, as being thoroughly determinable. This is because in thecollective determination of all things, the subject might find itsplace, thus coming to know the way in which its relative limitsmake it what it is. Kant points out that this determinability,

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however, is only formallypossible and to confuse suchpossibilityfor real conditions of complete determination would be tosubstitutesomethingintuitibleandrealforsomethingthatcanonlybe conceived–whatKant calls “subreption.”The subjectonlyhasaccesstoadistributeddetermination,sinceitsexperienceofobjectsisneverequivalenttothewholeofrealitybecauseofthelimitationofitspossibleexperiencetocertainformalconditions.Inthisway,materialconditionsareradicallyseparatedfromformalconditionsbythefinitudeofexperience,andrelativelimitationcutsthesubjectofffromobjectiveunity.

Ifallthethinkingsubjectcanknowarethingsrelativetoitsfinite mode of knowing, then this rules out knowledge of thingsindependently of the senses, that is, as “things in themselves.”However,Kantattemptstoavoidarelativistviewofthesubjectbyarguing thatuniversal epistemicconditionsapply to finite rationalbeings.There is a sense that subjectivity is thoughtof asabsoluteposition, inasmuch as knowledge achieves objectivity by beinggrounded in the conditions of every subject. A problem arises,however, since Kant conceives the subject in its inner relation toitself as conditioned by temporal succession (self-activity). GivenKant’s claims to universal epistemic conditions, outer relation isconsideredsimultaneous, sothat ‘thesuccessionthatalwaysexistsin the perceptions, as apprehensions, will not be ascribed to theobjects’(Kant,1998,A214/B261). For the relationof simultaneity to obtain, the subjectmustfind itself in coexistence or “community” with objects, and thisseems tobe rendered impossible since the subject’sexperienceofitselfisalwayssuccessive,duetothetemporalityofinnersense.AsKantnotes in theThirdAnalogyof the firstCritique: ‘Spacemakescommunity possible. Now since the thinking being with all itsfaculties, whose effects belong merely to inner sense, is not arelationofspace,thecommerciumofsoulwiththebodyisthereforenotcomprehensible.’(1998,A211/B258,n.e)InalettertoMarcusHerz, Kant (1967, 151) expresses this problem as a distinction

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betweenthewayinwhich,epistemically,‘thesoulasobjectofinnersense cannot perceive its place within the body,’ while,ontologically,‘[thesoul]isintheplaceinwhichthepersonis’(Kant,2005,18:619).Thus,ontologically, thesoulshouldhaveapositionin outer sense, in “the place” where the subject plays out itspersonhood (the significance of the role of the person will beexplored below). But since positing representations into innersenseandmakingthemconsciousmeanspositingthemintime(intheformofinnersense),aswellashavingatemporallyconditionedconsciousnessofthisactivityofpositing,itishardtoseehowoutersenseplaysanyrole intherepresentationofthe“theplace”ofthesoul. So, not only does the subject encounter a duality in itsdetermination,butalsoinitsaffection:theselfisaffectedformallyintheactofapprehensionofrepresentationsininnersense,which,occurringintime,issuccessiveandchanging,andtheselfisaffectedmaterially by an outer sense that furnishes the contents ofrepresentations, froma space (as the formof outer sense)whosesimultaneity is thought to subtend the changes of inner sense. AsManfredBaumrightlypointsout,whatthisamountstoisthat ‘thebody, being an object in space, must be something to which oursensations are referred andcannotbethereferringsubject’ (1989,284,emphasisadded). InKant’scriticalphase,headdressesthepossibilitythatthefullnessofspace,orthecommunityofobjects,mightbeconstructedin a thorough amplification by concepts in the understanding,beginning with the subject’s body as object and opening to theinteractionwithotherbodiesthataffectthesubjectovertime.Thesimultaneity of bodies allows space itself to become an object ofexperienceunderthepresuppositionoftheinteractionofbodiesinareciprocaltemporalsequenceofbodiesininnersense,andinthisway ‘matter everywhere mak[es] the perception of our positionpossible’ (Kant, 1998, A213/B260). However, this could notconstitutearealsubjectiveunity,butonlyaconceptofmatterthatlets us think bodies in distributed aggregation, not as collective

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unity. The conception of the place of subjectivity, throughsimultaneity,canoffernosystematicsubstantialitytotheselfsincemattercanonlyprovidethebasisforoutersense.Thought,insofarasitoccursundertheformoftimeininnersense,canonlyexpanditself in an indefinite sequence, at best ‘striving toward retrievingthe originarily infinite perfection of pure intuition’ (Kerszberg,1997, 37), a simultaneity that couldonlybe space itself, asemptyformwherenosubjectistobefound. Fromthisperspective,thefinitudeofthesubjectmightleadit, intheefforttoknowitselfasreal, totransgressthe limitsof itsmaterial conditions (its body) towards a fully determined field ofbodies, a spatial totality that must include it, as a unified form.However,thisstrivingisboundtofail,sinceonecannotpresupposetheexistenceofallreality(omnitudorealitas),butonlyitsidea.Thematerial conditionsof this transgressionareabsent insofar as thesubject has only an idea of thewhole. Further, ‘there is only oneconceptthathasthecapacityofrejoiningwithoutlosstheformsofhuman sensibility: this is the concept of ens realissimum, oruniversal concept of a reality in general’ (Ibid.). Yet, as explainedabove, foranobjectofsensetobethoroughlydetermined, itmustbe compared with all data that can be given in the field ofappearances, which is inevitably ‘considered as single and allembracing’ (Kant, 1998, A582), for there is only ‘one singleexperience in which all perceptions are represented as inthoroughgoing and orderly connection’ (Kant, 1998, A110). So, inorder to know “Imyself,” the subjectmust somehow achieve thissingular experience, but for the critical Kant transgression can atbest be regression toward an original condition, a space that ismerely formally infinite, since it is considered impossible that thematerialof“realityingeneral”tobegiventothesubjectascollectiveunity. The omnitudo realitas as ens realissumum can be nothingshort of real totality and its divine nature—God. Here the thornyproblemofthesoul’srelationtothebodyistakentoacosmiclevel,totheleveloftotality,bothinsofarasthehumansubjectcannot

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transgresswithout real limits and thatway directs itself towards“cosmic apperception,” and insofar as the subject is certainly notitselfGod.iii.TheEtherealCoherenceofExperience

In his post-critical Opus Postumum, Kant’s solution to theproblem of the commercium of body and soul, understood as theproblemoftheunityofthesubject,isthatspacemustsomehowberepresented as originally full if its community is to include thesubjectwithoutcontradiction,exhibitingaprioritheexistencethatcorrespondsto“Ithink.”Inthiswork,Kanttakesaradicalstep:heargues that theworld (as the complete domain of objects, and inthis sense, the cosmos) must be present to consciousness beforetherecanbeanydistinctionbetweeninnerandoutersense,astheground of “I myself.” He writes: ‘To mere inner and outerperceptionassuchtherealreadybelongmoving forces—ofmatteroutsideme as well as their composition insideme’ (1995, 22:18,Op.13-15).Moreover,intheCritiqueofJudgement,Kantrethinkshisearlier view of the regulative ideal of the systematic unity ofmaterial reality in terms of the purposiveness of nature, theprinciple that ‘[n]ature, for the sake of judgment, specifies itsuniversallawstoempiricalones,accordingtotheformofalogicalsystem’ (Kant, 1987, 20:215f). In the Opus, Kant argues that forexperiencetoachievesystematicunitythatisrealizedsubjectivity,theremustbeaprincipleforcombiningallmovingforcesofmatterinto a single, all-embracing whole. Whereas the MetaphysicalFoundationsofNaturalSciencehadshownthatmatteringeneralisalwaysconstitutedbythetwofundamentalforcesofattractionandrepulsion, Kant now attempts to provide an a priori principle inaccordancewithwhichthesetwofundamentalforcesarethoughttounderlie all particular varieties of matter. In other words, thepossibilityofexperience isnowthoughttopresupposeacollectiveunityoftheforcesfromwhichthedistributiveunityofexperienceis

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derived.Notethatthedirectionofthederivationofexperiencehasbeen inverted inKant’spost-criticalwork—nowfromcollectivetodistributive.Kant’smajor theoreticalmove in theOpus is toprovethat‘[t]heprinciplewhichservesasthebasisforthecombinationofallmovingforcesofmatterintoawholeofallpossibleexperienceisthe assumption of a material which is uniformly distributedthroughout cosmic space, and which penetrates all bodiesinternally’(Kant,1995,21:540,Op.24-27).Thequestionarisesastohowfullspacecanbethoughtasaunityofopposingforces,ifitistoground the varieties of matter in a uniform, all-penetratingmaterial. Kantarguesthatifmatteriswhatfillsspace,itmustdosobyresisting all other matter that attempts to enter the same space.Thiscanonlybemadepossiblebythemovingforceofrepulsion.Tofill space to a determinate degree, however, a second force isrequired that opposes the first and limits its expansion: anattractive force. ‘Neither force can in principle suffice on its own:without attraction, matter would by its repulsive force disperseitself to infinity, leaving space empty; without repulsion, matterwould by its attractive force coalesce into a single point, againleavingspaceempty.Therefore,itisonlybytheinteractionofbothfundamental forces that matter of a determinate quantity ispossible’(Förster,2002,63).However,inordertoavoidcircularityintheconstructionofhisconceptofmatter,3attractionmust

3In a letter to Beck dated September 8, 1792, Kant identifies “a circle that I

cannot get out of” in his attempt to understand the differences in density and

mass indifferent typesofmatter. In theMetaphysicalFoundations,Kantarguedthat the attractive force that makes possible the filling of space also makes

possible the contactbetweendifferent typesofmatter. Suchanattractive force

must therefore be prior to contact itself, ‘an immediate action through empty

space of onematter upon an other’ (Kant, 2004, 4:512, Prop. 7),which at this

point Kant identifies with Newtonian attraction, or gravitation. However, as

Förster explains, this identification introduces a problem into Kant’s theory:‘gravitationalattractionisalwaysproportionaltothemassor,foragivenvolume,

the density of matter….So the intensity of the attractive force must causally

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ultimatelybe the effect of repulsion– the effect of a resistance totheexpansionofthecosmosthatpushesbodiestogether.Repulsionisretainedasanessentialforceofmatter,butnowofamatterthatisoriginallyexpansive(originarieexpansiva): ‘theether,butnotasanobjectofexperience;rather,merelyastheideaofanexpansivematter’ (Kant, 1995, 21:378f., Op. 12). Moreover, a ‘universalattraction’mustbethoughtofresultingfromaresistancethat ‘thematter of the ether exerts upon itself,’ limiting itself to ‘oneuniversal cosmic body’ (ibid.). Kant’s “ether proof” in theOpus isintended todemonstrate thenecessityof “anall-pervadingether,”andinthissenseresembleshiseffortstoestablishthenecessityofGodinhispre-criticalwork.However,unliketheabsolutenecessityrequired for a proof of God (the impossibility of non-existence),Kant only wants to establish the necessity of the ether for thepossibilityofunifiedexperience.Kantwrites:

If itcanbeprovedthattheunityofthewholeofpossibleexperience

restsupontheexistenceofsuchamaterial…thenitsactualityisalso

proved,not,indeed,throughexperience,butapriori,merelyfromthe

conditions of possibility, for the sake of the possibility of

experience…Now the concept of the whole of outerexperience…presupposes all possible moving forces of matter as

combined in a collective unity; to wit, in full space (for empty

space…isnotanobjectofexperience).(1995,22:550-551,Op.86-87)

dependondensity,anddensitymustinturnbetheeffectofattraction’(Förster,

2002,35).Or,asKantdescribesthecircularity:‘thepowertoattractdependson

the density, this density on the power to attract’ (Kant, 2005, 11:361f). In the

Opus postumum Kant argues for an originally expansive matter in which noattraction is tobe found,except thatwhich itexertsonitself:anall-penetrating

ether. In order to counter its original repulsive expansion, and for there to be

existence in the first place, attraction is required; not the penetrative force of

attraction that is gravitation, but only attraction in contact, or cohesion. As

Försterputsit:‘Sincecohesionisacontactforce,itsmeasuredoesnotdependon

the quantity of a givenmatter. This is the first step in avoiding the circle. Thesecondstepconsistsinshowingthatcohesionitself–indeedallinternallymoving

forcesofmatter–dependsonthelivingforceofanether’(Förster,2002,45).

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WhileintheMetaphysicalFoundationsKantthinksoftheexistence of an all-pervasive ether as a merely empiricalhypothesis, in the Opus he is convinced that it could bedemonstratedas theconditionof thepossibilityofperceptionand thus the material of subjective experience. This shiftresulted from the recognition that anyperceptionof anouterobject is also the effect of a moving force of matter on thesubject,andthatspacemustbe filledwithsomethingtoserveasamediumforthetransmissionofmovingforcesbetweentheobjects of perception and the subject’s body, allowing it toperceive all bodies in space as determinately related to oneanother. In otherwords, Kantwould use the ether to groundthesystematicityinourcognitionofthephysicalworldsoughtinthethirdCritique’sprincipleofpurposiveness.Kantsuggeststhatbycommencingwiththeideaofawholeofmovingforcesthat constitute the basis of experience, one represents tooneself a priori full space as the ‘only one object of possibleouterexperience’(Kant,1995,22:554fn.,Op.89fn.).Whatthismeansisthat,objectively,thereisonlyoneexperience,and‘allso-calledexperiences arealwaysonlypartsofone experience,’in virtue of a universally distributed, unbounded materialwhich‘connectsall…bodiesinonesystemandsetsthemintoacommunity of reciprocity’ (Ibid). In other words, becauseexperience requires the ethereal coherence of a “universallydistributed world-material” in order to be systematic, allexperienceisalreadycosmicexperience.iv.MoralEffortandtheCosmotheologicalProposition

IfthesubjectistobecomeanempiricalobjectforitselfandresolveKant’sexistentialcrises,theremustbemorethanacommonbasisofmovingforces.Fortheretobeexperienceofanyparticularobjectinspace,theobject’smovingforcesmustaffectthesubjectinorder tobeknownassuch. It is important thatKanthad included

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organisms in the apriori division of bodies and that humans areexamplesoforganicallymoving forces.Hewrites: ‘Becauseman isconsciousofhimselfasaself-movingmachine[organism]…hecan,and is entitled to, introduce a priori organic-moving forces ofbodies into the classification of bodies in general’ (1995, 21:212-213, Op. 65-66). With this, the problem of position seems to beresolved.AsFörsterpointsout:

Only because we ourselves exercise moving forces do we

apprehend the appearances of moving forces upon us. But – and

this is the crucialpartofKant’s argument–only in theprocessof

such apprehension can we, and do we, appear to ourselves as

empiricalbeings.Empiricalself-consciousnessemergesatthepointofintersection(interaction)betweenthemovingforcesofmatteras

theyaffectme,andmyownmotionsthereon.Thatistosay,onthe

one hand, only because I am corporeal – a system of organically

movingforces–canIbeaffectedbymovingforcesofmatter;onthe

other hand, only insofar as I can representmyselfasaffected do I

appeartomyselfassensuousandcorporeal,thatis,asanobjectofoutersense.(2002,106)

So,anorganismisthoughttoaffectitselfwithmovingforcesinsofarasitisaself-movingmachine,andthusappearstoitselfwithinthefield of bodies and forces. Organic embodiment ensures thatinasmuch as humans insert themselves into the space of movingforcesthatallowsthemtoexperienceobjects,theywillexperiencethemselvesassituatedinthatspace.Withthis,humansmightcometo know themselves as subjected to those limits, at oncedetermining inner and outer intuitions (transcendentallyempirical), provided by the organic resistance that constitutes aunifiedfieldofforces. However,anewproblemarisesinsofaras‘[o]rganismistheform of a body regarded as a machine – i.e. as an instrument ofmotion for a certain purpose’ (Kant, 1995, 21:185, Op.), that is,insofar as the human body is determined by its purposiveorganization.Thequestionofwhythesubjectisdrivenbyaself-

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movement that allows it to appear to itself is inevitable. As Kant

tellsus,anorganicbodycannotderiveitsorganizationmerelyfrom

movement; themovementmustbedirected.Kantwrites: ‘There isno spontaneity in the organization of matter but only receptivity

fromanimmaterialprincipleoftheformationofmatterintobodies,

whichindicatestheuniverse,andcontainsathoroughgoingrelation

of means to ends. An understanding … [is] the principle of the

system’ (1995, 22:78, Op. 186). And for an organism to come to

know itself through its own organization, this principle must be

internal.

It isonlythespontaneityof thoughtthatmovesthesubject

fromwithin,andasKanthastoldusthroughouttheCritiques,this

spontaneityemerges inrelationto thecategorical imperative, that

is, in relation toduty.Empirical self-consciousness,hehadargued

early in the Opus, can emerge only in the context of a single, allembracingwholeofmovingforces,inthedeterminationofwhichI

positmyselfaspersistinginexternality.But,andthisisthenewand

importantthoughtconsideredattheendoftheOpus,‘Idonotonlypositmyselfasanobject.Ialsoconstitutemyselfasaperson,4thatis, 4 Itwould seem that Kant is unsatisfiedwith themanner inwhich existence ispersistentfortheorganism,sinceamerelyorganicdrivetowardspurposeisnot

sufficientlyfreetobeassociatedwiththehumanspiritthatcanwillactionssolely

on the basis of their rightness. This is connected to the problem of personal

immortality, which for Kant amounts to the free ground of cosmic persistence.This is a complex problem, especially insofar as there appears to be a rather

significantchangeinKant’sthoughtsonthesubjectfromhispre-critical,through

critical, and into his post-critical phases. In summary, it might be argued that

Kant moves from the pre-critical presupposition of immortality, to a critical

postulationofimmortalityasthepracticalnecessityofthewill’sendlessprogress

towardscompleteconformitywithmoral law, to thepost-critical “discovery”of

the real basis of such conformity.However, since in the last instance thispost-

criticalbasis iscomposedofmerelymoral forces,Kant’sargument isultimately

groundedinpracticalreason,andclaimsthatmoralconsiderationsalonesuffice

to justify the idea of personal immortality as a postulate (for more on Kant

postulationof immortalityseeSuprenant,Chris. (2008) “Kant’sPostulateof the

Immortality of the Soul,” International Philosophical Quarterly. Vol. 48, No. 1,

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asabeingwhoseactionscanbe imputedtome.This,Kantclaims,

also presupposes a collective unity of forces, albeit not ofmatter,

butforcesofmoral-practicalreason’(Förster,2002,138,emphasis

added). Such a collective unity of moral forces, Kant tells us, can

only be God, who is the ideal coherence of those forces directedtowards the good. Ethereal coherence givesway to an immaterialprinciple in order that spiritual coherence hold together the

repulsiveforcesinherentinpersonalexistence.5Soitisthequestion“Is thereaGod?” that compelsus todetermineourselves, and the

spacethatseparatesbeingintheworldfromthehighestbeingsets

us in an ideal relation to the unity of experience. The subject is

affectedby its own tendency towards the good, but this tendency

seems to lead again to a disconnection frommaterial conditions,

since the position of the subject ultimately results from amoraleffort to think what Kant calls ‘the cosmotheological proposition’(1995,21:21,Op.68):thereisagod.ThemoraleffortofthepersonisonlythoughttoberealeffortinasmuchasGodisthoughtofasa

personalprincipleof reason—an intelligentcause thatenables thesubjecttoactwithconsciousnessofpurposeanddirectsthesubject

toward itself according to a proposed practical unity of strictly

moral forces. Such a collective unity cannot constitute a really

delimiteddomainof affection inwhich the subject finds itselfquasubject, but remainsmerely the prerogative of the Kantianmoral

Issue 189: 85-98; for more on the role of the person in the Opus see Förster,

2000,117-147,“TheSubjectasPersonandtheIdeaofGod”).Forthepurposeof

this study, however, merely note that for Kant, the organic unit is not in itselfcapableofexperiencingitselfascosmic,andthereforeunabletoachieveabsolute

position. 5AlthoughKantnever saysasmuch, it is as thoughpersonality is a selection ofattractive forces. The thought here would be that the person is a self-limiting

whole, limitedbytheunitedattractionof thosepartsdirectedtowardthegood.

And rather than being disconnected from God, this limiting is in fact what

connectsitwithGod.Itisasthoughonlyamoralunitycouldavoidthedispersive

tendencyofrepulsion.Inotherwords,ifthereisonlyoneexperience,itismoralexperience.

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imperative.

§II

i.Bataille’sCommunityofForce

Couldtherebearealrelationtotheunityofexperience,onethat does not leave materiality and the body behind, as was

apparently the fate of the Kantian subject. As something of an

experiment, thispaper turns toGeorgesBataille foranalternative

resolution to the Kantian existential crisis, who throughout his

work appeals to a cosmic community of material forces, but

emphasizes a selection of forces implied by an embodied effort

inherent inmortality asabsoluteposition.WhileBataille’swork isfar lesssystematic thanKant’s, therearestrikingparallels in their

engagementswith subjectivity,materiality, force, community, and

cosmos.

Bataillehad fromvery earlyon inhiswritingsdirectedhis

attentiontowhathecalled“heterogeneousexistence,”whichistied

toavisionofmatterthatAllanStoekldescribesas‘sorepulsivethat

it resisted not only the idealism of Christians, Hegelians, and

surrealists, but even the conceptual edifice building of traditional

materialists’ (Stoekl in Bataille, 1985, xi). As Bataille defines it,

heterogeneousindicates‘elementsthatareimpossibletoassimilate’and in this way ‘a fundamental impact on social assimilation,

likewise has an impact on scientific assimilation’ (Bataille, 1985,

140-141). It is therefore necessary, according to Bataille, to posit

the limits of social and scientific tendencies and ‘to constitute a

knowledge of the nonexplainable difference, which supposes theimmediateaccessoftheintellecttoabodyofmaterialpriortoany

intellectual reduction’ (Bataille, 1985, 141). Arguably, this

knowledge appears in self-affection insofar as ‘the object of any

affective reaction is necessarily heterogeneous’ (Bataille, 1985,

142). Inasmuch as ‘in a disconcerting way, the subject [has] the

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capacity to displace the exciting value of one element onto an

analogous or neighboring one,’ the subject arises as a site of

heterogeneity where ‘[t]here is sometimes attraction, sometimes

repulsion,andincertaincircumstances,anyobjectofrepulsioncan

becomeanobjectofattractionandviceversa’(Bataille,1985,141-

142).The‘innerexperience’ofthesubjectisrootedinthis‘bodyof

material’ where its existence can connect to multiple

determinations,to limitlessmodificationsof itselfanditsobjectas

‘thesubjectcontestshimself,huntshimself’(Bataille,2001,94-95). This lineof thinking takesonanewdimension inBataille’s

work with the College de Sociologie, where he addresses thecompositionofcommunity throughanextensionof therelationof

the forces of attraction and repulsion. What is important in this

context is that, as Stoekl points out, Bataille begins to think of

entitiesascollectionsofotherentities:

thereisnosimplyisolableipsethatwouldrepresentunitarybeing.What cells are to a human being, a human being is to that larger

organism, the community. Being is not simple identity, but rather

rupture or disequilibrium, the sudden change of levels: being is

violentdifference,precariousnessandheterogeneityinrelationtoagivenstablegroup(StoeklinBataille,1988,xxi).

LikeKant,Bataille thinks that the relationbetweenattractionand

repulsion makes community possible, and consciousness of this

relation positions subjectivity. In his essay titled Attraction andRepulsion, Bataille writes: ‘It is not enough that individuals areattractedtoeachother.Itisalsonecessarythattheybeconsciousof

someattractionorother’(inHollier1988,105).Butthistendencyis

almosttheinverseofthemoraleffortoftheKantianperson.Bataille

does state that the consciousness of attraction results from a

‘fundamentalrepulsion,’butratherthanGodindicatingthefocusofmoraltendencies,thefocusforBatailleiswhatis‘untouchableandunspeakable; from theoutset it partakesof thenatureof corpses,

menstrual blood, or pariahs’ (Bataille in Hollier, 1988, 122), the

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pulsatingrhythmofthe‘transformationof…theobjectofrepulsion

into the object of attraction’ (Ibid). This pulsation invests an

‘unquestionable affective concentration’ (Ibid) into the repulsive,

through which base materiality comes to possess a force of

attraction,whichbringsaboutcollection.

Significantly, this base materiality associated with an

oscillation of forces is reminiscent of the Kantian ether. This

oscillation ‘would consist not in a movement concentrating

individualswhoaredistantfromeachotherbutintheintervention

of a new element at the moment in which the individuals come

close,somethinganalogoustotheproductionofanelectriccurrent6

uniting,inamoreorlessstablemanner,individualswhocameinto

contact’(BatailleinHollier,1988,109).However,hesaysthatwhile

this wavering stability is brought about by moments of intense

affection, itmust be insisted upon that this affection ‘is devoid of

personal significance’ (Bataille in Hollier, 1988, 110) – it is not a

concentrationof individualbodiesbutaconcentrationofaffection

that collects a field of bodies. This is because Bataille thinks that

community,ratherthanarisingfromacompulsiontodutyinherent

inKant’svisionofpersonhood,mustbe‘heldtogetherbybeingput

intouchwithjoy–byacontact–whoseaggregativevaluedepends

on life’s being satisfying and exuberant’ (Ibid). Crucially, this

holding together through joy emerges in the face of death, ‘to the

extent that the very dark, repulsive nucleus, around which all

turbulence revolves, has created the principle of life out of the

category death’ (Bataille in Hollier, 1988, 111). Joy in the face of

death is the self-affection that assures a certain unity, since

mortality makes the very life of the living think itself in itsdisappearance.Ultimately, forBataille,thesubjectposits itselfonlyinthisdisappearance.

6Thenotionofanetherhas longbeenassociatedwith fireandelectricity, from

ancient thoughtwell intomodernscience.SeeWhittaker,SirEdmund.(1951)AHistoryoftheTheoriesofAetherandElectricity.London:ThomasNelsonandSons.

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ii.TheExpendingCosmosandtheSubjectOutsideItself In another early essay entitled Celestial Bodies, Bataillediscussesmovingforcesfromacosmologicalperspective,clarifyingthe notion of joyful turbulence. In it Bataille refers to ArthurEddington, an astronomer often associatedwith the theory of theexpanding universe. 7 Of course, this notion of the universe asexpansivewasalreadypresentinKant’scosmology,resultingfromafundamentalcosmicrepulsion.Butwhatisinterestingisthewayin which Bataille thinks through this expansion. His reading‘transformsitintoaninterpretationoftheworldthatwouldratherdeservethenameofexpendinguniverse’(Hollier,1990,134).Thisisatransgressivemovementthatdrivestheuniverse,‘hurlingitintospace like a whirling explosion’ (Bataille, 1986, 75), and the‘underlyingnatureof theworld fromwhichwecome is thatofanexplosiverotationofmatter’(Bataille,1986,76).

While he says that ‘[t]hese considerations about ourselveshavebeenmadepossibleasknowledgedeveloped,’theyare‘whollycontrarytothoserepresentationswhichhaveestablishedmanandhisearthlybaseas theseemingly immutableseatofhuman life,’ adomain‘constitutedasnotsubjecttotherealityoftheuniverse,asentirelyautonomous, to thepointofperfect immobility setwithinthemadspinofitall’(Ibid).Withthisinmind,Batailleproposesa“Copernicanrevolution”ofhisown.Hewrites:

evenifhumanexistenceisreallyintheprocessofnowdiscoveringthe universe that sustains it, this existencemust acknowledge theuniverseasaspectacleexternaltoitself.How,indeed,canitclaimtoidentify with the rapture of the heavens, acknowledging itself asspectacleviewing itself,when the factof lookingpresupposes thatthe viewing subject has somehow escaped from the rapturous

7 See Eddington, Sir Arthur Stanley. (1933) The Expanding Universe: Astronomy’s “Great Debate,” 1900-1931. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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movement of the universe? All that we recognize as truth isnecessarilylinkedtotheerrorrepresentedbythe“stationaryearth”(Ibid)

Ofcourse,Batailleispointingtotheerrorofthestationarysubject,associatedwith Kant’s “Copernican revolution.” The question thatarises from this reversal of the Kantian reversal is how humanexistence can subject itself to the rapturous movement that isultimatelythe“movementofthewhole,” fromtheperspectiveofabodythatisitselfmoving?

Bataille suggests that the thought of autonomous humanexistence is directly correlated with misconceptions of themovement of the cosmos. The mistake is to think of humanexistence as constituted by accumulation and concentration, amovementofattractionaroundafixednucleus.Itisamistakethat‘graduallyeffaces the imageofa [material]reality freeof inherentmeaning or demand, replacing it with a personification… of theimmutable idea of the Good’ (Bataille, 1986, 78, emphasis added).The cycle of human energy, in its directedness toward a powerassociated with total coherence, disconnects itself from the realcoherenceofthecosmos.‘Thereis,’Bataillewrites,

butonewayout;itisinvainthatwedenyournature,andsincewedo seekpower,we can only assent to the forcewemust be [and]onemustgo…tothefulllimitofpower.Existenceinavidityattains,whenfullydeveloped,apointofdisequilibriumatwhichitsuddenlyandlavishlyexpends;itsustainsanexplosivelossofthesurplusofforceithassopainfullyaccumulated”(Ibid).

In this violent expenditure of self, in an encounter with therepulsive as such, one must, Bataille writes, ‘perceive that hebreathes in thepowerof death’ (Ibid.), awakening toamovementthatsustainsitselfbeyondalossofthesubject,‘wherethoughtkeepsgoingevenafteritssubjecthasbeenspent’(Hollier,1990,139).Themovement of forces takes bodies into the space of mortality inwhichthewholeofembodiedlifeisaffected,notmerelythesubject.

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Bataillediscovers,inthemovementofthecosmos,thepossibilityofa subject position that is the inverse of that discovered byKant. AsDenisHollierwrites:

Expenditurehereisnotsomuchanobjecttobethoughtof,asitisthe mode of thought when there is no subject left to think it.Thinkingexpenditure,forasubject,meansfirstofallthinkingofascene fromwhich he has been evacuated. Itmeans to push self-sacrifice at least to thepoint of the loss of ego, entering a spacewhere the ego, having become expendable, is endowedwith thegloryofnotbeingthere.(Ibid)

iii.MortalEffortandCosmo-atheology

For Bataille, mortality is the absolute limitation of livingmotion.8 Perhaps we must admit, after the death of God9 andagainstKant,that ‘membershipinthisworldistiedtothepositingof the body as thing insofar as it is mortal’ (Bataille, 1989, 46,emphasisadded).ForBataille, as forKant, it is thepositingof theobjectfromwithoutthatgenerallydefinesaworld,andthismeansthatthesubjectcomestoknowitselfintheworld‘fromtheoutsideasanother’(Bataille,1989,31).Interestingly,Bataillearguesthatatthisoriginalmomentofexteriorization,insofarastheworldshares 8 ThroughouthisworkBatailleappearscommittedtoapictureoflifeasorganic.Itisworthnotingthatmortalityherereferstothemortalityoftheorganism,andin this sense shares some of Kant’s understanding of the directedness of theorganism.Theorganismsharesin ‘themost luxuriousformof life,’sinceit isan‘abyss where enormous quantities of energy are swallowed up, and destroyed’(Bataille,1991,85).Onewonderswhat life in the faceofdeathmight look like,were“livingmotion”notalreadylimitedtotheorganism’sspaceofmortality. 9ThedeathofGodbecamesomethingofaprinciple forBataille,suggestingthattheGodthatguaranteestheidentityoftheresponsibleselfhasdisappeared.Forthemostpart,thisidealwastakenfromNietzsche,whowrote:‘WhitherisGod?...Iwilltellyou.Wehavekilledhim—youandI.Allofusarehismurderers.…Godisdead. God remains dead.’ And: ‘The greatest recent event—that “God is dead,”that the belief in the Christian god has become unbelievable—is alreadybeginningtocastitsfirstshadowsoverEurope.’(1974,279)

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thesameexternalitythatisessentialtothesubjectcomingtoknowitself,theworldandeverythinginitispositedonthesameplaneasthesubject.What this suggests is that thesenseof continuity thatwas associated with the subject qua subject is negated by thepositingofadistinctobjectiveworld.Yet,preciselyforthisreason,that continuity ‘derives new significance from the contrast it hasformed to theworld of things’ (Bataille, 1989, 35). It is here thatthereemerges‘thefascinationofthesacred,’butnotinrelationtoacosmotheological ideal that draws the subject towards objectiveunity,butrather inrelation toaworld that is ideal insofaras it isno-thing.Thisun-realworld ‘establishesreality,which it isnot,asitscontrary’(Bataille,1989,37). The positing of an ideal world is profoundly linked to thedefinition of body as being opposed to the soul, for only startingfromthenegativerepresentationofasacredand“spiritual”worlddoesthebodyfinditselfonthesideofthings.‘[I]tisthegloryofthehumanbody to be the substratumof a spirit’ (Bataille, 1989, 40).However,insofarasthebodybecomesathingonlyafterthesubjectfindsthatinthepositingofitselfasobjectithasalsopositedanon-objective domain, the body ‘is never a thing except virtually, somuchthatifdeathreducesittotheconditionofathing,thespiritismore present than ever: the body that has betrayed it reveals itmoreclearlythanwhenitservedit’(Ibid.).Death’sabsencerevealstheveryessenceofthesoul,anditsappearance(intheviolentswirlof the cosmos) is the supreme affirmation of life 10 . Life’sdisappearanceindeathrevealstheinvisibleunityoflifethatisnotathing, but is nevertheless real. Death is that which resists theexpansionoflife,butinthissamemomenttransformsthatexpanse 10 Whereas for Kant, the affirmation of the highest good through personal willensures the subject’s position in a moral and intelligible world/cosmos, forBataille it is the affirmation of life through the mortal body that disposes thesubject towards a world/cosmos that retains a persistent nothingness withinitself, theencounterwithwhichproducesa transgressiveaffectivity thatresistsintelligibility.

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into expense. The world of things (what Bataille calls “the realorder”)preservesitsvalueinduration,andinthissensedeathhasno place in it. But ‘[t]he real order does not so much reject thenegationoflifethatisdeathasitrejectstheaffirmationofintimatelife, whose measureless violence is a danger to the stability ofthings,andaffirmationthatisfullyrealizedindeath’(Bataille,1989,46-47).Theunityoftheself,whichwaslosttotheKantiansubjectprecisely because it was regarded as thing becoming object, isrestored inthedissolutionof therealorder,andthisalwaystakesplacethroughrealdeath. For Bataille, the subject stands in relation to itself as thequasi-locusofapureaffectivity(joy)withoutobjectthatemergesinthe face of death. The subject stands outside itself in an ecstaticmoment that interrupts the endurance of an expanding world ofthings,amomentthatisrealbutnon-objective;itfacesitselfasno-thing.Thesubjectfindsitselfinsofarasitlosesitselfatthatpointofoscillationbetweenforces,whereitbecomesotherthanitselfratherthanaperson,whereanexplosionofpowermakesitimpossibletoselectadirectednesssinceitisgivenovertotheeffusivelifeofthecosmos. For Kant, the temporality of the subject puts its self-identity into question and calls for an objective permanence thatpreserves the soul ‘through all its alterations, even the humanbeing’s death’ (Kant, 1998,A351),whereas forBataille, death is aviolence that exposes the soul as sacred nothing. Moral effortsubordinates the world of things to the divine. By prescribinguniversal obligatory relations between forces it reduces theircommunitytoanorderofthingsthatresiststheviolentexpenditureof the cosmos: ‘a community of those who have no community’(Bataille,1987,5:483). IntheplaceofKantiancosmotheologythatultimatelydissolvestheintimacyofthesubjectinthemoralperson,Batailleoffersacosmo-atheology11thatseekstheplaceofGodin

11 BataillewasworkingonaprojectcalledLaSommeathéologiquethatwasneverfinished, though it is as close as Bataille came to a “system.” Bataille himself

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sacred immanence, inaacosmosthatmakes itselfpresentonly initsabsence, inthe ‘insurmountablevertigoofallthingsthat leavesnothing as it is’ (Bataille, 2011,208).Mortaleffort is directednessbeyondastablesubjectthatrevealsitsreality–anabsolutepositionoutsideitselfwhereeverythingdies,evenGod.

References

Bataille,Georges.(1985)VisionsOfExcess:SelectedWritings,1927-1939.Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress.Bataille,Georges.(1986)“CelestialBodies”,October.Vol.36:75–78.Bataille,Georges.(1987)Oeuvrescomplètes.Paris:Gallimard,Bataille,Georges.(1989)TheoryofReligion.NewYork:ZoneBooks.Bataille,Georges.(1991)TheAccursedShare:AnEssayonGeneralEconomy.NewYork:ZoneBooks.Bataille,Georges.(2001)TheUnfinishedSystemofNonknowledge.Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress.Bataille,Georges.(2011)Guilty.NewYork:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.Baum,Manfred.(1989)“KantonCosmologicalApperception”,InternationalPhilosophicalQuarterlyXXIX.No.3,No.115(September):281–289.Förster,Eckart.(2002)Kant’sFinalSynthesis:AnEssayontheOpusPostumum.Boston:HarvardUniversityPress.Green,Garth.(2010)TheAporiaofInnerSense:TheSelf-KnowledgeofReasonandtheCritiqueofMetaphysicsinKant.Leiden:BrillAcademicPublishers,Incorporated.Hollier,Denis.Ed.(1988)TheCollegeofSociology.Minneapolis:Universityof

defined atheology as ‘the science of the death or the destruction of God (thescience of the things being destroyed inasmuch as it is a thing)’ (2001, 166).Stuart Kendall in his edited volume of Bataille’s works entitled TheUnfinishedSystemofNon-knowledge, outlines a few key points: ‘Atheology…is a science ofimmediacy…is a search for the death of objectivity…is a search forimmanence…implies a general economyof forces…the incarnationof revolt…bypracticing joybeforedeath’ (Bataille2001,xxxviii-xxxix).Bataillewrites: ‘IsnotGod themost basic presupposition of thought? I don’t doubt this, but this fatalpresuppositionisitselfgivenintheinexorablemovementofthought,itisnolessgiven than it is, ultimately, the fact of its absence.Atheology expresses the factthathumanthinkingisaboveallplacedbeforeGodandthenbeforehisabsence’(1987,13:367).

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MinnesotaPress.Hollier,Denis.(1990)“TheDualistMaterialismofGeorgesBataille.”TranslatedbyHilariAllred.YaleFrenchStudies(January):124–139.Kant,Immanuel.(1967)PhilosophicalCorrespondence,1759-99.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.Kant,Immanuel.(1987)CritiqueofJudgement.Indianapolis:Hackett.Kant,Immanuel.(1995)OpusPostumum.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Kant,Immanuel(1998)CritiqueofPureReason.TheCambridgeEditionoftheWorksofImmanuelKant.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Kant,Immanuel.(2003)TheoreticalPhilosophy,1755-1770.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Kant,Immanuel.(2004)MetaphysicalFoundationsofNaturalScience.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Kant,Immanuel.(2005)NotesAndFragments.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Kerszberg,Pierre.(1997)CritiqueandTotality.SUNYSeriesinContemporaryContinentalPhilosophy.Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.Nietzsche,Friedrich.(1974)TheGayScience.Trans.Kaufmann,Walter.NewYork:RandomHouse.

READINGS OF NIETZSCHE IN DOSTOEVSKY AND NIETZSCHE: THE PHILOSOPHY OF TRAGEDY BY LEV

SHESTOV

Marina Jijina-Ogden

The great Cyclops eye of Socrates – that eye that had never glowed with the sweet madness of artistic inspiration - turned upon tragedy. *

Nietzsche

All a priori judgments are lost, the philosophy of Kant and Count Tolstoy is ended, and there begins the realm of the Ding an sich. Would you like

to follow Dostoevsky and Nietzsche there?†

Shestov

*Nietzsche,F.,TheBirthofTragedy,2003,p.67†Shestov,L.,DostoevskyandNietzcshe:ThePhilosophyofTragedy,1969,p.198.

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Written in 1899-1903 when Shestov was still living in Russia,

DostoevskyandNietzsche:ThePhilosophyofTragedy (1903) isone

of theearliestworksof theRussianphilosopher.1Possibly, for the

first time in Russian literature the two great thinkers of the 19th

centuryDostoevsky(1821-1881)andNietzsche(1844-1900)were

brought into a comparative discussion, subjected to a critical

analysis,andevaluatedatasinglephilosophicallevel.

It is well known that Shestov’s discovery of the works of

FriedrichNietzsche in the 1890s had a stratospheric influence on

his thinking.2As Bernard Martin pointed out in the introduction

(1969) toDostoevsky,TolstoyandNietzsche, itwas fromNietzsche

that Shestov drew the inspiration for his own lifelong polemic

against the power of universalmoral rules and the superiority of

reason(VII).ForShestovthefocusofphilosophymovedawayfrom

logicalcontinuityofargumentandaimedtobringman ‘outonthe

shorelessseaofimagination,thefantastictideswhereeverythingis

equally possible and impossible’ (1923, 38). He developed a

philosophical perspective that rests on the absurd, or “the ugly

reality” as he defined it (1969, 148-149). Specifically, from

Dostoevsky Shestov adopted the underground man as the

spokesmanforhiscriticalthought.Inhisadvancetowardsanotion

of tragicphilosophy, Shestov reliedon the experiencesof the two

precursors,DostoevskyandNietzsche.

1The article Dostoevsky and Nietzsche was first published in The Art World

2According to Mme. Baranova Shestov first read Nietzsche in the year 1896

(1983,24).Lovtzky,G.L.remembersthatBeyondGoodandEvil(1909-1913)was

thefirstofNietzsche’sworkShestovread,followedshortlybyOntheGenealogyof

Morals(1887).ManyyearslaterShestovtoldhisdiscipleBenjaminFondanethat

the reading On the Genealogy of Morals had a stratospheric influence on his

imaginationanddisturbedhimtothestateofinsomnia,(Finkenthal,30).

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Since the 1840s Dostoevsky’s writing was appreciated in

Frenchintellectualcircleswherehebecameknownforhisinsights

intomurder, hallucination andmadness. Shestov emphasised that

Dostoevsky’s psychological realism challenged the notions of

Western ideals. From Shestov’s point of view Dostoevsky’s most

significantworkisNotesfromtheUnderground(ZapiskiisPodpolja,

1864). Precisely in this book Shestov found the key to his

interpretationoftherestofDostoevsky’swriting.Forthefirsttime

in this novel, according to Shestov, Dostoevsky established the

method of “psychology”3in his writing, which he was the first in

Russiatodiscover(1969,170,174).The“psychology,”presentedin

the underground man, 4 wrote Shestov, was ‘the first gift that

EuropegratefullyacceptedfromRussia’(Ibid.147).Thatauthentic

subliminal quality of Dostoevsky’s writing is precisely what

attractedNietzsche:

DostoevskyistheonlypsychologistfromwhomIwasabletolearn

anything. I rank my acquaintance with him among the most

splendidachievementsofmylife.(quotedinShestov,1969,146)

AccordingtoShestov,NietzschecameafterDostoevskytocomplete

his predecessor’s telling (Ibid. 317). Despite no apparent stylistic

resemblance between the two authors’ works, Shestov suggested

thattracesoftheexperiencesofDostoevsky’scharactersarefound

inNietzsche’sthought(Ibid.239).

He claimed that likeDostoevskyNietzsche ‘had come from

penalservitude- fromtheunderworldintothetragicreality, from

whichthereisnoreturntotheworldofcommonplace’(Ibid.317).

TheGermanphilosopherabandonedtheidealsofhisyouth,waiting

3Shestovdefined“psychology”asaself-liberationofeverythingthatis“foreign”

to one’s nature, such as theoretical knowledge and manifestations of idealism

(Ibid.266).4“The undergroundman” is the narrator andmain character inNotes fromthe

UndergroundbyDostoevsky.

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for the opportunity to liberate his thought in order to be able ‘to

speak boldly in his own way’ (Ibid. 274). Shestov structured his

analysis ofNietzsche’sworkbydividinghisphilosophical thought

into the earlier and later phases. In his view, themost significant

changestookplaceduringthesecondphaseofNietzsche’s literary

life.

Shestovasserted,thatupuntiltheageofthirtyNietzsche‘sat

in a corner, contemplating the ideas of others’ (Ibid. 250). In the

early 1870s Nietzsche studied Greek literature and culture; his

writing was mainly influenced by the philosophy of Arthur

Schopenhauer5(1788 - 1860) and the music of Richard Wagner

(1813-1883)(Ibid.239-240).InhisfirstbookTheBirthofTragedy

(1872)6Nietzschearguedthatinthetragicmyth‘youmayhopefor

everythingandforgetallthatismostpainful,’whileinitschordsof

delight ‘the terrible image of the world charmingly fades away’

(2003, 116). Accordingly, for young Nietzsche the tragic artist is

fearless toward that which is terrible and questionable (Shestov,

1969,311-312).Forhim,‘tragedyitselfisaproofofthefactthatthe

Greekswerenotpessimists’(TheWagner-NietzscheCorrespondence

1921,167).

However, in Nietzsche’s account, pessimism was not

necessarily a sign of decline and decay, it could also be a sign of

strengthand“over-abundance”(2003,3).Nietzschewrotethat‘the

tragedy of the ancients was diverted from its course by the

dialectical impulse towards knowledge and scientific optimism’

(Ibid. 82). Specifically, inNietzsche’s account, Socratic rationalism

and optimismwere responsible for the decline of Greek tragedy.7

5According toShestov,Schopenhauerwrotebookswithapessimistic tendency,

butwithanoptimisticfaith(1969,311).6NietzschededicatedthebooktoWagner.InNietzsche’sownwords,thisbookis

‘badlywritten,ponderous,painful,itsimagerywildandconfused,emotional,here

andtheresweetishtothepointoffemininity…’(quotedinDanto,2005,46).7IntheclimaxofTheBirthofTragedy(§11-§15)Nietzscheproducedhisaccount

ofhowSocraticideasofmakingprogressthroughreasondestroyedtragedy.

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Hence,inthefigureofSocratesNietzschesaw‘anoptimisticzestfor

knowledge;’ in his view, Socrates originated the idea that the

universeisintelligible,andthatbymeansoftherationalacquisition

ofknowledgemenmightbefreedfromthefearofdeath(2003,74).

Tragedywouldbeno longer required for its function isdismissed

by rational knowledge (Danto, 41). Thus, Nietzsche stated that in

the face of practical pessimism ‘Socrates is the archetype of the

theoretical optimist who, in his faith in the explicability of the

nature of things, attributes the power of a panacea to knowledge

and science’ (2003, 75). Besides, he noted, there is an endless

strugglebetweenthetheoreticalandthetragicphilosophies(Ibid).

Shestov asserted, that Nietzsche rejected the Greek

philosopher’s opposition to instincts as a form of decadence,

viewingSocrates’philosophyaspreachingofastrugglewithoneself

or “the improvement theory,” in Nietzsche’s own words (1969,

258). Shestov observed that while Nietzsche viewed Socrates’

teachingasanattempttoovercomehisinstincts,hisowneffortsto

“save himself” became a form of a new expression of decadence

(Ibid. 258). Thus, Shestov concluded, in his stance against

decadence Nietzsche fell into the same trap, for his own thought

wasnot too far fromSocrates’ (Ibid). ‘Noneof us,’wrote Shestov,

‘despitealloutwardevidence,wouldsignamoralcondemnationof

ourselves’(Ibid.259).Consequently,inhisopinion,Nietzsche’sidea

of decadence is contradictory because the struggle against

decadenceisalreadydecadentbyitsnature.

Unlike Socrates, who spoke mainly “words of theory,”

Nietzsche began to speak out with the intention to reveal to the

reader the “agonizing secret” of his life experience, in the way

DostoevskydidinhisGrandInquisitor8(Ibid.264).Shestovargued

8TheGrandInquisitorisaparableinDostoevsky’snovelTheBrothersKaramazov

(1880) told by Ivan Karamazov. In his next book,Apotheosis of Groundlessness

(1905) Shestov wrote: ‘In Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor lurks a dreadful idea.

Whocanbe sure,he says–metaphorically, of course– thatwhen the crucified

ChristutteredHiscry:“Lord,whyhastthouforsakenme?”Hedidnotcalltomind

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thatNietzsche tookaweapon frompositivismwithwhich to fight

idealism. However, he was never a positivist, and “the majority’s

happiness”didnotattracthim(Ibid.273,281).Forpositivismsees

happiness to be the meaning of life, and its faith consists of

utilitarian morals, relying on hope and justification (Ibid. 274).

Specifically, ‘under the cover of positivism,’ Shestov inferred,

‘Nietzsche pursued entirely different goals’ (Ibid. 274). For

example, Nietzsche used theory and logical thinking to justify the

groundsforhisrejectionofmoraljudgments.AsShestovsuggested,

positivism mainly appeals to those aspects of life, which don’t

contain irreconcilable contradictions; it succeeds inasmuch as it

leaves fundamentally unsolvable problems aside (Ibid. 275).

Shestov argued that man is born a positivist and first has to go

throughatheologicalandmetaphysicalstageinordertoobtainthe

experience of the limitation of knowledge, butwhen all efforts in

thepositivedirectionprove fruitless, itbecomesobvious that it is

impossible to rid life of “suffering” completely (Ibid. 285). Only

then,forShestov,oneisabletoabolishthelimitationsofpositivist

truthandbegintoquestion,withoutgivinganyfurtherthoughtas

to whether or not such questioning would be permitted by

contemporarymethodologyandepistemology(Ibid).

Shestov observed that in his youth Nietzschewas a proud

man, who thought of himself as worthy of a destiny marked by

achievementsof“seriousandimportantdeeds,”butafterfallingill

itoccurredtohimthatitmightnotbepossible9(Ibid.243).Abitter

realisationthathewas“aninsignificant,”“pitiful”personresultedin

his“shamefullyanddisgustinglyunhappy”state(Ibid.244,245).As

a consequence, Shestov empathised, “this highly perceptive

the temptationof Satan,who foronewordhadofferedHimdominionover the

world?And, if Jesus recollected this offer, how canwe be sure thatHe did not

repentnothavingtakenit?’(1923,117).9OnJune14,1879duetobadhealthNietzscheresignedhisprofessorialchairat

theUniversityofBasleandwasgrantedapensionof3000francsperyearfor6

years.From1879hespentmuchofhistimeinItalyandSwitzerland.

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philosopher”became ‘confusedand flustered, likeachildwhohas

lost its way in a forest’ (1969, 249). Disillusioned, Nietzsche

consideredSchopenhauer andWagner ‘themain instigatorsofhis

terrible misfortunes’ (Ibid. 243). Had Nietzsche’s life proceeded

withoutsuchcomplications,Shestovanticipated,hewouldperhaps

havekepthisfeelingsofloveandhisdevotionforhisteachersuntil

oldage(Ibid.247).

Highlighting the fundamental difference between the

philosophy based on theory and the philosophy derived from

practice, Shestov described Nietzsche’s approach to Socrates’

teaching as theoretical. Conversely, he wrote, Nietzsche in his

works told us of his life, ‘that poor life which undermined

everything that is lofty and great, and which for its own

preservation subjected everything todoubt thatmankind reveres’

(Ibid. 263). Shestov observed that when Nietzsche became a sick

and suffering man, he started speaking from his experience of ‘a

sickandsufferingman,aboutsubjectsthatareimportanttohim’10

(Ibid. 265). Shestov praised Nietzsche: despite all theoretical

calculationshechosetousehisownexperienceasthesourceofhis

philosophy.

Thereby, the timewhen theGermanphilosopher faced the

most difficult period of his life,whichwas followedby significant

changes to his philosophical vision, began with Human, All-Too

Human(1878)(Ibid.246).Nietzschesentthedraftofhisnewbook

toRichardWagner,histeacherandafriendofhisyouth;thebreach

thathadalreadybeengrowingbetweenthetwomenbecamefinal

andWagnerabandonedNietzsche11(Ibid.240).Forthefirsttimein

10 From the age of thirty-four to forty-four Nietzsche suffered painful and

loathsomeattacksofanincurabledisease(Shestov,1969,303-304).11NietzschedescribedhisbreakupwithWagnerinEcceHomo(1908):‘Whenthe

book was finally finished and in my hands – a profound surprise for one so

seriouslyill–Ialsosenttwocopies,amongothers,toBayreuth.Byamiraculously

meaningfulcoincidence,Ireceivedattheverysametimeabeautifulcopyofthe

text ofParsifal,withWagner’s inscription forme “for his dear friend, Friedrich

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his life, Shestov suggested, Nietzsche learnt what it meant to be

completely alone (Ibid. 268). For Nietzsche it was no longer

possibletoliveasbefore,wroteShestov,eventhoughheknewthat

thenewpathcouldpromisenothingbut ‘danger,agonizingdoubt,

and perpetual loneliness’ (Ibid. 249). From the point of view of a

rational judgement or “human wisdom,” in Shestov’s own words,

Nietzschewas“crushed,”“ruined,”withnochanceleftforsalvation.

HedescribedNietzscheoverpoweredbydespairandgrief, forhim

“thewholeworldcollided”inonemoment(Ibid.316,249).

But forShestov truthbelongedtorealityrather than to the

popular wisdom. Precisely then, he wrote, all metaphysical and

moralidealsceasedtoexistcompletelyfortheGermanphilosopher,

and his “greatly slandered ego” grew to ‘unprecedented, colossal

proportionsandbottledouttheentireworldinfrontofhim’(Ibid.

269).IfbeforetheillnessNietzsche“preachedgoodness,”“invoked

truth”and“sanghymnstobeauty,’’bycontrastonthisnewpathhe

encountered “much struggle,” “wavering” and “doubt” (Ibid. 272).

However, for Nietzsche ‘a sick man indeed has no right to be a

pessimist’ (Ibid. 249, 256). Thus, Shestov continued, the breakup

with Wagner was only the beginning of a major transformation

processinthephilosopher’swork,andyearswouldpassbeforehe

decidedtorevealhis“underground’’12ideasopenly(Ibid.275).

Thereupon, with the acknowledgment of Nietzsche’s own

human needs came his “psychology,” i.e. his self-liberation of all

that is foreign to his nature, such as theoretical knowledge and

manifestations of idealism (Ibid. 266). Having withdrawn from

theoreticalargumentsofsystematicphilosophy,Nietzschebeganto

Nietzsche,RichardWagner,ChurchCouncilor”-Thiscrossingofthetwobooks–I

feltasifIheardanominoussound–asiftwoswordshadcrossed.–Atanyrate,

bothofusfeltthatway;forbothofusremainedsilent’(1989,288).12According to Shestov (1969, 168)Notes from theUnderground presented an

exploration of the subjective reality of the horrors of the existence of “the

humblest man.” The “psychology” of the underground man became a turningpointintheliterarywritingattheendofthe19thcentury(Ibid.147).

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see the world “with his own eyes.”13‘The shore has disappeared

frommysight, thewavesof the infinitehaveengulfedme,’as it is

describedbyZarathustra(NietzschequotedinShestov,1969,281).

ShestovobservedthatNietzsche’slifetasktookhimbeyond

thelimitsofsystemsandspheres,‘intowhichhehadbeendrivenby

the traditions of science and morality’ (Ibid. 282). In this new

reality, expanded beyond the boundaries of theory, there was

nothingbutugliness.Hence,Nietzscheproclaimeduntruthandfalse

judgments to be the fundamental conditions of life that implied a

perilous resistance against customary value-feelings (Ibid. 283).

Although, one thing was certain, ‘there is reality here – a new,

unheard of, unwitnessed reality that has never before been

displayed’ (Ibid. 198). Shestov argued that Nietzsche’s newly

discovered “psychology,” his viewing of the world based on his

personal experience, had led him to a new knowledge. Shestov

wrote:

Ifalieissoessentialtolife,thenitisnolessessentialthatpeople

thinkthatthislieisnotalie,butthetruth.(Ibid.284)

ForNietzsche, errorwas now among the conditions of life (2008,

117).Hisdiscoverythat in theabsenceof trutheverything is false

broughthimtotherecognitionthattheerroneousnessoftheworld

helivedinwasperhapsthemostcertainthingavailabletohissight

(Nietzsche,1930,40).Thus,Nietzschearrivedattheconclusionthat

thenewtruthmaycontainsomethingfarbetterthanthecharmof

themost ostentatious lie (Ibid. 173). Crucially, he came to realise

that only philosophy that takes risks is capable of taking a stand

beyondgoodandevil:

To recognize untruth as a condition of life: that is certainly to

impugnthetraditionalideasofvalueinadangerousmanner,anda

13I.e.freeofpre-conceivedideas,universaltruthsanddogma.

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philosophywhichventurestodoso,hastherebyaloneplaceditself

beyondgoodandevil.(Nietzsche,1930,4)

Thus,Nietzsche’sthinkinginthesecondphaseofhiswritingcareer

detested the boundaries of morality and prevailed ‘voluntarily

amongiceandhighmountains–seekingouteverythingstrangeand

questionable in existence’ (1989, 218). Shestov pointed out that

Kantiantheoryoftheapriorihadleadtoabsurdityandunderlined

thenecessityofeachpersontorealisethat‘apartfromhimselfthere

isnooneelseintheentireuniverse’(1969,280).Accordingtothe

Russian philosopher, Nietzsche began his “regeneration of

convictions” 14 when he started viewing reality as an absurd

‘kingdom of whim, uncertainty, and an infinite number of

completely new and untried possibilities’ (Ibid. 298). In such

reality,wheresufferingistheessence,‘thetragicmanaffirmseven

theharshestsuffering’(Nietzsche,1989,209).

Theperiodbetween1886and1888, inShestov’sview,was

the turning point in Nietzsche’s life and literary career, when

‘somethingunprecedentedlyhideousandterriblehadbeguntostir

in his soul’15(1969, 241, 242). Nietzsche began his “underground

14In1873DostoevskywroteinhisDiaryofaWriter:‘Itwouldbeverydifficultfor

me to tell the story of the regeneration ofmy convictions’ (quoted in Shestov,

1982, 143). Shestov adopted this phrase from Dostoevsky’s vocabulary; itbecame one of the key concepts in his analysis of Dostoevsky and Nietzsche’s

writing. Shestov used what is now a less common meaning of the word“regeneration” (pererozhdeniye), i.e. ‘a fundamental change in one’s beliefs’.

AccordingtoTheOzhegovDictionaryoftheRussianLanguage(1984,450)theuse

ofthewordinthismeaningwaspopularinthe1800s-1850s.However,todaythe

corresponding word in the English language is mainly used in themeaning of

‘theactionorprocessof regeneratingorbeingregenerated, rebirth, renewalor

revival.’15ArthurDantopointedout inNietzscheasPhilosopher (2005) that the rupture

withWagnerwasacomplicatedepisodeinthebiographiesofbothmen,andthe

psychologyavailabletodateistoofragmented.

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work” during a long period of darkness, while he wrote Dawn16

(1881),wherehedescribedhimselfasanundergroundman:

In this bookwe can see the undergroundman at work - digging,

mining andundermining. You can seehim– alwaysprovided that

you have eyes for such deep work - making his way slowly,

cautiously, gently but surely, without showing signs of the

wearinessthatusuallyaccompaniesalongprivationoflightandair.

Itmightevenbesaidthatheiscontentwithhisworkinthedark.It

evenbeginstoseemasifsomefaithisleadinghimon,asifhefinds

solaceinhiswork.Perhapsheneedsa longperiodofdarkness,he

needsanunintelligible,hidden,enigmatic something forheknows

what awaits him: his ownmorning, his own redemption, his own

rosydawn.(NietzschequotedinShestov,1969,271).

Later Nietzsche confirmed that with this book he started his

“campaignagainstmorality”(1989,290).

ShestovobservedthatincomparisontoNietzsche’sideasof

the earlier periodnow in the lawsof natureNietzsche could only

find “a guarantee of unhappiness,” but in the horrors of life - a

guaranteeofafuture(1969,310).Accordingly,inBeyondGoodand

Evil (1886)Nietzsche suggested thatonemustexamine theirown

assumptionsandprejudices; to subjectoneself toone’sown tests,

the‘testsaremadeonlybeforeourselvesandbeforenootherjudge’

(1930,47).Subsequently,a “revaluationofallvalues”became ‘the

formula for an act of supreme self-examination on the part of

humanity’ (Nietzsche,1989,326).Nietzschedeveloped this lineof

argument in his next book, On The Genealogy of Morals (1887),

where he made one of his most celebrated statements, when

“nothingistrue,everythingispermitted”17(1969,282).

16SometimesthetitleisalsotranslatedasDaybreak.17Nietzsche, F., On The Genealogy of Morals (1989, 150). According to Walter

Kaufmannwhowrotethecommentariestothisbook,itisquestionablewhether

this statement is directly related to Dostoevsky’s idea expressed by Ivan

Karamazov in The Brothers Karamazov (if mankind lost the belief in God and

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Shestov suggested that in his mature writings Nietzsche

attempted to break away from the authority of modern theories,

while his thought did not seek stability or balance, which

correspondedtoDostoevsky’s“worldviewbycontradictions”(Ibid.

282, 293).18From the age of forty-four until his death Nietzsche

“preached” not only against the unhappy and the sick, but also

against their defenders, “the good and the just’’ (Ibid. 304).

Nietzscheadmitted thathis sickness gavehim the right to change

allhishabitscompletely:

The man who suffers severely looks forth with terrible calmness

fromhisstateofsufferinguponoutsidethings:allthoselittlelying

enchantments,bywhich thingsareusually surroundedwhenseen

through the eye of a healthy person, have vanished from the

sufferer; his own life even lies there before him, stripped of all

bloomandcolour.(2013,66)

The tragic and painful experience, Shestov inferred, provoked

Nietzschetoseekanew,“free”vision.InShestov’sviewZarathustra

represented the struggle of hope against hopelessness.

Paradoxically, intheend,Zarathustra ‘gainedcouragetorebaptize

whatweregardasevilinusandcallitgoodness’(Ibid.312).Thus,

inThusSpokeZarathustra (1883-1885)Nietzscheestablished “the

philosophyoftragedy”(Shestov,1969,293).

However, Shestov argued that Dostoevsky’s Raskolnikov19

purported the idea of ‘beyond good and evil’ 35 years before

immortality, “everythingwouldbepermitted”), as thenovelwasnot translated

intoFrenchuntil1888.18A pattern of inner contradictions prevailed in the characters of Dostoevsky’s

novels. For instance, the character of Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment(1866) is full of contradictions: Raskolnikov the murderer is mentallyunbalanced; his characteristic mood swings rapidly change from momentary

bravado to animal fear, from spontaneous generosity to cold heartlessness

(Terras,1998,54).19RaskolnikovisthemaincharacterinCrimeandPunishment,1866.

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Nietzsche wrote Beyond Good and Evil (1886) (Ibid. 213). In

Dostoevsky’snovelRaskolnikovkilledahumanbeingand founda

way to salvation when he converted to Sonia Marmeladova’s

evangelical faith. According to Shestov, Dostoevsky propagated to

lovenotonlythepeoplewhoyouseeashappy,butalsothosewho

are unhappy, ugly and disgusting (Ibid. 317). Thewriter depicted

thedreadful truthhehaddiscoveredas the result of theyearshe

spent at the Siberian penal colony 20 with horror and shame,

throughthevoicesoftheheroesinhisnovels(Ibid.315).Nietzsche,

to a greater extent, Shestov proposed, had reason to dedicate his

thought to tracking down the “psychology” of preachers and

morality. Like Dostoevsky, Nietzsche despised “the good and the

just,” but for him the tears of sympathy and compassionwere no

morethantearsofpityandfailure,and‘thestupidityof“thegood”

was unfathomably shrewd’ (Ibid. 304, 307). For Nietzsche this

rebellionwasanewandgreat“declarationofrights,”forthesakeof

whichheundertookallhis“undergroundwork”(Ibid.315).

Shestov argued that while Nietzsche often spoke of

aristocracy in his writing, it had little to do with him personally.

AccordingtoShestov,havingsubstitutedtheword“aristocrat”with

the phrase “the undergroundman,” Nietzsche himself became an

undergroundman–the“ugliestman,”“themanintowhosemouth

theserpent crawled,”asShestov referred tohim(Ibid.317;1982,

180). In his view, Nietzsche only joined the aristocrats, i.e. ‘the

happyones,theluckyones,thevictors,’ forexternalreasons(Ibid.

313). For “aristocratism,” hewrote, like the “good” aremeans for

beautifyinglifeandNietzschehadalittleconcernforit(1969,138).

20In thespringof1847DostoevskyhadbeguntoattendtheFridaymeetingsat

the house of M. V. Butashevich - Petrashevsky (1821-1866) to discuss social

problemsfromthesocialistviewpointofCharlesFourier.OnApril the22,1849

Dostoevsky was arrested and jailed. Dostoevsky was due to be executed soon

afterbythefiringsquad,buthisexecutionwaspardonedinexchangefor

8years (later shortened to4)ofprison labourcamp inWesternSiberia (1850-

1854).HeremainedinexiletillApril1857.

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Instead,Nietzscheunderstoodthattheevilwasasnecessaryasthe

good, that both are necessary conditions of human existence, and

‘thatthesunmustshineequallyonthegoodandthewicked’(Ibid.

133). The reason Nietzsche joined the aristocrats was to gain

strength to endure poverty,21because poverty is less noticeable

behindaristocraticmanners.

The underground people, like Nietzsche, rebel against

universal truths, harmony and regularity, which scientific

investigation and ethical theory seek so avidly. The thought of

DostoevskyandNietzschefoundrefugeintheeternaldarknessand

chaosoftheunderground,wherethelifeofeveryundergroundman

wasvaluedasmuchasthewholeworld(Ibid.322).Shestovclaimed

that in theirmatureworkDostoevsky andNietzsche spoke in the

name of the underground people – the poor, the indignant, the

outraged and the convicted (Ibid. 313, 317). However, with

Zarathustra Nietzsche not only raised the question of the

undergroundman, but also provided an answer to it (Ibid. 312).

Therefore, Shestov suggested, Nietzsche sometimes exceeded his

Russiancolleague(Ibid.301).

For Shestov, the merit of Nietzsche’s philosophy is that it

dealswiththequestionsandmeaningofhumantragedy–inallits

volume22;whileIvanKaramazovrevoltedagainst“thedevilishgood

and evil,” Zarathustra exclaimed: ‘We already knowwhat is good

and just, we possess it also; woe unto those who still seek here’

(Ibid.306-307).“Themenoftragedy,”DostoevskyandNietzsche,

abandoned humanism for the cruelty of real life to ‘side with

mankind’smosthorribleenemy’23and,accordingtoShestov,

21Shestovexplainedthatunder“poverty”heunderstoodNietzsche’segoism,‘the

egoismofapoorman,abeggar, indignantandoutragedover the fact thateven

hissacrificesaredisdained’(1969,313).22 Shestov, L., manuscript MS 2101-1, draft for Philosophy and Preaching,

Lazaunne,Dec.1898,75.23InOntheGenealogyofMorals(1887)Nietzschewrote:‘Beingevilisbeing“not

moral”(immoral),practicingimmorality,resistingtradition,howeverreasonable

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‘whateverharmthe“evil”maydo, theharmdoneby“thegood” is

the most harmful harm!’ (Ibid. 307). Even if the whole world

perished, the undergroundmanwould not renounce his rights or

exchange them for the ideals of pity cultivated bymorality (Ibid.

315). InShestov’sopinionneverbeforeDostoevskyandNietzsche

thepsychologyof the “good”was revealedwith such ruthlessness

(Ibid.317).

Shestov’s critical analysis of Nietzsche’s work aimed to

unveil the innerworld of the philosopher. Hismethod of reading

Nietzsche’swritingfocusedontheinvestigationandexposureofthe

author’sinnerconflict.SimilarlytohisreadingofDostoevsky,upon

establishing a breaking point in the philosopher’s life, Shestov

attempted to “deconstruct” his text, seeking to reveal a hidden

meaning in the author’s writing, a personal confession.24What

Shestov considered especially valuable in Nietzsche’s philosophy

was his personal, passionate approach to truth as opposed to the

abstract and theoretical attitude of traditional logic and

epistemology(Martin,1969,XXII).

ForShestovatruephilosophyistheonebasedonreality,on

life, it is the philosophy of penal servitude and the philosophy of

tragedy(1969,201).Shestovarguedthatthephilosophyoftragedy

ishostiletoallthatiscommonplace, itdemandsrespectfor“great

misfortune”and“greatugliness”;preciselywhenthecommonplace

ends the philosophy of tragedy begins (Ibid. 320). According to

Shestovtheidealsandhopesofthepositivistsandmaterialistsand

or stupid traditionmaybe.Harming theneighbor,however,hasbeen felt tobe

preeminentlyharmfulinallthemorallawsofdifferentages,untilnowtheword

“evil”isassociatedprimarilywiththedeliberateharmingoftheneighbor’(1989,

169).24For a philosophy writer like Shestov the link with literature was highly

important.AsMichelAucouturiernoticed:‘Shestovseesinaworkofliteraturea

personalconfessionoftheauthor(…).Fortruephilosophyinhiseyescangrow

onlyoutofanexistentialrevelation’(2002,79).

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their dreams “of chicken for Sunday roast and the universal

happiness”arenothingelsebutchildishfantasiesintheeyesofthe

peopleof tragedy(Ibid.318). Incontrasttosystematicphilosophy

Shestov’stragicphilosophystemmedfromtheacknowledgementof

thefundamentalchaosoflife.Thereforeheviewedtragedyas“the

mysterious unknown,” and believed that no social changes could

banishtragedyfromlife(Ibid.310,318).

ForShestovapersonbeginstothink“philosophically”when

no path of action is any longer left for him. Later, after leaving

Russia for good, during his years in exile, Shestov developed his

discourse on the philosophy of tragedy into a more radical

direction. Thus, in Speculation and Revelation (1964), published

posthumously,Shestovwrote:

Whenreasongrowsweak,whentruthdies,whenthelightgoesout

–only thendo thewordsofRevelationbecomeaccessible toman.

And,conversely,aslongaswehavelight,reasonandtruth,wedrive

Revelationawayfromourselves.(1964,63-64)

Significantly, as CzeslawMilosz (1981) pointed out, Shestov was

neitherapreacher,noramoralist,noratheologian;onthecontrary,

he aimed to present a dilemma in all its acuteness (109). The

influenceofDostoevskyandNietzscheismostevidentinShestov’s

earlierarticlesandessays,forexampleinTheGoodinTheTeaching

of Tolstoy and Nietzsche: Philosophy and Preaching (1900) and

ApotheosisofGroundlessness(1905),wherehisphilosophicalmood

is close to the existential philosophical tendency. As Boris Groys

wrote, ‘Shestov made an essential contribution to creating an

intellectualatmosphereinFrancethatlatermadepossibletherise

ofFrenchexistentialism’(2012,34).

Inhismaturewritings,whereShestov’sphilosophytookon

its most radical form, the notions of tragedy and the mysterious

unknown(neizvedannoye)openedupapathtowhatShestovcalled

a“biblicalrevelation.”OnoneofthefinalpagesofDostoevskyand

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109

Nietzsche: The Philosophy of Tragedy Shestov asked: ‘Must one

reallybeafraidoftheunknown?’(316).Hetookonthechallengeto

answer this question in his future philosophical writing, such as

Apotheosis of Groundlessness (1905), Penultimate Words (1916),

KierkegaardandDostoevsky(1935),KierkegaardandtheExistential

Philosophy (1936), Athens and Jerusalem (1938), Speculation and

Revelation(1964),SolaFide(1966)andotherworks.

References

Aucouturier,M.(2002)LeDostoevskideChestov,inDiagonalesDostoevskienns,

MelangesenL’HonneurdeJouguesCatteau,ed.MarieAudeAlbert,Paris:Presses

deL’Universite’deParis-Sorbonne.

Baranova–Shestova,N.(1983)Zhizn’L’vaShestova,Vol.1,Paris:LaPresseLibre.

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Notes

*TranslationsofthequotationsfromthemanuscriptsinTheLevShestovArchive,

fromRussianintoEnglishareallmine.

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AbouttheContributorsBradBaumgartnerrecentlycompletedhisPh.D.inLiteratureandCriticism at Indiana University of Pennsylvania. His work hasappeared in or is forthcoming fromMorsMystica (Schism, 2015)and Interdisciplinary Humanities. Current projects include WeirdMysticism,amonograph,AudensSolitudo,acollectionof fragmentsandaphorisms,andCeleste,anexperimentalnovella.NicolaMasciandaro(PhD,MedievalStudies,YaleUniversity,2002)isProfessorof English at Brooklyn College (CUNY) andaspecialistinmedieval literature. Hisworks include:TheVoice ofthe Hammer: The Meaning of Work in Middle EnglishLiterature(Notre Dame, 2007);Leper Creativity: CyclonopediaSymposium, co-edited with Ed Keller and EugeneThacker(punctum,2012);DarkNightsoftheUniverse,co-authoredwith Daniel Colucciello Barber, Alexander Galloway, and EugeneThacker(NAME,2013);AndTheyWereTwoInOneAndOneInTwo,co-editedwithEugene Thacker (Schism, 2014);SufficientUnto theDay: Sermones ContraSolicitudinem (Schism, 2014);and FloatingTomb:BlackMetalTheory,co-authoredwithEdiaConnole(Mimesis,2015).Constanza Bizraelli (Originally Constanza Nuñez-Melgar) is atheorist and a music composer and producer. She is the founderand editor-in-chief of Cyclops journal and a PhD candidate at thedepartmentofmusicof theUniversityofEdinburgh.Her researchinterests include contemporary experimental theory, theory ofreligion,contemporarymusicandsoundtheoriesandphilosophyofmythology.Currentprojectsinclude:TheRuinandtheSonicSacred:Towards an Heterology of Noise-Music, The Cyclops and OcularOriginationandAccentology.

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James F. Depew teaches in the Department of Politics at AcadiaUniversity. His research in comparative political anthropologyfocuses on questions of ethico-religious subjectivity vis-à-visanthropotechnical interventions. More specifically, his workexamines the history of ethico-religious conduct from the ancientGreeks tomodernity, anddevelops a critiqueof the techniques ofpersonal appropriation that have grounded the development ofcontemporary neo-liberal subjectivity. He has published onhistorical subjectivity and philosophical ethnology in the work ofSchelling, natural law from the Greeks to early modernity, andFoucault’s work on conduct, care of the self, and subjectivetechnologies.MarinaJijina-Ogdenisanaward-winningartistandphilosophyscholar. Born in St. Petersburg, Russia, since 2000 she has beenlivingandworking inGreatBritain.She isaPhDcandidateatTheUniversity of Glasgow and a contributing writer to The OxfordPhilosopher,aphilosophicperiodical.