issue april 20 - media.defense.gov

Issue 1414 24 April 2020

// USAF CSDS News and Analysis Issue 1414 //

twitter.com/USAF_CSDS | airuniversity.af.edu/CSDS // 2

FeatureReport

“HowMightArtificialIntelligenceAffecttheRiskofNuclearWar?”.PublishedbyRANDCorporation;April23,2018

https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE296.html

Advancesinartificialintelligence(AI)areenablingpreviouslyinfeasiblecapabilities,potentiallydestabilizingthedelicatebalancesthathaveforestallednuclearwarsince1945.Willthesedevelopmentsupsetthenuclearstrategicbalance,and,ifso,forbetterorforworse?Tostarttoaddressthisquestion,RANDresearchersheldaseriesofworkshopsthatwereattendedbyprominentexpertsonAIandnuclearsecurity.Theworkshopsexaminedtheimpactofadvancedcomputingonnuclearsecuritythrough2040.Theculminationofthoseworkshops,thisPerspective—oneofaseriesthatexaminescriticalsecuritychallengesin2040—placestheintersectionofAIandnuclearwarinhistoricalcontextandcharacterizestherangeofexpertopinions.Itthendescribesthetypesofanticipatedconcernsandbenefitsthroughtwoillustrativeexamples:AIfordetectionandfortrackingandtargetingandAIasatrustedadviserinescalationdecisions.InviewofthecapabilitiesthatAImaybeexpectedtoenableandhowadversariesmayperceivethem,AIhasthepotentialtoexacerbateemergingchallengestonuclearstrategicstabilitybytheyear2040evenwithonlymodestratesoftechnicalprogress.Thus,itisimportanttounderstandhowthismighthappenandtoassurethatitdoesnot.

Issue No. 1320



22 June 2018

TABLEOFCONTENTSNUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DETERRENCE • TheAirForceHasStoppeditsContinuousBomberPresenceMissioninGuam(AirForceTimes)“Ourdiversebomberfleet–B-52,B-1&B-2–allowsustorespondtoglobaleventsanytime,anywhere,”AirForceGlobalStrikeCommandsaidinthepost.

• AtlanticCouncilReleasesLandmarkReportAssessingEuropeanMilitaryMobility(AtlanticCouncil)Throughayear-longstudydrawingonconsultationswithNATO,theEU,andnationalgovernmentofficials,thetaskforcedevelopedasetofconcreterecommendationswhichtogetherrepresentacriticalnextsteptoenhancingNATO’stwenty-first-centuryconventionaldeterrencepostureandmilitarymobilitythroughoutEurope.

• DecodingtheLatestU.S.ReportonArmsControl:AreRussiaandChinaReallyCheating?(CSIS)TheStateDepartmentreleasedtheexecutivesummaryforthe2020AdherencetoandCompliancewithArmsControl,Nonproliferation,andDisarmamentAgreementsandCommitments,morecommonlyknownastheComplianceReport.

• UnconventionalDeterrenceinEurope:TheRoleofArmySpecialOperationsinCompetitionToday(RealClearDefense)Russia’snewgenerationwarfarepresentstwocriticalchallengestotraditionaldeterrence.

US COUNTER-WMD • ReaganTestSiteGivesBoosttoHypersonicTest(RedstoneRocket)Theeventwasamajormilestonetowardthedepartment’sgoaloffieldinghypersonicwarfightingcapabilitiesintheearly-tomid-2020s.

US ARMS CONTROL • TrumpAdministrationDoublesDownonIranNuclearTreatyAllegations(Al-Monitor)Iran’sreducedcooperationwiththeIAEAinrecentmonthsisprovidingfodderfortheTrumpadministration’sarguments.

• RussiaShowsWillingnesstoIncludeNewNuke,HypersonicWeaponinArmsControlPact(APviaDefenseNews)RussianPresidentVladimirPutinhasofferedtoextendtheNewSTARTarmscontroltreatythatexpiresin2021.TheTrumpadministrationhaspushedforanewpactthatwouldincludeChinaasasignatory.

• Panel:NorthKoreaIntentonFlexingMilitaryMuscleDuringPandemic(USNINews)ThetestsalsosignalthattheNorthKoreansarefollowingthroughonleaderKim’sspeechatyear’sendthatPyongyangwouldcontinuetodevelop“necessaryandprerequisitestrategicweapons.”

COMMENTARY • Deterrence,Norms,andtheUncomfortableRealitiesofaNewNuclearAge(WarontheRocks)“Deterrenceisnotaconditionachievedfromsimplypossessingnuclearweapons;itisbasedontheperceptionofmilitarypoweringeneral.”

• AmericaNeedsan'IranConsensus'(TheHill)



“Morethanfourdecadesafterthe1979IranianRevolution,westilllackaconsensusaboutthenatureoftheregimeinTehranandhowtodealwithit.”

• DefenseBudgetCutsFollowingthePandemicWillBeHardtoSwallow(TheHill)“Budgetcuttersforyearshavezeroedinonthestrategicnucleartriad,andcurrentplansforitsmodernizationofferthemnewtargets.”

• PreparingforaDarkFuture:BiologicalWarfareinthe21stCentury(RealClearDefense)“StatessuchasRussiacontinuetodevoteattentiontobiologicalwarfare,andRussianPresidentVladimirPutinhasexpressedinterestindevelopingweaponsbasedonnewprinciples,includinggenetics.”

• America’sBomberForceisFacingaCrisis(DefenseNews)“Taskedwithdeterrenceand,ifnecessary,strikingtargetsaroundtheglobe,AirForcecrewsoperatingtheseaircraftaffordthenation’ssecurityleadersuniqueoptionsbestembodiedinthephrase:anytime,anyplace.”

NUCLEARWEAPONSThe Air Force Times (Vienna, Va.)

TheAirForceHasStoppeditsContinuousBomberPresenceMissioninGuam

ByDianaStancyCorrell

April22,2020

StrategicbomberswillnolongerconductroutinerotationsoutofAndersenAirForceBaseinGuamanymoreastheyhavesince2004,accordingtoAirForceGlobalStrikeCommand.

Althoughthemovesignifiesthecloseofa16-yearmissionaspartoftheContinuousBomberPresencemission,thechangedoesn’tmeanstrategicbomberswon’toperateintheIndo-Pacificanymore,theAirForcesaid.

“InlinewiththeNationalDefenseStrategy,theUnitedStateshastransitionedtoanapproachthatenablesstrategicbomberstooperateforwardintheIndo-Pacificregionfromabroaderarrayofoverseaslocations,whenrequired,andwithgreateroperationalresilience,whilethesebombersarepermanentlybasedintheUnitedStates,”AirForceGlobalStrikeCommandsaidinastatement.

“U.S.strategicbomberswillcontinuetooperateintheIndo-Pacific,toincludeGuam,atthetimingandtempoofourchoosing,”thestatementsaid.

AirForceStrikeCommanddidnotdisclosetoAirForceTimesspecificlocationswheretheaircraftwilloperateintheregion,citingoperationalsecurityconcerns.However,thecommandsaidtheAirForcewillkeeptrainingwithalliesandcontinuetoevaluateitsoverseasposture.

“Wewillmaximizeallopportunitiestotrainalongsideouralliesandpartnerstobuildinteroperabilityandbolsterourcollectiveabilitytobeoperationallyunpredictable,”thecommand



said.“WecontinuallyreassessouroverseaspostureandadjusttomeettherequirementsoftheJointForceandcombatantcommandersaswellasourtreatycommitments.”

Thedecisionfollowsaso-called“elephantwalk”onAndersen’srunwayonApril13,wherefiveB-52strategic bombers joined an Air Force RQ-4 Global Hawk, KC-135 Stratotankers, a NavyMQ-4CTriton,andaNavyMH-60SKnighthawkstationedinGuam.

The“elephantwalk”camedaysaftertheChineseaircraftcarrierLiaoninganditsstrikegroupmadeitswaythroughtheMiyakoStraitnearJapanandTaiwan,accordingtotheSouthChinaMorningPost.Guamismorethan2,500milesfromBeijing.

AccordingtoTheDrive,whowasthefirsttoreportonthedevelopment,theofficialDefenseVisualInformationDistributionServicealsopostedphotosonApril14ofB-52sinGuamandlabeledtheimages“LastContinuousBomberPresenceMissiononGuam.”Thetitlesweresubsequentlymodifiedto“Andersenremainsready.”

AirForceGlobalStrikeCommandadditionallyforeshadowedapotentialshakeupinasocialmediapostonThursday.

“Ourdiversebomberfleet–B-52,B-1&B-2–allowsustorespondtoglobaleventsanytime,anywhere,”AirForceGlobalStrikeCommandsaidinthepost.“Whetherthey’relaunchedfromLouisiana,Guam,ortheU.K.,long-rangestrategicbombershaveandwillremainabedrockofourdeterrence!#DynamicForceEmployment.”

AccordingtotheNationalDefenseStrategyformerSecretaryofDefenseJimMattisputforthin2018,thedynamicforceemploymentconceptencouragesthemilitarytobelesspredictable.

SecretaryofDefenseMarkEsperhasreiteratedthathisprimaryobjectiveisimplementingtheNationalDefenseStrategyandaddressingthreatsfromChinaandRussia.

AccordingtoonlinemilitaryaircrafttrackerAircraftSpots,fiveB-52HshadleftGuamandwereheadedtoMinotAirForceBaseinNorthDakotaonApril16.

https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/your-air-force/2020/04/21/the-air-force-has-stopped-itscontinuous-bomber-presence-mission-in-guam/

Returntotop

Atlantic Council (Washington, D.C.)

AtlanticCouncilReleasesLandmarkReportAssessingEuropeanMilitaryMobility

ByAtlanticCouncil

April23,2020

WASHINGTON,DC–April23,2020–Today,theAtlanticCouncil’sTransatlanticSecurityInitiative,housedwithintheScowcroftCenterforStrategyandSecurity,launchedanewtaskforcereporttitled:OntheMove:AComprehensiveAssessmentofEuropeanMilitaryMobility.Thetaskforce,cochairedbyformerSupremeAlliedCommanderEuropeGeneralCurtisScaparrotti,USA(Ret.)andformerUSAmbassadortoHungaryColleenBell,willofficiallylaunchthereportonApril23duringapubliceventwithseniorUS,NATO,andEUmilitaryanddefenseofficialsandexperts.

Thereport’sfindingscomeatatimewhenthemilitarymobilityeffortinEuropehaslostmomentuminthefaceofothereconomicandpoliticalpressuresandrequiresrenewedemphasisateveryleveltosucceed.



TheAtlanticCouncil’staskforceonmilitarymobility,comprisedofformerandcurrentseniorUSandEuropeandefenseofficialsandexperts,wasestablishedinApril2019toassesstheadequacyofmilitarymobilityenhancementeffortsinEuropetosupporttherapidreinforcementofalliedforcesacrossthecontinentintheeventofcrisisorwar.

Throughayear-longstudydrawingonconsultationswithNATO,theEU,andnationalgovernmentofficials,thetaskforcedevelopedasetofconcreterecommendationswhichtogetherrepresentacriticalnextsteptoenhancingNATO’stwenty-first-centuryconventionaldeterrencepostureandmilitarymobilitythroughoutEurope.

“TheTransatlanticsecurityenvironmentisdynamicandincreasinglychallenging.FocusedandconsistentinvestmentinmilitarymobilityoverthecomingyearsisrequiredtoestablishrobustdeterrenceanddefenseandtoensurepeaceinEurope,”saidthetaskforce’sco-chair,General(ret.)CurtisScaparrotti,formersupremealliedcommanderEuropeandformercommanderofUSEuropeanCommand.“Therecommendationsmadeinthisreport,whenimplemented,willenhanceNATO,EUandtheNations’manydefenseinitiativesinprogress,especiallytheNATOReadinessInitiative.”

AmbassadorColleenBell,formerUSambassadortoHungary,philanthropist,andstrongproponentofacoherentandcomprehensiveapproachtomilitarymobilityinEurope,said,“EnsuringNATOhasthecapabilitiestodeterandifnecessary,defeat,anyadversaryisvital.ItisjustasimportanttoensureAlliescanprojectthosecapabilitieswheretheyareneeded,whentheyareneeded.EliminatingbarrierstofreedomofmilitarymovementiscriticaltoNATOmeetingthefullspectrumofcurrentandemergingsecuritychallenges.”

Asthedirectorofthetaskforce,WayneSchroeder,anonresidentseniorfellowattheAtlanticCouncil,hasledanextensiveprogramofresearchonongoingmilitarymobilityeffortsandtheremaininggapsandbarriers.“Atruetransatlanticcommitmentandawhole-of-governmentapproachbythenationsofEuropetomilitarymobilitywillbecentraltoassuringpeace,freedom,andsecurityacrossthecontinentinthe21stcentury,”saidSchroeder.“WhileEuropecurrentlyfindsitselfinachallengingfiscalenvironment,ithastheresourcebasetoprovidetherobustandstablefundingneededtoensurethesuccessoftheprojectoverthelong-term.AsustainedpoliticalcommitmentisessentialtoundergirdingthesuccessofmilitarymobilityinEurope.”

Thereportisavailablefordownload.Formediainquiries,pleasecontactpress@atlanticcouncil.org.Followtheconversationonlineusing#ACDefensehttps://www.atlanticcouncil.org/news/press-releases/atlantic-council-releases-landmark-reportassessing-european-military-mobility/

Returntotop

CSIS (Washington, D.C.)

DecodingtheLatestU.S.ReportonArmsControl:AreRussiaandChinaReallyCheating?

ByRebeccaHersman

April17,2020

OnApril15,2020,theStateDepartmentreleasedtheexecutivesummaryforthe2020AdherencetoandCompliancewithArmsControl,Nonproliferation,andDisarmamentAgreementsandCommitments,morecommonlyknownastheComplianceReport.Whiletheexecutivesummarystatesthefull,unclassifiedreportwillbereleased“attheearliestpossibleopportunityconsistentwithsafepersonnelandreducedstaffingpracticesnecessitatedbytheCOVID-19pandemic,”some



criticalquestionsandkeytakeawayscanalreadybegatheredfromtheavailableinformation.Inparticular,recentarticleshighlightspecificconcernsraisedinthereportthatRussiaandChinamayhaveconductedyield-producingorsupercriticalnucleartestsin2019inwaysinconsistentwiththeirinternationalcommitments.

Q1:WhatistheComplianceReport?

A1:Therecently-releasedunclassifiedexecutivesummaryisanabbreviatedversionofthecongressionallymandatedannualreporton“AdherencetoAndComplianceWithArmsControl,Nonproliferation,AndDisarmamentAgreementsandCommitments”—commonlyreferredtoastheComplianceReport.Perthe1961ArmsControlandDisarmamentAct,theStateDepartmentmustsubmittoCongresstheU.S.government’sassessmentofthecomplianceandadherenceto“armscontrol,nonproliferation,anddisarmamentagreementsandrelatedcommitments...includingconfidence-andsecurity-buildingmeasures(CSBMs)...andtheMissileTechnologyControlRegime,”byApril15ofeachyear.

The2019reportwasthesubjectofsignificantcontroversyanddisagreement,bothpubliclyandprivately.TheoriginalunclassifiedreportissuedinApril2019cameunderfireforitshighlypoliticizedtoneanddisproportionateIranfocusratherthanprovidingthefarmoretechnicalandintelligence-basedcomplianceassessmentsofprioryears.Acompletelyrevisedversion,farmoreinlinewiththetoneandcontentofprioryears,wasreissuedinAugust2019.Theexecutivesummaryofthe2020ComplianceReportsuggestsareturntothemorecareful,technicalapproachtocomplianceofpreviousyears,highlightinganumberofareasofconcernacrossarangeofarmscontrolandnonproliferationobligations.Inparticular,theexecutivesummarycarefullydelineatesbetweenfindingsofnoncompliancewithlegalobligations,issuesof“adherence”withpoliticalcommitments,anddescriptionsofareasofconcernforwhichactualdeterminationsofcomplianceoradherencecannotbemade.Ofnote,mostofthenucleartesting-relatedfindingsinvolvingChinadiscussedinrecentmediareportsfallintothislattercategory.Itremainstobeseenifthefullreportwillincludemoreelaboratedanddetailedfindingsinthisorotherareascoveredinthesummary.

Q2:WhatdoestheComplianceReportsayaboutRussia’sactivities?

A2:NumerouspriorcompliancereportshaveraisedseriousconcernsaboutRussia’scomplianceandadherencetoawiderangeofarmscontrolandnonproliferationagreements,andthe2020reportisnodifferent.Forexample,theUnitedStateshadassessedasfarbackas2014thatRussiawasinviolationoftheIntermediate-rangeNuclearForces(INF)Treatybypossessinggroundlaunchedcruisemissilesandassociatedlauncherswitharangebetween500and5,500kilometers.TheweapondeemedinviolationoftheINFTreatyistheSC-8SCREWDRIVER,reportedlydesignatedthe9M729byRussianforces.Citingtheseconcerns,theUnitedStateswithdrewfromthetreatyonAugust2,2019.

RegardingtheOpenSkiesTreaty,theUnitedStatesfindsthatRussiacontinuestobeinviolation.Inadditiontothepreviouslyidentifiedtwoviolationsinthe2019ComplianceReport,the2020executivesummaryallegesRussiaimproperlydeniedaplannedU.S.-CanadianflightovertheRussianTSENTR2019militaryexerciseonSeptember20,2019.

Regardingchemicalweapons,the2020reportassertsthatRussiacontinuestobenon-compliantwiththeChemicalWeaponsConvention(CWC)duetoitsuseofamilitary-gradenerveagentonMarch4,2018,inanallegedassassinationattemptintheUnitedKingdomagainstaformerRussianintelligenceofficer.The2019fullComplianceReportmadenosuchdetermination,insteadreferringtospecificreportingmechanismswithintheCWC.Importantly,givenreneweduncertaintyoverthefutureofNewSTART,the2020reportfindsRussiaisincompliancewiththetreatygoverning



strategicnuclearweapons.Ultimately,manyofthesefindingsareinaccordancewithComplianceReportsfromyearspast:thoughtheremaybedifferencesintoneanddetailsfromyeartoyear,theU.S.governmenthashadseriousconcernsaboutRussiancomplianceandadherenceforyears,andtheseconcernsarenotnecessarilyanewproblem.

Q3:WhatspecificallyintheComplianceReportraisesconcernsaboutnucleartestingbyRussiaandChina?

A3:The2020ComplianceReportsuggestsbothRussiaandChinahaveconductedsometypesofyield-producingnucleartests.WithregardtoRussia,thereport“findsthatRussiahasconductednuclearweaponsexperimentsthathavecreatednuclearyieldandarenotconsistentwiththeU.S.‘zero-yield’standard.”Similaraccusationshavebeenleviedbefore.InMay2019,thedirectoroftheDefenseIntelligenceAgency,LieutenantGeneralRobertAshley,statedinpublicremarksthat“theUnitedStatesbelievesthatRussiaprobablyisnotadheringtoitsnucleartestingmoratoriuminamannerconsistentwiththe‘zero-yield’standard.”

TheaccusationagainstChinesenucleartestingisnoteworthyinitsspecificitybutisalsomuchmorenuancedinitsclaim.AsoriginallyreportedbytheWallStreetJournal,thecompliancereportsuggeststhatahighlevelofactivityatChina’sLopNurfacilityand“possiblepreparationtooperateitsLopNurtestsiteyear-round,itsuseofexplosivecontainmentchambers,extensiveexcavationactivitiesatLopNur,andlackoftransparencyonitsnucleartestingactivities...raiseconcernsregardingitsadherencetothe‘zeroyield’standard.”Thisisnotanewproblem,andneitheristheconcernthatRussiaandpossiblyevenChinamayhavebeenconductingverylow-yield,supercriticaltestsinsupportoftheirnuclearweaponsdevelopmentandstockpilemanagement.Disagreementaboutwhatconstitutes“zero-yield”andhowitcouldbeverifiedliesattheheartofthesubstantivedebatesurroundingratificationoftheComprehensiveNuclearTestBanTreaty(CTBT)andisonereasonwhytheagreementhasyettoberatifiedbytheU.S.Senate.

Q4:WhatarethemajorquestionsleftunansweredfromthisexecutivesummaryoftheComplianceReport?

A4:Withtheinformationthatiscurrentlyavailable,thereisnothingdispositiveabouttheobservationsattheChinesetestingsiteLopNur.PerhapstheinformationintheclassifiedreportprovidesmoreconcreteproofofChinesenucleartesting,butopenlyavailableinformationraisesmorequestionsthananswers.Moreover,thenucleartestingmoratoriaobservedbyanumberofstatesincludingChina,Russia,andtheUnitedStatesandreferencedinthereportisavoluntarypoliticalcommitment.The“zero-yield”standardobservedandfavoredbytheUnitedStatesisneitherinternationallyagreednorlegallybinding,hencethelanguageusedinthereport:“asinterpretedinaccordancewiththeU.S.‘zero-yield’standard.”Asfortheinternationaltreatydesignedtoprohibitnucleartesting,theCTBT,bothChinaandtheUnitedStateshavesignedbutnotratifiedthetreaty,andthetreatyhasnotenteredintoforce.Assuch,itisdifficulttoconsidertheseactionsinacompliancecontext.Whetherornottheforthcomingfullreport(eithertheunclassifiedpublicversionortheclassifiedreporttoCongress)providesanymoreevidencesupportingtheseallegationsofcomplianceandadherenceremainstobeseen.

Q5:WhataretheimplicationsoftheseconclusionsfortheU.S.armscontrolandnonproliferationagenda?

A5:TheconclusionsofthecompliancereporthavegarneredattentioninpartbecauseofworriesaboutpossiblenucleartestingbyRussiaandChinaandwhatthiscouldsignalintermsofrenewednuclearcompetition.ThesereactionsalsoreflectconcernthatthesemattersofcomplianceandadherencebyotherstatesarebeingamplifiedwithintheTrumpadministrationforthepurposeof



justifyingcontroversialchangesinU.S.armscontrolandnonproliferationpolicyandpractice—whetherintermsofjustifyingpotentialwithdrawalsfromexistingagreementssuchastheOpenSkiesTreaty,thedevelopmentofnewcapabilitiesthatwouldpreviouslyhavebeenlimitedbytheINFTreaty,orthelatestcallsbysometo“unsign”theCTBT.

Onthislastpoint,thelatestconcernisthattheUnitedStateswouldusetheseassessmentsasjustificationtoredefineU.S.commitmenttothenucleartestingmoratoriumandpotentiallyviolatethe“zero-yield”standard,perhapsresumingsupercriticaltestingithasinsistedotherstatesnotconduct.Suchadevelopmentwouldlikelysetoffalarmbellsacrosstheinternationalnonproliferationcommunity,asthiswouldbeasignificantchangeinaU.S.governmentpolicythathasexistedfornearlythreedecades:asrecentlyasthe2018NuclearPostureReview,itwasstatedthat“theUnitedStateswillnotseekSenateratificationoftheComprehensiveNuclearTestBanTreaty,butwillcontinuetoobserveanucleartestmoratoriumthatbeganin1992.”TheUnitedStatescurrentlymaintainsitsstockpilethroughscience-basedstockpilestewardshipprograms,andasitcurrentlystands,theNationalNuclearSecurityAdministrationisonlypreparedtoresumenucleartests“whenthePresidenthasdeclaredanationalemergency...andonlyafteranynecessarywaiverofapplicablestatutoryandregulatoryrestrictions.”

RebeccaHersmanisthedirectoroftheProjectonNuclearIssuesandasenioradvisertotheInternationalSecurityProgramattheCenterforStrategicandInternationalStudiesinWashington,D.C.

CriticalQuestionsisproducedbytheCenterforStrategicandInternationalStudies(CSIS),aprivate,tax-exemptinstitutionfocusingoninternationalpublicpolicyissues.Itsresearchisnonpartisanandnonproprietary.CSISdoesnottakespecificpolicypositions.Accordingly,allviews,positions,andconclusionsexpressedinthispublicationshouldbeunderstoodtobesolelythoseoftheauthor(s).

https://www.csis.org/analysis/decoding-latest-us-report-arms-control-are-russia-and-chinareally-cheating

Returntotop

Real Clear Defense (Washington, D.C.)

UnconventionalDeterrenceinEurope:TheRoleofArmySpecialOperationsinCompetitionToday

ByBryanGroves&SteveFerenzi

April16,2020

TheProblem:RussianNewGenerationWarfare

Russia’saggressiveactionsinGeorgia,Crimea,andUkrainehighlightitsabilitytoquicklyachieveescalationdominancealongitsfrontierthroughtheemploymentofnewgenerationwarfareandreflexivecontrol.RussiaoccupiedsovereignGeorgianterritory,quicklyannexedCrimea,andsupportsproxyseparatistsintheDonbassregionofEasternUkraine—subvertingWesterninterestswithouttriggeringawarwithNATO.

ThisRussianwayofwarinvolvesacombinationofearlyplanning,mobilizationofspecialforcesandproxyelements(“littlegreenmen”),andpoliticalwarfare.Undertheguiseofprotecting“compatriots,”Russiautilizesindigenouspopulationstojustifyhumanitarianinterventionandthenmaintains“frozenconflicts”tocreatenewfactsonthegroundthatcementfavorablepolitical



outcomes,suchasthwartingGeorgia’saccessionintoNATO.RussianfaitsaccomplisagainstneighborsdemonstrateitsabilitytoseparatetheU.S.anditspartnerspolitically.RussianspeedandunityofactionexploittheWest’suncertaintyabouttheextentofwhatishappening,itspermanence,andaninabilityorunwillingnesstorespondquicklyandassertively.

Incompetition,Russiastaysbelowthethresholdofarmedconflictbyparalyzingpoliticaldecisionmakingprocessesthroughtheuseofinformationoperationsandunconventionalwarfare.Onselectbattlefieldsofitschoosingandinsupportofitsbroadercampaignofcompetition,Russiadominatesinshortperiodsofarmedconflictutilizingadvancedweaponryandemployinganti-access/areadenialsystems.Throughthishybridoperationalconstruct,Russiahasprovenitsabilitytoseparateitsfoes’armedforcesintime,space,andfunctionthroughtheapplicationofnon-military,indirect,asymmetric,andtraditionalmilitarymethods.Furthermore,alliedwargameshavedemonstratedthatRussianforcescouldaccomplishevenmore.TheycouldreachtheEstonianandLatviancapitalsofTallinnandRigawithin60hours,whiletherecentRussianZapad17exercisefurtherdemonstratesthevitalnatureofspeedfortheNATOalliance.

Russia’snewgenerationwarfarepresentstwocriticalchallengestotraditionaldeterrence.1)Evasionmechanismscharacterizedby“salamitactics”avoidtriggersforaNATOArticleVresponse.2)Advancedanti-access/areadenial(A2/AD)capabilitiesconstrainoptionstopunishtheoffender.Traditionaldeterrence,backedbylargemilitaryformationsandnuclearweapons,reliesonthepowertohurtanadversaryiftheycrossaline.Deterringhybridthreatsrequiresadifferentapproach.Itmustaddressthevulnerabilitiestheadversaryexploitsinthetargetnationandaugmentcapabilitiestoasymmetricallynullifytheadversary’smilitaryadvantages.ArmySpecialOperationsForcesofferunconventionalwaystoachievesuchdeterrence.

ConfrontingtheChallenge:UnconventionalDeterrenceinEurope

"ItispreciselytosendamessagetoRussia--don'tdoit–wearereadyandwillnotbehoodwinkedlikeUkrainians."-KarolisAleksa,LithuanianMinistryofDefense

Inrecognitionthatconventionalforcepreparationaloneisinadequate,theBalticsandotherEuropeannationshaveadoptedawhole-of-society“TotalDefense”approachconsistingofcivilianandmilitaryelementswiththepopulationsservingastheprimaryactor.

ComparingTraditionalDefense(military-focused)toTotalDefense(population-focused)

ArmySpecialOperationsForces(ARSOF)playacriticalroleinpreparingtheEuropeanpopulationtofulfillitsTotalDefenseresponsibilities–defendingnationalsovereigntythroughresiliencetoadversaryaggressionandregainingnationalsovereigntythroughresistancetoenemyoccupation.Deterrenceistheaim,preventingadversariesfromtakingmalignactionsinthefirstplace.Deterrencerequiresbothmilitarycapabilityandpoliticalcommitmenttouseit.Onewithouttheotherisinsufficient.Moreover,AmericamustdemonstrateitscapabilityandsignalitsintentiontoactearlytoestablishitscredibilityandinfluenceRussianforeignpolicy.

Americancommitmentincreasespartnerresilienceandresistancewithintheaffectedcountry.However,conventionaldeterrencepostures,suchaslargeexercisesandtroopmobilization,canbeviewedasoffensive—despiteeffortstosignaldefensiveintentions.Unconventionaldeterrenceistypicallylessprovocativebecauseitinvolvesasmallermilitaryfootprintandlessovertshowofforce.Yetitstillcommunicatestothewould-beadversary,suchasRussia,“Ifyouinvade,don'texpectourpeopletomakeiteasyforyou.”

Asanelementofalliedsupport,ARSOFcontributestobothresilienceandresistancethroughforeigninternaldefense(FID)andpreparationoftheenvironment.Workingwithpartnerforces,



thisunconventionalapplicationofsecurityforceassistanceasymmetricallysetsthetheatertoshapetheoperationalenvironment,deteraggression,andestablishtheconditionstowininlargescalecombatoperations(LSCO).

Resilience–FID,executedbyArmySpecialForces,SpecialOperationsCivilAffairs,andPsychologicalOperationsunits,contributestoresiliencebysupportingpartnernations’internaldefenseanddevelopmentprograms.Thesepre-conflictactivitiesbolsterthenations’institutionspriortotheemploymentofresistanceandaddresssocietalvulnerabilitiesthatRussiaexploits.

CivilAffairs-Civil-MilitarySupportElements(CMSE)fromthe92ndCivilAffairsBattalion,95thCivilAffairsBrigademaintainapersistentpresence365daysayearinEurope.CMSEsmapthehumanterrain,allowingSpecialOperationsCommandEurope(SOCEUR)tobetterunderstandthegroundtruthinthecountrieswheretheteamsoperatewhilealsosupportingpartnernations’civiladministration.CivilAffairsunitsarealsouniquelycapableofadvisingandassistingthepartnernationonthedevelopmentofaparallelorshadowcivilgovernmenttogovernduringresistancewhilesupportingitsabilitytoachieveahighlevelofpoliticalmobilization,andassistinginthefacilitationofcivilunrest.

PsychologicalOperations-The6thPsychologicalOperationsBattalion,4thPsychologicalOperationsGroupshapes,disrupts,andinfluencesbehaviorsofforeignaudiencesthroughprecisionmessaging.Psychologicallyhardeningpopulationsagainstadversaryinfluenceoperationsisaformofcognitiveaccessdenial.ExercisessuchasGallantSentry,whichfocusedontheethnicallyRussianregionofNarvainnortheasternEstonia,demonstratethepowerofmessagingtocommunicateU.S.andNATOprotectionofmarginalizedcommunities,assurepartners,anddeterRussianaggression,renderingEstoniansandotherEuropeanslessvulnerable.

Resistance–Inpreparationforresistanceactivitiestoregainnationalsovereigntypost-invasion,SpecialForcesgroupsenableEuropeanalliestohardencivilianpopulationsanddeveloplocalinsurgencies.Thisresistancecapacityservesasapersistentdeterrentinsupportofresiliencebysignalingtoanadversarythatthetargetofaggressionwouldbetoodifficulttotakeandhold–aformofphysicalaccessdenial.Thosecapabilitiesmaybeexercisedasflexibledeterrentoptions(FDO)inlieuof,orinconjunctionwith,conventionalFDOs.Ifdeterrencefails,ARSOFcouldsupportexistingresistancecapabilitiesthroughunconventionalwarfare(UW)activitiesinabluntlayertransitiontoslowenemymomentumandenablecombatforcestosurgeintothetheaterofwar.ARSOFcouldalsoleveragetheinsurgencytocreatewindowsofopportunityfortheJointForcetoexploitinthecloseanddeepareasduringLSCO.Securitycooperationexercisesinsupportofresistanceinclude:

TrojanFootprint–ThisSOCEUR-ledexerciserapidlydeployedSOFfromAmerica,Canada,andacrossEuropeintoPolandandtheBalticsonshortnoticetosupporttheregion’sindigenousterritorialdefenseforces’resistanceactivities.TrojanFootprintdemonstratedARSOF’sabilitytoshapethebattlespacefordecisiveactionbyconventionalforceswhileclearlysendingthemessagethattheU.S.isreadytogotowartoprotectitsNATOallies.

FlamingSword–ThisannualLithuanianSOF-ledmultinationalexercise,linkeddirectlytoTrojanFootprint,focusedonLithuanianSOF’sabilitytocommandandcontrolSOFfrommultiplenations,andintegrationwiththeirconventionalandirregularforces,theMinistryofInterior,andotheragenciestoneutralizeasymmetricthreats,conductresistanceactivities,andsupportconventionalforcesincounteringhybridaggression.

AlliedSpirit–AlliedSpiritisaU.S.ArmyEurope-directedmultinationalexercisedesignedtoenhanceNATOandkeypartners’interoperabilityandreadiness.ThisexerciseallowedARSOFto



buildcapacitywithpartnerSOFandterritorialdefenseforceswhileimprovingintegrationandinteroperabilitywiththeU.S.Army’s2ndCavalryRegiment,the1stInfantryDivision,andthe4thInfantryDivisionMissionCommandElement.Aspartofacontingentrepresenting10nations,TexasArmyNationalGuardsmenfrom19thSpecialForcesGroup(Airborne)mentoredAlbanianSOFandtheLithuanianNationalDefenseForceVolunteers(KASP),Lithuania’sprimaryirregulardefenseunit.

UnconventionallyExpandingtheCompetitiveSpace

ArmySpecialOperationsForcesplayacriticalroleinbuildingtheresilienceandresistancecapacitytosupportEurope’s"TotalDefense"programs.ThisdemonstratesU.S.resolvetoNATOwhilesignalingthecostsofRussianaggressionwithoutrequiringasignificantmilitaryfootprint.ConventionalforcepreparationaloneisinadequatetodeterRussia’shybridthreatsbecauseofRussia’ssignificanteconomic,materiel,andmilitaryadvantages.NorealisticamountofAmericanprovidedlethalaidcantipthebalanceagainstRussia.

Conventionaldeterrence,then,isinsufficient.Itisalsomorecostly.ConventionaldeterrenceinEuroperuns$1.875billionforaconventionalrotationalpresenceversus$55.8millionforSOFpartnershipstobuildcapacity.Atafractionofthecost,unconventionaldeterrencesupplementsconventionaldeterrencebyhardeninganentiresocietytoadversaryattemptstosubjugatethemandbyprovidingmeanstoresistbefore,during,andafterlarge-scalecombatoperations.

ThesecontributionsareanadvancementofARSOF’sColdWarforwardpresenceinEuropeandmissiontoconductUWshouldwarbreakoutbetweenNATOandtheWarsawPact.Thisforgottenhistoryshouldserveasamentalmodelforoperationstoday.ARSOF’scost-effectiveexpansionofoptionsallowstheJointForceandpolicymakerstocapitalizeonlimitedresourcesandConventionalForces-SOFsynergytoprevailingreatpowercompetitionwithRussia.

LTCBryanGrovesisanArmyStrategistandSpecialForcesofficerservingastheDirectoroftheUnitedStatesArmySpecialOperationsCommand(USASOC)G-5StrategicPlanningDivision.

MAJSteveFerenziisanArmyStrategistandSpecialForcesofficerservingintheUSASOCG-5StrategicPlanningDivision.

TheviewsexpressedinthisarticlearethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyreflecttheofficialpolicyorpositionoftheU.S.ArmySpecialOperationsCommand,theDepartmentoftheArmy,theDepartmentofDefense,ortheU.S.Government.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/04/16/unconventional_deterrence_in_europe_the_role_of_army_special_operations_in_competition_today_115207.htmlReturntotop

USCOUNTER-WMDRedstone Rocket (Huntsville, Ala.)

ReaganTestSiteGivesBoosttoHypersonicTest

ByCarrieDavidCampbell

April22,2020



TotheSpaceandMissileDefenseCommandpersonnelwhoruntheRonaldReaganBallisticMissileDefenseTestSiteintheSouthPacific,theMarch19successfultestoftheArmyandNavyjointlydevelopedhypersonicglidebodyisthemostrecenttestsupportedbyRTS.

InformationgatheredfromthetestandfutureexperimentswillfurtherinformtheDepartmentofDefense’shypersonictechnologydevelopment.Theeventwasamajormilestonetowardthedepartment’sgoaloffieldinghypersonicwarfightingcapabilitiesintheearly-tomid-2020s.

Throughthepasthalf-century,RTSradars,imagingsystems,datacollectioncapabilities,andpersonnelhavesupportedhundredsofmissiletestsrangingfromvalidationofconceptsanddesignsforintercontinentalballisticmissilestoanti-satellitesystemstoballisticmissiledefensesystems.LocatedhalfwaybetweenHawaiiandAustraliaontheKwajaleinAtollintheMarshallIslands,RTSprovidestestsupportcapabilitiesfoundnowhereelseintheworld.

“We’reveryproudofourroleasAmerica’snationaltestrange,andthelonghistorywehavesupportingthedevelopmentofICBMs,ASATs,BMDS,andnowhypersonic,”ThomasWebber,directoroftheTechnicalCenter,SMDC,said.“RTSisthenation’sonlylong-rangecapabletestrange.”

Col.BurrMiller,RTSdirector,saidtheRTSprovidesmuchmorethanjustradars,cameras,recordingequipmentanddataprocessingcapabilities.

“RTSpersonnelprovidecradle-to-gravesupportforeverymission,”Millersaid.“We’reheretosupportrequirementsdefinitionforthetest,environmentalimpactassessment,rangescheduling,rangesafetyandlogisticalsupport.”

Millernotesthetimefromtestconcepttotestiscriticaltoeachevent’seventualexecution.

“Therearealotofi’stodotandt’stocrossbeforeatestcanbecarriedout.Weworkhardtokeeptheburdenoffofourcustomers,anddoourbesttokeeptheredtapetoaminimum,”Millersaid.“But there are safety, environmental, host nation and government requirements that must beaddressed.”

Whenitcomestimetosupporttheactualtest,Millersaid,RTSbringsinstrumentationtobearunlikeanyotherrangeintheworld.

“Youonlygetoneshotatrecordingtestdata,”hesaid.“Formosttests,it’sallinstrumentationondeck.Ourtwotrackingradars,ALTAIRandTRADEX,supporttests,aswellasourtwoimagingradars,ALCORandMMW.Wealsohavemultiplehigh-speedopticalandcamerasystemsdedicatedtocapturingeverymeasurabledataopportunity.”

Afteratestissuccessfullyconductedbythelaunchteam,thereisstillmuchworktodoatRTS.Themetrics team at the RTS Data Analysis Center begins to perform data analysis in support ofcustomer requirements,working to fully flesh out all the collected data and perform extensiveanalysis.

AccordingtoJimCosseyfromtheRTSMissionsOperationsOffice,afteramissiontheyconductlessonslearnedmeetingsthatbenefitnotjustthecurrentcustomerforanypotentialfollow-ontests,butfuturecustomersaswell.

“PostmissionourmissionandbudgetteamalsobegintobalancethebooksandconductlessonslearnedmeetingstopotentiallyfindareasofimprovementforRTSmissionplanning/execution,”Cosseysaid.

Intheend,postmissionsupportisjustasbusyasmissionpreparationandmissionsupport.Millersaid.RTScouldnotaccomplishtheirmissionwithoutcorerangestakeholders.



“ThesestakeholdersincludeourfantasticsupportfromU.S.ArmyGarrison-KwajaleinAtollandourRTSRangedirectorteam,ourcontractingenablersatArmyContractingCommand-RedstoneArsenal,Space,MissileDefenseandSpecialPrograms,the413thContractingSupportBrigade,MIT/LincolnLabs,andallofourteammateswithourprimeandsubcontractorsatRGNext,”Millersaid.

Thenexttimeyoureadaboutamissiletest,hesaid,donotforgetaboutthepeopleworkingbehindthescenestomakethetestpossibleinthefirstplace.

https://www.theredstonerocket.com/military_scene/article_b3d50d6a-84ac-11ea-9c634b85c3b16bb3.html

Returntotop

USARMSCONTROLAl-Monitor (Washington, D.C.)

TrumpAdministrationDoublesDownonIranNuclearTreatyAllegations

ByBryantHarris

April16,2020

TheDonaldTrumpadministrationisusingtheStateDepartment’sannualarmscontrolcompliancereporttobuilduponitspreviousallegationsthatIranmaybeviolatingthe1970TreatyontheNonProliferationofNuclearWeapons(NPT).

TheStateDepartmentsubmittedabriefexecutivesummaryofthereporttoCongresstoday.Thisyear’sexecutivesummarybolsterstheemphasisthatlastyear’sreportplacedonthetroveofdocumentsthatIsraelsaysitobtainedina2018raidonanIraniannucleararchive.

The2019reportassertedthatthearchiveitself“couldpotentiallyconstituteaviolation”oftheNPT’sbanonnuclearweaponsdevelopment.Thesummaryofthisyear’sreportgoesastepfurtherbynotingthattheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)reported“articlesofchemicallyprocesseduraniumatanundeclaredlocationinIran.”

“Iran’sintentionalfailuretodeclarenuclearmaterialsubjecttoIAEAsafeguardswouldconstituteaclearviolationof Iran’s [comprehensivesafeguardsassessment] requiredby theNPTandwouldconstituteaviolationofArticleIIIoftheNPTitself,”theexecutivesummarysays.

Notably,compliancereportsunderboththeTrumpandBarackObamaadministrationshadconsistentlyfoundthatissuesrelatedtoIranianNPTviolations“wereresolvedasofthe2015reportingperiod,despiteIran’scontinuedrefusaltoacknowledgeorprovidecertaininformationaboutthemilitarydimensionsofitspastnuclearactivities.”

ThatassessmentchangedlastyearundertheleadershipofYleemPoblete,aprominentIranhawkwhoservedasassistantsecretaryofstateforarmscontrol,verificationandcompliance.PobleteleftthepostinJuneafterclashingwithUndersecretaryofStateforArmsControlAndreaThompsonoverthe2019report.ThompsonleftherpostinOctober.

Theassistantsecretaryofstatepostremainsvacant,butthe2020reportindicatesthattheStateDepartmentisstilldeterminedtomoveforwardwithitscaseoverIran’sallegedNPTviolations.



“Theproblemwithinsertingalltheseconcernsratherthanstickingtohardandfastassessmentsoflegalcompliance…isthatyou’retakingthisawayfrombeingaverycut-and-drydocumentforthepurposeofseeingwherewearewithtreatycomplianceandturningitintomoreofapoliticaldocument,”saidAlexandraBell,aseniorpolicydirectorattheCenterforArmsControlandNonProliferationwhoworkedonthecompliancereportsasasenioradvisertotheStateDepartmentunderPresidentObama.

Still,Iran’sreducedcooperationwiththeIAEAinrecentmonthsisprovidingfodderfortheTrumpadministration’sarguments.

Thesummaryofthe2020reportnotesthatTehranhasrefusedtoprovideIAEAinspectorswith“accessattwolocationsnotdeclaredbyIrananddidnotsubstantivelyrespondtotheIAEA’srequestsforclarificationregardingpossibleundeclarednuclearmaterialoractivitiesatthoselocationsandathird,unspecifiedlocation.”

IranagreedtoallowIAEAinspectorstomonitoritsNPTcomplianceaspartofObama’s2015nucleardeal.ButafterTrump’s2018withdrawalfromthedeal,Iranbeganviolatingitsendofthebargain,nearlytriplingitsenricheduraniumstockpilesinceNovember.Iranalsosaiditwouldnolongerobeythedeal'srestrictionsfollowingTrump’sJanuarystrikeonIranianMaj.Gen.QasemSoleimani—evenasTehrancontinuestonegotiatewithEurope.

WhiletheIrannucleararchiveandtheIAEA’sstruggletoinspectpotentialundeclarednuclearsiteshavealreadybeenwidelyreported,thefullreport—whichisundergoingadeclassificationreview—maycontainmorespecifics.ThismarksthesecondyearinarowthattheTrumpadministrationhasmisseditsAprildeadlinetosubmitthefullreporttoCongress.

“Theywereactuallylegallyrequiredtogetthefullassessmentup,”saidBell.“Itwouldbenicetoseethatsoonerratherthanlater.”https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/04/trump-double-down-iran-nuclear-treatyallegations.html

Returntotop

Associated Press via Defense News (Washington, D.C.)

RussiaShowsWillingnesstoIncludeNewNuke,HypersonicWeaponinArmsControlPact

ByAP

April17,2020

MOSCOW—U.S.SecretaryofStateMikePompeoandRussianForeignMinisterSergeyLavrovdiscussedarmscontrolandotherissuesFridayasMoscowhassignaledreadinesstoincludesomeofitslatestnuclearweaponsinthelastremainingarmscontrolpactbetweenthetwocountries.ButfirstWashingtonmustaccepttheKremlin’soffertoextendtheagreement.

TheStateDepartmentsaidthetwotopdiplomatsdiscussednextstepsinthebilateralstrategicsecuritydialogue.PompeoemphasizedthatanyfuturearmscontroltalksmustbebasedonU.S.PresidentDonaldTrump’svisionforatrilateralarmscontrolagreementthatincludesChinaalongwiththeU.S.andRussia,theStateDepartmentsaid.

RussianPresidentVladimirPutinhasofferedtoextendtheNewSTARTarmscontroltreatythatexpiresin2021.TheTrumpadministrationhaspushedforanewpactthatwouldincludeChinaasasignatory.MoscowhasdescribedthatgoalasunrealisticgivenBeijing'sreluctancetodiscussanydealthatwouldreduceitsmuchsmallernucleararsenal.



DeputyForeignMinisterSergeiRyabkovsaidFridaythatRussia’snewSarmatheavyintercontinentalballisticmissileandtheAvangardhypersonicglidevehiclecouldbecountedalongwithotherRussiannuclearweaponsunderthetreaty.

TheSarmatisstillunderdevelopment,whilethefirstmissileunitarmedwiththeAvangardbecameoperationalinDecember.

TheNewSTARTTreaty,signedin2010byU.S.PresidentBarackObamaandRussianPresidentDmitryMedvedev,limitseachcountrytonomorethan1,550deployednuclearwarheadsand700deployedmissilesandbombers.

Thetreaty,whichcanbeextendedbyanotherfiveyears,envisagesacomprehensiveverificationmechanismtocheckcompliance,includingon-siteinspectionsofeachside’snuclearbases.

NewSTARTistheonlyU.S.-Russiaarmscontrolpactstillineffect.Armscontrolexpertshavewarnedthatitsdemisecouldtriggeranewarmsraceandupsetstrategicstability.

https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2020/04/17/russia-shows-willingness-toinclude-new-nuke-hypersonic-weapon-in-arms-control-pact/

ReturntotopUSNI News (Annapolis, Maryland)

Panel:NorthKoreaIntentonFlexingMilitaryMuscleDuringPandemic

ByJohnGrady

April22,2020

AsquestionslingeraboutthehealthofNorthKoreanleaderKimJongUnfollowingarecentsurgery,Pyongyanghasleftnodoubtitintendstokeepflexingitsmilitarymusclewithitslatestroundofairandland-basedcruisemissiletests,AsianexpertsattheWilsonCentersaidlastweek.

Speakinginaconferencecall,AbrahamDenmark,directorthecenter’sAsiaprogram,said“there’sbeennofreezeputinplaceonitsmissileandnuclearprograms.”Theproof,headded,cameinMarch’snineshort-rangemissiletests.They“weremorethananyotherpreviousmonth’s.”ThetestsalsosignalthattheNorthKoreansarefollowingthroughonleaderKim’sspeechatyear’sendthatPyongyangwouldcontinuetodevelop“necessaryandprerequisitestrategicweapons.”

Thetestsarealsodesigned“toremindtheregionandtheU.S.that,despitewhat’sgoingonwithCOVID-19,they’restillgoingtomaintaindeterrence,”Denmarksaid.

Lastweek’stestswerelaunchedontheeveofSouthKorea’sparliamentaryelections.Newsreportssaytheland-basedfiringswerelikelythefirsttestofNorthKorea’scruisemissilearsenalinthreeyears.Theair-launchedmissilesweredesignedtostrikegroundtargets.

EdwardWong,adiplomaticcorrespondentforTheNewYorkTimesandacenterfellow,saidfollowingKim’sspeechtherewasageneralfeelinginWashingtonandothercapitalsthatNorthKoreamightresumetestingitsintercontinentalmissilesandpossiblyitsnuclearweapons.

Denmarksaidthat,sincetheadministrationhasnotobjectedinthepasttotheseshort-rangetests,Kim“willtakeupthespacehe’sbeengiven.”

Sofar,theglobalpandemicalsohasnotspurredanyrealinterestinNorthKoreainre-openingtalksondenuclearizingthepeninsulaoreasingeconomicsanctions.“Therehavebeennohigh-leveldiscussions…outsideofanexchangeofletterswith[PresidentDonald]Trump”onofferingmedicalassistanceifneededtocontainanoutbreak.



Wongaddedtherehasbeenaslow-downofship-to-shiptransfersinNorthKoreanorChineseterritorialwatersmeanttogetaroundtheU.N.SecurityCouncil-imposedsanctionsrestrictingNorthKoreanexportsofcoalandimportsofneededgoods.

“Thebordershavegenerallybeenclosed”betweenChinaandNorthKoreaontradeandpopulationmovement,hesaid.

FewbelieveNorthKorea’sclaimsofzeroreportedpositivecasesofCOVID-19.ItbordersChina,wherethepandemicbegan,andSouthKorea,whichreportedaseriousoutbreakthatapparentlyisnowundercontrol,JeanLee,whoheadstheKoreaprogramattheWashingtonthinktank,said.

ShequotedthetopAmericancommanderonthepeninsula,ArmyGen.RobertAbrams,whosaidtheregime’sassertionwas“animpossibleclaimbasedonalltheintelligencewe’veseen.”

The“noreported”cases,Leesaid,wasareminderto“alwaysquestiontheveracity”ofinformationcomingfromNorthKoreanofficialspokesmenaboutahostofmatters.

AtthesametimeasitwasreportingnoCOVID-19cases,inlastweek’smeetingofthePolitburo,LeenotedthatitapprovedtheconstructionofamammothnewpublichospitalinPyongyang.Thisfolloweditsearly-onrestrictionsonpublicgatheringsandtravel,closedbusinessesandgovernmentoffices,andabaronentryofmostforeignnationals,signsthatNorthKoreawastakingthepandemicseriously.

SpeakingfromSwitzerland,KatharinaZellweger,whowaslastinNorthKoreaattheendof2019,said,“peoplearereallytryingtofollowalltherulesandregulations”Kim’sregimeimposedinlateJanuary.“Manyplacesareclosed,sopeoplearestayinghome.”

Bytakingthosesteps,frombuildingalargehospitaltoenforcingsheltering-in-place,theregimeistrying“toregainconfidence[ofthepublic]athome”thatithasmattersundercontrol,Leesaid.Coupledwithitscontinuedshowofmilitarystrength,Leesaidthesedomesticeffortsareattemptsto“bringthepeopletogetherinaunifiedbattle.”

Whilebetteroffthanitwasduringthe“starvingtimes”ofthemid-1990s,NorthKorea’spopulationremainsextremelyvulnerabletoCOVID-19,theexpertsagreed.LeeandZellwegersaid40percentofitscitizensareundernourished,withchildrenbeingthemostaffected.Tuberculosisremainsachronichealthproblem,asdoeshepatitisB.

“Themostvulnerablewillsuffer”ifthereisamajoroutbreak,Zellwegersaid.“Ordinarycitizensarepoor,verypoor.”

Pyongyang’shealthcarefacilitiesarechronicallyundersuppliedtomeetroutineneeds,andtheflowofsuppliesandmedicalpractitionersthroughoutsidenon-governmentalorganizationshasslowedorstopped,sheadded.

ZellwegertermedtheNorth’shospitals“oldanddilapidated”butclean.

AlthoughtherehasbeensomeeasingofU.N.sanctionstoprovidemoremedicalaid,the“impossibilitytotransfermoney”toNorthKoreaandthedifficultyof“findingfundingforaidprogramishard”inthesetimes.

Foryears,theNorthKoreanregimeundertheKimfamily“madethecalculateddecisiontoputtheirpopulationatrisk”bylimitingcontactwiththeoutsideworld,Leesaid.

ButasWongsaid,“it’sinChina’sinterest[that]thereisnomassiveoutbreakofCOVID-19,”sendingthecontagionbackacrossitsborders,settingoffafloodofrefugeesseekingsafetyorcareandcausingthecollapseofKim’sregime.



https://news.usni.org/2020/04/22/panel-north-korea-intent-on-flexing-military-muscle-duringpandemic

Returntotop

COMMENTARYWar on the Rocks (Washington, D.C.)

Deterrence,Norms,andtheUncomfortableRealitiesofaNewNuclearAge

ByGeraldC.Brown

April20,2020

Oneofthemostimportanteventsofthelastcenturywasonethatnevertookplace—thatis,thermonuclearwar.FollowingtheU.S.nuclearstrikesagainstJapanin1945,furtheruseofnuclearweaponsseemedinevitable.TheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionamassedarsenalsofunprecedentedpower,andcompetedfornuclearsuperiorityinacontestthatseemedcertaintoendinall-outnuclearconflict.Butinstead,neitherutilizedtheirarsenals,competitiondrovetheSovietUnionbankrupt,andtheSovietempirecollapsed.TheUnitedStatesanditsalliesdominatedglobalpoliticsaftertheColdWar,anddemocracyspreadfurtheracrosstheworldthanatanyothertimeinhistory.TheColdWarendedwithouttheuseofasinglenuclearweapon.

However,thenon-useofnuclearweaponssince1945canbemisunderstood,andthewronglessonscanbelearned.ItissometimesassumedthattheabsenceofnuclearwarsinceWorldWarIIprovesthatnuclearweaponsarenotrelevantfornationalsecurity,willneverbeusedinconflict,orthatatabooagainstnuclearweaponswilldetertheiruseinthefuture.Thisthinkingisdangerous,andmaybringabouttheveryeventitassumescanneveroccur.

NuclearweaponswereneverusedduringtheColdWarbecausenationalleaders,eveninsituationsliketheCubanMissileCrisis,judgedthattherewasneveranyclearadvantageinlaunchinganuclearstrike.Therisksneveroutweighedtheperceivedbenefits,asanuclearattackwouldclearlyleadtonuclearretaliation.DeterrenceworkedduringtheColdWar,butonlybecauseWashingtonandMoscowworkedhardtoconvincetheotherthatusingnuclearweaponswouldneverbeworthit.WiththepossibilityofanewNuclearPostureReviewin2021,itisimportantthatpolicymakersstudywhatwilldrivecountriestouse,ornotuse,nuclearweaponsinthefuture.

TheNuclearTabooExists,ButitCanBeBroken

Itissometimesarguedthatanormativebasisofrestraint,a“nucleartaboo,”isresponsibleforthelackofinter-statenuclearconflict.Whilesuchatabooalmostcertainlyexists,itisunlikelytopreventstatesfromusingnuclearweaponsonitsown.Thedecisiontousenuclearweapons,likethedecisiontoengageinconflictingeneral,hashadalotlesstodowithmoralityandalotmoretodowithassessmentsofthenationalinterestanddomesticpoliticalconsiderations.

TheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionrefrainedfromnuclearstrikesduringtheCubanMissileCrisisduetomutualvulnerabilities.Thecrisisonlyde-escalatedwhenbothsidesgaveeachotherstrategicvictories—theSovietsremoveditsnuclearmissilesfromCuba,whiletheUnitedStatesremovedmissilesfromTurkey.U.S.governmentofficialsdecidednottousenuclearweaponsduringtheVietnamWarbecausethenatureoftheconflictmadethemimpracticalandnotworththecost.Militaryanalystscalculateditwouldtakearound3,000nuclearweaponsayeartoaccomplishtheirgoalsinOperationRollingThunder.FollowingtheKoreanWar,policieswereput



inplacetoimmediatelyrespondwithnuclearweaponsifareturntohostilitiesoccurred.NuclearweaponswereusedinJapaninWorldWarIIbecauseofthissamecalculus.TheU.S.governmentcalculateditcouldsave500,000alliedlivesandmassiveamountsoftimeandmoneybyusingthem.

Thisisnottosaythenucleartaboohasnoeffectonpolicy.Thefearofthemoral,reputational,andpoliticalcostsassociatedwithusingnuclearweapons—specifically,usingnuclearweaponsfirstinacrisis—hascertainlyactedasadeterrent.Thetaboo,combinedwiththemindsetthattheweaponswouldnotbenecessaryforvictory,contributedtoPresidentHarryTruman’sdecisiontonotusenuclearweaponsintheearlydaysoftheKoreanWar,andpreventedGen.DouglasMacArthur’soriginalwarplans—whichincludedtheuseofuptofiftynuclearweaponsandabeltofradioactivecobalttopreventreinforcements—frombeingimplemented.EvenSecretaryofDefenseRobertMcNamaraisreportedtohaveprivatelyadvisedagainstwagingnuclearwarunderanycircumstances.

Armscontrolagreements,fortheirpart,havereinforcedthenucleartaboobyseekingtocontrolpotentialescalation,providetransparency,andminimizethesituationswhereitwouldbeadvantageoustousenuclearweapons.However,armscontrolagreementsarenotsignedprimarilyfornormativereasons.Countries—specificallyRussiaandtheUnitedStates—havepursuedarmscontrolagreementsasameansoffurtheringcompetitionandoffsettinganadversary’sadvantagesinspecificsectors.

Theseagreementswerepursuedwhentherewasadisparityincapabilitiestocurbcompetitionandabandonedwhenthestrategicconditionsfortheagreementswerenolongerfavorable.Forexample,theAnti-BallisticMissiletreatylimitedboththeSovietUnionandtheUnitedStatestomaintaincomparablecapabilitiesandavoidacostlyarmsrace.ButWashingtonwithdrewfromthetreatyin2001whenithadaclearadvantageindevelopingmissiledefensetechnology.TheIntermediate-RangeNuclearForcestreaty,signedin1987,allowedbothsidestoreducetensionsintheEuropeantheater,whilestrategicallyallowingcontinuedcompetitionintherealmofairandsea-launchedmissileswheretheUnitedStateshadaclearadvantage.Russiabeganviolatingthetreatydecadeslaterwhenthestrategiccalculuschanged,inthefaceofaproliferatingChineseintermediate-rangemissileforce.

ThinkingThroughDeterrence

Nucleardeterrenceisoftenassumedtoworkautomatically,butinpractice,nuclearstatesareinherentlydifficulttodeter.Deterrenceisnotaconditionachievedfromsimplypossessingnuclearweapons;itisbasedontheperceptionofmilitarypoweringeneral.Nuclearweaponsdrasticallyenhanceastate’sstrengthbycreatingthecapacitytocausecatastrophicamountsofdamageinaveryshortperiodoftime,withstrikesthatarelargelyindefensible.Duetotheuniquecharacteristicsofnuclearweapons,nuclearstatesbecomelesslikelytoengageinconflictwitheachother.However,thismakesitevenhardertodeteranuclearstatefromcampaignsagainstnonnuclearstates.

TheUnitedStateshasextendeditsdeterrencecommitmentstoitsalliesinAsiaandEurope.Unfortunately,thismaybeanemptypromise.InthecaseofacrisiswithanuclearstatelikeRussiaorChina,thepotentialforescalationtothenuclearlevelalwaysexists.Thisbegsthequestion:HowfarisWashingtonreallywillingtogotodefendanally,andhowwouldtheAmericanpeoplerespondtoriskingnuclearwartodefendanallywhenthereisnothreattotheU.S.homeland?

IfanuclearpowerdecidedtousenuclearweaponsagainstastatewithintheAmericannuclearumbrella(e.g.,Australia,Japan,SouthKorea,andNATOallies,amongothers),theUnitedStatesmightrefrainfromrespondingwithnuclearweapons,sincedoingsowouldriskitsownsurvival.



ThisdynamicisoneofthereasonsthattheUnitedStatesmaintainsastrongmilitarypresenceandforward-deployednuclearweaponsintheterritoryofitsEuropeanallies:TheUnitedStatesisfarmorelikelytorespondtoaggressionifAmericancitizensarekilled.Thisvulnerabilityallowsstatestobuild“theoriesofvictory”thatinvolvetheuseofnuclearweaponsatthetacticalleveltooffsetconventionalinferiorityanddeterforeigninvolvement.

TheoriesofNuclearVictory

Nuclearusemaybemoreplausiblethanmanywouldliketobelieve.America’sadversariesinvestalotofresourcesinnuclearweapons,andaconsiderableamountoftimethinkingaboutsituationsinwhichtheywouldusenuclearweaponsandhowtofighttheUnitedStatesundernuclearconditions.Forexample,ifChinadecidedtomilitarilyretakeTaiwan—aprimarygoalofthePeople’sLiberationArmy—itfacestwoconsiderableobstacles.WhileitispossibleitcouldsucceedinanamphibiouslandingandtakeTaipei,thecostswouldbeimmense.Additionally,aninvasionrisksU.S.interventionandtheoutbreakofawarbetweentheUnitedStatesandChinaoverthesovereigntyofTaiwan.OneofthegoalsofChinesewarplanningagainstTaiwanistoensureaquickanddecisiveoccupationthatwoulddetertheUnitedStatesfromgettinginvolvedinthefirstplace.ThoughChina’sstatednuclearweaponspostureclaimsanofirst-usepolicy,thiscouldbeasituationwherethecost-benefitratioofusingnuclearweaponsistoogoodtoeasilyoverlook.Theuseoflow-yieldnuclearweaponsagainstspecifictargets,suchasTaiwanesemilitarybasesorcoastaldefenses,wouldhavetwoeffects.ItwouldclearthewayforaChineseoccupationwithpossiblyfewercoststhanaconventionalapproach,andwouldlikelydeterU.S.intervention.WithnoU.S.forcesbeingharmedandChinahavingdemonstratedawillingnesstoescalatetothenuclearlevel,theUnitedStatesisunlikelytofinditworththerisktointervene.

Chinawouldfaceeconomicanddiplomaticcostsfromtheinternationalcommunity,butitwouldfacesignificantcostsfromannexingTaiwananyway.Beijingcouldjudgethatusingnuclearweaponswouldbeworthit.AnalystshavetohonestlyassesshowmuchusingnuclearweaponswouldimproveBeijing’schancesofsuccess,andweighthatagainsttherepercussionsofdoingso.

Russia,withitsaggressivenuclearposture,massivearsenal,andrecentexpansionistactionsinUkraineisanotheralarmingcase.Moscow’scalculateduseofescalationcontrolsshowsawillingnessandabilitytocalculatetheappropriateuseofforce.IfRussiacanannexterritoryinUkraine,itcanconceivablydothesameintheBaltics.A2016RANDstudyarguedthatRussianforcescanrapidlymovethroughandcaptureoneoralloftheBalticstatesquickerthanNATOwouldbeabletoeffectivelyrespond.Additionally,theRussianterritoryofKaliningradanditsantiaccess/area-denialcapabilitiesprovideaneffectivemeansofdefendingagainstNATOintervention.CounteringsuchanoffensivewouldalmostcertainlyrequirestrikesagainstRussianterritory,whichcouldtriggeranuclearresponsefromMoscow.Russiaiswellpracticedinutilizingthefearoffurtherescalationanduncertaintytoitsadvantage;limitednuclearstrikes,oranucleardemonstrationinkeyareas,couldbeusedtocreateuncertaintyandfearofconflictescalatingtoalargerscale,deterringconflictatalowerlevelofescalation.Ifpushcametoshove,wouldNATObewillingtorisknuclearconflictforasmallstateinRussia’sbackyard?

Ofcourse,nucleardeterrenceismostcredibleasameanstopreventforeigninvasion.Thishasbeentheprimaryreasonnumerousstateshavesoughtnuclearweaponsinthefirstplace,includingIndia,Pakistan,Israel,andevenNorthKorea.Asignificantthreattothehomelandofanuclearstatecouldleadtotheuseofnuclearweaponstomakeupforconventionalinferiority,especiallyifthestateislosinggroundtoadvancingforces.Thestatemayutilizealimitedstrikeagainstaninvader’smilitarybases,tocutoffsupplytrains,orevenagainstanadversary’scitiestocoercethemintobackingdown.Furthermore,ifthestatefeelsitsnucleardeterrentisbeingthreatened,itmay



escalatebyusingitsnuclearweaponsunderfearofa“useitorloseit”situation.Theoretically,thisdilemmapreventsinvasionfromoccurringinthefirstplace.But,ifanadversarytrulybelievesinthisnormativerestraintandinvadesdespitethisdeterrent,isitreallybelievablethatthestatewillcontinuetorefrainfromusingnuclearweaponswhenitssurvivalisatstake?

IntheColdWar,analystslearnedthatitwasverydifficulttocrediblyengageandwininstrategiclevelwarfareagainstanuclearstate.Butthissamelessondoesnotapplytonuclearversusnonnuclearstates.TheUnitedStatesandRussiaareunlikelytotargeteachotherinnuclearconflict—itistoorisky.Butnuclearweaponscanbeusedagainstanon-nuclearstate—outsideofanuclearadversary’shomeland—withouttriggeringasuicidalresponse.Thereisamajordifferencebetweenstrikinganuclearpower’scitiesandthreateningtheirsurvivalandusinglow-yieldweaponsagainstastatethatcannotretaliateatthenuclearlevel.

Acounterargumentisthatitwouldnotbenecessarytousenuclearweaponsagainstanon-nuclearstate.However,thisassumptionmaynotalwaysholdtrue,andthefearofinter-statenuclearconflictmaybetheedgeanuclearstateneedstodeteragainstforeigninterference.IfanAmericanadversaryusesnuclearweapons—inamannerthatdoesnotthreatentheUnitedStates—willAmericablink?IstheUnitedStatestrulywillingtorespondwithnuclearweaponswhendoingsocouldquicklyturnasituationthatdidnotoriginallythreatenitintooneofmutualsuicide?

NuclearRestraintIsNotBasedonMorality

Nuclearweaponsmayhaveincreaseddeterrencebetweennuclear-armedstates,butitisincreasinglydifficulttodetertheminothercampaigns.Therearesituationswhenastatemaybeabletousenuclearweaponstotheiradvantage,anddeterringagainstthisrequireshardwork.

Nuclearweaponshavenotbeenusedincombatin75years.Considerationsofnuclearwarfarehavebecometaboo,whichhascontributed,inpart,tothenon-useofnuclearweaponsforsolong.Butthetaboodoesnotguaranteethatnuclearweaponswillnotbeusedinthefuture,andhistoryshowsusthattaboosareoftenbroken.Recentevidencesuggeststhatthenucleartaboomaynotbeasrobustasmanyassume.AnincreasingnumberofAmericanshaveevendeclaredtheywouldsupportusingnuclearweaponstosaveAmericanlives—asentimentunlikelytobeuniquetotheUnitedStates.Inonestudy,59percentofrespondentsstatedthattheywouldsupporttheuseofnuclearweaponsagainstIrantosaveU.S.soldiers,andadifferentstudyshowedthat77.2percentwouldsupportanuclearstrikeagainstal-Qaedaifnuclearweaponsweredeemedtwiceaseffectiveasconventionalweapons.

Unfortunately,theuseofnuclearweaponsmaybeincreasinglyplausibleintheyearsahead.TheJointComprehensivePlanofAction,or“Irandeal,”meanttoslowtheinevitableproliferationofnuclearweaponsintheMiddleEast,butwasunderminedwhentheUnitedStateswithdrewfromitin2018.NorthKoreannuclearweaponsandballisticmissileshaveproventobeaneffectivemeansofdeterringU.S.interventionandwillnotgoawayanytimesoon,bringingfearsofproliferationbothinEastAsiaandtootherdictatorshipsaroundtheworld.Bilateralarmscontrolagreementsarebecominglessrelevantastheyweakensignatoriesagainststatesoutsideoftheagreement,andmultilateralarmscontrolagreementshavebecomelesslikelytohavemeaningfulcontentduetothewidevarietyofconflictingcapabilities,arsenalsizes,andsecurityconcerns.Theunfortunaterealityisthatthenucleartabooisfallingapart.Ifwewishtocontinuetoseeaworldwherenuclearweaponsarenotused,deterrentposturesmustbebasedontheassumptionthatstateswillusetheseweaponswhenitisintheirinteresttodoso.

GeraldC.Brown(@GeraldC_Brown)isananalystwithValiantIntegratedServices,wherehesupportstheDepartmentofDefensenuclearenterpriseandconductsnuclearstrategyresearchand



exerciseanalysis.Previously,hespentsixyearsintheU.S.AirForce,GlobalStrikeCommand,workinginnuclearsecurityoperations.Allviewsexpressedherearehisown.

CORRECTION:AnearlierversionofthisarticlestatedthatDwightEisenhowerwaspresidentintheearlydaysoftheKoreanWar.Thatwasincorrect.HarryTrumanwaspresidentatthestartoftheKoreanWar.

https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/deterrence-norms-and-the-uncomfortable-realities-of-anew-nuclear-age/Returntotop

The Hill (Washington, D.C.)

AmericaNeedsan'IranConsensus'

ByLawrenceJ.Haas

April16,2020

ThecurrentdebateoverwhethertheUnitedStatesshouldeasesanctionsagainstIraninlightofthelatter’sstruggleswithCOVID-19reflectsabroaderreality:Morethanfourdecadesafterthe1979IranianRevolution,westilllackaconsensusaboutthenatureoftheregimeinTehranandhowtodealwithit.

ForIran,weneedsomethingakintothe“ColdWarconsensus”ofdecadesago,whenourtwopoliticalpartiesagreedthatAmerica’sbiggestglobalchallengewasSoviet-ledcommunismandthatWashingtonshoulddefenditselfanditsalliesby“containing”theSoviets.

Suchan“Iranconsensus”islongoverdue.Eversincetherevolutionof1979oustedtheU.S.-backedShah and ushered in a terror-sponsoring, hegemony-seeking, nuclear weapons-aspiring,antiWestern theocracy, Washington has pursued a confused, disjointed, meandering approachtowardtheIslamicRepublic.

TonurtureanIranconsensus,especiallyatatimeofbitterpartisanshipinWashington,themanelectedpresidentinNovembershouldconsiderappointingabipartisancommissionofforeignpolicyelders—formersecretariesofstate,nationalsecurityadvisors,andsoon—toconsiderthenatureofIran’sregime,clearlydelineatethechallengesitposes,andoutlineanapproacharoundwhichthecountrycanbroadlyrally.

That’sbecause,asourpoliciesofthelastfourdecadesmakeclear,welackagreementoneventhemostbasicissuesrelatingtoIran.Thoseinclude:

Whatistheregime?InTehran,anunelectedSupremeLeaderwieldsultimatepowerandanunelectedGuardianCouncilroutinelybarsmostcandidatesforparliament,reflectingthefactthatthegovernmentisfarmoreauthoritarianthandemocratic.

Nevertheless,intheearly2000s,DeputySecretaryofStateRichardArmitagewentsofarastotermIranademocracy,andfordecadesall-too-manyofourforeignpolicyexpertshaveheldouthopethattheelectionofasupposedlymoderateIranianpresidentwouldnurturedomesticreformsandwarmerU.S.ties.

Thatneitherthe“moderate”PresidentMohammadKhatamitwodecadesagonorPresidentHassanRouhanitodayhaveprovedtoberealreformistslikelywon’tconvincethesesameexpertstoabandonthishope.



Whatdrivestheregime?HenryKissingerfamouslysuggestedthatIranmustdecidewhetheritwantstobe“anationoracause.”ButWashington,too,mustdecidewhetheritconsidersIrananormalnationoranunrelentingrevolutionarycause.

StartingwithPresidentCarter,after IranianstudentsseizedAmerica’sembassy inTehran in late1979,presidentsofbothpartieshavesanctionedIranoveritsterrorsponsorship,regionalmischief,andnuclear-relatedpursuits.

WherepresidentshavedisagreedwithoneanotherisoverthepossibilitythatTehrancouldbepersuadedtomarkedlychangeitsbehaviorabroadandsheditsanti-Westernhostility,pavingthewayfornormalizedU.S.-Iranrelations.

ThoughotherpresidentstestedthepossibilitiesofaU.S.-Iranianrapprochementinback-channelcommunications,PresidentObamawentthefurthest—hopingthatbyrefusingtocriticizeIran’sfraudulentpresidentialelectionof2009andspearheadingaglobalnucleardealwithTehran,hecouldconvincetheregimetoreduceitshostility,changeitsnefariousways,andrejointheinternationalcommunity.

Howdangerouswouldnuclearweaponsmaketheregime?Iran’snuclearprogressstartedattractinggreaterattentionbeginningintheearly2000s,andPresidentsGeorgeW.Bush,Obama,andTrumpallvowednottoletIranacquireordevelopnuclearweaponswithwhichtothreatentheregionandwiderworld.

Thatconsensuswasabitofamirage,however.Tobesure,Obamarejectedtheideaof“containing”anuclearIran,sayingthatanIranwithnuclearweaponswouldposetoolargeofathreattoIsraelandtheUnitedStates.But,whileheandhisaidesproclaimedthattheU.S.-lednucleardealclosedoffallIranianpathwaystoabomb,thedealheultimatelyconcludedwasslatedtoexpireovertime,givingTehraneventualfreereintopursuenuclearweaponsanew.

ThatwasarealitythatTrumpapparentlydidnotwanttoaccept.HewithdrewtheUnitedStatesfromthedealandimposeda“maximumpressure”campaignofsanctionsto,amongotherthings,forceIranbacktothenegotiatingtabletocraftamorecomprehensiveagreement.

Indeed,nothingencapsulatesWashington’sdissensusoverIranbetterthanthenucleardealitselfanditsaftermath.

ObamatreateditasanexecutiveagreementratherthananofficialtreatyfortheSenatetoapprove,atleastinpartbecauseaRepublican-controlledSenatewouldn’thaveprovidedthetwo-thirdsvoteneededforratification.Now,manyDemocratsofboththeHouseandSenatearebemoaningTrump’sdecisiontoditchthedeal,fearfulthatitisolatesWashingtonfromitsalliesinEurope,whostillbacktheagreement.

Alltold,Washington’shead-spinningincoherenceofthelastdecadeoverIran’snuclearprogramshowsjusthowdesperatelyweneedaconsensus.It’slongpasttimetobuildone.

LawrenceJ.Haas,seniorfellowattheAmericanForeignPolicyCouncil,istheauthorof,mostrecently,"HarryandArthur:Truman,Vandenberg,andthePartnershipThatCreatedtheFreeWorld."

https://thehill.com/opinion/international/493067-america-needs-an-iran-consensusReturn

totop

The Hill (Washington, D.C.)



DefenseBudgetCutsFollowingthePandemicWillBeHardtoSwallow

ByDovS.Zakheim

April19,2020

Congresshasappropriatedmorethan$2.25trilliontocountertheimpactofCOVID-19onAmericanfamiliesandtheeconomy.ItislikelytospendevenmoreoncelegislatorsreturnfromtheirrecessinearlyMay.Thisunprecedentedlevelofexpenditureisresultinginamassivedeficitandnationaldebtlevelsthatarelikelytoexceed120percentofthenation’sgrossdomesticproduct,especiallyasGDPgrowthitselfisnolongeraforegoneconclusion.Inturn,therewillberenewedpressureonthedefensebudget,whichalreadyisforecasttohavenorealgrowthinfiscalyear2021.

Interestonthenationaldebt,whichatsomepointwillbegintoriseagain,willcreateamassiveburdenonannualfederalbudgets.Thedemandforincreasesindomesticspendingwillbedifficulttoignoreintheaftermathofthepandemic.Forthesereasons,itisnotbeyondtherealmofprobabilitythatdefensebudgetsbeginninginfiscalyear2022willnotevengrowinnominalterms.

EveniftheDepartmentofDefense(DOD)hadbeenforcedtoaddressonlytherealityofnorealgrowthindefensespending—asopposedtotheadditionalburdenofminimalnominalgrowth—itwouldhavehadtore-evaluateitsspendingpriorities.Historically,whenDODhasbeenforcedtoundertakewhatitterms“cutdrills,”thesehavebeendonewiththegreatestreluctance,andattimeshavebeencompletedwithlittleanalysisoftheimplicationsofpotentialtrade-offs.Invariably,whatresultedfromtheseeffortswerereductionsinspendingforoperationsandmaintenance,forcelevelreductions,orthesheddingofresearchanddevelopmentofuntriedweaponsandsystems.Ontheotherhand,thedepartmentandespeciallythearmedserviceswereexceedinglyreluctanttodispensewithlongstandinglegacyprograms.

Thistime,however,DODfacesabudgetchallengeofunmatchedproportions.Defensebudgetsarecertaintodeclineinrealterms.Indeed,shouldtheDemocraticPartytaketheWhiteHouseortheSenate(orboth)intheupcomingelections,evendeepercutsindefensearesuretofollow.YetthethreatsposedbyChinaandRussia,alreadyprojectedtoincrease,maywellprovetobeevengreaterinthefaceofaweakenedanddisorganizedWest.TheDOD,therefore,willhavetotakeseriouslytheneedforafundamentalre-evaluationofitspriorities,andnotmerelyundertakeanothercutdrill.

Thelasttimethedepartmentfundamentallyshifteditsfocuswasintheearly1990s,whenitsbaseforceresultedina25percentreductioninforcestructure,a20percentreductioninmanpowerrelativetofiscalyear1990anda10percentreductioninbudgetauthority.DODmayhavetoconsiderlaunchinganeffortalongsimilarlinesifitisnottobecaughtflat-footednextyear,asaresultofeitherthefullbudgetimpactofcoronavirusspendingortheNovemberelections,orboth.

Aswiththebaseforce,forcelevelsarealikelytargetforreductions.Payandbenefits,toincludefamilyhousing,areuntouchablebecausetheyarekeytomaintainingatop-levelvolunteerforce.Thisisespeciallycriticalatthistimebecause,intheaftermathofthevirus’sspreadwithinthemilitary,itmayprovedifficultfortheservicestomaintaintheirrecruitmentobjectives.Similarly,operationsandmaintenancebudgetscannotbetamperedwithtomaintaindeterrenceagainstpossiblenewadventurismonthepartofRussia,China,NorthKoreaorIran.

Apartfromforce-levelreductions,therefore,theonlyothercandidatesforcutsareresearchanddevelopmentandtheprocurementaccounts.ReductionsinR&D,typicallyfavoredincutdrills,willbemoredifficult,giventheneedtomaintainanadvantageoverRussiaandChinaintherealmsofhypersonics,artificialintelligence,quantumcomputingandothercutting-edgetechnologies.Procurementaccountsarethustheonlyremainingtargetsforbudgetreductions.



Budgetcuttersforyearshavezeroedinonthestrategicnucleartriad,andcurrentplansforitsmodernizationofferthemnewtargets.GlobalStrikeCommandisseeking$200billionoverthenextdecadetofundnewbombers,intercontinentalballisticmissiles,commandandcontrolandrelatedsupportingelementsofthestrategicnucleartriad.Ontheotherhand,longtimeopponentsofspendingonstrategicnuclearforceswillargueagainsttheneedforanewbomber,andinsteadwillcallforconvertingthestrategicnucleartriadtoadyadofland-andsubmarine-basedmissiles.Othercriticsofthetriadmaysupportthebomberprogramandmightpreferdispensingwiththeland-basedleginfavorofthebomberandsubmarinelegs.Budgetpressureswillunderscorebothsetsofarguments.

Withrespecttogeneralpurposeforces,therenodoubtwillbearenewedcalltohaltallaircraftcarrierprocurementbeyondthetwoFordclasscarriersunderconstruction,oratbesttosupportconstructionofonemore.EvenPresidentTrumpatonepointvoicedhisconcernabouttheprogram.Givenitsskyrocketingcosts,theF-35alsomayfinditselfinthecrosshairsofbudgethawks.TheArmyrecentlydroppeditsprogramtodevelopanOptionallyMannedFightingVehicle,itsthirdattempttoreplacethe1980sBradleyInfantryFightingVehicle,onlytorenewitseveralweekslater.Itmighthavetodropitagain.Finally,therehavelongbeencallsforare-evaluationoftheelements—andcosts—ofthenearlyfour-decades-oldmissiledefenseprogram.

Cuttingprocurementisalwaysadifficultpillfortheservicestoswallow,andthistimewillbenodifferent.NodoubtDODwillpointtotheneedtomaintainthedefenseindustrialbase,andworkers’jobs,asareasonforavoidingmajorreductionsindefenseprocurement.ThatargumentcertainlywillresonatewithCongress.Thistime,however,thecaseforresistingchangemaybeoverwhelmedbytheimpactofaplaguethathascaughtthenationunpreparedandmaywellreturnwithevengreaterforceinthemonthsoryearsahead.

DovS.ZakheimisasenioradviserattheCenterforStrategicandInternationalStudiesandvicechairmanoftheboardfortheForeignPolicyResearchInstitute.HewasundersecretaryofDefense(comptroller)andchieffinancialofficerfortheDepartmentofDefensefrom2001to2004andadeputyundersecretaryofDefensefrom1985to1987.

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/492756-defense-budget-cuts-following-thepandemic-will-be-hard-to-swallow

Returntotop

Real Clear Defense (Washington, D.C.)

PreparingforaDarkFuture:BiologicalWarfareinthe21stCentury

ByThomasG.Mahnken

April16,2020

NewsofthespreadofCOVID-19aboardtheaircraftcarrierUSSTheodoreRooseveltandthesubsequentreliefofitsCommandingOfficerhashighlightedthetensionthatexistsbetweenmaintainingmilitaryreadinessandtheneedtosafeguardthehealthofmembersofthearmedforcesinthefaceofapandemic.

Thediseasehasbeenafeatureofwarforthevastmajorityofhumanhistory–fromtheplaguethatravagedAthensearlyinthePeloponnesianWar,killingtheAthenianstrategosPericles;tothediseasesthatEuropeansettlersbroughtwiththemtotheNewWorld,devastatinglocalpopulations;tothehostoftropicaldiseasesthatcausedappallingcasualtiesintheChina-Burma-Indiaand



SouthwestPacifictheatersinWorldWarII.Thefactthatweweresurprisedbytheemergence,growth,andspreadofCOVID-19reflectsthefalseconceitof21stcenturylifethatwehave“conquered”disease.

Infact,pandemicsarebutoneclassoflow-probabilitybuthigh-impactcontingenciesthatwecouldfaceinthecomingyears,includinganearthquakeorothernaturaldisasterinamajorurbanarea,regimechangeinanimportantstate,andthecollapseoffinancialmarketsleadingtoaglobaldepression.WhenIservedasDeputyAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforPolicyPlanningbetween2006and2009,weexploredaseriesofsuch“shocks”aswellastheroletheDefenseDepartmentcouldplayinrespondingtothemasawayofhelpingtheDepartment’sleadersaddresssuchcontingencies.DuringmytimeinthePentagon,wealsoheldaseriesofwargameswithmembersofCongressandtheirstaff,governorsofseveralstatesandtheircabinets,andthegovernmentofMexico,toexploreindepththeconsequencesofapandemic.Muchofwhatwefoundthenresonateswithwhatweareexperiencingnow.Ontheonehand,themeasuresthatindividualsneedtotaketoprotectthemselvesagainstavirussuchasCOVID-19arerelativelystraightforward.Ontheotherhand,groupdynamics,bureaucraticbehavior,publicpolicy,andeconomicforcesmakeitdifficulttoimplementmeasuresthatmakesenseonanindividuallevelacrossasociety,letalongacrosscountries.Itwas,andis,alsoclearthattheDefenseDepartmentpossessesmedical,logistical,andcommandandcontrolassetsthatarehelpfulindealingwithadisastersuchasapandemic.Evenifnotasurprise,thefactthatpandemicsofthisscalearerareeventshashinderedpreparationandresponse.

Thecurrentpandemicforeshadowsanevendarkerfuture,oneforwhichweneedtoprepare.AlthoughitappearsthatCOVID-19isofnaturalratherthanman-madeorigin,thatmaynotbethecasethenexttimearound.Indeed,ourreactiontoCOVID-19showsjusthowvulnerablewearetothehostileuseofbiologicalagents,andjusthowdisruptivesuchanattackcouldbe.WhereastheDefenseDepartmenthasjustifiablydevotedalotofattentiontodevelopmentsinthehardsciences,thoseattheintersectionofbiology,genomics,andbigdataportendthedevelopmentofincreasinglysophisticatedbiologicalweapons.Forexample,theadventofgene-editingtechniquescouldallowstatestodevelopnewormodifiedpathogensthatwouldbemorelethal,difficulttodetectandtreat,andmoretargetedintheireffects.

StatessuchasRussiacontinuetodevoteattentiontobiologicalwarfare,andRussianPresidentVladimirPutinhasexpressedinterestindevelopingweaponsbasedonnewprinciples,includinggenetics.TheRussiangovernmentpossessesstockpiledbiologicalweaponsaswellasproductioncapabilities.Indeed,lessthanayearagotherewasanexplosionatRussia’sStateResearchCenterofVirologyandBiotechnology,aSoviet-erabioweaponslaboratorythatnowresearchesandhousesEbola,Smallpox,andAnthrax.IncontrasttotheU.S.armedforces,theRussianmilitarymaintainshighreadinesstoprotectitselfagainstchemicalandbiologicalweapons.WeneedtoensurethatU.S.forcesarecapableoffightingthroughsuchadvancedthreats.Thisincludesnotonlyprotectingoperationalforces,butalsothelogisticalsupportandfacilitiesuponwhichtheydepend.Ensuringtheoperationofthedefenseindustrialbaseinthefaceofsuchthreatsalsodeservesattention.Thelasttimethetopicreceivedscrutinywasmorethantwodecadesago,andeventhen,effortstoaddressthechallengewerepartial.

Arelatedareawherewecouldbesurprisedistheuseofbiology,chemistry,ortechnologytoenhancehumanperformance.A2012studybytheNationalResearchCouncilfoundthat“thesheerbreadthofthescopeofinquiry[intohumanperformancemodification]isstaggering,fromnanotechnologytogeneticengineeringtomanipulatingnormalhumanprocesses(suchashealingorfatigue).Predictingwhereeachwillgoisdifficult,predictingorevenimaginingtheinteractions,cross-applications,andunintendedconsequencesbordersontheimpossible."Whereasthe



barrierstohumanperformancemodificationintheUnitedStatesandelsewhereintheWestarehigh,otherstatesfaceaneasierpath.Forexample,Russia,China,andothershavelongusedperformance-enhancingdrugstoaidtheirinternationalathletes.Indeed,theInternationalOlympicCommitteehassanctionedRussianathletesfortheuseofsuchdrugs.Inthefuture,theUnitedStatescouldfacesoldiersonthebattlefieldwhousechemical,biological,orcomputationalmeanstoenhancetheirperformanceby,perhaps,increasingtheirstrength,improvingtheircognitivecapabilities,orreducingtheirneedforrest.Wealsoneedtofigureouttypesofhumanperformancemodificationcomportswithourvalues.

Planning and preparation today can reduce the impact of future shocks. The experience of thecurrentpandemiccangiveusinsightintofuturebiologicalwarfarechallenges.Similarly,measureswetaketodaytoprepareforfuturebiologicalwarfarecanalsoenhanceourreadinesstomeetfuturepandemics.

ThomasG.MahnkenisPresidentandChiefExecutiveOfficeroftheCenterforStrategicandBudgetaryAssessmentsandaSeniorResearchProfessorattheMerrillCenterforStrategicStudiesatJohnsHopkinsSAIS.HeservedasDeputyAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforPolicyPlanningbetween2006and2009.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/04/16/preparing_for_a_dark_future_biological_warfare_in_the_21st_century_115208.html

Returntotop

Defense News (Washington, D.C.)

America’sBomberForceisFacingaCrisis

ByMaj.Gen.LarryStutzriem(ret.)andDouglasBirkey

April23,2020

Thenationfacesabombercrisis,anditistimetoopenlyacknowledgethescaleandscopeoftheproblem.

Taskedwithdeterrenceand,ifnecessary,strikingtargetsaroundtheglobe,AirForcecrewsoperatingtheseaircraftaffordthenation’ssecurityleadersuniqueoptionsbestembodiedinthephrase:anytime,anyplace.Despitethecriticalityofthismission,theAirForcecurrentlyoperatesthesmallest,oldestfleetofbomberssinceits1947founding.Nootherserviceorallyhasthiscapability,whichplacesanimperativeonthisfiniteforce.Theservice’srecentannouncementthatitwillbeendingitscontinuousbomberpresenceinGuamfurtheramplifiestheprecariousstateofbombers.ItisastarkwarningtoseniorleadersinthePentagon,intheexecutivebranchandonCapitolHillthattheAirForceis“outofSchlitz”whenitcomestothecriticalmissionstheyperform.

Bombersareuniqueinstrumentsofpower.Theycanstriketargetswithlargevolumesofkineticfirepowerwithoutrequiringaccesstoforeignbasesandwithoutprojectingthevulnerabilityassociatedwithregionallybasedlandorseaforces.Thestrikingpowerofasinglebomberisimmense.Infact,B-1BsflyingmissionsagainstISISintheopeningdaysofOperationInherentResolvewereabletocarrymoremunitionsthanthatdeliveredbyanentirecarrierairwing.

Stealthbomberscanpenetrateenemyairdefenses,deprivingmobiletargetsofsanctuary.Theycanalsocarrylargebunker-bustermunitionsrequiredtoeliminatedeeplyburiedandhardenedfacilities.Bomberaircraftarealsocheapertooperateonaper-missionbasiswhencomparedtoalternateoptions,likeships,largepackagesofsmallerstrikeaircraftorstandoffmissiles.



Theerosionofthebomberforceisnosecret.AttheendoftheColdWar,theU.S.AirForcepossessed400bombersarrayedtofighttheSovietUnion.Today,ithasjust157,withaplantocutafurther17inthefiscal2021budgetsubmission.AirForceeffortstomodernizethebomberforceadecadeagowerethwartedwithintheDepartmentofDefensebyanexcessivenear-termfocusoncounterinsurgencyoperations.Bombersarerequestedbycombatantcommandsonacontinualbasisgiventheconcurrentthreatsposedbypeeradversaries,mid-tiernationslikeIranandNorthKorea,andhostilenonstateactors.

TheAirForceknowsthismissionareaisstretchedtoothin,andthatispreciselywhyin2018leaderscalledforanadditionalfivebombersquadronsin“TheAirForceWeNeed”forcestructureassessment.

Well-understoodriskexistswithoperatingahigh-demand,low-densityinventoryfortoolong.TheB-1Bforce,whichmakesupoverone-thirdofAmerica’sbombercapacity,offersahighlycautionarytaleinthisregard.Intheimmediateaftermathof9/11,theserviceretired26oftheseaircrafttofreeupmodernizationfunds,whichsubsequentlyweresnatchedawayfromthebombermissionareaforotheruses.Forthenexttwodecades,theAirForceflewtheB-1Binanearlycontinuousstringofintensecombatdeployments.Sustainmentfundingwasunder-resourced,whichfurtherworedowntheB-1Bforce.Lastsummer,B-1Breadinessratesplummetedbelow10percent—effectivelyputtingthemoutofcommission.

AsAirForceGlobalStrikeCommandCommanderGen.TimRayexplained:“WeoverextendedtheB1Bs.”Itwasatoxicformulaoftoomuchmissiondemandandtoofewairplanes.AirForceleaderscontinuallysignaledconcern,buttheircallsforhelpwentunanswered.

Thenormalsolutiontothissortofachallengewouldbestraight-forward:Gobuymoreairplanes.However,operationalB-21swillnotbeinproductionuntilthelatter2020s.TheAirForceisaskingtoretire17B-1stofreeupresourcestonursetheremainingaircraftalongasastopgapmeasure.

COVID-19emergencyspendingandcorrespondingdownwardpressureonfuturedefensespendingareonlygoingtoaggravatethecomplexityofthisjugglingactwithmissiondemand,availableforcestructureandreadiness.Whetherworldeventswillalignwiththesecircumstancesisyettobeseen.

ItwasinthiscontextthattheAirForcedecidedtoenditscontinuousbomberpresenceonGuam.Launchedin2004todeteradversarieslikeChinaandNorthKoreaandtoreassureregionalallies,themissionhasbeenatremendoussuccess.ItclearlycommunicatedU.S.readinesstoactdecisivelywhenU.S.andalliedinterestswerechallenged.EndingcontinuousbomberpresenceinthePacificnowsendstheoppositemessage,justastheregiongrowsmoredangerous.Thisisadecisionwithsignificantrisk,yetitisanoutcomecompelledbypastchoicesresultinginabomberforceontheedge.

Thepathforwardbeginswithadmittingthenationhasabombershortfall.Retiringmoreaircraftexacerbatestheproblem.NoristhisjustanAirForceproblem.Bombersarenationalassetsessentialtooursecuritystrategyandmustbeprioritizedaccordingly.Ifotherserviceshaveexcessfundstoinvestinideaslikea1,000-mile-rangecannonwhenthousandsofstrikeaircraft,variousmunitionsandremotelypilotedaircraftcanfilltheexactsamemissionrequirements,itistimeforarolesandmissionsreviewtodirectfundingtowardthemosteffective,efficientoptions.Bomberswouldcompetewellinsuchanassessment.Ultimately,thesolutiondemandsdoublingdownontheB-21program.

Therecomesapointwhereyoucannotdomorewithless.Giventheimportanceofbomberstothenation,rebuildingthebomberforceisnotanoption—itisanimperative.



RetiredU.S.AirForceMaj.Gen.LarryStutzriemservedasafighterpilotandheldvariouscommandpositions.Heconcludedhisserviceasthedirectorofplans,policyandstrategyatNorthAmericanAerospaceDefenseCommandandU.S.NorthernCommand.HeiscurrentlythedirectorofstudiesattheMitchellInstituteforAerospaceStudies,whereDouglasBirkeyistheexecutivedirector.Birkeyresearchesissuesrelatingtothefutureofaerospaceandnationalsecurity,andhepreviouslyservedastheAirForceAssociation’sdirectorofgovernmentrelations.

https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/23/americas-bomber-force-isfacing-a-crisis/

Returntotop

ABOUTTHEUSAFCSDSTheUSAFCounterproliferationCenter(CPC)wasestablishedin1998atthedirectionoftheChiefofStaffoftheAirForce.LocatedatMaxwellAFB,thisCentercapitalizesontheresidentexpertiseofAirUniversity—whileextendingitsreachfarbeyond—andinfluencesawideaudienceofleadersandpolicymakers.AmemorandumofagreementbetweentheAirStaff’sDirectorforNuclearandCounterproliferation(thenAF/XON)andAirWarCollegecommandantestablishedtheinitialpersonnelandresponsibilitiesoftheCenter.ThisincludedintegratingcounterproliferationawarenessintothecurriculumandongoingresearchattheAirUniversity;establishinganinformationrepositorytopromoteresearchoncounterproliferationandnonproliferationissues;anddirectingresearchonthevarioustopicsassociatedwithcounterproliferationandnonproliferation.

In2008,theSecretaryofDefense'sTaskForceonNuclearWeaponsManagementrecommended"AirForcepersonnelconnectedtothenuclearmissionberequiredtotakeaprofessionalmilitaryeducation(PME)courseonnational,defense,andAirForceconceptsfordeterrenceanddefense."ThisledtotheadditionofthreeteachingpositionstotheCPCin2011toenhancenuclearPMEefforts.Atthesametime,theAirForceNuclearWeaponsCenter,incoordinationwiththeAF/A10andAirForceGlobalStrikeCommand,establishedaseriesofcoursesatKirtlandAFBtoprovideprofessionalcontinuingeducation(PCE)throughthecareersofthoseAirForcepersonnelworkinginorsupportingthenuclearenterprise.ThismissionwastransferredtotheCPCin2012,broadeningitsmandatetoprovidingeducationandresearchonnotjustcounteringWMDbutalsonuclearoperationsissues.InApril2016,thenuclearPCEcoursesweretransferredfromtheAirWarCollegetotheU.S.AirForceInstituteforTechnology.

InFebruary2014,theCenter’snamewaschangedtotheCenterforUnconventionalWeaponsStudies(CUWS)toreflectitsbroadcoverageofunconventionalweaponsissues,bothoffensiveanddefensive,acrossthesixjointoperatingconcepts(deterrenceoperations,cooperativesecurity,majorcombatoperations,irregularwarfare,stabilityoperations,andhomelandsecurity).Theterm“unconventionalweapons,”currentlydefinedasnuclear,biological,andchemicalweapons,alsoincludestheimproviseduseofchemical,biological,andradiologicalhazards.InMay2018,thenamechangedagaintotheCenterforStrategicDeterrenceStudies(CSDS)inrecognitionofseniorAirForceinterestinfocusingonthisvitalnationalsecuritytopic.

TheCenter’smilitaryinsigniadisplaysthesymbolsofnuclear,biological,andchemicalhazards.Thearrowsabovethehazardsrepresentthefouraspectsofcounterproliferation—counterforce,active



defense,passivedefense,andconsequencemanagement.TheLatininscription"ArmisBellaVenenisGeri"standsfor"weaponsofwarinvolvingpoisons."

DISCLAIMER:Opinions,conclusions,andrecommendationsexpressedorimpliedwithinaresolelythoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheAirUniversity,theUnitedStatesAirForce,theDepartmentofDefense,oranyotherUSgovernmentagency.

issue april 20 - media.defense.gov

Documents