ivo supicic - expression and meaning in music

Expression and Meaning in MusicAuthor(s): Ivo SupičićSource: International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Dec.,1971), pp. 193-212Published by: Croatian Musicological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/836835Accessed: 13/08/2009 11:06

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EXPRESSION AND MEANING IN MUSIC

Ivo SUPI1Id

Institute of Musicology, Zagreb

The problem of expression and meaning in music, though an old one, often treated and somewhat worn out (because of a one-sided approach and inadequate solutions rather than because of the frequency of attempts at its resolution), has never ceased to be posed in modern musical aesthetics - even though objections have been raised to it on the grounds that it concerns only the listener's subjective appreciation, which cannot be justified by any objective criteria. Some musicians refused to allow the listeners' feelings, assessment or judgment to be taken seriously into account in the study of music. It is often forgotten, however, that the problem of expression and meaning in music appears also as a problem of musical creation, and that this is the principal way in which it can have any significance. At the same time, it also appears as a problem of the musical work, that is, the piece of music in question, since just as there is no expression without something being expressed. Only a work of music can serve as a vehicle of expression and meaning. Thus, in spite of the undeniable subjective aspect of the problem, there is also its equally undeniable objective aspect.

A second objection, which stems logically from the first, is that the problem of expression in music is not a scientific, musicological question. This view is an expression of a positivistic mentality. But the claim itself is questionable. It, too, like the first objection, contains only part of the truth. But, on the whole, it is the product of an insufficient and superficial understanding of music or of aprioristic attitudes to music that often find their roots in one's musical education and in the prevailing aesthetic conceptions of a given period. The view on which this objection rests also represents a reaction against the widespread but exaggerated romantic and pseudoromantic conviction that the highest and in fact only purpose of music as an art is the expression of emotions and sentiments. Obviously, this simplified and often dilettante sentimental view of music is completely devoid of any scientific significance. On the other hand, the problem of meaning and expression in music is not, indeed,

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE AESTHETICS AND SOCIOLOGY OF MUSIC 194

a purely positive scientific problem, because it is incapable of being ex- haustively explored in an empirical and rational fashion. It contains certain almost enigmatic aspects which escape all attempts at a scientific analysis. But this is not to say that this problem is wholly like this: some of its aspects are amenable to positive scientific treatment, as can be seen in many works of music, aesthetic concepts, attitudes of numerous composers, and of course in the way that many people experience music.

Finally, a third objection comes from the adherents of so-called formalistic theories. However, even the most extreme formalists, people who strenuously deny the ability of music to express human sentiments, emotions and thoughts, are eventually forced to recognize, in one way or another, that music does indeed possess some extramusical meaning or ability to signify; they do this by transferring this expressive ability to other levels and talking about the metaphysical (Schopenhauer), trans- cendental, noumenal, subconscious aspects of music, or about its relation to the dynamics of human feelings (Hanslick). Anyway, it would be absurd to believe that any work of man, and especially an art, could be completely and absolutely non-expressive. Psychological research shows clearly that man expresses himself in his activity, that he discloses himself and even betrays himself in what he does. This refutes any view of art as a product of the human mind which does not express its creator and carry meaning.

If, then, the problem of meaning and expression in music occupies its rightful place in musicology generally, and in musical aesthetics and psychology in particular, and if it is - as it appears to be - one of the oldest and deepest questions that can be asked about music, then it becomes obvious that this problem will also be among the most difficult and complex ever posed. And its solution will never be reached through simplicistic or superficial approaches. On the contrary, the problem calls for a complex and multidimensional treatment. Multidimensionality of treatment and refined analysis have, however, not been characteristic features of traditional aesthetic constructs designed to deal with meaning and expression in music.

At the time when ethos ruled the expressive significance of the Greek modes, or when in some other civilizations musical elements were being related to cosmic phenomena and seasons of the year (as in China) or to parts of the day and periods in man's life (as in Java),1 the institutional importance of these attributes of music prevented the possibility of their being put in doubt, or evaluated outside the framework of the accepted philosophical systems of which they formed a part.2 In European music, too, meaning has always been a more or less important element. How- ever, beginning in the nineteenth century, and more specifically in the twentieth century, a number of theories appeared which stressed the

1 Cf. Curt SACHS, The Rise of Music in the Ancient World, W. W. Norton, New York 1943, p. 110 ff.

2 Cf. Robert FRANCES, La perception de la musique, Vrin, Paris 1958, p. 252.


secondary importance of extramusical content in the study and evalu- ation of musical works. Thus, Boris De Schloezer takes the view that the aesthetic attitude consists in attention devoted exclusively to form, that is, to the aesthetically formulated musical element of the composition.3 According to Max Schoen, only those factors of aesthetic experience which belong primarily to form correspond to what is essential in the nature of art.4 Regardless of the slight differences between views such as these, it is important to note that even when they justly give prominence to musical elements in the scientific study of musical works, they do not deny the possibility of the expression, in music, of a certain extramusical content (which would, of course, be unjustified).

On the other hand, most authors who take the strictly formalist view and deny the expressive character of music fail to consider the listener and the experience of listening to music, regarding this as an element which is external to the musical activity itself and to aesthetic criteria. According to such authors, the only thing that matters is the artist's freedom, which gives birth to ?pure forms< and demands to be freed from the myth of expressivity and expression.5 This was the view taken by Stravinsky, who saw music as fundamentally incapable of expressing anything (feelings, attitudes, psychological states, natural phenomena) and who believed that it was wrong to give an audience authority to judge the value of a given piece of music. This, however, did not prevent him - as noted by Jacques Chailley - from composing The Fire Bird, Petrouchka, and Le sacre du printemps and from explaining, in his younger days in 1913, that this last piece was intended to >>express the sublime growth of reviving nature and the indistinct and deep quiver of universal ripening, a sacral fear of the midday sun<.6 This vacillation in views can be noticed in other authors too, and is not just a sign of the existence of different possible viewpoints concerning the expressive potential of music, but also a pointer to the serious difficulties that one encounters in trying to defend strict formalism, particularly when the defence requires a limitation of music in the name of artistic >purity< and its deprivation from all, supposedly extraneous, admixtures. In fact, while formalism may be defined as a view which denies any possibility of expressing extramusical content in music, and expressionism as a view which claims that music is capable of expressing some extramusical content, different authors formulate the two views in different ways, and some even attempt to synthesize them.

There are also authors who not only recognize the expressive potential of music but even give it greater prominence. Paul Dukas, for instance.

3 Cf. Boris DE SCHLOEZER, Introduction d J. S. Bach, Gallimard, Paris 1947, p. 259.

4 Cf. Max SCHOEN, >The Aesthetic Attitude in Music?, Psychological Monographs, 1928, No. 39, p. 169.

5 Cf. Robert FRANCES, op. cit., p. 252. 6 Quoted in Antoine GOLEA, Esthetique de la musique contemporaine, Presses Uni-

versitaires de France, Paris 1954, p. 27.

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saw expression as the vital element of music.7 Jean d'Udine believed that a fugue by Bach or a sonata by Mozart, just as much as a page from the works of Berlioz or Wagner, were ?transpositions< of extramusical content or experience. To take the view that these composers were inte- rested solely in combinations of sounds would mean, according to this author, an impoverishment of their works and a deprivation of that part of their personalities which has made them immortal.8 Max d'Ollone also believed that expression in music was unquestionable,9 while Henri De- lacroix claimed that form in music always symbolized feelings and that non-expressive music could not even exist.10 For R. Arnheim, expression is not an admixture that is added to a primary perceptive datum but is rather a direct product of the global effect of a given piece of music, while the details of texture and different formal elements - though a component part of the motive of expression, which presupposes them - are secondary.11

These mainly speculative attempts at the solution of this problem have been supplemented by the first empirical investigations. It has been quite some time now since Vernon Lee conducted a survey among musicians in England, Germany and France and found that about one half of those interviewed held the view that music was ?only music<, while the other half believed that it also carried an extramusical message.12 More interesting than these findings are the results of psychological experiments conducted recently by Robert Frances.13 Most music lovers and musicians who refuse to believe that there is a connection between music and extramusical content regularly base their claim on certain general aesthetic principles concerning the nature of music, or on a theory of the self-sufficiency and specific character of form. In most cases, their claim is not that they are unable to discover such a connection, and frequently they even establish it in practice despite their theoretical positions. They merely consider it aesthetically unjustified and meaningless, or a dilettante offense against music. It is clear from this, as noted by Frances, that individual opinions regarding the expressive potential of music are greatly influenced by prevailing aesthetic views and by one's educational background. A special aspect of the problem has been explored by Leo- nard B. Meyer, who notes that music assumes an expressive and signifying function only in conditions determined by certain historical and

7 Cf. Paul DUKAS, Ecrits sur la musique, S. E. F. I., Paris 1948. 8 Cf. Jean D'UDINE, L'art et le geste, Paris 1910, p. 195. 9 Cf. Max D'OLLONE, Le langage musical, La Palatine, Paris-Geneve 1952, Vol.

I, p. 38. 10 Cf. Henri DELACROIX, Psychologie de l'art, Paris 1927, p. 303. 11 Cf. R. ARNHEIM, ,The Priority of Expression<, The Journal of Aesthetics and

Art Criticism, 1946, Vol. VIII, No. 2, pp. 106-109. 12 Cf. Vernon LEE, Music and its Lovers, An Empirical Study of Emotion and

Imaginative Responses to Music, G. Allen & Unwin, London 1932, p. 28 ff. 13 Cf. Robert FRANCES, La perception de la musique, p. 254.


cultural factors.14 There is no doubt that awareness of this function is dependent on wider social considerations, the habits and mentality of a given period. We have already referred to the clearly defined ways in which listeners approached music, its expression and symbolism, in ancient China, Java and Greece. In these cultures, aesthetic contemplation was almost normative in character. Certain texts produced by these cultures specify very clearly not only what one should listen for and find in music but also how one should approach a given piece or kind of music. The manner of listening, and the approach to music, were determined by the entire philosophical and religious context, by the social function and purpose of music in a given community. The approach to composed music in the European civilization was not much different, at least until the time when, after the Renaissance, individualism began to gain ground.

Still, in different periods of European musical culture, it is possible to trace certain typical lines of approach to music and to the understanding of musical works in terms of meaning and expression. At the time when the Romantic conception of music began to develop in Germany - according to which music is not just a system of tones but rather a language of a higher order, leading to the discovery of deep and secret aspects of man and the world - people started to listen to Haydn and Mozart, and even to Bach, in this particular frame of mind. This view was quite clearly formulated in periodicals of that period.15 It was then that the expressionistic conception of music began to spread, so that even music from earlier periods was then >hearde in this way.

Later, in the nineteenth century, formal aspects of music were given priority and several formalist theories were advanced, partly because the Romantic view of musical expression had shown - apart from its quite acceptable aspects - certain weaknesses that could not be reconciled with the new, positivist spirit. Besides, composed music lost much of its earlier functional significance during that century and became an increasingly autonomous activity, not necessarily connected with any external circum- stances or extramusical purposes, performed mainly in concert form. This increased independence of music at a social level was matched by cor- responding theories at the aesthetic level; these claimed full autonomy for music not only from the extramusical content that it was supposed to ?transpose< into its own language, but also from other arts. Eduard Hanslick,16 taking a formalist view, was adamant in defending the principle of the autonomy, and even complete separateness, of music against Hegel's view (shared by almost all Romantics) of the unity of all the arts. The spread of formalism was also felt in the approach to music of

14 Cf. Leonard B. MEYER, Emotion and Meaning in Music, The University of Chi- cago Press, Chicago 1957, 2nd ed.

15 See, for instance, texts in Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung published from 1799 onwards by Kant's pupil Chr. Fr. MICHAELIS.

16 Cf. Eduard HANSLICK, Vom Musikalisch-Schonen, ein Beitrag zur Revision der Asthetik der Tonkunst, Vienna 1854.

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audiences following the decline of Romanticism: the emancipation of music in terms of social consumption and manner of performance resul- ted in a new manner of listening to music - as a purely musical pheno- menon and not as a vehicle of an extramusical message or content. This process continued and intensified in the twentieth century with the ad- vent of radio, which presents music in its >>pure< form, excluding any visual or other extramusical element.

In our own time, many musicians adopt the formalist view. Even in the scientific explication of musical works from earlier periods, emphasis is often laid on formal elements (in the same way in which it was laid on expressive elements during the Romantic period). In the case of Beethoven, for instance, the beginnings of polytonality are emphasized, or even elements of dodecaphony or quartal harmony, later developed by Sch6nberg. The use of the human voice in the Ninth Symphony, according to Scherchen, represents only the use of a sound different from the sound of the orchestra, without any expressive intention.17 The difference between Mozart and Beethoven, according to this view, would lie only in musical ?,idiom<<, in the manner of composition, the technique or the personal style - and >personal style< means here the frequency of certain melodic and rhythmic formulae, harmonic relations and construc- tive or structural schemes.18 In actual fact, however, these two composers differ in many other more important ways, which go beyond the elements listed here; and the claim made here concerning the two composers is the product of a narrow formalist view and of the retrospective application of a criterion which is scientifically unacceptable in the analysis of music of past periods (and of any music, for that matter).

Although the expressionist and formalist views are hard to defend in their extreme, >,classical< formulations (dating from the periods of Romanticism and Positivism in the nineteenth century), and although each includes or recognizes certain assumptions contained in the other, they should be examined in their own right and their differences should be objectively assessed. These differences are partly due to misunder- standings and confusions whose origin can be traced to polemic debates in Hanslick's time. But in the nineteenth century the problems of meaning and expression in music were not new: they were only posed in a new social, intellectual and emotive climate, different from that characteristic of the period of the Enlightenment. At that time, extreme formalism did not have many adherents. Chabanon was its first proponent in eighteenth century musical aesthetics, and he actually preceded Hanslick, who was, ho,wever, unjustly regarded as its originator.

The scientific flaw of all formalist and expressionist concepts lies in their readiness to generalize, to put forward one principle and aspect and

17 Cf. Hermann SCHERCHEN, Vom Wesen der Musik, Mondial Verlag, Winter- thur-Zurich 1946, p. 206.

18 Cf. Boris DE SCHLOEZER, >Sur le langage musicalb, Journal de Psychologie, 1951, No. 1-2, p. 250 ff.

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exclude all others, or at least to play down the value of other principles and aspects. Also, the terms >form< and >>expression<< often remain un- clarified. Hanslick, for example, never quite explained in what sense he was using the term >>form<<.9 Actually, form and expression in music, like matter and form,20 are only two aspects of one and the same artistic reality and should therefore be viewed in their mutual dependence, so that they can be given the place that they deserve in certain works of music, historical periods or styles. It is sometimes said, for instance, that the classical period of European music focused its attention mainly on form, while the Romantic period laid heavy emphasis on expression. But this is not to say that all classical music was non-expressive, or that Ro- mantic composers paid no attention to form (if this term is meant to signify what is academically known as ?musical form<<). If it is wrong to assume, as some people do, that all innovations in musical language and style are dictated by the needs of expression, it is equally wrong to think that evolution in music is limited to innovations in the techniques, forms, rhythms, and other structural elements of music. In some cases, evolution will be caused by the need to express musical content, in others to express - through it - some kind of extramusical content. It is an ele- mentary fact that composers do not always introduce technical innovations solely for their own sake.

But terminological clarity and precision are still lacking in the treatment of problems in musical expression. Modern musical aesthetics generally employs the term >form< to signify an aesthetically formed musical element in a composition. We thus speak of melodic form, temporal and rhythmic form, harmonic form, and - simply - form or musical form.21 The meaning of this term should therefore be distinguished from the meaning of the term >musical form<< mentioned earlier, which refers to the structure of a given piece of music (e. g. menuet, rondo, scherzo, or suite, sonata, symphony, etc.). It is important to note also that the term ?form< has nothing to do, in terms of meaning and aesthetic orientation, with the term >formalism<. While form, in no matter what sense, is a simple aesthetic fact, formalism is an aesthetic attitude and concept. That is also why the term >>expressionism<<, as used in musical aesthetics to designate the aesthetic view which recognizes the ability of music to express some extramusical content, should not be confused with those trends in twentieth century music which have been labelled ?Expres- sionist<<. Equally, we should be careful not to confuse both of these uses of the term with expression as such (the fact or act of expressing), or with expressive music, which appeared in the history of music much before the so-called Expressionist current at the beginning of this century.

19 Cf. Jean G. HARRELL, >Issues of Music Aesthetics?, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 1964, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, pp. 197-206. 20 Cf. Ivo SUPICIC, >Matter and Form in Music?, The International Review of Music Aesthetics and Sociology, 1970, Vol. I, No. 2, pp. 149-158.

21 Cf. Gis6le BRELET, Le temps musical, P. U. F., Paris 1949, 2 vols.

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Another important distinction which ought to be made concerns pure and expressive music. Taking the expressive value or quality of music as a criterion, one can distinguish two basic types of music: expressive music (which expresses a certain extramusical content in an understandable way) and pure music (which expresses only musical content). Tak- ing, on the other hand, the nature of the source of sound as a distinctive criterion, one can distinguish vocal, instrumental, and vocal-instrumental music. What we need is a more refined distinction than is usually made between ?absolute< and >programmatic? music, which is not only imprecise but also too schematic (though very widespread), because it commits violence in confronting the two >kinds< of music, and what they stand for, even when no such confrontation is justified. The term >absolute music< is awkward in itself, since no music and no musical work can in any sense be regarded as absolute. Besides, the adjective >absolutec< has the adjective >,relative< as its opposite, but - as far as I know - no one has ever discussed >relative music<. The use of the term ,pureo to refer to instrumental music is also unjustified. (Instrumental music is *pure< in the sense that it is not connected with any extramusical means of expression - not even the word, which appears in vocal and vocal-instrumental music.) Instrumental music is >purec only by the nature of its source of sound, but this by no means implies that it cannot also be expressive. Equally indefensible is the confrontation of *pure? and opro- grammatic? music, which is a subtype of expressive music. Expressive music is often hastily confused with programmatic and ?dramatic< music. The consequences are quite far-reaching: first, any music of expressive character is then labelled programmatic; second, any piece with a descriptive title is regarded as programmatic; third, all vocal or vocal- -instrumental, and particularly >dramatic? (opera, oratorio) music is regarded as expressive par excellence, because it uses words. And yet all three of these contentions are demonstrably false.

First of all, pure music, too, is also always an expression (in a more narrow sense of the word): it is an expression of the composer's creative personality even though it does not express, directly and specifically, his extramusical world of experience; it is an expression of itself; it is - in a peculiar way - an ,expression?( or ,reflection<< of its own time and place. Although pure music is not expressive in an understandable way and in relation to the listener (i. e. phenomenologically), it is expressive in relation to its source or its creator (i. e. ontologically). This presupposes, however, that pure music is not a purely artificial, cerebral, technical or academic construct but that it rather stands in a very close, deep and existential relationship with the composer's personality, from which it springs - despite all technical and rational elaboration - in a sponta- neous way. When this ontologico-psychological aspect is enlarged by a phenomenologico-psychological (that is, understandable) aspect, pure music ceases to be pure and becomes expressive.

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In addition to these distinctions involving music itself, distinctions are also needed among different expressionist and formalist aesthetic concepts. There are several expressionist viewpoints, not all of which belong to the Romantic period. There is, on the other hand, more than one (i. e. Hanslick's) formalism. The problem of meaning and expression in music has too long been posed within an excessively narrow and ex- clusive framework. In the heat of polemic, Hanslick himself fell victim to the Romantic exaggeration he was trying to combat. Enough time has passed now to enable us to view Hanslick's aesthetics in historical pers- pective, to evaluate it in a sober and objective mood, and to appreciate its positive contribution, while remaining aware that it is basically and generally unacceptable. Hanslick was undoubtedly wrong in denying the expressive potential of music. But he was right in claiming that the expression of feeling could not represent the main objective of music and that ?beauty< in music was a specific quality that could not be reduced to psychological qualities. Such >sentimentalist< views had earlier been advocated by the Romantics and even before them by the proponents of the >affective theory?<, who failed to see that the expression of extramusical content generally, and emotions and feelings in particular, could not possibly be the sole objective of every piece of music - if for no other reason, then because of the existence of pure music.

Hanslick's fame has until very recently dimmed the reputation of his forerunner, Chabanon,2 who had not only taken the formalist stand- point but had also elaborated it in considerable detail and formulated arguments against phenomenological expression (of extramusical content by music) which are rather similar to the arguments advanced by Gil- son23 in our own time. Gilson's arguments could be summarized as fol- lows: since mind and imagination are never absent, it is impossible to listen to music without thinking of something; and because music prompts us to certain thoughts, we are prepared to believe that it actually contains these thoughts, while in fact music is nothing more than >har- moniously composed notes<. However, this seemingly foolproof argument starts from a completely false premise: it separates the act of creation - wrongly and inadmissibly - from its result, the work of music; it shows how one falls into the psychological trap of transposition when one ascribes the extramusical content experienced during listening to music itself; but recognizing that intellect and imagination are necessarily present, and even active, in the process of listening, this argument forgets that intellect and imagination, and the whole personality of the composer, cannot be excluded in the creative process of compositon. On the contrary, they can, particularly when the composer so wishes, leave their expressive imprint on the piece of music, thus enabling the listener

22 Cf. Michel-Paul-Guy de CHABANON, De la musique consideree en elle-meme et dans ses rapports avec la parole, les langues, la poesie, et le theatre, Pissot, Paris 1785.

23 Cf. Etienne GILSON, Matieres et formes, Vrin, Paris 1964, pp. 168-182.

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- within the limits of the expressive potential of the language of music (which, naturally, does not include concepts and conceptual precision) - to experience it in a powerful and unmistakable way. Although the work of music undoubtedly preserves its autonomy, it cannot be fully divorced from the human element without unacceptable deformation.

Bach's music probably provides one of the most revealing examples of a music that has been submitted to divergent interpretations of its expression and meaning. Jacques Handschin has shown that the nineteenth century regarded Bach mainly as a representative of the old world of outmoded polyphony.24 We have already mentioned that the period of Romanticism experienced Bach in a >romantic< way.25 For Spitta and his followers, Bach was in the first place an uncompromising musician who cared nothing about the expression of feeling or about musical description. But already, at the turn of the century, Andre Pirro and Albert Schweitzer regarded Bach as a poet-musician, deeply con- cerned in his music with the expression and meaning of the text, sub- mitting his own musical treatment, both vocal and instrumental, to the textual meaning. (This is not to claim, of course, that all of Bach's instrumental pieces are expressive.)26 Forkel spoke of Bach as a personifi- cation of the Germanic genius, while Norbert Dufourcq depicts him as an authentic follower of Latin traditions. Summarizing such different views of Bach, Chailley adds his own and compares Bach with Miche- langelo in the sphere of fine arts, regarding him - because of his detailed and minute expressive, descriptive and symbolic treatment of the text - as a figurative artist and even a miniaturist in music.27 Although, as Su- sanne Langer notes, Bach's expressive-technical procedures cannot be adopted as laws of musical expression generally,28 which ought to be self-evident, his notion of the relation between tones and words was generally valid for own. While Pirro and Schweitzer tried to prove this with their analyses of Bach's cantatas and chorales, Chailley wanted to demonstrate the continuity of Bach' expressive conception through an analysis of his Passions, pointing to the fact that symbolism, expression and description in Bach is not less frequent than in his contemporaries, but that it is different in quality. Bach's running musical >commentary< on the text is the product of such rich musical invention that its purely musical qualities are sufficient to justify the existence of a given piece of music as a logical and coherent work of art, without appealing to any

24 Cf. Jacques HANDSCHIN, >J. S. Bach et XIX siecle?, La revue internationale de musique, 1950, No. 8, pp. 157-164.

25 Cf. Friedrich BLUME, >Bach in the Romantic Era<, The Musical Quarterly, 1964, Vol. L, No. 3, pp. 290-306, and J. S. Bach im Wandel der Geschichte, Kassel 1947.

26 Cf. Albert SCHWEITZER, J.-S. Bach, le musicien-poete, Paris 1905, and Andre PIRRO, L'esthetique de Jean-Sebastien Bach, Paris 1905.

27 Cf. Jacques CHAILLEY, Les Passions de J.-S. Bach, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1963, pp. 4-5.

28 Cf. Susanne K. LANGER, ?O smislu u muzici<< (On Sense in Music), Zvuk, 1966, No. 69, p. 476.


extramusical expressive intention. This however, is not to say that the presence of logical musical content rules out expression, description and symbolism in the majority of Bach's vocal-instrumental compositions. But since many of Bach's other works are non-expressive and represent examples of pure music (or were even written in the first place to demonstrate the composer's technical skill), some authors are prepared to quote the example of Bach as the clinching argument - without any justification - in their defence of formalism and >absolute< music in its superior ?purity<. The implication is that >>impurity< in music is the result of the composer's expressing himself, of allowing his feelings, thoughts and ideas to be felt in his work. However aesthetic impurity may only appear in a vulgar, non-artistic treatment of expression and description, but certainly not in these processes themselves when they are applied as an artistic principle. The history of European music shows quite clearly that aesthetic failure in the sphere of expression, symbolism and description has never been due to the fact that individual composers have tried to depict, in music, certain extramusical experiences and elements, but rather to the fact that this was done in an aesthetically unacceptable, trite and unartistic way. In short, failure has occurred always when the expressive sense of a given piece of music has been placed above its aesthetic sense and value.

These otherwise untenable formalist views deserve to be given credit for the way in which they have stressed the priority of the aesthetic sense and of the values which can only stem from music itself and should not be sought elsewhere. On the other hand, the basically acceptable expressionist views deserve credit for having preserved the human, and humanist, view of music, stressing the unavoidable presence of man in works of music and the value that this presence represents. But modern aesthetics ought to develop a conceptual framework that will enable it to discuss expression in music differently from the way in which it was discussed during the Romantic period. The simplistic solutions of both expressionism and formalism should be abandoned. Notions which fail to consider the specificity of musical expression and the autonomous and peculiar nature of musical art should be revised. Above all, it is important that extramusical content should not be ascribed to compositions which do not possess it, and that it should not be denied in compositions in which it exists.

As for the latter group, it can mean something and express something only when it uses a certain ?language<< to signify and express what it has to say. The term ?language of music< had already been introduced in the nineteenth century, while the term >>musical philology<< has been coined in this century to denote that particular branch of musical science which takes that language as an object of study.29 However, considerable

29 Cf. Jacques CHAILLEY, Pour une philologie du langage musical, in IMS, Re- port of the Fifth Congress, Utrecht-1952, G. Alsbach & Co., Amsterdam 1953, pp. 100-106.

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disagreement still exists over whether music is a language or not. Al- though numerous views have been expressed about this matter, often dif- fering in details, they can all be reduced to three main claims: the first is that music is a kind of language (this view was held by the Romantics. such as Mendelssohn; today it is still held by Deryck Cooke); the second claim is that music is not, and cannot be, a language (this view was held by Hanslick, and more recently by Susanne K. Langer and Etienne Gil- son); the third claim is that music is a special, non-conceptual kind of language (this was the view held by Jules Combarieu, and is today adopted by Enrico Fubini).

In his well-known letter sent from Berlin on 15 October 1842 to Marc-Andre Souchay, in which he discussed the meaning of his Lieder ohne Worte, Mendelssohn gave a very clear formulation of his notion of musical language. He expressed the opinion that many people complain of the lack of expressive clarity in music as against words, whose meaning is clear to everybody. But, according to him, exactly the opposite is true - not only as regards speech but also as regards individual words: they are ambiguous, their meaning is imprecise, they are easily misun- derstood, unlike music which >fills the soul with a thousand things much better than words can doz. Thoughts expressed in music are not too indefinite to be expressed in words; on the contrary, they are too definite. Identical words never mean identical things for different people. Only music can mean the same thing, inspire the same feeling in one person and in another; but this feeling can never be expressed in the same words.30 In other words, Mendelssohn claimed that the language of music is not only definite but that it is actually superior to the spoken language; music can designate precisely even the slightest nuance in human feelings because it is a language of feelings, and as such it is unambiguous, direct and definite.

Adopting the view that music is expressive, that is, that it is capable of expressing an extramusical content, Cooke notes that this view can only be upheld if it is found that music has its own vocabulary and that it is a true language. According to him, music is a language of emotions and feelings, because it can speak only their language since it operates with tones rather than concepts. However, within its own expressive framework and its own ?terminology<, music has at its disposal expression which carry a definite meaning and which thus make up its language. These basic expressions of unambiguous meaning used in the language of music include, in Cooke's interpretation, intervals and harmonic relations. Thus, for him, tonic and major second are emotionally neutral, major third expresses joy, augmented fourth - when it modulates to-

30 Among other things Mendelssohn wrote: *Die Leute beklagen sich gew6hnlich, die Musik sei so vieldeutig; es sei so zweifelhaft, was sie sich dabei zu denken hitten, und die Worte verstande doch ein jener<, and added: >Mir geht es aber gerade umge- kehrt<?. However, curiously enough, according to Einstein, Mendelssohn's viewpoint was the finest statement ever made in justification of >pure? or ?absolute, music. Cf. Alfred EINSTEIN, La musique romantique, Gallimard, Paris 1959, 4th ed., p. 13.


wards the tonality of the dominant - expresses active aspiration, etc. These and other claims are illustrated by Cooke with numerous examples of European music, dating from the early fifteenth century to atonal music in the twentieth century. With these examples, Cooke implies that his scheme is valid only for European tonal music, and in this way he denies the universal significance of the language of music. But Cooke's attempt seems to suffer from an important drawback: the >musical terms<< to which he ascribes unambiguous meanings do not always posses such meanings even within the period to which they belong. The musical significance and emotional effect of one and the same interval or harmonic relation is not the same in the works of Palestrina, Bach, Beetho- ven, Wagner, or Stravinsky. Cooke seems to have lost sight of the fact that meaning and expression in music can only be reasonably discussed within the specific and full context of a given piece of music, without first isolating individual melodic, harmonic or any other elements. But accepting this view would mean a recognition of the specific nature of the language of music (and this Cooke does not do to a sufficient extent) and the abandonment of the attempt to discover and fix its vocabulary by analogy with the vocabulary of the spoken language (which Cooke has tried to do).31 Besides, as noted correctly by Enrico Fubini in his analysis of Cooke's views, >the complex and rich world of music from the Renaissance until the present day, which has been able to express a wide range of feelings in artistic form, in perfect harmonic constructs with their unlimited possibilities, seems to have been reduced, in Cooke's vocabulary, to a comfortable scheme, impoverished precisely in those potentials in which the author professes his confidencee.32

The other group of views includes those that claim that music is not, and cannot possibly be, a language. Thus, Hanslick believed that music differed radically from the spoken language in that the latter was a means of expression and that it possessed instrumental value: in the spoken language, notes Hanslick, sound is only a sign for the expression of something >completely extraneous to that sign<; in music, on the other hand, sound is important in itself, or rather >>it is an end in itself<?. Therefore, no analogy between music and language is possible. Music is an a-semantic art and is untranslatable into the spoken language. The a-semanticism of music is also advocated by authors of such disparate philosophical orientation as Gilson and Susanne Langer. Gilson notes that every part of speech in the normal language >performs a well-defined function which contributes to the definition of the meaning of words and sentences of which the language is composed<.33 But nothing similar exists in music. There is no >musical language< in the true sense

31 Cf. Deryck COOKE, The Language of Music, Oxford University Press, London 1959.

32 Enrico FUBINI, >Jezik i semanticnost muzike< (The Language and Semanticity of Music), Zvuk, No. 73-74, p. 3.

s3 Etienne GILSON, Matieres et formes, p. 170.

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of the word. First of all, there is no system of notes whose function is to signify certain concepts and feelings. In music one cannot say >>father<, >mother?< or ?filial love<. Besides, even if a sound dictionary of this kind existed, the mutual relations between signs in music would be so different from those in the spoken language that it would be easy to see that notes have no signifying function. The notion of the sentence, an expressed thought, is different in the spoken language from in music. What is particularly important is that one cannot change the order of notes in a musical motive without turning it into a new motive. In the spoken language, on the other hand, word-order can be changed and even words themselves can be replaced by others, but meaning is preserved. A change in the order of notes or the choice of other notes in a fugue theme, for example, will result in a new theme and eventually a new fugue. Briefly, the musical motive depends on its form, and the form consists of a given sequence and of the relations of notes that compose it.34

However, since music is not the language of ideas - continues Gilson - - it is often claimed to be a language of feelings. To some people this seems obvious, since music can be gay, sombre, joyful, sad, inspiring, or longing - in short, capable of ?expressing< different affective states. Some theorists note that music is capable of expressing innumerable nuances of feeling which the spoken language with its words cannot express. But we are here faced, says Gilson, not with the expression but rather with the stimulation and provoking of feelings. Each time when music addresses itself primarily to affectivity, its contribution consists not in signification but in its effect on the listener and his feelings. No matter what the composer's affective state at the moment of writing, he does not want to convey it to us but rather to create in us the affective state that he would like us to experience.35

Although some of Gilson's views are correct, they are on the whole unsatisfactory. It is quite clear that music does not use concepts and ideas and that tones do not and can not express any extramusical content which would be conceptually definite and fully determined in the same way in which different thoughts can be conceptually determined and expressed in the spoken language. As noted by Roland-Manuel, whose opinion Gilson quotes and accepts, the language of music is per- fectly clear in itself, but it does not offer any security in expressing ideas and depicting objects; in particular, it is an illusion to believe that the knowledge of the title of a piece of music, or of the extramusical content that it purports to express or designate, is sufficient for a complete understanding of the music.36 On the other hand, it is quite certain that the composer can >construct? his music without the intention of expressing anything and that this music will, nevertheless, provoke certain

34 Ibid., p. 170. 36 Ibid., pp. 173-174. 36 Cf. ROLAND-MANUEL, Sonate que me veux-tu?, Mermod, Lausanne 1957, pp.

92-93.


feelings, emotions and even thoughts which the composer may not have had when writing. But this is just one of the possibilities, and certainly not a rule. Gilson actually contradicts himself when he says that Hanslick, though correct in his view of pure music, was wrong in pretending that musicians never wrote any other kind of music. Gil- son is aware of the fact that there is not just one kind of music, but more, and that each has a right to exist, that is, that it has its own justification and value. He even adds that different procedures, such as for instance the leading motives, may in a certain way make language out of music, that is, build a musical >vocabulary< in which certain musical motives will, within a given context, designate persons, objects, situations, or even abstract ideas and concepts, without the use of the spoken language.37 This illustrates what we have said earlier, namely, that even convinced formalists can hardly defend their views consistently and fully.

In her >philosophy in a new key?, Susanne K. Langer tries to prove, first, that music is not language, and, second, that it is not a direct expression of feeling. Music, according to her, is a language only in a metaphorical sense, and it is an expression of feeling only in a symbolic way. The characteristic feature of every language is that it has its grammar, syntax, and vocabulary. Language is made up of expressions which can be isolated, which are autonomous and supplied with a certain constant and definite meaning and relationship, all of which makes it possible to construct a dictionary. A set of terms or expressions combined according to the rules of grammar and syntax forms a linguistic system which is translatable into another linguistic system or language, e. g. English into French and the other way round. These are, briefly, the characteristics of a discursive linguistic symbolism which are not present in the artistic symbolism. Music has no vocabulary. It has no terms that would possess constant, definite meanings in the way in which words of the spoken language possess them. Tones have no meaning outside their context, so that musical symbols cannot, like linguistic symbols, be translated or defined by means of other symbols or expressions. Music. for Susanne K. Langer, is not a language because it has no vocabulary. To call the tones of a scale >words<, harmony >grammar<<, and the- matic development >syntax<< is a useless parallel, since tones lack the fundamental element that makes words what they are - namely, a definite meaning.38 A musical symbol, according to her, is an >unconsumed symbol<, while spoken language symbols fully exhaust themselves by their transcendence with regard to what they symbolize. In the last analysis, her aesthetic concept is basically a repetition of formalist claims, with special emphasis on irrational solutions characteristic of the Romanticists.

37 Ibid., pp. 178-179. 38 Cf. Susanne K. LANGER, >O smislu u muzici? (On Sense in Music), Zvuk, 1966,

No. 69, p. 474.

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It is interesting to note that some of the views held by formalists and expressionists coalesce, as in the work of Jules Combarieu, who belongs to the third group of theorists about the language of music. According to Combarieu, music is the art of thinking in (or with) tones. Music is thinking sui generis. But music expresses neither ideas nor feelings. And yet, through its form, it can reach the aspects of reality which are in- accessible to rational thought. In music we think without concepts, >not in order to get rid of the objects that concepts stand for but rather to penetrate into them more deeply<.39 Music is ocapable of going beyond the external appearance of human beings and reaching more or less into their intimate spheres. This makes it a very realistic art.<40 On the other hand, ?the spoken language, which consists of very clear terms, uses only definitions. It thus deforms everything that it touches.?41 Music is a peculiar kind of experience, capable of reaching deeper, in a more authentic and even direct way, into reality. Hence the advantage of its language. But this language cannot express a definite feeling. Music transmits the intensity, the internal and general dynamism, of psychological life, in all its gradations.42 Combarieu summarizes his outlook on this question in the following formula: ?Music is a special act of the mind which intervenes in the chaos of affective life to introduce order and beauty into it.?43 This philosophy brings Combarieu close not only to Hanslick but also to people like Stravinsky and H. H. Stuckenschmidt who came after him and stressed that the primary task of music was to establish a kind of >order between man and time<. As Fubini notes correctly, Combarieu thinks that feeling is necessary in music and that it must be present there, but that priority should be given to the musical idea, which takes over from feeling only its quantitative variations and dynamism. A similarity with Hanslick's views is quite obvious here, the only difference being that Hanslick emphasized the interplay of sound forms in movement, )t6nend bewegte FormenK,44 while Combarieu em- phasizes the linguistic, structural and syntactic aspect of music.45 Like most other formalists, Combarieu advocates a-semanticity while actually transferring musical meaning to another level.

However, although some authors advocate a-semanticity, there re- mains at the back of their minds a certain misunderstanding of semanticity itself. They tend to assume that semanticity exists only in the spoken language, and with this presupposition they deny the existence of any other kind or type of language, including the language of music.

39 Jules COMBARIEU, La musique, ses lois, son evolution, Flammarion, Paris 1907, p. 8.

40 Ibid., p. 333. 41 Ibid., p. 333. 42 Ibid., p. 55. 43 Ibid., p. 46. 44 Eduard HANSLICK, op. cit., p. 74. 46 Cf. Enrico FUBINI, ,II linguaggio musicale nel pensicro di Jules Combarieus,

Rivista di estetica. 1962, Vol. VII, No. 3, p. 429.

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There are, however, different kinds or types of semanticity, each with its own specific features. Thus, musical semanticity does not rest, or is not built, upon expressions and terms characterized by unambiguous or uni- versally accepted meanings. Music possesses a special kind of contex- tual and conceptually undetermined semanticity. This semanticity cannot, in this respect, be compared with the semanticity of the spoken language. An isolated sound does not possess the same expressive value as an isolated word or letter; though every expression is necessarily related to cognition in some way, not every type of expression depends on concepts and words, nor does it unmistakably lead the person to whom it is addressed to a conceptually precise understanding of what has been expressed.46 As Roman Vlad notes, the conceptually undetermined semanticity of music >cannot be equated with lack of meaning but rather with multiple meanings<.47 Furthermore, a characteristic feature of this semanticity is the fact that it presupposes as its basis a formal aesthetic organization of musical matter from which - as well as from this organization - it springs. The expressive meaning of the language of music thus rests upon its aesthetic meaning and stems from it. Another characteristic feature of musical semanticity consists in the fact that musical language, while lacking conceptual determination, is so deep and powerful that its indeterminacy and multiplicity of meaning is but a small >defect<, more than offset by the wealth and effectiveness of musical expression. Enrico Fubini notes that ?many of those who deny music its semantic potential actually take the spoken language as a model - whether they are conscious of it or not. Susanne Langer is right in claiming, with many other people, that music has no vocabulary.<48 But the absence of a vocabulary does not mean the absence of language. As Roland Barthes says, no system of signs, that is, language, can be pro- perly studied except within the framework of a ?metalanguage<, which enables us to compare it with other systems of signs outside the typical meanings and specific materializations of signs of the language under study.49 ?A tone or a group of tones in the language of music has nothing that would correspond to it in any other language, and especially not in the spoken language; Levi-Strauss is right in claiming that, among all

languages, music is the only one that unites the contradictory qualities of

being at the same time understandable and untranslatable...50 Meaning is therefore not ... the characteristic of tones: it is between them and it

46 Cf. Ivo SUPICIC, La musique expressive, Presses Universitaires de France, Pa- ris 1957, p. 58.

47 Roman VLAD, Modernitd e tradizione nella musica contemporanea, Einaudi, Torino 1955, p. 178.

48 Enrico FUBINI, >Struktura i vremenitost muzike?, (The Structure and Temporal- ness of Music), Zvuk, 1969, No. 91, p. 4.

49 Cf. Roland BARTHES, Elementi di semiologia, Einaudi, Torino 1966, p. 43. Quoted in E. Fubini, ?Struktura i vremenitost muzike<, p. 5.

50 Cf. Claude LEVI-STRAUSS, II crudo e il cotto, Bompiani, Milano 1966 (translated from the French), p. 36. Quoted in E. Fubini, ibid., p. 5.

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comes out always from the context of certain relationships. Significant relationships exist between tones, or rather tones become signifying thanks to the entire complex of differential relatiohs in which they are included.<<51 Thus, the component elements of which the language of music is composed acquire meaning only in mutual co-presence, in the whole that they form in a work of music. Their meaning, quite under- standably, depends on the individual and historical characteristics which determine it. This means that the language of music is not universal in terms of its meaning and expression.

The language of music must not be reduced to the language of dis- course, nor must its existence be denied because it is incompatible with discursive expression and different from it; equally, the whole question of the language of music must not be reduced to the question of a definite and precise conceptual apprehension of what this language purports to convey, designate and express. When trying to understand a work of art, particularly music, it is important to make a clear distinction between rational understanding, involving the nature, causal relationships and finality of formal facts or elements of the particular work of art, and intuitive understanding, which accompanies the former but is not equivalent to it in conceptual precision and clarity. This latter understanding has to do with the meaning and expression of extramusical content. Experiencing such assumed extramusical content in a piece of music means >>recognizing<< this content through the aesthetic structure and organization of musical matter, which structure and organization may be more or less elaborate, consistent and complex with respect to expression and meaning. The organization may range in its intended effect from the creation of a certain atmosphere to the rather definite depicting of certain sequences of extramusical contents (as in programmatic music). Most frequently, particularly when he takes no clear semantic attitude, the listener will turn his conscious attention to the aesthetic or formal structure, or to music as such, while the elements of expression and extramusical meaning will remain in the background, or will be only felt and not consciously grasped; but even in this case they will have an effect on the listener - despite their marginal or accidental nature and secondary position - that will fill his mind with feelings and harmonies, reflections and reverberations, rather than with clearly grasped ideas of definite and unmistakable meaning in a rational sense. It is also important at this point to take note of the distinction which is sometimes made between expression and meaning in order to highlight the differences in the psychological level: meaning would be epicritical and expression protopathic; expression would be a rough datum characteristic of the structure, while meaning would represent a rationalizing and ex- plicative elaboration of this datum. Noting this possible distinction, Ro- bert Frances recalls, however, that expression and meaning are insepa-

51 E. FUBINI, ibid., p. 5.


rably fused.52 This fact does not exclude the possibility of music's signifying a certain extramusical content, even without the composer's wish to express this content, because there are analogies between musical form and extramusical events - which, of course, is a separate problem. But the >weakness and greatness of expressive music lies in the fact that there is no predetermined harmony between expression and form<(.53 Not even the most authentic expressive music will take one further in cognition than it does in experience. Meaning and expression in music exist so that extramusical content can be experienced, not rationally apprehended, while listening to music.54 We should particularly avoid - despite certain points which they have in common - equating the func- tions and potentials of music and philosophy.

Sazetak

IZRAZAJ I ZNACENJE U GLAZBI

Problem izrazaja u glazbi ne prestaje zaokupljati suvremenu glazbenu este- tiku, premda ga neki smatraju vige pitanjem subjektivnog dozivljavanja glazbe nego pitanjem koje bi se moglo rijesiti po objektivnim prosudbama znanosti. Medutim, taj se problem ne tice samo slusaoca, nego takoder glazbenog stva- ralastva i samih glazbenih djela, koja su nosioci izrazaja i znae&enja. Uosta- lom, i sami zastupnici formalizma najcesce priznaju glazbi stanovito izvanglaz- beno znacenje ill sposobnost izrazavanja, prebacujuci ih, medutim, na neki drugi plan: metafizicki, transcendentalni, numenalni, podsvjesni itd. No od XIX st. naovamo opcenito se sve vise istice sporedna vaznost problem-a zna- ce,nja i izrazaja u glazbi. Defunkcionalizacija tzv. ozbiljne muzike na drustve- nom planu pridonijela je i razvitku njezine autonomnosti na estetskom planu, ne samo s obzirom na druge umjetnosti nego i na izvanglazbene sadrzaje koje bi glazba imala ?transponirati? u svoj vlastiti jezik. Ako se ekspresionizam moze definirati kao koncepcija koja drzi muziku sposobnom da izrazava neke iz- vanmuzicke sadrzaje, a formalizam kao koncepcija koja to osporava, valja is- taci da se ovaj posljednji znatnije razvio i kao reakcija na romanticka i pseu- doromanticka pretjerivanja, koja su u glazbi vidjela umjetnost Zija bi vrijed- nost i cilj stajali iskljucivo u izrazavanju emocija i osjecaja. Ali na shvacanj-a o znacenju i izrazaju u glazbi utjecu npr. i povijesno-kulturni cinioci. U stvari, samo pod djelovanjem odredenih uvjeta te vrste glazba poprima stanovita znacenja i izrazajnu funkciju. Stoga je i jedna od slabosti dosadasnjih formalistic- kih i ekspresionistickih koncepcija stajala u generaliziranju negacije ili afir- macije znacenja i izrazaja u muzici.

S druge strane, do danas nije unesena potpuna jasnoca ni u terminoloske probleme tog znaEenja i izrazaja. Sam Hanslick, kojeg se krivo smatra prvim

52 Cf. Robert FRANCES, La perception de la musique, p. 272. 53 Gisele BRELET. Le temps musical, p. 470. 54 Cf. Ivo SUPICIC, La musique expressive, p. 117 ff.

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istaknutim predstavnikom formalizma, jer je to bio prije njega M. P. G. de Chabanon, nije na primjer nikada potpuno razjasnio svoje poimanje *forme*c. Taj pojam je, medutim, vi'ezna'an, jer se, u 'irem smislu, odnosi npr. na me- lodijsku, ritmi6ku, harmonijsku iii vremensku organizaciju glazbene materije, a u uzem smislu ozna'uje samo strukturu muzi'kog djela u cjelini. Dok je for- ma estetska 'injenica, formalizam je estetska zamisao. ZEksipresionizamo u glazbi XX stolje6a nije pak isto 'to i ekspresionizam kao estetsko shva6anje glazbenog zna'enja i izra'aja. Uostalom, ekspresivna se muzika pojavila u povijesti davno pri'je spomenutog ?ekspresionizma?, a razlikuje se od Eiste muzike u tome 'to izrahva neke izvanglazbene sadrfaje na relativno spoznatljiv jna4in, dok je C'ista muzika nosilac isklju6civo glazbenih sadr'aja. Razlikovanje izmedu >.apsolutne" i >programneo muzike je pak samo nezgrapna shematizacija. Iz- r"az ?apsolutna muzika? zato je i nepogodan 'to se nijednu glazbu ni u kojere smislu ne moze smatrati ne'cim apsolutnim. Uz to se tor pojmu suprotstavlja pojam relativnog, a termin ?relativna muzika< ne upotrebljava se u znanstve- noj terminologiji. Takoder je neosnovana upotreba termina ?Eista muzika-( za obilje'avanje instrumenttalne glazbe, koja je u stvari >Eista samo s obzirom na njezin zvucni izvor i nepovezivanje s izvanglazbenim izrahjnim sredstvima, gto ne uklju'cuje to da ne mo*ze biti eks-presivna. Neopravdano je i suprotstav- Ijanje ?6ciste?< i programne muzike, jer je programn-a muzika samo podvrstat ekspresivne muzike. U tim razlikov'anjima kriterij ekspresivnosti i kriterij zvu6nog izvora ne smiju se poistovje6'ivati. Isto tako treba razlikovati estetski i ekspresivni smisao i vrij'ednost glazbenog djela. Potrebno je napustiti simpli- cisti6ka rjegenja ekspresionizma i formalizma.

Prilivatljivija od koncepcija koje glazbu smatraju jezikom koji je obdaren vlastitim rje'cnikom (D. Cooke), ili drz'e da muzika nije i ne moz'e biti jezik (S. Langer, E. Gilson), jesu shvac'anja koja, najprije, pojam jezika uzimaju m~no- go gire, a zatim, u tom okviru, smatraju gl1azbu sp-ecifi6nim nepojmovnim jezikom (E. Fubini). Pojmovna neodredenost glazbene semanfiZnosti nije isto 'Sto i nezna'cenje, nego je vi:Seznac'na (R. Vlad). Koliko jezik glazbc oskudijeva na pojmovnoj odredenosti, toliko obiluje na bogatstvu, dubini i snazi. Medutim, glazbena semantic'nost ne po'6iva na izrazima univerzalno prilivatljivog znacenja. Osim toga, ona je kontekstualna: sastavni elementi jezika glazbe dobi- vaju zna'cenje jedino u medusobnoj nazocnosti, u cjelini koju sa'i.njavaju ui

muzic&om djelu, a ovise, kao i to zn-aucenje, o individualnim i povijesnim mo- mentima koji ih odreduju. Jezik se glazbe ne mol'e svesti na diskurzivni jezik, jer ni najaiutentic'nija ekspresivna muzika ne vodi dalje u spoznaji, negoli u do- z'ivljaju. Ali sadrz'aji zna&'nja i izraz'aja u glazbi mogru se autenti'cno doz'iv- jeti a da ih se racionalno ne spozna. Do'zivljaj izvanglazbenih sadrhija njiho- vo je ?>prepoznavanje?< kroz estetsku organizaciju muzi&ke materije koja moz'e biti vi'se ili manje zamau'na, provedena, dotjerana i stilizirana s obzirom na samo zna&enje i izraiaj, te prema tome i6'i od stvar-anja nekog op6eg ugodaja (u evokativnoj muzici) do preciznijeg ocrt-ava;nja izvanglazbenih sadrz'aja (u programnoj muzici). Premda se zn-aucenj'u u glazbi katkada pripisuje epikriti& ki, a izraz'avanju protopati.cki zna'caj, oni su medusobno nerazdvojno povezani. Osim toga, usprkos nekim njihovim dodimnim to'ckama, ne smiju se poistovje6i - vati funkcije i mogtucnosti glazbe i filozofij'e.

ivo supicic - expression and meaning in music

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