j o'shea - kant - the categories of understanding_00000

8/3/2019 J O'Shea - Kant - The Categories of Understanding_00000

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We have referred repeatedly to the need to 'justify' ouremployment of certain concepts in the making of a priori yetsynthetic judgments ('throughout every change, substantialmatter must abide', 'every event must have its cause'). Kantexpressed this question of epistemological justification (oralternatively, 'epistemic' justification - basically, 'how do youknow?') using terms borrowed from legal and judicial theory.The question concerns our right to employ certain concepts:quidjuris ('with what right?'). Of course, we in fact do speak of'causes' and 'permanent matter'; Hume would admit (andstress!) that point. But that is just a question of fact: quid facti. Forperhaps our believing that there always has to be a particularkind of cause for every event is no more justifiable (howeverinstinctive or habitual the belief may be) than the belief thateverything is governed by Fate.To illustrate the distinction here, suppose you have a televisionset in your house; that is, you in fact have possession of it (quidjach). Butnowwecan raise the questionof your title orentitlementto that possession (quid juris). Can you trace your possession ofthat television back to a legally sanctioned transaction, or didyou steal it? Kant explains to us (see A84-5/Bll6-17) that juristsused the term 'deduction' to describe a demonstration to thecourt that someone is legally entitled to something, as opposedto merely showing that someone has something in theirpossession. (This has nothing to do with deduction as in'deductive logic', syllogistic proofs, etc.) Kant now appliesthese distinctions to the question we have been pursuing: thequestion of justifying judgments that involve a priori concepts(such as substance and causality).

Now among the manifold concepts which form thehighly complicated web of human knowledge, thereare some which are marked out for pure a prioriemployment, in complete independence of al lexperience; and their right to be so employed alwaysdemands a deduction. For since empirical proofs donot suffice to justify this kind of employment, we arefaced by the problem of how these concepts can relateto objects which they yet do not obtain from anyexperience. The explanation of the manner in whichconcepts can thus relate a priori to objects I entit le theirtranscendental deduction; and from it I distinguishempirical deduction, which shows the mannerin whicha concept is acquired through experience ..and whichtherefore concerns, not its legitimacy, but only its defacto mode of origination (A85/B1l7).

Hume, for example, describes in detail the sort of senseexperiences and psychological processes that in fact lead to ourpossession and employment of (what pass for) the concepts ofcausality and substance. This is what Kant calls an empiricaldeduction. Hume, however, further argues that there is nopossible rational justification for our employing these conceptsas we do. These a priori concepts, which impute necessity toexperience, thus require what Kant calls a transcendentaldeduction :we must address the question of our epistemic rightto employ such concepts. Quid juris, 'with what justification'?

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THE 'CLUE' TO AJUSTIFICATION: THEA PRIORI FORMS OFJUDGMENT

Philosophy 2 1995


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j o'shea - kant - the categories of understanding_00000

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