j05 final - haskins business case - 16 october 2003 (not ... · option a: transformation of rural...

Haskins Review - Business Case 1

Haskins ReviewBusiness Case

HASKINS REVIEW

BUSINESS CASEOctober 2003



Contents

• Case for Change

• Approach to Business Case

• Options for Implementation

• Intangible Benefits Assessment

• Implementation Costs

• Delivery Costs

• Investment Appraisal

• Implementation Timetable

• Risks

• Appendices



CASE FOR CHANGE

Analysis of Defra’s current rural delivery arrangements suggests that they are complex, over-burdensome, and not customer friendly. Problems include:

Poor accountability

• Defra’s rural policy remit is not widely understood, making delivery of its objectives more difficult than it should be. • Rural policy and delivery functions are at times confused and overlapping, blurring accountability.• Rural policy development fails to take proper account of customer needs and the realities of delivery, a situation

exacerbated by the lack of a shared, reliable evidence base and shared definitions of “rural”• There is a shortage of effective and consistent management information on rural delivery, which restricts Defra’s

ability to make policy and to track progress against its objectives.

Failure to satisfy regional and local priorities

• Customers are expressing dissatisfaction with the delivery of rural services, which they feel do not address their needs or expectations.

• A lack of rigorous standard setting and accountability in the provision of business advice means that quality is variable.

Too many players

• Too many organisations are involved in rural delivery, resulting in confusion (e.g. delivery of sustainable land management is handled by at least 6 national agencies working with multiple regional and local organisations).

• Customers are confused by the roles and responsibilities of the many organisations involved in rural delivery.



(Continued…)

Lack of co-ordination

• There are far too many regional strategies (more than 70 regional or sub-regional strategies in one region alone).• Regional co-ordination of delivery is unduly complex, often bringing together several organisations with similar or

overlapping agendas. Membership of discussion forums is too unwieldy for effective dialogue. • There are too many initiatives, schemes and services (there are for example over 100 separate streams of rural

delivery activity and funding in one sub-regional area, such as a National Park). Poor co-ordination between them has created a complex and confusing delivery landscape.

• Many initiatives are insufficiently tied into the wider regional agenda and are not championed by those agencies that are in a position to make these links.

• Deliverers have a patchy understanding of the strategic objectives of their work.

Confused customers

• Customers lack clear information on relevant products and services. Scheme guidance, qualifying criteria and application processes are complex and off-putting

• Land managers and rural business owners complain about the bureaucratic approach to regulation and poor co-ordination between regulatory agencies.

• Poor communication during the process of scheme applications has led to false expectations, confusion and in some cases wasted investment on the part of the customer.

• Delays in the processing of some grants adds to customer uncertainty and can undermine benefits.• The prescriptive and inflexible nature of some schemes raises serious questions about their ability to target need

effectively. • A lack of on-going help and support for projects once the initial grant is received creates unnecessary uncertainty.

The current rural delivery system is not meeting existing needs. Forthcoming challenges are likely to increase yet further the demands on an already under-performing system. Radical change is necessary.



APPROACH TO BUSINESS CASE

• This business case has been prepared in support of the Haskins Review of Rural Delivery. It is intended to provide a high level assessment of the benefits and costs associated with implementing the recommendations set out in the Haskins Review.

• For each costable recommendation, the implementation costs and the impact on on-going delivery costs were calculated. The intangible benefits resulting were scored for all recommendations.

• The recommendations were then rated according to the relative importance of their contribution to improving rural delivery. They were then grouped into 3 Options, reflecting their relative priorities and interdependencies

• Cumulative costs, savings and intangible benefits were then assessed for each Option.

• In constructing the business case model, every effort was made to make an accurate assessment of the costs involved. Care has been taken not to underestimate costs, and the model is conservative when assessing potential savings.

• The model itself has been quality assured by Deloitte Consulting, and the assumptions contained within it have been validated with a number of internal and external bodies, including the Office of Government Commerce.



OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

• The review process presented a wide-ranging set of interdependent recommendations to achieve essential change in the rural delivery framework.

• It was necessary to ensure that sensible, realistic, and above all coherent implementation options were proposed, and then analysed in the business case.

• All 33 of the Haskins recommendations were rated Critical, Important, or Preferred on the basis of their relative importance to the improvement of rural delivery.

• Three options for change emerged for analysis.

Every recommendation is implemented (critical + important + preferred)OPTION A*

All critical and important recommendations are implementedOPTION B

Only critical recommendations are implementedOPTION C

• These 3 Options are presented in the following pages.

• A 4th option, that of doing nothing, was also evaluated. The No Action scenario is discussed further on page 14 and forms the basis for measuring the potential for savings achieved under the first 3 options.

* Refer to Appendix A for a summary of each of the recommendations by Option.



OPTION AOption A: Transformation of rural delivery system to maximise realisation of policy objectives, improve customer

satisfaction and achieve best value for money

All recommendations implemented, Critical, Important and Preferred. This will achieve:

Better accountability, whereby:• Defra’s rural policy remit is well understood by all concerned;• it is easier to pinpoint accountability for success or failure and their causes;• policy is better attuned to need and takes greater account of delivery factors;• government works collectively to achieve the best outcomes;• Defra has better information on rural delivery to inform policy;• national leadership on rural policy is clear.Delivery brought closer to the customer, whereby:• there is greater regional and local control over rural economic and social outcomes;• Regional Development Agencies have stronger links with other organisations with an interest in the rural agenda;• there are fewer regional players engaged in regenerating rural businesses and communities and there is better co-ordination of rural business

advice;• there are stronger incentives for local authorities to improve rural services.A more integrated approach to sustainable land management, whereby:• delivery of sustainable land management is more effective, rational and efficient;• accountability for policy development and delivery relating to forestry is clearer;• delivery of forestry policy in England is better integrated with the government’s wider sustainable land management agenda within a modern legal

framework;• levy-funded organisations supporting the marketing and development of agriculture are more rational and efficient;Improved co-ordination, whereby:• regional co-ordination of rural delivery is more efficient (and Government Offices for the Regions have a stronger role as coordinators and monitors);• front line delivery is more co-ordinated and efficient;• strategic planning is more rational;• there are better arrangements for regional consultation with stakeholders on rural delivery and for holding rural deliverers to account.Delivery made better for the customer, whereby:• best practice in delivery is spread more effectively within and between regions;• land managers receive more co-ordinated services with the minimum of burdens;• regulation of farms benefits more from local knowledge and is more locally accountable;• it is easier to monitor the flow of money supporting rural delivery, and services are more rational and transparent;• rural development schemes are much more user-friendly and effective in targeting the most deserving needs.



OPTION B

Option B: Transformation of rural delivery system in all but the least essential areas

All Critical & Important recommendations implemented; preferred recommendations not implemented.

Outcomes achieved include all of Option A, except:

• Public sector rural business support and advice is not fully integrated in the broader regional framework of economic regeneration, and continues to be of variable quality.

• Government Offices for the Regions would not lead a co-ordinated approach to front-line delivery, spreading best practice on integrated delivery and facilitation.

• The levy boards would remain un-rationalised, with no efforts to exploit the potential for sharing of resources (administrative, economic and research). Without any resulting savings, the opportunity to strengthen support for industry programmes might be lost.



OPTION C

Option C: Minimum action necessary to achieve basic improvement of rural delivery system

Only recommendations judged Critical to improving current rural delivery arrangements implemented.

• There is partial clarification of policy/delivery framework, but:- forestry policy remains outside Defra control;- delivery appreciation of policy staff is not significantly improved; there is insufficient flexibility in the allocation resources for delivery; delivery

targets are imposed from centre without the necessary consultation and negotiation with delivery agents.

• There is some devolution of delivery to regional and local authorities, but:- RDAs are not judged capable of delivering the ERDP project-based schemes.

• A partially integrated approach to land management is achieved, but:- forestry delivery remains outside and unaligned with new integrated agency, with integration benefits not fully realised;- Defra does not develop effective liaison with RDAs, and may not be satisfied with RDA commitment to sustainable development.

• There is some improvement to regional co-ordination of strategy and delivery, but:- delivery bodies are not required to join up delivery plans, losing potential synergies and retaining overlaps;- Government Offices for the Regions retain a potentially conflicting mix of rural policy/delivery functions, and are not focused on the

development of a co-ordinated approach to frontline delivery;- RDAs do not develop their capacity to meet their rural responsibilities and fail to play their part in the achievement of sustainable

development objectives;- public sector rural business support and advice remains unco-ordinated at regional level, and of variable quality.

• There is some improvement to frontline delivery for customers, but:- inspection functions remain un-rationalised, and the potential for savings and improved customer service from integration are not realised;- levy boards remain un-rationalised, and the potential to share resources (administrative, economic and research) is not realised; the

opportunity to strengthen support for industry programmes may also be lost.



INTANGIBLE BENEFITS• For the purposes of this business case, intangible benefits are those benefits to which it is not possible to

attach a financial value. Understanding the potential intangible as well as the tangible (costed) benefits is an essential element of this business case.

• Four intangible benefits were identified following the data gathering phase. These four features were seen as key to the successful delivery of rural services, and were valued and recognised as being areas for improvement by rural stakeholders.

Customer satisfaction To what extent does the recommendation add value to and improve the delivery of rural services, from the customer’s perspective?

Optimisation of public good To what extent does the recommendation optimise the use of public money, for public good?

Greater flexibility To what extent does the recommendation ensure future-proofing of the system and allow for efficient modifications to the way policies are delivered (from the deliverers’, rather than customers’ perspective)?

Credibility To what extent does the recommendation improve and/or enhance the credibility of the total rural delivery system?

INTA

NG

IBLE

B

ENEF

ITS

• It is assumed that making no change in the way rural services are delivered (the No-Action case) would deliver none of the above benefits, and would therefore score zero against the intangibles.

• Approach: Each recommendation was assessed against its contribution towards achieving an intangible benefit, with either a ‘High’, ‘Medium’, ‘Low’ or ‘Zero’ rating, scoring 10, 5, 1 and 0 respectively. Also, each intangible benefit was given a weighting according to the relative importance against the others. The results of the scoring is shown on the following slide. The full Scoring Methodology & Results is available from the Haskins Review team.



0

20

40

60

80

100

CustomerSatisfaction

Optimisation ofPublic Good

GreaterFlexibility

IncreasedCredibility

Option AOption BOption C

INTANGIBLE BENEFITS ASSESSMENT

• The total intangible benefits score for each Option is:- Option A = 100%- Option B = 95%- Option C = 67%

• The level of intangible benefits clearly gained varies greatly, depending on which Option is implemented.

• Option C performs much less well than Options A and B.

Intangible benefits score in %



COST OF IMPLEMENTATION• Estimated cost of implementation over 3 years is £107m.

Sources of assumptions include:

• RPA Change Business Case• Developing Defra Business Case• BQS Regional Estates appraisals• Defra spend 2001• HM Treasury

Assumptions on implementation costs have been based upon the following metrics:

For organisations:• Business Change Management• IT Change Cost• Property Exit Cost

For individuals:• Transfers• Redundancy• Voluntary Early Retirement• Training Cost• Professional Services Costs• Cross-agency Pay Aggregation Cost

These 9 metrics have been applied to each appropriate recommendation on a % basis, based on number of affected employees.

Approach• In constructing the business case model, every effort was

made not to under-estimate the costs of implementation• Implementation costs based on estimation of number of staff

being moved - a well defined, evidence-driven assumption • The most significant costs per head drive the model, namely

property exit, IT and Voluntary Early Retirement costs.• Property exit accounts for 27% of costs in model, high

assumptions being made in absence of detailed Defra Estate data. Effective management of estate may avoid need to incur such costs.

• All assumptions have been tested with a variety of internal and external parties

Implementation Costs over 3 years £ 107 m£ 107 m £ 107 m£ 107 m £ 102 m£ 102 m

Option A Option B Option C

SUMMARYProjected implementation costs for Options A and B are the same; cost of Option C is slightly lower



Property exit cost (£29.3 m)

IT change cost to integrated agency (£21.3m)

Voluntary early retirement (£18.1m)

Business change management to the integratedagency (£11.2m)Professional services cost (£8.2m)

Cross-agency pay aggregation cost (£7.7m)

Transfers (£3.5m)

Redundancy (£3.1m)

Training cost (£2.6m)

Business change management to Defra (£1.0m)

IT change cost to Defra (£2.5m)

BREAKDOWN OF IMPLEMENTATION COSTS BY METRIC

Voluntary Early Retirement is the third most significant cost. Effective human resource strategies for recruitment and redeployment, and a well-timed implementation plan may reduce the need to incur such costs.

Property Exit is the most significant cost, as assumptions had to be made in the absence of detailed information about the Defra estate. Effective estate management and a well-timed implementation plan may reduce the need to incur such high costs.



• Quantifying the projected costs of No-Action, using knowledge of future directives across the rural delivery system, as well as estimated growth in spend based on the last 3 years, suggests that the future No-Action costs will grow by 6% p.a.

• Estimated future costs of the delivery system are built upon an assumption of the quantifiable impact of each recommendation, which can be aggregated within each option A, B and C.

• Savings in the first year after full implementation, against the predicted annual delivery cost if nothing were to change, are estimated to be approximately £29m for all options.

• The estimated Net Present Value for Option A is £96m over 10 years, and £291m over 20 years (taking into account up-front investment costs) using HM Treasury’s 3.5% per annum discount rate.

ON-GOING DELIVERY COSTS

* Delivery costs do not include the programme spend for grants and schemes etc which are not within the scope of business case. These costs reflect the costs of delivery and administration only.

** Discounted to 03/04 at 3.5%.


£ 213 m £ 213 m £ 215 mDelivery Costs of Total System * £ 180 m £ 243 m

2003/4No actionin 5 years

Savings in First Year After Savings in First Year After Implementation Implementation £ 29 m£ 29 m £ 29 m£ 29 m £ 27 m£ 27 m

£ 180 m £ 180 m £181 mDiscounted to Today’s Money ** £ 204 m



OVERALL INVESTMENT APPRAISAL


£29 m£29 m £29 m£29 m £27 m£27 m

CONCLUSION

• The payback periods for all options are approximately the same, given the sensitivity to the assumptions used in this business case.

• Option A shows a considerable advantage in terms of the intangible benefits. In particular, this option offers radical improvements to customer service and optimisation of the public good (maximum outcomes achieved using public money). Option C provides an implementation saving of 4.5%, but a 33% loss in the intangible benefits.

£ 107 m£ 107 m £107 m£107 m £102 m£102 m

44 44 44

100%100% 95%95% 67%67%

Annualised savings Annualised savings

Implementation costs Implementation costs

Payback period (years) Payback period (years)

Benefits score as % of all Benefits score as % of all potential benefits available potential benefits available



-£100

-£80

-£60

-£40

-£20

£0

£20

£40

£60

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 CostBenefitNet cumulative benefit

NET CUMULATIVE BENEFIT

Implementation Costs

Costs will be incurred on a decreasing profile during implementation: 2004/05 - £38.6m2005/06 - £34.2m2006/07 - £34.1m

Annualised Savings

Annualised savings have been calculated to begin the year after costs have been incurred to achieve the benefit. It is likely they will commence earlier, bringing forward the Break Even Point.

Beyond 2007, it has been assumed that the annualised savings will remain the same (£29m p.a.), although as working arrangements mature, they could be expected to increase marginally year on year.

Net Cumulative Benefit

Due to the 3 year implementation plan and delayed nature of the annualised savings, the Break Even Point is expected to be in the latter part of 2008/09.

Break Even Point



IMPLEMENTATION TIMETABLE

Explanatory notes can be found in Appendix B

2004 2005 2006 2007

Accountability

Agency rationalisation

Government Offices

b. Defra’s policy remit clarifiedc. Mgmt policy/delivery separatedd. Defra consulting delivererse. Mgmt information improvedf. Forest policy moved to Defrag. RAFs enhanced

k. CA dissolved

h. EN, CA, RDS shadow agencyi. EA collaborates with agencyj. FC aligned with agency

l. Levy Boards rationalisedm. Inspectorates rationalised

General Election WindowSR 2004 CSR 2006?

Timeline

ERDP IT System Successor to ERDPCAP reforms commence

Window for Bill to pass through Parliament & come into effect

a. Defra reporting annually

Rec. 18

Rec. 16Rec. 17Rec. 19Rec. 9

Rec. 30Rec. 20

Rec. 33 Rec. 33 Rec. 33 Rec. 33Rec. 1

Rec. 2,5,6,7Rec. 3,4

Rec. 8

Rec. 25

RDAs

Local Authorities

Whole Farm Approach

ab. Funding streams rationalised ac. Scheme rules simplified

n. GO enhanced co-ordinationo. Joint regional delivery plansp. Defra to consult GOsq. GOs withdraw from delivery

r. RDAs develop skills/capacitys. Concordat & prep. for ERDP2 deliveryt. RDAs adopt CA schemesu. RDAs resp. for Business Links

v. Local PSA agreedw. LAs resp. for local schemesx. LAs adopt CA scheme deliveryy. LAs co-ordinate regulation

aa. WFA substantially implemented

z. EA agreed reg. role for LAs

Funding Schemes

Rec. 27

Rec. 12Rec. 10

Rec. 31

Rec. 28Rec. 29

Rec. 32

Rec. 21,26Rec. 22

Rec. 24Rec. 23

Rec. 9Rec. 13

Rec. 14Rec. 9

Rec. 15

Rec. 11

Key Development

Implementation Phase



RISKS

Defra’s Risk Management is championed by Sir Brian Bender. In the departmental Risk Strategy, April 2001, he said:

“Risk to the Department’s business can take various forms, e.g. financial risk, risk to projects, risk to the services we deliver, risk to the public or specific stakeholders, risks from missed opportunities or from policy failures, and the risks to our reputation … we need a clear understanding of how such risks should be managed. Doing this properly is central to planning to succeed and avoiding failure; to meeting our key objectives and targets; to creating confidence in a watchful public; and to meeting the demands of good corporate governance. It will also make us better able to learn the value of appropriate risk-taking and benefit from innovation within the Department, promoted through a ‘no blame culture’. “

Importance of Risk Management

• “Risk Management – getting the right balance between innovation and change on the one hand, and avoidance of shocks and crises on the other.” (Prime Minister, November 2002, Cabinet Office Strategy Unit Report)

• Achieving an appropriate management of risks is crucial if Defra is successfully to embrace the challenges it faces and deliver its demanding agenda.

• Important lessons on risk management were also learnt from the BSE Inquiry, the Royal Society study and from the Foot & Mouth Disease outbreak. As related to the Haskins Review, these lessons have stressed the need to:

· highlight the critical risks, both strategic and operational, to the successful delivery of the Review’s recommendations; · understand the underlying causes, assumptions and impact;· address the risks now (where possible) with targeted mitigation actions;· demonstrate that the probability or impact has been reduced to an acceptable level – where possible or appropriate;· achieve better risk / reward balance and return on investment



Risk Management Methodology

• Defra’s risk management is founded on 4 principles of transparency, co-ordination, public credibility and effectiveness. The Haskins risk management process has adopted those principles in the identification and management of risks.

• 102 risks were identified and quantified in the Haskins Risk Log. They were collated from a face-to-face consultation process, from structured risk interviews, and workshops specifically aimed at building a comprehensive risk picture. Both experts external to the Review Team (External Workshop) and specialists from within the Team (Internal Workshop) were involved.

• These risks were captured, quantified, prioritised and clustered into 14 categories to enable effective mitigation plans to be developed. Further analysis of these categories identified 4 critical areas in the Risk Landscape, as the diagram illustrates

• See Appendix C for the full risk management methodology used by the Haskins Review team



RISKS – SUMMARY OF KEY RISKS (1)

• The eight most significant risks identified through the workshops and interviews, were grouped by immediacy of impact: i) during the Report’s transitional phase, and ii) during the Report’s implementation

• These are highlighted below:

Ministers become embroiled in public debate.

Review used as political football between

stakeholders.

Supporters of specific interest groups (e.g. agencies, hunting) perceived as being under threat, use political process and media to undermine Report’s recommendations.

Legislation not secured in time.Imminence of election may result in legislation being

postponed/shelved.

Compromised transitional measures enacted that only implement a limited amount of recommended change. Loss of momentum and reduced coherence of package of recommendations.

Cherry picking of recommendations to achieve compromise at expense

of coherent policy.

Recommendations could be diverted, compromised or

removed.

Major recommendations that would have achieved greatest benefits to the customers might be dropped in favour of easier, but less far-reaching proposals.

Lack of support from key stakeholders.

Key stakeholders might not agree with conclusions.

Danger that leadership might not give full backing to the implementation. Without putting ‘heart and mind’ behind it, the implementation may be less successful, thus damaging perceptionsand resulting in poor impact on staff morale.

Top Risks During Report’s Transitional Phase (October 2003 – April 2004)



RISKS – SUMMARY OF KEY RISKS (2)

Plan delivered but government policy objectives not achieved.

Outcomes missed or seriously compromised and

targets not achieved.

Increased uncertainty, resulting in low morale; potential disintegration of organisations through loss of staff and key skills resulting in more business disruption.

Lack of leadership

Effective leadership is not evident and the lack of support from the top

cascades.

Lack of leadership breeds disharmony and disquiet amongst staff.Lack of team ethos to achieve report’s objectives. Poorly implemented recommendations (i.e. change without benefits), would be extremely damaging.

Change overload

Change capacity of organisation exceeded;

change might be excessive, unco-ordinated and not

aligned to business needs.

The impact of poorly conceived and implemented change programmes has a) short term effects: confusion about business needs driving change, loss of focus on delivery of today’s business; and b) long term effects: reputational risk from loss of department’s credibility, difficultly recruiting and retaining top staff, reduced tolerance of future change programmes.

People issues mishandled

Change programme poorly handled, seen not as an

‘opportunity’ but as a threat to jobs and stability.

People need to be high priority in terms of expectations setting and communications. If change was not handled effectively, the negative impacts of change would dominate, resulting in missed opportunities and reduced benefits. This would result in confusion, loss of morale, concern about job prospects, locations, career paths etc.

Top Risks During Report’s Implementation



Risk: Conclusions

• The effective management and mitigation of those risks that have already been identified (as well as a systematic approach to deal with emerging risks and changing circumstances downstream) will be crucial to success. The suggested risk management methodology is at Appendix B.

• Good practice was followed in identifying risks to successful implementation of the Haskins recommendations. The real value of the risk assessment is in the development of a mitigation strategy, and subsequent adoption of good practice Risk Management (to monitor and review the risks, particularly in the light of changing circumstances). The on-going risk management process will be owned by the Defra Haskins Implementation Team, and the ownership of the individual risks will need to sit at an appropriate level, where effective action can be taken.

• It is important to note that, although for the most part similar risks were identified by internal and external experts, the relative priorities given to the risks differed. The department must ensure that the differing needs and concerns of external and internal stakeholders are addressed sufficiently in planning the risk management strategy (and that engagement in risk management continues downstream).

• The danger of missing opportunities should also be an important part of the department’s risk management strategy for implementation of Haskins.



Appendices



Appendix A: Summary of Recommendations By Option

Criticali Defra to review and clarify rural policyii Policy development with Defra, with delivery

through national, regional and local agenciesiii Defra to consult delivery organisations early in

policy formulationviii Defra should improve management informationix Dissolution of Countryside Agencyxiv Delivery of schemes and services to local

communities by LAs and community groups, not Defra and Agencies

xvi Establishment of new, integrated agencyxvii Establish joint collaboration between integrated

agency and Environment Agencyxxi GORs to be given stronger remit as

coordinators and monitors of rural deliveryxxv Regional Rural Affairs Forums to be where

Ministers are held accountable by regional stakeholders

xxvii Defra should help expedite the whole farm approach

xxviii EA agrees with LAs supplementary role on regulation and compliance

xxix LAs to take lead role in coordinating general regulation and compliance advice

xxxi Defra should review all funding streams & schemes

xxxii Defra should review and simplify grants process

xxxiii Defra to report on change progress annually

Importantiv Train Defra policy officials in delivery issuesv Deliverers to agree targets with Defra rather than

have them imposed by Whitehallvi Defra to seek greater flexibility in the allocation of

resources. vii Defra to enter into joint targets with mainstream

service departments that influence rural agendax RDAs to play key role in the devolved delivery of

Defra’s economic and social agenda, building capacity to contribute to sustainable development

xi Establishment of Defra/RDA concordat to improve accountability

xii ERDP Project-Based schemes should be passed to RDAs

xv Defra, with ODPM and LGA, should agree targets for rural delivery by LAs

xviii Policy development role of FC England should be transferred to Defra

xix Delivery activities of FC England should be integrated or closely aligned with new agency

xxii Delivery agencies should strengthen regional joint working through joint delivery plans

xxiii Closer and earlier consultation by Defra with GOsfor more co-ordinated policy development and strategic planning

xxiv GOs should withdraw from direct delivery to maintain role as coordinators

xxx Defra should rationalise inspection functions

Preferredxiii RDAs to improve quality and

consistency of rural business support and advice, and to take responsibility for Business Links

xxvi GOs should work with regional and local organisations to develop a more co-ordinated approach to frontline delivery

xx Defra should rationalise levy-funded organisations that it sponsors

Option A

Option B

Option C

Recommendations were rated as ‘Critical’, ‘Important’ or ‘Preferred’ based upon how critical they are to improving rural delivery.



Accountabilitya. Defra reporting annually Progress in implementing recommendations published, e.g. in Departmental Report.

b. Defra’s rural policy remit clarified Defra to: define ‘rural’; explain rural policy remit, consulting stakeholders on clarity; and develop shared rural evidence database.

c. Mgmt policy/delivery separated In the context of SR2004 and subsequently, Defra to seek ways of maximising flexibility in the allocation of resources, consulting delivery organisations; Defra also to develop guidance on relationship between Defra and delivery organisations.

d. Defra consulting deliverers Better use of concordats between Defra and delivery organisations; a precise framework and guidance agreed for consultation with deliverers on the development of policy and delivery schemes; Defra to consult with RIU on how RIAs can take greater account of delivery; develop and implement strategy for inward and outward secondments and for recruitment of people with delivery expertise and experience.

e. Mgmt information improved Consortium of Defra’s LURA and OSD DGs, deliverers and stakeholders to devise action plan for harmonising management information.

f. Move FC policy to Defra Government to prepare timetable for implementation; during transition, FC to begin joint working with Defra and staff to share offices.

g. Enhance RAFs Defra and GOs to reconstitute National and Regional RAFs respectively based on transitional plans for CA, Board members and regional staff.

Agency rationalisation

h. EN,CA, RDS shadow agency Defra to develop implementation plan in consultation with affected organisations and the Environment Agency (see y); appoint shadow Chief Executive (April 2005) appoint shadow Chair (October 2005) and Board (April 2006); RDS and EN regional staff to begin joint working and co-location, IT, administration functions etc and streamlining management structures; relevant CA functions and staff to also move to shared offices (see k); and erdpIT project rolled out to all the above.

i. EA collaborates with agency During the transition period, Defra, the EA, EN, RDS and relevant parts of the CA to develop joint working agreements such as concordats or joint work/business plans. Defra to investigate appointing joint Board members between EA and new agency. Once in place agencies to hold joint public meetings and prepare relevant public documents on new arrangements for customers, and EA to advise on scope and targeting of new agri-environment schemes.

j. FC integrated/aligned with agency FC delivery aligned with new agency’s; co-location where feasible; these to be transitional in the case of integration; 1y legislation for either option.

k. CA dissolved CA functions to move to respective organisations: Defra to develop implementation timetable for absorbing relevant CA policy staff, transferring powers for designating National Parks and other relevant functions to Defra; transitional arrangements for staff dealing with on-going access and landscape issues etc to new agency, eg joint working, shared offices; and preparation for schemes that are not wound down to transfer to RDAs or LAs.

l. Levy Boards rationalised Defra to scope and implement plan to rationalise Levy Board administration.

m. Inspectorates rationalised Defra to scope and consult on integration of inspection functions in the light of internal review, consulting with FSA, EA and others as necessary.

General Notes1. Defra to develop an Implementation Plan taking account of recommendations and subsequent sections on ‘Making it happen’ in the main report (Chapters 4-9).

2. The need for primary legislation (e.g. to establish the integrated agency and subsequent winding down of existing organisations, to give powers to local authorities to implement environmental legislation, to transfer relevant powers to the Secretary of State, and any other relevant provisions, including new powers and definitions, warranting legislation) should be introduced by November 2004, effective from April 2006. The need for legislative provision to effect change should be kept to a minimum. A thorough review of statute will be necessary.

3. Defra and its delivery organisations should at all times keep affected staff informed on progress in carrying out the Implementation Plan. Negotiations on terms and conditions of affected staff should be carried out in such a manner so as to reduce uncertainty and minimise risks of haemorrhage.

4. Defra should prepare a plan to communicate to its customers and stakeholders the expected effects these changes, and any transitional arrangements that will be necessary to ensure continued delivery of services.

5. The operation of shadow agencies has precedents in England, e.g. in the establishment of the Environment Agency. Defra should investigate appropriate arrangements.

Appendix B: Implementation Plan Explanatory Notes (i)



Whole Farm Approachaa. WFA substantially implemented Defra to review timetable and parameters for implementing whole farm approach, consistent with CAP reform process. Development of shared

database in collaboration with farming organisations. Action plan for increasing farm IT / internet access. Advice on managing data privacy.

Funding streams and schemesab. Funding streams rationalised Defra to establish review board develop principles and methodology for rationalising existing schemes and vetting new initiatives. Agree end date

for mature schemes and plan for simplification of others. Exit strategy and and subsequent implementation plan agreed.ac. Scheme rules simplified Defra to review all schemes in consultation with customers, stakeholders and deliverers and develop plan to remove barriers to access and improve

communications. Defra to negotiate a more flexible, regional approach for the successor to the current ERDP.

Local Authoritiesv. Local PSA agreed Government to negotiate appropriate local PSA targets for next round.

w. LAs resp. for local schemes Government to consult on optimum combination of incentives and sanctions to promote consistency; GOs to define and agree role as intermediatary and monitor between Defra and LAs; Central-Local Partnerships to co-ordinate activity; LAs to take on CA delivery where appropriate (see k) and arrange for others to deliver with RDAs assigning funding (see p); LAs and Defra to define scope for enhanced role for rural Parish/Town Councils.

x. LAs adopt CA schemes See k

y. LAs co-ordinate regulation Government and LAs to develop future role with delivery agencies. Resourcing/ training of LA officers. Development and roll-out of shared database.

z. EA agree regulatory role for LAs Defra to investigate need for enabling legislation and agree funding arrangements with LA and EA. EA and LAs to agree working arrangements and action plan in consultation with Defra. Training of LA officers.

RDAsr. RDAs develop skills/capacity RDAs to devise action plans for demonstrating and developing capacity, developing closer working relationships, take on grant schemes from CA,

and arranging for others to deliver (see k); RDAs to bid for the necessary resources and to consider absorption of relevant CA staff.

s. Concordat & prep. for delivery Defra, RDAs and DTI to agree concordat and review targeting statement, to negotiate with Brussels for greater flexibility; develop policies adaptable to regional circumstances, provide RDAs with access to erdpIT; RDAs to map future arrangements for co-operating with other organisations (see n and o); integrated agency established in consultation with RDAs; Defra applies the lessons of devolved control in other UK areas in consultation with NAW and SE; RDAs to negotiate with RDS for relevant resources, review long term role, examine how they can assist in the medium term, discuss arrangements for consistency and establish national network on implementation good practice.

t. RDAs adopt CA schemes See k

u. RDAs resp. for Business Links Review current pilot programme, and implement its conclusions. Review any pre-agreed transitional role for GOs with clear exit strategy.

Government Officesn. GO enhanced co-ordination Working group to develop scope and remit for Rural Priority Boards in consultation with deliverers and stakeholders, then establish. Maintain GO

regional links to avoid incompatibility of approach.

o. Joint Regional Delivery Plans Defra and delivery partners to work with GOs in identifying scope for joint planning, targeting etc, to implement recommendations of government review of the voluntary and community sector, to manage internal cultural change to support VCS, and Defra funding streams (see ab) to take account of VCS.

p. Defra to consult GOs Defra to work with GOs and Whitehall partners in making rural and other national/regional strategies simpler and more coherent. Defra to use SR2004 drive and resource future regional strategies (see n and o).

q. GOs withdraw from delivery Defra, RCU and other government departments to develop exit strategy from GO delivery.

Appendix B: Implementation Plan Explanatory Notes (ii)



Appendix C – Risk Management Methodology• The recommended risk management methodology is depicted in the diagram below. • The reviews, consultations and workshops covered steps 1 to 4 of the total Haskins Review Team’s risk management

work (see below), i.e. the identification and evaluation of the key risks to the business’s objectives. • The active management of the risks has not been covered so far, but it part of the ongoing work of the Haskins

Implementation Team.

Track outcomeLessons learnt

Identify risk(s)

Identify Risk by: • Main assumptions • Brainstorm• Past experience• Potential sources• Examine the context• Worst case scenario

Analyse risk(s)

• Evaluate potential impact of the risk (H-L)

• Estimate probability (H-L)• For significant risks

estimate proximity • Prioritise risks• Group risks

Plan

Develop mitigation plan

and change project plan

Project continue no change

Define what the risk is to; i.e what are the

goals and benefits of the programme

Define risk approachPrioritise programmes

Base this on:• criticality• complexity• urgency

• Assign owner• Decide response- ignore & monitor

or- plan to mitigate

& avoid

Manage

• Implement plan• Track implementation

Define risk appetite

Review

• Review effectiveness

• Review risk approach

• Confirm project is within risk parameters

Expected to be mitigated or happy to

accept risk of occurrrence?

Yes

Develop contingency plans No

• Develop contingency plan• Define contingency trigger

criteria and times

Implement contingency plans

• Monitor situation• Instigate contingency

Step 1

Step 3 Step 4 Step 5

Step 6

Step 2

Step 7



GATEWAY ZERO REVIEW

• The Gateway Review process is a requirement set out by the OGC for all large business change programmes.

• The first step in that process, Gateway Zero, focuses on the project business justification and provides assurance to senior management that the business requirement has been adequately researched and fits within the department’s overall strategy.

• The results of the assessment are represented in the graph, together with explanatory notes.

0.00

0.20

0.40

0.60

0.80

1.00

1.20

Preconditions Potential for success Review of currentphase

Risk management Readiness for nextphase – prepare highlevel business case

Best PracticeRDRDesired Position

A gap exists between the current and the

desired position due to lack of Project Profile

Model scoring, and the dependence the

project has on Defra’s future direction.

A strong business case and clear roles and responsibilities

place the project in a strong position. Some stakeholder resistance

is still seen as a pressure.

Strong consideration has been given to 1) the assumptions for programme success,

and 2) the options and how they align to

Public Sector Reform.

Thorough risk identification has taken place with

internal and external stakeholders. Next

steps for the management of risks

has been defined.

Well defined programme structure and controls are in

place. Recruitment of staff and skills is

underway.

j05 final - haskins business case - 16 october 2003 (not ... · option a: transformation of rural...

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