· pdf file27 jan aung san and british prime minister clement attlee signed an agreement in...

DDAAGGAADocumentation for Action Groups in Asia

DDOOSSSSIIEERRMay 2001

Military & Ethnic Conflict in Burma 1

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Chronology 2 – 3

Country Profile 4 – 5

Current Situationð “Armed Conflict Profiles – Burma” 6 - 7

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ð “Ethnic Groups: Overview” 8ð “Burma, Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity” 9ð “Get Burma’s Minorities Talking” 9 - 10ð “An Overview of Burma’s Ethnic Politics” 10 – 14ð “The Karennis: Asserting Ethnic Identity” 14 – 16ð “Roots of Vengance & Hatred” 16 - 18

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ð “Junta Dreams or Nightmares?Observations of Burma’s Military since 1988” 18 - 24

ð “Burma/Myanmar: How Strong is the Military Regime?” ” 25 - 26ð “Fatal Attraction’” 26 - 27

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ð “Endeavours of the Myanmar Armed Forces Governmentfor National Reconsolidation” 28 – 30

ð “Steps towards Peace” 30 - 31ð “Burma A Ray of Hope” 32 - 33


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This will be the fourth dossier DAGA has produced on Burma. In the first three dossiers,we focused on Investments, Tourism and Refugees. This time round, the dossier will focuson the Military and Ethnic Conflicts.

The SPDC has recently resumed talks with Aung San Suu Kyi, a move that has been greetedwith a mixture of positive anticipation as well as scepticism. Many are of the opinion thatthese talks are just stalling tactics of the State Peace and Development Council of Burma[SPDC]. Many more are of the opinion that these talks will not succeed until and unless theethnic issues are dealt with. Hence, Burma democracy supporters from around the worldhave urged the international community to escalate efforts to ensure that talks betweenBurma's military regime and democratic opposition are transformed into a genuinetripartite dialogue involving its military regime, democratic opposition and ethnicnationality groups.

Despite these talks, the results of the 1990 elections have not been recognised. Furthermore,serious human rights violations and humanitarian crises continue unabated in Burma.Military abuses, including forced labour, forced relocation and violence against women, arestill systematically committed, especially in the non-Burman ethnic nationality states.Political parties are prohibited from functioning freely. The illicit trade in drugs remains asignificant source of income for the military regime. The overall health and educationallevel of people in Burma has severely deteriorated under the SPDC.

Recently, ALTSEAN-BURMA made an oral intervention to the UN Convention on HumanRights highlighting the systematic oppression of ethnic nationality and religious minoritiesin Burma, and the prevalent use of forced relocation. These human rights abuses have ledto an increase in the number of internally displaced persons. Many of these internallydisplaced persons end up becoming refugees, trafficked persons and migrant workersseeking to escape the intense oppression perpetrated by the regime known as the SPDC.

Through the articles compiled in this dossier we hope to provide the reader with somebackground information as well as analysis to the issues of the Military and the EthnicConflict. The information in this dossier is by no means exhaustive but we do encourageour readers to visit the websites provided in the articles to get more information anddiscussions on the issues. We hope that such information and resources provided here willhelp our readers develop critical perspectives and international solidarity on the Burmaissue.

Finally, we want to thank Max Ediger for helping to put this dossier together and WongYick Ching for the layout work.

CHAN Beng Seng


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Sourcehttp://pilger.carlton.com/burma/chronologyhttp://www.perc.flora.org/PEN/1999-11/supplement/burma7.htmlBurma Chronology of Events, Asian Human Rights Commission

1824-1886 Burma annexed to British Indiaduring three successive Anglo-Burmese Wars.

1937 Burma separated from India andgranted a constitution, providing alimited measure of self-government(ethnic minorities were administeredunder a separate system untilindependence).

1942-1945 World War II: The Japaneseoccupied Burma and grantedfictitious independence under apuppet regime led by anti-Britishnationalists who later turned againstthe Japanese and aided the Alliedforces in retaking the country.

1945 Japanese are defeated; Britishauthority was restored. A coalitionof nationalist forces, the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League(AFPFL) emerged as the principlepolitical organisation under theleadership of General Aung San.

194727 JAN Aung San and British Prime

Minister Clement Attlee signed anagreement in London promising aninterim government for Burma inpreparation for independence"within or without the BritishCommonwealth".

12 FEB Leaders of Shan Kachin and Chinpeoples signed an agreement withAung San at Panglong, and agreedto join the proposed Union of Burmain exchange for some degree ofautonomy for their respective areas.

19 JUL Aung San and six cabinet membersassassinated in Rangoon. U Nubecame new AFPFL leader andchief of the cabinet.

24 SEP A new constitution was approved,guaranteeing a democratic systemand limited federalism. The Shan andKarenni states got the right to secedefrom the proposed Union of Burmaafter a ten-year period ofindependence. A Kachin State with noright to secede was established.There was no provision for a Karenstate.

19484 JAN The Union of Burma became an

independent nation outside of thecommonwealth, carrying on theBritish tradition of parliamentarydemocracy. U Nu became firstdemocratically elected Prime Ministerof independent Burma.

19622 MAR Burmese army led by General Ne Win

overthrew U Nu's democraticgovernment and seized power inRangoon. U Nu and his ministerswere jailed along with over thirtyethnic leaders. The new junta, calledthe Revolutionary Council, wasestablished, investing Ne Win with fullexecutive, legislative and judicialpowers. The parliament wasdestroyed and the constitutionsuspended.

3 APR The "Burmese Way to Socialism" waspublished and was said to be theguiding ideological basis of theregime. A Burma Press Council wasformed to control the press.

4 JUL The Burma Socialist ProgrammeParty (BSPP) was formed by the newRevolutionary Council. All privateenterprises were nationalised and astate controlled-centralised economywas introduced. The country wassealed off from the outside world.


19631 APR In an effort to quell multiple

insurrections, a general amnesty wasissued to all insurgents. All armswere to be turned in by 1 July.

11 JUL The Revolutionary Council offered tomeet and negotiate with insurgents inRangoon.

28 SEP Working People’s Daily, a premiergovernment organ, was founded. TheVanguard and Guardian newspaperswere nationalized.

15 NOV Negotiations with Mon, Chin, andKarenni insurgents ended in failure.Over 700 Leftists and Communistswere arrested. University studentsdemonstrated. Universities andcolleges were closed. Thegovernment banned the monopolypurchase of the rice crop.

196428 MAR The law to protect National Solidarity

was promulgated. All political partiesexcept the BSPP were banned and allproperty and assets confiscated.

28 DEC The Revolutionary Councilannounced a new set of laws for allstates, thus eliminating someautonomy.

19743 JAN A new constitution guaranteeing a

single-party socialist rule wasadopted. Separate Chin, Mon andArakan states were established, butwithout the limited autonomy that theethnic states were guaranteed underthe 1947 constitution. Ne Win becamepresident of the Socialist Republic ofBurma.

2 MAR On the 12th anniversary of the 1962coup, the new constitution came intoeffect.

29 JUN The US and Burmese governmentssigned an agreement committing to"suppressing the illegal cultivation,processing, production, and traffickingof narcotic drugs". The USgovernment agreed to supplyRangoon with Bell 205 helicopters forthis purpose.

11 DEC The government declared martial law.

1986 Inspired by the success of theSouth Korean people in gaining fairelections, the Burmese peopleorganised protests demanding thedemocratisation of the country andthe end of military rule.Demonstrations were quashed withforce, resulting in some 3000deaths.

1987 Burma's economy havingplummeted under military rule,Burma achieved Least DevelopedCountry status at the UN.

1988 A massive democratic movementinitiated in Rangoon and spreadthroughout the country.

SEP State Law and Order RestorationCouncil (SLORC) seizes powerafter two years’ mass unrest,caused by economic collapse andrepression. Countrywidedemonstrations led to massacre ofthousands. Armed ethnic minoritygroups and Burman pro-democracyactivists who had fled to the jungleformed the Democratic Alliance ofBurma and Karen headquarters ofManerplaw.

1990MAY Multiparty elections won by Aung

San Suu Kyi’s National League forDemocracy (NLD), with 457 out of485 seats. Burma SLORC refusedto transfer power. A group of 12elected members fled to ethnic-controlled land near Thai borderand found National CoalitionGovernment of the Union of Burma(NCGUB).

2001Mid JAN Initial bi-partite talks started

between Aung San Suu Kyi and theSPDC. Details of the talks remainsecret. While this raises hopeamong some groups, the forcedrelocation of people in many areasof the country continues unabated.For the majority of the rural people,peace still seems too far away.


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Sourcehttp://www.asiasource.org/profiles

Geography

Capital: Yangon (Rangoon)Area: 678,500 total sq. km;

657,740 land sq. km;20,760 water sq. km

Coastline: 1,930 kmLand Use: 15% arable land;

1% permanent crops;1% permanent pastures;49% forests and woodlands;34% other

Demographics

Population: 47,305,319Age Structure: 36% 0-14 years;

59% 15-64 years;5% 65 years+

Population Growth Rate: 1.65%Birth Rate: 28.96 births/1,000 population

Death Rate: 12.51 deaths/1,000 populationNet Migration Rate: 0.00 migrants/1,000 population

Sex Ratio: 1.06 Male:Female at birth;1.04 Male:Female under 15 years;1 Male:Female 15 - 64 years;0.82Male:Female 65 years plus

Infant Mortality Rate: 78.35 deaths/1,000 live birthsTotal Labor Force: 18,800,000Urban Population: 27%

Access to Safe Water: 38%Life Expectancy at Birth: 54.51 years for total population;

53.03 years for males;56.08 years for females

Total Fertility Rate: 3.7 children born/womanLiteracy: 83.1% total population;

88.7% male;77.7% female

Burma Human RightsYear Book 1998-99,

Human RightsDocumentation Unit

(NCGUB)


Economy

GDP: $56 billionGDP - Real Growth Rate: 6.00%GDP - Per Capita (PPP): $1,190

GDP - Composition by Sector: 61% from agriculture;10% from industry;29% from services

Inflation Rate – CPI: 35.00%Unemployment Rate: N/A

Budget: $7,900,000,000 revenues;$12,200,000,000 expenditures

Industrial Production Growth Rate: 9.20%Electricity Production: 4.10 billion kWhExports - Total Value: $693.00 billionImports - Total Value: $1.40 billion

Debt – External: $5.30 billionEconomic Aid: $0.06 billion

Military

Military Expenditure- Percent of GDP: N/A

Sources: This data is collected from the CIA World FactBook, the World Bank, and the InternationalMonetary Fund for 1998 unless otherwise detailed below in notes.

Head of State and Government

Chairman of the State Peace and Development Council:Gen. Than Shwe

Birthdate:February 2, 1933 in Kyaykse, Mandalay Division

Education:Attended Secondary School

Private Career:Postal Clerk; Member, Army (1953-present); General of the Army

Political Career:Chief of Staff, Ministry of Defense; Army Deputy Chief of Staff; Deputy Commander-in-Chiefof Defense Services (1990-92); Deputy Chairman, State Law and Order Restoration Council(1990-92); Chairman, State Law and Order Restoration Council (September 1988-November1997); Chairman, State Peace and Development Council (November 1997-present); PrimeMinister and Minister of Defense (April 1992-present); Minister of Agriculture (present)

The State Peace and Development Council16 Zawgyi Road, YangonTelephone: (+95 1) 532404; 532318; 532466

Source: http://www.asiaobserver.com/leaders_burma.htm


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Armed Conflict Profiles – Burma

Peace Pledge Union

Conflict Background

Pro-democracy demonstrations in 1988 werecrushed, with 3000 civilian deaths, in a coup bythe military State Law & Order RestorationCouncil. SLORC then refused to recognise1990 elections at which the National League forDemocracy (NLD), led by Nobel Peace Prize-winner Aung San Suu Kyi, took the majority ofthe votes. Thereafter pro-democracy activistshave been continually persecuted, oppressedand abused by SLORC militia.

Burma has also long had problems created byunhappy relations with its indigenous ethniccommunities. Out of a population of 44.5million, the Burmese ethnic people are amajority (68%) but the country also includesother ethnic populations: Shan (9%), Karen(7%), Rohingya and Mon (4% each), Chinese(3%), Indian (2%) and others (5%). In 1949 theKaren took up arms, followed later by themobilisation of the Shan State Army. TheChristian Karen National Union is fighting forautonomy for a Karen State, which is opposednot only by the military government but also bythe Karen Buddhist Democracy Army. Humanrights organisations have also reported thetorture and killing, by government forces, ofhundreds of the Shan community. Governmenttroops have also carried out a policy of forciblyclearing land for international investment in oiland tourism.

In 1997 Aung San Suu Kyi again called for aboycott on the part of companies doingbusiness in Burma, which met with some co-operation and a US ban on new investments.Human rights issues were foregrounded byBurma’s controversial admission to theAssociation of South Eastern Nations (ASEAN);officers and supporters of the legally electedNLD continued to be persistently harassed,oppressed and imprisoned.

At the end of 1997 the SLORC juntaannounced that it was replacing itself with theState Peace & Development Council (SPDC);ex-SLORC officials still held leading posts, butthere were also some new faces. No reforms

were announced, however, nor were thereovertures to the NLD.

In May 1998 it was reported that the SPDCwas secretly expanding the number of opiumfarms in designated drug-control areas, with allthe implications for violence and conflictassociated with such activities. (Evidencewould later emerge confirming close linksbetween the junta and the key drug producersand traffickers from the country’s opium poppygrowing region, the ‘Golden Triangle’ in thenortheast.)

There were tense moments in August as thetenth anniversary of the pro-democracyuprising approached. Aung San Suu Kyi wasrepeatedly prevented from travelling round thecountry, sometimes trapped in her car for daysat a time. However, the date passed withoutany serious incidents being reported other thanthe detention of 18 foreign democracy activistswho were distributing leaflets (“8-8-88: don’tgive up”). But harassment by the governmentcontinued unabated.

In October, after a visit from Alvaro de Soto,UN special envoy to Burma, the governmentannounced that it had released a number ofmembers of the NLD after ‘detaining them foran exchange of views’, adding that ‘members ofthe NLD have been meeting with thegovernment since September in an effort tobuild a multi-party democracy and to preservethe prevailing peace’.

In the spring of 1999 Aung San Suu Kyi wasunable to visit her husband in England beforehe died, or for his funeral; it was feared that ifshe left the country the regime would preventher from returning. She continued to lead herparty with determination and with emphasis onnon-violent principles. A Rangoon ceremonymarking the 52nd anniversary of the murder ofAung San (Suu Kyi’s father) passed quietly,with continued resolve ‘to seek answers topolitical problems by holding talks peacefullythrough political means’. The NLD are facedwith the SPDC junta’s refusal to resume talksunless the NLD renounces the committeewhich it set up in 1998 in lieu of the parliamentit had been banned from forming.

There were further reports of oppression ofethnic Karen, including the blockade of foodand medicine to refugees. Indeed, the poorly-paid Burmese army was said to have steppedup the killing of ethnic civilians right across the


PEACE PLEDGE UNION4lb Brecknock Road,London N7 OBT, BRITAINPhone: +44 020 7424 9444Fax: +44 020 7482 6390Email: [email protected] Site: www.ppu.org.uk

country, as well as the requisitioning andlooting on which it relies for its own supplies.

There were also reports that the three-year-oldinsurgency of ethnic Shan had recently beensubjected to intensified opposition fromBurmese military, who have forciblydepopulated rebel areas by a number ofmeans, including suppression of language andculture, relocation to ill-supplied settlementsadjacent to army bases, torture and killing.Thousands of Shan have retreated to thejungles of Shan State, or across the border toThailand, at the rate of 1500-3000 a month.

‘Our hope is that the international communitywill put pressure on the Burmese regime sothat it will stop its violations against thepopulation’, said the secretary of the KarenWomen's Organization (KWO), part of adelegation travelling in Europe to raiseawareness of the oppression of minority ethnicpeoples in Burma. ‘We do not get sufficientattention from the world’, added a member ofthe Shan Women Action Network (SWAN).‘Since 1996, the centre of the Shan State hasbeen emptied: 300,000 persons have beendeported from 14,000 villages.’

In September the military regime deployedextra police and anti-riot units in Rangoon aspart a nation-wide security clampdown toprevent a threatened uprising called bydissidents for ‘Four Nines Day’ (9/9/99).

In October, those present at a forum of Asia-Pacific democratic leaders heard a messagefrom Aung San Suu Kyi, in which she said:‘Every day that is delayed is a day more ofsuffering for our people and for our country. Iknow that we are not the only people who aresuffering from lack of justice and from the lackof basic human rights. But we have to do whatwe can and we would like to bring democracy,justice and human rights to Burma. And whenwe are a democracy, we would like to helpothers in our region and in the world to achievethe same kind of rights for which we are fightingnow. Already a decade has passed since thepeople of Burma made it quite clear to thewhole world that they wanta democracy and they wereprepared to make manysacrifices for democracy.Yet it’s not possible for us todo it alone, because theworld is so interconnectedthese days that we cannotstand alone’.

Recent Events

As the monsoon ended and the military beganpreparing for renewed skirmishes with ethnicinsurgents along the border with Thailand, aUN Human Rights Commission report accusedBurma of practicing forced labour, summaryexecutions, abuses of ethnic minorities andrepression of civil and political rights. ‘At thevery worst we are faced with a country which isat war with its own people. At the very best, it isa country which is holding its people hostage.’

When UN special envoy Alvaro de Soto visitedBurma in October 1999 and spoke with a juntaleader and Aung San Suu Kyi, there werehopes that some movement towards break-through might be possible. A press reportsuggested that the ruling military junta wasbeginning to respond to criticism. It had allowedthe Red Cross to inspect prisons and report onthe condition of political prisoners (‘securitydetainees’). It had made a move towards talkson establishing a human rights commission,and to allow lawsuits filed by the opposition.The opposing National League for Democracyis still led by Aung San Suu Kyi, who has calledfor the release of political prisoners andfreedom for political parties to operate openly:without these concessions she has so farrefused to enter into talks with the SPDC,whose own terms are that the NLD ‘shadowgovernment’ (over 1000 of whose officials arein prison) should be abolished.

Meanwhile, ways have been sought by NGOsand aid agencies to assist Burma’s poorwithout at the same time propping up the illegalregime. The SPDC has continued to spend sixtimes as much on defense as on health. (It alsorecently banned the posting of political writingdetrimental to Burma on the Internet.)

The Karen resistance – one of the world’soldest insurgent ethnic groups – found itself incrisis in January after a raid on a Thai hospitalin which 10 hostage takers were shot by Thaimilitary. (The Karens’ aim had been to demandthat the Thai army stop shelling the Karen basein Burma.) A new leader for the Karen, Ba

Them Sein, was appointed; he saidthat his group would reduce itsmilitary role and be open topossibilities for talks with the junta.He also hoped that the KarenNational Union would absorb andcontrol God’s Army, the band ofKaren rebels led by charismatic 12-year old twins.


Ethnic Groups: Overview

Burma Project

A peaceful and democratic Burma requiresharmonious accommodation among thecountry's diverse ethnic groups. Without lastingresolution to questions of local autonomy andnational power-sharing, rebellions that haveflared and simmered in Burma's borderlands fornearly five decades cannot be resolved. Andwithout peace, there is little chance forgrassroots economic development that couldhelp reduce opium production and herointrafficking in many impoverished areas.

Lack of a reliable census makes it impossible tomore than roughly estimate the composition ofBurma's ethnic mosaic or its total population.Some experts suggest existing population databe skewed to exaggerate the number ofBurman, who are the largest single ethnicgroup. According to available statistics, theycomprise about two-thirds of Burma'sapproximately 47 million people, and dominatethe army and government. Most of Burma'sethnic minorities inhabit areas along thecountry's mountainous frontiers. Karen andShan groups comprise about 10% each, whileAkha, Chin, Chinese, Danu, Indian, Kachin,Karenni, Kayan, Kokang, Lahu, Mon, Naga,Palaung, Pao, Rakhine, Rohingya, Tavoyan andWa peoples each constitute 5% or less of thepopulation.

Burma has experienced a long history ofmigration and conflict among various ethnicgroups along fluid frontiers, which were finallyfixed only during British imperial rule from the1820s to 1948. Under British control, diversepeoples far from Rangoon were brought underat least nominal central administration. Yetmany areas remained effectively self-ruled, withonly a thin veneer of imperial oversight. DuringWorld War II, while manyBurman joined Japanese forces,many minority ethnic groupsremained loyal to Britain. Thisreflected a genuine desire forindependence on the part of bothgroups: Burmans struggling to befree of the British colonial yoke,and ethnic minorities wishing toescape Burman domination.

The Union of Burma became independent in1948 only after extensive negotiations led byGeneral Aung San, who convinced most ethnicminority groups to join the new union. ThePanglong Agreement of 1947 outlined minorityrights and specifically gave the Shan andKarenni peoples the option to secede from theunion a decade after independence. Yet theseconstitutional guarantees were never fullyrespected. Almost immediately uponindependence, Burma was thrown into a seriesof brutal ethnic wars that have continued withvarying intensity to this day.

The principal demands of Burma's ethnicminorities are to gain genuine autonomy for theirhome areas and to achieve a significant voice inthe affairs of the country as a whole. Fewdemand total independence as their ultimategoal. Since its 1988 coup, the State Law andOrder Restoration Council (SLORC) (renamedthe State Peace and Development Council inNovember 1997), has negotiated cease-fireswith most armed ethnic opposition groups andwaged fierce assaults against others. MuslimRohingya people in southeastern Burma weretargeted in 1991, and over 250,000 fled toneighbouring Bangladesh. At least 110,000Karen and Mon people from eastern Burma arerefugees in Thailand following intense Burmesearmy offensives since 1994.

In many areas, uneasy truces prevail. Amongthe first cease-fires concluded were with ethnicWa and Kokang armies, which until 1987 servedunder the Burmese Communist Party. TheBurmese army's agreements with these groupspermit opium cultivation and the right to tradewithout interference in Burma. The result hasbeen a sharp increase in heroin production andsmuggling from Burma and a worldwide rise inheroin use and addiction. Some other ethnicopposition organizations, particularly the KachinIndependence Organization and the KarenNational Union, have taken strong standsagainst drug production and trafficking.Prospects for a democratic, prosperous, andpeaceful Burma are dim without a just andamicable settlement of the country's ethnic

conflicts. The junta's proposednew constitution does little toaddress ethnic groups'grievances. Burma's democraticopposition has urged seriousefforts to redress theseproblems, and achieving ethnicreconciliation and cooperationwill be a major challenge for anyfuture Burmese government.

BURMA PROJECTOpen Society Institute400 West 59th Street, 4/F,New York, NY 10019 USAPhone: +212 548 0632Fax: +212 548 4655Email: [email protected]: www.burmaproject.org


Burma, Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity

Martin Smith, 1999

An Ethnic Overview

The population of Burma today stands at some 48 million,double the estimated figure at independence. Under the 1975constitutional reforms, the map of modern Burma shows sevendivisions, largely populated by the Burman majority, and sevenethnic minority states, the Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Mon,Rakhine (Arakan) and Shan. This, however, gives the deceptiveappearance of an easy symmetry to what is undoubtedly one ofthe most complex ethnic mixes in the world. Over 100languages have been identified in Burma. The 1931 census, thelast available to attempt to give any kind of detailed ethnicbreakdown, distinguished 44 ethnic, sub-groups among theChin alone. In a population of 14,647,497 the census, in a set offigures many minorities believe are deeply flawed, put the majorethnic families such as the "Burman", including Rakhine, atapproximately 65 per cent; the Karen at just over 9 per cent; theShan at 7 per cent;the Chin and Monsome 2 per centplus each; theKachin, Palaung-Wa and Chinese atjust over 1 per centeach; and the'Indian', many ofwhom have sinceleft Burma, ataround 7 percent.

But if Burma has often been called an anthropologist's paradise,the complete untangling of its complex ethnic past is a task stillto be accomplished. Historians are generally agreed that theearliest inhabitants of modern Burma still recognizable todayare the Mons of Lower Burma. They are the descendants ofAustro-Asiatic (Mon-Khmer) peoples who once occupied muchof SouthEast Asia and from whom today's hill tribe Palaung (Ta-ang) and Wa inhabitants of the Shan State are also distantlydescended. The first Karen and Chin settlers where probablythe next to move down into central Burma before the main bodyof ethnic Burma migration occurred into Upper Burma in the 9th

and 10th centuries A.D. In the wake of these migrations theexisting inhabitants were presumable either absorbed or pusheddeeper into remote mountains and forests. Others like the Pyu(or P'iao), who left evidence of a highly developed civilization,simply disappeared. At about the same time, the first Shanbegan moving through the river valleys of the far north-east aspart of a major ethnic Tai migration into South-East Asia. Thepresent ethnic picture was completed by the migration ofvarious tribes, largely Tibeto-Burmese in origin, into the remotemountains of the northeast, the last probably being those of thevarious Kachin sub-groups. It is a movement that still goes on,for various hill tribes, such as the Lisu and Akha, continue tomove down into Thailand.

Get Burma's MinoritiesTalking

Josef SilversteinInternational Herald TribuneMonday, 5 February 2001

As representatives of themilitary government in Burmacontinue secret talks with theopposition leader, Daw AungSan Suu Kyi, both sides shouldbe aware that the centralproblem today, as it was whenBurma gained independencefrom Britain in 1948, is nationalunity. It does not exist becausethere is a lack of equality andtrust between majority Burmeseand other ethnic groups, andbetween the military and thepeople.

Restoration of democratic ruleand respect for human rightsand civil liberties are, of course,important. But if the talks are tobe the first step in solving long-standing problems, then theinterests of the ethnic minoritiesmust get high priority. Theyrepresent a third of the nationalpopulation, but most do not feelpart of the nation.

After so many years of war,misunderstanding and division,the basic issues of unity, trustand peaceful resolution ofproblems must be discussedopenly, honestly and in depthso that a new social basis canbe found and built upon.

The military rulers defend theirseizure of power in 1962 andagain in 1988 as necessary topreserve national unity,territorial integrity andsovereignty. They claim thatany mistrust is a legacy ofcolonial rule. They say that thecease fires they negotiated withethnic minorities were firststeps toward equality, sharingof power and trust. Suchprinciples, they claim, will be inthe new constitution.


In 1989, when the Burma Communist Party implodedand the minority representatives who served as itscadres broke away and formed ethnic groupings, thegovernment offered them cease-fire agreements to endtheir wars against the state. It allowed those whoaccepted to keep their weapons, administer their areasand run their economies with a minimum of interference.

However, the government did not allow them to discusstheir political future. That was to be put off until a newconstitution was in place.

In 1993, the junta created a national convention at whichinvited Burmese and minority representatives weresupposed to develop the principles for a newconstitution. The move failed because it was tightlycontrolled and the participants were denied free speechand interaction. After a walkout by Shan minoritydelegates, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi withdrew thedelegates of her National League for Democracy.

Most of the ethnic minorities contend that the conditionsthat drove many to fight the central government or resistin other ways have their roots in inequalities inscribed inthe 1947 constitution and in the absence of fullautonomy, resource-sharing and participation indecisions affecting their future. They also deeply resentthe emergence of Burmese culture as the nationalculture, instead of a multiculture reflecting the diversity ofthe population.

For half a century the minorities have been victims ofrules made in Rangoon, the central government'sviolence and unwillingness by those in power to discussthe grievances of ethnic minorities and work together tofind real solutions.

While the Karens continue their war against thegovernment, their leaders have been on record since1984 as saying that they no longer seek independence.They refuse to accept a cease-fire because its terms saynothing about the future. A significant portion of theChristian Karens also has religious differences with theBurmese, who are Buddhist.

As dialogue between representatives of the military andthe people progresses, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is thelogical person to speak for the people. She is committedto a free, democratic and peaceful Burma based onequality for all, the rule of law and human rights. Sherespects the cultural diversity of the nation and the rightsof the people to retain their identities, languages andtraditions. She trusts the people, as most trust her.

She should have minority leaders at her side toparticipate in the discussions and speak to the issueswhich directly effect their people. That would be the bestsymbol possible of equality, unity and trust as efforts aremade again to build a united Burma.

An Overview ofBurma's Ethnic Politics

Christina Fink

What little news exists about Burmausually concerns Nobel Peace PrizeLaureate Aung San Suu Kyi and thestruggle for democracy. But there isanother, equally pressing problem inBurma: the ethnic nationalitiesstruggle for autonomy. While thesetwo political battles are oftenconsidered separate issues, they are,in fact, inextricably linked.

Ethnic nationalities are the dominantpopulations in at least half of theterritory now referred to as Burma,and make up over thirty percent of thecountry's total population. Becausethey have historically enjoyed theirown polities in the plains or lived inmountainous areas untouched byBurman rule, the ethnic nationalitieshave sought political arrangementsreflecting their independent identities.Burma's military regime, however, hasinsisted on political and culturalassimilation, with centralized controland a nationalist cultural agendapromoting the Burmese language andBuddhism at the expense of otherlanguages and religions.

For over 50 years, ethnic peoples inBurma have been fighting for degreesof autonomy varying from themaintenance of their own states withina federal union to outrightindependence. They seek to sustaintheir own languages and cultureswhile retaining control over politicaland economic life in their regions.Some of the smaller ethnic groupshave also called for autonomousareas within larger ethnic states.However, the Burmese governmenthas refused to devolve power to theethnic regions, arguing that doing sowould lead to the breakup of theunion.

Pro-democracy politicians in Burmaare increasingly cognizant of the needto recognize ethnic political andcultural rights, but many still giveprecedence to the struggle for


democracy. While most ethnic political leadersand civilians favor democratic rule, they are notconfident that a simple restoration ofdemocracy will lead to a resolution of theirpolitical problems. Ethnic Burmans are thedominant population and have tended todiscount ethnic minority demands in the past.Consequently, Burma’s ethnic nationalitiesworry that they will continue to be marginalizedif their concerns are not addressed inconjunction with the struggle for democracy.Meanwhile, in order to prevent ethnic politicalforces and the pro-democracy movement fromcollaborating, Burma’s generals have tried tolimit contact between the two groups.

A Legacy of Divisions During British rule [1825-1948], the colonial government took directcontrol over Burma's heartland while allowingthe peoples in the less-populated hill areas toretain their own forms of government. Non-Burmans were often recruited into the colonialcivil service and army and were sometimesused to put down Burman resistancemovements. At the beginning of World War II,some minority peoples, including the Karen,Kachin, and Rohingya Muslims, sided with theBritish. The Burmans, however, welcomed theinvading Japanese as their liberators. Burmansoldiers massacred Karen villagers, andKarens retaliated by killing Burmans. By theend of the war, Burman support had shifted tothe Allies, but both British colonial policies andthe war had left deep-seated mistrust andanimosity between Burmans and other ethnicgroups.

Before the British would grant the countryindependence, they insisted that the politicalstatus of non-Burman groups be resolved. In1947, General Aung San persuaded the ethnicgroups to join in a multi-ethnic conference atPanglong, in the Shan hills, to devise a politicalstructure acceptable to both Burmans andethnic nationalities. Although the Karenboycotted the conference, some of the otherethnic groups participated and agreed upon theconcept of a federal union within which eachethnic state would be accorded full autonomyover internal administration.

The 1947 Constitution detailed the right of thestate governments to make laws, run their owncivil services, and develop their own budgets.Because state heads would also serve in theUnion cabinet and members of state legislativecouncils would serve in Parliament, the stateswere closely linked to the central government.The Karenni (later renamed Kayah) and Shan

States were given the right to secede after tenyears if they were not happy with their statuswithin the union. The newly-formed KachinState, which included territory previously underBurman control, was not permitted to secede,the Chin political leaders decided againstforming a separate state, and the territorialdimensions of a new Karen State remained tobe finalized.

Burma gained independence on January 4,1948, but the fragile trust between Burman andethnic minority leaders had weakened withGeneral Aung San's assassination six monthsbefore. Karen nationalist leaders continued toargue with the Rangoon government over theboundaries of a proposed Karen State, butcould not come to an agreement. Increasinglyfrustrated, a group of Karen nationalists took uparms in order to forcibly create an independentstate that might then join the Union.

After briefly seizing control of several cities incentral Burma as well as Insein, now a suburbof Rangoon, Karen forces were driven out ofthe plains and regrouped in the mountains tothe east. In the meantime, the Mon and theArakanese, who also wanted their own states,organized armed resistance movements.Although the 1950s were a period ofparliamentary rule in Burma, the governmentand ethnic nationalist leaders were unable toresolve ethnic conflicts. The Burman majorityheld sway in the government and felt little needto compromise with ethnic peoples. The centralgovernment did almost nothing to promotedevelopment in ethnic regions, and in ShanState, central government troops, sent to pushout fleeing anti-Communist Chinese soldiers,abused the local Shan population. In addition,Prime Minister U Nu upset many non-Buddhistsby running his 1960 election campaign on thepromise that he would make Buddhism thestate religion, despite General Aung San'searlier insistence that the state remain secular.

As the central government increased the powerconcentrated in Burman hands, ethnic politicalleaders called for a more decentralized federalstructure with a single Burman state andseveral ethnic states, each with the samepowers. In the meantime, a number of Shanand Kachin university students took to the hillsto fight for greater autonomy.

Federalism Becomes a Dirty Word

Arguing that military intervention wasnecessary to prevent the breakup of the union,


General Ne Win seized power on March 2,1962. Assuming that it would be short-lived,many Burmese initially welcomed military rule.Opinions changed when it became clear thatthe regime was not merely transitional. By then,however, it was difficult to organize resistance.The military government banned all politicalparties except the regime's own BurmaSocialist Programme Party, nationalized or shutdown newspapers, and dissolved mostindependent associations. As military rulecontinued, so did official rhetoric that federalismwould inevitably lead to anarchy and only thearmed forces could prevent the country'sdisintegration. Arakanese, Chin, Karen, andMon States existed in name but were given noautonomous powers. Meanwhile, the ethnicnationalist armies continued to defend their"liberated areas" in the hills, with some groupsin Northern Burma turning to drug trafficking asa means of support.

The central Burman population did not believethe regime's propaganda about the armedforces bringing prosperity and development tothe country; their daily experiences told themotherwise. However, many people did believethe regime's portrayals of armed nationalistleaders as criminals, drug dealers, andwarlords. Burmese citizens responded to theidea that assimilated nationalities would nolonger desire autonomy.

Meanwhile, the Burmese army carried outbrutal campaigns in areas where ethnic armiesoperated. As a result, ethnic populations wereincreasingly convinced that peaceful co-existence was impossible. After the 1988nationwide pro-democracy demonstrations, asmany as 10,000 students and other activistsfled to the border areas where they saw forthemselves the Burmese army's abuse ofethnic minority civilians. Most were shocked.They were also surprised to learn that mostethnic peoples in remote villages did not speakBurmese and had never been under Burmanrule. Many of the Burman students andpoliticians taking refuge in border areasbecame more sympathetic to ethnic oppositiondemands.

During the same period, Aung San Suu Kyi andthe National League for Democracy (NLD)forged closer ties with the ethnic groups. AungSan Suu Kyi reached out to ethnic groups asshe traveled the country campaigning in late1988 and 1989. Following her father's ideals,she called for self-determination in political andeconomic affairs and equal rights for all ethnic

groups. Although she and other NLD leadersnever used the word 'federalism', they didadvocate that another Panglong conference beheld once democracy was reestablished so thatthe issue of ethnic rights could be resolved.Many ethnic people joined the NLD believingthey could best press for their rights from withinthe party. Others set up ethnic-based partiesand formed the United Nationalities League forDemocracy, an alliance that worked closelywith the NLD. Other young ethnic activistsmade their way to the jungle headquarters ofthe armed opposition groups, sure that theregime would not hand power over easily. Theyturned out to be right. When the NLD won alandslide victory in the 1990 election andseveral ethnic parties also gained seats, theruling regime refused to honor the results.

Although the 1988 pro-democracydemonstrations and 1990 elections did not leadto the restoration of democracy or theresolution of the ethnic nationalities' demands,there were positive consequences. Thelegitimacy of the pro-democracy movementwas greatly enhanced both domestically andabroad, and more people began to recognizethe need to protect the political rights ofBurma's ethnic nationalities. Since then,stepped-up radio broadcasts from abroad havebeen particularly important in informingBurma's residents about the activities of ethnicminority and pro-democracy activists. At thesame time, ethnic opposition groups havebecome more active in sending representativesto the UN and other international fora andproviding information for an internationalaudience detailing the crisis faced by Burma'sethnic peoples.

Exacerbating Tensions

The military regime has continued to insist on aunitary state and since 1990 has pushed anationalist agenda based on Burman cultureand Buddhism. While the regime claims it ispromoting unity, many of its policies haveinstead exacerbated ethnic and religioustensions. For instance, army commanders inArakan State have encouraged BuddhistArakanese to move into areas traditionallyinhabited by Muslim Rohingyas. In Chin andKachin States, they have removed Christiancrosses on hills and replaced them withBuddhist pagodas. The military has alsopermitted Burman, Chinese, and Wa migrationinto traditionally Shan areas, depopulated bythe civil war.


In addition, the regime has restricted theteaching of ethnic languages and in somecases has offered cash incentives to Burmansoldiers who marry ethnic women. Suchpolicies have served to drive ethnic peoplestoward more extreme nationalism and haveconvinced some ethnic leaders that they cannotprotect their people and cultures withoutindependent states.

Despite a common goal – the overthrow of thecurrent military regime and a transition todemocracy – and the progress made towardmutual understanding and trust over the lastten years, tensions still exist between Burmanpro-democracy activists and the ethnicopposition. Burman dissidents ofteninadvertently reinforce such mistrust. Likemajorities everywhere, they tend to think lessabout the concerns of ethnic groups than theydo about restoring democracy, which they seeas the real problem. They often argue thatethnic rights can be discussed once democracyhas been achieved. Similarly, armed ethnicleaders have sometimes viewed the strugglefor democracy as tangential to their ownstruggles for political autonomy. While many ofthe ethnic groups living in areas controlled bythe central government participated in the 1988pro-democracy demonstrations, the leaders ofthe ethnic nationalist armies held their soldiersback, seeing it as an intra-Burman conflict.Even today, some ethnic leaders worry thatBurman military and pro-democracy leaders willeventually reconcile, leaving the situation ofethnic nationalities unresolved.

Burma's democracy leaders are aware of thesedoubts. As Aung San Suu Kyi wrote in one ofher "Letters from Burma" printed in Japan'sMainichi newspaper (February 3, 1997), "Ourethnic nationalists still harbor a deep feeling ofmistrust of the majority Burmese, a mistrustnatural to those who have not been accordedjustice and fair play. In trying to build up astrong union, our greatest challenge will be towin the confidence of those who have onlyknown repression and discrimination."

Splitting its Opposition

In addition to the alliance between the NLD andethnic political parties inside Burma, pro-democracy groups and ethnic nationalistarmies have formed military and politicalalliances in the border areas. For each steptaken toward closer relations, however, themilitary regime has responded by sowing

discord. The regime worries that an alliancebetween the pro-democracy movement andethnic political organizations could force thegenerals out of office.

Intent on dividing its opposition, the Burmesegovernment has urged armed ethnic oppositiongroups to accept ceasefires. Under pressurefrom neighboring countries and outnumberedby the regime's growing army, most of thealmost twenty different ethnic armies havemade ceasefire deals with the regime. Theseagreements give ethnic groups economicprivileges and allow them to retain their arms.The government has promised not to interferewith the trafficking of heroin and amphetaminesby drug-producing opposition groups inexchange for ceasefire agreements. While theceasefires have ended the horrors of the civilwar in many areas, none have led tonegotiations on political rights. They alsocontain provisions that ethnic leaders refrainfrom contact with Aung San Suu Kyi and theNLD and with their former allies.

In exile overseas or in the border areas,Burma's opposition groups have increasinglysought to formalize their collaboration andestablish a legal framework for coexistence.The National Council of the Union of Burma, analliance of pro-democracy and non-ceasefiregroups, drafted its own constitution proposing afederal structure with eight ethnic states, onlyone of which would be Burman. This was donein response to the Burmese government'songoing attempts since 1993 to draft a newconstitution through the National Convention, abody hand-picked by the military. The regime'sdraft constitution stipulates that one quarter ofParliamentary representatives come from themilitary. NLD delegates refused to accept thisprovision, and many ethnic participants wereangered by the regime's unwillingness todevolve power to the ethnic nationalities. In1997, ethnic non-ceasefire groups organizedthe Mae Tha Raw Hta seminar, a historicmeeting on the Thailand-Burma border in whichparticipants endorsed both the pro-democracymovement and federalism. The declarationaffirmed support for the NLD under Aung SanSuu Kyi's leadership, insisted on the need towork toward a tri-partite dialogue between theNLD, the ethnic opposition, and the militaryregime, and argued for the establishment of agenuine federal union. Three ceasefire groupsangered the regime by signing the declaration.

In mid-1998, Aung San Suu Kyi called on themilitary regime to convene the 1990 Parliament


within three months. When the generals did notrespond, she and other pro-democracy leadersset up a Committee to Represent the People'sParliament. Ethnic politicians who worked withthe NLD and this committee have subsequentlybeen imprisoned or forced to flee the country.Though the ethnic nationalist struggles havebeen going on for more than fifty years, theregime continues to assume it can make theethnic minority problem disappear.

Conclusion

The fact that many pro-democracy leaders inBurma now recognize the importance of ethnicissues and have developed workingrelationships with ethnic leaders offers hopethat ethnic political demands will ultimately beresolved at the negotiating table. However,such a resolution is unlikely to be implementedby the military regime, which rejectsdecentralization and power-sharing. Theongoing civil war, population relocations, andreligious persecution, compounded by appealsto narrow nationalism on all sides, have causedmuch damage. Without visionary leadership, acommitment to dialogue, and the emergence ofa culture of tolerance, lasting peace willcontinue to elude Burma.

Christina Fink is an anthropologist and authorof a forthcoming book, "Living Silence: BurmaUnder Military Rule," describing the impact ofmilitary rule on Burmese people's lives.

References & further reading

Aung San Suu Kyi (1997). Letters from Burma.London, UK: Penguin Books.

Maung Maung (1959). Burma's Constitution. TheHague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Burma Debate (November/December 1996).Special Issue on Ethnic Perspectives.

Smith, Martin (1999). Burma: Insurgency andthe Politics of Ethnicity. London, UK: ZedBooks.

Smith, Martin (1994). Ethnic Groups in Burma.London, UK: Anti-Slavery International.

The Karennis: Asserting Ethnic Identity

Dr. Macariu Tiu<www.iidnet.org/iep/mac-burma.htm>

Dr. Macariu Tiu wrote this story after his trip tothe refugee camps in the Burma-Thai border.Dr. Tiu is a university professor in thePhilippines.

Theh Reh was 12 years old when Burmese(Myanmar) soldiers "invited" him to the soldier'scamp to plant bamboo and fashion bambooslats. He was not paid when he was "invited"again to dig earth for a railroad project. Thishappened thrice; each time he worked for awhole week. It was backbreaking work even fora full adult, but he couldn't complain. He wasstill lucky in the Burmese context.

Some villages are forced to porter for thesoldiers and to act as guides. This is the mosthated work for the villagers. They are made tocarry war materials and army provisions. To getexempted, they have to bribe the soldiers – selltheir cow, if need be. Otherwise, they have towork without pay, to be away from their familiesfor several weeks. They are poorly fed andwhipped when they are too slow. But the worstthing is that they are being used by theBurmese soldiers in their war against ThehReh's own people: the Karennis, a minoritynationality in eastern Burma who have beenfighting for independence from the Burmesegovernment for 50 years.

Thus, when Karenni villagers hear thatBurmese soldiers are coming, the young boysand the menfolk would immediately makethemselves scarce for fear of being "invited."But relocated as they are in designatedvillages, most of these boys and men wouldultimately be victims of "invitations."

For these relocation villages are actually theBurmese version of the notorious strategichamlets of Vietnam. To wipe out Karenniresistance, the Burmese government hadresorted to a scorch earth policy, burningKarenni houses, farms and crops, and forciblyevacuating the villagers to live in the strategichamlets where the people's movements couldbe controlled and monitored. The entirecountryside outside of these camps hasbecome a free-fire zone. All animals and


foodstuff found in these areas are confiscated.And anybody seen in the abandoned villagesand forests could be summarily shot.

As they live far from their farms, the villagershave a hard life in these strategic hamlets.Many have escaped, preferring to live in thejungles despite the constant threat fromBurmese patrols and raids.

To avoid detection in the jungles, only four orso families would form a cluster. They avoidmaking fires at night. As they breed chickens,they tie up the beaks of the cocks so they won'tcrow and betray their presence. They releasethe ties only when the cocks have to drink oreat.

Meanwhile, the Karenni Army harass andattack Burmese patrols when opportunitiesallow it.

The Burmese-Karenni conflict can be tracedback to several centuries of Burmese attemptsto subjugate neighboring hill peoples. At onetime or the other, some of these hill peoples,such as the Karens, Kachins, Arakanese,Mons, Shans, etc.. became subjects of theBurmese rulers. But the Karennis, under theirkings and Sawphyas, resisted all attempts ofsubjugation , and four major Karenni statesrepresenting the subtribes generally enjoyedindependence and complete sovereignty.

Even during the British colonial rule of Burma,the British generally treated the Karenni stateslike sovereign states. But when the Britishwithdrew after the Second World War, itincorporated the Karenni States into the Unionof Burma, which included the States of theShans, Arakanese, Kachins, etc. This was thebasis for Burmese occupation of the KarenniStates, and the Karennis have since struggledto free their land from Burmese occupation.

In general, the attitude of the Burmese rulerstoward the minorities is one of the uttercontempt. The majority Burman are descendedfrom the Pyus, a Tibeto-Burman people, whoslowly took over the lands of the variousnationalities, enslaving them or pushing theminto mountainous areas. As late as the 1850's,a Rangoon governor swore to shoot any Karenwho knew how to read. For fear of being rapedby Burmese raiders, women of a Karennisubtribe, the Pedaung, made themselves uglyby wearing neckrings, starting a tradition thatcontinues to this day.

The Burmese rulers have a special form ofpunishment for Karenni leaders that theycapture. In 1948, U Bee Tu Ree, the first headof the Karenni National Organization, was tiedup, dragged by a motorcar to death, placed in abag, and thrown in a river. His body was neverfound. For daring to ask for the land of hispeople, he was deprived of a piece of land forhis burial.

But barbaric methods of torture and rape, andoutright ethnocide, have only fuelled thecontinued resistance of the Karennis and theother minority nationalities in Burma. Thesevarious nationalities have formed their ownarmed groups to oppose Burmese rule. In theattempt to keep the colonial relic state that isthe Union of Burma, the country is almostalways in a state of martial law, with the militarykeeping a tight grip on government. As a result,the minorities are not the only ones oppressed;many Burmese themselves are victimized, andthey too have protested violations of humanrights.

In the middle of 1988, massive studentprotests, joined in by millions of people, sweptBurma. On August 8, the All-Burma StudentsDemocratic League (ABSDL) declared ageneral strike. The military governmentresponded ruthlessly. The soldiers shot thedemonstrators and hunted them down on thestreets. Those captured were tortured, thewomen raped. Some who were found in thehospitals were finished off. There were reportsthat even those still alive were cremated withthe dead. The government put the death toll at500, but other witnesses said the figure couldbe around 10,000.

The brutal crackdown led to the exodus ofstudents to the jungles, and the universitieshave since remained closed all over Burma.The military consolidated its rule through theState Law Order Restoration Council (SLORC)and proceeded to forcibly relocate thepopulations in problematic areas. To softeninternational criticism, the SLORC held nationalelections in 1990, only to be soundly crushedby the National League for Democracy (NLD)led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter ofthe Burmese national hero. The SLORCrefused to turn over power to the winners.

Today, the SLORC has been renamed theState Peace and Development Council(SPDC), and is trying to woo the opposition.But most Burmese and minorities are notconvinced. Meantime, refugee camps have


sprouted along the Thai-Burmese and Bangladesh-Burmeseborders, with refugees estimated to number over a milliondisplaced Karennis, Karens, Shans, Mons, Kachins, etc.

For as long as the Burmese government wants to control the livesof the restive minorities, Burma will likely remain unstable. Anygovernment whose primordial objective is the preservation of theterritorial integrity of a colonial relic state which contains manynationalities will likely become militaristic as this provides themilitary with the perfect excuse to seize and maintain power in thename of national security. But this national security is really thechauvinism of the majority Burmese nationality, a nationality thatthe minorities refuse to identify with.

Thus, the Burmese government is aggressively pursuing all formsof warfare: civilian, military and cultural in order to achieve"Burmanization" of the other nationalities.

In the west where Muslims live, the government is resettlingBuddhists to dilute the population, a strategy of civilian warfarepracticed since ancient times. This is a form of ethnocide byattrition. Where there is open resistance, the military solution isapplied. In "pacified" areas, cultural warfare assumes importancewhen subject peoples are degraded, their languages and culturalpractices banned, and the policy mix of assimilation,marginalization or exclusion is applied to exterminate ethnicidentity and achieve the goal of one national "imaginedcommunity."

But the minorities want self-determination and independence andare quite capable of standing up on their own feet. Only 300,000strong, the Karennis assert that they are a separate nation with aseparate identity and can become a viable independent Karennistate without Burma's control. They have always been a freepeople, and will remain a free people. Thus, in 1992, when he was16 years old, Theh Reh would leave his village in search offreedom. He went to the border where the Karenni resistance hadbuilt schools and hospitals in their freedom bases. These campswere attacked in 1995, forcing thousands of men, women andchildren to enter Thailand and become international refugees.

But within the Karenni State, the Karennis continue with theirresistance. During the day, the Burmese soldiers control the townsthrough sheer number and firepower, but they know that theycannot be assured of their safety because Karenni soldiers canattack them anytime.

In the meantime, the refugees try to make life as normal aspossible in the camps. They appear to be better off than those leftbehind in Karenni State; but their "hearts are dead," and they longto go back to their own homes as a free people. Theh Reh iscurrently studying in the camp, preparing for that glorious moment.

INITIATIVES FOR INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE (IID)27G Galaxy St., GSIS Heights, Matina, Davao City, PHILIPPINESEmail: [email protected] Web Site: www.iidnet.orgTelefax: 63-82-299 2052

ROOTS OF VENGANCE& HATRED

Phar Haw HsuhBurma Issues

Volume 9 Number 11November 1999

I am writing this essaybased upon my experiences

in the Karen revolution,other personal experiences

and discussions withBurman and other ethnicfriends. As I have littlewriting experience, this

essay will containweaknesses. It is also verysubjective. However I amwriting with the honestintention of finding a

solution to the root causesand consequences of

vengeance and hatredbetween the national races

in Burma.

In ancient times, variousethnic groups migrated intothe land today known asBurma. They lived togetherin relative peace as theytilled the land or hunted thejungles. But among thesegroups, some set up feudalsystems to gain control overthe people and theresources. This startedconflicts among some of thegroups as the practice ofslavery and exploitationspread. Those groupswithout strength naturallybecame the tools of strongergroups. As a result, thosewithout strength lost theirland, their houses, and theirlives. Weaker ethnic groups,which were initially united,were scattered into manysmaller groups and spreadacross the land in flight toescape encroaching battles.Some groups almost entirelylost their languages andcultures.


These events have occurred across the courseof history because of the feudalists’ single-minded pursuit of their own willful desires.Some flippantly say that this happens becauseit is a “natural” historical event. But for theauthor, these events are an important part ofBurma’s unique history which must beaccepted and studied carefully. If ethnic groupsknow their exact history then they will be ableto guard against similar oppression in thefuture. Likewise, if they have a good sense ofhistory they will be able to protect theirtraditional land rights and way of life. In order todevelop peace in the land it is very important torecognise the role of history. For a society todevelop peacefully, an understanding andacceptance of true history is essential. Historycannot be made up of lies, nor is it shameful toexpose genuine history. In history, everyonehas made mistakes. History is not simply a toolto identify who is bad and who is good. Wehave to get lessons from history to preventwrongs from taking place again in the future.So true history is very important. Some peopleare willing to say “let bygones be bygones,” butI believe one cannot forget. To forget is tobecome an “historical criminal,” one who fails totake responsibility for history and seek ways tocorrect it. Furthermore, even today, the BurmaArmy and others continue to implement thepractices of the past. This is the root cause ofvengeance and hatred among the people ofBurma. Consequently, revenge takes the formof civil war and other horrendous events whichcontinue to occur even today.

Many people say that these events have takenplace due to the 1947 Constitution which wasconceived while the nation was a British colony.I maintain that this is not the real root cause ofconflict in Burma. The reason is that thislanguage of blame-placing on the colonialists isfrequently used by chauvinists as an excuse forthe realities of today. I accept that, in the past,Westerners were part of the problem. Howeverthe events that have unfolded in the nation arenot purely due to the actions of the British. His-tories, both the oral traditions passed on insongs and poems and more formal writtenhistories tell of centuries of war and oppression.It is even possible to examine the conditionsduring colonization and compare them with thecurrent situation and see that the problemexisted before the colonial history.

The current issue in Burma is also not an issueof democracy or who is in power. If there wasdemocracy or if the opposition group gainedpower but the people didn’t solve the root

causes of the problem, violence and murderwould rear their ugly heads again. Furthermore,because seeds of hatred were planted longago, they are rooted very deeply in the heartsof the people. However, I believe that everyonecan work together to end this problem one day.Today, Burma’s hatred, vengeance and civilwar is not an accident that popped up in thelast few days or via the will of God. If one groupdominates another and does not treat themwith human dignity, then problems will arise.

The terrible suffering of all the ethnic na-tionalities before and through fifty years of civilwar cannot be ended at once. There willcontinue to be terrible personal vengeance untilthe root cause of the problem is identified andsolved. Presently there seems to be littleprogress in this. One reason is that the wrongmedicine is being given to cure the disease.

There is inter-communal distrust, and thosewho have committed wrongs are not brought toaccount for them. Consequently, the victimsdon’t dare to forgive. There is also self-centeredness and egotism. This has allresulted in the long term conflict. It should havefinished long ago, but it has been prolonged.Consequently, everyone has a responsibility toend the hatred and vengeance. In my opinionsevery ethnic group must be involved in thewriting and dissemination of genuine history.Writing such a history would require a processof discussion on the past and continuingproblems in the country. In order for history tobe genuine, all perpetrators, victims and alsoforeigners need to be involved. The British, inparticular, need to be involved as they contrib-uted directly to the ongoing problems. It is alsoof particular importance to this process that amediating ‘third party’ be involved as well. Thisgroup would be made up of persons from allthe national ethnicities, Asian leaders andconcerned and involved members of theinternational community. Included in this groupwould be religious leaders, academics, peoplewith historic ties to Burma, UN officials ormembers of other trans-governmentalorganizations and politicians currentlyconcerned with the country and the region.Most importantly, however, the members ofsuch a team would need to be individualstrusted and respected by all of the partiesinvolved. This outside party would have to helpothers agree to principles before discussions,agree on what issues exactly to discuss, givesuggestions on possible solutions, maintain thebalance between the parties involved, reducetension, ask questions about whether or not


issues are agreed to and helpand encourage participants. Ifthey get agreement from all sides,they have to record it in an officialmanner. They have to discusswhat to do if some group breaksan agreement. So this third partymust be honest, brave,perseverant and patient. In thisway the discussion will be justand they can help find the way tosolve the problems. If they do notwork in this way, they will becomea tool for one of the groups.

While a mediating group wouldhave a significant role in suchnegotiations, they only assist inthe process. In order to workeffectively towards a solution tothe conflict in Burma, everyoneneeds to understand the reasonwhy hatred has happened, under-stand the feelings of those whohave suffered, and seek creativeways to change the presentnegative situation. Every groupmust accept the differences thatexist between them: religious,cultural, ethnic, racial, etc....Honest mutual respect basedupon human dignity is necessaryand it must be taught on thegrassroots level to every ethnicgroup. This is one way to destroyhatred, to create a new countrythat everybody can participate in.In this way we can build justiceand lasting true peace for ourcountry and our people.

BURMA ISSUESP.O. Box 1076Silom Post OfficeBangkok 10504, THAILANDEmail: [email protected]

Junta Dreams or Nightmares?Observations of Burma’s Military since 1988

Mary P. CallahanBulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars

Volume 31, Number 3July – September 1999

More than a decade after taking power in a bloodycrackdown on a nationwide pro-democracy movement, theBurmese military junta appears unencumbered byinternational and domestic reprobation of its authoritarianpractices. The junta has barely flinched in the face of thesuspension of economic aid, the imposition of an armsembargo, the ban on U.S. visas for senior junta leaders andthe 1997 ban on new investment in Burma by U.S. citizens.Throughout the last decade of junta rule, rumors of militaryfactions, elite in-fighting (“hard-liners vs. soft-liners”), armymutinies, desertions of foot soldiers, a Chinese takeover, andthe outright demise of the regime have been notable for theirfrequency, optimism, and inaccuracy. All around them,Burma’s military rulers watch authoritarian regimes crumble.And nothing seems to change in Burma.

Or does it? In fact, today’s tatmadaw (Burmese, for “armedforces”) looks very different from the army that took over in1988. In ten years, the tatmadaw has expanded from186,000 to 370,000 members and spent more than $1 billionon 140 new combat aircraft, 30 naval vessels, and numerousrocket launch systems, tanks, armored personnel carriers,and other hardware.1 In terms of personnel, material,command and control, and counterinsurgency capabilities,this is a bigger, smarter army with a lot more firepower thanits predecessor in 1988.

But all this gain and growth cannot come without a certainamount of institutional and personal pain. And with any kindof transformation, the consequences may not line up with theintentions of the architects. In fact, two specific outcomes –the unprecedented rise in power of army regionalcommanders and the emergence of a potential generationalschism in the officer corps – render today’s tatmadaw thenemesis of both pro-reform and pro-junta forces. Theconstruction of this bigger, more imposing army may fulfill thedreams of the frustrated generals who seized power in 1988,but it turns out that the fulfillment of this dream has madebedfellows of the generals and the pro-reform opposition, asboth share the same nightmare. As anti-junta forcesencompassing such diverse elements as Jessie Helms,Human Rights Watch, Madeline Albright, and expatriate Bur-mese groups wait for U.S. economic sanctions to destroy thepower of the military junta, the tatmadaw generals face amuch more formidable peril created not by the sanctioningWest, but by themselves.


The Rise of Regional Commanders

Perhaps the most unmistakable change duringthe rule of the State Law and Order RestorationCouncil and its successor, the State Peace andDevelopment Council,2 lies in the ascent ofregional commanders. While the mansions,luxury cars, and royalty-like treatment of theseofficers are visible to anyone traveling outsideof Rangoon, it is interesting that one of themost poignant displays of the devolution ofarmy power comes inside the Armed ForcesMuseum in the heart of Rangoon. In themuseum, the second floor is devoted to aseries of colorful Buddhist-style shrines, withportraits of regional commanders taking theexalted place of Lord Buddha. Interwovenamong displays of antiques, agriculturalproducts, and models of tatmadaw-built bridgesare fanciful, jataka-style paintings of theregional commanders, doing good works intheir areas of responsibility.3 These are all setin a multimedia environment, as nappingmuseum employees awaken at the sound ofvisitors’ footsteps, quickly plug in a tape player,and treat guests taking in the sites to tunessuch as “It’s a Small World After All.” as theytake in the sights. By comparison, the dingier,quieter third floor takes us through dustydioramas and bland, black-and-white photos ofhigher-ranking generals who happen to becabinet ministers. Not surprisingly, the airconditioners seem to function only on thesecond floor.

The museum layout reflects the unambiguousrise in status of regional commanders duringthe 1990s. After the 1988 takeover, three newregional commands were established (bringingthe total to 12) and regional commanders weregiven formal authority over law and order intheir territory. Given the turbulence of the 1988uprising throughout the country and the hu-miliating defeat suffered by the army-backedNational Unity Party (NUP) in the 1990 election,the Rangoon junta soon gave regionalcommanders informal, de facto authority overanything they were interested in. While therewas variation from one part of the country toanother, regional commanders – at the behestof the junta – eliminated political dissent,dismantled the old socialist state and party,negotiated new or transformed administrativeand economic arrangements, and along theway began to resemble the warlords of earlytwentieth century China. Lacking any centralcapacity to do so, SLORC asked them to buildroads, housing, markets, suburbs; to rearrangepopulations to accommodate tourism and other

industries; and to enhance surveillance andcrowd control capabilities. This built a ricketyyet enduring state apparatus at least for nowbeholden to the whims of regionalcommanders. While the power and wealth ofarmy field commanders has waxed and wanedsince Burma gained independence from Britainin 1948, at no point did upcountry commandersever approach the degree of political andeconomic clout that they have accumulatedunder this regime. In fact, in the years leadingup to the 1988 uprising, regional commanderswere rotated systematically every three years;by the time a regional commander put downroots and consolidated personal authority in aregion, he would be transferred elsewhere.

Throughout the 1990s, tensions have mountedbetween powerful regional commanders andthe Rangoon-based junta leadership. Forexample, two days after Gen. Than Shwe re-placed Sr. Gen. Saw Maung as junta chair inan April 1992 palace coup in Rangoon,government newspapers carried a front-pagephoto of the four Upper Burma regionalcommanders ostensibly gathered in Mandalayfor an opening ceremony of a new departmentstore. Not exactly avid shoppers, they hadanother message that was clear to all,especially the audience in the capital:Reshuffles in Rangoon mean nothing withoutthe approval of the upcountry bosses. Inanother instance, SLORC struggled to curb theincipient warlordism of upcountry regionalcommanders throughout the first half of 1993,and finally managed to lure the most powerfulcommanders to Rangoon where they took onlucrative portfolios (e.g., Trade and Tourism)and where SLORC could tighten its control overthem.

More recently, the November 1997reorganization of the junta into the State Peaceand Development Council resulted in large partfrom the same kinds of tensions. The reshuffleallowed the junta’s top four leaders to purge themost corrupt cabinet ministers (some of whomhad launched their illicit empires while servingas regional commanders), to “demote” most ofthe regional commanders by assigning themministerial portfolios in Rangoon, and to placerelatively junior flag officers in regionalcommands and on the junta itself for the firsttime in the decade. Does this mean Rangoonand the junta won a decisive victory to establishcentral control? This seems very unlikely, aseven these more junior regional commandersquickly will appreciate the opportunities forpersonal gain and the inadequacy of


Rangoon’s support for or control over theiractivities.

Re-centering Power in the Future?

In the future, these tensions may not beresolvable by cabinet and command reshuffles.If the center demands greater control overupcountry resources and the commanders balk,the Rangoon regime – whether it is this junta ora democratic government – will have to findsome kind of compensation or incentive for fieldcommanders to give up their power and wealth.To date, the Rangoon-based junta has trieddifferent mechanisms to entice regionalcommanders to toe the regime line, but nonehave seriously changed the organizational setup that devolves power to military commandersupcountry.

The junta-backed civic organization, the UnionSolidarity and Development Association(USDA), represents a possible check on thepower of regional commanders. Organized in1993 to mobilize the population in support ofthe junta, the USDA has grown into a complexbureaucratic organization with a territorialstructure that parallels that of both the juntaadministration and the military field commands.All government employees are required to jointhe USDA and to attend periodic government-sponsored rallies that draw as many as100,000 people in major urban areas. Nearlyhalf of the purported 10 million members areclaimed to have received “nurturing andtraining” from the regime’s hand-picked USDAleaders.4 One component of the training ismilitary, and USDA groups have been deployedto intimidate junta opposition and rally supportfor the regime.5 The organization hasdeveloped extensive economic holdings, whichinclude local bus monopolies, fish ponds, ricemilling, construction, and real estate. There areindications that the junta leaders in the capitalhave tried to keep the territorial structure underthe USDA under Rangoon’s authority; Sr. Gen.Than Shwe, for example, as benefactor of theUSDA, frequently visits regional and local-levelUSDA organizations. These visits often end upas the lead story on the evening news.However, the extensive economic holdings ofthe USDA throughout the country can functiononly with the cooperation of regionalcommanders, who in many cases use theseenterprises and the mass organization for theirown purposes.6

Another possible check on the power of theregional commanders has emerged from the

War Office. As the junta has devolved day-to-day authority over local affairs to the regionalcommanders over the last ten years, the armyhigh command at the same time was busybuilding an expansive network of militaryorganizations and facilities at least nominallyunder the control of Rangoon-based militarydirectorates.7 The construction of numerousarmy schools, universities, and hospitals, aswell as new military intelligence branches, theOffice of Strategic Studies, and other militaryunits at the national level all representadditional sources of patronage and powercontrolled at least officially from armyheadquarters. However, it is important to notethat the regional commanders frequently havede facto control over the regional branches ofthese politico-military organizations, as well asover admissions to the better hospitals and theassignment of places in army schools outsideof Rangoon, thus decentralizing the actualinfluence created by this institution-building.8

If the Rangoon junta and the army highcommand lack the resources and power toconfront authoritatively the regionalcommanders, are there regional elites whomight rise to challenge the tatmadaw warlordsin their own fiefdoms? As of now, the mostserious contenders would be the leaders ofdrug trafficking armies in the opium-producingand heroin-refining areas near the borders.Prior to 1989, most of the border regions werewar zones in which some minority groupsfought against the tatmadaw for varyingdegrees of autonomy or independence. After1989, SLORC concluded 17 cease-fireagreements with rebel armies. Some ofSLORC‘s ceasefire partners such as the UnitedWa State Army and the Myanmar NationalDemocratic Alliance Army (MNDAA, KokangChinese) remain heavily armed and extensivelyinvolved in the heroin trade.9 Some of theseleaders, such as Khun Sa, have ended theiranti-Rangoon insurgencies and establishedlegal financial, tourist, and other enterprises inRangoon. As these drug traffickers have begunthe process of integrating themselves and theirdrug profits into the mainstream economy ofcentral Burma, it is possible that they maysomeday find their economic and politicalinterests in conflict with those of the regionalcommanders. But given how small the actualterritory is that is controlled by the ethnic drug-trafficking armies, it is just as likely thatcommanders and drug traffickers will reachsome kind of mutually profitableaccommodation that may once againmarginalize Rangoon.10


The only other possible challenge to thewarlordism of the regional commanders wouldcome from the pro-democracy opposition, theNational League for Democracy. Led by AungSan Suu Kyi (daughter of national hero, AungSan), the NLD won 392 seats out of a possible485 in the 1990 election, indicative of both thepopularity of the party and the ability of theparty to organize the electorate throughout thecountryside. However, over the last nine years,the junta has destroyed the party by arresting,torturing, intimidating, and buying off partyleaders, elected members of parliament, andNLD sympathizers. This has left the NLD withan extremely popular, charismatic leader inAung San Suu Kyi, and no channels throughwhich to organize opposition to either the juntaor its regional commanders far beyond her owncompound in Rangoon. As a result of thisrepression, the NLD leaders have feltcompelled to practice tight control under acentral executive committee and have not beenable to build an upcountry apparatus that couldchallenge or even force any kind ofcompromise with the upcountry regionalcommanders. The NLD also has had littlesuccess in allaying the concerns of some ethnicminority leaders, who see the organization asnarrowly Burman-centric and tainted by theleadership roles played by former senior armyofficers such as Tin Oo and Aung Shwe.Without the support of leaders of ethnicminorities, who constitute 35 percent of thenational population, it will be difficult for theNLD to challenge the power of the regionalmilitary commanders or the junta in Rangoon.11

Generational Change

The second source of concern for both theregime and the opposition lies in the increasingexperiential gulf between senior and juniorofficers in the tatmadaw. This problem ofgenerational schism is relatively new for thisarmy. It was not until 1988 that Burmaexperienced its first major generation change inarmy leadership circles. This occurred whenformer General Ne Win resigned after 26 yearsat the helm of the army and the country andwas replaced by a junta made up of officerswith no World War II or “revolutionary”experience. What we have seen over the lastdecade in Burma is the post-Ne Win generationof military leaders reasserting the power,influence, and priorities of the tatmadaw, whichhad diminished under the rule of the BurmaSocialist Program Party (1962-1988). After adecade of SLORC/SPDC rule, army leadersare now far more in charge of the national

political apparatus than they were under theBSPP. At times they appear frankly disdainfulof the old generation, particularly of Ne Win’srole in fostering the crisis of 1988, which led tothe enormous loss of prestige for the army.

Moreover, this second generation of leaderscomes out of different formative experiencesthan its predecessor, which must influence tosome degree their values, decisions, andtactics. These army officers never led soldiersinto battle against external threats, except forthe few at the very top who were first com-missioned when independent Burma faced itsonly major external enemy on Burmese soil(the U.S.-backed Kuomintang in the 1950s).Instead, the combat experience of both thejunta leaders and their immediate juniors(colonels and one- and two-star flag officers)came in domestic counterinsurgencycampaigns that met with varying degrees ofsuccess.12 By the mid-1970s the armysuccessfully had eliminated nearly all remainingpockets of insurgents in central Burma, butlacked the resources, material, andinfrastructure to reoccupy contested territory inthe frontier regions or to achieve decisiveresults against any major insurgent group. Ininterviews in 1991, 1995, and 1997, a numberof retired and active-duty army officerscomplained to the author that the tatmadawcould have unified Burma 20 years ago had theruling BSPP committed the resourcesnecessary to achieve that objective. Thecollapse of the BSPP in 1988 cleared the wayfor correcting this mistake. It is important toremember that all along, these officers werekilling fellow citizens, not foreign enemies.Hence the command relationship thatSLORC/SPDC has reinvigorated with itspopulation is hardly surprising.

What about the future “new" generations ofarmy leaders? Will the political pendulum swingback, bringing the junior officers to the side ofpro-democracy reformers? For the first time inthis army’s history, the “military” experience ofofficers commissioned over the last ten years isunlikely to include extensive involvement incombat. In fact, officers as high ranking asmajors and in some cases lieutenant colonelstoday probably have less war-fighting thanroad-building experience. This is not to suggestthat road-building is a new job for thetatmadaw. Today’s senior officers also wereinvolved in infrastructure and civic projects inthe 1970s, but those were projects that werepart of a counterinsurgency war effort. Thisdistinction became clear during a September


1997 conversation with a lieutenant colonelfrom the infantry who was supervising theconstruction of a road in Rakhine State inwestern Burma. This officer – who wasextremely articulate and very intelligent – wasbored to death, serving his visitors tea, askingabout new books, talking about the Asianeconomic crisis and its effects on his family’sfortunes. When asked whether he thought thisrather unimpressive road would survive thecoming rains, he shook his head and shrugged.When asked who would use the road – tourists,soldiers, traders, peasants – he replied, “Mostlikely, nobody.” On the surface, this scene wasprobably not unlike a scene one might havecome across one or two decades earlier. Thislieutenant colonel had a few soldiers under hiscommand, and a flock of young children andfarmers piling up and rearranging rocks onwhat used to be a bullock track. But in one veryimportant dimension, this lieutenant colonel’slife in no way approximated that of a lieutenantcolonel who might have supervised road-building in 1977. At that time, there wasurgency: his road would transport troops andmaterial to a battle where he hoped hiscomrades and military academy classmatescould stay alive. In 1997, the road had nopurpose and the officer was bored.

This anecdote suggests that it is unlikely thattoday’s junior officers will come out of their mid-careers with the same sense of siege andthreat that today’s senior officers have. Doesthis mean that the junior officers will be moreopen to reforms? Will their experiencessupervising conscript labor in infrastructureprojects throughout the countryside make themmore sympathetic to the needs of the workers,farmers, and other less fortunate folks insociety? May be. Such a scenario played out in1973-1976 in Thailand, when the YoungMilitary Officers Group (in Thai, “Khana ThahanNum”; also known as, “The Thai Young Turks”)was formed. In a situation that might one dayconfront today‘s junior tatmadaw officers, theYoung Turks came to view their senior officersas thoroughly corrupted by capital, which hadresulted in both operational failures incounterinsurgency campaigns and a seriousloss of the military’s prestige among thepopulace. Championing the cause of socialjustice for all and moral virtue among nationalleaders, the Young Turks influenced successfulcoups in 1977 and 1980, but ultimately in 1981and 1985 were crushed in their subsequentcoup attempts.13 However, one big differencebetween the pro-reform Thai Young Turks andjunior officers in today’s tatmadaw is that the

Thai officers had been commissioned straightinto the Vietnam War and later gelled as apolitical organization as they watched civilianofficials frustrate army efforts to end internalinsurgency. The older generation of Thai armyand national leaders was getting these youngofficers and their troops killed in underfunded,poorly strategized counterinsurgencycampaigns. Their sense of urgency for reformof both the military and the political system wasparamount. It is difficult to know whether juniortatmadaw officers will ever feel a similar senseof life-or-death urgency.

Moreover, the tatmadaw’s increasinginvolvement in infrastructure projects is notnecessarily going to create commonalties ofinterest between the population and officers.Here it is important to note that the officerscommissioned after graduation from theDefence Services Academy at Maymyo areamong the very few young Burmese to haveobtained university degrees over the lastdecade. With civilian universities closed formost of the last ten years while armyacademies and institutes have rapidlyexpanded their enrollments, the gap betweeneducated and uneducated has grownprecipitously.14 It is more likely that workingamong the people will reaffirm army distrust ofand disdain for the uneducated population. Infact, one journalist reports that oppositionleader Aung San Suu Kyi told him that sheconsidered senior military leaders to be farmore reasonable and open to her ideas thanthe more rigid, less tolerant junior officers.15

Furthermore, the ethno-geographical limitationson the officer corps cannot be ignored in thisevaluation. Since most of the officers are of themajority Burman ethnicity and speak nominority languages, those projects under way inthe border regions are more likely to sowdivisiveness and antipathy than any sense ofempathy.

The Tatmadaw Edifice:Monolithic or Cracked?

Building this huge, powerful army wasunquestionably the dream of the post-Ne Win,post-1988 generation of national and armyleaders. However, the resultant rise to power ofthe regional commanders and the increasinglyuncharted territory separating junior and seniorofficers may turn this dream into a nightmare inthe months and years to come. Whether thesecenter-periphery or generational tensions willfracture the army into factions that mobilize


officers to dismantle existing governing andcommand structures in the future, there is nodoubt that these tensions have vexed theSLORC/SPDC throughout the 1990s.

Why haven’t these divisions produced a mutinyin the ranks or a regime-threatening challenge?Historically, the tatmadaw has remained byAsian standards remarkably unified. Over thelast five decades, as the officer corps inThailand, Indonesia, and the Philippinesperiodically have been torn apart by politicallymobilized factionalism, tatmadaw leadershiphas never been seriously threatened bychallenges from within the ranks.16 During thelast decade, three factors probably account forthe continued cohesion of the officer corps.First, dismantling the socialist economy andstate has opened up a vast array of patronageopportunities over which the army hasundisputed control. This has enabled individualarmy officers and non-commissioned officers tobuy valuable land at cheap prices, receiveundermarket loans to launch businesses(sometimes in their wives’ and children’snames), and channel wealth and resourcestoward private businesspeople in exchange forsubstantial rewards. At the institutional level,Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings, Ltd.(UMEH) has grown into the largest indigenousfirm with registered capital of ten billion kyat(US$ 1.4 billion at the official exchange rate).Founded in 1990 to provide off-budget incometo finance army expansion, UMEH is ownedjointly by the Directorate of DefenseProcurement (40%) and retired and active-dutydefense services personnel (60 percent).UMEH controls the lucrative gem trade inBurma, and all major foreign investors enter theBurma market via a joint venture with UMEH.Given that there is no public reporting of UMEHfinances, the company thus operates animmense off-budget slush fund on behalf ofmilitary leadership, which no doubt has helpedto ensure the continued loyalty of officers whomight otherwise be disgruntled with highcommand and junta policies. 17

Second, the 1990s saw a dramatic expansionof intelligence capabilities, aimed not only ateliminating political opposition among thecivilian population but also at compelling loyaltyand unity within the tatmadaw ranks. After1988, the Directorate of Defence ServicesIntelligence (DDSI) greatly expanded its per-sonnel, capabilities and territorial presence.18

Three of the 23 DDSI intelligence detachmentsare responsible for surveillance of army, navy,and air force personnel. These detachments

rely on informers from within the ranks, anddossiers are compiled on units and individualsin the military. The extent of DDSI infiltrationinto the ranks is unclear, but it is popularlyperceived to be deep and widespread. Thisperception represents a formidable constrainton plots and conspiracies among aggrievedsoldiers as well as senior officers. Additionally,as individuals and units have taken advantageof the explosion of patronage opportunities –especially in the early 1990s – DDSI hastracked their formal and informal economicactivities. Since many of these activities are ofmarginal legality, DDSI maintains greatleverage in ensuring continued obedience.

Third, however tense relations among militaryofficers have been, these difficulties pale incomparison with the degree of enmity betweenthe military and the politically mobilizedpopulation in 1988. Among the officer corps,there is an entrenched “us-vs.-them,” siegementality in which the military (“us”) always hasdone the right thing and the citizenry (“them”)has often been dangerously misguided, as inthe 1988 uprising. Propaganda campaigns inpopular magazines, on ever-present red-and-white billboards, and in sloganeering duringtelevision commercial breaks remind “them”that “Anyone who tries to break up theTatmadaw is our enemy” and “No matter whotries to divide us [the tatmadaw], we will alwaysremain united.” Whatever generational or otherkinds of cracks have threatened the structuralsoundness of the armed forces, no significantcontingent in the tatmadaw has questioned theproposition that the army, its soldiers, and alltheir perquisites are protected only when firmlyunified against the population.

Do these three inducements to loyalty –patronage, surveillance, and the siegementality – guarantee long-term, monolithiccohesion for the armed forces against popularsentiments? There are signs that the regimedoes not think so. The expansion of intelligencecollection inside the armed forces alonesuggests that tatmadaw leadership is worriedabout intra-military threats. Additionally, thebreakneck recruitment of an additional 180,000troops into the armed forces over the last 10years – although probably initiated for otherreasons, such as for rebuilding the post-Socialist state and army – has created anorganizational nightmare for anyone who mightseek to challenge the army leadership (in boththe War Office in Rangoon and the regionalcommands). Army leaders have positionedunits throughout the country, thus reminding


both the population and unhappy officers thatthe junta has more firepower than anyone else.Interestingly, at a 1998 conference sponsoredby the regime, a Malaysian colonelrecommended the downsizing of the tatmadawto promote military modernization; thetatmadaw respondent emphatically denouncedthe idea.19

The most pervasive sign that the regime isconcerned about the reliability of the military isfound throughout the public realm in theregime’s extensive propaganda campaigns.While most observers interpret the bizarresloganeering campaigns as a sign of theregime’s isolation from the desires andconcerns of the Burmese citizenry, this viewmisses important components of this campaignthat are directed as much at the military officercorps and other ranks as they are at the rest ofthe population.20 Also, the slogans representonly the surface of a deeper nationalreinvention process, which SLORC/SPDC hasrooted in a series of historiographical andcultural projects aimed at reconstructingnational identity. After 26 years of rewritinghistory to explain the teleology of Burmesesocialism, SLORC immediately created a newgrowth industry in writing tatmadaw-centeredhistory. One of the first projects that the juntaassigned the Committee for the Compilation ofAuthentic Data of Myanmar History wasresearch toward a history of the tatmadaw, laterpublished in five volumes by the Committee’ssuccessor organization, the Myanmar HistoricalCommission.21 Over the last decade, science,cultural, and national and local historymuseums have popped up all over Rangoonand the rest of the country. Built by particularministries, regional commands or armed forcesdirectorates, all of them revere the tatmadaw ascentral to the narrative of progress and nationalhistory. To the outside observer, it seems that ifthe tatmadaw were as central to the identity ofthe nation and to the well-being of every citizen,massive historiographical and cultural projectssuch as these would not be necessary.Furthermore, it is interesting to note that theaudience of these readings and museums doesnot seem to be the general population. Onvisits to many of these museums in 1995 and1997, I found mostly young army soldiers andrecruits in attendance and few civilians otherthan bussed-in schoolchildren.

One final sign of regime nervousness lies in theexpanding activities of the military intelligenceOffice of Strategic Studies (OSS), anorganization that recently has been attributed

with near omnipotence in Burma’s politicalrealm.22 OSS was founded in 1994, probablyfor these two reasons: to create a new four-stargeneral billet so that there would be one tojustify Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt’s promotion toGeneral, and to create a semi-academicinstitution similar to strategic studies think tankselsewhere in the Association of SoutheastAsian Nations (Asean), thus giving Burma a“one-and-a-half-track” seat at Aseangatherings.23 Since then, OSS departmentsappear to have taken on responsibilities forcoordinating and perhaps even initiatingpolicies in areas as significant as the drugtrade, the economy, ethnic affairs, and foreignaffairs. With “strategy” broadly defined, OSSalso has overseen research projects aimed atexpanding SLORC‘s historiographicalrevolution initiated in the early 1990s.Specifically, OSS has attempted to historicizethe modern nation and to place Burma atorigins of all human progress. Toward that end,OSS took charge of the Pondaung PrimateFossil Exploration archaeological project. Withlittle or no archaeological expertise, the dig hasproduced specious claims that fossils found inthe Pondaung region prove that “humancivilization began in our motherland”24 and thatharmony among all ethnic groups existed inBurma all the way back to the Neolithicperiod.25 Although the historical improbability ofthese claims is striking to outsiders, it isimportant to remember that OSS would notmake such implausible claims unless seniormilitary officials perceived a need todemonstrate an inviolable past to justify theirstranglehold over a shakier present. And moregenerally, OSS‘s apparent consolidation ofcoordinating authority over everything fromfossils to foreign affairs would never haveoccurred had the ad hoc nature of SLORC’searlier policies not been so seriously deficientin implementation. By the mid-1990s, it wasclear that SLORC rule wasn’t working, and asvarious members of the junta scrambled to findappropriate solutions, OSS materialized underthe aegis of Gen. Khin Nyunt.

To conclude, it is important to read the 1990snot as a story of the building of an omnipotentmonolith, but as a story of attempts toobfuscate the failures of monolithic military rule.There are cracks in the tatmadaw edifice, themost serious of which are the center-peripherydisputes between regional commanders andthe junta and inter-generational tensions.These cracks have produced structuralunsoundness demanding repairs. The history ofSLORC/SPDC rule is a history of these repairs.


Burma/Myanmar:How Strong is the Military Regime?

Report21 December 2000

International Crisis Group

This report, the first in a proposed series, is apreliminary assessment of the strengths andvulnerabilities of the State Peace andDevelopment Council (SPDC), the militaryregime ruling Burma/Myanmar. Its purpose is toprovide essential background – not at thisstage policy prescriptions – for policy makersaddressing the prospects for non-violentdemocratic transition in the country and ways toachieve that transition.

Despite the international attention whichBurma/Myanmar continues to attract, there arelarge and important gaps in publicly availableinformation about the personalities who leadthe SPDC, about the operations and state ofthe armed forces, and about the situation inmany parts of the country and inside importantgroups, such as the students and the monks. Acomplete and reliable picture of the strengthsand vulnerabilities of the SPDC will require afurther major research effort.

But the outlines of that picture are reasonablyclear: a regime which is presently very strongand comfortable in its resistance to internal andexternal pressures for change, but which is nottotally invulnerable, particularly in terms of itscapacity to maintain tight military control of theentire country.

The military government in Burma/Myanmardoes presently appear to be as strong as at anytime in the country's history. It controls allpublic aspects of the country's political life andimportant parts of the private sector economy.It has put in place all of the institutional means,including a robust and well-organised domesticintelligence apparatus, needed to ensure thecontinuity of military rule. It is showing noweakening in its determination to hold on topower.

The modernisation of the armed forces since1989 has delivered the regime unprecedentedmilitary successes against ethnic insurgencies.Over the decade, the government has brokeredcease-fire agreements with seventeen of itsformer foes, including the most powerful narco-armies, such as the United Wa State Army(UWSA). The regime partially opened up

Burma/Myanmar's economy after 1988prompting new levels of foreign directinvestment, particularly in the oil and gassector, into the early 1990s. The country hasachieved positive economic growth through thewhole of the last decade at the national level,though this has been from a low base and isprobably not as high as the reported averageannual GDP growth of about 5 per cent. Thedrug trade has become a significant factor inthe overall economy and the regime hasobtained vital revenue from reinvestment ofnarcotics profits.

Despite its considerable strength, the regime'sstranglehold on power does have somevulnerabilities, the most important of which maylie within the armed forces – precisely that partof the Burmese governing order about whichthe outside world knows least. The mostsignificant vulnerability here is simply over-stretch. The more extended the military's reachhas become in areas previously controlled byethnic insurgents, the more vulnerable theregime's control becomes, and it isquestionable whether it has the sophistication,capacity and management tools to make andimplement the necessary fine judgementsabout how far to extend its operations. There isalready some evidence that the regime cannotfeed its soldiers in the far-flung outposts. Afour-fold salary increase for the armed forcesreported in April 2000 is another suggestedpointer to the scale of the problem.

The ethnic armies, although most of them forthe moment are not fighting SPDC forces, willremain a potential threat if only because theyretain all their weapons. These groups aresignificantly weaker and somewhat moredemoralised than ever before, but the cease-fires were not exclusively the result of militarydefeat at the hands of government forces. TheSPDC regime had to make promises to securethe agreements, such as offering a role indrafting a new Constitution, and these will needto be kept if the regime is to continue to reapthe political gains from the cease-fires.

There is no doubt that popular discontent inBurma/Myanmar is profound, with regimesuccess coming at the cost of sustainedbrutalisation of the civil population, includingforced labour and forced migration. But it isunclear just how politically focused thediscontent is, and whether or in what ways itcould threaten the SPDC. The politicalopposition, primarily the National League forDemocracy (NLD) continues to mount a


challenge to the legitimacy of the militaryregime and will remain an important irritant to it.But the NLD's points of leverage inside thecountry for weakening the SPDC's grip onpower are few, and it is difficult to be optimisticabout it achieving change in the near term.

Internationally, the SPDC is in a strongposition. It has major allies, particularly China,which has been supplying it with militaryequipment in large amounts. Its otherneighbours (ASEAN countries and India) andsome near-neighbours (Taiwan and HongKong) have been expanding relations with it.Burma/Myanmar has been denied bilateralmilitary sales and multilateral economic aidfrom most developed countries and these andother sanctions do at least continue to registerthe moral and political unacceptability of theregime. The robust role of the InternationalLabour Organisation (ILO) in investigating andcondemning forced labour, and likely follow upmoves by other UN agencies, will also helpensure that the SPDC's position remains asubject of considerable international politicalcontest. But actual and threatened sanctions,and other forms of international isolation, haveso far done little to undermine the regime'ssurvival.

The challenge for the international communityis to find ways – having regard to the regime'sapparent strengths and vulnerabilities – tointensify the pressure upon it to accommodatepeaceful democratic transition. A crucial relatedissue is how, in achieving that transition, tosupport the democratic opposition forces withinthe country in ways that are notcounterproductive. Future reports by ICG willseek to address these issues.

Fatal Attraction

The IrrawaddyVol.8 No.3

March twenty-seventh is a special day for theBurmese armed forces as it commemorates thefifty-fifth anniversary of the Burma NationalArmy’s resistance against the Japaneseoccupation. Many soldiers march in paradesand receive jasmine garlands around their neckfrom admiring young women who gather withcrowds to watch the procession.

Like many of the armies of the region, theBurmese military gained an exalted position insociety for its role in the struggle forindependence. But under Gen Ne Win’stutelage, the military’s reputation has suffered,as its engagements have not been against theBritish and Japanese imperialists, but againstBurmese. Surprisingly, however, half a centurylater, the military remains a sought after careerchoice and retains a degree of popularity inBurma, despite the low standard of living formany soldiers and its involvement in forcefulsuppression of civilians.

Life in the Burmese army is difficult for many ofits rank and file. Aside from the danger ofcombat with insurgents, soldiers face a host ofhardships: beatings, isolation from theirfamilies, and lack of proper food and shelter.

Many soldiers are underpaid, as militarycommanders withhold their soldiers’ pay as ameans to pay for basic supplies. Naing Oo, aformer member of Light Infantry Battalion (LIB)283 in Karen State, reported receiving 850 kyat(less than three US dollars at the black marketrate) per month, not enough to help his family.He added that often officers would steal rationsfrom subordinates who were left to beg.

Officers deduct fees for clothes, food and otheressentials from salaries of those under theircommand. These days, quite forgotten, border-based soldiers receive no supplies at all. Theoutcome is: cases of theft and looting inneighboring countries, particularly in Thailand.

Faced with daily hardship, some soldiers desertor defect. “Many defectors come, not becauseof support for the opposition, but because theydon’t like the army,” according to a dissidentbased in Thailand.


One army defector, Myo Win Zaw, wasarrested in Rangoon for not having an ID card.Given the choice between prison or the army,he chose the latter. After four months of traininghe was sent to LIB 205 in Karen State.

Recruitment comes from volunteers, townshiplotteries, and imprisonment. However, somesoldiers volunteer to join as a way to a betterlife. In her study of the Burmese military titledSchool of Rape, Betsy Apple writes that, “TheTatmadaw is able to continually expand itsranks not only because the profession ofsolider is still seen as noble and heroic, butalso because there are few alternative jobs inBurma.”

One ethnic-Karen Tatmadaw sergeant from Pa-an explains, “When I was in school, we weretaught about the good things of the Tatmadaw,Gen Aung San and how Burma got itsindependence. That’s why I wanted to becomea member of the Tatmadaw.” He has since leftthe army and now lives in Mae Sot.

For some soldiers, especially those witheducation, the military offers opportunity. SaysKo Htun Ngwe, a former student activist, “Someof my old friends have joined the military. Theywere classmates at Rangoon University andwere even involved with the 8-8-88 protest andwent to the border afterwards.” Later theyreturned to Burma and became officers in thearmy. “For them this is the best way of life,” headded.

While top leaders and high-ranking officers inRangoon enjoy special privileges and wealth,border- and provincial-based soldiers find life isnot getting better. “There is a big gap betweenus, no justice,” said Aung Kyaw Zan, anArakanese, who joined the army in the 1990s.He and two other soldiers fled to border areaslast year.

Membership in the military is a means to makea living in the midst of a stagnant economy.Difficult-to-get government permits can beobtained easily by officers and their familymembers engaged in business. A Rangoonbusinessman laments in disgust, “Either youhave green (US dollars) or real khaki green, oryou can’t do business and make real money inmy country.”

To Love and Hate the Tatmadaw

While the military has soiled its once cleanreputation by firing on civilians, it still retains

support, especially in Burman dominated areas.Repeatedly, the military has been called out tosuppress protests against the government.Notably, students were fired upon in 1962,1974 and 1988. In ethnic areas, insurgents andethnic minorities have born the brunt of themilitary’s use of force for even longer.

Zaw Zaw, a former student activist based inThailand, was shocked by the preferencesshown for the military by female Burmesemigrants in the border town of Mae Sot. “Theystill wanted to marry a soldier,” he said.

When asked about the public’s resentmenttowards the military for its harsh treatment ofcivilians, Ma Mya, a student in the US,responded, “Everyone in Burma knowssomeone in the army.” Presumably, this makesit harder to place blame.

One former army officer living in exile explainshow he carried out difficult orders. “When theorder comes from above, whether you agree ornot, you must do it,” he said.

The Karen sergeant recounts that before 1988,his friends and classmates welcomed himwarmly when he visited his home in Pa-an onleave. “But after the ‘88 affair, they didn’t evenwant to speak to me,” he added.

Since 1988, the military has tried to refine theimage of its officers to counter critiques of theopposition that they are uneducated brutes.According to sources, the government hasencouraged officers to use knife and fork,rather than their hands, when eating. They arealso urged to marry women with some kind ofeducational background.

However, it will take more than cosmeticchanges for the Tatmadaw to return to itsformer pedestal. As Moe Min, a computerexpert based in Thailand says, “Before 1988, Iliked the military, but now I don’t. But I don’thate them all. Some soldiers are very good.They hate the military, but they are so scared.”


Endeavours of the Myanmar ArmedForces Government for National

Reconsolidation

State Peace and Development Council2000

Introduction

There are 135 principal ethnic races, in theUnion of Myanmar. During the long historywhen Myanmar was an independent, sovereignnation, these many national races lived in unityand harmony, both in times of weal and woe. Itwas only when the country became a colony ofthe British did this unity breakdown due to the'Divide and Rule'' administrative policy of theBritish. Unity between the national races wasthus disrupted and hostility andmisunderstandings became rife. The mischiefmade by the colonial rulers created a host ofproblems and the newly independent countrywas left with a legacy of armed strife andinsurgency. In addition to the disunity, many ofthe patriotic youths, who had participated in thefight for independence, had in the course oftheir struggle, also been brainwashed withdifferent ideologies, both of the right and leftvarieties. These irreconcilable differences inpolitical persuasion and ideological outlook atthe time of independence also exacerbated thesituation. Adding fuel to the fire were the easilyavailable arms and ammunition left scatteredthroughout the country which had been abattleground of the Second World War. Thesewere the main factors that led to the birth of theinternal armed insurrection together withindependence. Soon after independence wasdeclared on 4th January, 1948, the BurmaCommunist Party headed by Thakin Than Tunchose to go underground on 28th March to startan armed rebellion. This led to the emergenceof a variety of armed groups of Kayin, Kachin,Mon; Pa-O, Shan, Palaung, Lahu, Kokang andso forth, and the country was soon engulfed byinsurgency. Since the outbreak of theinsurrections, successive governments hadtried both military and political means to re-establish peace in the country. The politicallyelected governments, the caretakergovernment, the revolutionary councilgovernment and the Myanmar SocialistProgramme Party government, had all withoutexception made every effort for a peaceful

resolution to the internal strife. Each hadoffered periods of amnesty – in 1958, 1963,1974 and 1980 respectively – and hadextended invitations for peace discussions. Butonly a few splinter groups from the mainstreaminsurgents chose to take advantage of theseoffers for peace. Not a single entire armedgroup ever availed itself of the opportunity toreturn to the lawful community. So the peacetalks held previously met repeated setbacksand failure. It was only after the Government ofthe Armed Forces assumed Stateresponsibilities that armed ethnic groupsdecided to return to the legal community andthis has led to the establishment of peace inmost parts of the country. From the time theArmed Forces assumed State Power, it haddrawn up and laid down Three Main NationalTasks that are the bounden duty of all citizenswhich are, Non-disintegration of the Union,Non-disintegration of National Unity and thePerpetuation of National Sovereignty. To fulfilthe goals inherent in the Three National Tasks,Four Political Objectives, Four EconomicObjectives and Four Social Objectives weredrawn up for implementation. For therealisation of one of the Four PoliticalObjectives, "consolidation of nationalsolidarity", the Government extendedinvitations to hold peace talks for return to thelegal fold. This was followed with meetings anddiscussions on the Government's PeaceInitiatives.

The State Law and Order Restoration Council,keeping in view the importance of nationalunity, declared a moratorium on militaryoperations against the KNU on 28th April 1992and effected unilateral cease-fire in the KayinState. To open up the way for the armednational groups to renter the legal fold andthere by establish peace the Secretary-1Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt officiallydeclared the Government's peace initiativesand offers in his meetings with the localpopulace at Loikaw, Kayah State on 17thNovember 1993; at the towns of Ye andThanbyuzayat, Mon State on 25th November1993 and at Mya Padaing Village KawkareikTownship, Kayin State on 26th November1993. In his meeting with the local populace inLoikaw, the Secretary-1 stated that:

"The armed groups in Myanmar havebeen fighting against the State for over 40years. It is time now to ponder seriously,what good or benefit this has or has notachieved, and whether or not this has orhas not resulted in development of the


State. At present, the Government is doingeverything possible, without any kind ofdiscrimination whatsoever between theStates and the mainland, to close anysocial gaps that may still exist. TheGovernment has achieved success in itspeace initiatives with some of the armednational groups and they have nowrejoined the legal community. In theregions in which peace now prevails,development has gained momentum withina short period of time. So, on behalf of theGovernment, I would like to officially urgethe remaining armed national groups totake advantage of discussions for peacethat will enable them to enter the legalfold." When the Secretary-1 met the localpopulace at the towns of Ye andThanbyuzayat respectively, he reiteratedthe invitation, saying: "We have declaredto the world our invitation to theunderground armed groups for peacetalks and discussions are being held on aone-to-one basis. So, if we all join handsto work in unity with warmth anddevotion, our country shall surely makegreater strides in development."

At Hpa-an and Mya Padaing Village ofKawkareik Township in Kayin State he said:"The armed insurrection in the Kayin State hasbeen going on for nearly 40 years. Peace willprevail only if this armed opposition can beended. So for the sake of peace in the KayinState, I would like to call upon the armedgroups in the region to come and meet with usand hold discussions from an objective andrealistic viewpoint and with a kindred Unionspirit."

Due to this realistic and correct politicalobjective, and the good will and sinceritydemonstrated by the Government inimplementing it, the Kokang nationals brokeaway from the Burma Communist Party andachieved peace. Since then, many of thearmed groups have opted for peace. Up to nowaltogether, 17 armed groups have returned tothe legal community to bring about peace – apeace that now prevails almost in the entirecountry.

Conclusion

The Armed Forces was obliged to form theState Law and Order Restoration Council andassume State Power on 18th September 1988.

But from the time it assumed power theGovernment has made unceasing endeavoursto end the internal armed conflict that haderupted together with independence, and toestablish peace and stability in the country.Previously, successive governments had alsomade efforts to bring about peace, but to noavail. The State Law and Order RestorationCouncil however, laid down a National Policycomprised of Three National Tasks as well aspolitical, economic and social objectives asguidelines for implementation. Of all thepolitical objectives "national reconciliation" wasconsidered a primary concern and a vitalnecessity for perpetuation of the Union. Ittherefore, invited the armed ethnic groups toreturn to the legal fold. It gave the groups timewithout limit to hold thorough discussions onthe Government's peace initiatives and withinfinite patience awaited their decisions. In themeanwhile the government drew up and beganto implement comprehensive developmentprogrammes and projects in the border regionswhere the national races well and which hadlagged far behind in development. Due to thecorrectness of this national political policy andthe sincere good will demonstrated by theGovernment, the armed insurrections haveended in nearly all the regions of the country.

Since the Kokang, 'Wa' and Shan/ Akhar ethnicarmed groups revolted against and broke awayfrom the Burma Communist Party and reachedpeace accords with the government, the call forpeace has echoed through the entire country.This upsurge for peace spread andencompassed not only the people but alsomade an impact on the kinsfolk of the armednational groups. The people who had sostoically withstood the suffering anddevastation inflicted by the armed conflict nowwelcomed the peace initiatives of theGovernment heart and soul, and in turn urgedand encouraged the armed national groups totake advantage of the peace offers. Thecombined desires for peace of influentialBuddhist monks, Christian clerics of alldenominations, of those who had willinglyshouldered the role and duties of peaceemissaries and the people in the region,worked as a catalyst to convince the armedethnic groups that time and conditions wereripe for peace.

The armed ethnic groups on their part weregreatly moved by the intense desire for peaceand stability of the local peoples and theappeals made by the latter had a profoundeffect. Moreover they also came to understand


and appreciate fully, thesincerity and genuine good willof the government. This ledthem to take the first steps onthe path to peace. Therepresentatives of the ArmedForces and those of the armedgroups were thus able to holdtalks calmly and in a mutualspirit of magnanimity. Theoutcome was the return to thelegal fold of one armed groupafter another and peacebecame a reality. The onlyarmed group that has refusedto avail itself of thegovernment's peace initiativesis the Karen National Union,(KNU), even though thegovernment issued an orderfor a unilateral cease-fire forits benefit. The MTA led byKhun Sa, howeversurrendered unconditionally.This success is oneunprecedented in the historyof the insurgency.

The armed groups who havemade peace are nowenthusiastic partners with thegovernment in regionaldevelopment projects. Leaderso farmed groups, whoreturned to the legal fold intime for the NationalConvention, are delegatesparticipating in discussionsthat will determine their future.These national groups arecontributing their share inlaying the foundation forenduring peace and for a newdemocratic state of the futurehand in hand with the ArmedForces. The Armed ForcesGovernment has thussuccessfully implemented"reconciliation of the nationalraces", one of the most crucialof the four political objectives.The outcome of this is peaceand stability throughout thecountry. This is indeed a mostnotable achievement worthy ofrecord in the annals ofMyanmar history.

Steps towards Peace

Max EdigerBurma Issues

Volume 8 Number 6June 1998

In the sixties and early seventies, as America's war in Viet Namraged on, the American people were constantly assured that anend to the bloody conflict was in sight. While we wanted tobelieve that the killing was soon to be over, we felt little hopebecause there was no clearly defined plan of action beingarticulated by our leaders to give us confidence, a plan thatwould actually provide the potential to move towards that much-desired peace. Hope is what unifies and energizes people, andwhen that hope cannot be nourished by concrete plans andactions, unity falls apart, struggle stagnates and people seekmeans to simply live for bare survival. Thus, dictatorshipsurvives and suffering lingers on untamed and unending. InBurma today, many people live in an atmosphere ofhelplessness because they, too, seek and desperately needsome indication that a workable plan for peace exists and isbeing put into action.

Seeking a strategy for peace which can revitalize the hope of adiscouraged people requires the creativity to pursue processesoutside the normal, and the courage to look painfully inward toseek that which presently stymies progress towards peace.Among the many diverse groups in Burma who presentlystruggle against the militarization the country has lived under fordecades, there are a few of those creative and courageousvoices which are suggesting some concrete steps that can giveus hope that peace will be achieved. Their suggestions not onlygive the people of Burma reason to hope once again and tostruggle in unity, but also give the international community aclear focus for positive and effective actions for peace. Thosevoices need to be sought out and heeded seriously, for perhapsthey can provide the hope that the people of the country sodesperately need.

The following five steps to peace are not really that complex.However, each step in the process is extremely significant andneeds to be considered carefully and developed systematically.These steps can not only give the long-suffering people ofBurma hope, but can also help focus and unify the concernedenergies of the world towards an active and positive involvementin developing a long-lasting and just peace.

Nationwide Cease-fire

The first step in breaking the present stalemate and opening theway for honest and progressive dialogue is the establishment ofa nationwide cease-fire monitored by an international andneutral force. With a total cease-fire, and assurance that thecease-fire is guaranteed, the people of Burma can startseriously looking at the issues before them which must beaddressed in order to bring about justice and peace.


For the Burmese military to agree to such acease-fire, the international community mustget involved in a way that the military will see itin their best interests to take this step. Thiscan be done if significant actions are taken inthe UN Security Council, and if countriesaround the world continue putting political andeconomic pressure on the junta so the militarywill sincerely agree to abide by such a cease-fire. The purpose is not to crush the military,but to convince them that it is in their bestinterests to attend honest dialogue with thevarious opposition groups so that a peacefulsettlement can be achieved which will ensurea just peace.

Withdrawal of Troops

A cease-fire must be followed by thewithdrawal of Burma Army troops from areaspredominantly occupied by members of thevarious ethnic groups. This withdrawal ofBurmese troops will provide an atmosphere ofrelative calm and security for the ethnic groupsso that people can return to their villages andbegin rebuilding their lives. If this withdrawal isalso monitored by an international peace-keeping force, it is very possible that a largepercent of the refugees living in neighboringcountries will start returning home as well. Thisstep, therefore, would also help increaseregional stability by easing the stress somecountries experience from having to take careof tens of thousands of refugees. If therefugees can return to their homes underthese controlled conditions, it is quite certainthey will not feel the need to flee again toescape abuses from a military they so fear anddread. Under these circumstances an at-mosphere conducive to dialogue can be es-tablished.

Identifying Root Issues

The third step entails a meeting ofrepresentatives from the various ethnic groupsto clearly identify the basic issues which theywant addressed in tripartite talks, so that theethnic people will have confidence that theycan live in security and peace. Since the issuein Burma is an ethnic conflict, it can only besolved when the root causes of that ethnicconflict are honestly and openly confronted. Ifthe representatives at this meeting are truly intouch with the grassroots people, they can puttogether a list of rights which these grassrootspeople most urgently want protected in order

to feel secure and safe in their homes. This listof rights can then be the basis for furtherdialogue and national planning.

The involvement of the people in drawing upthis list of rights is essential for them to feelownership of the process and confident in itsresults.

Tripartite Dialogue

Talks between the Burmese military, theNational League for Democracy (NLD), andrepresentatives of the ethnic groups can thenbe held to discuss these specific ethnic issuesin detail and seek appropriate solutions whichwill be acceptable to everyone. These tripartitetalks should also include observers from theUnited Nations or from other third-party groupswhich are acceptable to all members of thetalks. These observers must be in attendanceto make the talks more transparent and to helpfacilitate discussion on some of the moresticky issues.

National Convention

Through discussions dealing with the rootcauses of 50-year civil war, groundwork canbe laid for anew National Convention to drawup a constitution. A constitution is only asstrong as the support it gets from the people,so the fears and concerns of the people mustbe effectively addressed by the constitution. Ifsteps 3 and 4 were thoroughly carried out, abill of rights could be drawn up which lists therights people most dearly want protected. Theconcerns of those people who have lived inthe civil war zones or in refugee camps for allof their lives must be given priority. They needto trust that they can rebuild their lives in anatmosphere of peace.

Peace in Burma has been elusive for manygenerations already. Hundreds of thousandsof innocent people have lost their lives andmillions have lost their homes, fields and live-lihoods. This conflict which continues soaggressively is not simply an internal issue. Itis a global issue which we must all seriouslyhelp seek solutions to, and become involved inthe process which can bring about justice andpeace. The five-point plan outlined in verygeneral terms above could be a starting point.


BURMAA Ray of Hope

Bertil Lintner, BANGKOK

BURMA'S MILITARY LEADERS may appearto have made a New Year's resolution to makeup with the opposition, but don't bet on it.Hopes of a breakthrough followed theunexpected announcement in early Januarythat the generals had opened a dialogue withpro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, whoheads the beleaguered opposition NationalLeague for Democracy.

The news was generally welcomed withcautious optimism, though analysts did notethat it comes at a time when both sides havetheir backs against the wall.

The government has been under growinginternational pressure to open a dialogue withthe opposition and improve its human-rightsrecord, while the economy is in a desperatestate and faces further ruin from InternationalLabour Organization sanctions imposed inNovember because of the continuing use offorced labour.

The NLD, meanwhile, has been virtually wipedout as a functioning opposition. Suu Kyi andmost of the top leadership are in detention,while thousands of followers have beenarrested and hundreds of offices shuttered.

The announcement that Suu Kyi and thejunta's powerful intelligence chief, Lt. Gen.Khin Nyunt, had met several times came afterRazali Ismail, the United Nations specialenvoy on Burma, concluded a five-day visit tothe country on January 9. He talked to bothsides during his trip.

"Mr. Razali was able to confirm that the twosides had started a direct dialogue since lastOctober and that they were satisfied with theresults achieved so far in the area ofconfidence building," the UN said in astatement, adding: "The two sides areexpected to start more substantive discussionsshortly."

There were soon further signs that thegovernment was adopting a change ofapproach in its dealings with Suu Kyi, who hasbeen under house arrest since she tried to visitparty workers in the northern city of Mandalayin late September.

For the first time in five years, state-runnewspapers halted their vicious daily attackson Suu Kyi, apparently at the request ofRazali. Then junta officials visited NLDheadquarters and said 86 jailed supporterswould be allowed to receive food parcels andletters.

This is all welcome news. The Thailand-basedAll Burma Students' Democratic Front hailedthe talks as a "historic breakthrough" and "themost positive sign we've seen since thegeneral election held in 1990." In that election,the NLD won 392 out of the 485 seatscontested in the first multiparty polls in Burmasince 1960. The irate army nullified the resultsand the assembly has never met.

But most diplomats and analysts are wary,while some fear the junta's real intention issimply to persuade the internationalcommunity to ease the pressure on Rangoonbefore it reverts to its bad old ways. "It is astart, but we must not expect resultsovernight," says Harn Yawnhee, Brussels-based spokesman for the pro-democracymovement in exile. "There is a lot of ground tobe covered and a lot of mistrust to beovercome. Anything can happen to derail theprocess and both sides will have to work hardto keep the process alive. It could be a longprocess, with many ups and downs and stopsbefore it goes anywhere."

But a Bangkok-based analyst says: "Thegenerals will use the ruse of democracy to getthe international community off their backs.They plan to legitimize the status quo under adifferent guise." He and others say the litmustest of the generals' sincerity will be if theyrelease Suu Kyi and all other politicalprisoners and allow the reopening ofopposition-party offices.

The pessimists note that it's not the first timethe generals have held talks with Suu Kyi. Shemet twice with Khin Nyunt and junta chief Gen.Than Shwe in 1994, during her first longstretch of house arrest. But the talks went nofurther after Suu Kyi said she was not trying tostrike a deal. The difference now is that whilethere was no significant outside involvement inthe earlier talks, the latest ones have beenpushed by strong regional interests and theUnited Nations.

The catalyst for change appears to have beenthe appointment of Razali, a Malaysian, asspecial envoy to Burma. His appointment


came amid mounting frustration in theAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations –especially in Thailand – at the debilitatingeffect Burma's membership was having on thebloc's relations with the West, particularlyEurope. Burma was inducted as a member in1997, largely at the behest of Malaysian PrimeMinister Mahathir Mohamad.

Razali visited Burma as a representative of theUnited Nations, but it was no coincidence thatMahathir was in the country at the same timeon an official visit. Razali said Mahathir's visit"definitely helped the UN effort" but was aseparate Malaysian initiative.

MALAYSIAN CONNECTION

Mahathir, apparently keen to redeem areputation tainted by his harsh treatment of theopposition back home, focused on the carrotof business and investment in his talks withthe Burmese. Diplomats say much of thepolitical spadework was done just before histrip by a visiting team of high-rankingMalaysian officials.

Mahathir and these officials made it clear tothe generals that donor nations would neveraccept a situation in which they went aheadand passed a new constitution without the

opposition. The generals needed to do more ifthey were to win Western aid, which was cutafter the army crackdown on pro-democracyprotests of 1988.

Clearly the generals were feeling the pressurefrom sanctions and their overseas allies toshape up. But some Burmese fear they willreturn to past practices by holding a couple ofrounds of talks, letting them break down andthen blaming it all on Suu Kyi; then they willpass a new constitution to legitimize their rule.

"We have to be cautious. I think sanctions,including the ILO's, are working," says pro-democracy magazine editor Aung Zaw, addingin reference to tensions within the junta: "Italso shows that internal conflicts among thetop three are tense. Not only the NLD, but thejunta itself is in deep trouble. I think KhinNyunt has to do that as he has been pushed ina corner by his rivals." Those rivals are ThanShwe and army chief Gen. Maung Aye.

Harn Yawnhee is more optimistic. "Given theinvolvement of Dr. Mahathir, Asean, Razaliand the UN secretary-general, I think it will notbe a repeat of 1994. I think both sides realizethe need to find a solution for the sake of thefuture of Burma as a nation. Let us wait andsee."

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