Jane Green and Will Jennings

University of Manchester

 

Measuring and Analysing Mood in Party and Government Competence Evaluations in the U.K. and U.S.A.

Nuffield College, March 6, 2012

What should the characteristics of party competence be at the aggregate-level?

What shapes party competence ratings? Do we need macro-competence, if we have partisanship, economic indicators & evaluations, events and PM/presidential approval?

How might the explanation and the consequences of macro-competence vary across institutional settings?

Can - and should – macro-competence be added to our understanding of the macro-polity? 2

Research Questions

Overview

1. Data and Estimation of Mood in Competence

2. Macro-Competence in the UK and USA: validation

3. Modeling Macro-Competence and the Vote (US)

4. Implications and Conclusions

U.K. 1950 – 2008: 2,383 items for party ‘best able to

handle’ and relative handling questions Gallup, Ipsos-Mori, Populus, YouGov, BES.

U.S.A. 1948 – 2010: 2,512 items for party ‘better job’

handling and general performance questions Gallup, AP/Ipsos, ABC/Washington Post, NBC/Wall

Street Journal, YouGov/Polimetrix, NES

Data

7

Part 1 Macro-Competence in the UK and the USA: a validation

U.K. Macro-competence, by party, 1950-2008

54% common variation 63% common variation

20

25

30

35

40

45

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Conservative Party

20

25

30

35

40

45

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Labour Party

U.S. Macro-competence, by party, 1944-2010

67% common variation 51% common variation

25

30

35

40

45

50

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Republican Party

25

30

35

40

45

50

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010

Democratic Party

U.K.: Macro-competence and Covariates

Macro-Competence Conservative Labour Liberals Government Approval * Governing Party 0.659*** 0.510***

- (118) (118) Leader Ratings 0.796*** 0.790*** 0.411*** (118) (118) (117) Macro-Partisanship 0.562*** 0.804*** 0.606*** (118) (118) (117) Personal Economic Expectations * Governing Party 0.469*** 0.335** 0.053 (118) (118) (117)

* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001

Note: correlations are tested for interaction of governing party with government approval and personal economic expectations.

U.S. Correlations II: control of the White House

Macro-competence

Governing Party

Opposition Party

Congressional Ballot 0.495*** 0.432***

Macro-Partisanship 0.490*** 0.362*** Consumer Sentiment 0.402*** 0.033***

Presidential Approval 0.779*** -0.618*** Congressional Approval 0.449*** -0.359***

*p≤0.05, **p≤0.01, ***p≤0.001 Start =1980Q1, End = 2009Q4 N = 120

15

Macro-competence and party support, U.K.

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

Mac

ro-C

ompe

tenc

e /

Vote

(%)

1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007

Macro-Competence Vote Intention

Labour Party

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Mac

ro-C

ompe

tenc

e /

Vote

(%)

1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007

Macro-Competence Vote Intention

Conservative Party

16

Macro-competence and party support, U.S.A.

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

Mac

ro-C

ompe

tenc

e /

Gen

eric

Bal

lot (

%)

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008

Macro-Competence Generic Ballot

Republican Party

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

Mac

ro-C

ompe

tenc

e /

Gen

eric

Bal

lot (

%)

1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008

Macro-Competence Generic Ballot

Democratic Party

Competence and Macro-Partisanship UKGranger-causation between macro-competence and macro-partisanship

Conservative

Party Labour Party

Macro-competence Granger-causes macro-partisanship

χ2test statistic 5.920* 11.081***

p-value 0.052 0.075

Macro-partisanship Granger-causes macro-competence

χ2test statistic 5.164† 1.679

p-value 0.076 0.364

AIC 8.292 7.674

Durbin-Watson d-statistic 1.921 1.789

Lag, selected according to AIC criteria 2 1

N 118 118

* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 Start = 1979Q3, End = 2008Q4.

Competence and Macro-Partisanship USGranger-causation between macro-competence and macro-partisanship

Governing

Party Opposition

Party

Macro-competence Granger-causes macro-partisanship

χ2test statistic 8.639* 1.787

p-value 0.013 0.181

Macro-partisanship Granger-causes macro-competence

χ2test statistic 5.751† 1.894

p-value 0.056 0.169

AIC 6.344 6.270

Durbin-Watson d-statistic 2.064 2.167

Lag, selected according to AIC criteria 2 1

N 106 107

* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 (variables are pre-whitened through fractional differencing)

Start = 1983Q1, End = 2009Q4. Observations for the period 1980Q1 to 1982Q4 are lost due to fractional

differencing of the variables.

19

Part 2 Macro-Competence in the USA: further validation and analysis

20

Government

Opposition

VOTE

Part

y Co

mpe

tenc

e

Part

y Co

mpe

tenc

e

21

Government

Opposition

VOTE

Part

y Co

mpe

tenc

e

Part

y Co

mpe

tenc

e

Congressional approval by share of party seats

Presidential approval

Macro-partisanship

22

Government

Opposition

VOTE

Part

y Co

mpe

tenc

e

Part

y Co

mpe

tenc

e

Congressional approval by share of party seats

Presidential approval

Macro-partisanship / Public policy mood

Events/Shocks

Economy

Policy Performance

Policy Outcomes

Reputations

Research Questions II: macro-competence US

Is macro-competence responsive to existing measures of performance evaluations (i.e. congressional approval, presidential approval) and macro-partisanship?

Does the interaction of congressional approval and share of the House of Representatives have an effect on macro-competence for the opposition party?

Does governing party competence drive opposition party competence?

What does macro-competence add to models of party support in the US?

Macro-competence for governing and opposition parties

Macro-competence (Gov) Granger-causes macro-competence (Opp)

χ2test statistic 7.575*

p-value 0.023

Macro-competence (Opp) Granger-causes macro-competence (Gov)

χ2test statistic 0.437

p-value 0.804

AIC 7.773

Durbin-Watson d-statistic 2.052

Lag, selected according to AIC criteria 1

N 107

* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 (variables are pre-whitened through fractional differencing)

Start = 1983Q1, End = 2009Q4. Observations for the period 1980Q1 to 1982Q4 are lost due to fractional

differencing of the variables.

Fractional persistence of macro-competence

How quickly do shocks persist or dissipate?

If shocks to the reputation of parties due to good or bad performance last indefinitely, public opinion on valence is an integrated process, and if shocks dissipate quickly, it is stationary: determines the degree to which parties are forgiven for past mistakes and mismanagement.

Degree of fractional integration estimated with the Robinson (1995) multivariate semiparametric method, which calculates the value d for macro-competence: equal to 0.56 for the governing party series and 0.71 for the opposition, with the t-statistic indicating these values, as with the covariates, are significantly different from zero.

Fractionally difference the series to avoid spurious estimates.

26

Fractional differencing parameter d

Robinson’s d

d Std Err

t-ratio

d=0

Vote (Gov/Opp) 0.617 0.085 7.279***

Macro-Competence

Governing party 0.559 0.084 6.637***

Opposition party 0.706 0.061 11.515***

Macro-Partisanship (Gov/Opp) 0.772 0.086 9.000***

Presidential Approval 0.756 0.086 8.444***

Consumer Sentiment 0.931 0.083 11.228***

Congressional Approval 0.749 0.080 9.386***

***p<0.001 N = 120, Start = 1980Q1, End = 2009Q4

27

Cointegrating regression: macro-competence and presidential approval

Macro-Competencet

Governing Party

Opposition Party

Presidential Approvalt

0.275*** (0.019)

-0.265*** (0.018)

Carter

-6.037*** (1.599)

-5.526*** (1.507)

Reagan

-7.071*** (1.172)

2.646*** (1.105)

Bush I

-7.308*** (1.232)

4.377*** (1.161)

Clinton

-4.716*** (1.169)

4.605*** (1.102)

Bush II

-5.985*** (1.178)

9.651*** (1.111)

Constant

28.702*** (1.545)

46.193*** (1.456)

Adjusted R-squared 0.720 0.834

Root MSE 2.202 2.076 Robinson’s d of residuals 0.331 0.297

Standard Error 0.113 0.085

T-ratio 2.926*** 3.480*** * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001 N = 120; Start = 1980Q1, End = 2009Q4

The model

dMacro-Competence = + dECM (residuals: cointegrating regression)+ dCongressional Approval+ dShare of House of Representatives+ dCongressional approval x House share+ dPresidential Approval+ dMacro-Partisanship+ dConsumer Sentiment

29

Fractional cointegration: macro-competence

∆dMacro-Competencet

Governing Party

Opposition Party

dECMt-1

-0.251*** (0.083)

-0.333*** (0.085)

∆dCongressional Approvalt

1.890† (1.051)

0.965 (1.142)

Share of H of Repst

-0.031 (0.031)

-0.015 (0.024)

∆dCongressional Approvalt * Share of H of Repst

-0.041† (0.024)

-0.016 (0.020)

∆dPresidential Approvalt

0.090** (0.029)

-0.109*** (0.027)

∆dMacro-Partisanshipt

0.740*** (0.172)

0.401* (0.169)

∆dConsumer Sentimentt

-0.026 (0.028)

0.026 (0.027)

Constant

1.003 (1.525)

1.105 (1.224)

Rho 0.311 0.080 Durbin–Watson d-statistic 1.921 1.991

Adjusted R-squared 0.429 0.361

Root MSE 1.418 1.340 † p ≤ 0.1, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001. N = 108; Start = 1983Q1, End = 2009Q4

Cointegrating regression: macro-partisanship and generic ballot

Votet

Governing Party

Opposition Party

Macro-Partisanshipt

0.702*** (0.033)

0.702*** (0.033)

Constant

13.584*** (1.607)

16.186*** (1.683)

Adjusted R-squared 0.795 0.795

Root MSE 1.917 1.917 Robinson’s d of residuals 0.394 0.394

Standard Error 0.075 0.075

T-ratio 5.268*** 5.268*** * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001 N = 120; Start = 1980Q1, End = 2009Q4

The model

dCongressional Ballot = + dECM (residuals: cointegrating regression)

+ dCongressional Approval+ dShare of House of Representatives+ dCongressional Approval x House share+ dPresidential Approval+ dMacro-Partisanship+ dConsumer Sentiment

+ Macro-competence residuals (gov) t-1+ Macro-competence residuals (gov) t+ Macro-competence residuals (opp) t

32

∆dVotet

Governing Party Opposition Party

(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) dECMt-1

-0.271** (0.096)

-0.202* (0.097)

-0.297*** (0.092)

-0.346*** (0.103)

-0.349*** (0.102)

-0.371*** (0.099)

∆dCongressionalApprovalt

0.791 (1.080)

0.710 (1.031)

0.568 (1.008)

-0.510 (1.603)

-0.340 (1.552)

-0.669 (1.526)

Share of H of Repst

-0.093** (0.029)

-0.092*** (0.027)

-0.090** (0.027)

0.017 (0.036)

0.017 (0.035)

0.019 (0.034)

∆dCongressionalApprovalt * Share of H of Repst

-0.019 (0.025)

-0.017 (0.024)

-0.014 (0.023)

0.013 (0.028)

0.010 (0.027)

0.016 (0.027)

∆dPresidentialApprovalt

0.049 (0.032)

0.054† (0.032)

0.059* (0.030)

-0.032 (0.035)

-0.031 (0.033)

-0.046 (0.034)

∆dMacro-Partisanshipt

0.725*** (0.191)

0.735*** (0.188)

0.723*** (0.180)

0.775*** (0.221)

0.805*** (0.213)

0.745*** (0.220)

∆dConsumerSentimentt

0.050 (0.031)

0.048 (0.031)

0.039 (0.031)

-0.040 (0.034)

-0.037 (0.032)

-0.034 (0.033)

∆dMacro-Competence(Gov)(Residuals)t -

0.188† (0.106)

- - - -

∆dMacro-Competence(Gov)(Residuals)t-1 - -

0.205* (0.105)

- - -0.277* (0.119)

∆dMacro-Competence(Opp)(Residuals)t - -

-0.392*** (0.109)

- 0.361** (0.120)

0.340** (0.118)

Constant

6.048*** (1.458)

5.998*** (1.356)

5.893*** (1.354)

1.542 (1.867)

1.532 (1.829)

1.429 (1.782)

Rho 0.148 0.068 0.128 0.300 0.317 0.305 Adjusted R-squared 0.384 0.414 0.468 0.229 0.289 0.310

† p ≤ 0.1, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001 N = 108; Start = 1983Q1, End = 2009Q4

Public opinion on party competence is consistent with a mood about valence in the U.S., (and in the U.K.).

Macro-competence is explained by existing performance variables; these variables (and the ECM) explain between 36% and 43% of variance in macro-competence.

Some evidence that macro-competence is demonstrated in the legislature, for the party in power (as a function of House share).

In a very conservative estimate of the short-run effects of valence, this variable, macro-competence, explains 8-9% of variance in party support (and 3-9% in the U.K.).

Macro-competence is important in the U.S., where it serves as an especially important series for the valence of the opposition; suggesting that the out-party can do relatively little to shape its competence, but its competence is highly important to the vote. 33

Summary

34

Implications

Competence matters over time and in context.

Potential applications of the measure for models of vote choice and electoral forecasting.

Construct of macro-competence is relevant to parties and elites who wish to establish a reputation for competence.

Future questions: Does competence contribute to polarization or moderation

of party positions? Does competence enable parties to widen the issue agenda

of their campaigns? How do governing parties seek to bolster their reputation

for competence when in power? Does the context of policy responsibility mediate the effects

of policy competence?

Jane Green and Will Jennings

University of Manchester

 

Measuring and Analysing Mood in Party and Government Competence Evaluations in the U.K. and U.S.A.

Nuffield College, March 6, 2012

Economic issues and valence Macro-competence is not a product of economic questions (best

party on the economy); these items compose a small proportion of each measure; including or excluding them makes no substantive difference; economic evaluations load onto the same dimension similarly to other policy issues.

Position issues and valence Ratings on positional issues are still competence-based; they are

not positively associated with public policy mood; they co-vary with other issues; their inclusion or exclusion makes no substantive difference to our results.

Public policy mood and valence We are exploring the dynamics of thermostatic mood for another

paper, but in all our models public policy mood is not simply a function of valence, or vice versa.

Validity considerations

Valence and Macro-Partisanship (USA)Granger Causation Tests between Valence and Macro-partisanship

Republicans Democrats

Valence Granger-causes macro-partisanship

χ2test statistic 7.362* 3.168†

p-value 0.025 0.075

Macro-partisanship Granger-causes Valence

χ2test statistic 3.367 0.825

p-value 0.186 0.364

AIC 6.348 6.321

Durbin-Watson d-statistic 1.97 2.19

Lag, selected according to AIC criteria 2 1

N 106 107

* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 (variables are pre-whitened through fractional differencing)

Start = 1983Q1, End = 2009Q4. Observations for the period 1980Q1 to 1982Q4 are lost due to fractional

differencing of the variables.

Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model of Macro-Competence and the Costs of Governing, U.K.

Macro-Competencet Labour Conservative Liberal Macro-Competencet-1 0.867***

(0.062) 0.873*** (0.068)

0.759*** (0.085)

Time in Governmentt

-0.181† (0.105)

-0.140* (0.065)

-

Time in Oppositiont

0.089 (0.058)

-0.001 (0.129)

-

Constant 4.096*

(2.040) 4.436† (2.352)

2.098** (0.767)

* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 † ≤ .1

Start: 1950End: 2008

N=59

41

ADL Model of Events on Macro-Competence, U.K.

Start 1979 Q3End 2008 Q4

N=118

Macro-Competencet

Labour Conservative Liberal

Macro-Competencet-1 0.702***

(0.063) 0.885*** (0.095)

0.778*** (0.071)

Macro-Competencet-2 - -0.250**

(0.091) -

Time in Governmentt

-0.030 (0.030)

-0.005 (0.008)

-

Event 1981 Q1: Creation of the SDPt

-2.111* (1.023)

-1.274 (1.036)

1.563* (0.665)

Event 1982 Q3: Falklands Wart

1.946* (0.980)

2.866** (1.007)

-1.267* (0.633)

Event 1984 Q1: Miner’s Striket

-0.054 (0.783)

-1.770* (0.773)

0.505 (0.477)

Event 1988 Q3: Merger of SDP and Liberal Partyt

0.301 (0.793)

0.0168 (0.802)

-0.918 (0.592)

Event 1990 Q1: Poll Taxt

0.341 (1.088)

-0.325 (1.099)

0.071 (0.694)

Event 1991 Q1: Gulf Wart

-1.279 (1.061)

0.873 (1.069)

0.307 (0.687)

Event 1992 Q4: ERM Crisist

2.770*** (0.849)

-2.610** (0.816)

-0.010 (0.433)

Event 2003 Q3: Iraq Wart

-1.828† (0.974)

0.098 (0.529)

0.060 (0.311)

Event 2007 Q4: Northern Rockt

1.196 (0.920)

1.926* (0.905)

0.136 (0.607)

Constant 10.265***

(2.174) 12.174***

(2.230) 2.008** (0.737)

* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 † ≤ .1

Start 1979 Q3End 2008 Q4

N=118

∆Macro-Competencet Labour Conservative Liberal Macro-Competencet-1 -0.179†

(0.098) -0.167† (0.096)

-0.240*** (0.055)

Macro-Competencet-2 -0.198*

(0.091) -0.267** (0.087)

-

∆Leader Ratingst

0.060* (0.027)

0.118** (0.040)

0.067*** (0.018)

Leadert-1 0.042*

(0.021) 0.131** (0.042)

0.014† (0.008)

∆Macro-Partisanshipt

0.220* (0.110)

-0.078 (0.084)

0.144 (0.068)

Macro-Partisanshipt-1 0.155†

(0.085) 0.014

(0.045) 0.154*** (0.046)

∆PEXPt

-0.046 (0.034)

-0.089* (0.039)

-0.014 (0.015)

PEXPt-1 -0.008

(0.023) 0.013

(0.019) -0.011 (0.008)

∆GOVt

-6.571 (5.638)

-13.952* (5.633)

-

GOVt-1 3.986

(3.125) -0.180 (3.380)

-

∆(PEXPt*GOVt)

0.096† (0.055)

0.137* (0.055) -

PEXPt-1*GOVt-1 -0.034

(0.033) 0.013

(0.040) -

Time in Governmentt

-0.057† (0.035)

-0.018 (0.011)

-

Constant 6.787†

(4.144) 7.079** (2.368)

1.066 (0.807)

* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 † ≤ .1

An Error Correction Model of Macro-Competence, U.K.

Start 1979 Q3End 2008 Q4

N=118

An Error Correction Model of Vote Intention, U.K. ∆Votet

Labour Conservative ECM: Votet-1

-0.372*** (0.06)

-0.376*** (0.070)

-0.451*** (0.078)

-0.479*** (0.081)

∆Macro-Competencet -

0.372* (0.152)

- 0.346*** (0.104)

Macro-Competencet-1 -

0.135 (0.131)

- 0.206* (0.090)

∆Leader Ratingst

0.344*** (0.041)

0.324*** (0.043)

0.341*** (0.047)

0.296*** (0.047)

Leadert-1

0.230*** (0.046)

0.216*** (0.045)

0.169** (0.057)

0.115* (0.056)

∆Macro-Partisanshipt

-0.050 (0.175)

-0.145 (0.178)

0.029 (0.097)

0.040 (0.094)

Macro-Partisanshipt-1

-0.126 (0.129)

-0.179 (0.135)

0.106* (0.052)

0.106 (0.050)

∆PEXPt

-0.141* (0.055)

-0.124* (0.055)

-0.019 (0.045)

0.022 (0.044)

PEXPt-1

-0.182*** (0.043)

-0.179*** (0.042)

-7.924† (6.519)

-0.044* (0.021)

∆GOVt

-16.843† (9.090)

-14.737 (8.969)

-7.924 (6.519)

-2.226 (6.454)

GOVt-1

-24.014*** (5.475)

-25.603*** (5.572)

-9.255 (3.876)

-9.202* (3.734)

∆(PEXPt*GOVt)

0.211* (0.088)

0.178* (0.088)

0.078 (0.064)

0.024 (0.063)

PEXPt-1*GOVt-1

0.254*** (0.057)

0.267*** (0.057)

0.120** (0.046)

0.116** (0.044)

Time in Governmentt

0.051 (0.053)

0.074 (0.057)

-0.027* (0.013)

-0.020 (0.013)

Constant

28.014*** (6.881)

25.570*** (6.956)

8.528*** (2.536)

5.437* (2.710)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Incumbents

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Oppositions

Liberals macro-competence

70% common variation in all issue ratings

UK Valence, by party, 1950 - 2008