japan and thailand independence during world war ii

Japan and Thailand Independence during World War II 1

Running Head: JAPAN AND THAILAND INDEPENDENCE DURING WORLD WAR II

Japan and Thailand Independence during World War II: An Analysis of Japan-Thailand

Relations before the Alliance

Monsicha Hoonsuwan

Drake University


Japan and Thailand Independence during World War II

During Word War II, Japan’s southern advance resulted in Japan’s occupation of most of

the Southeast Asian countries, primarily the former colonies of western powers, namely Britain,

France, and the United States of America. Thailand was the only exception. During WWII, it had

a self-ruling government, not a puppet government set up by the Japanese as in Manchukuo. It

maintained its own right to decision-making regarding domestic and international policies. The

country, under a leadership of nationalistic Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram, collaborated with

Japan in its war effort, and finally declared war against the Allied powers. In other words,

Thailand was the only country in Southeast Asia, and possibly in the whole East Asian continent,

that decided to ally itself with Japan. The development of this alliance, however, was unclear and

remains controversial. Thus, the nature of Thailand independence and the development of this

alliance is worth investigating, as Japan did not permit any other countries in Asia to have the

same rights to self-governing as Thailand had. Therefore, a question centering this essay

concerns the Japanese decision to allow Thailand self-determination when it took over other

countries in Asia by force, then occupied them as territories. After much research, the essay

concludes that, Thailand’s independence during WWII was self-obtained, and did not result from

the Japanese’s will to exempt Thailand from being incorporated into one of its territories. That is,

due to Thailand’s actions, the Japanese were prevented from occupying Thailand. The two

factors that restrained the Japanese occupation were, firstly, Thailand’s practice of bamboo

diplomacy, and secondly, Thailand’s ability to safeguard its sovereignty amidst the threats of

colonization by the British and the French.

Japanese domination of Thailand began on December 8, 1941, following the arrival of

Japanese military forces from Cambodia and the sea. Skirmishes between the Japanese and Thai


forces occurred with casualties on the night of December 7. In the absence of Thai Prime

Minister Phibun Songkhram, the Thai cabinet voted against the Japanese demand that Thailand

allow Japanese troops to maneuver anywhere in the country. However, in the early morning of

December 8, Prime Minister Phibun appeared and gave a cease fire order. Signing an Offensive-

Defensive Alliance with Japan, the Thai government rationalized its decision as a preservation of

the country’s sovereignty. The Japanese seized control of Bangkok, reported to be aided by some

Japanese civilians (United States, 1944, p. 7). In a report by Office of Strategic Services, the

Japanese control had an air of correctness and legality, which preserved for the Thais their self-

respect (United States, 1944, p. 1):

“Thailand was not invaded – the Japanese obtained the right of transit across the country; Thailand is not patrolled by Japanese garrisons – fifty thousand troops have permission to remain there to fight the common foe; Thailand was not forced to declare war on Great Britain and the United States – she did so voluntarily under the terms of the Offensive-Defensive Alliance made with Japan; Thai economy is not controlled by Japanese shippers and manufacturers – Thai banking and industry are merely participating in Greater East Asia co-prosperity” (United States, 1944, p. 1).

The Japanese objectives in Thailand could be sorted into two categories: the immediate

objectives and the long-term objectives (United States, 1944, p. 3). Instantly, the Japanese

wanted to use Thailand’s facilities – the ports, airfields, and railways – as a base to further

advance into Burma and Malaya. At the same time, the Japanese wanted to make Thailand an

ally who would supply Japan with food, equipment (planes, vehicles, and boats), facilities, and if

possible, troops. Furthermore, the Japanese desired to include Thailand as a part of the Greater

East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as a long-term goal, which would permit Japan to control

Thailand’s economy, foreign policy, and military affairs, through series of campaigns to

indoctrinate the Thais and absorb them culturally, spiritually, and politically. The GEACPS was

a political creation for the Japanese government with Japan at the center of the rational East Asia


system (Swan, 1996, p. 146). Thus, to include Thailand in the GEACPS meant Thailand would

be treated in the same way as other East Asian states. According to Swan (1996), the Japanese

intended to supervise all of the important sectors in the Thai economy, regulating closely the

country’s position in the GEACPS. Hence, Thailand “exemplified Japan’s whole new approach

to its new order in East Asia” (Swan, 1996, p. 143). The only thing that differed Thailand from

other East Asian countries was its independence.

As indicated in the policy plans, the Japanese had no intention to incorporate Thailand as

one of its occupied territories as it did to Manchuria, Korea, Taiwan, and most of Southeast

Asian countries. Of course, the Japanese government was determined to “pay attention to

upholding the honor of Thailand as an independent nation” (Swan, 1996, p. 140), therefore, it

sounded illogical to state that Thailand obtained its independence by itself. However, one needs

to consider the fact that the Japanese had a capability to take over Thailand, but it decided not to.

The decision to not take over Thailand could result from a combination of “astute diplomacy…

and luck” (Nuechterlein, 1965, p. 91) and the status of the country before joining the war. Thus,

Japan sought to make Thailand its ally and seek cooperation instead of dominating the country.

In the ultimatum rejected by the Thai cabinet on the night of December 7, Japan offered

three alternatives to the country. First, Japan promised not to interfere with Thailand’s internal

administration if the country allowed Japanese troops to maneuver to Burma and Malaya.

Second, Thailand and Japan could form a defensive military alliance. Lastly, Thailand would

join Japan in the war against the Allies in return for territories in the Malay Peninsula

(Nuechterlein, 1965, p. 73). Japan viewed Thailand as a strategically important launching

platform, and it could have used its military forces to incorporate Thailand into its empire

without having to make these offers at all. The Japanese could not, however, since they were


restrained by Thailand’s self-governing status. Unlike other Southeast Asian countries, Thailand

had never been colonized by Western powers, thus, having no need for the Japanese “liberation”

(United States, 1944, p. 4). Taking over Thailand would jeopardize Japan’s plan for the New

Order in East Asia greatly. Therefore, it needed other ways to gain Thailand’s cooperation.

“While Japanese at all levels did not wish their country to be seen as having invaded a friendly,

neutral, Asian state, military considerations limited Tokyo’s flexibility” (Reynolds, Anomaly or

Model? Independent Thailand's Role in Japan's Asian Strategy, 1941-1943, 1996, p. 247).

Hence, the Thai government’s ability to maintain the country’s self-rule, regardless of being

enclosed between two major imperialist powers, created a restraint on how much control the

Japanese could impose on Thailand in order to achieve its goal of Pan-Asia (or the expansion of

the Japanese empire, for that matter).

The second factor manifested in a more intricate way. Thailand’s sovereignty during the

imperialism era resulted partly from a skillful usage of “bamboo diplomacy” by the Thai

government. Bamboo diplomacy, bending with the wind or sitting on the fence, became a

characteristic of Thailand’s foreign policy. It helped Thailand avoid colonialism in the early 20 th

century, and it helped the country avoid, again during WWII, the Japanese occupation. “During

WWII, the country demonstrated skillful ‘bamboo diplomacy’ by simultaneously collaborating

with both Japan and the Allies. Consequently, Thailand suffered less than virtually any country

in the Asian region during the war” (Chen, 2007, Abstract). In order to understand how the use

of bamboo diplomacy had ameliorated Thailand’s self-determination, the investigation of how

the Japanese became a part of Thai wartime politics, “one of the greatest circus performances of

all time” (Saunders, 1993, p. 611), is necessary.


Extremely proud of its independence, Thailand’s main objective in foreign policy was to

preserve its sovereignty. Once the two most powerful imperialists, namely Britain and France,

were weakened because of their engagement in WWII in Europe, Japan sought to exploit this

advantage by exercising more power in Southeast Asia. Hence, Japan became Thailand’s new

security threat. In 1940, Thailand first declared its neutrality and sought nonaggression pacts

with Britain, France, and Japan. However, as soon as Thailand realized that the Allies could not

offer help, it shifted its policy completely to cooperate with Japan. “The problem for the

government was to preserve the nation’s neutrality; and failing this, the next task was to reach an

accommodation with whatever power presented the greatest danger” (Nuechterlein, 1965, p. 67).

Some Thai leaders also saw the cooperation with Japan as an opportunity to reclaim its territories

ceded to Britain and France. In 1933, Thailand abstained from a vote of censure against Japan at

the League of Nations, which was interpreted by the Japanese as a “display of solidarity and

praised it extravagantly” (Reynolds, 1996, p. 244).

It remains an open question whether Prime Minister Phibun was pro-Japan and disposed

to a fascist view of foreign policy, using nationalism as a tool to pursue expansionist goals, or

was Phibun an opportunist who sought anything beneficial to Thailand. Was merely fearful of

the Japanese power? Nevertheless, many Japanese sources were quick to cite the Thai’s

government’s enthusiasm in joining the Japanese in WWII. “Studies that have made substantial

use of Japanese sources show a much earlier, more intense, and more willing Thai commitment

to Japan’s aims in Southeast Asia” (Batson & Hajime, 1990, p. 3). According to Batson and

Hajime, Japanese sources provide some information not found in Thai sources. One of the

information concerns Wanit Pananon, a person whom the Japanese believed to have played a key

role in Thailand-Japan relations. Wanit was involved in controversies over economic Thailand-


Japan economic relations. He handled the negotiations that eventually resulted in the Japanese

monopoly of the rubber market in Thailand. He was also involved in negotiations over Japanese

requests for loans. In 1941, he was attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The rise of Wanit,

who was clearly sympathetic with Japanese cause, in Thai politics might have convinced Japan

that Thailand was loyal to it. As Batson and Hajime suggests in the translated version of Wanitto

no Higeki, or The Tragedy of Wanit (Batson & Hajime, 1990, p. 6):

“So Wanit emerges suddenly from near total obscurity, becomes a key figure in Thai politics of the late 1930s and early 1940s, and particularly in Thai-Japanese relations, serving as Phibun’s trusted confidant and go-between, and then in 1944 just as suddenly (and probably violently) disappears from the scene. His subsequent neglect in Thai writings has been almost total.”

Batson and Hajime believes that the Thais have had good reasons to let Wanit’s story remains

obscure as Wanit symbolized Thailand’s commitment to Japan. The importance of Wanit is

confirmed by Nagaoka’s article The Drive into Southern Indochina and Thailand that Wanit was

invited to the Four Ministers Conference in Japan to discuss the settlement of territorial disputes

between Thailand and France on November 5, 1941 (Nagaoka, 1980, p. 218). In addition, Wanit

was present during the negotiations of the 7th-8th and finally played a key role in the talks leading

to the formal Thai-Japanese alliance on December 11th. In short, the fact that Japanese sources

refer to Wanit as a crucial figure between Thailand and Japanese relations reflects the Japanese

belief that Thailand under Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram was pro-Japanese. This fact is, of

course, controversial as many Thais would cite the resistance movements led by Pridi

Phanomyong and Seni Pramote, a Thai minister in Washington. They organized the underground

Free Thai (or Seri Thai) movement to fight the Japanese. Nonetheless, the seemingly pro-

Japanese actions taken by Phibun might intensely convince Japan that it was easier to ally with


Thailand than invading the country, wasting soldiers’ lives and resources, as Thailand at the time

was already in support of the Japanese cause.

However, Thailand’s loyalty to Japan was questionable as Phibun was reported to play

both sides before the country decided to ally with Japan. On November 1941, Tokyo received a

report stating that Thailand had secretly allied with Britain and the United States, in which

Thailand would participate in the joint defense of the South Pacific and would support the United

States over the Axis if she were to enter the war (Nagaoka, 1980, p. 219). Prime Minister Phibun

denied all the allegations. “But while Phibun had made a secret commitment to the Japanese, he

was playing a double game by simultaneously urging the British and Americans to deter any

further Japanese advance. He and his advisers recognized that Thailand’s independence could

best be protected, and the nation’s bargaining power maximized, by a great-power standoff.”

(Reynolds, 1996, p. 246). Phibun showed a preference toward the Japanese, but also tried to

restrain their relations as he was unsure about Japan’s intentions toward Thailand. Hence, he

maintained dual diplomacy between Japan and the West right up to the eve of war (Swan, 1987,

p. 292). Phibun’s practice of bamboo diplomacy definitely was one of the factors leading to

Japan-Thailand alliance instead of the incorporation of Thailand as a part of the Japanese empire.

The Japanese believed that Thailand was willing to cooperate – there were no reasons to waste

its resources on Thailand in an invasion. Meanwhile, Phibun’s contact with the United States and

Britain led to some limitations on how Japan-Thailand relations would develop. For the

Japanese, forceful invasion of Thailand could lead to immediate war with the United States, in

which the Japanese needed more time to prepare for.

Despite its alliance with Japan, Thailand was able to emerge from the “right” side once

the war was concluded. Its resistance movements were recognized by the United States, and it


was the United States that affirmed Thailand’s claim that she was coerced into Japan-Thailand

alliance – that the alliance did not reflect the will of the majority of Thai people. The Free Thai

movement was used to support this claim. Phibun, having supported the Japanese during the war,

did not deny the Free Thai movement’s claim that it had been fighting along side the Allied

powers against the Japanese – Thailand was forced to ally with Japan. Postwar Thailand foreign

policy, thus, reflected Thailand’s use of bamboo diplomacy. Nonetheless, the autonomy Thailand

had during WWII did not protect Thailand against the disastrous consequences of war. “Thailand

hardly escaped the war unscathed” (Reynolds, 1990, p. 66). In spite of “having more freedom of

action than any other country under Japanese control…Thailand was still dominated by Japan

militarily, politically, and economically” (United States, 1944, p. 1). Japanese military control of

Thailand received little Thai support, according to the Office of Strategic Services, yet, Japan

had gained control of Thai bases, communications, and supplies. Thailand’s sovereignty meant

that the Japanese could dominate Thailand politically without having to administer civil affairs.

Japan’s domination of the Thai’s economy allowed Japan to obtain supplies for its army,

monopolize Thai raw materials, used Thailand as a market of its export, and monopolized Thai

industries. Japan attempt to dominate Thailand culturally, however, met little success because of

Thai hostility (United States, 1944, p. 6). It was surprising for many to find out that, after the

war, there remained little animosity against the Japanese (Reynolds, 1990, p. 66). After all, it

was Thailand that manipulated the Japanese and the West for its own safety. Thailand escaping

the war with relatively little damages was perhaps a good enough reason for the Thais to forgive

what the Japanese had brought them during WWII.


References

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politics. Singapore, Singapore: The National University of Singapore.

Chen, P.-H. (2007). Bamboo Diplomacy: Interpreting the Formation of Thailand's Worldview

and Its Implications on Modern Thai Foreign Policy. International Studies Association;

2007 Annual Meeting (p. Abstract). International Studies Association.

Nagaoka, S. (1980). The Drive into Southern Indochina and Thailand. In J. W. Morley, & J. W.

Morley (Ed.), The Fateful Choice: Japan's Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939-1941 (R. A.

Scalapino, Trans., pp. 209-240). New York City, New York, United States of America:

Columbia University Press.

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Saunders, D. (1993). Judith A. Stowe. Siam Becomes Thailand: A Story of Intrigue Book

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japan and thailand independence during world war ii

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