***Japan Assurances DA***ShellsProlif---1NCNuclear war

Tanter ’17 [Richard; Senior Research Associate at Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability and Director of the Nautilus Institute at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology; “Donald Trump’s Japanese and South Korean Nuclear Threat to China: A tipping point in East Asia?,” https://apjjf.org/2017/07/Tanter.html, #NCC2020

A nuclear-armed Japan may come about through reluctant U.S. acceptance of a nationalist Japanese government mimicking De Gaulle’s removal of France from NATO in the 1960s, while still remaining generally aligned with ‘the West’. Or it may be the result, as Tillerson seems to envisage, of Japan being encouraged by the United States to become, as Richard Armitage advocated, ‘the Great Britain of East Asia’ – presumably in part thinking of Britain as a hyper-loyal client nuclear state, dependent on the U.S. for its missiles. This would envisage Japan as a loyal and still subordinate partner, a second tier, or at least third tier nuclear- armed state – presumably with a high level of ‘conventional weapons militarization’. This is not a thought much welcomed in Seoul, and Japanese and South Korean nuclearization will be separated only by an historical nanosecond, with Taiwan equally facing a future-defining choice about nuclear weapons development. In this fantasy of U.S. East Asian nuclear hegemony reborn, all this would be accompanied by a U.S.-led East Asian version of NATO, linked in the south to Australia, and in the wilder shores of late imperial dreaming of an ‘alliance of democracies’, to a U.S.-aligned India. What could possibly go wrong? But in the longer run, apart from the direct risks of such an event for the U.S. itself, its East Asian alliance network, now in its seventh decade, founded on Japanese and Korean acceptance of U.S. nuclear primacy and a U.S. nuclear umbrella, would change dramatically, bringing with it, for better or worse, the end of U.S. hegemony in East and Southeast Asia. Whether occurring on a Gaullist or British model, the foundations of Korean and Japanese relations with the United States would be irrevocably altered. Even leaving aside the obvious questions about the DPRK, in the event of a nuclearized Japan and South Korea, clearly the mathematical risks of nuclear war initiated in East Asia would be very much greater than even the current risks of India-Pakistan nuclear conflict. Regional nuclear security planning would be woven with multiple valences of possible perceived nuclear threats. The calculus of China-U.S. nuclear relations immediately becomes much more complex, with China facing two new potential threats, nominally at least coordinating with the U.S., in addition to the older concerns about India and Russia. For the United States, a nuclear-armed, fully ‘normalized’ Japan would never be the undoubted loyal lapdog of by then likely post-United Kingdom Little England. And the calculations of a nuclear-armed South Korea and Japan about each other would start and finish in historically-conditioned suspicion. At a global level, the U.S. opening the door to Japanese and Korean nuclear weapons could not fail to encourage a cascade of regional races to nuclear weapons, not only in the Western Pacific but in the Middle East, in Latin America, and quite possibly in Africa. The risks of regional nuclear war with all its now thoroughly documented catastrophic environmental and climate consequences would be both manifold and far higher than at present.

**UniquenessJapan AllianceBrink---2NCThe alliance is strong now but vulnerable to missteps on key security issues.

Akimoto 20, writer for the Japan Times (Satohiro, January 19th, “The Japan-U.S. alliance is stronger than ever, but that doesn't mean it's on autopilot,” The Japan Times, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/01/19/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-us-alliance-anniversary-60-years-commentary/, #NCC2020

WASHINGTON – When the Japan-U.S. security treaty was revised 60 years ago, nobody expected that it would become one of the most remarkable security alliances in history.

The treaty, which is the centerpiece of the two nations’ alliance, has continuously provided a strong security architecture to protect the strategic interests — stability, peace and prosperity — of the two countries for more than half a century.

The alliance evolved organically over the years and adapted to the geopolitical challenges of the times thanks to the stewardship of alliance managers in both countries. What was largely an alliance designed to guard against communism during the Cold War has now evolved into a regional and global security infrastructure that covers new domains like cyber and space.

As Defense Minister Taro Kono said in Washington last week, the U.S.-Japan alliance is stronger than ever.

Yet that does not mean the security relationship can run on autopilot, and it is not just because of U.S. President Donald Trump’s ungrounded criticism of Japan as a “free rider” of security.

Ryozo Kato, during his time as Japanese ambassador in Washington, often remarked that the relationship between Japan and the U.S. was like “gardening.” It is one of the most beautiful gardens in the world for everybody to enjoy, but the garden requires constant, thoughtful and skillful care with a grand plan in mind. The same could be said of the security treaty, which deserves the best care possible.

Being on the same page

As we face a new set of challenges in the age of great geopolitical shift, the anniversary also presents a timely and much-needed opportunity for both countries to calibrate the alliance’s future. As it has been skillfully done in the past by statesmen from both countries, the Japan-U.S. security cooperation needs to continue to evolve in order to adapt to the ever-changing environment.

Here are some of the major issues the U.S. and Japan would do well to address together:

Even as Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Trump’s “bromance” appears rock-solid, both countries need to be on the same page regarding major geopolitical issues, especially where the interests may not perfectly align in reality.

Indeed, there was a time when Tokyo and Washington saw security threats differently.

While the Japanese public has perceived China as a major security concern since the late 1990s, the U.S. saw China more as an economic opportunity rather than a security challenge, until that perception began to change in the latter years of the administration of President Barack Obama.

China, which Kono last week in Washington essentially described as a threat, is one — if not the biggest — issue.

The alliance is strong but vulnerable

John Wright 20 U.S. Air Force officer, pilot, and a Mike and Maureen Mansfield Fellow. He is a Foreign Area Officer who specializes in Japan, and recent author of the book “Deep Space Warfare: Military Strategy Beyond Orbit.” The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author, and not necessarily those of the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Government, Mansfield Foundation, or any other government or government entity. “Where No Alliance Has Gone Before: US-Japan Military Cooperation in Space”, https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/where-no-alliance-has-gone-before-us-japan-military-cooperation-in-space/ #NCC2020

With the United States’ December 21, 2019 creation of a separate and sovereign branch of its military completely devoted to space, the U.S. Space Force, the global race to emancipate a portion of national military power from terrestrial shackles and place it firmly into orbit is on.

The announcement also unleashed a somewhat unexpected cascading effect: the increased attention paid to military space activities by U.S. allies and partners, who have no choice but to follow where the U.S. military moves its gravitational pull. In particular, Japan has made announcements in recent days that indicate its intention to remain in lockstep with the United States, at least in terms of defense.

On January 5, 2020, scarcely two weeks following the U.S. Space Force announcement, the Japanese government indicated it plans to rename the Japan Air Self Defense Force to the Japan Aerospace Defense Force. Not coincidentally, on January 21, during a speech given on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe vowed to make the alliance “a pillar for safeguarding peace and security in both outer space and cyberspace.”

While words are good, actions are better. In a less-noticed but more consequential move, the Ministry of Defense is finalizing a bill to be placed before the Diet that asks to craft a space operations-exclusive military unit staffed with 20 personnel. While this paltry number of people can barely be expected to efficiently run their task of monitoring space debris and “suspicious satellites,” the move is a significant step for a nation that often struggles with global defense developments due to Japan’s unique domestic restrictions and legal concerns. In many ways, it is surprising to see Japan, a nation that still sorties 1960s-era F-4 aircraft (though there are plans to replace them with F-35s), and is fielding their very first military Remote Piloted Aircraft (a model the United States has been flying for nearly 20 years) in 2021, take its defense posture in space seriously.

These initiatives have several implications. First, the Japanese government’s attitude toward space and its place in the U.S.-Japan alliance reflects what’s at stake during the next major conflict, which will surely involve space. As an increasing number of government and commercial systems depend on space assets and space support, space can no longer be ignored as a future theater; the time is now to incorporate space into alliance strategy. This strategy, however, needs to catch up. Currently, Japan refers to space as a “new domain” in the 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines and briefly discusses space defense in the annual 2019 Defense of Japan white paper. Space is completely left out of the now-outdated 2015 Guidelines for U.S.- Japan Defense Cooperation.

Second, Japan’s emphasis is a good move for the alliance as a whole, and enhances its survivability. If Japan takes measurable steps to join its ally and if Japan meaningfully contributes to space security, space is less likely to become another seam where the alliance could come undone.

Further, there is a strategic advantage to taking a stance on both position and form when it comes to space. While other nations will struggle to “get serious” about space, and will need to decide between size, scope, and capability of their forces, Japan has confirmed its political and defensive outlook toward space, which means it has also acknowledged space’s effect on combined alliance defense. This is good, since the political dangers posed in space are very real. Despite the existence of the well-intentioned but toothless Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which prohibits use of force activities in space, the obvious future is that space will act as yet another stage upon which the political games of earthbound nation-states will play out.

Nation-state competition will not disappear as states found and fund forces to travel, explore, and exploit the inky blackness of space; rather, competition will intensify, as discoveries with both economic and defense applications are made, and as states better understand how vulnerable they are without proper space defense and deterrence. This is the political reality of space, and the fact that both members of the U.S.-Japan alliance understand this means the alliance has much less danger of breaking apart upon first contact with space-centric competition. If anything, mutual interest in the same environment will lead to cooperative efforts and a strengthened alliance here on Earth.

Notably, the odds of military confrontation in space have also increased. By funneling U.S. military space power into the highest echelon of military independence and funding (an independent service), escalation and competition is not far behind. It will not be surprising if we see several other competitors forming their own service-level forces by year’s end, though their actual forms will likely vary greatly. The fact that the United States has “jumped” to a service-sized solution to military space competition, and not a smaller organization like a corps or geographic command, means other nations have no real strategic options but to match the U.S. precedent as close as they can in size and capability. The U.S.-Japan alliance must prepare for this eventuality.

Japanese government decisions to strengthen its space defense capabilities thus come from a mix of terrestrial strategy, political realities, and prudent alliance management. However, significant challenges remain. For one thing, today’s nation-states (including the United States) are understandably gun-shy about sharing space defense capabilities and space-centric technology, which means alliance military space activity will naturally move at the speed of the slowest member. For another, we do not yet know just what space-on-space conflict will look like between combatants who possess similar space-based strength, which makes warfare difficult to plan for and will present an immediate challenge to alliance coordination should such a conflict occur.

Despite these doubts, recent Japanese government announces are positive and will help usher both the alliance and U.S.-Japan relations through its current comparatively rocky period of trade spats and quibbles over military basing. Without a doubt, the political impact of allied space defense could easily result in the U.S.-Japan alliance extending its prerogatives beyond Earth’s territorial confines.

Assurances Now---2NCAssurances do work now – the alliance is strong, but there’s latent fear of U.S. disengagement

Dr. Matteo Dian 19, Professor in the Department of Political and Social Sciences of the University of Bologna, Ph.D. (cum laude) in Political Science from the Scuola Normale Superiore--Italian Institute of Human and Social Sciences, “Tokyo's Strategy, Between China and the U.S.”, About Energy, 7/10/2019, https://www.aboutenergy.com/en_IT/topics/tokyo-strategy.shtml# #NCC2020

Abe, Trump and the U.S.-Japan alliance

During the last decade, and particularly since Shinzo Abe’s second term as prime minister, Japan has pursued different strategies to respond to China’s ascent. These strategies have focused on efforts at bolstering its alliance with the United States, which culminated in the approval of new guidelines for defense cooperation between the two countries in 2015, the building of bilateral and multilateral relations with other Asian partners such as through the “Quad” with Australia and India and the development of trans-Pacific forms of economic governance such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

Donald Trump’s election as president of the United States has put this multidimensional strategy under serious strain. Both as a presidential candidate and as U.S. president, Trump has repeatedly expressed his skepticism about alliances and has openly accused America’s leading European and Asian partners of exploiting alliances to avoid “paying the bill” in terms of military expenditure. Trump has also voiced his opposition to renewing America’s unconditional commitment to defending its allies, arguing that alliances should be made conditional on possible economic and trade concessions.

On the economic front, Trump immediately announced that the U.S. would withdraw from the TPP, a move widely interpreted in the region as benefiting Chinese state capitalism insofar as it brought to an end the attempt to shape the rules of regional economic integration in a way that would foster a form of free market capitalism. The Trump administration, moreover, has imposed tariffs against its allies, including Japan, hitting sectors like steel and aluminum.

Abe’s response has been very clear, with security as his top priority along with the preservation of Japan’s alliance with Washington. Following the November 2016 elections Abe immediately set about establishing a privileged personal relationship with Trump and separating the management of the alliance from the various political and economic problems created by the new American administration.

For the time being, Abe’s strategy has been successful in avoiding a deeper crisis in bilateral relations and has allayed Japanese fears of American disengagement. Also, developments that would be detrimental to Japan, such as a bilateral agreement between the United States and North Korea in the absence of denuclearization, seem less likely today than in the recent past.

This, however, has not completely dissipated the climate of uncertainty characterizing the alliance under President Trump’s Administration. On the one hand, Tokyo fears the danger of “entanglement” if the trade war with China were to lead to increased tension between the two global powers, including in the military sphere, on the other hand, Japan is concerned about the possibility of being “abandoned” if Trump were prepared to enter into agreements with Beijing that have the potential to damage Japanese interests and security.

A2: Resilient---2NCThe U.S.-Japan alliance is solid but a rift breaks it down---that spikes Japan’s threat perceptions of China and North Korea

Weston S. Konishi 19, senior fellow at the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, 5/23/19, “Trump and Abe: The odd couple,” https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/05/23/commentary/japan-commentary/trump-abe-odd-couple/#.XV8HMehKhl8 #NCC2020

At the invitation of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, U.S. President Donald Trump will travel to Tokyo on Saturday as the first foreign leader to meet newly enthroned Emperor Naruhito. This unique honor caps off Abe’s campaign to develop a close personal rapport with his famously mercurial counterpart — including nominating Trump for a Nobel Peace Prize and presenting a set of gold-plated golf clubs to the bling-happy leader of the free world. Such largesse is not without its reasons. Japan relies on its alliance with the United States for its national security and, although China has become its largest overall trade partner, the U.S. is Japan’s largest export market. This is a bilateral relationship that Japan cannot afford to lose. Yet the Trump administration presents unique challenges for Tokyo. Not only did the administration impose steel and aluminum tariffs on Japan last year, but it forced Tokyo into bilateral trade talks to avoid even more damaging tariffs on autos and other goods. A more alarming concern is Trump’s uncertain appreciation for the strategic importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance. His statements on NATO and other alliance partners suggest a purely transactional world view, largely oblivious to the delicate nature of alliance diplomacy. An ugly trade war or a rift between the two leaders could jeopardize an alliance that Japan depends on to deter serious threats like China and North Korea. Suddenly those golden golf clubs make a whole lot of sense. It is anyone’s guess how genuine the Abe-Trump relationship really is. The political blueblood — the son of a former foreign minister and grandson of a former prime minister — and the casino man from Queens make for a very odd couple. Trump appears to have few loyalties outside his immediate family and Abe’s charm offensive, reasonable people can assume, seems more calculated than authentic. Yet those reasonable people may be wrong — the affinity between Abe and Trump may run deeper than skeptics wish to believe. Japanese who are in the know assure me with a straight face that Abe’s rapport with Trump is real, and there are not too many other world leaders who Trump calls for advice on a regular basis. There are even signs that Abe’s overtures have paid off, as seen by the Trump administration’s adoption of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” — a strategic vision first outlined by the prime minister. Ironically, Abe may find the current disrupter in chief in the White House a more kindred spirit than his cool-headed predecessor, Barack Obama. Indeed, despite all the Sturm und Drang surrounding the Trump administration, the Japanese foreign policy establishment does not pine longingly for the days of the “no drama Obama” administration. On the contrary, the open secret that Japanese foreign policy elites — who tend to be politically right of center — prefer Republican over Democratic presidents has never been more glaringly obvious than now.

A2: Aegis ThumpsCancelling Aegis was a financial and political decision---the security relationship remains

Tom Le 20 [Tom Le, Assistant Professor of Politics at Pomona College, specializing in Japanese security policy, war memory and reconciliation, East Asia regionalism, and militarism norms "Does Japan’s Suspended Missile System Signal a Retreating Defense Sector?," Tokyo Review, 6-23-2020, https://www.tokyoreview.net/2020/06/does-japans-suspended-missile-system-signal-a-retreating-defense-sector/, #NCC2020

The Aegis Ashore program was a risky venture from the onset due to high costs and local resistance. Akita Governor Satake Norihisa agreed that the suspension was “sensible”. Even proponents of the program, such as Defense Minister Kono, could not escape the reality that “pursuing the plan is not logical.” Some may conclude that suspension of the program is a strategic recalibration and Japan is no longer lockstep with the United States concerning regional security. Japanese interests have not changed, but sober assessments of its ability to shoulder the costs will ensure that Japan will not make promises it cannot keep. A well-functioning alliance requires more than aligned interests but aligned expectations as well.

Zero negative effect on the alliance---just realigned goals

Hornung 19 [Jeffrey W. Hornung, Jeffrey Hornung is a political scientist that specializes in Japanese security and foreign policies, East Asian security issues, and U.S. foreign and defense policies in the Indo-Pacific region, including its alliances, he has Ph.D. in political science, George Washington University; M.A. in international relations (Japan studies), "Japan Is Canceling a U.S. Missile Defense System," Foreign Policy, 5-25-2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/02/japan-aegis-ashore-expense-cancel-united-states-alliance/, #NCC2020

As important as it is to understand the factors driving Japan’s decision, it is also important to clarify what Tokyo’s cancellation does not represent. Critics of Abe will likely argue that the cancellation of the project indicates a divergence in strategic objectives between the United States and Japan, but the cancellation is better characterized as simply a different approach toward a shared objective. Even if Japan seeks to acquire a different weapons system for its defensive needs, it has maintained a highly consistent North Korea policy, even as the United States’ own policy has changed. Similarly, Tokyo’s suspension is not a repudiation of U.S. President Donald Trump. Although it is true that Tokyo decided on the system in 2017, Japan did not do so to accommodate Trump, as some have argued; rather, the idea had been percolating in Tokyo long before Trump became president early that year. Japan’s 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines, in reference to the country’s ballistic missile defense system, spoke of the need to “enhance readiness, simultaneous engagement capability and sustainable response capability to strengthen the capability to protect the entire territory.” This “sustainable response capability” referred to a ground-based tier of missile defense. In turn, the Ministry of Defense began to research the Aegis Ashore and THAAD systems. Japan has been interested in Aegis Ashore since 2014, after the United States began developing the capability for two sites in Europe. By the time of Trump’s call to buy more American-made products and weapons, Japan had already decided

A2: Trump Thumps---2NCTrump has continued Obama’s pivot to Asia----high-level security meetings prove.

Jeffrey W. Hornung 19. Political scientist at the RAND Corporation, specializing in Japanese security and foreign policies, East Asian security issues, and U.S. foreign and defense policies in the Asia-Pacific region, including its alliances; associate professor for the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies; PhD, political science, George Washington University. Managing the U.S.-Japan Alliance: An Examination of Structural Linkages in the Security Relationship. 2nd ed. 12-17-2019. https://spfusa.org/research/managing-the-u-s-japan-alliance/ #NCC2020

Recent changes on both sides of the Pacic Ocean have helped make the U.S.-Japan alliance the strongest it has ever been. In the United States, President Barack Obama pursued a rebalancing strategy to the Asia-Pacic that signicantly elevated Japan’s strategic value. In Japan, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe passed a set of security laws on September 19, 2015, to ensure Japan will be able to play a more proactive contribution to peace.1 And on April 27, 2015, the allies released new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. Much like the heightened expectations of a more proactive Japan that followed the revised National Defense Program Guidelines in 2004 and the completion of the Defense Policy Review Initiative with the United States in 2006, the passage of the security legislation and revision of the Defense Guidelines has once again raised expectations that the alliance will be more effective and proactive in addressing security issues throughout the Asia-Pacic region and beyond.

This is unlikely to change, even under the Donald Trump administration. Visits by Secretary of Defense James Mattis to Japan and Prime Minister Abe to the United States in President Trump’s first month served to reinforce the positive trajectory of security ties by reiterating past commitments to the alliance. What is more, even if the Obama administration’s ‘rebalance’ strategy to the Asia-Pacific is eliminated, or drastically changed, the Asia-Pacic will remain of crucial consequence to U.S. national security. is is a function of the region’s economic and security importance. Central to successful U.S. engagement will be Japan.

The alliance has weathered Trump’s rhetoric

Japan Times 20. "Trump touts U.S.-Japan alliance as treaty turns 60, but urges Tokyo to do more". Japan Times. 1-19-2020. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/01/19/national/politics-diplomacy/donald-trump-us-japan-alliance-60th-anniversary-security-treaty-contribute-more/ #NCC2020

Trump said in the statement that the alliance is “rock-solid” and acknowledged that it has been “essential to peace, security, and prosperity” for both countries and the region over the past six decades. On Sunday, Japan and the United States marked the 60th anniversary of the signing of their security treaty, an alliance they call the “cornerstone” of peace and stability in the region. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and members of his Cabinet participated in a commemorative reception in Tokyo on Sunday afternoon, which was also attended by Joseph Young, charge d’affaires of the U.S. Embassy in Japan, and Lt. Gen. Kevin B. Schneider, commander of U.S. forces stationed in the country. “Today, more than ever, the Japan-U.S. security treaty is a pillar that is indestructible, a pillar immovable, safeguarding peace in Asia, the Indo-Pacific, and in the world, while assuring prosperity therein,” Abe said in his speech. Abe said the alliance should become even more robust to “safeguard freedom, liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, one that sustains the whole world, 60 years and 100 years down the road.” The treaty is the basis for the U.S. military’s stationing of troops in Japan. Along with U.S. bases, Japan also hosts the Ronald Reagan, the only American aircraft carrier to be home-ported abroad. In June last year, Trump complained that under the treaty, even if the United States were attacked, Japan would not be required to help and could “watch it on a Sony television.” The alliance has faced domestic criticism, too. Some point to Japan’s position under the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” as being at odds with the country’s efforts to abolish nuclear weapons as the world’s only target of an atomic bombing. There is also persistent local opposition against hosting U.S. forces in Okinawa, which is home to about 70 percent of the total area of land exclusively used by U.S. military facilities in Japan, amid repeated accidents and cases of assault and rape by American troops. Still, the foreign and defense ministers of Japan and the United States said Friday in a joint statement that the alliance “has played and will continue to play an integral role in ensuring the peace and security of our two countries, while realizing our shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.” “Our alliance is stronger, broader, and more essential today than ever,” Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi and Defense Minister Taro Kono said along with their U.S. counterparts, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Defense Secretary Mark Esper. Signed in 1960 by the governments of then-Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi — Abe’s grandfather — and then-President Dwight Eisenhower, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States replaced a 1951 agreement that helped form the basis of relations between the countries following the end of World War II. The revised treaty removed a clause in the earlier version that allowed the United States to intervene to quell insurgencies within Japan, and made explicit Washington’s obligation to defend Japan from an armed attack. Abe has worked to boost Japan’s role in the alliance, in 2014 removing an outright ban on exporting weapons and reinterpreting the pacifist Constitution to allow the Self-Defense Forces to protect allies in certain situations under collective self-defense.

**LinkJapanFraming---2NCJapanese perceptions are the only relevant factor---they might be totally false, but they think the DA is true and will act on it

Emily Cura Saunders 16, PhD Candidate at the Claremont Graduate University and Graduate Research Associate at Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Bryan L. Fearey, Director of the National Security Office at Los Alamos National Laboratory, “To Pursue an Independent Nuclear Deterrent or Not? Japan’s and South Korea’s Nuclear Decision Making Models”, in Nuclear Threats and Security Challenges, Ed. Apikyan and Diamond, p. 39-40 #NCC2020

A major security concern for Japan is a rising China, both in its military strength and economic policies. The Japanese worry that their economic edge of the 1980s has been in decline due to competition with China, and as a result, China is becoming competitive vis-à-vis regional economic dominance. The Center for Strategic and International Studies hosted a Third US-Japan Strategic Dialogue forum in which they note, “Japan is seriously studying the American strategic posture in this region. Will the US choose Japan or China as a strategic partner? Will it choose neither? Unless the US chooses to promote the Japan-US relationship to a level like that of the Anglo-American special relationship, Japan may withdraw from the alliance and the US may find itself an isolated power in the Pacific.”58 This relationship needs to be carefully considered when thinking about Japan’s potential nuclear.

Similarly, Japan watches how the United States deals with North Korea. Japanese officials want to know how the United States will stem the tide of proliferation in the region. The United States has a long history of assurances when it comes to Japanese anxieties over nuclear posture. A more recent development is that Japan has asked to be more involved in the process of nuclear posture planning. The Japan Times noted that “Two days after the latest nuclear test by the North, U.S. President Barack Obama told Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in a telephone meeting that there would be no change whatsoever in America’s commitment to defend Japan, including nuclear deterrence through its nuclear umbrella over Japan.”59 The United States needs to continually express its intent to provide Japan with security in both words and deeds. It is important that the United States continually involves Japan in discussions concerning the nuclear umbrella.

Japan finds itself on the same tightrope the United States finds itself on, specifically how to applaud/pursue reductions of and emphasis on nuclear weapons while simultaneously maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. Japan was apparently sufficiently satisfied with the final draft of the 2010 NPR and their consultations beforehand. However, Japan was insistent on further discussions addressing more willing to talk of their specific concerns, holding high-level meetings to discuss the details and implications of the 2010 NPR. There were, however, still a few points of contention.

One of the largest issues between Japan and the United States on the NPR is the different threat priorities. While Japan is not impervious or ignorant towards terrorism, they see state actors as their main threats, whereas the NPR identified nuclear terrorism as the highest priority, specifically “preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.”60 Japan, on the other hand, sees China and North Korea as its biggest threats, not terrorism. In the Pacific Forum dialogue at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Japanese participants have warned of a potential problem should the United States not pay sufficient attention to traditional state-based nuclear security threats.”61

Another point of contention was how the 2010 NPR dealt with China. The NPR stated,

The United States and China are increasingly interdependent and their shared responsibilities for addressing global security threats, such as WMD proliferation and terrorism, are growing. The United States welcomes a strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater role in supporting international rules, norms, and institutions.62

This is in stark contrast to the stance as articulated in from Japan’s White Papers (vide supra).

This less-than-confrontational language in the 2010 NPR further increases Japan’s anxieties about the U.S.-Sino relationship. While the fear of abandonment may not be analytically founded, the fear remains that perhaps the United States will look for different allies in the region. Should Japan believe that the United States and China were becoming closer, would they be inclined to either look for security guarantees elsewhere, or move toward an independent deterrent?

While these sources of tension exist, Japan is nevertheless very proud of its partnership with the United States, and vice-a-versa. The aforementioned 2013 White Paper highlighted the US-Japan partnership. It explained the “peace and security of Japan is ensured through developing seamless defense measures by coupling Japan’s own defense capabilities with the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements.”63

Japan, like South Korea, has never actually pursued a nuclear weapons program. They have, however, like South Korea had major security threats and tensions. The security model does not hold true in this case. Japan is surrounded by two nuclear weapons states, each of which has continually provoked Japan, and yet, while some of these threats are quite provocative, Japan has yet to respond with direct proliferation activities. Japan does, however, closely monitor its relationship with the United States, and when regional threats are coupled with a perceived wavering of U.S. support and commitment, Japan is more likely to hint at an independent deterrent.

U.S. reassurance is key to restrain and moderate the trajectory of Japanese defense modernization---the plan causes it to rapidly escalate

Joseph Karam 15, foreign policy and national security observer, Norwich University MA in Diplomacy Studies concentrating on International Terrorism, 5/15/15, “Rising Sun: The Case for Japan’s Military Normalization,” http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2015/05/15/rising-sun-the-case-for-japans-military-normalization/ #NCC2020

In the decades since the end of World War II, the U.S., recognizing the shifting interests within the geopolitical landscape of South East Asia, encouraged Japan to increase its defense posture – working over time to slowly move them toward military normalization.

Historically, Japan has resisted contributing to regional defense initiatives, choosing instead to rely more on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, between the U.S. and itself (an agreement that guaranteed the U.S. would protect Japan from military aggression); however, this position began to shift in the 1990s following the rise in Chinese military power, and in the recent decade has caused Japan to alter course from its pacifist doctrine. Japan is not only witnessing the emergence of a more assertive China, which is looking to exert its dominance over the region, but also a belligerent and unpredictable North Korea that is experimenting with new and more advanced weapons systems (i.e., nuclear weapons, medium and long range ballistic missile).

Even though Japan’s pacifist constitution restricts its ability to maintain a standing military, its constitution allows for the creation of a self-defense force. While the acquisition of military hardware and the build up of troops began as a humble undertaking, it has since blossomed into a highly advanced and formidable military force.

Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force, arguably its most important “military” branch, consists of an amalgam of highly sophisticated naval weapon systems. The Soryu-class submarine is among the worlds most advanced non-nuclear attack submarines, it is able to displace 4,100 tons submerged, allowing it to achieve 20 knots under water and 13 knots on the surface. The Soryu-class is equipped with a full compliment of 20 type 89 high-speed homing torpedoes, as well as American-made anti-ship Harpoon missiles. The Soryu-class is also capable of utilizing advanced cruise missiles, which, should the need arise; will provide Japan a preemptive strike capability.

The Atago-class destroyer, as well as its predecessor the Kongo-class, offers the Japanese a versatile surface combat platform, capable of engaging multiple threat environments. The Atago-class destroyer is outfitted with the MK-45 lightweight artillery gun, two MK-141 missile launchers, that provide up to eight ship-to-ship missiles, and a MK-15 Phalanx Close-In-Weapon-System – capable of defending against anti-ship missiles, aircraft, and littoral warfare threats.

Japan’s naval capabilities have the potential to help stifle an increasingly aggressive Chinese military posture, as well as ensure the protection of its territorial sovereignty. The deployment of these naval weapon systems can profoundly complicate Chinese, or North Korean military calculations in the region, causing them to stop and consider the ramifications of pushing for the establishment of a hegemony in South East Asia, or even, in the case of North Korea, pursuing provocative military action against Japan.

Not to be out done, Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force is at the cutting edge of aviation technology. The “tip of the spear” in Japan’s air combat arsenal is the Mitsubishi F-15J – a homemade redesigned version of the American F-15 Eagle, this veteran fighter jet comes equipped with numerous air-to-air missiles, and has been in a perpetual state of evolution during its 30+ years of deployment – enjoying numerous retrofits and upgrades to its radar and electronic guidance systems.

While the F-15J is an excellent fighter aircraft, combat aviation technology has advanced beyond F-15Js current capabilities – Japan is already beginning to plan for its replacement. The Japanese, at one point, expressed interest in purchasing the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor, however, the U.S., for a variety of reasons, were not keen on selling it.

Japan is set to join the American Autonomic Logistics Global Sustainment Program (ALGS), which is an eight nation logistical partnership created to sustain the manufacturing and operation of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II, commonly referred to as the Joint Strike Fighter. In joining the ALGS, Japan has said that it is interested in manufacturing components for the F-35, which would mean relaxing its long established ban on the export of military hardware.

The potential inclusion of Japan in the ALGS is a major shift in Japan’s military posture, and represents a watershed moment in the transfer of military technology from the U.S. to Japan. If this agreement goes through, any doubts about the direction of Japan’s military normalization will be laid to rest. Japan possesses the third largest economy in the world, coupled with advanced manufacturing capabilities, and a massive population – Japan has the potential to reemerge as a major player on the global stage. Japanese recognize the threat environment in which it exists, and as Prime Minister Abe moves Japan toward military normalization, he has sent a clear signal to Japan’s neighbors that it will not acquiesce to a Chinese predetermined status quo and it will not tolerate military posturing from North Korea.

Over the years, China has been working toward developing the military capability that would allow it to establish an anti-access/area denial (A2-AD) zone in the western pacific (A2-AD is a strategy that focuses on preventing an enemy from conducting military operations in, near, or within a specific region). In the event that a military confrontation was to occur, the Chinese, utilizing A2-AD stratagem, want to neutralize U.S. power projection in the western pacific. This would limit the ability for the U.S. to respond to, for example, a military annexation of Taiwan, or one of the many territorial disputes currently playing out in the South China Sea. From a U.S. perspective, the emergence of a robust and formidable Japanese military will be indispensible in acting as a countermeasure to the Chinese implementing an effective A2-AD strategy.

There are many factors to consider when discussing Japan’s military normalization, however, none are more important than ensuring Sino-Japanese relations remain on an even keel. Sino-Japanese relations have a long and checkered past, mostly due to the fact that China, as well as the Korean Peninsula suffered tremendous hardship and cruelty under the yoke of Japanese imperialism. Japan’s push toward military normalization has the potential to awaken the deep seeded mistrust that has always plagued Sino-Japanese relations.

Prime Minister Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party are firmly in control of Japanese Parliament, and are unlikely to face any meaningful political challenge for several years. Recognizing this opportunity, Prime Minister Abe has taken the necessary steps to fundamentally alter the geopolitical outlook of Japan – the U.S. will play a critical role in ensuring that this shift in Japan’s military posture does not occur at a pace that would unwittingly escalate Sino-Japanese tensions. There is a delicate balancing act playing out, on the one hand the U.S. wants to bolster Japanese military capabilities, in the hopes of deterring Chinese military ambitions, but at the same time, the U.S. must maintain positive relations with Beijing – needless to say, the coming decades will require some deft diplomatic maneuvering to maintain regional stability.

If the U.S. is able to keep Japan on its course toward military normalization, without exacerbating tensions with Beijing, then the U.S., in Japan, will discover a robust and formidable partnership that can help maintain U.S. influence in the Western Pacific and South East Asia for the foreseeable future.

Alliance distrust ruins umbrella credibility – the credibility of the umbrella hinges on political ties not the other way around, so only we control whether Japan prolifs

Oliveira 19 [Dr. Henrique Altemani de Oliveira is a professor of International Relations at the University of Brazil. MA and PhD in Sociology from the University of Sao Paulo. Japan: A Nuclear State? May 23, 2019. www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0034-73292019000100207] #NCC2020

The Japanese security architecture is nurtured by a tripe composed by the Japan-U.S. Alliance, the role of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), and by the nuclear protection from its cover by the U.S. nuclear umbrella and its commitment to extended deterrence. On the one hand, the role of the JSDF is at present much more compatible with armed forces than with a self-defense mechanism. With advanced military capacities, it participates in collective self-defense actions, - with or without the U.S. presence, - as a way to contribute to the maintenance of regional and international security (Smith 2016; Paris 2016; Oros 2017; Samuels and Wallace 2018). Confronted with the insecurities related to the Japanese militarization, the maintenance of the Constitution’s Article 9 tends to be viewed as a demonstration of Japan’s pacifist character, which is reinforced by the continuity of the Japan-U.S. alliance. It should be noted that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty gradually has been transformed into an alliance that is characterized by a variety of lines of security cooperation directives between these two actors, with relatively symmetrical roles, with the nuclear capacity as the main asymmetry.

As it is strongly dependent upon the U.S. nuclear umbrella and extended deterrence, Japan has become confronted with a dilemma of whether or not to believe in a U.S. response to a real threat. Faced with such doubts, the pragmatic response from the Japanese leadership has been to seek to acquire nuclear technology as well as the plutonium resources that would allow it to develop its own deterrence capacity. Yet, Japan still makes it clear that its position is to reinforce the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and to stay below the U.S. nuclear protection. In this regard, the nuclear option aimed at the acquisition of such weapons will only be chosen if the Alliance and/or the nuclear protection would be discontinued. On the other hand, the U.S. distrust in relation to the Japanese nuclear potential, or the consolidation of a military partnership, has been relatively minimized, with the U.S. assuming a more tolerant - if not outright encouraging - posture.

For Japan there is still a significant issue, which often is not directly addressed, but which in practice relates to a belief that the mastering of nuclear knowledge and the consequent possession of nuclear weaponry confers a differentiated status to a state, thus permitting it to obtain a special locus amongst international powers. In a normal situation, Japan would be conscious of the importance which its cooperation with the U.S. holds in relation to the American interests within the region. In other terms, Japan needs the U.S., in much the same way that the U.S. needs Japan in order to continue its international policy with focus on East Asia. To this can be added the considerations related to the potential financial, economic, political, and diplomatic costs which Japan would have to assume in order to contain reactions, especially from China, The Korean Peninsula, South East Asia, and even Russia. Even so, with a possible rupture, the response from the Japanese leadership might well be immediate, as the population, - in spite of its pacifism and systematic nuclear opposition, - seems to be conscious of the vulnerabilities and total insecurity in a regional context marked by threat and insecurity.

Link Wall---2NCThey closely watch for signs of reduction and read into them as weakening credibility---spurs offensive prolif

Justin V. Anderson 13, Senior National Security Policy Analyst with SAIC and Jeffrey A. Larsen, Director of Research at the NATO Defense College, “Extended Deterrence and Allied Assurance: Key Concepts and Current Challenges for U.S. Policy”, INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER, September, http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss/OCP/OCP69.pdf #NCC2020

Responding to allied concerns regarding the ability of the United States to field conventional forces sufficient to their defense is also important for the purposes of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and sophisticated conventional weapons. In the late 1960s, for example, the removal of a division of U.S. ground forces from the ROK – part of the Nixon administration’s broader efforts to reduce the U.S. military presence in East Asia – led Seoul to quietly explore the possible development of its own nuclear weapons program. U.S. diplomatic pressure, together with assurances it would maintain a significant military footprint on the Korean Peninsula, ultimately convinced the ROK to drop these efforts. Its actions, however, revealed a connection between the size and strength of in-country or regional U.S. military forces backing extended deterrence guarantees and an ally’s interest in pursuing its own independent nuclear deterrent as an insurance policy against potential future adversary attacks. U.S. allies that fear U.S. security guarantees are weak or fading may seek other means to ensure they are protected from their adversaries – to include nuclear weapons, if they feel nuclear deterrence is critical to their security.

A mix of conventional and nuclear U.S. military forces, and deployments of these forces in sufficient strength to counter adversary threats, have provided a protective umbrella over U.S. allies from a range of threats for decades. For many allies, however, their heavy reliance on this umbrella leads them to closely observe U.S. decisions to shift, drawdown, or otherwise change the numbers or posture of U.S. military forces assigned to, or associated with, extended deterrence and assurance missions. They are deeply concerned by any move that may imply the United States is less able to defend them. As demonstrated by the U.S. experience with the ROK during the Cold War, it is important for the United States to rapidly respond to these concerns to prevent an ally from making a decision that will complicate or abrogate U.S. extended deterrence and assurance strategies and/or destabilize regional security.

Overall posture in Asia is carefully tailored to include a mix of capabilities that is perceived as highly credible---even small changes throw off the balance

Justin V. Anderson 13, Senior National Security Policy Analyst with SAIC and Jeffrey A. Larsen, Director of Research at the NATO Defense College, “Extended Deterrence and Allied Assurance: Key Concepts and Current Challenges for U.S. Policy”, INSS OCCASIONAL PAPER, September, http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss/OCP/OCP69.pdf #NCC2020

Tailoring Extended Deterrence and Assurance Strategies

The framework presented in Figure 1.1 is intended to communicate the critically important concept that assuring allies, and extending deterrence against their potential adversaries, requires the United States to carefully tailor policies, strategies, and plans combining effective military capabilities with clear demonstrations of political resolve. This requires national leaders, policy makers, diplomats, intelligence analysts, defense strategists, and military planners to work together to ensure the seamless integration of U.S. extended deterrence and assurance strategies and policies – despite their differing requirements. Moreover, it also requires all of these U.S. actors to understand that any changes to these strategies and policies – to include perceived changes – can have a ripple effect affecting the cost-benefit calculations of numerous U.S. allies and/or their potential adversaries. This reflects the central importance of U.S. extended deterrence and assurance strategies to the security of allies and the strategizing of their opponents. It also throws into sharp relief the degree of difficulty associated with tailoring these strategies for individual actors within a complex, dynamic geopolitical environment.

Alliance---2NCDefense pact is key to the US-Japan alliance---that solves regional stability and growth

Reynolds 19 Isabel Reynolds, Bloomberg News. Everything You Need to Know About the U.S.-Japan Defense Treaty Irking Trump June 25, 2019, 2:58 AM EDT https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-25/all-about-the-u-s-japan-defense-treaty-irking-trump-quicktake #NCC2020

A longstanding defense treaty between the U.S. and Japan is the latest international agreement to attract the ire of President Donald Trump. He is said to have mused about withdrawing from the treaty because he sees it as one-sided, since it promises U.S aid if Japan is ever attacked but doesn’t oblige Japan’s military to come to America’s defense. A U.S. withdrawal would represent a fundamental shift in an alliance that has helped guarantee security in Asia, laying the foundation for the region’s economic rise.

1. What is the treaty?

It was first signed in 1951 along with the Treaty of San Francisco that officially ended World War Two. Revised in 1960, the “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan” grants the U.S. the right to base military forces in Japan in exchange for the promise that America will defend the nation if it’s ever attacked. Under some circumstances, the treaty would include the U.S. defending Japan from cyberattacks. During the U.S. occupation after World War II, the Americans imposed a pacifist constitution that prohibited Japan from maintaining land, sea or air forces.

2. What does the U.S. get out of it?

The U.S. was initially anxious to maintain a bulwark against the communist bloc in Asia; Russian military planes still regularly fly around the Japanese coast in what experts say is an effort to monitor U.S. activity in Japan. U.S. bases in Japan, which are concentrated in the southern prefecture of Okinawa, formed a launchpad for the U.S. wars in Korea in the 1950s and later in Vietnam. The U.S. Seventh Fleet -- based in the central Japan port of Yokosuka -- has helped maintain the security and stability that’s been essential to the economic and trade growth of the region, benefiting U.S. exporters.

Reverse Causal---Prolif---2NCEnding the defense pact cause Japanese prolif---causes arms racing and collapses other alliances

Reynolds 19 Isabel Reynolds, Bloomberg News. Everything You Need to Know About the U.S.-Japan Defense Treaty Irking Trump June 25, 2019, 2:58 AM EDT https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-25/all-about-the-u-s-japan-defense-treaty-irking-trump-quicktake #NCC2020

4. What would an end to the treaty mean?

It would risk ceding security of the Western Pacific to China and potentially spurring a fresh nuclear arms race. Shelter from the so-called U.S. nuclear umbrella has allowed Japan to avoid developing its own arsenal -- a move that would raise tensions in China and the Korean Peninsula, where memories of past Japanese aggression run deep. To get around the constitutional ban, Japan has gradually built up a military it refers to as the Self-Defense Forces and has introduced modern weaponry, much of it purchased from the U.S., with an annual defense budget of 5 trillion yen. The loss of U.S. protection, combined with the proximity of nuclear-armed North Korea and a rapidly burgeoning Chinese military, might be enough to push Japan down the nuclear route. It would also call into question the U.S.’s military commitments to Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan and a host of other allies around the world.

Ending the defense pact causes arms racing

Hannon 19 Elliot Hannon, Slate staff writer. Trump Reportedly Has Mused to Aides About Ending U.S.-Japan Defense Treaty Because It’s Too “One-Sided” https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/06/trump-end-japan-defense-treaty-abe-world-war-ii-security-okinawa.amp #NCC2020

Bloomberg’s reporting acknowledges that there’s no indication the Trump White House has made any moves on altering the treaty with Japan, but this is how harebrained Trump ideas become harebrained Trump policies. What are the consequences of Trump’s 24-hour cable news strategic goals? Well, for starters, “scrapping the treaty would risk ceding security of the Western Pacific to China and potentially spurring a fresh nuclear arms race, if Japan decided it needed to protect itself from nuclear-armed neighbors,” Bloomberg notes. “It would also call into question the U.S.’s military commitments to Australia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan and a host of other allies around the world.”

Senkakus---1NCThe flipside of entrapment concern is abandonment---protection of ECS is key to restrain Japan

Basu 20 [Dr. Titli Basu is Associate Fellow at the East Asia Centre in Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, India. “In an uncertain East Asia, Japan's security choices face balancing act between U.S. and neighbors,” 1-22, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/01/22/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-security-east-asia/#.Xs_qERNKh24, #NCC2020

Alliance security dilemma

Pursuing Japan’s national interests within the U.S.-Japan alliance framework demands undoing the critique of asymmetrical reciprocity. For this 70-plus-year-old alliance to serve as an effective regional stabilizer, its scope needs to be normalized, equalized and enlarged. The “ironclad” defense pledges in the alliance exist alongside the security dilemma of abandonment and entrapment dynamics. On one hand, as the secondary power who is more dependent on the U.S. for its security, abandonment apprehension is prevalent in Japanese discourse. On the other hand, U.S. entrapment concerns regarding the East China Sea are a reality given the high costs of a military confrontation with China.

As Washington demands mutuality in alliance arrangements, Japan has stepped up in coordinating with the United States within its Defense Guidelines, which anchor the division of roles between Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. forces and outline how militaries will interact in peacetime and during contingencies, through the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism. Japan and the U.S. forces enjoy high interoperability, and a majority of the big-ticket items acquired by Japan are being procured or coproduced under license from America.

The challenge of alliance management and hedging against U.S. abandonment under U.S. President Donald Trump’s insular “America First” approach while managing geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges is testing Tokyo’s options. Japan will certainly continue to incrementally step up its contribution toward the alliance as the top priority with the intention of averting abandonment and shaping a regional order favorable to Japan’s national interests. Nevertheless, the gradual erosion of U.S. primacy and fluidity in the regional security architecture is making Japan weigh the depth of American commitment to Japan’s security. In some quarters, this is also leading to arguments in favor of Japan becoming more self-reliant in terms of security.

A ‘normal’ Japan

The normalization proposition remains at the heart of the security debate. The concept of normalization does not imply militarization. It is rather situated in the context of enabling Japan to contribute to international peacekeeping activities and constitutional change. Ichiro Ozawa’s seminal work “Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation” is a valuable account on this line of thinking.

The conversation on a “normal” Japan gained momentum during the Gulf War, following Japan’s failed effort to send out the SDF in support of the U.S.-led, U.N.-authorized coalition, and the subsequent criticism of Japan for checkbook diplomacy after Tokyo’s contribution of $13 billion. The normalists contest the notion of Japan’s exceptionalism, drawn from its World War II experience and the subsequent constitutional constraint limiting Japan’s normal participation in international affairs. They support constitutional revision of Article 9 and support progressively increasing Japan’s responsibilities within the alliance frame in order to assist the United States in managing the global order.

But Tokyo’s normalization discourse has raised alarm among regional neighbors as they envisage what Japan aims to accomplish under the rubric of normalization. Beijing and Pyongyang have often accused Tokyo of engineering an external threat argument to realize the objective of re-militarization.

Maximizing autonomy

Undoing the postwar political order imposed by American Occupation is often pushed by the far-right, who lack trust in the U.S. commitment to protect Japan under Article 5 of the security treaty. They support rearming Japan, commensurate with its economic status, since it is irrational for a resource-deficient Japan to rely on other nations for secured passage of its critical supplies in the maritime space.

Nevertheless, in the current strategic environment, given the costs and challenges of attaining security by means of maximizing autonomy or multilateralism, Tokyo’s best option remains bolstering its alliance with the United States. Japan’s pursuit of autonomy outside the alliance framework would erode U.S. protection. In addition, it will also deepen the trust deficit among regional stakeholders.

Japan opposes the rise of a Sino-centric regional order. Being a “beneficiary” of the U.S.-led international order, Japan’s resolve is to buttress that order, even as the balance of power shifts in East Asia. Going forward, Japan will continue to build its deterrence and incrementally expand the role of the SDF within the framework of the U.S. alliance.

While Washington waits for Tokyo to assume greater responsibilities in managing regional security, the challenge for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is to articulate in certain terms what entails a “proactive contribution to peace.” Abe must solve the puzzle of demonstrating to its most valued strategic partner that Tokyo is ready to share the load of safeguarding regional security, while factoring in the sensitivities of regional stakeholders.

Senkakus---2NCDefense of islands is key to shore up alliances

Teo 19 [Victor Teo, Assistant Professor in the Department of Japanese Studies at the University of Hong Kong and is concurrently Affiliated Faculty with the China Studies Program and Korean Studies Program at the university, “Japan’s Rejuvenation and the US-China Divide,” Japan’s Arduous Rejuvenation as a Global Power, pp 107-132, 4-9, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-13-6190-6_3, #NCC2020

Assistant Professor in the Department of Japanese Studies at the University of Hong Kong and is concurrently Affiliated Faculty with the China Studies Program and Korean Studies Program at the university

The handling of the nationalization of the Senkaku Islands was regarded as rightful in some quarters in Japan, while there were contrarian views that Japan was risking war to save the US-Japan alliance, as most constituents in Japan’s political entity did not expect this kind of response from China—even though the country’s ambassador to China, Uichiro Niwa, had warned in June 2011, after communications with the Chinese, that a move to “nationalize” the islands would trigger an “extremely grave crisis” and “decades of past efforts would be brought to nothing” (Financial Times, June 6, 2012; Straits Times, January 28, 2018). There is a view that Japan’s almost “reckless” behavior in attempting to “purchase” the islands was not an administrative blunder caused by the DPJ’s inexperience in foreign policy in general or with China in particular, but rather an all-out attempt by conservative elements within Japan to forestall the realization of a greater threat—that the US and China might have been moving toward a new East Asian shared paradigm by which they would adopt a shared security architecture (Harner 2012; White 2013). This is the classic “abandonment” dilemma of alliance theory.

Shinzo Abe’s victory came on the heels of the US “pivot” to Asia after Secretary Clinton announced President Obama’s new initiative to focus on Asia. While Japan was contesting China in the East China Sea, the Philippines and Vietnam confronted China in the South China Sea. The US pivot rested nicely on these fulcrum points. What was happening in the East China Sea must be contextualized against a larger hegemonic struggle that was going on in the South China Sea. This happy coincidence of the rise of the Abe 2.0 administration, coupled with the refocusing of US policy, meant that the alliance became even more important in taking down China, by now widely perceived as an irredentist systemic challenger.

The argument against overreliance on the US-Japan security alliance is well rehearsed and often heard: is it too much for Japan to trust the US to go to war for them against China in order to defend Japanese interests? Apart from its military strength, today’s China is stronger in almost every way than the USSR was. China believes that time is on its side; if anything, the aggressive diplomatic maneuvers on the part of the US in response to China’s emerging Ocean strategy is a reaffirmation of this view. As the quote from former Tokyo Governor Ishihara shows, a real but unspoken thought in Japanese minds is how far would the US go to defend Japanese interests against China. Despite the promises of senior US officials and successive presidents, Japanese officials wonder privately if Washington’s actions would match up to its rhetoric, especially if the conflict was over something that Washington considered non-essential. Beyond that, being chain-ganged into a conflict with China is something that Tokyo should not take lightly, given the Trump presidency. The treaty binds Japan to US military action that is decided primarily in Washington D.C. Not all issues that crop up in a US-China confrontation would necessarily involve Japan, and even if they did, Japanese domestic circumstances or national consensus might not allow Tokyo to intervene. In order to enhance the military aspects of Japan’s normalization, the Japanese government has over the course of the last 15 years striven to beef up its military strength, even though it is confined by the US-Japan alliance. Regardless of what the official position is, from a theoretical perspective, tightening the alliance under the guise of “normalization,” even though convenient, is likely to make Japan more dependent rather than less.

It is this overt dependency that should be reconsidered. The inhibiting constraints of the US-Japan security alliance is well known and well understood by most Japanese commentators and US officials. One need not look far—the literature on technological cooperation between the US and Japan in the field of high-tech defense, such as in space cooperation or the Joint Strike fighter, is replete with these references. Officially, the treaty puts the US and Japan on equal footing as allies. Unofficially, even though the treaty has appeared from different angles to treat the US and Japan on unfair terms, what is surprising is how officials in both countries have consistently managed and interpreted the alliance to their advantage, and persuaded domestic audiences and third parties of its worth.

From the Japanese perspective, there are three important reasons for doing so. First, Japanese officials are of the view that this partnership, despite its imperfections and issues, provides Japan with the easiest, best and cheapest security insurance for them to hedge militarily against China. This is a neighborhood security concern, and backyard fires triumph security concerns elsewhere. The second reason is tactical. Given Japan’s penchant for a political low profile and relative inexperience in global affairs, partnering with the US might offer them relatively low barriers of entry into the affairs of regions afar. With decades of experience under their belt, riding alongside the superpower through the alliance is a great way to sell the alliance both at home and reassure Japanese neighbors abroad. Third, it socializes China to the fact that Japan can and will act in concert with the US to defend itself, and that China has little or no chance of prying this alliance apart. Most importantly, the tightening of embrace prevents China from usurping Japan’s role in the alliance. This fear of abandonment is as real as the fear of entrapment into a war caused by excessive American adventurism.

Senkakus are a major area of interest for Japan---removing security guarantee collapses security relationship

French 18 (Erik David Ph.D. in Political Science, Syracuse University, August 2018, “The US-Japan Alliance and China 's Rise: Alliance Strategy and Reassurance, Deterrence, and Compellence,” 5-22-20, https://surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1918&context=etd, #NCC2020

Each of the three great powers has a stake in the future of the Senkaku Islands and the ECS more broadly. The US’ takes no side in disputes over the sovereignty of the Senkakus or the validity of each states’ EEZ claims. The US does, however, have a reputational interest at stake given Japan’s current administrative control over the Senkakus. If the US were to allow Japan to be coerced into relinquishing the islands to China, it would likely damage Japan’s confidence in the US commitment to Japanese security more generally. The Senkakus also form part of the first island chain, a series of islands running from Japan to the Malay archipelago which curtail the Chinese Navy’s (PLAN) ability to access the West Pacific, and therefore have strategic significance for US efforts to keep Chinese maritime power in check. 7 Japan and China each have significant interests in the Senkakus and ECS. Japan worries that Chinese control over the Senkakus could better allow the PLAN to threaten Japanese sealanes.8 China aspires to expand its maritime influence and break out of the first island chain. Japan and China both have an interest in accessing the potential untapped (albeit limited) seabed resources in the ECS, including modest oil and gas fields.9 There are also potentially lucrative fishing grounds in the ECS that both states would prefer to control.10

Senkakus---A2: Alliance Remains---2NCSenkaku is key---removal of security guarantee ruins the alliance

Chellaney 17 [Brahma Chellaney is a geostrategist and the author of nine books, “Japan's Senkaku challenge,” 2-27, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/02/27/commentary/japan-commentary/japans-senkaku-challenge/#.Xs_nlRNKh24, #NCC2020

The Feb. 12 Trump-Abe joint statement came out strongly for the Senkakus’ defense: “The two leaders affirmed that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security covers the Senkaku Islands. They oppose any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japan’s administration of these islands. … The United States and Japan oppose any attempt to assert maritime claims through the use of intimidation, coercion or force.”

This unambiguous commitment should be seen as an important success of Abe’s proactive diplomacy in seeking to build a personal connection with the new U.S. president. Abe was the first foreign leader Trump hosted at Mar-a-Lago, which he calls “the southern White House.” Earlier, just after Trump’s unexpected election victory, Abe met face to face with him by making a special stop in New York en route to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Peru.

Let’s be clear: The Senkaku issue is not just about a 7-sq.-km piece of real estate or the potential oil and gas reserves that lie around it. The strategically located Senkakus, despite their small size, are critical to maritime security and the larger contest for influence in the East China Sea and beyond.

China is seeking to wage a campaign of attrition against Japan over the Senkakus by gradually increasing the frequency and duration of its intrusions into Japan’s airspace and territorial waters. In doing so, it has made the rest of the world recognize the existence of a dispute and the risks of armed conflict.

Japan Link UniquenessDefense Cooperation---2NCThe alliance will remain strong because we are maintaining defense cooperation.

Vernuccio 19, Frank Vernuccio serves as editor-in-chief of the New York Analysis of Policy and Government (Frank, May 12th, “Vernuccio’s View: U.S.-Japan Coordinate Pacific Defense Vs. China,” https://thebronxchronicle.com/2019/05/12/vernuccios-view-u-s-japan-coordinate-pacific-defense-vs-china/, #NCC2020

The U.S. – Japan Security Consultative Committee, with the participation of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan, Minister for Foreign Affairs Taro Kono, and Minister of Defense Iwaya met in Washington on April 19. The two nations agreed to continue to play an “indispensable role in upholding a rules-based international order and promoting their shared values, noting that their strategic defense policies aligned with each other.” The United States reiterated its commitment to the defense of Japan through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, including conventional and nuclear.

The participants “affirmed their strong commitment to realize a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific,’ a shared vision for a region in which all nations are sovereign, strong and prosperous. The U.S.-Japan Alliance serves as the cornerstone of peace, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and remains iron-clad amid an increasingly complex security environment…[they] reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining readiness to face threats in the Indo-Pacific region, and discussed tangible ways to implement the National Defense Strategy and Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines. Both parties agreed to enhance alliance capabilities and interoperability across the conventional, cyber, and space domains. Secretary Shanahan expressed appreciation for Minister Iwaya’s leadership, which has further strengthened the alliance and helped to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific region.”

In a thinly veiled reference to China, both Washington and Tokyo expressed concern about “geopolitical competition and coercive attempts to undermine international rules, norms, and institutions present challenges to the Alliance and to the shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.” In return, they stressed the need to deepen regional cooperation, led by the U.S. and Japan. They also noted the rapidly evolving challenges in space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum. In response, they pledged to deepen their joint endeavors to counter the threats.

Senkakus---2NCStatus quo is solid---carefully balancing China and Japan to prevent escalation

French 18 (Erik David Ph.D. in Political Science, Syracuse University, August 2018, “The US-Japan Alliance and China 's Rise: Alliance Strategy and Reassurance, Deterrence, and Compellence,” 5-22-20, https://surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1918&context=etd, #NCC2020

In the context of the ECS dispute, the US has attempted to balance reassurance and deterrence toward China. On the one hand, the US seeks to reassure China that the US and its Japan will not fundamentally alter the status quo in the ECS by developing or militarizing the Senkaku Islands. On the other hand, the US seeks to deter China from challenging Japan’s administrative control of the Senkaku Islands through military coercion. The logic of strategic coordination suggests that US alliance strategy will play a critical role in its attempts to influence China. When the US distances itself from the dispute, it will cause acute fears of abandonment in Japan. If Japan fears abandonment too intensely, it may hedge by either adopting a confrontational or accommodative stance toward China. This behavior will undercut US reassurance and deterrence toward China.

**Impact

AlliancesAlliances Solve War---2NCAlliances solve global stability

Murphy 16 Martin N. Murphy, PhD is a Visiting Fellow at Corbett Centre for Maritime Studies at King’s College London. He has held similar positions with CSBA and the Atlantic Council in the U.S “The Importance of Alliances for U.S. Security” Oct 7, 2016 34 min read https://www.heritage.org/military-strength-topical-essays/2017-essays/the-importance-alliances-us-security

Alliances: America’s Great Strategic Advantage

Since 1941, “alliances have proven to be a crucial and enduring source of advantage for the United States.”55

How so?

Alliances prevent war. Not every war, of course, but by driving up the cost of aggression, defensive alliances have an effective record of deterring revanchist states from using violence as a means of settling disputes or gambling on a quick military thrust to achieve relatively risk-free advantage. History suggests strongly that states with allies are less at risk of attack than those without them, an observation borne out by the success of U.S. alliances during the Cold War.

This does not mean that aggressors will refrain from using other means to achieve their objectives; in fact, they already are doing so, and campaigns designed deliberately to remain below the level of violent confrontation are likely to become more common. General Valery Gerasimov, chief of the Russian General Staff, has observed that in recent conflicts, non-violent measures occurred at a rate of four to one over military operations and that objectives previously viewed as attainable by direct military action alone could now be achieved by combining organized military violence with a greater emphasis on economic, political, and diplomatic activity.56

Defensive alliances will therefore need to extend the breadth of their activities to avoid being outflanked by opponents that use unconventional means to acquire political advantage.

Alliances control rivals. The United States is first and foremost an air and naval power. It wins its wars by retaining control of its own movement and access to supply and denying similar freedom to its adversary. To do that successfully requires a global network of bases and the ability to control the world’s key chokepoints. Geography and the current U.S. basing structure mean that China, Iran, and Russia are likely to be bottled up in any future conflict—although China’s recent island-building activity in the South China Sea reveals a determination to secure its trade routes to the south and west and overcome what has been termed its “Malacca dilemma,”57 and using non-military means has enabled it to confuse and blunt an effective U.S. and allied response to this expansion.

Alliances control allies. Entrapment is a concern for any dominant alliance partner. Germany failed to restrain Austria–Hungary in 1914—indeed, encouraged it to act quickly to win what it expected would be a short war. This risk makes management of alliance relations essential, something at which the U.S. has proved to be remarkably adept. Conversely, the U.S. has felt constrained on occasion by its alliance partners, but mostly when they were being asked to operate in ways that were removed from the alliance’s primary task.

Alliances enable balancing. When regional states attempt to disrupt the status quo, smaller regional states will either balance against it in an effort to retain their independence or join it (“bandwagon”) in an attempt to curry favor and, by being seen as friends, retain sufficient influence over its actions to limit damage to their own interests. A core of U.S. allies in each region can act as a center of attraction around which balancing can be built, as is occurring now in East Asia. Without them, the sole option for regional powers may be to bandwagon with the regional aggressor.

Alliances prevent alliance formation by others. Most of the world’s military powers are members of U.S. alliances. If these alliances did not exist or were abandoned, states would almost inevitably be drawn closer to China, Russia, and Iran and possibly into alliances in active opposition to the United States.

Alliances control the bulk of the world’s military power. The nations that are allied with the U.S. spend around $1 trillion on defense (about 62 percent of global military expenditure) and have 6 million people (31 percent of their populations) under arms. China, Iran, and Russia collectively spend roughly 17 percent of global defense expenditure and are able to draw upon around 19 percent of global military manpower (roughly 3.7 million people under arms).58

Alliances can hold the line. In a multipolar world in which a reduced U.S. defense establishment might have to face multiple threats, strong and confident allies can hold the line even if they may not be able to roll back the aggression by themselves. This allows the U.S. time to prioritize threats and respond when it is able to do so.

Alliances facilitate global power projection. The United States is isolated geographically behind two great oceans. To be able to exert power in Asia, the homeland of revanchist power, it requires bases in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. From these bases, it can exert influence and power where and when it needs to do so and in small packets early on to deter and prevent challenges from arising that later could be defeated only by the application of overwhelming force. The notion that the United States could mount a campaign using long-range U.S.-based air power or the concept of prompt global strike alone is based on a misunderstanding of what both capabilities are designed to achieve.59

Alliances are the cost-effective option. Preserving peace and sustaining the global political and economic system’s current U.S. orientation can be achieved most cost-effectively with allied support. The alternatives would call for either the maintenance of a huge U.S. military presence overseas far in excess of what is being maintained now or the holding of substantial forces in readiness at home in case the need arose to fight their way back into Europe or Asia to confront trouble in support of what is called “offshore balancing.”60

Alliances enhance international legitimacy. They mean that the United States never has to walk alone. When it resists aggression, it is able to do so with the moral authority of the free world.

The U.S., Allies, and a Free World

The free world: a phrase that unfortunately has dropped out of fashion since the end of the Cold War yet is as relevant as ever. China, Iran, and Russia are revanchist powers. All three aim to revise the existing order in their respective regions unilaterally and at the least possible political and military cost to themselves. America is the leader of the free world, and revanchist powers know that if they are to succeed, they must diminish U.S. power globally and undermine the tenets of the current, American-led global order.

Each successful step they take along that path diminishes U.S. security and the security of U.S. partners and allies who accept the current global order as one that serves their own political and economic interests as much as it serves those of the U.S. To achieve their aims, the leaders of China, Iran, and Russia are suppressing individual liberty in their own countries, isolating their populations from information that undermines their control, and concentrating power in their own hands. America has seen the world darken this way before and knows that a darker world is one in which conflict is more likely.

Japan Nuclear ProlifO/V---2NCGoes nuclear---turns every hotspot

Chanlett-Avery 9 [Emma Chanlett-Avery is a CRS Asian Affairs Specialist, “Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests,” Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf #NCC2020

Any reconsideration of Japan’s policy of nuclear weapons abstention would have significant implications for U.S. policy in East Asia. Globally, Japan’s withdrawal from the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) could damage the most durable international non-proliferation regime. Regionally, Japan “going nuclear” could set off a nuclear arms race with China, South Korea, and Taiwan and, in turn, India, and Pakistan may feel compelled to further strengthen their own nuclear weapons capability. Bilaterally, assuming that Japan made the decision without U.S. support, the move could indicate Tokyo’s lack of trust in the American commitment to defend Japan. An erosion in the U.S.-Japan alliance could upset the geopolitical balance in East Asia, a shift that could indicate a further strengthening of China’s position as an emerging hegemonic power. These ramifications would likely be deeply destabilizing for the security of the Asia Pacific region and beyond.

Timeframe---2NCTimeframe – the impact is quick – Japan has rapid capabilities

Windrem 14 (Robert Windrem, MA in American Studies @ Seton Hall University, research fellow at the Center on Law and National Security at NYU, Fellow at the Fordham School of Law’s Center on National Security, “Japan Has Nuclear 'Bomb in the Basement,' and China Isn't Happy,” 11 March 2014, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/fukushima-anniversary/japan-has-nuclear-bomb-basement-china-isnt-happy-n48976, #NCC2020

But government officials and proliferation experts say Japan is happy to let neighbors like China and North Korea believe it is part of the nuclear club, because it has a “bomb in the basement” -– the material and the means to produce nuclear weapons within six months, according to some estimates. And with tensions rising in the region, China’s belief in the “bomb in the basement” is strong enough that it has demanded Japan get rid of its massive stockpile of plutonium and drop plans to open a new breeder reactor this fall. Japan signed the international Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which bans it from developing nuclear weapons, more than 40 years ago. But according to a senior Japanese government official deeply involved in the country’s nuclear energy program, Japan has been able to build nuclear weapons ever since it launched a plutonium breeder reactor and a uranium enrichment plant 30 years ago. “Japan already has the technical capability, and has had it since the 1980s,” said the official. He said that once Japan had more than five to 10 kilograms of plutonium, the amount needed for a single weapon, it had “already gone over the threshold,” and had a nuclear deterrent. Japan now has 9 tons of plutonium stockpiled at several locations in Japan and another 35 tons stored in France and the U.K. The material is enough to create 5,000 nuclear bombs. The country also has 1.2 tons of enriched uranium. Technical ability doesn’t equate to a bomb, but experts suggest getting from raw plutonium to a nuclear weapon could take as little as six months after the political decision to go forward. A senior U.S. official familiar with Japanese nuclear strategy said the six-month figure for a country with Japan’s advanced nuclear engineering infrastructure was not out of the ballpark, and no expert gave an estimate of more than two years. In fact, many of Japan’s conservative politicians have long supported Japan’s nuclear power program because of its military potential. “The hawks love nuclear weapons, so they like the nuclear power program as the best they can do,” said Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Non-Proliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California. “They don’t want to give up the idea they have, to use it as a deterrent.” Many experts now see statements by Japanese politicians about the potential military use of the nation’s nuclear stores as part of the “bomb in the basement” strategy, at least as much about celebrating Japan’s abilities and keeping its neighb