The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 17 | Issue 18 | Number 3 | Article ID 5313 | Sep 15, 2019

1

Japan-Russia Relations and the Miraculous Revival of SuzukiMuneo

James D.J. Brown

Prime Minister Abe Shinzō and SuzukiMuneo in September 2016 (NikkanGendai)

At the start of the 2000s, Suzuki Muneo wasone of the most prominent politicians in Japan.Elected to the House of Representatives for thefirst time in 1983, Suzuki eventually servedeight terms. He became a powerful figure inthe Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and wasappointed head of the Hokkaidō and OkinawaDevelopment agencies in 1997. He also becamedeputy chief cabinet secretary in thegovernment of Obuchi Keizō in 1998. However,while these are senior positions, Suzuki’s realpower was unofficial. Exercising extraordinaryinfluence over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs(MOFA) that often exceeded that of the foreignminister, Suzuki established himself as a key

figure in Japanese foreign policy, especiallywith regard to Russia.

Above all, in advance of the Irkutsk summitbetween President Vladimir Putin and PrimeMinister Mori Yoshirō in March 2001, Suzuki,in close cooperation with certain Japanesediplomats, pioneered what they regarded as amore realistic means of resolving thelongstanding dispute over the Russian-heldSouthern Kuril Islands, which are claimed byJapan as the Northern Territories. Suzuki’sstrategy entailed discontinuing Japan’s hithertoinsistence on Russia’s simultaneous recognitionof Japanese sovereignty over all four of thedisputed islands.1 Instead, Suzuki promoted aphased approach that would see the transfer ofthe two smaller islands of Shikotan andHabomai, followed by continued negotiationsover the status of the larger islands of Iturupand Kunashir, which are known as Etorofu andKunashiri in Japanese. This initiative provedhighly controversial since critics, includingwithin MOFA, feared that it effectively meantabandoning Japan’s claim to all four islands.Ultimately, after bitter infighting within Japan’sforeign-policy elite, the policy was rejected infavour of a more conventional four-islandapproach after Koizumi Jun'ichirō replacedMori as prime minister in April 2001. Suzukiwas therefore left to lament what he saw as amissed opportunity, claiming that “The returnof the Northern Territories was before oureyes.” (2012: 197).

APJ | JF 17 | 18 | 3

2

Map of the disputed islands (CartoGIS,College of Asia and the Pacific, TheAustralian National University)

Having reached the peak of his power, Suzuki’sfall was precipitous. In February 2002, in ameeting of the Budget Committee of the lowerhouse, Sasaki Kenshō of the JapaneseCommunist Party accused Suzuki of misusinggovernment funds that had been allocated forthe Northern Territories. This marked the startof an escalat ing series of corruptionallegations, which led to Suzuki’s resignationfrom the LDP in March and his arrest in June.In 2004, after spending 437 days in pretrialdetention, Suzuki was found guilty by theTokyo District Court on two counts of acceptingbribes, one count of perjury during testimonybefore the Budget Committee, and one count ofviolating the Political Funds Control Law forconcealing donations (Carlson and Reed 2018:71-2). After his appeal was rejected and hisconviction upheld by the Supreme Court in2010, Suzuki was sent to prison for a period oftwo years, though he was released on paroleafter 12 months. He was also barred frompolitical office until 2017. Adding to his

troubles, Suzuki was diagnosed with cancer in2003, resulting in the removal of two thirds ofhis stomach. He was also treated for cancer ofthe oesophagus in 2010.

Such developments would be expected toterminate any political career, yet Suzuki hasproved remarkably resilient and has succeededin restoring much of his former influence. Moststriking is that, since December 2015, Suzukihas met regularly with Prime Minister AbeShinzō, becoming one of his leading advisors onJapan’s Russia policy (Suzuki 2018: 28-9). Inparticular, Abe regularly consults with Suzukiahead of meetings with President Putin. Forinstance, in advance of Abe’s talks with Putinon the sidelines of the G20 summit in Ōsaka on29 June 2019, Suzuki met Abe twice, on 5 Juneand 26 June. Not coincidentally, Abe’s Russiapolicy has come to bear many of the hallmarksof the approach pioneered by Suzuki during theearly 2000s. This includes moving away fromthe demand that Russia recognise Japan’s rightto sovereignty over all four of the disputedislands, and the placement of emphasis insteadon conducting joint economic projects on thecontested territory. In other words, after a gapof almost 20 years, Suzuki’s policy from 2001,which came to be known as the “two-plus-alpha” formula, is back as the focal point ofJapan’s Russia policy.

Furthermore, Suzuki presents himself as anunofficial envoy to Russia. He visited Moscowin April 2019, where he met chairman of theFederat ion Counci l ’ s Committee onInternational Affairs Konstantin Kosachev.During the visit, Suzuki announced (accurately)that the countries’ “2+2” meeting between thedefence and foreign ministers would take placebefore the end of May, something that theforeign ministries had yet to confirm (Nikkei2019). Additionally, there are signs that Suzukiis again active behind the scenes. For example,when Diet member Maruyama Hodakadisgraced himself during a visa-free visit to thedisputed island of Kunashir in May 2019 by

APJ | JF 17 | 18 | 3

3

drunkenly raising the prospect of Japan seizingthe disputed islands by force, the Russianambassador Mikhail Galuzin phoned Suzuki toask how Maruyama’s behaviour should beinterpreted (Satō 2019).

2

In Suzuki’s ownwords, “My role is to create an atmosphere inwhich the prime minister can confidentlyconduct negotiations. Supporting from behindis fine for me.” (Tanewata 2019).

After his initial conviction, Suzuki formedShintō Daichi and was re-elected to the lowerhouse as the party’s sole representative in theelections of September 2005. However, despiteremaining head of his own party, Suzuki hasmaintained ties with the LDP. This bond wasstrengthened when Suzuki’s daughter, Takako,joined the LDP in September 2017 and waselected to the lower house in the Octoberelection.

3

Despite her brief tenure in the partyand her relative youth (she was born in 1986),Suzuki Takako was appointed parliamentaryvice minister of defence in October 2018. Thereis little doubt that this promotion owed much toher father’s close ties with Prime Minister Abe.Moreover, despite supposedly representingdifferent parties, Suzuki Muneo and Takakocontinued to hold joint events that wereattended by LDP grandees. For example, on 1June 2019 they held a joint fundraising event inSapporo that was attended by Minister forEconomic Revitalisation Motegi Toshimitsu, aswell as chair of the LDP’s General Council KatōKatsunobu (Hokkaidō Shinbun 2019b). This isfurther evidence of Suzuki’s closeness togoverning circles.

Not everything, however, has been going inSuzuki’s favour. On 20 March 2019, the TokyoDistrict Court dismissed his application for aretrial to overturn his criminal conviction andthereby clear his name (Sankei Shinbun2019a). Additionally, his cancer of theoesophagus returned and he underwentsurgery on 27 May. Undeterred by thesesetbacks, Suzuki ran in the upper-houseelections on 21 July as a candidate for Nippon

Ishin no Kai, a conservative party based inŌsaka that is ideologically close to the LDP.Participating in the proportional section of thevote, Suzuki was successfully elected, therebycompleting his remarkable journey from prisoncell to the floor of the House of Councillors.

It is not unusual for Japanese politicians tobounce back from corruption scandals, yet thescale of Suzuki Muneo’s revival is exceptional.Unlike most other politicians who faceallegations of illegal activity, Suzuki wasactually sent to prison and banned from publicoffice for five years. Furthermore, at the timeof his prosecution, he was widely vilified by theJapanese media in what was described as“Suzuki-bashing” (Togo 2011: 139). Yet, despitethis destruction of his public image in the early2000s, Suzuki has managed, not only to returnto national politics, but to regain significantleverage over government policy. He alsoenjoys a degree of access to the prime ministerthat is extraordinary for a convicted criminalwho is neither a member of the ruling party nor(until July 2019) a member of parliament.

The purpose of this article is to analyse how ithas been possible for Suzuki Muneo to firstestablish, and then reestablish, such politicalinfluence. It will also examine his impact onJapan-Russia relations. In so doing, the aim isto gain new insight into this remarkablepolitician, but also to understand what Suzuki’scase says about Japanese politics more broadly.

The emergence of Suzuki Muneo

Japanese politics has a strong hereditary streakand many politicians owe their initial success tofamous political forebears. However, this is notthe case with Suzuki Muneo. Suzuki was bornin January 1948 in Ashoro, eastern Hokkaidō.As he recounts in one of his many books, hisfamily was not especially poor but nor werethey ever really comfortable. Both parentsworked long hours on their farm and, as a

APJ | JF 17 | 18 | 3

4

child, Suzuki himself often had to help out withthe livestock and in the fields (Suzuki 2012:6-7). After completing high school, Suzuki wasexpected to take an administrative job in a coalmine and had to persuade his parents tosupport his dream of attending universityinstead. He was eventually accepted atTakushoku University (a private institution inTokyo) and Suzuki tells the story of how hisfather had to sell the family’s best horse toafford the tuition (Suzuki 2012: 106).Tragically, one year later, when Suzuki was 19years o ld , h is fa ther d ied o f a bra inhaemorrhage. This deepened the family’s woesand Suzuki was only able to continue hisstudies thanks to the support of his mother andolder brother.

This humble, rural upbringing forms a key partof Suzuki’s political identity.

4

He claims that hewas interested in politics from an early age andwrote in a junior high-school essay that it washis dream to become a politician. His politicalbeliefs were further developed during a visit toTokyo in the second year of high school. Thisschool trip took place in 1964, just a monthbefore the start of the Tokyo Olympics. Suzukiexplains that he was impressed by the scale ofthe city, as well as by the number of tallbuildings and the quality of the infrastructure.Most of all, he was shocked by the gap in livingstandards between the capital city and theHokkaidō countryside. He says that thisinspired him to enter politics so that he couldwork to bridge this divide (Suzuki 2012: 7).

Suzuki therefore presents himself as a man ofthe people, working to create a fairer societythat serves the interests of ordinary citizens,especially those in rural areas. He is also avocal opponent of neoliberalism, which heclaims became influential in Japan as a result ofthe administration of Prime Minister KoizumiJun'ichirō (2001-06). Suzuki fears that, due tothe pursuit of privatisation and the freeing ofmarket forces, Japan’s national unity andtraditional values have been eroded and it has

become a society in which “the weak are meatand the strong do eat” (Suzuki 2012: 9-10).Added to this, he is concerned about the lack ofsocial mobility and warns that, if you are borninto a poor family, you cannot get the educationyou need in order to get a good job (Suzuki2012: 146). To remedy this, Suzuki argues formore government funding for regionalrevitalisation, including to maintain anddevelop road and rail networks in Hokkaidō. Healso argues for a return to an “old Japan” inwhich people did more to support theircommunity instead of only being concernedwith themselves. To achieve this, he says it isessential for Japanese politicians to set a goodmoral example (Suzuki 2012: 135).

Lacking a privileged start in life, Suzuki had towork hard to establish himself in nationalpolitics. Indeed, Suzuki boasts of the “SuzukiMuneo style”, which is his strategy of workingtwice as hard as anyone else and emphasisingface-to-face engagement with the voters(Suzuki 2012: 154). This approach was ondisplay during the campaign for the July 2019upper-house election. During just the first threedays, Suzuki visited the most easterly, westerly,and northerly points of Japan, and by the end ofthe campaign he had travelled 21,171 km(Suzuki 2019d). Suzuki is also active on theinternet, writing a personal blog since 2013and not even missing a day when admitted tohospital for cancer treatment in May 2019. Thisincessant activity is consistent with Suzuki’spersonality, which Tōgō Kazuhiko, a formerJapanese diplomat who was closely associatedwith Suzuki at the start of the 2000s, describesas “ne-aka”, meaning innately cheerful or,literally, with a bright root.

5

Suzuki’s first job in politics was as secretary toNakagawa Ichirō, a politician who he continuesto lionise as the “Kennedy of eastern Hokkaidō”(Suzuki 2012: 107). Nakagawa was a seniorfigure in the LDP and served as minister ofagriculture from 1977 to 1978. He also stoodfor election for the presidency of the LDP in

APJ | JF 17 | 18 | 3

5

1982 and would have become prime ministerhad he not lost to Nakasone Yasuhiro. Suzukidescribes Nakagawa as a father figure to whomhe devoted 13 years of his life (Suzuki 2012:108). It was when working for Nakagawa thatSuzuki demonstrated his capacity forextraordinary hard work, often returning homeat one or two o’clock at night and going tocollect Nakagawa again at six o’clock in themorning (Katō 2002: 12). It was also at thistime that Suzuki began to show an interest inrelations with Russia (or the Soviet Union, as itthen was). As a politician from Hokkaidō,Nakagawa naturally wished to improverelations with Japan’s northern neighbour.What is more, Nakagawa’s ministerial portfolioincluded fisheries, which was a prominent areaof bilateral cooperation following the signing ofa Soviet-Japan fisheries agreement in 1977.Suzuki therefore came to share Nakagawa’sinterest in this relationship and, ultimately, theaim of strengthening ties with Russia becamehis defining “personal passion”.

6

Nakagawa Ichirō and Suzuki Muneo

Even at this early stage in his political career,Suzuki was a divisive figure. In particular,Nakagawa’s wife Sadako is said to have beenstrongly against Suzuki’s appointment as

secretary, believing that there was somethinguntrustworthy in Suzuki’s constant restlessness(Katō 2002: 11). Critics also claim that, duringhis time in Nakagawa’s office, Suzuki becameincreasingly imperious. Hiranuma Takeo, whowas also a secretary to Nakagawa, is quoted assaying that, if he allowed the phone to ringeven once before answering, Suzuki would hithim in the head (Katō 2002: 13). It is alsoreported that Suzuki even felt bold enough toharangue members of parliament visitingNakagawa’s office (Katō 2002: 13). Ultimately,Suzuki’s influence was such that, even ifNakagawa authorised something, it would nothappen until Suzuki approved it too (Katō 2002:13).

The source of this power is said to have beenSuzuki’s control over Nakagawa’s finances.Katō Akira, who has written an excoriatingbook about Suzuki, describes him as anextremely effective political fundraiser (Katō2002: 14). This made Suzuki valuable toNakagawa. Moreover, Suzuki’s hold on thepurse strings enabled him to exercise leverageover his polit ical boss. Drawing uponinformation from Uekusa Yoshiteru, who wasalso a secretary to Nakagawa before becominga member of parliament, Katō alleges thatSuzuki threatened to expose a scandal inNakagawa’s campaign finances if Nakagawadid not support Suzuki’s bid to run in thegeneral election of 1983 (Katō 2002: 16). Katōalso claims that Suzuki may have been involvedin the disappearance of funds that were leftover from Nakagawa’s unsuccessful bid for theLDP leadership in November 1982. WhenNakagawa was told by Suzuki on New Year’sDay that none of this money was left ,Nakagawa is said to have become enraged andbegan punching Suzuki in the head (Katō 2002:18). Just over a week later, Nakagawa wasfound dead in a hotel room in Sapporo, havingseemingly taken his own life.

Nakagawa’s family held Suzuki responsible fordriving the politician to his death. In particular,

APJ | JF 17 | 18 | 3

6

his wife, Sadako, claims that Suzuki not onlyruined Nakagawa’s political career but also hisprivate life (Katō 2002: 11). Moreover, shealleges that Nakagawa had shouted, “Suzuki,how dare you stab me like this! You’ve killedme. I’ve no choice but to die.” (quoted in Katō2002: 18). In response, Suzuki retorts thatNakagawa was depressed after losing the LDPleadership election. He was also terrified that itwas going to be revealed that he had receivedan illegal donation of one million yen from AllNippon Airlines. Added to this, Suzuki claimsthat Sadako herself added to the pressure onNakagawa by threatening to divorce him if hedid not sack Suzuki (J-Cast 2010).

After Nakagawa Ichirō’s death, Suzuki followedthrough with his plan to stand for election inDecember 1983. In so doing, he became a rivalto Nakagawa Shōichi, the 30-year-old son ofNakagawa Ichirō, who had stepped into hisfather’s shoes. Under the system that operateduntil the reforms of 1994, all members ofJapan’s House of Representatives were electedin multi-member constituencies by single non-transferable vote. This meant that members ofthe same party ran against each other in largeconstituencies, thereby encouragingfactionalism within the dominant LDP. In thecase of Suzuki and Nakagawa Shōichi, in thefour elections between 1983 and 1993, theywere opposing candidates in Hokkaidō’s 5thdistrict, from which five Diet members wereelected. On each occasion that the two men randirectly against each other, Nakagawa toppedthe polls, with Suzuki securing election as thefourth or fifth most popular candidate.

Even after the electoral reform of 1994, whichcreated a mixture of single-member districtsand a party list system with proportionalrepresentation (PR), Suzuki and Nakagawaremained rivals. This was because the LDP nowneeded to decide who would be its solecandidate in the new 11th district, where bothmen had their greatest concentration ofsupport. Ahead of the election in 1996, the LDP

leadership opted for Nakagawa. Suzuki alsolost out in the 12th district, his second choice,where the LDP’s Takebe Tsutomu was judgedthe stronger candidate. He was eventuallyselected to run in the 13th district but lostheavily to the candidate from the New FrontierParty. Despite this, Suzuki was still able toreturn to parliament as a result of votes for theLDP within the Hokkaidō PR block (Carlson andReed 2018: 73).

This long-term rivalry between NakagawaShōichi and Suzuki Muneo is another factorthat makes Prime Minister Abe’s frequentmeetings with Suzuki surprising. This isbecause Abe and Nakagawa Shōichi were veryclose. Nakagawa was one year older than Abeand they shared a nationalist agenda, with acommon desire to promote patriotic educationand a less apologetic attitude towards Japan’swartime history. After Abe became primeminister for the first time in September 2006,he appointed Nakagawa as chair of the LDP’sPolicy Research Council. Later, in September2008, under the leadership of Asō Tarō,Nakagawa was appointed Minister of Finance,but served less than five months. In February2009, Nakagawa, who was known for his heavydrinking, appeared drunk during a pressconference at a G7 finance ministers’ meeting.He claimed that his drowsiness and slurredspeech were due to a strong dose of coldmedicine, but he was forced to resign withindays. Nakagawa lost his seat in the generalelection of August 2009 and was found dead inhis Tokyo apartment a few weeks later, afterreportedly taking sleeping pills (Nakamoto2009).

Suzuki’s accumulation of power

Despite his energetic campaigning and prowessas a fundraiser, Suzuki has never beenespecially successful electorally. As noted,under the system of multi-member districts,Suzuki consistently lagged behind Nakagawa

APJ | JF 17 | 18 | 3

7

Shōichi and was only ever the 3rd or 4th mostpopular LDP candidate within the Hokkaidō 5thconstituency. What is more, after the electoralreform of 1994, he never succeeded in winninga single-member district, always beingreturned to parliament as a result of PR partyvotes.

7

As such, Suzuki’s political power rested,not on his broad appeal with the voters, but onhis steady accumulation of influence within thepolitical system and especially over Japan’sMinistry of Foreign Affairs.

The leverage that Suzuki was able to exert overMOFA at the start of the 2000s was aconsequence of a peculiarity in the Japanesepolitical system. Although the foreign ministerhad nominal control over the ministry, inreality, many politicians holding this positionowed their promotion simply to the fact that itwas the turn of their LDP faction to receive asenior cabinet post. As a consequence, manyJapanese foreign ministers had l itt leinternational expertise and did not serve longenough to significantly shape foreign policy.Real control was exercised by senior MOFAbureaucrats, as well as by certain politicians,like Suzuki, who, no matter what their formalresponsibilities, made a point of specialising inforeign affairs. These are known as the “policytribesmen” (zoku giin) (Carlson and Reed 2018:94-5).

The relationship that developed betweenSuzuki and MOFA was a reciprocal one.Specifically, Suzuki made himself valuable tosenior diplomats by working within the politicalsystem to further the interests of the ministry,such as by arguing for the opening of newoverseas missions and by pressing the Ministryof Finance to protect MOFA’s budget. Inreturn, Suzuki expected to be consulted aboutkey decisions and to play a hand in shapingforeign policy.

Suzuki’s influence was exerted covertly andonly truly came to light following PrimeMinister Koizumi’s appointment of Tanaka

Makiko as foreign minister in April 2001. She isthe daughter of Tanaka Kakuei, who served asprime minister between 1972 and 1974. Suzukiand Tanaka Makiko became major adversaries,but there are actually several similaritiesbetween Suzuki and her father. They both hadrelatively humble origins and rose toprominence through their mastery of backroompolitics. In addition, both men closelyassociated themselves with the goal ofdirecting public spending towards rural Japan.For this reason, Suzuki claims that he, ratherthan Tanaka Makiko, is the politician whoreally inherited Tanaka Kakuei’s spirit (Suzuki2018: 118). Another thing that the two menhave in common is that they were both foundguilty of corruption and given prison sentences.

Tanaka Makiko’s appointment as foreignminister came at a time when MOFA was roiledby allegations of corruption. The mostspectacular of several scandals was the case ofMatsuo Katsutoshi, who was director of theMinistry’s Overseas Visit Support Division. Atthe beginning of 2001, it was revealed that,between 1993 and 1999, Matsuo had engagedin the widespread theft of funds that wereintended for arranging overseas trips by theprime minister and other officials. Ultimately,Matsuo was arrested for having “used 410million yen ($3.4 million) to purchase a yacht,condominium, golf club memberships, a stringof racing horses, and to pay his mistresses andformer wife” (Carlson and Reed 2018: 99).Although MOFA initially sought to portrayMatsuo’s case as the crime of a singleindividual, Tanaka Makiko saw it as indicativeof an institution that had evaded oversight fortoo long and had become “a hotbed ofcorruption” (quoted in Satō 2005: 98).

As Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tanakaimmediately set out to reform the Ministry,putting her on a collision course with seniordiplomats. The first sign of trouble came in May2001 when senior MOFA officials made a seriesof personnel changes without consulting the

APJ | JF 17 | 18 | 3

8

minister. Determined to stamp her authority,Tanaka responded by freezing all personneltransfers (Carlson and Reed 2018: 99). Seniorofficials were appalled by this politicalinterference and turned to Suzuki Muneo forassistance in countering her reform efforts.This set the stage for what Satō Masarudescribes as “the Battle between TanakaMakiko and Suzuki Muneo” (Satō 2005: 61).

Front cover of an issue of ShūkanAsahi (2002) with the title “Makiko’sbattle”

Suzuki clearly shared the objective of opposinginstitutional changes that threatened hissteadily accumulated influence over theMinistry of Foreign Affairs. However, Suzukiand his allies were also opposed to Tanaka

because of her attempts to alter the course ofJapanese foreign policy. MOFA officials andSuzuki regarded themselves as internationalexperts and did not want their carefullydeveloped policies to be disrupted by Tanaka,whom they saw as a foreign policy neophyte.

The clearest example of this is with regard toRussia policy. During the late 1990s and early2000s, under the administrations of HashimotoRyūtarō, Obuchi Keizō, and Mori Yoshirō,Suzuki and supportive MOFA officialsdeveloped a new approach to the territorialdispute with Russia. Up until this point,Japanese governments had consistentlypromoted what might be described as aprincipled approach to resolving the territorialdispute. This meant that Tokyo would continueto insist upon the immediate return of all fourof the islands, or at least the demand thatMoscow simultaneously recognise Japan’s rightto sovereignty over all four. This position wasmaintained even though it was apparent thatJapan’s refusal to compromise meant that therewas no prospect of a breakthrough. Theinnovation put forward by Suzuki and hisassociates was to abandon the unrealistic goalof securing the return of all four of the islandsin one go. Instead, they promoted a phasedapproach. In advance of the Irkutsk summit inMarch 2001, this crystallised as the proposalfor a “two-plus-two” formula. This would seetalks about a peace treaty and the transfer ofthe smaller islands of Shikotan and Habomaibeing conducted separately from negotiationsabout the future status of the larger islands ofKunashir and Iturup. Suzuki, as well as TōgōKazuhiko, who was then Director-General ofMOFA’s European and Oceanian AffairsBureau, and Satō Masaru, who was a leadingRussia expert within MOFA, saw thiscompromise approach as the only means ofachieving progress towards resolving theterritorial dispute (Brown 2016: 117).

Believing that they were on the verge of abreakthrough, the Suzuki-led group was aghast

APJ | JF 17 | 18 | 3

9

when, shortly after taking office in April 2001,Tanaka proposed an entirely different strategy.She did this by suggesting a return to the hard-line demand for “the return of four islands as abunch” that was pursued by her father when hemet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev inOctober 1973 (Satō 2005: 65). Since Suzukiand his allies were convinced that Tanaka’sretrograde approach would badly damagerelations between Japan and Russia, takingaction to oppose the minister was regarded as anecessary step to protect Japan’s nationalinterests (Satō 2005: 103-5). These concernswere not without foundation since, afterTanaka Kakuei’s visit to Moscow in 1973, therewere no further official meetings between theSoviet and Japanese leaders until Gorbachevtravelled to Tokyo in April 1991. The Suzukifaction therefore feared that bilateral relationswould be returned to the state of stagnationthat had characterised the late-Cold Warperiod.

Driven by these motivations, MOFA officials, incollaboration with Suzuki, sought to underminethe foreign minister. In these efforts, they weregreatly assisted by Tanaka herself, whocommitted a series of gaffes. The first of theseoccurred in early May 2001 when, at the lastminute, Tanaka cancelled a meeting withvisiting U.S. Deputy Secretary of State RichardArmitage. Her critics leapt upon this incidentas an indication of her unprofessionalism; theyreported that the reason for the cancellationwas because she was busy writing thank youletters to those who had sent flowers incongratulation for her ministerial appointment(Satō 2005: 97). Further leaks followed aboutother cancelled meetings and she was alsoattacked for accidentally revealing the locationof where U.S. State Department officials werehiding after the terrorist attacks of September11 2001 (Satō 2005: 122).

This battle between the foreign minister andher officials was largely played out in public,with Tanaka telling the media, “They are

digging holes and placing landmines in front ofme, apparently trying to get me out of the wayso they can go back to doing things as theywish” (quoted in The Japan Times 2001). Therewere also bizarre incidents, such as whenTanaka returned to her office from a Dietsession to find that one of her rings wasmissing. Reporters in a neighbouring roomwere able to record Tanaka accusing heradministrative secretary Kozuki Toyohisa (whowas appointed Japanese ambassador to Russiain 2015) of stealing the ring and ordering himto go to buy a replacement (The Japan Times2001).

Another confrontation with bureaucrats relatedto the transfer of Kodera Jirō from his positionas director of the Russian Division to the postof Japanese ambassador to the UnitedKingdom. Kodera was a supporter of thehardline stance on the territorial issue withRussia that was favoured by Tanaka. Suzukitherefore saw him as an obstacle to hispreferred Russia policy and is therefore said tohave used his influence to have Koderatransferred. However, as soon as Koderaarrived in London, he was immediately recalledby Tanaka and reappointed to his formerposition. Absurdly, Kodera spent only 3 hoursin the UK before flying back to Japan. Inrevenge, Suzuki took the opportunity to grillTanaka for two hours in parliament on Kodera’srecall and her broader Russia policy (Sayle2002).

Ultimately, Prime Minister Koizumi had to stepin to end this state of dysfunction within theMinistry of Foreign Affairs. The final straw wasa conflict over invitations to the TokyoConference on Reconstruction Aid forAfghanistan in December 2001. Two Japanesenon-governmental organisations (NGOs) --Peace Winds Japan and Platform Japan -- wereinitially invited to the conference. However,when Suzuki learned that Ōnishi Kensuke, arepresentative of Peace Winds Japan, hadcriticised the government in a newspaper

APJ | JF 17 | 18 | 3

10

article, he allegedly instructed his allies withinMOFA to exclude the NGO from the conference(Berkofsky 2002). Tanaka was furious about thebarring of these NGOs, especially because, asshe claimed, Vice Foreign Minister NogamiYoshiji twice told her that MOFA had beenforced to exclude the NGOs on the orders ofSuzuki Muneo (Sayle 2002). Nogami deniedthat he had ever mentioned Suzuki’s name, andboth he and Tanaka accused each other oflying. With Tanaka having lost all control of herministry, Koizumi sacked her at the end ofJanuary 2002, while Nogami was demoted(Sayle 2002).

Suzuki’s victory proved short-lived since, lessthan two months later, he was forced to resignfrom the LDP. Nonetheless, Suzuki’s role inhelping drive Tanaka from office demonstratesthe extraordinary level of informal influencethat he had amassed within the Ministry ofForeign Affairs. Indeed, this was later tacitlyacknowledged by MOFA. After Suzuki’s arrestin 2002 and surprise reelection to the Diet in2005, MOFA issued staff with a formal manualon how to deal with Suzuki in order to ensurethat the controversial politician did notreestablish inappropriate levels of influenceover the Ministry (Shūgiin 2009).

Japan’s key man in relations with Russia

Suzuki Muneo being received by VladimirPutin at the Kremlin in April 2000 (Jiji)

Further to his privileged connections withinMOFA, Suzuki’s political power was establishedupon his reputation as a politician who is anexpert on relations with Russia and thedisputed Northern Territories. It is thisexpertise that has sustained Suzuki’s politicalinfluence over the years, enabling his Lazarus-like return from incarceration to the innercircle of the Japanese leadership. AlthoughSuzuki’s actual achievements with regard toRussia are meagre, the failure of all Japanesegovernments over the last seven decades tomake any progress on this issue makesSuzuki’s alternative approach and optimisticrhetoric seem enticing. Specifically, PrimeMinister Abe evidently judged that Suzuki’sassistance was indispensable if he is to succeedin his goal of finally resolving the territorialdispute with Russia and signing a peace treaty.

Principally, Suzuki presents himself as theleading political representative of formerJapanese residents of the four disputed islands.

APJ | JF 17 | 18 | 3

11

Prior to their occupation by Soviet forces at theend of the Second World War, the Japanesepopulation of the four islands was 17,291(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2018).After being forcibly expelled from the territoryby the Soviet Union, the majority of theseindividuals settled in Hokkaidō. By March2019, only 5,913 of these former islandersremained alive and their average age was 84.1(Ōno 2019). Despite their dwindling numbers,the plight of these individuals remains anemotive issue within Japan.

As a native of eastern Hokkaidō, where many ofthe former islanders reside, it was natural forSuzuki to associate himself with their cause.Suzuki was also quick to recognise that, formany of the former residents, what matteredmost was not the principle of sovereignty overthe islands but the practical matter of access.Suzuki’s promotion of a compromise solutiontherefore appealed to many. His so-called “two-plus-alpha” formula only promises the return ofShikotan and Habomai plus some form ofaccess rights to Iturup and Kunashir (Takewata2019).8 Nonetheless, the opportunity to freelyvisit their former homeland before the end oftheir lives is more attractive to many than thevague possibility of the return of all fourislands, which might not be achieved fordecades, if ever.

Added to this, Suzuki has long been aproponent of closer political and economic tieswith Russia as a means of preparing the groundfor a territorial deal, as well as a way ofpromoting regional development in Hokkaidō.In this respect too, Prime Minister Abe isheeding his advice. Central to Abe’s “newapproach” to relations with Russia, which wasannounced in May 2016, is an 8-point economiccooperation plan, which prioritises enhancedbilateral ties in the areas of health, urbaninfrastructure, exchange between small andmedium-sized enterprises, energy, industriald i v e r s i f i c a t i o n a n d p r o d u c t i v i t y ,industrialisation of the Russian Far East,

cutting-edge technology, and people-to-peopleexchange (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan2016). Again, this represents a reversal of theapproach taken by previous Japanesegovernments, which often held back economiccooperation until hoped-for progress on theterritorial issue was achieved. Encouraged bySuzuki’s advice, Abe’s policy is instead tofrontload economic investment in the hope thatthis will generate the needed momentum todeliver a territorial breakthrough (Brown2018a: 1-5). To date, the biggest Japaneseinvestment in Russia under the “new approach”is the purchase of a 10% stake in Russia’sArctic LNG-2 project, which was announced inJune 2019. The stake is worth more than $2bnand, while the Japanese consortium includesMitsui & Co, 75% of the financing is beingprovided by state-controlled JOGMEC.

As the self-styled representative of the formerislanders and with concrete ideas for resolvingthe dispute, Suzuki presents himself as the onepolitician who can finally facilitate a deal withRussia. Ahead of the upper-house election inJuly 2019, he told voters: “No matter what ittakes, I want to resolve the NorthernTerritories problem. To do this, I want to returnto parliament once again. Please everyone,once again give Suzuki Muneo the opportunityto work. Suzuki Muneo will not lose. I will win!”(quoted in Takewata 2019)

Central to Suzuki’s claim to be able to deliver abreakthrough are his long-standing connectionswithin the Russian political elite. These weredeveloped with the assistance of Satō Masaru,who has been a key figure in Suzuki’s rise, fall,and rehabilitation. During the 1990s, whenSuzuki was extending his influence over theMinistry of Foreign Affairs, Satō was a juniornon-career diplomat specialising in Russianpolitics.

9

The two men initially met during a tripto Moscow by Suzuki in 1990 and reportedlybonded over their shared dislike of careerdiplomats (Katō 2002: 38). These are the eliteofficials who dominate senior positions within

APJ | JF 17 | 18 | 3

12

MOFA and are usually graduates of Japan’smost prestigious universities. From this firstencounter there developed an unusually closepersonal relationship, with Suzuki describingSatō as an “intellectual giant” (Suzuki 2019b)and Satō, in return, praising Suzuki for his“exceptional ‘grounded mind’” (Satō 2005: 49).

Suzuki Muneo and Satō Masaru

Over the course of the next decade, Satōbecame Suzuki’s “private soldier” within MOFA(Katō 2002: 41). Suzuki used his influence tohave Satō appointed to the specially createdrole of chief analyst within the first division ofMOFA’s Intelligence and Analysis Bureau.From this position, Satō worked to furtherSuzuki’s foreign policy agenda and to providehim with information from within the Ministry.Tanaka, in her battle with Suzuki for controlover MOFA, recognised the instrumental rolethat Satō played in facilitating the influence ofher rival. In frustration, she began describingSatō as MOFA’s “Rasputin” and sought tomarginalise him by having him transferred(Satō 2005: 126-7).

Satō knows the Russian language well anddeveloped an impressive array of contactsduring his time at the Japanese embassy inMoscow. He was therefore able to assist Suzukiin developing connections with the Russianpolitical elite. As a consequence, when Suzuki

was at the peak of his political power at theturn of the century, Russian officials visitingTokyo would meet Suzuki for informal late-night discussions at which Satō, of course, wasalso present. One regular contact was ViktorKhristenko, who was first deputy primeminister from May 1999 to January 2000 (Satō2005: 129). Also, when Russian ForeignMinister Igor Ivanov visited Tokyo in February2002, Suzuki and Satō, along with formerPrime Minister Mori, met him for talks at asushi restaurant in Roppongi the night beforehis official meeting with Foreign MinisterKawaguchi Yoriko, who had just replacedTanaka Makiko. When they learned that thepress were outside, Suzuki and Satō stayedbehind in the restaurant to hide their presence,while the others left. As they were finallydeparting, they received a phone call fromRussian ambassador Aleksandr Panov, whoinvited Suzuki to visit Ivanov’s hotel room for afrank discussion in preparation for the nextday’s formal talks (Satō 2005: 143-4). This isevidence of the behind-the-scenes role thatSuzuki was performing at the time.

Suzuki no doubt believes that these covertefforts were important in facilitating thedevelopment of Japan-Russia relations.Nonetheless, his activities with regard to thedisputed islands and his close contacts withRussian officials have proved a continuingsource of controversy.

To begin with, in l ine with his aim ofmaximising Japan’s involvement on thedisputed territory, Suzuki has long been aproponent of Japanese investment and jointprojects with Russia on the islands. This wasSuzuki’s key focus during the late 1990s.Moreover, since soliciting Suzuki’s help inDecember 2015, Abe has also become a strongadvocate of joint economic projects on theislands, agreeing with Putin in September 2017to concentrate on five priority areas:aquaculture, greenhouse agriculture, tourism,wind power, and waste management (Ministry

APJ | JF 17 | 18 | 3

13

of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2017).10 However, atleast during the 1990s, Suzuki’s enthusiasm forpromoting Japanese investment on the disputedislands led him into trouble.

One controversial incident occurred in May1996 when Suzuki joined a visa-free exchangevisit to the island of Kunashir. Suzuki,alongside a group of former Japanese islanders,for whom these visits are primarily intended,proposed to plant a number of Japanese cherrytrees that they had brought with them as asymbol of peace and friendship. The localauthorities agreed but insisted that the groupcomplete the necessary quarantine proceduresbefore the trees could be planted. Suzuki waswilling to comply but a MOFA official, who wasaccompanying the group, refused, saying thatcompleting the quarantine forms would implyacknowledgement of the Russian government’sjurisdiction over the disputed territory. It wastherefore not possible for the cherry trees to beplanted. Although the unnamed diplomat wassimply following official procedure, Suzuki wasfurious. As Ignacy Marek Kaminski recounts,

“Suzuki had not only accused Mr. X ofundermining his regional peace efforts, but hehad also physically attacked Mr. X during thegroup’s return trip onboard the Japanesevessel. Although the official’s facial and leginjuries required a week to heal, the ForeignMinistry suppressed the incidents caused bySuzuki” (2004: 186).

The other main source of scandal was Japan’sprovision of financial assistance to the islandsby means of the so-called CooperationCommittee (shien iinkai). This entity wasestablished within MOFA in 1993 as a vehiclefor providing assistance to the territories of thef o r m e r S o v i e t U n i o n . T h i s s o u n d suncontroversial . However, s ince theCooperation Committee sat outside Japan’susual structures for providing aid, its fundscame to be used in an opaque manner for arange of other purposes.

Specifically, Suzuki is alleged to have used theresources of the Cooperation Committee tofund projects on the disputed islands thatgenerated lucrative contracts for Hokkaidōbusinesses that were major donors to Suzukihimself. For instance, in June 1995, Suzukisuccessfully lobbied Foreign Minister KōnoYōhei to approve construction of a medicalfacility on Shikotan.

11

According to Kaminski,“The building contract was awarded to thecontractor from Suzuki’s constituency, whichwas a regular contributor to Suzuki’s electoralfund.” (2004: 181). Kaminski also notes that,after Suzuki was promoted to the position ofdeputy chief cabinet secretary in 1998, “theovert economic aid to the Russian-occupiedislands jumped from about 0.5 billion yen in1998 to over 3 billion in 1999.” (2004: 183).The implication is that Suzuki used hisenhanced leverage to direct more money fromthe Cooperation Committee to projects on theislands that would reward his political donors.

The most memorable of these projects is the so-called “Muneo House”, an emergencyevacuation facility on Kunashir, which isproperly known as the “Japan-RussiaFriendship House.” It is alleged that, twomonths before the 417 million yen constructioncontract was awarded, “Suzuki conferred withthe Foreign Ministry’s officials regarding thebidding requirements and procedures. OnSuzuki’s request, the ministry illegally limitedthe contractors eligible to place the bids tothose from Hokkaido’s Nemuro region and withcertain business experiences in the past.”(Kaminski 2004: 183). It was subsequentlyreported that, between 1995 and 2000, the twosuccessful contractors had donated over 9million yen to Suzuki’s electoral supportcommittee (kōen kai) (Kaminski 2004: 198).

APJ | JF 17 | 18 | 3

14

“Muneo House” on Russian-held Kunashir(2012)

Although the alleged chicanery regarding thebuilding of “Muneo House” is the best-knownscandal relating to Suzuki, it was not theleading factor in his arrest and imprisonment.Instead, Suzuki was sent to prison for crimesconnected to two separate instances of bribery.The first case involved Suzuki’s acceptance in1998 of 5 million yen from Yamarin, a lumbercompany, in exchange for Suzuki’s influence asdeputy cabinet secretary in assisting thecompany to avoid punishment for illegallogging in national forests. Suzuki’sprosecution for perjury also relates to this case,since he was found guilty of lying about theYamarin bribe during sworn testimony in a Dietcommittee hearing in March 2002.

The second bribery case involved Suzuki’sacceptance of 6 million yen from ShimadaConstruction between 1997 and 1998.Prosecutors successfully argued that thesefunds were a bribe that had been given toSuzuki, who was then head of the HokkaidōDevelopment Agency, in return for his help inwinning government contracts (Carlson andReed 2018: 71-2). Shimada Construction is alsoreported to have paid John Muwete Muluaka,Suzuki’s former Congolese private secretary,15 million yen over a period of six years,despite the fact that “Big John”, as he is known,had done no work for the company. As Axel

Berkofsky elaborates, “The affair became evenmore bizarre when it was revealed thatMuluaka had been granted permanentresidence in Japan in October 2001, eventhough his diplomatic and normal passportsexpired in 1994 and 1998 respectively.” (2002).

However, while the misuse of CooperationCommittee funds was not directly connectedwith Suzuki’s arrest, it was the cause of thedownfall of his ally Satō Masaru. Specifically,Satō was arrested, and subsequently foundguilty, of illegally procuring 30 million yen fromthe Cooperation Committee to pay for morethan 10 Japanese academics and ForeignMinistry officials to attend a conference at TelAviv University in Israel. Since CooperationCommittee rules only permitted the funding ofsuch events in Russia or other Soviet republics,this spending was deemed illegal. He was alsoaccused of inappropriately using 3 million yenfrom the Cooperation Committee to pay for thevisit of an Israeli researcher and his wife toJapan in January 1999 (The Japan Times 2002).Separately, Satō was accused of providingconfidential information to a Japanese tradingcompany about a construction contract on theNorthern Territories (McCormack 2010: 2).

Tōgō Kazuhiko, who had moved from hisposition of Director-General of MOFA’sEuropean and Oceanian Affairs Bureau tobecome Japan ’ s ambassador to theNetherlands, was also caught up in the scandal.He was forced to resign from the Ministry inApril 2002 and then in Europe he wasinterviewed by prosecutors in relation to thesame charges as Satō. However, since Tōgōavoided returning to Japan until 2006 – whenhe testified on Satō’s behalf – he was neverarrested.

As with Suzuki, Satō has subsequently made aremarkable comeback. After being suspended(and later sacked) from the Ministry of ForeignAffairs, Satō began a phenomenally successfulcareer as an author, writing countless books

APJ | JF 17 | 18 | 3

15

and articles on a wide range of topics andbecoming an influential public intellectual. Satōalso retains close ties with Suzuki and hasregularly appeared alongside him at publicevents organised by Shintō Daichi, Suzuki’spolitical movement. Satō has also made asignificant contribution to laundering Suzuki’sreputation. This he achieved by writing Kokkano Wana [The Trap of the State] in 2005. Thisbook, which became a bestseller in Japan,convincingly argues that Satō was harshlytreated for what were, at most, administrativemisdemeanours and which certainly did notmerit pre-trial detention of 512 days. What ismore, the book provides a favourable accountof Suzuki’s character and intentions in hisexercise of influence over the Ministry ofForeign Affairs (Satō 2005: 62-128).

Aside from the controversy arising from the useof Cooperation Committee funds and promotionof projects on the disputed islands, Suzuki’sties with Russian officials have also periodicallyraised concerns. For example, Kaminskimentions rumours of Suzuki’s contacts withRussian intelligence operatives. Specifically, heclaims that “Suzuki had private meetings with acertain Smirnov of the Russian embassy inTokyo. Suzuki was aware that Smirnov was anintelligence officer. But he pressured the headof the National Police Agency (NPA) not topursue his meetings with Smirnov.” (2004:191).

Such reports might seem alarming but it isimportant to emphasise that there is noevidence to suggest that Suzuki ever knowinglyserved the interests of the Russian state. Theintelligence services play a prominent role inPutin’s Russia and Suzuki may simply havejudged that meeting intelligence officers is anecessary step in the process of cultivating anetwork of valuable contacts within the Russianpolitical system. Nonetheless, there remainlegitimate concerns about Suzuki’s Russianconnections. He has pro-Russian inclinations, ahistory of criminality, and regular access to

Prime Minister Abe. This trinity of factors mayhave encouraged the Russian intelligenceservices to view Suzuki as a securityvulnerability that can be exploited. Moreover,even if this is not the case, it is certain thatRussian officials will seek to use their contactswith Suzuki as a means of projecting influenceinto the prime minister’s office in an attempt toensure that the Japanese leader continues topursue a Russia policy that is deemedfavourable to Moscow.

What Suzuki’s return says about Japanesepolitics more broadly

The magnitude of Suzuki Muneo’s rise, fall, andrise again is unique. Even Suzuki himself talksof three “miracles” (Suzuki 2019e). The firstwas his initial election to the lower house in1983; the second was his re-election in 2005,which occurred after his arrest, but prior to hisofficial sentencing; and the third was hiselection to the upper house in July 2019. Yet,even though there is no politician quite likeSuzuki Muneo, there are some broaderconclusions about Japanese politics that can bedrawn from his extraordinary case.

Firstly, and most obviously, the return ofSuzuki suggests a high degree of tolerance fora certain type of corruption within Japan.Although his conviction has been upheld inJapan’s Supreme Court and his demand for aretrial rejected, Suzuki has never acceptedresponsibility for his crimes, nor has heapologised. Despite this, many Japanese voters,as well as the media and broader political class,appear willing to forgive and forget. Thisrelaxed attitude towards graft also appears toinclude Prime Minister Abe since he began toinvite Suzuki to the Kantei in 2015, when theconvicted politician was still banned frompolitical office. Abe’s only nod to propriety hasbeen his refusal (so far) to permit Suzuki torejoin the LDP.

APJ | JF 17 | 18 | 3

16

It is not easy to immediately identify why thereshould be such acceptance of Suzuki’sbehaviour in Japan, whereas similar actions inmany liberal democracies would be sufficient toend a political career many times over. Oneconsideration, however, is the fact that theSuzuki scandals do not primarily relate toaccusations of personal enrichment. Instead,Suzuki was essentially found guilty ofdeveloping a symbiotic relationship withcompanies in Hokkaidō through which heassisted them to win business and, in return,they provided him with financial resources tokeep him in power. This is a perversion of theproper function of the democratic process andcan therefore be regarded as corruption(Carlson and Reed 2018: 15-6). Nonetheless,some Japanese voters may simply consider thatSuzuki was performing his proper role ofserving the interests of his constituency. This isconsistent with Miyamoto Masafumi’s broaderobservation that, in Japan, the “publicperceives corruption as a victimless crime anddismisses the affair” (quoted in George Mulgan2010: 194).

Acceptance of corruption as a normal part ofthe political game is therefore one structuralfactor that appears to have facilitated Suzuki’sreturn to power. However, the other lessonsfrom the Suzuki case relate to qualitiesembodied in Suzuki himself. There are three ofthese: the ability to connect oneself to powerfulpolitical patrons; the possession of policyexpertise; and personal charisma.

First, Suzuki’s success demonstrates thereliable benefits of tying oneself to influentialindividuals and, when necessary, engaging inoutright sycophancy. After Nakagawa Ichirō’ssuicide, Suzuki cultivated ties with KanemaruShin, an important LDP powerbroker fromYamanashi prefecture. According to Berkofsky,“He [Suzuki] and Koichi Hamada, anotherindependent in the LDP, acted as Kanemaru’sbodyguards and often served as Diet hecklersduring Kanemaru’s tenure as LDP Secretary

General” (2002). Kanemaru was a centralfigure in the Sagawa Kyūbin scandal that brokein 1992 in which he was alleged to havereceived a 500 million yen bribe from theparcel delivery firm, which he then shared witharound 60 other LDP politicians. Prosecutorsalso accused Kanemaru of tax evasionamounting to over one billion yen. When hishome and offices were searched, investigatorsdiscovered a hoard of cash, bearer bonds, and220 pounds of gold bars. Although he wasarrested, Kanemaru’s trial was suspended dueto his poor health and he died in 1996 (Carlsonand Reed 2018: 54-6).

Subsequent to Kanemaru’s downfall, Suzukiprioritised relations with Nonaka Hiromu, whoserved as Chief Cabinet Secretary between1998 and 1999. He also became close to MoriYoshirō, who Nonaka helped to make primeminister in April 2000. In developing theseconnections, Suzuki endeared himself bysharing his financial resources. Specifically,“Over a two-year period from 1997-1999, hecontributed a total of 39 million yen to 11 LDPlawmakers, including members of the currentKoizumi cabinet, senior vice ministers andparliamentary vice-ministers.” (Berkovsky2002).

As the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)prepared to take power after the generalelection in August 2009, Suzuki set aside hislong-term connections with the LDP andstrengthened ties with the new government ofHatoyama Yukio. This immediately paiddividends when he was appointed chair of thelower house committee on foreign affairs. Thiswas despite the fact that Suzuki was still ontrial for bribery. Suzuki again sought to makehimself useful with regard to both Russia policyand Okinawa, but in September 2010 hisconviction was upheld and he was sent toprison.

After his release on parole in December 2011and the LDP’s return to power a year later,

APJ | JF 17 | 18 | 3

17

Suzuki shifted his allegiance to the Abeadministration and increasingly sought to alignhis statements with government policy. Thisinvolved reversing his position on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which he had previouslycriticised as a neo-liberal policy and harmful tofarmers in Hokkaidō. Suzuki has also not beenshy about personally praising key figures in theAbe government, saying, for example, that “Igreatly appreciate the skill and ability of ChiefCabinet Secretary Suga, who continues toachieve excellent results.” (Suzuki 2019a).Additionally, despite supposedly representingan opposition party, Suzuki acclaims Abe as theonly leader who can resolve the territorialdispute with Russia. He also asserts that “Ihave 1000 percent trust in Prime MinisterAbe’s foreign policy towards Russia and I wanth im to make fu l l use o f my persona lconnections, information, and experience.”(quoted in Sankei Shinbun 2019b).

Such relentless courting of the powerful hasbeen a key element of Suzuki’s success, yet hisconstant shifting of allegiances would not havebeen tolerated if he did not have something tooffer in return. At times, this has been financialbut, above all, Suzuki has used his expertise onRussia as his main currency of exchange.Suzuki’s knowledge of Russia and his web ofpersonal contacts in the country are a rarecommodity within Japanese politics and havemade him valuable to a succession of Japaneseleaders. This certainly applies to Abe, who isunlikely to have given Suzuki the access to theprime minister’s office that he enjoys, if thesame expertise were available from a lesscontroversial source.

Indeed, so rewarding has been Suzuki’sassociation with Russia that it is surprising thatmore members of the Japanese parliament havenot followed him in cultivating a particularbilateral relationship. In the current Diet, theonly other politician who stands out for hisespecially well-developed ties with a specificcountry is Nikai Toshihiro, the LDP secretary

general, who is known for his contacts inChina.

Adding to the appeal of Suzuki’s expertise onRussia is that, irrespective of his realmotivations, his approach to the territorialdispute is logical. In particular, having studiedthe dispute, it is hard to disagree with Suzuki’sassertion that the principled approach ofdemanding Russia’s recognition of Japanesesovereignty over all four of the islands hasfailed and that the only plausible solution is acompromise that would see, at most, thetransfer to Japan of the two smaller islands ofShikotan and Habomai, plus some form ofenhanced access to the larger two islands(Sankei Shinbun 2018). This realism regardingthe territorial issue is again something that hascontributed to Suzuki’s relations with Japaneseleaders, especially prime ministers Mori andAbe.

Lastly, in addition to the benefits of associatingoneself with powerful figures and accumulatingcountry-specific expertise, Suzuki Muneo’senduring success demonstrates the value ofcharisma in Japanese politics. While Suzuki isgenerally a divisive figure, everyone can atleast agree that, unlike many of his colleaguesin Japanese politics, he is not boring. In part,th is i s a consequence of h is natura leffusiveness, but he is also skilled at self-promotion. One notable factor is the speakingstyle that he has cultivated, which, according toMurray Sayle, “advertises his provincial rootsand an exaggerated humility rising to high-pitched yelling that suggests either a hair-trigger temper or the feigned rage of a samuraiwarrior as seen in Japanese TV serials.” (2002).He has also increased his visibility by adoptinga signature item of clothing – a lime-greennecktie – that he is rarely seen without.Additionally, he has made effective use of hisfriendship with Matsuyama Chihara, a populars inger f rom Ashoro , Hokkaidō , whocampaigned for Suzuki ahead of the 2019election. More surprising is that, during the

APJ | JF 17 | 18 | 3

18

same campaign, Suzuki also secured theendorsement of Steven Seagal, a Hollywoodactor who starred in martial arts films duringthe 1980s and 1990s, before becoming aRussian citizen in 2016 (Suzuki 2019).

Steven Seagal and Suzuki Muneoduring the 2019 upper-house electioncampaign (Twitter)

Some of these traits might be regarded aspopulist, especially Suzuki’s embrace ofcommon language to signal his identity as achampion of the ordinary Japanese people. Inany case, in the sometimes dull world ofJapanese politics, Suzuki’s distinctive characterand active self-promotion have been importantin helping him overcome his inauspicious startin politics, whereby he lacked the establishednetwork of support that is available tohereditary politicians. It was also this charismathat made the Suzuki-Tanaka battles of the

early 2000s so captivating to a Japanese TVaudience. In the case of both these politicians,the excitement generated by their theatricalperformances appears to have encouraged theJapanese public to take a forgiving attitudetowards their obvious failings.

Conclusion

This article has charted the remarkablepolitical career of Suzuki Muneo over the pastfour decades. This has seen his progressionfrom the humble role of secretary to NakagawaIchirō to the heights of being appointed deputychief cabinet secretary in the administration ofObuchi Keizō. Emphasis was also placed on theextraordinary influence that Suzuki exercisedover the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and on hisvery public battle with Foreign Minister TanakaMakiko during the early 2000s. A prominentfeature of the article has also been thenumerous allegation of corruption andmisconduct that have been directed at Suzukiover the years, as well as the crimes of bribery,perjury, and violation of political funding lawsfor which he was eventually sent to prison.

The ability of Suzuki to regain access to theprime minister’s office and to achieve re-election in 2019, despite his criminal record, isunprecedented in modern Japanese politicalhistory. Nonetheless, some broader conclusionshave been possible. Namely, the Suzuki casesuggests a significant degree of tolerance forcorruption within Japan, especially when thecrimes are judged to be to the benefit of thelocal constituency and not motivated by thedesire for personal enrichment. Additionally, asis perhaps true of all political systems, Suzuki’senduring success points to the importance ofcultivating ties with powerful politicians, ofbecoming the go-to expert on a valued subject,and of bringing sparkle to the political arena.

Suzuki campaigned for election to the upperhouse in 2019 under the slogan that this was to

APJ | JF 17 | 18 | 3

19

be “Suzuki Muneo’s last battle” (Suzuki 2019e).Suzuki turned 71 in January 2019. By thestandards of Japanese politics, this is notespecially old, but the unfortunate return of hiscancer of the oesophagus may have caused himto assess that his days in politics werenumbered.

Despite this, it is too early to write the finalchapter of Suzuki’s political biography. Thereason for this is that Prime Minister Abe hasfully adopted the Russia policy that Suzuki hasadvocated since the late 1990s and isimplementing it in close consultation with theveteran politician himself. As noted, this entailsexpanding political and economic ties withRussia, as well as moving away from thedemand for the return of all four islands andinstead emphasising the goal of securing thetransfer of just two. Abe’s embrace of thisagenda was signaled by his agreement inNovember 2018 to base peace treaty talks withRussia on the countries’ 1956 Joint Declaration.This document promises the transfer ofShikotan and Habomai after the signature of apeace treaty, but makes no mention whatsoeverof the larger islands of Iturup and Kunashir.Furthermore, Abe has fully signed up toSuzuki’s long-favoured agenda of promotingjoint economic projects on the disputed islands.In December 2016, when Putin visited Abe inhis home prefecture of Yamaguchi, the leadersagreed to discuss such projects. Havingsubsequently narrowed the focus to fivepriority areas, it was agreed in June 2019 thatpilot projects would begin in the areas of wastemanagement and tourism. The first of thesetrials took place in August 2019 when fourRussian officials visited the Nemuro area ofHokkaidō to learn about Japan’s experience ofwaste management. The second is planned forOctober 11-16, when 35 Japanese, includingofficials, will visit Kunashir and Iturup on a trialtourism excursion. Given Suzuki’s influence inconvincing Abe to adopt this approach, it isperhaps appropriate that, during their stay onKunashir, the tourists are likely to stay in the

“Muneo House” (Hosokawa 2019).

All of the indications are that Muneo’s agendawill not enable Abe to deliver the legacy-defining resolution to the territorial disputethat he is aching to achieve. This is because theRussian side appears to consider even theprospect of transferring the two smaller islandsas excessive. Indeed, since Abe conceded inNovember 2018 to making the 1956 JointDeclaration the basis for talks, Russia’sposition has only hardened. Specifically, theRussian leadership has made it clear that thetransfer of two islands as a gesture of goodwillcould only occur if Japan were first to acceptRussia’s legitimate right to all four of theislands as a result of Soviet victory in WorldWar 2. Added to this, Moscow would requirelegal assurances that no U.S. military facilitieswould ever be permitted on the transferredterritory (Brown 2018b). As the Russianleadership well knows, no Japanese primeminister could easily accept these conditions.The impression is therefore that Moscowmerely intends to accept the fruits of Abe’sengagement, without offering anythingconcrete in return.

And yet, given Suzuki’s extraordinary returnfrom the political wilderness, as well as Abe’sown remarkable comeback after his failure asprime minister in 2006-07, perhaps we shouldnot entirely rule out the possibility that thepair’s plan will succeed. Suzuki evidentlybelieves that he has defied the political odds onseveral occasions already and can do so again.If he is right and can mastermind extracting anacceptable territorial deal from the Putinadministration, Suzuki will have performed hisgreatest miracle of all.

List of works cited:

Berkofsky, Axel, 2002, “Corruption and Briberyin Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Caseof Muneo Suzuki,” Japan Policy Research

APJ | JF 17 | 18 | 3

20

Institute, JPRI working paper no.86, June.

Brown, James D.J., 2016, Japan, Russia andtheir Territorial Dispute: The NorthernDelusion (London: Routledge).

Brown, James D.J., 2018a, “The Moment ofTruth for Prime Minister Abe’s Russia policy,”The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus,vol.16-10(5), 15 May.

Brown, James D.J., 2018b, “The high price of atwo-island deal,” The Japan Times, 16November.

Carlson, Matthew M. and Reed, Steven R.,2018, Political Corruption and Scandals inJapan, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).

J-Cast, 2010, “Nakagawa ichirō-shi jisatsu nioikonda no wa dare ka -- suzuki muneo-shihajimete kuchi o hiraki hanron [Who droveNakagawa Ichirō to his death? For the firsttime Suzuki Muneo gives his rebuttal],”

George Mulgan, Aurelia, 2010, “The perils ofJapanese politics,” Japan Forum, 21(2):183-207.

Hokkaidō Shinbun, 2019a, “Maruyama-shi,sake ni nomarebōsō, [Maruyama’s drunkenrampage]” 31 May.

Hokkaidō Shinbun, 2019b, “18-nichi ni san'in-sen handan Suzuki Muneo-shi [Suzuki Muneoto decide on 18th whether to run in upper-house elections]", June 1.

Hosokawa Shinya, 2019, “Yontō shiken tsuā 35-nin kibo [Test tour to the four islands will havecapacity of 35]” Hokkaidō Shinbun, 17 August.

The Japan Times, 2001, “Tanaka cries foul atbureaucrats, urges teamwork,” 5 November.

The Japan Times, 2002, “Prosecutors grill Togoon funds scandal in Europe,” 12 June 2002.

Kaminski, Ignacy Marek, 2004, “Applied

anthropology and diplomacy: Renegotiatingconflicts in a Eurasian diplomatic gray zone byusing cultural symbols,” ch.10 in Langholtz,H.J. and Stout, C.E. (eds.) The Psychology ofDiplomacy, (London: Praeger).

Katō Akira, 2002, “Suzuki muneo kenkyū[Researching Suzuki Muneo]”, (Tōkyō:Shinchōsha).

McCormack, Gavan, 2010, Ideas, identity andideology in contemporary Japan: The SatoMasaru phenomenon,” The Asia-Pacific Journal:Japan Focus, vol. 8, issue 44(1): 1-22.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2016,“Japan-Russia Summit Meeting,” 7 May.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2017,“Japan-Russia summit meeting,” 7 September.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2018,“Nihon no ryōdo o meguru jōsei [About thesituation on Japanese territory],” 11 July.

Nakamoto, Michiyo, “Former Japan financechief found dead,” The Financial Times, 4October 2009.

Nikkei , 2019, “Nichiro 2 purasu 2, 5getsumatsu kaisai o teian Roshia [Russiaproposes that Japan-Russia 2+2 is held in lateMay],” 11 April.

Ōno, Masami, 2019, “Hoppōryōdo, 2-shimahenkan ni kaj i kiru shushō [NorthernTerritories: Prime Minister has shifted toseeking return of two island],” Asahi Shinbun,17 July.

Sankei Shinbun, 2018, “Suzuki Muneo-shinichiro kōshō ‘2-tō purasu a’ ga genjitsu-tekikaiketsu e no michi [Suzuki Muneo on Japan-Russia talks: ‘2 plus alpha’ is the path to arealistic solution]” 18 October.

Sankei Shinbun, 2019a, “Suzuki Muneo-shi nisaishin mitomezu Tōkyō chisai kettei bengo-dan, sokuji kōkoku e, [Tokyo District Court

APJ | JF 17 | 18 | 3

21

decision does not allow Suzuki Muneo retrial,lawyers to immediately appeal],” 20 March.

Sankei Shinbun, 2019b, “Suzuki Muneo Nihonishin no kai San'in giin Hoppōryōdo shōten wa9 gatsu kaidan [Suzuki Muneo, member ofupper house from Nippon Ishin no Kai:Northern Territories – Focus on Septembertalks],” 9 August.

Satō Masaru, 2005, Kokka no Wana [The Trapof the State], (Tōkyō: Shinchōsa).

Satō Masaru, 2019, “Maruyama Hodaka giin no‘sensō’ hatsugen, nichiro kōshō ni an'un [Dietmember Maruyama Hodaka’s ‘war’ commentspose a threat to Japan-Russia talks]”Nippon.com, 22 May.

Sayle, Murray, 2002, “The Makiko-JunichiroShow,” Japan Policy Research Institute, JPRIworking paper no.89, October.

Shūgiin, 2009, Shitsumon honbun jōhō[Question text information], 4 June.

Suzuki Muneo, 2012, Seiji no Shuraba [Political

Carnage] (Tōkyō: Bungei Shunjū).

Suzuki Muneo, 2018, Seiji Jinsei (Political Life),(Tōkyō: Chūōkōron Shinsha).

Suzuki Muneo, 2019a, “Hana ni mizu hito nikokoro,” official blog, 12 June.

Suzuki Muneo, 2019b, “Hana ni mizu hito nikokoro,” official blog, 27 June.

Suzuki Muneo, 2019c, “Hana ni mizu hito nikokoro,” official blog, 14 July.

Suzuki Muneo, 2019d, “Hana ni mizu hito nikokoro,” official blog, 21 July.

Suzuki Muneo, 2019e, “Hana ni mizu hito nikokoro,” official blog, 22 July.

Tanewata, Yoshiki, 2019, “Suzuki muneo,saigono tatakai [Suzuki Muneo’s last battle],”NHK, 31 July.

Togo, Kazuhiko, 2011, “The inside story of thenegotiations on the Northern Territories: fivelost windows of opportunity,” Japan Forum,23(1): 123-145.

James D.J. Brown is Associate Professor in Political Science at Temple University, JapanCampus. His main areas of expertise are Russian-Japanese relations and international energypolitics. His research has previously been published in the following academic journals:International Politics, Politics, Asia Policy, Post-Soviet Affairs, Problems of Post-Communism,Europe-Asia Studies, and The Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. He is the author of Japan,Russia and their Territorial Dispute: The Northern Delusion (Routledge).

Notes1 To be precise, the disputed territory consists of three islands, which are known as Iturup,Kunashir, and Shikotan in Russian, and Etorofu, Kunashiri, and Shikotan in Japanese. There isalso a small group of islets known collectively as the Habomais. For simplicity, this latterarchipelago is customarily referred to as a single island, making it a “four-island dispute”.2 Specifically, during the visa-free visit to Kunashir on 11 May 2019, Diet member MaruyamaHodaka is reported to have drunk more than 10 shots of cognac. He then became disorderly

APJ | JF 17 | 18 | 3

22

and raised the prospect of Japan going to war to seize the disputed islands. It is also allegedthat he said that he wanted to “buy” a Russian woman (Hokkaidō Shinbun 2019a).3 Suzuki Takako first entered parliament in 2013 as a candidate for Shintō Daichi. Thisfollowed the resignation of the party’s representative Ishikawa Tomohiro following a politicalfunding scandal. She then joined the Democratic Party (DP) and was returned to the lowerhouse in the election of December 2014. She left the DP again in 2016, making the LDP herthird political party by the age of 31.4 Katō Akira questions the extent of Suzuki’s childhood poverty, suggesting that he hasexaggerated his family’s hardship in order to bolster his image as a self-made politician andrepresentative of the common man (Katō 2002: 93-5).5 Interview conducted with Tōgō Kazuhiko, Tokyo, 27 May 2019.6 Interview conducted with Tōgō Kazuhiko, Tokyo, 27 May 2019.7 In the elections of 1996 and 2000, Suzuki was elected to the House of Representatives as acandidate of the LDP in the PR Hokkaidō block. During the election of November 2003,Suzuki was in pre-trial detention (which lasted a total of 437 days) and unable to stand, but hereturned to the lower house in 2005 through PR votes for Shintō Daichi, his own politicalvehicle. He was elected again in the same way in August 2009, but was forced to relinquishhis seat when he was sent to prison the next year. Suzuki was banned from political officeduring the lower house elections of 2012 and 2014, and failed in his bid for election inOctober 2017. After switching to Nippon Ishin no Kai, he was successfully elected to theupper house through PR party votes in the election of July 2019.8 The “two-plus-two” and “two-plus-alpha” proposals are similar, and both have beenpromoted by Suzuki Muneo. “Two-plus-two”, which was emphasised at the time of the Irkutsksummit in 2001, aims for the transfer of two islands to Japan, plus the continuation of talksabout the other two. “Two-plus-alpha”, which appears to be Abe’s current goal, implies thetransfer of two islands to Japan, plus some form of special access rights and joint economicprojects for Japan on the other two islands.9 In fact, prior to being steered towards Russia by MOFA, the scholarly Satō Masaru’s mainarea of interest was church-state relations in Czechoslovakia (Satō 2005: 17).10 The proposed joint economic projects on the disputed islands are entirely distinct fromAbe’s 8-point economic cooperation plan, which applies to Russia as a whole. 11 Kōno Yōhei is the father of Kōno Tarō, who was appointed foreign minister in August 2017.